the redemption of the rascals

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'The Redemption of the Rascals': The Xinzheng Reforms and the Transformation of the Status of Lower-Level Central Administration Personnel Author(s): Luca Gabbiani Source: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Oct., 2003), pp. 799-829Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3876527Accessed: 28-08-2015 09:16 UTC

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Modern Asian Studies 37, 4 (2003), PP. 799-829. ? 2003 Cambridge University Press DOI: 10.1017/S0026749X03004037 Printed in the United Kingdom

'The Redemption of the Rascals': The Xinzheng Reforms and the Transformation of the Status of Lower-Level Central Administration

Personnel

LUCA GABBIANI'

Coll ge de France, Paris

Introduction

Two of the main practical problems which confronted the Xinzheng reforms (1901-1911) were, on the one hand, financial issues, and on the other, personnel issues.2 In this paper, I will concentrate on the latter. When one thinks of the reforms in relation to administrative personnel, the main aspects generally brought up are centered

upon innovations introduced at that time. Among other things, we could mention the new schools or, to be more general, the new educational system that was built up around the empire-mostly after

1900-to prepare a new generation of officials trained in specific fields of 'modern' knowledge. They, in turn, were expected to fill in the positions in the newly set up administrative institutions at the central and local levels. Their new training was to allow them to be in charge of the new responsibilities the reformed Qing bureaucratic

apparatus had set out to perform in such fields as justice, fiscality

1 The author is currently a Ph.D. candidate at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales and research assistant at the Collkge de France, Paris. He wishes to thank Maryline Lieber (Universit6 Versailles-St Quentin), Shana Brown (University of California Berkeley), Rui Magone (Freie Universitat Berlin) and Pierre-Etienne Will (Collkge de France) for their reading and comments. He also wishes to thank the participants at the AAS panel for their suggestions and support. All remaining inaccuracies or errors are his only.

2 The terms used by Zhang Yufa arejingfei and rencai, or expenses and talented persons. Cf. Zhang Yufa, 'Wan Qing de Shandong xinzheng (186o-191 )' (New policies in Shandong during the late Qing, 186o-191 1), in Hao Wenping and Wei Xiumei (eds),Jinshi Zhongguo zhi chuantongyu tuibian (Tradition and metamorphosis in modern Chinese history) (Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1998), vol. 1, pp. 517-66, and especially p. 562.

oo026-749X/03/$7.50+$o. 1o

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800oo LUCA GABBIANI

and finances, the military and police, education or public health, to name but a few. To summarize, the search for talented men, a Chinese age-old principle for sound government, was trusted to that for new talents. The 1905 disbanding of the traditional examination

system did much to reinforce this trend. During the first decade of the 20oth century, the steady increase in the number of Chinese

young men going abroad to study-especially toJapan--can serve as a testimony to this 'new knowledge and new talent fever' of the late

Qing. The fights against one another to which some of the central and provincial administrative offices resorted in order to secure for themselves the services of those deemed of talent are but another

exemplary illustration of this aspect.3 The observations I will make here stem from a slightly different

perspective. Rather than analysing innovation per se, be it institu- tional or educational, I will focus on the traditional metropolitan administration's personnel and its fate through the reforms. In fact, one striking aspect of the period is that this body of bureaucrats- most of whom were never to follow a new training, at least before

91 ii-remained the main main-d'oeuvre reservoir upon which

depended the running of the new central institutions. As logical as this circumstance might seem-the argument being that only a revolution might have spurred the tabula rasa effect necessary for a

thorough change in personnel (and even in such a case, one can

doubt)-it nevertheless had interesting consequences on the reform

process itself. The continued overcrowding of the ranks of the central administration is the one I would like to highlight here. The last section of this presentation will be centered on two events that took

place in 1910. The first is a feud that arose, in the spring and early summer of that year, between the lower personnel of the (by then

' For the consequences of the end of the traditional examination system, cf. B. Elman, A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, University of California Press, 2000), pp. 6o8-18. For aspects on Chinese students studying abroad, cf. Douglas Reynolds, China, 1898-1912. The

Xinzheng Revolution andJapan (Cambridge (Mass.)/London, Harvard University Press, 1993). The conflicts between administrative organs are well exemplified in the archives of the new ministry of civilian affairs, or Minzhengbu. See in particular Minzh-

engbu, 486/14, envelope 169, dated GX 33/4/1 (May 12, 1907) and env. 253, dated GX 33/7/13 (August 21, 1907). These documents are held by the Number One

Archives in Beijing. The first number in the reference (here 486/14) refers to the number of the index voume. In the case of the board of civilian affairs archives, there are two (486 and 513). The second number corresponds to the file's number. The files, in turn, hold envelopes in which the documents are stored. Most of the time, these envelopes are numbered and dated.



'THE REDEMPTION OF THE RASCALS' 801

not so) new Board of civilian affairs (Minzhengbu) and its presidency. The second is the internal examination this same board held in the wake of the 1909-191o empire-wide central examination. Both

episodes are quite insignificant. Indeed, one could even consider the first to be ludicrous, as it revolves around a fight for hierarchical elevation. They nevertheless are revealing. From a general stand-

point, they illustrate the permanence of high levels of competition for official positions in the newly reformed central bureaucracy, a

proof that the power of attraction of the bureaucratic career as a way to achieve prestige and power remained unchanged by the reforms.

Moreover, the first of these events also serves as a testimony to the

expectations of the personnel at that time, showing how, even at the lowest levels of the hierarchy, the slightest opportunity for promotion was considered a very serious matter. As we will see, the outcome of the feud kept these expectations alive, so to speak. But this should not conceal the fact that the reformed administrative system was not better armed than the traditional one to live up to them.

Thus, considering both episodes, one could say that the reforms turned the old-in this case the old overcrowding problems-back into the old. Or, in a more radical fashion, that they did not change anything. From the perspective of the reforms in general, such an

opinion is far from doing them justice. Ample research, recent and

less, has earmarked the important transformations in a number of fields as a direct result of the Xinzheng reforms.4 In the case at stake

here, this negative outlook would also prove misleading, since these events stem from some significant innovations introduced at the time in the central administration's hierarchical organization. As a matter of fact, it is directly related to the way-rather radical for that matter-the secular problem posed by the famous (as well as

4 Among these numerous works, one might mention the book by Douglas Reyn- olds already cited, as well as Roger Thompson's China's Local Councils in the Age of Constitutional Reform, r898- 9Ii (Cambridge (Mass.)/London, Harvard University Press, 1995); Barry Keenan, Imperial China's Last Classical Academies: Social Change in the Lower Yangzi, 1864-19z1 (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1994); Xiao-

hong Xiao-Planes, Education et politique en Chine: le role des ilites du Jiangsu, 1905-1914 (Paris, Editions de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 2001); Kristin Stapleton, Civilizing Chengdu. Chinese Urban Reform, 1895-1937 (Cambridge (Mass.)/ London, Harvard University Press, 2000); Marianne Bastid, L'6volution de la socidti- chinoise 9

latfin de la dynastie des Qing, z873-19zi (Cahiers du Centre Chine, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, 1979), or J6r6me Bourgon, 'Shen Jiaben et le droit chinois A la fin des Qing', Ph.D. dissertation, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, 1994.



802 LUCA GABBIANI

infamous) clerks and runners of the central boards was solved at the time. I shall therefore start by saying some words on this subject.

I. The Metropolitan Clerks

Rascals or Not?

Any discussion centered upon the clerks and runners of the pre- reform metropolitan boards should probably start with the following crude fact: not much is known about them.5 What we do know can be briefly summarized as follows. In contradistinction to the official civil servants (guan), the clerks (shuli) form that part of the bureaucratic body recruited locally. They have not gone through the traditional system of examinations, at least theoretically. Therefore, their positions are not integrated into the official nine ranks hierarchy of the Chinese imperial bureaucracy. For this reason, they are not eligible for an official salary (fenglu). The only official remuneration

they receive is a food allowance (fanshi yin).6 In the metropolitan administration, they are found in all the sections and departments of the boards. There, they assist the officials in taking care of the routine administrative work. Broadly speaking, they can be considered as the specialists of administrative 'scriptures': they are in

charge of receiving documents and files, of their registration and further transmission to the office concerned; they are also asked to prepare documents formally, to write drafts as well as the final revised documents; and they generally take care of the archives of their offices.

5 Philippe Favre, 'Etudes sur les clercs des six ministeres centraux de la dynastie des Qing (1644-1911)', Master thesis,

]Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences

Sociales, Paris, 1994, 114 pp., is the only work I know of, specifically centered upon the metropolitan clerks. Unfortunately, it was not followed by a doctoral dissertation. Important aspects are to be found in Pierre-Etienne Will, 'Bureaucratie officielle et bureaucratie reelle a la fin de l'empire', in Etudes chinoises, vol. VIII, no 1 (Spring 1989), pp. 69-142, especially pp. 108-i118.

6 For examples of such sums, cf.Jinwu shili (Regulations of the Peking gendarmerie, thereafterJWSL), preface 1851, fasc. 12, p. 14ab. It is not clear to me whether they were handed out on a daily, monthly or yearly basis. In the middle of the 19th century, Wei Yuan indicates that the annual sum of money given out for all metropolitan clerks as food allowance amounted to 83 330 taels. Officials also received such an allowance (gonfeifanshiyin). In their case, the total amounted to some 143 00ooo taels per year. See Wei Yuan, Shengwuji (Record of military glories), preface 1842 (re-ed. Beijing, Zhonghua shuju, 1984),j. 11, p. 476-




In short, their responsibilities appear insignificant, even though they are central to the smooth workings of the bureaucratic apparatus. Moreover, these men appear only seldom in the official administrative regulations. The system clearly does not grant them any great value. However, this fact does not of necessity make them rascals. Still, the term is not too strong to illustrate how they were

generally represented in late imperial sources. Under the brushes of

high officials or of eminent literati, the clerks appear as uneducated

petty individuals, only interested in taking advantage of their positions for their personal benefit, corrupt down to the root and-

supreme lise-majesti---concentrating in their hands most of the actual

power of the government. Thus, according to these descriptions, rascals they were, but of a type essential to the bureaucratic machinery.

I will not consider in detail the large set of clichis referring to the clerks and runners in the late imperial textual tradition.' It nevertheless seems necessary to try to unveil at least part of the reality that lies underneath the paradoxical circumstance they seem to be embedded in.

The Facts

The problem posed by the clerks during the late imperial period has of course been the focus of research. Most relates to its implications at the level of local administration.8 Some of the most detailed information on the metropolitan clerks is found in the book James Cole devoted to Shaoxing. His dealing with this topic stems from the

widely spread opinion, during late imperial times, that these men

7 For lively examples of such depictions dating back to the late 19th century, see Xu Ke's Qingbai leichao (preface 1917). A whole section of this work is centered upon the clerks. Three centuries earlier, the famous Ming loyalist Gu Yanwu (1613-1682) also pointed to their exactions. Cf. Favre, 'Itudes sur les clercs ...' p. 18, Will, 'Bureaucratie r6elle.. .', p. 117.

8 For example, Ch'ti T'ung-tsu, Local Government in China under the Ch'ing (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1962), and John Watt, The District Magistrate in Late Imperial China (New York, Columbia University Press, 1972). Myiazaki Ichi- sada's article 'Shindai no shori to bakuyfi' (Clerks and private secretaries during the Qing), in T6y6shi kenkyu, vol. 16, no 4 (1958), pp. 1-28, is a good introduction to the problem. It was translated into Chinese under the title 'Qingdai de xuli he muyou', in Liu Junwen (ed.), Riben xuezheyanjiu Zhongguo lishi lunzhu xuanyi, vol. 6 (Ming-Qing) (Beijing, Zhonghua shuju, 1993), PP. 508-39. Finally see the recent book by Bradley Reed, Talons and Teeth: County Clerks and Runners in the Qing Dynasty (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2000).



804 LUCA GABBIANI

all came from Shanyin county (Zhejiang)--one of the two counties

encompassing the city of Shaoxing.' As a matter of fact, this opinion remained common until the very end of the imperial period. Hattori Unokichi, for example, an early 20oth centuryJapanese observer, still mentions it in the pages he devotes to the clerks in Beijing. The

following remarks are mainly drawn from his observations.'0 I have

organized them along two of the main lines of criticism against the clerks, that of monopoly of power and that of corruption.

The picture of the metropolitan clerks presented by Hattori is that of a group of individuals engaged in a specific career. From the

description he gives, this career was also built up around a nine ranks

hierarchy, even though the parallel with the official administrative hierarchy should not be overemphasized. Its gates were not open to

anybody. A certain level of education was required-writing abilities

being of course the main prerequisite-as well as relations with individuals already inside this world. Indeed, a first position was usually granted through recommendation by a senior clerk or by the head of the clerks of a given department. In short, one needed education and guanxi to enter 'clerkdom'-aspects also put forth by Cole. Start-

ing as a sort of factotum, the clerk progressively climbed the hier-

archy through the gradual mastering of the administrative paperwork of the department to which he belonged. Among the stages of the hierarchy were found that of copyist of documents, corrector of drafts, transmitter of drafts to the officials, writer of propositions, reader-corrector of propositions, etc. The highest rank was that of head of the clerks of a given department-jingcheng. This rank is the only one to be found in administrative regulations of the Qing. According to Hattori's description, it was accessible only when the former head retired and sold the post to his successor. The fact that all other positions were not included in official regulatory provisions clearly offered a certain latitude of action to the head of the clerks of a department, as well as to the officials he depended from, in the

9 James Cole, Shaohsing: Competition and Cooperation in Nineteenth-Century China (Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 1986), especially chap. 6. See also the book by Guo Runtao, Guanfu, muyou yu shusheng-'Shaoxing Shiye'yanjiu (Administrative offices, private secretaries and literati-A study of the 'Masters of Shaoxing') (Beijing, Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1996).

10 See Shinkoku Chhitongun Shireibu (ed.), Pekin shi (Gazetteer of Peking) (Hakubunkan, 1908). Hattori was head editor of the project. A dozen of other

Japanese residents of Beijing wrote parts of the book. I have used the Chinese translation by Zhang Zongping and Liu Yonghe, Qingmo Beijingzthi ziliao (Beijing, Beijing Yanshan chubanshe, 1994). For the information, see pp. 85-7.




enlistment of new clerk recruits. The pyramidal character of the career implies that only so many of the clerks could make it to the

top. To do so, expertise was necessary. The last step, nevertheless, was reached through direct purchase of the position."

The purchase of ajingcheng position, Hattori confirms, was considered as an investment in its own right. With it, of course, came the administrative responsibilities of head of the clerks, such as the

management of the rest of the clerks of the department, the supervi- sion of their work and also that of the new enlistments.'2 It also

gave access to certain sums of cash that were customarily tied to the

position. As mentioned above, the only official remuneration the bulk of the clerks received was theirfanshi allowance. These were drawn

upon the bufei sums, or expenses for 'board [work]', that the provinces were required to hand in every year to the central boards at the same time as their provincial tax quotas. Nevertheless, the clerks did receive a salary for the work they accomplished, salary which was

regularly given to them by their head, according to their individual

position in the hierarchy (except for the first year of training during which the aspirant-clerk was to provide for his expenses, short of one meal per work-day). According to Hattori's own wording, these funds had two main sources. The first were the famous lougui. The word

encompasses a wide array of expenses and surcharges the central administrative services were liable to demand as a counterpart to their management of affairs.'" The second were the bufei. Hattori further explains that both of these sums were directly managed by

" There is some evidence of the hereditary character of some of the positions, even though I have not found any precise case relating specifically to the boards. One outstanding case is that of Li Qing, one of the leaders of the 1813 Eight Trigrams Rebellion, who inherited the clerk position his father had held some time before in the southern circuit sub-prefect yamen of Shuntian prefecture, around Beijing. Cf. Susan Naquin, Millenarian Rebellion in China: The Eight Trigram Uprising of 1813 (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1986). This anecdote is also quoted by Cole, op. cit., pp. 113-14.

12 The relation between a head-clerk and his subordinates is well exemplified in a Beijing gendarmerie memorial of July 5, 1749 (QL 14/5/21). In it Peng Weiwen (from Shaoxing) explains, among other things, how the year before he had been hired by a head-clerk of the board of finance (Hubu), by the name of Meng Tinge. It was the same Meng who decided to fire him, a mere ten months later. See Qingdai Neige Dakuyuancang Ming Qing dang'an (Ming Qing archival documents stored in the Daku of the Grand Secretariat during the Qing) (Taibei, Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Lishi yuyan yanjiusuo), vol. A159, document 43.

13 These customary charges were also an important source of extra revenue for local and provincial level administrations. Cf. Will, 'Bureaucratie officielle ...', esp. pp.

90-5?



806 LUCA GABBIANI

the different heads of the clerks, that they were considered as part of the position itself. Thejingcheng not only used them to cover the

salary expenses for the clerks, but also to buy such materials as

paper, ink, etc. As as matter of fact, some of the charges levied by central administrative offices were termed as fees for tea-leaves or for paper-ink-and-brushes. The word investment I used above derives from the fact that in the case--certainly frequent-the expenses induced by salaries and administrative work did not exhaust the sums managed by the heads, they in turn were to keep the surplus for themselves. According to Hattori, in some cases-the board of

finance, for example, or that of punishment-the surpluses seem to have been far from negligible.

As of now, I have not been able to find any evidence related to the amounts the head-clerk of a department might have been able to

pocket through this means. I have no precise information either on the average salary a clerk could expect to earn. However, it must have been quite low, a circumstance they shared with the metropolitan officials, at least in terms of the latter's regular incomes.14

Indeed, ample documentation shows that until the last years of the

dynasty, a significant part of the lower-level personnel in the central administration lived all year round on the premises of the boards

they were attached to. Starting from the 18th century, and recur-

rently during the 19th century, we find memorials-especially by censors--denouncing this custom and the problems it posed to administrative efficiency. These documents depict how clothes, bed-

ding and personal belongings of the clerks, and at times of their

families, were to be found all over the place, sometimes even barring the way of the offices. They also denounced the use made of office

space for private purposes: get-togethers among clerks, dinners and

parties, and even marriage celebrations....'5 This evidence should

14 Drawing upon regulations and archival materials (including registers of semestrial pay for metropolitan officials), I have come up with a hundred taels per year as the estimated average regular salary of metropolitan officials. The sum was far from being sufficient to sustain their way of life in Beijing, at least in the 19th century. As their colleagues in the territorial administration, they must have had other sources of income. Further research is needed to clarify what these were in order to understand what was the level of their real income.

15 See (Qinding) Taigui (Official regulations of the Censorate), 1892,j. 42, p. 3a- 4b. In 1826, for example, more than 70 persons were reported as living inside the buildings of the board of punishments. For marriages and other celebrations reportedly held inside government buildings, seeJWSL, fasc. 4, p. 6b-7a. This last case relates to 1840.



'THE REDEMPTION OF THE RASCALS' 807 not be discarded as mere exaggeration. As a matter of fact, as late as 1907, the presidency of the newly founded board of civilian affairs felt compelled to issue a 'Short regulation manual on hygiene for internal use'-evocative title indeed-in which we find, among other

things, a deadline set for August 9, 1907, for all lower-level personnel to move out of the premises. The custom of living in the work-

place most certainly stemmed from their low remuneration, which did not offer them the opportunity to find lodging in the city, known to be expensive even for regular officials.'6

Power and Abuses

The power enjoyed by the metropolitan clerks clearly derived from their experience and expertise in administrative paperwork. Special- ists of the bureaucratic 'scriptures', they were also supposed to know

perfectly the administrative jurisprudence that accompanied them- the famous li, or sub-statutes, that in due time found their way in

growing numbers into all domains of bureaucratic work. Under the

Qing, as is well known, they were the key to the functioning of the bureaucratic apparatus. Administratively speaking, this thorough knowledge was the main edge the clerks-at least those who really possessed it-had on the metropolitan officials. However, this circumstance did not stem from any deliberate strategy triggered off

by the clerks in order to circumvent the authority of their superiors. Standing outside the official administrative hierarchy, a clerk was not subject to the administrative process of promotions and demotions and to changes in assignations. Indeed, in the metropolitan administration, they tended to complete their entire career if not in a given section or department, at least in one single board. With time came experience, and along with it the knowledge of the jurisprudence pertaining to that specific board. This, in turn, allowed them-or at least some of them-to make use of it in the best pos- sible manner. The influence a well trained clerk could draw upon in his field was also enhanced by the situation on the officials' side. In the late Qing, there existed a rapid turnover in higher-level administrative functions in the boards, a circumstance which often did not allow enough time for the new incumbent to master the files before

16 For the regulation manual, see Minzhengbu, 486/18-2, env. 217, dated GX 33/6/4 (July 13, 1907).



808 LUCA GABBIANI

being once again transferred to another charge. Moreover, many held concurrent positions, a situation which did not favour efficiency. They therefore had to rely heavily on their subordinates, especially for routine matters. As for the medium-level metropolitan officials, igth century sources tell us more about their 'dolce vita' way of

life-and, in terms of cash, the dire straits they often went through because of it-or about their career problems due to the levels of

overcrowding in the bureaucratic ranks, rather than depict any feature coming close to 'workaholism'."7

Even on this grounding, it still is difficult to offer a clear-cut answer to the question of monopoly of power. As a matter of fact, much work remains to be done in order to understand precisely how the central administration worked under the Qing.'8 I don't intend, here, either to overemphasize the role of the clerks or to understate that of the officials-both groups played their part.'9 But from the above-mentioned facts, we can sense that the former represented an

important part of the central bureaucratic apparatus, just as they did at the local level. One can even say that the better trained ones-

presumably to be found in the highest levels of the 'clerkdom' hier-

archy-were actually an essential element in the working of the central boards.20

17 Good examples of what, in the end, might also be a cliche are to be found in Li

Ciming's journal, the famous Yuemantang riji and its several continuations. See also the classic work by Zhang Dechang, mainly based on this same source, Qingjiyi ge

Jingguan de shenghuo (The life of a metropolitan official during the Qing) (Hong Kong, Zhongwen daxue chubanshe, 1970). The Dao Xianyi lai chaoye zaji (Random notes on the Capital taken since the Daoguang and Xianfeng reigns) by the Mongol bannerman Chongyi is also revealing, as are the Tianzhi ouwen (Things heard close to Heaven) by the Manchu Zhenjun, the Hua mengji (Notes on a dream of splendors) and the Chunming meng lu (Annals of a dream of the Chunming [door]), by He

Gangde. All were written in the early 20oth century. In the same vein, but anterior, is the Shuicao qingxia lu (Freetime jottings from the Department of water

conservancy), by Wang Qishu (second half of the 18th century). 18 For a first overview, see T. Metzger, The Internal Organization of the Ch'ing Bureau-

cracy. Legal, Normative and Communication Aspects (Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard Univer-

sity Press, 1973). '9 In the latter part of the 19th century, the situation in the board of punish-

ments (Xingbu) serves as a proof of the working abilities of the medium-level met-

ropolitan officials. What has been termed as a school of legal specialists developed in the board at that time, comprising such a figure as Xue Yunsheng, the compiler of the Duli cunyi (Doubts remaining after having read the sub-statutes), which he

compiled during the late 19th century. Shen Jiaben did his classes in that group of people. See Bourgon, 'Shen Jiaben et le droit chinois ...

20 See Will, 'Bureaucratie r6elle ...', esp. pp. 1o8-18.




Hence, the clerks did enjoy a certain degree of power. On the other hand, there is no doubt that they also committed abuses. The

question here should rather be to know to what extent malpractice was actually their distinctive way of living. General claims about such

malpractices are plentiful in the sources. Like their local-level coun-

terparts, the metropolitan clerks were attacked for their expert way to turn regulations to their own advantage, often as a means for extortion. However, direct evidence for such acts in the capital is not as abundant as might be expected. In fact, most cases I have come across concern abuses committed at the taxation bureaus of the

Chongwen tax administration. There, direct contact with merchants and brokers, as well as with the population at large, certainly offered

interesting opportunities. But then again, in that specific case, it should be noted that the clerks were neither the only ones nor even the first in line to commit such exactions.21

Most other criticisms made of them were centered on two main domains. First, their general tendency to abuse their documentary expertise to bar officials from decisive intervention in the administrative process.22 Some authors, and Hattori is one of them, declare that clerks could go as far as to sequester at their home parts of their office's archives-the most important ones of course-in order to limit, or even render completely impossible, their access for the officials. How much of this really happened is, as always, hard to

say. The criticism should not be entirely discarded. Indeed, evidence

suggests that such practices did exist, but that they were not limited to the spheres of 'clerkdom'. Beijing city censors, for example, were often the targets of remonstrances on the same grounds.23 The

21 The Chongwen tax administration seems to have been steeped in endemic corruption, at least since the middle of the 18th century. Sign or consequence, Heshen spent a long period of time as its head. In 1839, the Daoguang emperor issued an edict complaining about the abuses of the clerks of the tax bureaus. The emperor insisted on the fact that these men were clearly monopolizing the positions through family ties, since they all were named Wang or Zhang. The coincidence is striking, of course, even though the emperor must have known that both surnames were among the most common in Chinese at the time. See Qing Shilu Beijing shi ziliaojiyao (182o-I9Ii) (Selection of documents relating to Beijing from the Qing Veritable Records, 1820-191 1) (Beijing, Zijincheng chubanshe, 1990), p. 115.

22 For an exemplary case, see the memorial by Tao Tingjie, dated 1823, in the compilation by Wang Yanxi and Wang Shumin entitled Huangchao Dao Xian Tong Guang zouyi (Memorials dating from the Dao[guang], Xian[feng], Tong[zhi] and Guang[xu] reigns), n.d.,j. 24, pp. 1177-8.

23 See (Qinding) Taigui,j. 19.



810 LUCA GABBIANI

second category of abuses relates to the exceeding of the regulatory five-year tenure period for the jingcheng, or head-clerks. Since they were the only category of clerks acknowledged by official regulation compendia, it is not clear if this rule was also to be used for lower- level clerks. According to Hattori, the central reason for which head- clerks tried to escape this provision was that five years were not

enough for the cash returns from the position to cover the expenses of the initial purchase. In fact, apart from the income factor, it is

easily understandable that these men, engaged in what appears as a lifetime career, were not willing to consider the idea of resigning because of this five-year time limit. Hence, they resorted to innumer- able strategies in order to overcome the rule: name changes or alteration of geographical origin, followed by a false resignation and a real new appointment. They could also exchange positions with another head-clerk, sometimes even outside their original board, etc. In most cases, evidently, all these artifices must have been carried on with the informal approval, to say the least, of the official or officials in charge. From the latter's point of view, not much was to be gained, in terms of work efficiency, from the mandatory resignation of an expert clerk.

To sum up, the clerks did enjoy a certain degree of power, which derived from their expertise in administrative procedures. Devoid of an official salary, they nevertheless could count, according to their

position, on part of the customary fees and surcharges received in return for the official work carried on by their sections, departments or boards. This last point calls for two short remarks. First, these

sums, which, as is well known, were levied at the local level as well, were not statutory, in the sense that they were not listed as such in the compendia of administrative regulations. But they were not

illegal either, since their collection was authorized. Therefore, they should not be considered as pertaining to corruption. Nevertheless, corruption itself did not lie far away in such a system, where the limit between acceptable and unacceptable practices was blurred. In

fact, cash oriented exactions by metropolitan clerks were certainly not uncommon at the time. The low level of their remuneration was but an incentive, just as the numerous but expensive pleasures of

Beijing city life. Still, for that matter, clerks were clearly not the

only ones in line. Second, the existence of such fees and surcharges serves as testimony to an interesting aspect: the fact that 19th century central administrative services functioned if not for money, at least through money.




At this point, one can wonder where exactly lay the problem of the clerks. Clearly, it did not simply stem from their being stigmatized as rascals. From the above information, we can sense that the denigrat- ing discourse developed against them does more to reveal the social

gap lying in between two groups of professionals engaged in the same

general activity, but not with the same legitimacy--that of the examinations-than it does to describe objective features of 'clerkdom' or of those who chose it as a career. Among the objective factors consti-

tuting the clerks' problem, some distinctive ones were the lack of official remuneration, that of quotas for their positions and the large latitude the head-clerks enjoyed over the quantity and the quality of the new enlistments. From a general perspective, these problems did not stand far apart from those with which the entire Qing administrative apparatus, and specifically its metropolitan component, was confronted at the time. As a matter of fact, the measures adopted during the Xinzheng reforms in order to solve the clerks' problem, were not really separated from the larger scheme aiming at

reforming the central bureaucracy in general. The main goal was not to put an end to the denigration suffered by the subaltern personnel. Rather, it was to try to put back on track an administrative

machinery considered on the whole as inefficient.

II. The Clerks and Xinzheng General Aspects

Apart from innovation, the reforms also had to deal with the reasons for this inefficiency, objective or perceived. Two main aspects were dealt with: the levels of remuneration and the global size of administrative personnel. The inadequacy of salaries had been stressed long before the beginning of the 2oth century. Paul Hickey has shown that the measures adopted in this field by the government during the Xinzheng reforms were not as conclusive as it had expected.24 In terms of personnel, the size of the central bureaucratic apparatus had steadily grown throughout the dynasty. The evolution of the

quotas of positions listed in official regulations illustrates the trend.

24 See P. Hickey, 'Fee-taking, Salary Reform and the Structure of State Power in late Qing China, 1909-1911', in Modern China, 17/3, 1991, PP. 389-417. See also his Ph.D. dissertation, 'Bureaucratic centralization and public finance in late Qing China, 1900-1911', Harvard University, 1990.



812 LUCA GABBIANI

But it does not tell the whole story. Looking at the administration's Yearbooks, published on a regular basis during the 19th century, it is easily observable that the largest part of the growth came, on the one hand, in the form of supernumerary officials (ewai), and on the other, from the bulky ranks of the banner bilingual secretaries

(bitieshi).25 The factors that triggered off this growth are diverse. Among them, the numerous campaigns of sales of positions-or official venality of positions (juanna)--during the 19th century, certainly stand apart. This general trend had several consequences. Suffice it to say that the overcrowding of official ranks to which it led, and the consequently severe narrowing of career prospects for officials, obviously did much to help demobilize them."6 A significant aspect of 19th century metropolitan administration, this demobilization was another facet the reforms were to try to correct.

It is difficult to find any precise quantitative information about the evolution of the number of clerks in the metropolitan administration. Still, it seems safe to say that it followed the same trend as that of officials. Nineteenth-century sources tell us of clerks surpassing in number the officials, some departments employing up to several tens of them at the same time. Moreover, the official regulations of the dynasty show that the quotas for head-clerks-the only ones for whom we can get a clear picture-also grew during this time. As mentioned earlier, during the reforms, the problem of the clerks was not separated from that of the rest of the metropolitan administration ranks. The policy applied was expected to solve the problems of personnel size as a whole. It revolved around the implementation of a three-tiered administrative hierarchy which was to live on, after the fall of the Qing, to become the basis of the Republican bureaucracy.27 What would be then known as thejian-jian-wei system was first introduced in the fall of 19o6, at the time of the major reforms

"5 See, for example, the Da Qingjinshen quanshu (Administrative yearbook) for the

year 1843, published by the Ronglutang in Beijing. 26 In the case of metropolitan administration, 19th century sources often mention

the career dead-end that a promotion to a 5th rank position corresponded to. Indeed, the central administrative hierarchy comprised no less than 9 positions of ranks 5b and 5a. Moreover, opportunities for a rank 4 promotion were harder to obtain: first, they corresponded to an assignment in the provinces, at the prefectural level, and second, they were usually conferred on officials of the Hanlin Academy who had proven efficient. See He Gangde, Huamengji,j. 1, pp. 6-7. His Chunming menglu also has interesting observations.

27 See Julia Strauss, 'Symbol and Reflection of the Reconstituting State. The Examination Yuan in the 193os', in Modern China, 20/2, 1994, PP. 211-38.




of the administrative apparatus. Apart from specific quotas for each administrative rank, it set three main stages in the administrative

hierarchy, differentiated by the mode of assignment. The highest bureaucratic positions-ranks 1 and 2-were to be filled by special imperial decree (tejian). They actually were not inserted in the three- tiered system. The first tier was that of positions in the third and fourth ranks. They were to be filled through formal imperial choice from a pool of three candidates recommended by their superiors (ian). Positions of ranks five to seven were to be filled through a

regular administrative procedure-the superior memorializing the names of two appropriate candidates to the organ in charge of personnel which, in turn, was to make the final decision (zoubu). Assign- ments to positions in the last two ranks-8 and 9-were to be decided by the board hierarchy itself and a document sent to the same organ for registration of the names.28 This level represented the last tier of the new administrative build-up. Its positions were said to be delegated (weiyong). It was through this general scheme that the problem of the clerks was to be solved. The solution followed four main principles: creation of new positions integrated in the administrative hierarchy, setting of specific quotas, payment of official salaries, and new mode of enlistment.

Suppression or Integration?

Two preliminary remarks should be made here. First, the new system presented in the fall of 1906 was indeed implemented, but with significant differences from one administration to the other, and also with time lapses. As of 191o, the metropolitan bureaucracy was still far from displaying a homogeneous situation. Second, even before the 1906 reform, some innovations in administrative positions and

personnel management had already been introduced.29 Among these, new measures relating to the clerks were mentioned since 1901.30 In the capital, major action in this respect seems to date back to

28 See Qingchao xu wenxian tongkao,j. 115, p. 8742. 29 See, for example, the creation of new central institutions such as the board of

commerce in 1903 (Shangbu) or of the board of police in 1905 (Xunjingbu). 30 See the several edicts dated of 1901 in the Qingchao xu wenxian tongkao, j. 28,

pp. 7801-2. Drawing on evidence from the Ba county archives, Reed (op. cit., pp. 31-2) shows that the imperial order given that year to suppress all supernumerary clerks at the local level was followed quite losely.



814 LUCA GABBIANI

1904 or 1905. In his concluding remarks on the clerks-this negative peculiarity of the Chinese administrative system, as he puts it- Hattori tells us the problem is beginning to be dealt with, thanks to the 'new times' that have started after the Boxer uprising. According to him, the board of war (Bingbu) had recently adopted a motion to dismiss all of its sub-official personnel at once, the objective being to

get the regular officials back to work. Furthermore, the rumor had it that the same decision-which he considers as central to a healthy remodelling of the Chinese central administration-was about to be

implemented by the board of personnel (Libu) and that it would

certainly be extended to the rest of the bureaucratic apparatus afterwards.

The well informed Hattori was right: in the second half of 1905, the Libu did memorialize to inform of its decision to suppress all its clerks. It asked to grant the best among them some lowly positions in territorial administration, as a reward for services rendered. At the same time it asked for a six-month period of leniency regarding 'public errors' (gongzui) that might be committed from then on by regular officials. The argument set forth was that the work load had hitherto been taken care of by several hundreds of clerks along with the hundred or so regular officials. The dismissal of the former was

necessarily to have consequences on the work efficiency of the latter. This observation serves as a direct illustration of what the number of clerks might have been-several hundreds in the board of personnel alone-as well as of their role in bureaucratic work. Always as a means to relieve the soon-to-be overworked regular officials, another

suggestion of the board was granted. From then on, the officials were to be personally in charge of drafting propositions on the basis of the sub-statutes and other archival documents, but the rewriting of these drafts and of the final revised documents as well as the management of the document registers and of the archival procedures were to be the responsibility of a new group of board personnel, the copyists (tenglu), who were to be chosen among the literati (shiren). In fact, the memorial mentioned, on the one hand, some ex-bilingual secretaries

already selected, and on the other, a group of individuals that were all to possess traditional prefectural or provincial-level examination certificates and for whom an internal selection exam was to be

organized."3 The responsibilities of these new copyist positions closely recall

the functions of the ex-clerks. So does the fact that one had to be of

31 See Qingchao xu wenxian tongkao,j. 119, pp. 8789-90o.




literatus pedigree-i.e. have passed through part of the traditional examination curriculum-to be eligible for the internal selection exam. Indeed, James Cole has argued that a good number of 18th and 19th century metropolitan clerks, those at least originating from

Shaoxing's region, were probably men who had come to the capital to take the Shuntian prefectural examination, because of its largesse in terms of who could sit through the exam as well as of success

quotas. After one or, for the more wealthy ones, several failures, some resorted to 'clerkdom' in order to make a living.32 This situation was certainly not limited to individuals coming from Shaoxing. Even though the early 2oth century project was not formulated as

such, the new positions established were certainly partly destined to be held by ex-clerks of the boards.

I have not found direct evidence relating to the fate of the clerks of other central boards. Nevertheless, around that period, similar new positions but with different names appear in other administrative organs. We find copyist positions (under the name of shuji) in the

newly-founded board of police in late 1905. They were transformed into secretary positions (lushi) the next year, when the board of civilian affairs took over. These same secretary positions were also to be found in the Grand Secretariat (Neige), in the board of justice (Fabu), in that of communications (Youchuanbu), etc. The board of

personnel itself introduced secretary positions in 1909, and filled them with the former copyists." This last case shows the direct relation existing between these new copyist and secretary positions, in

spite of their different denominations.34 The following section will describe how they were introduced in the case of the board of civilian affairs (1906-1912).

The Measures Implemented by the Board of Civilian Affairs

As indicated above, four main principles were followed in the process of transferring the clerk positions into the new administrative hier-

32 See Cole, op. cit., chap. 6, pp. 107-11. 33 For this last information, see Qingchao xu wenxian tongkao, j. g19, pp. 8789-

90. For the other boards and central organs having secretary positions, see 19o09 Yearbook.

34 A memorial sent by the presidency of the board of civilian affairs (draft dated July 1908) is even more explicit, saying that the new general administrative organization presented in 1906 for the whole metropolitan bureaucracy included a provision turning all shuji positions into lushi. See Minzhengbu, 486/18-3, env. 450, dated GX 34/6/13 (July 11, 1908).



816 LUCA GABBIANI

archy-new positions, fixed quotas, official salaries and new mode of enlistment. Among the administrative ranks set up for the board of civilian affairs in the fall of 19o6, a new position appears, that of

secretary (lushi) of rank 8 and 9. Along with the position of registrar- in-training (sishusheng)-the lowest rank, still said to lie outside the

hierarchy (wei ru liu), and already used in the board of police-they form the last tier of the new administrative build-up, that of the

delegated ranks (weiyong). According to some dictionaries, the lushi title existed in traditional Chinese administration. It designated a local official in charge of archives and registers. I have never encountered it in any Qing period official regulations before the Xinzheng reforms. As for the sishusheng title, it seems to have appeared at the time of the reforms only, first as a position of the 7th rank in the new military hierarchy. As official posts in the civil administration, I have encountered them only while reading the archival records of the boards of police and of civilian affairs.

The work these men were in charge of was the same as was

expected of the ex-clerks, at least as far as documentary evidence

suggests. They were responsible for the writing of documents in their draft as well as definitive forms and for the management of

incoming and outgoing written communications-registration and

archiving for example. They also took care of general internal

correspondence. Moreover, they were expected to take turns for

night permanence in the offices, as well as for the weekly rest-day. The innovation lies in the fixation of quotas for this level of

personnel. In the board of police, there were no quotas either for secretaries or for registrars-in-training. In 1907, the newly-created board of civilian affairs introduced such quotas, but only for the secretaries. A total of 52 positions were provided for, 20 in the 8th rank and 32 in the 9th.35 Clear numbers for the registrars-in- training are more difficult to obtain as no quota was ever fixed.

Nevertheless, directly after the creation of the board, an examination was held (February 1907) to enlist such personnel. Forty

35 Regular in-quota positions were to be filled only with individuals who had gone through the probationary formation period of one year. Before that, they were considered as interim (shu). The regulations also made provisions for supernumerary secretary positions. They were limited to eight slots maximum-four in each of the two ranks-for each of the board's eight offices, amounting to a total of 64 slots. These slots did not necessarily have an incumbent. They could be resorted to when the work load was too heavy, or when an interim secretary was about to be appointed to an in-quota position. Therefore, they cannot be simply added to the 52 official in-quota positions.




individuals were retained, 24 to be immediately assigned to specific positions, 16 having to wait to be called upon. On the whole, a year after the beginnings of the board, secretaries and registrars- in-training may well have amounted to approximately 8o people- a figure to be compared with the quota of 65 medium-level administrative personnel for the whole board.36

Another important innovation was the integration of both groups into the administrative promotion process. This possibility is clearly inscribed in the official regulations."7 For the registrars-in-training, they provided the opportunity to become secretary of rank 9 and for

these, in turn, to climb to a rank 8 position. These three positions belonging to the same tier of the hierarchy-the delegated positions-the promotion process followed an internal evaluation mode, the decision being then ratified by the board's direction. More inter-

estingly, the rules offered the possibility for 8th rank secretaries to access positions of the 7th rank-that of 'little metropolitan official' of rank 7 (xiaojingguan). This did not amount only to a promotion of one rank. It also corresponded to a jump from the lowest to the medium tier of the administrative hierarchy, thus theoretically further opening access to positions up to rank 5. The importance of the shift gave the process a more complex character. At that level, competition was also more important since positions of rank 7 were the first ones accessible to successful candidates of the new examination system set up after the disbanding of traditional exams in 1905- The implications this possibility had for the concerned individuals

might not seem of major significance to early 21st century observers. As we will see, for the actors a hundred years ago, they seemed well worth fighting for.

Along with the quotas, the Xinzheng reforms also introduced official salaries for this personnel. In-quotas secretaries of ranks 8 and

9 were paid monthly allowances of 30 yuan and 25 yuan respectively.

36 For the lushi figures, see Minzhengbu, 486/18-2, env. 912, dated XT 2/4th month (May 191o). The exact date for the setting of their quotas is not clear. A document dated July 1908 (see Minzhengbu, 486/188-3, env. 450) explains that

they were fixed the year before. That would mean during 1907. For the registrars- in-training figures, see Minzhengbu, 486/18-2, env. 217, dated GX 33/6/4 (July 13, 1907). One document, approximately dated May 21, 1907, sets the rules for the work of the registrars and indicates that their number at that date should be set as

a quota. Unfortunately, it doesn't give any figure. For the quota of medium level board personnel, see Qingchao xu wenxian tongkao,j. 119, pp. 8790-1.

7 Among others, see Minzhengbu, 486/18-2, env. 912, dated XT 2/4th month (May 1910).



818 LUCA GABBIANI

They also received seasonal grain stipends." Registrars-in-training were given 20 yuan a month. I have found no evidence of grain stipends for them. Starting from 1907, when this personnel was asked to leave the premises of the board, 6 more yuan a month were pro- posed as a lodging allowance to those unable to make ends meet. In

comparison to the regular salaries paid to metropolitan officials before the reforms, these amounts were significantly higher.39 During their probationary period or if they were enlisted as supernumerary, secretaries and registrars received lower allowances Ointie) and were not eligible for grain stipends.

As mentioned above, the first positions of secretaries were introduced in the administrative hierarchy of the board of police. At the time, they were called shuji and were distributed among three different ranks. They were selected by the directing body of that board. No quotas were fixed for these positions. Evidence suggests that the criteria for selection had been set on knowledge and experience in administrative matters and ability to write official documents. Ex- clerks evidently enjoyed an advantage in these matters.40 Because of the necessary continuity in administrative work, the individuals chosen to fill the secretary positions (lushi) on the board of civilian affairs were those who had held the shuji positions on the board of

police." Some registrars-in-training, who had proved efficient during

"3 See Minzhengbu, 486/18-3, env. 450, dated GX 34/6/13 (July 11, 1908). This is further confirmed by the case of the secretaries working in the central police stations of the city. See Minzhengbu, 486/39, env. 993, dated XT 2/7th month (August 1910). I have found no information on the quantities they were entitled to receive.

"9 The figures come from the archives of the board of police, Xunjingbu, 268/1, env. 64, dated GX 32/5/15 (July 6, 1906). At the time, official equivalence with the silver tael was set at 1 yuan for 0.72 taels. As said above, the average official salary of metropolitan officials in the first half the 19th century can be estimated at some

1oo taels a year (values of cash and grain added together). This sum of course hides very different individual situations. Nevertheless, it shows the low level of official remuneration of metropolitan officials even before the drastic cuts of the late Xian- feng era and those immediately following the Boxer rebellion.

40 Even though I have found no clear evidence telling of clerks being selected, the context lends strong support to this possibility.

4 There seems to have been an examination, at the time of the setting up of the board of civilian affairs, to determine what positions the secretaries of the board of police were to be turned into. See Minzhengbu, 486/18-2, env. 912, dated XT 2/ 4th month (May 191o), undated document to the presidency of the board of civilian affairs about the way to enlist the secretaries. On the other hand, Minzhengbu, 48/ 18-3, env. 450, has a copy of a document sent by the board of civilian affairs to that of personnel specifying that the ex-board of police secretaries of ranks 2 and 3 were to be turned into secretaries (lushi) respectively of ranks 8 and 9. As for the secretar-




their tenure on the board of police, were also appointed to lushi positions. The others were simply reinstated at the same level on the new board.42 All the newly-appointed secretaries were assigned delegated interim positions (paishu). It was only in the next year (1908) that they were formally designated to the board of personnel for official registration as interim holders (zishu). The need for more of this category of personnel was felt shortly after the new board resumed its administrative activities. An innovative mode of enlistment was therefore set up, whose main feature was an exam held by the board to select the most able candidates.

Early in 1907, only a couple of months after the founding of the board, the first such examination was convened to enlist a new series of registrars-in-training. The extant evidence only allows one to grasp it in bits and pieces. It took place on the 9th of February of

1907, most certainly on the premises of the board. The test was to judge the writing abilities of the candidates, in terms of style and knowledge of the characters. They were also expected to prove their acquaintance with the correct forms of administrative documents and to show the quality of their calligraphy. I have found no indication on the number of candidates, but we know a total of 40 were successful. They were distributed among three groups, according to the final ratings. The 24 individuals listed in the first two groups were given direct access to a position of registrar-in-training. Their precise assignment was left to the different offices of the board to decide.43 The remaining 16 were registered as apt for assignment and asked to wait for openings. Demotions and resignations among the registrars, and in some cases promotions, did offer an opportunity to some of the waiting persons to be called upon for office. Yet for others, patience proved hard to endure. At least four complaints were filed, their authors expressing the frustrations due to such a situation. The first dates back to the second half of 1907, a mere six months after the selection. The last was sent some two years after

ies of rank 1, in the ex-board of police always, they were to become expectant 'little metropolitan officials' of rank 7 (houbu).

42 For lushi positions filled by efficient registrars-in-training, see Minzhengbu, 486/18-2, env. 912 mentioned in the preceding note, same undated document. The argument of administrative continuity was also put forth in a number of cases of medium-level administrative ranks, old personnel being therefore directly reinstated in the new positions of the new board of civilian affairs. See Minzhengbu, 530/3, especially document dated GX 32/12/23 (February 5, 1907).

43 It is quite conceivable that the most important offices of the board had a first choice privilege which enabled them to pick the best graded new recruits.



820 LUCA GABBIANI

it. All show the eagerness of their authors to serve in the public service of their country, often mentioning the excitement of these new times. Most start by understating the problem of remuneration, some going as far as volunteering for unpaid work. In spite of this, all end up describing the dire straits they and their families

(especially their old parents) had to go through, financially speaking, because of such a long wait.44 Cynicism aside, these complaints offer an interesting illustration of the pervasive influence of the ideal of a

public service career-even at its lowest levels-on these men at the time. For that matter, the examination held in the fall of 191o to enlist new secretaries and registrars is even more revealing.

III. The Events of 191o

The aspects described up to now are mainly drawn from rules and

regulations. They show what were the goals aimed at and how these were expected to be met. They offer an ideal representation of how

problems were to be solved, but give no clear view on how the

adopted solutions were actually implemented. Some documents held in the archives of the board of civilian affairs allow for a more detailed picture of the situation. They concern two events that took

place in 1910. The first, chronologically, is the 'feud' that opposed a

group of secretaries of the board to its presidency regarding their access to 7th rank positions. The second, and the one I will consider

first, is the examination held in the late fall of 191o to enlist new secretaries and registrars-in-training.

The 191o Examination for Secretaries and Registrars

This examination is directly related to the new civil service examination that took place between 19o9 and 191o. According to evidence from the board of civilian affairs, in the middle of 19o9 a provincial- level exam was held empire-wide. The successful candidates trav- elled to Beijing the next year, for the capital examination-the chao- kao-that took place during the month of July. They were to pass this according to the category they had been registered into at the

44 For these complaints, see Minzhengbu, 486/18-2, env. 995, dated XT 2/7th month (August 1910o).




end of the provincial exam (yougong or bagong). The successful candidates were to present a last exam called dianshi, held in the Baohe-

dian, in the heart of the Forbidden City. As can be seen, the termino-

logy as well as the sequence of events show the links of this exam with the traditional examination system. I have found no indication on the number of candidates, but according to the board's archives, a total of 140 individuals were finally retained. In August, they were summoned for imperial audience according to their exam category, and an edict was issued granting them an official rank: the yougong successful candidates were to be given positions of 'little metropolitan officials' of the 7th rank just like the bagong registered in the first degree (yi deng). Those of the second degree were to be used as secretaries.45 After the administrative sorting process that took place at the board of personnel--between September and October-a total

of 37 persons were dispatched to the board of civilian affairs. All were appointed to interim positions, 19 as 'little metropolitan officials' and 18 as secretaries, and were to serve their probationary period there.46

In the middle of the 7th lunar month, the board of civilian affairs decided to call for its own internal examination. Following similar

examples by such boards as that of education (Xuebu), of the army (Lujunbu) and by the new higher court of justice (Daliyuan), it was to be open only to men having succeeded at the provincial-level examination or having obtained a graduation certificate from one of the new secondary schools in the country. As is stated in the preliminary discussion between the board's directing bodies, the timing was

very favourable. Indeed, many men of such pedigree were in Beijing at the time because of the capital examination. Clearly, the board's own exam was expected to attract at least part of the candidates who would fail the former. The document then explains that the individuals selected through the board's exam would be registered in a list, according to their respective ratings.47 They would be called

upon by the board, in the list's descending order, when an opening in the secretary positions would have to be filled. After the compulsory

45 7th rank positions were also the ones given to the successfulyougong and bagong in the traditional system.

46 In the board of civilian affairs, there was a total of only nine in-quota positions for the 'little metropolitan officials' of rank 7. I have no precise information con- cerning the ranks-8th or 9th-to which the secretaries-to-be were appointed. See Minzhengbu, 486/18-1, env. 1039, dated XT 2/9/19 (October 21, 1910).

47 The successful candidates would be issued a certificate of registration (jiming).



822 LUCA GABBIANI

probationary period, if considered useful, they would join the ranks of the expectant secretaries (houbu). If not, they would simply be discarded. The aim was actually twofold. On the one hand, it was hoped that a pool of efficient--or at least thought-to-be-efficient- individuals would hence be created to which the board could turn whenever needed. On the other, the presidency expected the move would help rationalize and unify the process through which this lower-level personnel was to gain access to positions. Thereafter, as was specified, the different offices of the board were not to recruit

by themselves any registrars-in-training. Similarly, none of their requests to transfer into their service individuals from other administrations as expectant secretaries would be granted anymore.48

The extent to which the second part of this twofold aim was achieved is hard to evaluate. As for the first part, the success was more than clear. Between the 14th and the 19th of October, no less than 1849 persons took the exam.49 Such a crowd took the services of the board by surprise. A mere three days before the first session, Wang Nianzeng, Yan Ling and Qiao Baoheng, the three officials in

charge of its organization, were forced to change its location because of lack of space. In the end, it was held in the Jiaoliansuo (a training compound for the new police) of the Outer city, with tables and benches borrowed from different administrations. The test itself was

composed of two parts: first, the writing of an essay on a given topic, using vernacular Chinese (guowen); second, the preparation of a draft administrative document. The candidates were judged on their abil-

ity to express themselves in an intelligible manner (wenli tongda), on the quality of their kaishu-style calligraphy and on their knowledge of the correct forms of documents. Three hundred candidates passed the exam. As always, they were divided into three groups. All were asked to send their curriculum vitae to the board and, in turn, received a registration certificate.50

4~ See Minzhengbu, 486/18-2, env. 995, dated XT 2/7th month, document dated XT 2/7/19 (August 23, 1910o) sent by the Counselling Office (Canyiting) of the board to its direction.

'9 On each of the first four days, an average of approximately 280 candidates per day took the exam. The last two sessions were reserved to the candidates from Shandong (on the 16th) and to those from Zhili (on the 17th). The main reason was their numbers: Shandong candidates totaled 231, while Zhili, with 493 candidates, represented by far the single largest pool of candidates. These figures give an idea of the geographical origins of this category of personnel at the time.

5 Some of these CVs are still preserved in the archives of the board. The term CV should not be taken in its present-day meaning: these documents only state basic information such as name, surname, geographical origin, age and brief




The pool of potential personnel the board had hoped for was indeed created, but the career prospects for these individuals were

very narrow. The extant evidence tends to show that only very few ended up working for the board before the fall of the Qing, a year or so later. Of course, this evidence might not tell the whole story. The lack of specific quotas for registrars-in-training may have allowed some of them to find employment as such.51 Nevertheless, as we have seen, some of the successful candidates of the 1907 registrars examination were still waiting to be called for office in late

19o9. As for the secretaries, the in-quotas, interim and supernumerary positions amounted to approximately a hundred in all. Between the men already holding positions and the individuals who were just appointed because of their success in the 1910 capital examination, the competition for remaining slots must have been severe. The pool thus created, playing the role of a 'waiting-room' for expectant lower- level officials, serves as a testimony to the continuing pressure on official positions in the central administration at the time. The fol-

lowing episode will offer another interesting illustration of this

aspect.

The Promotion Feud of the Spring of igzo

The regulations relating to the personnel of the board of civilian affairs specified that its 9 in-quotas positions of 'little metropolitan official' (7th rank) were accessible to 8th rank secretaries as part of the normal hierarchical promotion system. However, several pre- requisites were to be met in order for this normal promotion procedure to be called upon. First, the eligible candidate had to have held a regular in-quota position during a three-year tenure at the end of which he had to have been recommended for first rank at the trien- nial capital administration evaluation (jingcha). Second, he could

account of studies. They also mention the names of the father, grand-father and great grand-father, as well as the address where the candidate could be reached in Beijing. See Minzhengbu, 486/18-2, env. 472, dated Republic 1/8/25 (October 5, 1912). Several documents from the board of civilian affairs held in the No. 1 Arch- ives are actually archived in folders dating to the first year of the Republic.

51 The new police forces in Beijing could also pick in this pool of individuals their low-level administrative personnel. In fact, they seem to have employed an impress- ive number of registrars: in 1906, for example, a total of 102 were working in the different police offices of the capital. See Xunjingbu, 268/1, env. 64, dated GX 32/ 5/15 (July 6, 1906).



824 LUCA GABBIANI

then be inscribed in one of the classes (ban) of personnel eligible for such a promotion. In this instance, he would be inscribed in the second class.52 The promotion process was to follow the succession of these different classes, one after the other, the first opening for a 'little metropolitan official' position being given to an individual

registered in the first class, the second to one of the second class, and so on until all classes had had their turn. At that point, the

process would start over again with the first class. If, for some reason, the class whose turn it was did not have any eligible individual, it would be skipped, the position being offered to the next class. In the second class, the individuals inscribed were to be presented for

promotion according to the evaluation of their respective working abilities made by the superiors.

This administrative procedure could prove quite long. First, there were not many of these positions available-only 9 in the board of civilian affairs. Second, 7th rank positions were the first entry step into public service for men who had succeeded in the nation-wide examinations. After their formation period, they would be inscribed in the first class of expectant officials. Third, secretaries were

dependent upon the work evaluations made by their superiors (and therefore upon the relations they enjoyed with them). Lastly, any such opening could always be authoritatively given to a specific indi-

vidual, through imperial decree or via a decision of the board's presidency-even though the 19o6 new three-tiered administrative hier-

archy was to limit such occurrences. The feud that arose in early 191o between the board's directing body and its secretaries revolved

precisely around what the latter considered as an authoritative move

by the former to appoint two new 'little metropolitan officials'. In the spring of 1910o, 16 secretaries of the board filed a complaint

denouncing the way the board had dealt, at the end of the preceding year, with the appointment of two 'little metropolitan officials' of the 7th rank. These two men-Gui Chang and Qi Yuan-had been

presented for appointment to such positions because of their ex- status of police administration officials of rank 7.53 Before ratifying

52 I have found no information on the exact number of classes existing in the case of this particular promotion. Evidence suggests that there were at least five- and probably more.

53 Early in 19o09, Shanqi (Prince Su), then head of the board of civilian affairs, set up yet another plan to reduce the spendings of the board. Its main line was that administrative personnel in the police forces had to be cut down, to make way for more policemen and police officers. The positions of both Gui Chang and Qi Yuan were among those that were cut down. The)y therefore had to be reinstated into




the procedure, the board of personnel had asked twice for comple- mentary information on the grounds that the regulations stipulated that one of the two positions was destined to an individual registered in the second class of promotion-i.e. to a secretary of rank 8. Each

time, the board of civilian affairs answered that the turn of the second class had to be skipped because of lack of eligible individuals, none of the secretaries having been confirmed (zouliu) yet. In fact,

according to the timing of the administrative process, the first con- firmations should have occurred at the end of 190o9, precisely at the time when Gui Chang and Qi Yuan were registered for positions within the board.54 By early 191o, the secretaries had therefore good reasons for feeling frustrated, a feeling that grew even deeper when

they heard of the concluding remark written by their superiors in their last response to the board of personnel. According to it, what- ever might be the level of competence of the secretaries, they would never compare favourably with the expertise in public affairs that could be expected of 'real' officials of rank 7.

To the ears of the secretaries, this vexatious last remark must have sounded like the traditional debasing discourse aimed at the old times' clerks. It certainly helped trigger off their 'counterattack'. As to confirm the board's presidency in its prejudicial views, Liu

Jialu, Qing Yuan, Bai Dairen and the others insisted, in their com-

plaint, on the very minor responsibilities they held (most notably the verification and final rewriting of documents). Nevertheless, they said, they had taken care of them with all due attention and preci- sion, a fact that could not have gone unnoticed by the board authorit- ies. They then went on formulating their demand. Citing the board's

reply to the board of personnel and the internal promotion regulations, they asked that a number of them be granted a confirmed

other positions, a process which was to sharpen even more the pressure on administrative positions on the board.

54 The confirmation procedure corresponds to the registration of an individual as titular of a regular in-quota position. It was named zouliu, or 'memorializing to keep [someone in his position]'. As mentioned above, in early 1907, right after the creation of the board, the men chosen from the group of the secretaries of the board of police were delegated to interim secretary positions on the board of civilian affairs (paishu). A year later, in the middle of 19o8, a second step was taken: the board of personnel was asked to officially register the ones considered suitable as official recipients of these interim positions (zishu). At this point, they started their probationary one-year formation period, at the end of which they could be confirmed. During the year 190o9, documentary evidence shows that the board did move to confirm some of the secretaries, but the whole process was delayed for reasons I have not been able to make clear.



826 LUCA GABBIANI

status, which was to open the access to hierarchical promotion. To

strengthen their request, they also mentioned similar situations in other central administrations, where such demands had already been

granted. They concluded saying that a positive decision would prove beneficial on two grounds: it would offer opportunities for future careers to in-quotas secretaries and it would help keep the levels of

congestion (yongsai) among the interim secretaries to acceptable levels. The story doesn't say how exactly the board's directing officials reacted to the complaint. Nevertheless, on May 22, 191o, a memorial endorsing all its propositions was sent to the throne and was granted with imperial approval. In it, 14 secretaries were presented for confirmation, io being of full rank and the last 4 still in interim positions.

For these men, the decision was an important success. First of all, their voice-that of the lowest levels of the administrative pyramid- had been heard. Second, their request to be granted, according to the rules, access to the second tier of the bureaucratic hierarchy had been accepted. For men who, only some years before, were consid-

ered, at least in the realm of discourse, as the scum of the bureaucratic apparatus, this must have felt close to redemption. In fact, the

importance of the episode for these men can be appreciated through the host of documents written by the different offices of the board to recommend such and such of their secretaries, and by the individual

requests sent to the presidency, some insisting until the very last day before the memorial was sent.j5 This shows the level of expectations of these individuals-their eagerness for a career. Their attitude cer-

tainly also stemmed from their knowledge of the growing pressure on the board's available positions. They were of necessity aware of the fact that all interim secretary positions were full since late 19o8, as were most of the supernumerary slots. They most certainly knew of the nation-wide examination that was about to have its last round in the capital. Of the successful candidates, some would join their same ranks. Finally, as their complaint shows, they had directly experienced the risks of being sacrificed to offer positions to the 'real' officials whose posts had been suppressed during these years. They did not fight in vain. Indeed, their 191o success was further enhanced by the definitive promotion of one of them to the position

5 A total of 23 secretaries were recommended at first, 14 being chosen in the end. For the whole affair, see Minzhengbu, 486/18-3, env. 931, dated XT 2/4/14 (May 22, 191o).




of 'little metropolitan official' of rank 7 before the fall of the

dynasty."56 For the student of the late Qing, this episode is quite revealing.

First, it illustrates the extremely detailed nature of Xinzheng documentation in central administration-an unprecedented situation when compared to earlier periods. On the sole subject of promotions, for example, these documents offer precise insights on procedures which, in fact, can also help explain pre-reform situations. Second, this episode sheds direct light on the lowest levels of bureaucratic

personnel, a category on which pre-reform archival documentation is usually mute. In particular, it offers a striking example of what was the expertise-or 'power'-these men could count on. Indeed, as the text of their complaint shows, they knew precisely what was

going on in the board and what decisions were being made upon what grounds. Their writing and rewriting of the documents, their

handling of the archives and their management of internal communications gave them access, in this particular case, to all the necessary information. Hence, they could cite internal regulations. But they could also refer explicitly to exchanges between their superiors and the board of personnel-in particular to the vexatious remark mentioned above. Finally, they could also draw upon their knowledge of how such questions had been or were dealt with in other administrations. Indeed, this aspect is quite frequent-especially for salary matters-and shows the networking process going on among this level of personnel employed in diverse metropolitan boards. This example offers a direct illustration of what knowledge clerk-level personnel could count on, even before the reform period, to foster its position.

Conclusion

To conclude, I would like to underline three main points. The measures adopted during the Xinzheng reforms to solve the clerk problem were mainly of the same nature as the ones implemented for the whole of the metropolitan administration: new administrative hier-

archy, salary reform, introduction of quotas and transformation of

56 This man was Liu Jialu, the first signature on the complaint. As of XT 3/10/ 22 (December 12, 1911), he is said to be 'little metropolitan official' in one of the offices of the board. See Minzhengbu, 486/18-2, env. 1355, dated XT 3/10/25 (December 15, 1911). Clearly, had it not been for this interesting episode and for the level of detail of the documents, his name would never have been known to us.



828 LUCA GABBIANI

the mode of enlistment. Judging from a practical perspective, they were well thought of and could certainly have had positive repercus- sions. The new hierarchy and the setting of quotas would have helped manage and control the size of the lower-level personnel. The payment of regular salaries was to help curb extra-legal fee taking or unofficial charging for administrative work. The new mode of enlistment was expected to bring about an elevation of the quality of the

personnel while limiting personal relations and influence in the

securing of positions. All these steps were clearly positive in intent. Their contribution to a strengthening of the bureaucratic machinery before the fall of the dynasty remains difficult to estimate, precisely because of the fall of the dynasty. The fact that they were continued after the winter of 1911-12 might serve as an illustration of their value. However, there are two domains for which the reforms under- taken can be more clearly evaluated.

In the set of measures adopted, the lack of a clear distinction drawn between the so-called clerk problem and that of the metropolitan administration in general lends a certain authority to the idea

that, by the late Qing, the traditional negative discourse stigmatizing the clerks was not very operative any more. The problems encountered by the bureaucratic apparatus were thought of in more general terms and considered as lying elsewhere. From this perspective, it is not clear that the measures implemented during the reforms

brought about any 'redemption' of the sub-official level of personnel. On the other hand, the feud of 1910 serves as a good example of the positive effects the reforms had for these individuals. Through their integration in the official hierarchy, they were able to make their voice heard and to respond to old prejudices. The improvement of their status, that such a circumstance illustrates, derived primarily from the reforms. Indeed, for some of these men, the latter even

proved useful in terms of career prospects, the case of Liu Jialu who became 'little metropolitan official' of rank 7 before 191 1 being the most exemplary one.57

From a more general standpoint, the measures adopted at the time of the reforms were not as successful in overcoming some central malfunctions of the late imperial bureaucratic apparatus. Among

57 In spite of its exemplary character, it should not be considered as laying the grounds for regular promotions of this sort. As a matter of fact, during the Repub- lican period the passage from the third to the second tier of the administrative hierarchy was still a bottleneck hard to break through by normal administrative promotion means. Cf. Strauss, 'Symbol and Reflection ...', p. 224.




these, I have mentioned the engorgement of the administrative ranks. The evidence from the year 191o I have drawn upon here, tends to show that the power of attraction of a career in the bureau-

cracy remained largely unchallenged throughout the Xinzheng period. In fact, the overcrowding did not only concern the lower levels of the new administrative hierarchy. A mere two years after the 1906 remodelling of the central administration, we can observe, at the end of documents of the board of civilian affairs, the large number of

signatures by officials holding interim positions or said to possess 'no

specific appointment' (xingzou). The situation is further confirmed by the 1909 Yearbook of the imperial bureaucracy: in it, the supernumerary personnel listed greatly exceeds the number of regular officials. This does not come as a surprise: the Xinzheng period is known to have triggered off a movement of expansion of the state apparatus and therefore, volens nolens, of the number of administrative positions. The opinion, among the Chinese elites, that a public career remained a must, was still pervasive at the extreme end of the Qing, as is well illustrated even by the examples of the secretaries

developed here. This inclination was to evolve only slowly after the fall of the empire-if it ever did. As a matter of fact, ten years into the Republic, a foreign observer like Sidney Gamble would still point out the many young men travelling to Beijing from all over China, and living there in the hope of obtaining, one day, an official or a

supernumerary appointment in its administrative services.58

58 See S. Gamble and J. Burgess, Peking. A Social Survey (New York, George H. Doran Company, 1921), p. lo1 et passim.



the redemption of the rascals

Documents