the real threat of nuclear smuggling

During past centuries, most peo-ple who thought of smugglingat all considered it a somewhat

esoteric professionÑa way of avoidingtaxes and supplying goods that couldnot be obtained through licit channels.Drugs added a more insidious dimen-sion to the problem during the 1970sand 1980s, but trade in uranium andplutonium during the past Þve yearshas given smuggling unprecedented rel-evance to international security.

Yet there is considerable controversyover the threat nuclear smuggling pos-es. Some analysts dismiss it as a minornuisance. Not only has very little mate-rial apparently changed hands, they ar-gue, but, with a few exceptions, most ofit has not even been close to weapons

grade. None of the radioactive contra-band that has been conÞscated by West-ern authorities has been traced unequi-vocally to weapons stockpiles. Some ofthe plutonium that smugglers try topeddle comes from smoke detectors.

In addition to these amateur smug-glers, there are many scam artists whosell stable elements that have been ren-dered temporarily radioactive by ex-posing them to radiation or who obtainlarge advances based on minute sam-ples. Indeed, many of those who traÛcin nuclear materials do so with little orno idea of what they are stealingÑone

Pole died of radiation poisoning aftercarrying cesium in his shirt pocket, anda butcher in St. Petersburg kept urani-um in a pickle jar in his refrigerator.

The Danger Is Real

Based on the bumbling nature ofmost of the smuggling plots uncov-

ered so far, some well-informed observ-ers have suggested that, in Germany atleast, the only buyers are journalists, un-

The Real Threat of Nuclear Smuggling

Although many widely publicized incidents have been staged or overblown, the dangers of even a single successful diversion are too great to ignore

by Phil Williams and Paul N. Woessner

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dercover police and intelligence agents.Some go even further and contend thatpariah states such as Iraq, Iran, Libyaor North Korea may not be interestedin acquiring illicit nuclear arsenals at atime when they are in the process oftrying to reestablish normal relationswith the West.

Nevertheless, nuclear smuggling pre-sents a grave challenge. In almost all il-licit markets, only the tip of the icebergis visible, and there is no reason why thenuclear-materials black market shouldbe an exception. Police seize at most 40percent of the drugs coming into theU.S. and probably a smaller percentageof those entering western Europe. Thesupply of nuclear materials is obvious-ly much smaller, but law-enforcementagents are also less experienced at stop-ping shipments of uranium than theyare in seizing marijuana or hashish. Tobelieve that authorities are stoppingmore than 80 percent of the trade wouldbe foolish.

Moreover, even a small leakage ratecould have vast consequences. Althoughsecrecy rules make precise numbers im-possible to get, Thomas B. Cochran ofthe Natural Resources Defense Councilin Washington, D.C., estimates that abomb requires between three and 25

kilograms of enriched uranium or be-tween one and eight kilograms of plu-tonium. A kilogram of plutonium occu-pies about 50.4 cubic centimeters, orone seventh the volume of a standardaluminum soft-drink can.

Although rigorous screening of all in-ternational shipments could catch someradioactive transfers, several of the mostdangerous isotopes, such as uranium235 and plutonium 239, are only weaklyradioactive and so could be easily shield-ed from detection by Geiger counters orsimilar equipment. X-ray and neutron-scattering equipment, such as that inplace at airports to detect chemical ex-plosives, could uncover illicit radionu-clides as well, but because it is not de-signed for the task its practical eÝec-tiveness is limited.

If the amounts of material needed fornuclear weapons are small in absoluteterms, they are minuscule in compari-son to the huge stockpiles of highly en-riched uranium and plutonium, espe-cially in Russia, where both inventorycontrol and security remain quite prob-

lematic. World stocks of plutonium,which totaled almost 1,100 tons in 1992,will reach between 1,600 and 1,700 tonsby the year 2000, enough to make asmany as 200,000 10-kiloton bombs. Asdisarmament agreements are implemen-ted, another 100 tons of reÞned weap-ons-grade plutonium will become avail-able in the U.S. and RussiaÑironically,in the postÐcold war world, one of thesafest places for plutonium may wellbe on top of a missile.

Security Is Lax

In addition, the U.S. and former Sovi-et states each hold about 650 tons of

highly enriched uranium. These largestockpiles are all the more disturbingbecause control over them is fragileand incomplete. The Russian stores inparticular suÝer from sloppy security,poor inventory management and inad-equate measurements. Equipment fordetermining the amount of plutoniumthat has been produced is primitiveÑyet without a clear baseline, it is impos-

NUCLEAR-SMUGGLING INCIDENTS have been reported across central Europe tothe PaciÞc coast of Russia (dots show sites of seizure, origin or transfer). Securityat some stockpiles is being upgraded, but unsettled economic and political condi-tions are undermining morale. Hundreds of incidents over the past Þve years sug-gest that illicit trade in uranium and plutonium could be a grave problem.

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SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN January 1996 41

5 OR MORE

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SITES OF NUCLEAR-SMUGGLING INCIDENTS

NUCLEAR STOCKPILES, REPROCESSING PLANTS OR WEAPONS-DESIGN LABORATORIES


sible to know what may be missing.Virtually nonexistent security at nu-

clear installations compounds the prob-lem. The collapse of the KGB took withit much of the nuclear-control system.Ironically, under the Soviet regime se-curity was tight but often superßuous.Nuclear workers were loyal and well paidand enjoyed high status. As pay andconditions worsen, however, disaÝec-tion has become widespread. With analienated workforce suÝering from lowand often late wages, the incentives fornuclear theft have become far greaterat the very time that restrictions andcontrols have deteriorated.

In November 1993 a thief climbedthrough a hole in a fence and entered asupposedly secure area in the Sevmor-put shipyard near Murmansk. He useda hacksaw to cut through a padlock ona storage compartment that held fuelfor nuclear submarines and stole partsof three fuel assemblies, each contain-ing 4.5 kilograms of enriched uranium.Although the uranium was eventuallyrecovered, Mikhail Kulik, the oÛcialwho conducted the investigation of thetheft, was scathing in his report: therewere no alarm systems, no lighting andfew guards. Kulik noted: ÒEven pota-toes are probably much better guarded

today than radioactive materials.Ó Im-provements in security at the base sincethe incident have been very modest.

The situation is not entirely gloomy.According to reports, some of the nu-clear citiesÑformerly secret sites wherebombs were designed and builtÑarewell secured, and the controls on weap-ons-grade materials are generally morestringent than those on lower-qualityitems. Although eÝorts to enter theclosed zone at Arzamas-16 (the Rus-sian weapons-design laboratory that isa rough counterpart to Los Alamos Na-tional Laboratory in the U.S.) have re-portedly doubled during the past year,the security system there appears to re-main eÝective. Moscow is also makingeÝorts to reestablish security through-out its nuclear industryÑin some cases,such as the Kurchatov Institute of Atom-ic Energy in Moscow, with direct assis-tance from the U.S. Yet the task is for-midable. Nearly 1,000 stores of enricheduranium and plutonium are scatteredthroughout the former Soviet Union.

The Rise of Smuggling Networks

Against this background, it is hardly surprising that the number of nu-

clear-smuggling incidentsÑboth realand fakeÑhas increased during the pastfew years. German authorities, for ex-ample, reported 41 in 1991, 158 in 1992,241 in 1993 and 267 in 1994. Althoughthe vast majority of cases do not in-volve material suitable for bombs, asthe number of incidents increases sodoes the likelihood that at least a fewwill include weapons-grade alloys.

In March 1993, according to a reportfrom Istanbul, six kilograms of enricheduranium entered Turkey through theAralik border gate in Kars Province. Thematerial had apparently been broughtfrom Tashkent to Grozniy, where Che-chen crime groups entered the picture,then to Nakhichevan via Georgia, beforearriving in Istanbul. Although conÞrma-tion of neither the incident nor the de-gree of the uraniumÕs enrichment wasforthcoming, it raised fears that Che-chen ÒMaÞaÓ groups had obtained ac-cess to enriched uranium in Kazakh-stan. KazakhstanÕs agreement in 1994to transfer enriched uranium to the U.S.suggests that such speculation mayhave had some basis.

In October 1993 police in Istanbulseized 2.5 kilograms of uranium 238and detained four Turkish business-men, along with four suspected agentsof IranÕs secret service. A Munich mag-azine later reported that the uraniummay have gone to Turkey via Germany.According to one of the Turkish detain-ees (a professor who had previously


A Nuclear Bestiary

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Americium 241 Alpha-particle source Fraudfor smoke detectors (substitute for moreand other devices desired elements)

Beryllium Neutron reflector Illicit reactors;in reactors or bombs nuclear weapons

Cesium 137 Radiation source for Fraud; industrial or medical murder applications; present by radiationin radioactive waste from reactors

Cobalt 60 Gamma-radiation Fraud; source for industrial murder or medical applications by radiation

Lithium 6 Thermonuclear Thermonuclear weapons weapons

Plutonium Alpha-particle source Fraud;for smoke detectors; nuclear weaponsnuclear weapons;nuclear reactor fuel

Polonium 210 Alpha-particle and Nuclear weaponsneutron source for industrial applications

Uranium Nuclear reactor fuel; Fraud; nuclear weapons nuclear weapons

Zirconium Structural material Illicit reactorsfor nuclear reactors

Licit Use Illicit Use


been involved in the smuggling of an-tiquities), accomplices ßew the urani-um by Cessna to Istanbul from Harten-holm, a private airÞeld near Hamburgowned by Iranian arms dealers.

SigniÞcantly, 1994 saw several inci-dents involving material that was ei-ther weapons grade or very close to it.On May 10 police in Tengen, Germany,found six grams of plutonium 239 whilesearching the home of businessmanAdolf Jaekle for other contraband. Theplutonium, which was in a container inthe garage, was discovered only by ac-cident. Jaekle had widespread connec-tions, including links with former oÛ-cers of the KGB and the Stasi (the EastGerman secret police) and with Kintex,a Bulgarian arms company that has longbeen suspected of a wide range of ne-farious activities. Much of the initialspeculation has dissipated, but impor-tant questions about the Jaekle case re-main unanswered. It would be unwiseto exclude the possibility that the plu-tonium was simply a sample for a muchlarger delivery.

On August 10 authorities in Municharrested a Colombian dentist and twoSpaniards in possession of 363.4 gramsof high-grade plutonium and 201 gramsof lithium 6 (a component of hydrogenbombs). They had brought their contra-band to Munich from Moscow on a Luft-hansa ßight and were captured amidmuch fanfare. It later turned out thatagents from the German federal intelli-gence body, the BND, had induced thethree men to bring in the material.

The operation caused great contro-versy in Germany; BND agents were ac-cused of helping to create rather thancontrol the nuclear-smuggling problem.The three men were connected neitherwith Colombian drug gangs nor Basqueterrorists; there was no evidence thatthey were experienced smugglers. Theysimply had Þnancial problems and hadbeen trying to solve them by selling thelithium and plutonium.

In all the controversy over the propri-ety of the BNDÕs actions, however, animportant point was lost. Even as ama-teurs, the three men succeeded in ob-taining a signiÞcant amount of high-grade plutonium.

Then, on December 14, police inPrague arrested three men in a car with2.7 kilograms of highly enriched (87.7percent) uranium 235. Two were nucle-ar workers who had come to the CzechRepublic in 1994: a Russian from atown near Obninsk and a Belarusianfrom Minsk. The third was a Czech nu-clear physicist, Jaroslav Vagner, whohad not been oÛcially employed in thenuclear industry for several years. Inmid-1994 a similarly enriched sample

of uranium had apparently turned upin Landshut, Bavaria, and on March 22,1995, two more men, one of them a po-lice oÛcer, were arrested in connectionwith the December incident.

The number of smuggling cases inGermany, at least, has declined sincethese highly publicized arrests. TraÛck-ers appear to be going elsewhere. Somehave gone through Switzerland and Aus-tria and into Italy. More may be takingthe routes to the south through the Cen-tral Asian republics and the Black Sea.As former International Atomic EnergyAgency inspector David Kay has pointedout, these paths in eÝect reverse thoseused by the KGB to smuggle Westerngoods into the former Soviet Union. Bor-der controls in these areas are muchweaker than those going into westernEurope, and the potential clients arecloser.

Some of the seizures in Germany andTurkey make it fairly clear that outlawstates such as Iran may in fact be look-ing for high-quality nuclear material. Itappears, indeed, that some of them haveset up their own networks. Both Libyaand Iraq have experience with suchmethods, since each nation set up front

companies to facilitate the illicit diver-sion of precursor chemicals and equip-ment to develop chemical weapons.

Furthermore, as the Jaekle case im-plies, smugglers are not all blunderingamateurs. Although there is no mono-lithic nuclear MaÞa, ex-spies from theformer Soviet bloc countries appear tobe taking a leading role in the profes-sional networks. They have apparentlybeen joined by entrepreneurs, often in-volved in the arms business, whosedealings span a continuum from the lic-it, through the shady, to the illicit.

Not surprisingly, because nuclearsmuggling is a potentially proÞtablebusiness, organized crime groups havealso become involved. Some Turkishgangs appear to be engaged in thetradeÑhaving graduated from clandes-tine export of antiquities, they treaturanium as just another commodity.

In Italy, Romano Dolce, a magistrateinvestigating the nuclear trade, was ar-rested for participation in the verycrimes he was pursuing. This scandalaroused considerable speculation thathe had focused on some cases in orderto divert attention from other, moresigniÞcant transactions.

SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN January 1996 43

DEPLETED URANIUM SLUG, weighing roughly seven kilograms, Þts comfortably inThomas B. CochranÕs hand. The physicist, who works for the Natural Resources De-fense Council in Washington, D.C., estimates that a similar amount of weapons-gradematerial would be enough to construct a bomb capable of destroying a small city.

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Perhaps the most insistent question,however, concerns the involvement ofRussian organized crime. Although nu-clear traÛcking does not seem to be apriority for these groupsÑother activi-ties are both more immediately lucra-tive and less riskyÑthere is growingevidence that some Russian criminalgroups are diversifying into trade in radioactives.

Enforcement EÝorts Lag

Even though serious eÝorts are be-ing made to attack the problem at

the source, the international communi-ty has been slow to respond to the dan-gers that nuclear smuggling presents.The Russian nuclear regulatory agency,GAN, now has 1,200 employees, but thedegree of authority it can actually wieldover the old nuclear bureaucracyÑbothcivilian and militaryÑis uncertain.

Furthermore, even if GAN is success-ful, it will take several years to upgradesafeguards, and smugglers are not go-ing to sit by idly in the meantime. As aresult, there will be a premium on goodintelligence and law enforcement dur-ing the remainder of the 1990s. Unfor-tunately, international agencies with nu-clear expertise are not yet cooperatingeÝectively with those whose responsibil-ity is to stop illicit trade. The IAEA andthe United Nations Crime Preventionand Criminal Justice Branch are bothlocated in ViennaÕs International Center,but the IAEAÕs mandate does not allowit to engage in investigative activity. Asa result, contacts between the two havebeen little more than desultory.

In Washington, meanwhile, early re-sponses to the smuggling problem havebeen ill conceived and poorly coordi-nated. Since 1994, the Federal Bureauof Investigations has taken the lead and

has been working closely with the De-fense Nuclear Agency and the DefenseIntelligence Agency, but the U.S. remainssome distance from a comprehensivepolicy.

We suggest that systematic multina-tional measures be taken as soon aspossible to inhibit theft at the source,to disrupt traÛcking and to deter buy-ers. The U.S., Germany, Russia and oth-er nations with an interest in the nuclearproblem should set up a Òßying squadÓwith an investigative arm, facilities forcounterterrorist and counterextortionactions and a disaster managementteam.

Such an idea seems very far-fetchedat the moment, at least in part becauseof a continuing reluctance to recognizethe severity of the threat. It would be atragedy if governments were to acceptthe need for a more substantive pro-gram only after a nuclear catastrophe.


The Authors

PHIL WILLIAMS and PAUL N. WOESSNER work at the Ridgway Center forInternational Security Studies at the University of Pittsburgh. Williams, whodirects the center, is a professor in the graduate school of public and inter-national aÝairs. During the past three years, his research has focused ontransnational criminal organizations and drug traÛcking, and he is the ed-itor of a new journal, Transnational Organized Crime. Woessner, a researchassistant at the Ridgway Center, received his masterÕs degree in interna-tional aÝairs in 1994. He also earned an M.S. in planetary science and a B.S.in astronomy and physics, the latter at the University of Maryland.

Further Reading

ÒPOTATOES WERE GUARDED BETTER.Ó Oleg Bukharin and Wil-liam Potter in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 51, No. 3,pages 46Ð50; MayÐJune 1995.

CHRONOLOGY OF NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENTS: JULY 1994Ð JUNE 1995. Paul N. Woessner in Transnational OrganizedCrime, Vol. 1, No. 2, pages 288Ð329; Summer 1995.

NUCLEAR MATERIAL TRAFFICKING: AN INTERIM ASSESSMENT.Phil Williams and Paul N. Woessner in Transnational Orga-nized Crime, Vol. 1, No. 2, pages 206Ð238; Summer 1995.

Although outlaw nations probably make up most of the market for nuclear weapons, there is a clear danger

that organized crime groups or terrorists could also jointhe nuclear club. The transi-tion from transporting nu-clear contraband to using itdirectly is apparently an easyone: radioactive isotopeshave already been used formurder. In late 1993 Russian“Mafia” assassins allegedlyplanted gamma-ray-emittingpellets in the office of aMoscow businessman, kill-ing him within months. Atleast half a dozen similar in-cidents have been reportedin Russia since then.

A criminal organizationcould also use radionuclidesfor large-scale extortionagainst a government or cor-poration. It would be fairlyeasy for a nuclear blackmail-er to establish credibility byleaving a sample for analy-

sis. Subsequent threats to pollute air or water supplies, oreven to detonate a small nuclear weapon, could have con-siderable leverage. Nor can the possibility be entirely ex-

cluded that a terrorist orga-nization or an extremist cultsuch as the one that alleged-ly carried out nerve-gas at-tacks in 1995 in the Tokyosubway might acquire nucle-ar materials.

Even if such a group didnot acquire enough uraniumor plutonium to make a fis-sion weapon, they might beable to mix unstable iso-topes with conventional ex-plosives to create widespreadcontamination. If the terror-ists who bombed the WorldTrade Center in New YorkCity had made use of radio-active substances, for exam-ple, they might have killedthousands and rendered amajor business district unin-habitable. —P.W. and P.N.W.

Bombs and the Mob

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the real threat of nuclear smuggling

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