8/17/2019 The Prospective Military Power of Al Qaeda

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-prospective-military-power-of-al-qaeda 1/8

 The Prospective Military Powerof Al Qaeda Aliated Groups in

the Syrian ConictDecemer !"# $%!&Aaron 'in# Daniel Smith# and (yan Pereira

The following is part of a series of thought pieces authored by members of the START

Consortium. These editorial columns reect the opinions of the author(s), and not

necessarily the opinions of the START Consortium. This series is penned by scholars who

hae grappled with complicated and often politici!ed topics, and our hope is that they

will foster thoughtful reection and discussion by professionals and students ali"e.

Policy ma)ers in the *nited States have deep concerns aout the prospective inuence

and military stren+th of al Qaeda aliated reel +roups participatin+ in the Syrian

conict, -n li+ht of these concerns# this article o.ers a tentative estimation of AQ/

aliates0 relative military stren+th in two years0 time,

After reviewin+ a variety of academic# 1ournalistic# and +overnment sources we have

come to the conclusion that 2al Qaeda aliated +roups in Syria will have +reater

military power 3relative to other +roups4 than at present y the end of $%!5,6 The

relative military power of AQ/aliated +roups 3de7ned elow4 will increase due to

enhanced capacities as well as decreases in the overall military ecacy of competin+

+roups in the Syrian conict such as the 8ree Syrian Army and the military forcesassociated with the Assad re+ime,

9vidence supportin+ our conclusion falls into three +eneral cate+ories# includin+: 3!4 the

relative e.ectiveness of military coordination etween AQ/aliated +roups# 3$4 the

e;tensive territorial 2safe havens6 held y AQ/aliated +roups# and 3&4 outside support

in the form of weapons and recruits,

 The AQ/aliated +roups have een ale to coordinate military activities with one

another while 8SA/aliated +roups have stru++led with intense internal rivalries#

clashin+ a+endas# and the resultin+ inaility to coordinate at a national scale, The aility

to conduct 1oint operations at a national scale will li)ely increase the overall military

power of AQ/aliated +roups within the relevant timeframe,

AQ/aliated +roups have also een ale to estalish control of territorial 2safe havens6

in the northeast# which a.ords them the opportunity to uild e.ective local

administrative apparatuses, This stands in contrast to the disor+ani<ed attempts of 8SA/

aliated +roups and pro/re+ime forces to uild up an administrative infrastructure in

hotly contested areas, The control of uncontested territory allows them to secure the

human and material resources of held areas and utili<e the space as a lo+istical asset in

military operations,

8/17/2019 The Prospective Military Power of Al Qaeda

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-prospective-military-power-of-al-qaeda 2/8

8inally# the AQ/aliated factions ene7t from si+ni7cant outside support in the form of

oth arms and recruits, This includes the provision of weapons y the Gulf Cooperation

Council in addition to the si+ni7cant inu; of recruits and 7nancial resources from al

Qaeda/lin)ed or+ani<ations in -ra= and elsewhere, These resources will enhance the

military power of AQ/aliated +roups in the comin+ years,

>avin+ summari<ed our asic 7ndin+s and the evidentiary support# we will now provide

a rief overview of the current distriution of military power etween +roups,

Extant Distribution of Military Power

 The followin+ section riey outlines the contours of the Syrian civil war y discussin+

si+ni7cant reel coalitions# clarifyin+ which +roups this analysis considers to e lin)ed to

al/Qaeda# e;plainin+ the e.ects of the re+ionali<ation and internationali<ation of the

conict# and concludes y discussin+ si+ni7cant attle7eld chan+es over the past

several months,

?hile the Supreme Military Council 3SMC4 was estalished to etter coordinate

operations etween local and re+ional units of the 8ree Syrian Army 38SA4# in reality# the

SMC does not control or coordinate strate+ic decisions across the war0s several fronts

and multiple actors, ?hile many 8SA aliates are secular# li)e the @orthern Storm

ri+ade# the 8SA does include nationalist -slamist reels# includin+ memers of the

Syrian -slamic 'ieration 8ront coalition and Su=our al/Sham# an -slamist +roup that

envisions an -slamic Syria ut disavows calls for an -slamic caliphate and whose leader

heads the Syrian -slamic 'ieration 8ront 3S-'84,!

Bther si+ni7cant 7+htin+ coalitions include aysh al/-slam# which was estalished with

Saudi 7nancial assistance and continues to receive si+ni7cant Saudi fundin+ , 'iwa al/

-slam is the most notale 7+htin+ force within the coalition# with a si+ni7cant military

presence in contested suurs around Damascus# li)e Ghouta,$ The Syrian -slamic 8ront

3S-84 operates independently of the 8SA althou+h its 7+hters often 7+ht alon+side each

other and coordinate actions on the +round in heavily contested areas,Ahrar al/Sham is the est/e=uipped and trained attalion of the S-8, The +roup endorses

an -slamic Syrian state thou+h its leaders have not called e;plicitly for a caliphate, Ahrar

al/Sham has closely cooperated with oth 8SA and al/Qaeda lin)ed +roups durin+

important military attles, There are also many independent reels includin+ -slamist

+roups li)e the *mmah ri+ade that call for an -slamic Syria ut whose leaders have

si+naled a willin+ness to participate in democratic elections if and when Assad0s re+ime

falls,

8or the purposes of this analysis# al/Qaeda lin)ed +roups include the -slamic State of

-ra= and al/Sham 3-S-S4# the Adullah A<<am ri+ades# 8atah al/-slam# and ahat al/

@usrah# an or+ani<ation that was estalished with the help of seed money from leadersof the +roup then )nown as the -slamic State of -ra= 3-S-4, This analysis also considers

Ahrar al/Sham# althou+h not the roader Syrian -slamic 8ront# to e an al/Qaeda lin)ed

+roup +iven the hi+h de+ree of cooperation etween this attalion and al/Qaeda lin)ed

+roups in contested territories, The +roup0s -slamist outloo) and cooperation with

+roups li)e ahat al/@usrah fosters the al/Qaeda lin)ed radicals0 +rowin+ military

stren+th,

8/17/2019 The Prospective Military Power of Al Qaeda

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-prospective-military-power-of-al-qaeda 3/8

 The second al/Quasyr campai+n represented a turnin+ point in the conict +iven the

erstwhile possiility that reels would overthrow Assad earlier this year, The successful

campai+n has disoriented the reels# +iven Assad control of )ey transit/resupply routes#

and ensured a route connectin+ Damascus to the Alawite coastal stron+holds of 'ata)ia

and Tartus, 9vidence su++ests that Assad won0t defeat the reels in the ne;t two years#

however, (eel forces still control si+ni7cant territory in the north and east# li)e inAleppo and -dli# have conducted successful attac)s within Damascus# continue to carry

out operations in re+ime stron+holds# and are still actively contestin+ territory,

 This reels0 continued aility to cooperate durin+ intense 7+htin+ and the hi+h sta)es of 

the conict ma)e it li)ely that GCC states will increasesupport for their respective clients

if they suspect that Assad may e cementin+ recent attle7eld advances, Similarly#

perceived *,S, hesitancy to support the increasin+ly radicali<ed reel opposition may

incentivi<e these states will step up their assistance to their respective clients,

*ninterrupted military resupply chains and forei+n interest in the outcome of Syria0s

civil war mean that weapons# 7+hters# and fundin+ will continue to ow to +roups li)e

the S-8, The reel0s aility to continue successful operations li)e suicide attac)s inDamascus and -S-S0 capture of the Mena+h Air7eld does not threaten Assad0s hold on

power, -n forcin+ him to commit the Syrian Armed 8orces 3SA84 to defend re+ime

stron+holds and protect important facilities# however# the SA8 are stretched thin# unale

to launch the sustained o.ensive needed to ta)e si+ni7cant amounts of reel/held

territory,

Evidentiary Support

>avin+ summari<ed the +eneral distriution of military power# our analysis will now

e;amine the evidence for AQ/aliates0 +reater military power 3relative to other +roups4

in $%!5,This evidence can e cate+ori<ed into three road cate+ories: silitary

coordination# 2safe havens#6 and e;ternal support,

#ilitary Coordination

(eels operatin+ in Syria have one +oal in common# which is to topple the al Assad

re+ime, Aside from this +oal# the myriad reel +roups in Syria e;hiit di.erences in

ideolo+y# fundin+# allocation of resources# and 7+htin+ e.ectiveness, (ather than actin+

under a coherent strate+y# many reels have een actin+ independently without

e;tensive plannin+, -ndeed# many +roups of 7+hters are simply rushin+ to the sound of

+un7re, >owever# al Qaeda aliated 7+hters have shown +reater capacity to coordinate

comple; attac)s than the moderate 8ree Syrian Army 38SA4 forces,

 The Syrian reellion has een characteri<ed y widespread fracturin+ and +eneral lac)

of command and control, The 8SA has shown an inaility to coordinate the e.orts of the

ri+ades under their umrella, As the 8SA loses more 7+hters due to ideolo+ical

di.erences and dissatisfaction with a lac) of support from the upper echelons of the

or+ani<ation# the 8SAs inaility to coordinate their 7+hters will continue to +row, 8SA

units have een 7+htin+ each other over limited resources# a si+n that short term

interests have een hamperin+ cohesion within the 8SA,

?hile re+ional commands have appeared amon+ 8SA ran)s# lac) of unity and lac) of

resources remain a ma1or prolem within these re+ional commands,& Disparate sources

8/17/2019 The Prospective Military Power of Al Qaeda

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-prospective-military-power-of-al-qaeda 4/8

of e;ternal support may also undermine the re+ional commands# particularly those

hardline sectarian elements of the opposition supported y Gulf states, Competition

over resources may radicali<e under/funded reel factions# and drive more moderate

factions to do what they can to +ain access to resources even if it mean cooperatin+

with al Qaeda lin)ed +roups,E

Al Qaeda aliated +roups# such as -slamic State of -ra= and al Sham 3-S-S4 and ahatal/@usra 3@4 have demonstrated leadership in comple; attac)s a+ainst military

installations and +overnment/held lo+istical nodes, Groups not aliated with al Qaeda

have fou+ht alon+side @ and -S-S units# ut 1ihadist elements have often ta)en the lead

in coordinatin+ these comined forces in the most comple; attac)s,5

An e;ample of @ led coordination can e found in the sie+e of ?adi al/Deif# where they

led attac)s on the +overnment stron+hold in Bctoer $%!$ and continued to launch

assaults until the sie+e was lifted in April $%!&,F -n7+htin+ etween reel attalions and

the departure of @ to 7+ht elsewhere lead to a collapse in cohesion# allowin+ the

re+ime to rea) the sie+e, This aility to coordinate and lead comple; attac)s has

helped to increasin+ly push @ into a leadership role in the South,

 The ease with which al Qaeda lin)ed 1ihadist +roups have een ale to wor) with each

other has also +rown dramatically, Ahrar al Sham and @ have uilt a stron+ wor)in+

relationship althou+h they do not wor) to+ether in every operation, Despite this# these

+roups have een popularly lin)ed re+ardless of whether they cooperated in an

operation or not, This phenomenon has also een oserved with @ and -S-S, As the war

dra+s on# this aility to lead will attract more 7+hters to e;tremist +roups, There is a

stron+ possiility that this will also +radually push e;tremist +roups into more

leadership roles within the Syrian opposition over the course of the comin+ months and

years,

$Safe %aens& and #ilitary 'ower 

-n star) contrast to other factions within the Syrian conict# AQ/aliated +roups have

the ene7t of territorial 2safe havens6 from which they can launch operations and

develop more e.ective administrative apparatuses, (eels0 control of the @orthernorder and Tur)ey0s military and political support of the reel opposition means that

forei+n 7+hters wishin+ to enter the active theater of war in Syria face less restraints

than previous 1ihadists tryin+ to 7+ht in areas li)e Af+hanistan# -ra=# and Somalia, "

 Tur)ish ocials0 hesitancy to prevent reels from crossin+ its order with Syria and the

reels0 control of the order from the Syrian side has allowed the conict to ecome

internationali<ed at a worryin+ pace, The ma1ority of 7+htin+ etween re+ime forces and

the reels has ta)en place in the southwest of the country surroundin+ Damascus# with

reels 3mainly 8SA/aliated4 rarely ale to consolidate a secure ase of operations,

>owever# the AQ/aliated +roups have sei<ed territory in the country0s northeast# which

has een a low priority for the Syrian Armed 8orces 3SA84,

 The primary reason for this is that the SA80s operations are aimed at securin+ lo+istical

and military dominance in the corridor etween Damascus and the Alawi/dominated

areas alon+ the coast,H 8urthermore# 8SA/aliates have een the foremost threats to

SA8 military and political power in Damascus, Accordin+ly# the +eopolitical interests of

SA8 forces and AQ/aliated +roups yield a relatively paci7c area in the northeast that

has avoided the fre=uent shifts in control characteristic of the southwest, Control over a

relatively uncontested territory will li)ely enhanced the military power of AQ/aliated

8/17/2019 The Prospective Military Power of Al Qaeda

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-prospective-military-power-of-al-qaeda 5/8

+roups due to administrative and strate+ic advanta+es that accrue to +roups that

control such uncontested spaces,

8irst# the ac=uisition of a territorial 2safe haven6 is propitious to the development of an

administrative infrastructure at the local level, Scholars such as Adul)ader Sinno ar+ue

that such 2safe havens6 a.ord +roups the opportunity to develop centrali<ed and

speciali<ed administrative apparatuses that can then e used to uild pulic support forthe +roup,!% Sources cite the surprisin+ly hi+h =uality of +overnance in the provincial

capital of (a=aa after its capture y ahat al/@usra# indicatin+ that the 2safe haven6

=ualities of the northeast will continue to e a oon for local perceptions of al/@usra0s

political le+itimacy,

Al/@usra0s careful attention to the maintenance of e.ective administration was

demonstrated in the days followin+ the capture of (a=aa, Durin+ that period# the +roup

secured administrative 7les and +overnment facilities which were then used to carry on

the =uotidian functions of +overnance and social service provision,!! The e;tent of

pulic +oods provision has far outstripped the tentative measures employed y 8SA/

aliated +roups to ameliorate the economic woes aIictin+ recently captured areas,

Administrative penetration of local society has also led al/@usra leaders to incorporate

local notales into the city0s new +overnance structure,

Community leaders are encoura+ed to select representatives from within their own

ran)s to interface with al/@usra administrators and aid in the maintenance of pulic

order,!$ ?hile the ma1ority of evidence is speci7c to al/@usra and Ahrar al/Sham# these

two +roups are amon+ the dominant AQ/aliated +roups in terms of si<e and territorial

control, Their dominant positions mean that their ehaviors are li)ely to e emulated y

less powerful factions under the AQ/aliate anner,

-n terms of military power# the provision of essential pulic +oods and co/optation of

social elites serves as disincentives a+ainst 7fth column activities such as saota+e and

espiona+e, There are also stron+ theoretical and empirical reasons to predict that a

modicum of political le+itimacy and correspondence with local elites increases a +roup0s

capacity to e;tract 7nancial and material resources from the populace without forcefulresistance,!& Such resources can then e used to aid in military e.orts a+ainst

competin+ +roups,

Second# the safe haven availale to AQ/aliated +roups in the northeast also +ives

them a strate+ic advanta+e y increasin+ the security of supply lines and openin+ the

option of strate+ic withdrawal to forces operatin+ at the frin+es of the safe haven, The

importance of supply lines to all factions is demonstrated y the sei<ure of Al a y the

-slamic State of -ra= and the 'evant 3-S-S4 which deprived 8SA/aliated +roups of )ey

e;ternal resources,!E

 The threat of losin+ access to crucial supplies is less serious for +roups such as al/@usra

and Ahrar al/Sham who have essentially uncontested control over the areas orderin+

northwestern -ra= and AQ-/facilitated supply lines, The aility to launch and recallmilitary operations from an uncontested territory also lends to the lon+/term military

power of AQ/aliated +roups, y contrast# the tenuous nature of control y SA8 and

8SA/aliated forces in the southwest has seriously curtailed the ran+e of strate+ic

options availale to those +roups# which in turn contriutes to their inaility to hold

territorial +ains for sustained periods of time,

External Support

8/17/2019 The Prospective Military Power of Al Qaeda

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-prospective-military-power-of-al-qaeda 6/8

>opes for a contained civil war in Syria were lon+ a+o dashed, Saudi Araia is a crucial

supporter of reels# notaly +roups 'iwa al/-slam and the Army of -slam coalition, Saudi

+oals include overthrowin+ the Assad re+ime# wea)enin+ -ran0s re+ional power# and

preventin+ the Muslim rotherhood0s ascendancy in Syria in the event that Assad

falls,!5 After aandonin+ early attempts to encoura+e Assad to address some of the

protestors0 demands# Tur)ey has stepped up its military involvement in the conict, Jeymotivations include overthrowin+ Assad# challen+in+ the Syrian Democratic *nity Party#

and preventin+ the estalishment of an independent Jurdish state that would emolden

 Tur)ish Jurds and undermine the fra+ile peace ne+otiations with the Jurdistan ?or)er0s

Party 3PJJ4,

Qatar is another si+ni7cant GCC player althou+h it has primarily funded more radical

+roups li)e ahat al/@usrah and Ahrar al/Sham, Moderate reels initially e;pected that

they would receive li+ht weapons# military e=uipment# and trainin+ assistance after the

sarin +as attac) in Ghouta, >owever# these hopes were dashed when the *nited States

and (ussia reached an a+reement to compel Syria to 1oin the BPC? and eliminate its

chemical stoc)piles,

8ears that supplies intended for the 8ree Syrian Army would e con7scated orpurchased y al/Qaeda lin)ed +roups has limited fundin+ to moderate units and

ri+ades within the 8SA,!F These moderate reel units and ri+ades# with less cash#

supplies# and 7+htin+ e;pertise than +roups li)e ahat al/@usrah and -S-S are at ris) of

some ran)/and/7le 7+hters ecomin+ demorali<ed and defectin+ to receive etter

individual ene7ts and improved chances of military success 7+htin+ with al/Qaeda

lin)ed +roups,

As the conict dra+s on# these Sala7st# AQ/lin)ed +roups will attract lar+er amounts of

fundin+ and arms from outside actors see)in+ to inuence the conict, 8urther# AQ/

lin)ed +roups0 successes in capturin+ and distriutin+ humanitarian assistance will li)ely

translate to success in ta)in+ control of donated weapons and funds, This is even more

li)ely +iven the close cooperation etween these and other reels on the +round,Additional factors su++est that these +roups may ecome stron+er militarily and ale to

ta)e control politically of territory that is not currently contested y the SA8,

Since the al/Qaeda/lin)ed +roups are etter funded# they can o.er recruits selective

incentives li)e decent wa+es and health care services that other reel units and

ri+ades cannot, -n addition these etter/or+ani<ed# trained# and e=uipped al/Qaeda

lin)ed +roups o.er recruits a +reater chance of attle7eld success a+ainst the Syrian

Armed 8orces or other opponents within the reel opposition,

 This will entice memers of other reel +roups to 1oin ran)s with al/Qaeda/lin)ed +roups,

 The internationali<ation of the conict# with outside 7+hters from the Caucuses# Africa#

9urope# and @orth America# su++ests that international 1ihadists0 military inuence willcontinue to e;pand in the civil war, -S-S0 capture of Al/a from @orthern Storm not only

showed that al/Qaeda/lin)ed +roups levera+e their military superiority to ta)e political

control of reel/held territories ut also that they can use this to inuence other reels,

y ta)in+ Al/a# for instance# -S-S now controls a )ey resupply route for the reels#

+ivin+ the +roup +reater control over the distriution of weapons and vital

resources,! Given the aforementioned trends in the ac=uisition and utili<ation of

8/17/2019 The Prospective Military Power of Al Qaeda

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-prospective-military-power-of-al-qaeda 7/8

e;ternal support# it is proale that such support will enhance the military power of AQ/

aliated +roups over the ne;t two years,

?hile the +eneral conclusion may e alarmin+ to champions of 8SA/aliated factions in

Syria# the availale evidence points towards several strate+ies for enhancin+ the

military power of factions not aliated with AQ, 8irst# material and 7nancial support

must e supplemented with demonstrated cooperation etween 8SA/aliated factions,?ithout coordinated e.orts# the reels stand to lose +round to AQ/aliated +roups as

well as the Syrian Armed 8orces re+ardless of material assistance, Second# the *nited

States can attenuate the 2safe haven6 and 2e;ternal support6 advanta+es of AQ/

aliated +roups y wor)in+ closely with the -ra=i +overnment to clamp down on the

ow of resources from AQ- to their counterparts in northeastern Syria, These two

strate+ies may stem the tide of AQ/aliates0 military power over the course of the ne;t

two years,

!, Geeily# Maya, KSyrian -slamists split and mer+e,K @B?, Mercury Media -nc, $F

Septemer $%!&, ?e, F @ov $%!&,

$, >arfouch# Ali, KAssessin+ Syrias -slamic Alliances,KMiddle 9ast Bnline,6# !F Bctoer

$%!&, ?e, F @ov $%!&,

&, >olliday# oseph, 2Middle 9ast Security (eport 5: Syria0s Maturin+ -nsur+ency,6

?ashin+ton DC: -nstitute for the Study of ?ar# une $%!$, ",

E, >olliday# 2Middle 9ast Security (eport 5: Syria0s Maturin+ -nsur+ency,6 !",

5, @assief# -sael, 2Syria0s Southern attlefront,6 -nstitute for the Study of ?ar, Posted

Bctoer !!# $%!&,http:LLwww,understandin+war,or+Lac)+rounderLupdate/syrias/

southern/attlefront, &,

F, Dupree# onathan, 2Syria *pdate: (e+ime rea)s Sie+e of ?adi al/Deif,6 -nstitute forthe Study of ?ar,Posted April !"#

$%!&,http:LLwww,understandin+war,or+Lac)+rounderLsyria/update/re+ime/rea)s/sie+e/

wadi/al/deif 

, B0a+y# 9li<aeth, 2Middle 9ast Security (eport F: ihad in Syria,6 ?ashin+ton DC:

-nstitute for the Study of ?ar# Septemer $%!$, $5,

", >e++hammer# Thomas, 2Syria0s 8orei+n 8i+hters,6 8orei+n Policy Bnline, Posted

Decemer !%#

$%!&,http:LLmideastafrica,forei+npolicy,comLpostsL$%!&L!$L%HLsyriasforei+n7+htersNst

hash,A5F1Ew',9F+wfm,dps

H, Mi)e (o+ers# 8orei+n Policy -nstitute Syria Panel!%, Sinno# Adul)ader >, Br+ani<ations at war in Af+hanistan and eyond, Cornell

*niversity Press# $%%", p+, F

!!, (ania Aou<eid# Time Ma+a<ine Bnline March $&#

$%!&, http:LLworld,time,comL$%!&L%&L$&Lhow/islamist/reels/in/syria/are/rulin+/a/fallen/

provincial/capitalL

8/17/2019 The Prospective Military Power of Al Qaeda

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-prospective-military-power-of-al-qaeda 8/8

!$, Bliver >olmes and Ale;ander D<iados<# (euters une $%#

$%!&, http:LLwww,reuters,comLarticleL$%!&L%FL$%Lus/syria/reels/+overnance/

specialreport/id*S(9H5%5($%!&%F$%

!&, Mar+aret 'evi# (ule and (evenue !H"",

!E, ar7 and Oelin# $%!&

!5, 'andis# oshua, KThe Syrian *prisin+ of $%!!: ?hy the Assad (e+ime is 'i)ely to

Survive to $%!&,K Middle 9ast Policy Council, -,! 3$%!$4: n, pa+e, ?e, !5 Dec, $%!&,

!F, K*S and *J suspend non/lethal aid into Syria,K Al/a<eera, Al/a<eera# !$ Dec $%!&,

?e, !5 Dec $%!&,

!, ar7# ara)# and Aaron Oelin , KAl Qaedas Syrian Strate+y,K 8orei+n Policy, !% Bct

$%!&: n, pa+e, Print,

J9?B(DSTopics:

Al/Qaida and Aliated Movements Political conict and Riolence  Terrorist@etwor)s  Threat Assessment?eapons and Tactics

Research Area:

Riolent Groups and Movements

Regions:

Middle 9ast and @orth Africa