The Processes of International Negotiation Project Network Newsletter 21/2003

ContentsFrom the PIN Steering Committee 1Negotiation in Islam 1Negotiating European Integration 5Conference on “The Sources ofEuropean Negotiation” 7Workshop on Formal Models 8How People Negotiate 9Knowledge Diplomacy in theClimate Talks: A New PIN Project 10Professional Cultures inInternational Negotiation 11Universality of Negotiation 11Remembering Tallyrand 12From Peace to Justice 12

From the PIN SteeringCommittee

Negotiation in Islam

(continued on page 2)

The following statement is the major part of a lecture delivered by Professor Wahbahal-Zuhaili, Director, Department of Islamic Jurisprudence and its Schools, Faculty ofSharia, Damascus University, Syria, to the Saudi Arabian Foreign Ministry in Riyadh.Though in exegetical style, it carries an important message.

them to refrain from their worship offalse gods in order to plant in its placethe seed of true faith in God Almighty.Peaceful negotiations were morecommon than resorting to force andfighting. This is illustrated not only bythe fact that the legislation on Jihadoccurred approximately 15 years afterthe coming of the Prophet, but also bythe peaceful spirit and love of peacefound in many verses of the HolyQuran, among them the followingstatement of the Almighty:

60:8 God forbids you not, with regardto those who fight you not for (your)Faith nor drive you out of your homes,from dealing kindly and justly withthem: for God loveth those who are just.

60:9 God only forbids you, with regardto those who fight you for (your) Faith,and drive you out of your homes, andsupport (others) in driving you out, from

Negotiations are considered of majorimportance as a positive tool for

promoting peace, establishing securityand stability, spreading the spirit offriendship and understanding, improv-ing international relations, and enablingthe parties concerned to live in security,prosperity, and happiness. In Islam,negotiations are part of the decisive andserious dialogue that takes place betweenMuslims and others to end conflicts;negotiations enable the spread of theIslamic faith, foster good neighborlyrelations, strengthen the bonds of cordial-ity and cooperation, or facilitate theconclusion of cultural and economictreaties.

If war has been a common occur-rence among human beings since timeimmemorial, so too has negotiation.Negotiations are, in fact, a practice thatis frequently resorted to, even thoughthe literature may neglect to discuss it.For, in reality, cases of peace are morefrequent than cases of war; war is anunusual state of affairs for humanity—a dangerous situation requiringconsiderable preparation, training,sacrifice of money, and expenditure onarms. Among the earliest examples ofnegotiations are those concerningconflicts between primitive tribes overpastures or attempts to extend influenceor domination over an important loca-tion. We also find negotiations betweenmessengers and prophets and theirpeople to spread the call for the unifica-tion of God’s world, the acknowledgmentof His existence, and the institution ofHis laws; the arrival of such messen-gers caused disquiet and divisionbetween people and created conflictand intense discord. People clung to thepagan traditions of their fathers andancestors, and the Prophet desired

The goals of the PIN Group are thewidest-possible dissemination of

new information about negotiation,the development of networks ofscholars and practitioners who areinterested in the subject, and, moregenerally, the improved study andpractice of negotiation at the inter-national level. These goals are beingachieved repeatedly in the work of thePIN Program, as many items in thisissue of PINPoints will testify.

The international conference,organized by the French PIN networkand scheduled to take place in Parisfrom 11–12 December 2003, has at-tracted more than 50 internationalscholars to present research papers.Many more are coming to listen. PINmembers and their colleagues are activepresenters at international conferencessuch as those of the InternationalStudies Association and the Interna-tional Association for ConflictManagement. The book that we havepublished every year of the Program’sexistence reaches a large internationalaudience. We have held road showsaround the world. As we return fromTehran and Mannheim this year, weprepare for our visits to the Universityfor Peace (UPAZ) in Costa Rica andto Cairo University next year. As aresult of the Tehran meetings, theGroup is looking at conducting sup-port activities for dialogue among thefive riparian states of the Caspian Sea.Moreover, one of the forthcoming PINbooks analyzes (for the first time, oddlyenough) the European Union as a nego-tiation process.

On a wider front, six major conflictsin Africa are on the path to resolutionas a result of international negoti-ations. This is, of course, a sign of thetimes rather than a direct result of PINactivity. On the other hand, the leadingnations of the world, the members of

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the United Nations Security Council,are struggling to find the appropriatenegotiatory behaviors for dealing withstaggering problems such as Iraq,nuclear proliferation, and climatechange. We could go on and on, under-lining the importance of negotiationtoday, as we often do in these editorials.

Yet, it is through individual effortsthat progress is being made in theacademic field and among practitioners.In the academic world, there are veryfew programs for the study and analysisof negotiation and, more broadly, ofconflict management/resolution. Mostof those that do exist are located in theUnited States and, even there, they arenot many. Mainstream internationalrelations theory deftly skirts roundnegotiation; social psychology, after aperiod of active attention, passesbeyond it; economics does not knowhow to handle it. Circularly, as both acause and an effect, foundations payextraordinarily little attention tonegotiation. The Hewlett Foundation,which has graciously underwritten thePIN Program for some years since theCarnegie Corporation ended its

turning to them (for friendship andprotection). It is such as turn to them(in these circumstances), that dowrong.

The Holy Quran, al-Mumtahanah [Shethat is to be examined], Sura LX: 8–9

Legitimacy and Types ofNegotiations

In view of their peaceful nature,negotiations are more beneficial thanviolence and terror. Violence is a coerciveprocedure and its effect is temporary.Negotiating, on the other hand, isconstructive and stabilizing; it has alasting effect because it depends on theelements of rational persuasion andmutual respect, on the observation ofthe principle of equality, the endorse-ment of friendship and understanding,and the rejection of discord and strug-gle. Thus, the benefits of negotiationare immediate and come swiftly;moreover, the Almighty proclaimedthat compulsion on religion groundswas forbidden and undesirable:

2:256 Let there be no compulsion inreligion: Truth stands out clear fromError: whoever rejects evil and believesin God hath grasped the most trust-worthy hand-hold, that never breaks.And God heareth and knoweth allthings.

The Holy Quran , Baquara [TheHeifer], Sura II: 256

We find other signs and indicationsof the legitimacy of negotiations in theHoly Quran from the verses of thetime-honored Madani legislation, as inthis statement of the Almighty:

9:6 If one amongst the Pagans askthee for asylum, grant it to him, so thathe may hear the word of God; and thenescort him to where he can be secure.That is because they are men withoutknowledge.

The Holy Quran, Tauba [Repentance],Sura IX: 6

In his interpretation of this verse,Ibn-Kather says, “The purpose (of theverse) is that he who came from Dar

al-Harb (the land of war) to Dar al-Islam(the land of submission) to perform amission or commerce, or to requestreconciliation or a truce, or to carry ajiziah (tax taken from non-Muslims),or for other such reasons, and requestedfrom the Imam or his deputy safety, begiven safety for as long as he is visitingDar al-Islam and until he goes back tohis home and country.” Al-Qurtobi says:“This is correct. The pagans asked tomeet the Prophet Muhammad, God’sblessing and peace be upon him, in orderto talk about reconciliation and their otherworldly interests. This all happenedthrough the channels of negotiation.”

The statement of God Almighty alsoendorses negotiation:

8:61 But if the enemy incline towardspeace, do thou (also) incline towardspeace, and trust in God: for He is Onethat heareth and knoweth (all things).

The Holy Quran, Anfal [The Spoils ofWar], Sura VIII: 61

because there is no path to an under-standing on peace, to the adoption of

sponsorship, has been unique in its sup-port of the subject but is now reorganizingthe funding of its Conflict ManagementProgram. The important Carnegie Com-mission on Preventing Deadly Conflict,led by Dr David Hamburg, constituted amuch-needed and productive program,but its brief term is over. The US Instituteof Peace is a lone institution in the fieldwith a broad mission and limited means.MacArthur recently gave large grants toa series of American universities forsecurity studies; military studies havenever lacked for funds. It is reported thatthe Ford Foundation has established anew Conflict Management Program. It isabout time—and we await news of thecontent with interest.

This is not a plaintive cry of self-interest; the PIN Program has been ableto use the financial support it has receivedboth frugally and productively, and welook forward to its continuation on ourrecord. Rather, it is a call for attention tothe larger field and its needs—an alertaddressed to the program managers of thelarge foundations to start planning sup-port for research and institution-buildingwithin universities and other teaching and

research organizations; to assist themin developing and disseminating moreand better information about an activitythat is widely practiced in our daily livesand badly needed in the conflict-riddenworld of today. In a world where nationalleaders are trained in well-supportedtheories of International RelationsRealism, a new surge of program build-ing is needed for teaching, studying,disseminating, and improving theprocess of negotiation and conflictmanagement.

PIN is doing well, thank you, but wewould like some company please.

Rudolf AvenhausFranz Cede

Guy Olivier FaureVictor Kremenyuk

Paul MeertsGunnar Sjöstedt

I. William Zartman

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peace and to the granting of peace,except through negotiation. The verseon the legitimacy of neutrality alsoendorses this practice, and it is thestatement of God Almighty:

4:90 Accept those who join a groupbetween whom and you there is atreaty (of peace), or those who ap-proach you with hearts restrainingthem from fighting you as well asfighting their own people. If God hadpleased, He could have given thempower over you, and they would havefought you: Therefore if they withdrawfrom you but fight you not, and(instead) send you (guarantees of)peace, then God Hath opened no wayfor you (to war against them).

The Holy Quran, Nisaa [The Women],Sura IV: 90.

The Prophet Muhammad, God’sblessing and peace be upon him,entered into many negotiations with thepagans in Mecca and in Medina, beforethe outbreak of fighting and afterwards,and this demonstrates the legitimacy ofnegotiating.

One example is the negotiation bythe Prophet Muhammad, God’s bless-ing and peace be upon him, with theJews of Bani al-Nuzair in and aroundMedina over blood money for two menaccidentally killed by a Muslim.

Another is the negotiation by theProphet, God’s blessing and peace beupon him, during the Hudabiah Recon-ciliation, with the envoy of Quraish,Suhail ibn Ummr.

Another is the negotiation, with AbiSufian, the leader of Quraish, to endthe fighting during the conquest ofMecca. Abi Sufian said: “O messengerof God, the best warriors of Quraishhave been wiped out; there is noQuraish after this day.” The Prophet,God’s blessing and peace be upon him,replied: “He who shuts his door is safe,and he who enters the home of AbiSufian is safe.” So the people shut theirdoors.

Still another example is the negoti-ation by Prophet Muhammad, God’sblessing and peace be upon him, withBodail bin Warqa al-Khozaee, from thepeople of Tehama in Southwest Arabia,who informed the Prophet about thepreparation of Quraish to fight prior to

the Hudabiah Reconciliation. TheMessenger of God, Muhammad, God’sblessing and peace be upon him, said:“We did not come to fight anyone, butwe came as pilgrims to perform Omrah(the minor pilgrimage to Mecca). Thewar has exhausted Quraish and harmedthem. If they wish, I will make peacewith them for a time, provided theyallow me and the people to performOmrah…”

The Objectives of Negotiation

Among the most important objectivesof negotiation is to spread the Islamiccall. For example, during the hajjseason before his Hegira to Medina,the Prophet negotiated with six KazrajArabs from one of two major Arabtribes inhabiting Medina, calling themto Islam to help him deliver themessage of his God. The followingyear, the Prophet concluded the FirstAqaba Pledge of allegiance with 12men, 10 of whom came from theKazraj and 2 from the Oss, the secondmajor Arab tribe in Medina. The fol-lowing year, the Second Aqaba pledgeof allegiance included 73 men, amongthem 62 from the Kazraj and 11 fromthe Oss.

Other objectives of negotiation in-clude the settlement of an armedconflict, ending an ongoing war, ex-changing prisoners of war or ransom-ing them, as occurred on the firstmilitary encounter between the Muslimsand the pagans from Mecca during theGreat Bader Battle in the second yearafter Hegira. In that battle, an agree-ment was reached to ransom prisonersof war for 4,000 dirhams each; anyonewho did not have ransom, but wasproficient in reading and writing, wasassigned 10 boys from Medina toteach; and that was his ransom. Thiswas repeated in the wars of theMuslims against the Persians duringthe era of the Rightly Guided Caliphs,and with the Byzantines during the eraof the Umayyad and Abbasid caliph-ates. In 245 A.H. (A.D. 860), Mikhailbin Tufeel asked for negotiations toimplement peace between the Byz-antine state and the Abbasid state so thatthere could be a prisoner-of-war ex-change between them.

Negotiating can be used to ward offdanger from the Islamic lands; it caninclude the payment of money fromMuslims to others, as happened duringthe negotiations and treaty of recon-ciliation between the Muslims and theByzantines during the reign ofMo’aweiah. Negotiating can also beused to endorse good neighborlyrelations, or to stimulate trade andcommerce, and other vital interestsbetween the Muslims and others. Thisactually happened between the Islamicstate and the Byzantine state of easternEurope, the greatest European powerof the Middle Ages. Negotiating andpledging for the purposes of neigh-borliness, friendship, commerce, orany other objective to implement peaceand trade benefits, was frequent duringthe different Islamic epochs.

Among the examples of negotiationsand diplomatic activity was the dis-patch by three of the most powerfulAbbasid caliphs—Abu Jaafer al-Mansoor, al-Mahdi bin al-Mansoor,and Haroon al-Rashid bin al-Mahdi—of delegates to negotiate with court ofthe Franks to reinforce the alliancebetween the Abbasids and the Franksso that the Umayyad emirate inAndalusia would remain in constantfear of the threat of the Franks on itsmargins. As the negotiations and diplo-matic activity between the Abbasidsand the Franks reached their peak, andexchanges of precious gifts took placebetween Haroon al-Rashid andEmperor Charlemagne, politicalrelations between the Abbasids and theFranks were strengthened.

On the other side of the coin, thestrengthening of relations between theFranks and the Abbasids caused areaction on the part of the Byzantines,who feared further Frankish influencein Christendom, particularly afterCaliph Haroon al-Rashid sent the keysof the Church of the Resurrection inJerusalem to Charlemagne. As a result,the Byzantines turned to the Emirateof the Umayyads in Andalusia andincreased their negotiating activity anddiplomacy to foster the harmony of inter-ests on western Europe between theByzantines and the Andalusian Umay-yads. Negotiating missions came fromConstantinople to Cordoba, the capital

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of Andalusia, and the political relationsbetween these two capitals reached theirzenith during the reign of EmperorConstantine VII and the UmayyadCaliph Abd al-Rahman al-Nasser.

In most cases, negotiations takeplace to request the conclusion of areconciliation agreement or a truce,and an end to the state of tensionbetween nations, as happened duringthe negotiations to conclude theHudabiah Reconciliation in the sixthyear after Hegira. The Quraish sent aman called Suhail ibn Ummr to engagein a dialogue with Muhammad onreconciliation. When he arrived, hesaid: “O Muhammad, what has hap-pened was not the verdict of our wisemen, but something that was carriedout by the foolish among us. So releaseto us those whom you have takenprisoners.” The Prophet Muhammadsaid: “Not until you release thosewhom you have with you.” Then theyreleased Ottoman and the 10 men whowere with him, and Suhail said to theProphet, God’s blessing and peace beupon him: “Let me write a treaty betweenus and you.” When the Prophet saw it,he said: “God has facilitated your affair.”

The objectives of Islamic negotiationmultiplied and achieved numerousaims, among them consolidation ofpolitical, cultural, scientific, and socialties. Thus, during the Abbasid era, theMuslims sent negotiators to the capitalsof Europe to end a state of war, con-clude a commercial or a culturalalliance, and other similar matters.Negotiations pertaining to ending astate of war or settling conflicts tooktop priority in diplomatic relationsbetween the Islamic state and Europeanpowers. The cultural negotiations ofambassadors had numerous objectives;for example, to request rare books, andto study historical sites relating tooccurrences in the Islamic state orevents mentioned in the Holy Quran.One example is the mission of theAbbasid Caliph al-Wathiq (A.D 842–847) to Ephesus in Asia Minor to visitthe graves of Ahl al-Kahf (the Peopleof the Cave) who died as martyrsduring the days of Emperor Dakaldyanosand were mentioned in the Holy Quranin Sura al-Kahf (Sura XVIII).

In the modern age, as regional statesemerged, negotiations assumed the newrole of settling conflict on borders or incertain areas, such as islands, whetherbetween Muslims and other Muslimsor between Muslims and others, forexample, the border problems betweenIraq and Iran, between Qatar and Bah-rain, and between Qatar and SaudiArabia. Negotiations perform an impor-tant role in many scientific and militaryfields, such as obtaining expertise,buying weapons or manufacturingthem, and acquiring atomic know-howfor peaceful or military purposes.

Fundamentals of NegotiatingThe success of the negotiations de-pends on the commitment of the twosides, both Muslim and non-Muslim,to the fundamental rules governing theconduct of the negotiations. Agreementis usually reached in advance con-cerning these fundamental rules andconditions, and dialogue proceeds fromthere. The two sides will take cogni-zance of these fundamentals only ifthey have good intentions. Diplomaticcustoms and traditions have been suchthat the two sides first exchange lettersand messages until they reach anagreement on the practicalities ofending the conflict. These letters ormessages are drafted in an amicablestyle that seeks to remove whatevermalice and hatred there might be oneither side. Negotiations begin with theexpression of viewpoints, presentationof arguments and evidence in supportof one’s own case, and a reminder tothe other side of the principles ofnegotiation that were agreed upon.During negotiations, the Muslim sidemust pay as much attention to theIslamic interest as possible whenagreeing on issues, in line with theinstructions of the Imam to negotiators.One of the important factors of suc-cessful negotiation is the observanceof the principle of flexibility duringnegotiations to bring points of viewcloser, end the conflict, stabilizesecurity and peace, and replace disputeand conflict with cordiality andunderstanding.

An excellent example of the flexibilityof Muslims during negotiations came

during the Hudabiah Reconciliation.The Prophet, God’s blessing and peacebe upon him, called for Suhail ibn Ummr,the man sent by the Quraish to negoti-ate the peace treaty, and instructed himto write at the top of the page of thetreaty, “In the name of God, the MostGracious, the Most Merciful.” Suhail,however, objected, saying, “As for ‘theMost Gracious, the Most Merciful,’ Ido not know God by that name. Let uswrite (instead), ‘In thy name, O Allah’.”The Muslims said: “By God! We willnot write this; we will write only, ‘Inthe name of God, the Most Gracious, theMost Merciful’.” But the Prophet, God’sblessing and peace be upon him,instructed Suhail to write, ‘In thy name,O Allah’. Then Muhammad continued,“This is what Muhammad, the Messen-ger of God, agreed to.” But Suhail said:“I don’t believe that you are theMessenger of Allah. If I did, I wouldnot have kept you away from the Kaabaand I would not have fought you. So,write ‘Muhammad, the son of AbdAllah’.” The Prophet, God’s blessingand peace be upon him, replied: “ByGod! I am the Messenger of God, evenif you have accused me of lying.” TheProphet, however, agreed that heshould be referred to in the treaty as“Muhammad, son of Abd Allah.” TheMuslims were very upset at this, andone of them cried out, “Are you notAllah’s Messenger, and are we notMuslims? How can we accept such treat-ment when we are right and they arewrong?” But the Prophet knew whatwas best and the Treaty of Hudabiahwas signed.

These are the important features ofnegotiations in Islam and if theydemonstrate anything, it is the pre-eminence of Islamic thought anddiplomacy and that Islamic negotia-tions do not differ in their proceduresand results from modern principles ofnegotiations. They also demonstratethat where an important aim is in view,Muslims are credible and high-principled, disciplined, ambitious intheir objectives, and superior in boththeir intentions and their resolve.

Translation by Turki al-Tamimi.Translations from The Holy Quran by

Abdullah Yusuf Ali

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Negotiating European Integration

tion. It is doing this in two ways: bycovering more and more aspects of thesubstantive areas that it views as its owndomain and by strengthening the EUinstitutions. The supranational elements,such as the European Commission, theEuropean Parliament, and the EuropeanCourt of Justice, are being beefed up, asare the intergovernmental bodies, such asthe European Council of Heads of Statesand Government Leaders, the Council ofMinisters, and the whole range of work-ing groups and committees served bynegotiators from the public and—to a farlesser extent—the private sector.

Member states organize themselvesinto coalitions. Stable coalitions can beseen along North–South lines (rich andpoor, but mainly the Germanic versus Latincultures). There is also a supranational–intergovernmental axis, Atlanticismversus Continentalism, free traders versusprotectionists, big countries and smallcountries, and so on. All these groupingsare cross-cutting: one country is alwayspart of more than one “structural” allianceand, in addition to this, there are countlessdifferent coalitions on different issues.The effect of these coalition patterns istwofold: they both slow down and sta-bilize EU negotiation processes. The EUmay well be a negotiation arena thatsecures both European and nationalinterests, but it does not enhance thestrength of the Union as a global actor.The Union is (still) no match for theUnited States, which is capable ofbreaking up EU consensus on vital worldquestions such as the war againstterrorism, the International CriminalCourt in The Hague, and the interventionagainst Iraq. The European Union is, asa negotiated framework, both powerfuland vulnerable, united and disunited, afortress and a free-for-all.

The present negotiation process can becharacterized as an international multi-lateral process based on multilateralintranational negotiations. The interna-tional multilateral process, however, hasbeen affected by two other dimensions,the first being the drive for supra-nationalism and the other being nationalor intranational policy making.

From the very beginning, the memberstates realized that a workable EU wouldbe impossible without at least a partialtransfer of sovereignty to supranational

bodies, in the first instance, the Com-mission. The effect is that EU negotiationprocesses cannot be seen as purely inter-national. If we define an internationalnegotiation process as something thatcannot really be controlled because theworld lacks a strong third party to makea decision if international negotiationsfail—and here we apologize to the UnitedNations and, in particular, to the SecurityCouncil and the International Court ofJustice—then, at least parts of the EUnegotiation processes cannot be calledinternational. Where the Commission hasa strong role to play and states can decideby qualified majority voting (mainly inthe first pillar and partly in the thirdpillar)—though they will always try toreach consensus first—a distinctnegotiation process comes into being,which we can label “supranationalnegotiation.” The difference betweeninternational and supranational nego-tiations, then, is a difference in control.As national negotiations are very muchcontrolled by national governments,international negotiations have more ofa free-for-all character and supranationalnegotiations are an in-between hybrid. Interms of the negotiation process, it hasbeen observed that supranational nego-tiations are more intense (because of thethreat to be outvoted) than their inter-national counterpart.

This drive toward supranationalism, inother words the creation of a strong nego-tiating framework to enhance the ef-fectiveness of international negotiations,is not a new development. After the fallof the Roman Empire, whose formerborders are still at the root of the culturalrift between the EU countries of the Northand South—expressing itself, inter alia,in the usage of French and English in EUplenary sessions—the Europeans tried toreplace the Roman order by a hierarchicalframework of sovereign states. Thisstructure decayed during the Middle Agesand came to an end in the middle of the17th century at the Peace Conference ofWestphalia (1648).

Countries then tried to keep thebalance in a system of sovereign statesthat were formally equal, although some,of course, were far more equal than others.Stability was constantly threatened by theuse of force, with international negotia-tion becoming a tool in warfare. States

The European Union (EU) is oneenormous negotiation process. What

is this process about today? And will itbe about in the years to come, once theEU has deepened and widened?

The EU started off as a confidence-building mechanism between the FederalRepublic of Germany and France. Bothcountries wanted to prevent another warin Europe by making an economic arrange-ment that would create a stable and securesituation with economic benefits as aspin-off. Thus, in 1952, the European Coaland Steel Community was established;but France and Germany needed someneutral partners to help them forge a long-lasting stability. So Italy and the Beneluxcountries stepped into the process.

Ever since, this multilateral frameworkfor international negotiations has beenexpanding: within the economic realm(first pillar), into the security and foreignpolicy dimension (second pillar), and inthe arena of justice and home affairs(third pillar). Apart from widening itsnumber of new areas of concern, how-ever, the EU has also enlarged itsmembership. It is broadening in twoways: by increasing the number of policyareas and the number of partners to beintegrated.

New countries have entered the ringin several waves: Denmark, Ireland, andthe United Kingdom (1973); Greece(1981); Portugal and Spain (1986); andAustria, Finland, and Sweden (1995).The Fifteen have now decided to accept10 new members in 2004: Cyprus, CzechRepublic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, andSlovenia. Bulgaria and Romania may joinin 2007, and Croatia may well be slottedin before that. Turkey will have to wait,let’s speculate, until 2015. By that date,countries such as Albania, Bosnia andHerzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia willalso be serious candidates—and Norwayand Switzerland, too: it’s up to them. TheEU may end up in the first quarter of the21st century with some 35 states, sharingborders with the non-member states ofthe Organization of the Islamic Confer-ence, the Commonwealth of IndependentStates, and Israel, of course, though somecommentators see that country as a futuremember of the European Union.

The EU is not only broadening itshorizons, but also deepening its coopera-

mix of supranational and internationalnegotiation processes on the Europeanlevel, with a growing circus of bilateraland trilateral bargaining.

What then about national negotiationsor, better still, intranational negotiationprocesses? As the EU grows in substanceand area, national coordination becomesmore and more important and more andmore difficult. It becomes more importantbecause decisions taken in Brussels havean ever-growing impact on nationalpolicy making. Therefore, ministries willhave to set clear priorities and cooperateas effectively as possible. While biggermember states can still relax somewhatin this respect, the smaller states have notime and plenty of power to lose. Theyare obliged to be as effective as possiblein their multilateral intranational nego-tiations. This is a particular shock for thenew member states in Central Europe.They have only 10 years of experiencein coordinative negotiations betweenequal ministries. Before that, the SovietUnion and the communist party took thedecisions. Even the old member statesthemselves are confronted by multiplyingcoordination problems. The Ministries ofForeign Affairs (MFAs) can hardly copewith the growth of negotiation processesbetween the specialized ministries at atime when coordination is needed morethan ever. Some policy makers havealready started to think aloud about theoption of decentralizing the tasks of theForeign Ministries to specializedministries, adding a foreign affairscoordination unit on to the Office of thePrime Minister, and doing away with theMFA. As one additional argument is thatas the bulk of the negotiation processesin the EU deal with national affairs, onlysecond-pillar matters should remain inthe foreign affairs domain and the worldoutside the EU, of course. But as moreand more foreign policy making becomesintegrated within the EU, the room forindependent external policies outside itis also diminishing. What will be the roleof the diplomatic negotiator?

We would like to postulate that,because of the deepening of the process,the role of the diplomatic negotiator willbe taken over, and actually has been takenover already in many areas, by civil ser-vice negotiators, both at the national aswell as the supranational and interna-tional levels. It has been noticed that thereare not enough specialized civil servantsto run the negotiation processes in a

thought to reverse this by using warfareonly as a last resort in conflict manage-ment, should negotiation not work. Toenhance the stability of the internationalnegotiation processes between theEuropean states, more and more multi-lateral conferences, such as the one atWestphalia, were organized. One shouldnote, however, that such conferenceswere multilateral only in the sense thatmore than two or three countries partici-pated. The negotiations remained parallelbilateral. It was only at the Congress ofVienna at the beginning of the 19th centurythat real multilateral negotiations could beobserved. At the beginning of the 20th

century, this multilateralism was institu-tionalized in the League of Nations and,later, in the United Nations. For genuine,peaceful cooperation and integration,however, this proved to be inadequate.Consequently, supranationalism wasintroduced as the highest stage of stablenegotiation processes between states.

Does this mean that supranationalnegotiation will be the dominant nego-tiation mode in the EU at the end of the21st century? There are no signs of this.Intergovernmentalism is on the rise againand, as a result, so is international negoti-ation in its multilateral and bilateralformat. Why is this? On the one hand, ithas to do with the cyclical character ofEU processes. Times of further integra-tion are balanced by times of nationalreaction, followed by more international-ization and supranationalization. But italso has to do with the character of thenegotiation processes themselves. Themore actors and the more issues, the morecomplex the multilateral process.Supranational negotiations are part of thesolution for rising complexity, the otherpart being intergovernmental bilateraland trilateral negotiations, includinglobbying. The negotiation process cannotbe managed inside the multilateral modeas much as it could in the past (thoughmany of the most important decisions inthe EU have undoubtedly been “pre-cooked” in small caucuses). The resultis a process around the process, makingthings more manageable perhaps, butincreasing opacity and frustrating con-certed cooperation. The growth of cen-tered negotiation processes in the EUprovokes an increase in centrifugalnegotiation processes that tend to run ina parallel instead of integrated way. Is thisa regression to 17th century practices? Forthe time being, we will probably see a

smooth way. Civil service generalists willhave to oversee the job—bureaucrats indiplomats’ clothing, one might argue.Several problems arise here. The linkagebetween the different substantive areascould be endangered, as this new breedof negotiators will direct their efforts onto their own sector and will not take intoaccount the “packages” between theseareas. This might then secure a role—nolonger a dominant role as in the 20th

century—for the old-fashioned but prob-ably newly styled EU diplomat. He/shewill also be needed in the external EUnegotiations as far as the second pillarstuff is concerned but will lose out on firstand third pillar external relations. Whilediplomats are trained to overcome cul-tural and emotional rifts, civil servantsmay not be so well-versed in such proce-dures. The consequence could be a less-rational negotiation process within theEU, which is a dangerous development ona continent that has been devastated byreligious and ideological wars. More atten-tion is needed to the emotional factor inEU negotiation processes. As it happens,negotiators of the countries of the Northhave more difficulty in dealing with thisthan their counterparts from the Southwhere networking is their bread and butter.

We would also like to postulate thatnot only the deepening but also thebroadening of the EU will complicate andchange EU negotiation processes, mainlybecause of the rising number of actors.EU member countries are contemplatingmore institutionalization and even tooksome decisions on this in Nice under theFrench Presidency. This will not, however,lead to a further reduction in nationalsovereignty or even to greater politicalmaneuverability, and European countriesdo not like this very much, to say the least.So the process will be slow and, even if itis successful, there will be doubts as tohow much more effective the moreinstitutionalized and formal negotiationsare over ad hoc and informal ones.

But there is also a question of culturehere: systemic, political and bureaucratic,and societal. Systemic, because the varietyof political cultures will increase, makingmatters less comparable and less trans-parent. The EU already faces differences,such as those between centralized countries(France, Sweden), and decentralized ones(Germany, Belgium). This systemic in-comparability already leads to confusion,behavioral differences between negotiators,and obstacles to effective decision

6

making. Political, because the behavioraldifferences between the network cultureof the South and the process culture ofthe North will be complicated by thehierarchical cultures in most of the can-didate member states. Their politicalculture has been shaped by centralizeddemocracy, based on a much older layerof autocratic rule under the AustrianEmperors, the Ottoman Sultans, and theRussian Tsars. As “take” seems to makemore common sense than “give and take,”the EU might be in for a surprise as faras negotiation processes are concerned.These differences in outlook are strength-ened by bureaucratic and societal habitsand will profoundly change the negotia-tions inside and outside Brussels. Trustmay be faltering and it will take time toredress this.

Then there is the multiplication ofissue areas. New issues will be integratedinto the process, more coordination willbe needed, and the negotiation processwill be complicated further. There is abright side to this, however. The moreissues and the more options, the morelikely there are to be integrative insteadof distributive negotiating processes.

Conference on “The Sources of European Negotiation” Held in Paris

diplomacy, which, in those days, wasseen as a form of palace intrigue andinvolved the extensive use of corridors.This diplomacy borrowed its strategiesfrom Florentine creativity and itsopenness to other cultures from Venetianshrewdness. It was subtle and abundantwith its frequent pirouettes and secretcorrespondence, its intricate games anduse of go-betweens. Later, it evolved intotable diplomacy—and cocktail and “petitfours” diplomacy. Under such conditions,it is no surprise that Sir Henry Wotton, alate 16th-century English diplomat,described an ambassador as “an honestman sent to lie abroad for the good of hiscountry.”

Richelieu, adviser to the king ofFrance, then elaborated the concept ofongoing negotiation, a process defined asa way of effectively managing royalaffairs. Negotiation took on a mainlypreventive function and was designed toavoid the possibility of open conflict.Such a concept is quite a way from theearlier idea of negotiation as the art ofweaving plots.

On the initiative of Alain Lempereur, diplomatic scholars and practitioners came togetherat a conference on the Sources of European Diplomacy, organized by the School ofAdvanced Economic and Commercial Studies (ESSEC) in Paris from 18–19 June 2003.Among the analysts present were historians (Marc Fumaroli, Bernard Barbiche,Madeleine Hael, Lucien Bély); political scientists (Charles Cogan); lawyers (AlainLempereur); economists (Christophe Dupont); sociologists (Guy Olivier Faure). Amongthe practitioners were Alain Plantey, former diplomatic advisor to Général de Gaulle;Hubert Védrine, former French minister of foreign affairs; Jean-Bernard Mérimé, formerFrench representative at the UN Security Council; and Alain Lamassoure, member ofthe European Parliament.

To summarize, we see an EU negoti-ation process that will be so complex thatit might, in itself, be an obstacle to furtherintegration. At the same time, the possibil-ities for integrated solutions will be onthe rise. The result may be a new balance,where the EU will continue to grow as asystem, and a process that will be largerthan the sum of its parts. At the sametime, there will be important issue areaswhere the parts will be—and perhaps willbecome—too large for the common good.This disparity may develop along thelines of the internal and the external posi-tion of the EU. Internally, more powerand possibilities will be generated.Externally, the EU may remain what it istoday, or might even slide back to be-coming a coalition that cannot get its acttogether.

For EU negotiation, this would meangrowing interdependency of national,international, and supranational negotia-tion processes. Politicians and civilservants would dominate the scene;diplomats would lose their hegemony. Inthe relations between the EU and theoutside world, however, the distributionof roles would be more balanced.

Politicians, civil servants, and diplomatswould be of equal importance to negoti-ators. They would have to find a balancedinterplay. Power would be less central-ized than inside the EU and, while externalforces would have little impact on theinternal EU negotiation process, theywould be more able to distort the externalones. While, internally, a common negoti-ation market might be expected, it wouldprobably remain a partial free-for-all inthe external sphere, especially as far ascommon foreign policy and security areconcerned.

To conclude, we would like to statethat EU negotiation processes will be asufficient tool in managing the commonand diverging interests of the EUcountries in the first quarter of the 21st

century. After that, they could hamperfurther integration as long as theseprocesses remain rooted in the intranationalnegotiations as we know them today. Anew format will have to be found then and,yes, the political system of the UnitedStates could be the model here, as long asEurope can guard and enhance its owninherent cultural values.

Paul Meerts

There was a time when French was thelanguage of diplomacy, and French

diplomats were particularly active indeveloping their thinking on negotiationin the classical age. Remarkable practi-tioners, such as Hotman de Villiers, deWicquefort, de Callières, Pecquet,Bonnot de Mably, and de Felice, have lefta substantial legacy from the 17th and 18th

centuries. From diplomacy “in spirit” to the“spirit of diplomacy.” A theory of bal-anced Mazarin-style diplomacy was nowdeveloped and fostered; negotiation wasno longer the court of last resort before awar but a presage of peace. Moreover, towrite about negotiation at that time was

to pen a treatise on the most effective ap-plication of the intellect and the passions.From those early diplomatic seeds spranga whole field of European public law.

Negotiation as we know it in the westwas invented by the Greeks and Romans.The process was conducted in a mannerthat would ensure its effectiveness: overa banquet. The first modern Europeandiplomats were the Papal Nuncios, therepresentatives of a Church that wasvying for influence. Thereafter came thetechnicians and virtuosos of negotiationof 15th century Italy.

It took a French Protestant, Hotmande Villiers, to codify the principles of

7

8

With de Felice, the pre-romantic his-torical context became highly influential.Men were moved by their passions; thepoint, therefore, was to discover what theother person’s passions were and to hideone’s own; then to make strategic use ofone’s discoveries.

De Callières made explicit the ap-proach of shifting from a confrontationalrationale to a “logic of complicity.” Thepoint here was the subtle quest forconsensus by cooling down the passionsand cultivating cardinal diplomatic valuessuch as patience. Form and substance com-pleted each other, and rhetoric reinforcedthe intentions of the negotiator. GreatEuropean peace conferences such asthose at Münster and Osnabruck, themasterly treaties of Westphalia, Nijmegen,Rijswijk, and Utrecht bear witness tostrong borrowing from these principles.

From the French Revolution to thepresent day, the model has evolved con-siderably between two major historicmilestones: the last legacy of the classicalage, Talleyrand at the Vienna Congress,

and the modern age with de Gaulle, thevery opposite of the chameleon nego-tiator, reintroducing values, charisma anda sense of universality. The de Gaullemethod relies on a long-term vision andaims to substitute state reason for statepassion. The diplomat has to be rationaland strategic. In the modern world, thecapacity to negotiate expresses theindependence of the country: “I negoti-ate, therefore I am.” Whenever possible,one has to start from a position of strengthand compensate for a lack of power by afirmness of attitude.

Sincerity is not a handicap as itstrengthens credibility. To negotiate overthe conditions within which the nego-tiation will subsequently be carried outis the most important phase of thenegotiation. The way one treats the otherparty is essential; one should not hurt thepride of a people, the dignity of itsrepresentatives. To honor the other is tohonor oneself. Symbolic gestures alsoplay also an important role, and must beused to enhance reality.

Today, negotiations are not a one-timeevent but are continuous and multilateral.Being able to assess the power balanceis a basic requirement, as is discoveringthe real goal of the other party. Nego-tiators have to be realistic about them-selves, to understand how they are viewedby their counterparts. They have toperceive what might be an effectivecompromise, propose it at exactly theright moment, and be able to explain itlater in the face of public opinion whichis rarely inclined to compromise. In thiscase, anticipation plays an essential part.Multilaterality calls for coalition buildingwith a quasi-infinite number of possibi-lities. It has to be played as if one were achess player able to manage 10 gamessimultaneously. One must also integratethe time dimension because the adversaryof today may be the necessary ally oftomorrow.

Guy Olivier Faure

Workshop on Formal Models

A workshop for the PIN project,“Formal Models for International

Negotiations,” was held from 14–15 June2003 at IIASA. The project, in particularits origins and objectives, was describedin a call for proposals in PINPoints issue18/2002; earlier contributions to thesubject were presented in severalPINPoints (e.g.,16/2001).

Leen Hordijk, Director of IIASA,opened the workshop with a broad over-view of the past and present scientificwork of IIASA. This was followed by apresentation by the workshop organizers,Rudolf Avenhaus and I. William Zartman,of the concepts behind the workshop, asoutlined in the earlier call for proposalsand on the basis of their written intro-duction to the project which had beendistributed to participants.

Ten invited speakers gave papers rep-resenting a broad international spectrumof expertise in the field. The papers maybe grouped into three categories, asfollows:

Analyses of formal models in general

• Rationality of Choice versus Rationalityof Knowledge (Andrej Wierzbicki,Poland);

• Procedural Design for Conflict Resolu-tion (Matthias Raith, Germany); and

• Bridging Games and Diplomacy(Michel Rudnianski, France).

Analyses of formal models withapplications• A Strategy-proof Procedure for

Negotiating Multilateral Treaties(Steven J. Brams, USA, D. MarcKilgour, Canada, and M. Renzi Sanver,Turkey);

• Using Formal Models for AddressingPractical Problems in Negotiations(Daniel Druckman, USA, and SerdarGüner, Turkey);

• Formal Models for Forecasting Out-comes of Negotiations of InterstateConflicts (Rudolf Avenhaus andThomas Krieger, Germany);

• The Graph Model for Conflict Reso-lution as a Tool for Negotiators (D.Marc Kilgour, Canada); and

• Recent Developments in InternationalRelations (Barry O´Neill, USA).

Formal models for concretenegotiations• International Negotiations on Climate

Change: A Non-cooperative Game

Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol (AkiraOkada, Japan); and

• The IIASA Rains Model (MarkusAmann, IIASA).Following the presentations of papers

by their authors, participants gave pre-pared statements; thereafter all partici-pants made contributions to the betterunderstanding and formulation of thepapers.

To end the workshop, there was a generaldiscussion, centering around questionssuch as, Were important topics omitted?and Lessons for theory and practice? Theresults of these discussions will be takeninto account in the conclusions whichwill be made available in due course.

Full papers, completed or improveddue to the workshop findings, are ex-pected to be ready towards the end of 2003.Revisions and possible further contribu-tions are expected to take a year. Thus, ifall goes according to plan, a manuscriptcould be ready for publication at the endof 2004. A second workshop, to include abroader range of presentations, is plannedfor 12 June 2004, also in Laxenburg, andthe book should appear in 2005; SpringerVerlag has expressed interest.

Rudolf Avenhaus

9

Recently Published by PIN

How People Negotiate: Resolving Disputes in Different CulturesEdited by Guy Olivier Faure

This book is a compilation ofnegotiation stories, presented with an

integrative overview. The project wasoriginally designed as a fishing expedi-tion—throwing out nets, seeing what sur-faced, then letting the catch speak for itself.

Some negotiation stories are strangeand exotic, coming from China, Egypt,the United Arab Emirates, Guatemala, theHoly Land, Indonesia, Israel, Kenya,Korea, Lebanon, the ancient Middle East,New Guinea, Nigeria, Russia, Turkey,and Zaire. Others are drawn from westernsettings such as France, Germany, and theUnited States but are not always too obvi-ously concerned with negotiations. Someof these negotiations are exotic in their ownright, such as negotiating with oneself,negotiating one’s own way through bicycletraffic, animals appearing to negotiate witheach other, an observation framed as anegotiation with an armchair. The storiesbegin with Abraham negotiating with theLord about the fate of Sodom, the firstrecorded account of negotiations known.

These negotiations tell something newand unusual about negotiation. They areappealing, intriguing, exciting, intellectu-ally challenging, and original. They shedlight on new angles to negotiation. Fi-nally, they tell something more about theworld we live in and, indirectly, they alsoteach us about ourselves.

Guy Olivier Faure

Introduction

Part I: Negotiation: Definition andScope

01 Negotiating with an ArtifactCécile Deman

02 Do Horses Negotiate?Françoise Burgaud

03 Negotiation with the SelfVictor Kremenyuk

Part II: Problem Framing andReference Points

04 Abraham and the LordFrom The Bible

05 Never Miss a BargainNasir ed-Din Khodja

06 The Perfect SwitchJiwen Sushui

07 The Beggar Needs a Better LifeSurya Sukanta

08 Negotiating in the Deep FreezeI. William Zartman

09 Co-Payment of a Traffic TicketHonggang Yang

10 Just a Small ThingDaqian Wang

11 Young Girl’s WishAmy Tan

Part III: Risk and Stress Management

12 Cycling in BeijingGuy Olivier Faure

13 Rahab and the SpiesFrom The Bible, presented bySteven Brams

14 Tushratta’s Requests to thePharaohsSerdar Güner and Daniel Druckman

Part IV: Escalation and Entrapment

15 The Oyster and the DisputantsLa Fontaine, translated byI. William Zartman

16 A Question of PatienceChristine Sournia

17 The Stupid Egg SellerXiangling Li

18 On the Back of a CamelEvangelos Papadopoulos

Part V: Deception, Tricks, andStategems

19 Mrs. SweetnessFeng Menlong, presented byAnkhy Ia

20 The Chinese NephewAuthor unknown

Part VI: Fairness

21 The PasswordWang Xianghong

22 Which Is My Half?Nasir ed-Din Khodja

23 The Faustian BargainPresented by Alexander Mehlmann

Part VII: Power Issues

24 Selling and Buying Hahm in KoreaSung Hee Kim

25 Resisting the UniformAnne Faure Bouteiller

26 Did You Pay the Ferryman?Joanna R. Cameron

27 Encountering the “Green Visitors”Charles-Édouard de Suremain

Part VIII: Cultural Issuesand Identity

28 Restaurant BargainingLambros Anagnostopoulos

29 Personal Encounters AbroadFrancis Deng

30 A Sexually Demanding Husbandand a Domineering Mother-in-LawM. Faour

Part IX: Third-Party Interventionand Mediation

31 Peace Negotiation in the NewGuinea HighlandsWilliam L. Ury

32 Nyabeda TragedyMzee Javan Odenyo

33 The Case of the Lost ToothRichard T. Antoun

34 Negotiating within the KinshipPlatformNze Ozichukwu Chukwu

Conclusion

10

Knowledge Diplomacy in the Climate Talks: A New PIN Project

climate talks as a whole. Typically, actors(national governments, coalitions ofstates, international organizations) drawfrom the power base at their disposal inorder to carry through a negotiationstrategy or to defend their interests moregenerally. For example, effectiveleadership in the climate talks dependson the capacity to use relatively superiorknowledge to frame proposals and arguefor them at the table. Knowledge is likelyto sustain almost any negotiation strategyone way or the other, but it is particularlyeffective for supporting approaches basedon rational argumentation that explainwhat is “good for you and good for me.”

This perspective highlights theleadership problem not only in theclimate talks but in other multinationalnegotiations on complex issues. In com-plex negotiations, leaders also need tohave sanctioning power in order todiscipline other parties and make themoffer sacrifices in the exchange-of-concessions game. Sanctioning power,however, is obviously not a sufficientcondition for leadership in the climatetalks or in any other similar negotiationson highly complex issues. A leader in theclimate talks has to be able to persuadeother negotiating parties that a certainapproach to coping with the climateproblem is—or is not—effective and fair.If the effectiveness and fairness argu-ments cannot be accepted on rationalgrounds, then a negotiating strategy onthe part of the hegemonic leader to en-courage cooperation by other delegateshas little chance of producing a sus-tainable agreement.

The agency/structure perspective onknowledge in the climate talks offers anumber of approaches to supporting andfacilitating these negotiations. Forexample, capacity building in order tosupport poor, developing (African)countries in pursuing their specialinterests would probably represent animportant way of smoothing the progressof the climate talks.

This agency/structure perspective hasimportant flaws, however. In someregards it is too simplistic. Process needsto be introduced into the analysis. Theimpact of knowledge on a negotiation andits outcome is determined by how it ishandled during the process. In the pre-Kyoto negotiations, knowledge was

processed in a way that was highlyinstrumental in the search for anagreement but which will probably notbe repeated in the post-Kyotonegotiations.

The history of the negotiations onclimate change distinguishes them fromother multilateral talks such as, forexample, the rounds of the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)and the World Trade Organization(WTO). The GATT/WTO rounds wereinitiated by a leading power, the UnitedStates, which invited other countries toparticipate. Not unusually, coercivepower was employed in the pre-negotiations, even if military power wasirrelevant.

The climate talks had an entirelydifferent character. A distinctive featurewas the leading role of the internationalscientific community in the pre-negotiations. When climate change wasput on the international agenda in themiddle of the 1980s, this issue was fairlyunknown, not only by policy makers butalso in scientific circles. Therefore, issueclarification required exceptional mea-sures, one of which was the institutionof the IPCC, an organization for thegeneration and accumulation of scientificknowledge concerning climate warming.The climate issue, as we now understandin it in the political discourse, wasessentially constructed in the pre-Kyotonegotiations.

Using the IPCC as a principal instru-ment, the world scientific communitytook the initiative of identifying and fram-ing the climate issue. This enterprise wascontinuously supervised, however, bynational delegations. Although theinternational scientific communityprovided the basic knowledge/information,national delegations also actively par-ticipated in the construction of theclimate issue. The climate issue was notdelivered to them but was rather a resultof their own doing in collaboration withthe international scientific community.Hence, national delegations were them-selves responsible for the construction ofthe climate issue, and this situation hadfar-reaching consequences. The agree-ment on the construction of the climateissue did not simply represent a widelyaccepted frame of reference. It alsoimplicitly included a set of basic

According to the Swedish diplomat, BoKjellen, who for many years has

chaired large environmental conferences,as well as serving as chief environmentalnegotiator for both Sweden and theEuropean Union, a new diplomacy hasbeen particularly highlighted in theclimate talks. New categories of actorshave entered the game and old actors havetaken on new roles. New negotiationstrategies have been developed and themix of background factors influencingthe negotiations has been altered.

Many of these changes are associatedwith the increased importance ofscientists, and ultimately of scientificknowledge, in international environ-mental negotiations. The climate talks arean extreme case in this regard. TheIntergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange (IPCC) represents a new ap-proach that has given the internationalscientific community a prominent role inmultilateral negotiations. There is nodoubt that the IPCC has functioned as acrucial driver in the negotiations that firstproduced the 1992 Framework Agreementon Climate Change and, five years later,led to the1997 Kyoto Protocol. The issueof climate warming—causes, effects, andcountermeasures—is so complex that itneeds to be framed and expressed inscientific language even when beingconsidered in a political context. Thus,in all negotiations directly or indirectlyconcerning climate change, it has beennecessary to establish a common under-standing of the issues being negotiated.Scientific knowledge allows the natureof the problem of climate warming to beexpressed, produces suitable counter-measures, and contributes to clarifyingthe risks related to causes, effects, andcountermeasures.

Knowledge diplomacy is an importantelement of the new diplomacy that hasemerged during the last decades. Theagency/structure debate offers a tradi-tional approach of bringing knowledgeinto the diplomatic game of the climatetalks. Seen in this perspective, knowledgeis part of the structure that constrains thechoices and performance of the actors ornegotiating parties. More specifically,knowledge is part of the power baseunderpinning the climate talks, and isassociated both with individual negotia-tion strategies and the facilitation of the

11

objectives. A special and crucial featureof the pre-Kyoto talks on climate changewas that joint interests and joint ob-jectives were established before theparties took positions. This is differentfrom the usual situation of a typicalmultinational negotiation where the mainchallenge is to construct joint interests onthe basis of differing, separate interests.The difference between the two ap-proaches is immense. Most, if not all,delegations were simply not able todiscern their separate interests before thejoint interests, nested in consensual issueknowledge, had been developed. It maybe argued that the emerging consensualknowledge was a substitute for failing

leadership in the climate talks on theKyoto Protocol.

Since Kyoto the situation has changedin many ways. If the negotiation of theKyoto Protocol was a success, itsimplementation has been something of afailure. Thus, the current debate isparticularly concerned with how theclimate talks might become moreeffective. The argument is often heardthat adequate knowledge is needed for thedesign of an effective climate regime. Thenegotiations are not served by moreresearch. The main strategy should be touse existing knowledge in a creative way.This appears to be a rational approach ifthe climate talks are looked at through

International Conference, “Universality of Negotiation,” To Be Held in Paris

An international conference onnegotiation will be held in Paris from

11–12 December 2003. The conferenceis being organized by the French PINgroup and NEGOCIA, a French businessschool belonging to the Paris Chamberof Commerce. The main topic will beUniversality of Negotiation—Cuttingacross Domains, Disciplines, Approaches,Cultures, Conceptualization and Practice.

The purpose of this conference is tocreate a synergy between different fields

of negotiation (e.g., business, social, inter-national, environmental) by examining anumber of interrelated themes, such asconflicts and cooperation, cultures andidentities, ethics and finalities, teaching,training and apprenticeship. The con-ference will provide an opportunity toseek out, as a group, a common base oreventual cross-references betweenvarious fields of negotiation.

An audience of 400 researchers andpractitioners is expected. The language

of the conference will be French, withsimultaneous translation into English formost of the workshops. A publication inFrench and another in English com-prising the most significant contributionson research and practice will follow.

Information can be obtained from thefollowing Web site: www.negocia-evenementiel.com

Guy Olivier Faure

Part I: IntroductionGunnar Sjöstedt, Guy Olivier Faure, and Winfried Lang

Part II: Case StudiesIntroduction: Negotiations of the Past1. Scientific Culture and Its Role in International Negotiations—Klaus Gottstein2. Lawyer Culture: Negotiations on the Establishment of an International Criminal

Court—Gerhard Hafner3. Finland’s Membership Negotiations with the European Union—Timo Kivimäki4. Uruguay Round Services Negotiations—Anders Ahnlid5. Negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty—Andreas J. Kumin6. Negotiations on the Convention to Combat Desertification—Pamela Chasek

Part III: AnalysisIntroduction: Perspectives on Professional Culture7. A Qualitative Interview with Thirteen Practitioners—Nancy Caldwell8. An Analytical Perspective from International Business Negotiations—Stephen E. Weiss9. Conceptualizing Professional Culture and International Negotiations—Kevin Avruch10. Negotiation Strategies across Industries—Catherine H. Tinsley and Jean A. Grube

Recently Published by PIN

Professional Cultures in International Negotiation

Edited by Gunnar Sjöstedt

the agency/structure spectacles. Theintroduction of process into the analyticalframework, however, leads to a differentconclusion. It may seem rational todiscontinue the production of newknowledge in the climate negotiation.The problem is, however, that thisstrategy eliminates a crucial driver in theregime-building process, making itnecessary to develop new strategies forthe knowledge diplomacy in the climatetalks. This is the main reason why PINhas decided to begin a new book projectconcerning long-term facilitation of theinternational talks on climate change.

Gunnar Sjöstedt

12

Remembering TalleyrandFrom Peace to Justice

PIN Books

How People Negotiate: Resolving Disputes in Different Cultures, G. O. Faure,editor, 2003, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Netherlands.ISBN 1-4020-1831-2

Professional Cultures in International Negotiation: Bridge or Rift?, G. Sjöstedt,editor, 2003, Lexington Books, Lanham, MD, USA.ISBN 0-7391-0638-4

Containing the Atom: International Negotiations on Nuclear Security andSafety, R. Avenhaus, V.A. Kremenyuk, G. Sjöstedt, editors, 2002, Lexington Books,Lanham, MD, USA.ISBN 0-7391-0387-3

International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues, 2nd Edition, V.A.Kremenyuk, editor, 2002, Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, San Francisco, CA, USA.ISBN 0-7879-5886-7

Preventive Negotiation: Avoiding Conflict Escalation, I.W. Zartman, editor, 2001,Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham, MD, USA.ISBN 0-8476-9894-7 (cloth) ISBN 0-8476-9895-5 (paper)

Power and Negotiation, I.W. Zartman, J.Z. Rubin, editors, 2000, The Universityof Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, MI, USA.ISBN 0-472-11079-9

International Economic Negotiation. Models versus Reality, V.A. Kremenyuk,G. Sjöstedt, editors, 2000, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham, UK.ISBN 1-84064-167-3

Negotiating International Regimes: Lessons Learned from the United NationsConference on Environment and Development (UNCED), B.I. Spector, G.Sjöstedt, I.W. Zartman, editors, 1994, Graham & Trotman Limited, London, UK.(Now a subsidiary of Kluwer Academic Publishers.)ISBN 1-85966-077-0

International Multilateral Negotiation: Approaches to the Management ofComplexity, I.W. Zartman, editor, 1994, Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers, San Francisco,CA, USA.ISBN 1-55542-642-5

International Environmental Negotiation, G. Sjöstedt, editor, 1993, SagePublications, Newbury Park, CA, USA.ISBN 0-8039-4760-7

Culture and Negotiation. The Resolution of Water Disputes, G.O. Faure, J.Z.Rubin, editors, 1993, Sage Publications, Inc., Newbury Park, CA, USA.ISBN 0-8039-5370-4 (cloth) ISBN 0-8039-5371-2 (paper)

Processes of International Negotiations, F. Mautner-Markhof, editor, 1989,Westview Press, Inc., Boulder, CO, USA.ISBN 0-8133-7721-8

The year 2004 marks the 250th

anniversary of the birth of CharlesMaurice de Talleyrand Périgord, a majorfigure in international negotiation. To cele-brate his memory, a conference entitled,“Talleyrand, Prince of Negotiators?” willbe held in Paris at the Business School of theEcole Supérieure des Sciences Economiqueset Commerciales (ESSEC) from 1–4 February2004. Among the topics to be dealt withare the education of the diplomat, his mainnegotiations, such as his diplomatic missionto London, his negotiations with the BarbaryStates, with the Pope, and with the Concertof Powers at the Congress of Vienna. Thespecific methods used by Talleyrand toconduct his negotiations, the ethical issuesraised by his practices, the role of womenespecially in the Congress of Vienna, andthe legacy of Talleyrand and his school incontemporary conferences, will be pre-sented and discussed. A play, a film, and avisit to Talleyrand’s residences in Paris willadd a further dimension to the conference.

The language of the conference will beFrench. All information concerning theconference organized by IRÉNÉ (ESSEC)can be obtained at www.irene-paris.com.

Guy Olivier Faure

A Conference on the Role of InternationalLaw, Negotiations and International

Development in Efforts to Establish Peaceand Justice will be held from 25–27 March2004 at The Hague in The Netherlands.There will be two plenary sessions in thePeace Palace, one on the afternoon of 25March and one on the morning of 27March. On 26 March, four parallel workingsessions will be organized in four of thefive institutions that are organizing the

Conference. The Dutch PIN Group willorganize a full-day session, “NegotiatingPeace and Justice,” chaired by I. WilliamZartman and Paul Meerts, hosted by theClingendael Institute. Members of the PINNetwork who are interested in participatingin the Conference are kindly requested to con-tact Paul Meerts (pmeerts@clingendael.nl).

I. William Zartman

The Processes of International Negotiation Project

Copyright © 2003International Institute forApplied Systems Analysis

A-2361 Laxenburg, AustriaTelephone: +43 2236 807 267

Telefax: +43 2236 71313E-mail: pin@iiasa.ac.at

Managing Editor: I. William Zartman

IIASA is a nongovernmental,international research institution

sponsored by scientific organizationsfrom 16 countries.

IIASA has member organizations inAustria, China, Czech Republic,

Egypt, Estonia, Finland,Germany, Hungary, Japan,

Netherlands, Norway, Poland,Russian Federation, Sweden, Ukraine,

United States of America.