the politics of large-scale economic and infrastructure projects in

LITERATUREREVIEW

MARCH 20113

The Politics of Large-Scale Economic and Infrastructure Projects in Fast-Growing Cities of the South

Literature ReviewBy Loraine Kennedy, Glen Robbins, Dianne Scott, Cathy Sutherland, Eric Denis, Julia Andrade, Liliana Miranda, Aurélie Varrel, Véronique Dupont, Bérénice Bon

Table of Contents

1. Introduction................................................................................................................................3

2. TheMainIssuesAddressedinWP2............................................................................................4

3. CitiesandGlobalCapitalism(Macro)..........................................................................................5

4. AgglomerationEconomies..........................................................................................................8

5. MesoandMicroScalesofAnalysis...........................................................................................10

6. UrbanRegimes..........................................................................................................................12

7. LandManagementInstitutionsandPractices...........................................................................13

8. Mega-ProjectsandMega-Events..............................................................................................14

• Mega-Events.....................................................................................................................17

9. Visioning/Imagineering...........................................................................................................17

10. ImplementationofLarge-ScaleProjects:ExaminingImpactsattheMicroandMetropolitanScales........................................................19

References.........................................................................................................................................21

1 Introduction

Policy-makers in developing countries increasinglyplacetheir largecitiesat thecentreof theireconomicgrowth strategies. Such city-centric policies usuallyinvolve interventions designed to establish eithercompetitiveproductionplatforms(e.g.,enterpriseparks)for engaging with global markets or specializedinfrastructure (e.g., urban transport, airport, malls,gatedresidentialcommunities)forbuttressingeconomicdevelopment. Large-scaleeconomicand infrastructureprojectsindevelopingcountries,aimedatleveragingthepotentialofcitiesasgrowthengines,throwupparticularchallenges for urban sustainability by fuelling landspeculation, exacerbating urban sprawl, reorientingemploymentpatterns,displacinglocalpopulationsandlivelihoods, and increasingenvironmentalhealth risks.These specialised spaces strive for maximum globalconnectivitywithoutnecessarilyfavouringlinkageswiththe local economy, thereby creating risks for urbanspatial fragmentation and social exclusion.Moreover,theymaycontainabuilt-insocialbias,i.e.,affluentandmiddleclassgroupsbenefitmoredirectlytotheextentthat these policies promote primarily commercial andserviceactivitiesrequiringskilledlabour.

The study of the politics of large-scale economic andinfrastructureprojects isthecentralthemeofWP2oftheC2Sproject.Thispaperwilloutlineasetofquestionsandhypothesesforthisworkpackagewithreferencetoexistingliterature,theobjectivebeingtoconductareviewthroughtheanalyticallensesoftheC2Sproject,thatis,withattentionto participatory knowledge management systems and

inclusivegovernance.Themainassumptionof theoverallprojectisthatinordertopromotemoreresilientpatternsofdevelopment,citiesneedtoincorporatedifferenttypesofknowledge into their strategicplanningactivitieswith theactiveparticipationofvarioustypesofactors(Hordijk,Baud2010: 2). This means for instance that economic growthstrategieswouldneedtointegrateenvironmentalandsocialdimensionsandthatlocalgovernancewouldneedtoinvolvevarioussocialactorsincludingsociallymarginalizedgroupsinordertoproducemoredeliberativeanddemocraticdecision-making (Sao Paulo WP5, p2). It is also assumed thatparticipatory spatialisedknowledgecontributes toabetterunderstandingofurbandevelopmentprocesses,includingthesocial,spatialandenvironmentalimpactsontheurbanlocaleconomyofparticularcitymarketingstrategies,notablythepromotionoflarge-scaleeconomicandinfrastructureprojects,comparedtoalternativestrategies(SaoPauloWP5,p2).

In our analysis of large-scale projects, also calledmegaprojects, we give attention to two distinct stages:projectconceptionandprojectimplementation,whichofteninvolvedifferentsetsofprocessesandactors.Thesewillbetheobjectsofempiricalstudyinthetenselectedcities,andourdeparturepointforexaminingknowledgemanagementsystemsandurbangovernance.AsAltshulerandLuberoffpointout:“effortstorealizelarge-scaleinvestmentprojectsoftenprovideanunusuallyrevealingwindowonpatternsofinfluence in urban development politics. Such projectsinvolvehuge commitmentsof public resources andoftenentailsignificantthreatstosomeinterestsandvaluesevenastheypromisegreatbenefitstoothers”(2003:4).

The Politics of Large-Scale Economic and Infrastructure Projects

in Fast-Growing Cities of the South

Literature Review

By Loraine Kennedy, Glen Robbins, Dianne Scott, Cathy Sutherland, Eric Denis, Julia Andrade, Liliana Miranda, Aurélie Varrel, Véronique Dupont, Bérénice Bon

Introduction

3

ThecentralresearchquestionaddressedinWP2istheimportance given to large-scale economic andinfrastructure projects in different types of cities inrelation to alternative strategies for economicdevelopment.Weproceedontheassumptionthatmega-projects are concrete manifestations of a strategy ofinternational competition among large cities to attractinvestments.Howcanweexplainthispolicychoice?Towhatextentdosucheconomicstrategiesbuildonexistingstrengths?Whattypesofemploymentaresoughttobecreated?Aretheyarticulatedwithotherstrategiesthatcatertosmall-scaleenterprisesorinformaleconomy?Anddotheyalignwithlocalskillsets?

Wefurtherassumethatsuchmegaprojectsareshapingthefutureoflargecitiesatallscales:throughchangesinlanduse,dislocationofpeople,changesinemploymentandlocaleconomies,distributionofenvironmentalcosts,andassuchthey are influencing the resilience of cities, their futurecapacitytoresistorrecoverfromexogenousshocks.

Theyalsoshapethefutureofcitylandscapesandofwhat “city” means.Megaprojects, often designed byprominent architects and planners operating at theinternational/transnational level, are outposts to testand foster the dissemination of newurban forms andspatialpatternsglobally,oftenwithoutlocalawarenessoftheseimports,oronlyforalimitedaudience.Inthatsense they cause many displacements, supposedlycreativeones,potentiallydestructiveones(GellertandLynch 2003). Because of the manner in whichmegaprojects are designed they retrace in profound

waystheboundariesbetweenprivateandpublicspace,andredefineaccesstopublicgoodsandtomobility.Assuch megaprojects ultimately contribute in a highlyinfluentialwayinreshapingthedailyfunctioningofthecityatthelocallevelfortheentireurbanpopulation,assuggestedbyGellertandLynch(2003).

Itisimportanttounderscorethatmegaprojectsarenotanewphenomenon;indeedinsomecontextssuchastheUSthe‘greatmegaprojectera’wasduringtheperiod1950-70,afterwhichtherewasabacklash(Altshuler&Luberoff2003).Butinmanyplaces,notablytheso-called‘emergingeconomies’,megaprojectsappeartobeontherise.

Giventheir impacts, it is importanttounderstandthepoliticsoftheseprojects,themannerinwhichtheyemerge,aswellastheinstitutionalenvironmentinwhichtheytakeshape.Asindicatedabove,weareinterestedinanalysingtwo aspects of the process: knowledge managementsystemsandgovernancepatterns.

Accordingly, we are interested in the mobilisation,generation and sharing of knowledge involved with theconceptionofmega-projects.Moregenerally,whatexplicitorimplicitmodelsinformurbanagendas(visioningprocesses)inthecitieswearestudying?Whichpolicyinstrumentsarechosenandwhataretherationalesputforward?Uponwhattypesofknowledgetotheyrepose?Howcanwecharacterizeinournationalandlocalcontextsthegovernanceaspectsoftheseprojects:Whodecides?Towhatextentaredecisionstheresultoftransparentandparticipatorydecision-makingprocesses?Arevarioustypesofactorsinvolved(CSO,private

2 The Main Issues Addressed in WP2

Detailed analysis of the actors involved in promotinglarge-scaleprojectsalsoprovideanopportunitytoidentifygroupswhoareleftoutoftheprocess.Itisobservedinsomecountriesthat localpopulationsdirectlyaffectedby large-scaleprojectsareveryoftenuninformedanddonothaveanopportunity to position themselves to better benefit, tomitigate losses or to organize resistance in an effectivemanner. In some cases, sociallymarginalized groups aredeliberately excluded and their contribution devaluedbecause they go against powerful interests. Moreover,greenfielddevelopmentoftentakeplaceinurbanperipheries,wherelandischeaper,butthismayalsobewheremuchofthe urban poor live, often in illegal settlements. In suchcontexts,peoplewhodonotholdlegaltitlesarenotlikelyto

be recognized as legitimate stakeholders and hence areexcluded from the elaboration and implementationprocesses of large-scale projects,which severely inhibitstheir capacity to formulate a collective response or todemandareview.Thestudyofmega-projectimplementationwill includeattentiontolocalformsofcontestation.Itwillalso involve analysis of social, spatial andenvironmentalimpacts,incollaborationwithotherworkpackages.

Theaimofthispaperistoreviewtheexistingliteratureinordertohelpustoformulatespecificresearchquestionsandhypotheses.Giventhevastliteratureonthistopic,itisusefultodistinguishdifferentscalesofanalysisandtreatthemseparately(macro,meso,micro).

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TheMainIssuesAddressedinWP2

At the macro level, there is considerable literature,mainly originating from critical approaches (regulationschool, neo-Marxist, neo-Gramscian), dedicated toexplainingthecurrenttrendofstrategiesaimedatcreating‘competitivecities’.Amajorpointofdepartureofmuchofthisliteratureisthatchangesincapitalismandtechnologyhaveacceleratedtheprocessesknownasglobalizationandforced states at all levels to engage in economic restructuringinordertocompetemoreeffectivelyintheglobalmarketplace. Economic slowdown starting in the1970s,linkedtothedeclineofthedominantFordistmodelof industrial production, led tomassive restructuring ofnational economies in Europe andNorth America. Thisresulted in fundamental changes in organisation andtechnology of industrial production, and in the spatialdivisionof labour, intra-nationallyand internationally.Asincome shifted from manufacturing to service sectoractivities, citieswere increasingly promoted as strategicassetsofeconomicadjustment,andgrowthbecamemoreconcentrated in urban areas.Moreover, consumerism intheformofshopping,entertainmentandleisureactivities,driven by middle and high-income groups, graduallybecameinitselfamotorofmanyurbaneconomies(Sellers2002).Inthelast20yearssimilardevelopmentshavebeenobservedincitiesoftheSouth,astheireconomieslinkupto international markets and as local actors aspire tobecominga‘worldcity’ora‘globalcityregion’.Naturally,theextenttowhichpolicy-makersareadoptingsuchcity-centric strategieswillneedtobeestablishedempiricallyforeachcountry/cityintheproject;wecanexpectthattherewill be significant variation given the specific ‘model’ ofeach country’s economy, its engagement with globalcapitalism,andlocalsocialandpoliticalspecificities.

Harveywasamongthefirsttoanalysetheseprocessesinwhathecalledtheshifttourban entrepreneurialism

relying on public-private partnerships for promotingurbangrowthanddevelopment(Harvey1989).Thiswasanalysed as a shift of capitalist reproduction fromnational tosubnationalscales.Continuing in thesamebroad theoretical path, subsequent scholarshipelaboratedtheconceptsofglocalstates (Swyngedouw1996)andglocal fixes (Brenner1998), referring to thespecificwaysstatesseektoattractcapitalthroughspace-based interventions,usually specialised infrastructure,inurbanregions.Examplesofglocalfixesincludefittedoutproductionplatformsintheformofindustrialparksorstate-of-the-artportsornicelypackagedredevelopedurbanareas,ofwhichtheBaltimoreWaterfrontandtheLondonDocklandsareclassicexamples.

Such interventions are analysed as part of broaderstrategiesofterritorialrestructuringandstate re-scaling,onwhichthereisconsiderableliterature(Brenner1998,2004).Oneofthecentralhypothesesofthisneo-Marxistperspectiveisthateachphaseofcapitalismisrootedinparticular forms of territorial organisation, sociallyproduced ‘geographical infrastructures’ intended tofacilitate capital investment and accumulation, and ascapitalismevolvessodoesterritorialorganisation(1998:13),Fallingunderthebroadheadingofpoliticalgeography,this research project attempts to bring together in acommon framework two separate bodies of literatureemanatingfromurbanstudies,globalcitiesinparticular,and international political economy. Quoting Brenner:“State re-scaling is a major accumulation strategythrough which these transformed ‘glocal’ territorialstates attempt to promote the global competitiveadvantage of their major urban regions. Global cityformationandstatere-scalingarethereforedialectically intertwined moments of a single dynamic of global capitalist restructuring”(1998:1,italicsadded).

3 Cities and Global Capitalism (Macro)

sector)?Intermsofcitypolitics,whichlocalgroupscanbesaidtobedrivingtheprocess?Whichlevelsofgovernmentaremostdirectlyinvolved?

Thereisavastliteraturethatengageswiththeissuesweare examining in WP2, originating from scholarship ingeography, economics, politics, sociology and urbanstudies. Within these broad disciplinary fields, varioustheoreticalframeworksandapproachesarebeingused.Wedonotintendtofollowanysingleframeworkratherwewill

borrowconceptsandanalyticaltoolsfromvarioussources.Moreover,theapproachwillvarydependingonthescaleatwhichtheanalysisistakingplace.

Totheextentthatthisresearchprojectexamineslocaleconomicandsocialprocessesacrosscities,itisparticularlyconcernedwithlocal(metropolitan)scale.Butgiventhatour ten cities are located in four different countries, onthree continents, therewill necessarily be attention tonationalandsubnationalscalesaswell.

CitiesandGlobalCapitalism(Macro)

5

oraspectsofneoliberalismadoptedandimplementedincountries and cities vary according tonational and local contingencies,theirsocial,political,economicandhistoricalcontexts(Hart,2004,Veltz2005).Forinstance,theGEAR(Growth,EmploymentandRedistribution)policy inpost-apartheid South Africa has been analysed by someobserversasamacro-scaleneoliberaleconomicpolicy,theaimofwhichwastointegrateSouthAfricawiththeglobaleconomy (Peet 2002).2 This policy placed the capitalistsystem at the heart of the reconstruction programme,arguingthateconomicgrowthandthe‘trickledown’ofitsbenefits would result in social upliftment. The privatesector was seen as a key actor in achieving economicgrowthwiththemunicipalitiesplayinganenablingrole.3This has led to the use of the PPP mechanism as animportant neo-liberal tool for stimulating urbandevelopmentandtheemergenceofanymega-projectsinSouthAfrican cities,which are embraced as stimulatingtransformationbycreatingjobs.However,thisportrayalofpublic action as ‘neoliberal’ needs to be nuanced; PPPshave been pursued in parallelwith a progressive policyorientation, for instance continued public housing andservice provision by municipalities. Alongside somerelativelyfraughtPPPattemptshasalsobeenalocalstatethat–drawingondevelopmentalstatemodels–hassoughtto invest inmega-projects that it feels would generateappropriate economic growth returns. Projects such asconventioncentres,themeparksandbusinessparkshavebeenafeatureofthis.Inmanycasesthestatehastakentheprimaryriskandsubsequentlysoughttoleverprivateinvestmentasaresultoftheseinvestmentsandtodrawonprivatepartnerstohelpmanagesomeoftheseprocesses(documentedby(Freund2010).Forthesereasons,someobservers qualify the SouthAfrican approachmore as ahybridofneoliberalandpopulistsocialdemocraticagendasalongwith a populist nationalist influence, pointing outthatitinvolvesgrowingthesocialwelfareprogramme,largescale subsidy driven public housing, a persistentcommitment to state ownership of major parastatals,redistributiveprogrammesandaffirmativeaction(CharltonandKihato2006;Harrison2006).

In Peru, whose economy is heavily dependent onexportationoftheextractionofnaturalresourcessuchasmining(e.g.gold,copper,silver,zinc),gas,oil,fishmealandwoodtransnationalandnationalcorporationsrepresentpowerfulactors.Theyarenodoubtinfluentialincirculating

2 Country reports have provided important indications about each country’s global engagement and macro-level economic policies, which contribute significantly to defining the overall investment climate.

3 The GEAR policy was introduced into the Integrated Development Plans (IDP) of cities.

Swyngedouw et al (2002) in a study of large scaleprojects in Europe using a political-economy approachconcludethatneoliberalismincitiesistheintersectionoftheshiftsinglobaleconomicforcesandpeople’slivesinspecificplaces(Lefebvre,1974).TheymaintainthatthisconceptionlinkswithLefebvre’sideaofthe‘urban’beingthemediatingspacebetweenglobalabstractforcesandeveryday lived space. In this spatial approach, theexpansionofglobalinterestsinlocalplacesincreasinglygivesrisetoresistanceoflocalpeopletotheseexpressionsoftheglobaleconomyatthe localscale inurbanspace(Harrison,2006;Pieterse,2008).

This theoretical literature offers many compellinginsights for understanding the processes we intend tostudy, notably by linking changes in urban policy anddevelopmenttobroadereconomicissues.Onechallenge,frequentlynoted in the literature1, is to successfully linkthese somewhat abstract macro constructs with otheranalytical levels and with local actors, concrete policymeasuresanddevelopmentpatternsontheground.

Itisassumedforinstancethatthegrowingimportanceofmega-projectsincities,atthecoreofthisWP,isintimatelylinkedtotheincreasingintegrationofnationalandurbaneconomies into a constantly evolving global economicsystem.Thisintegrationisitselflinkedtothedisseminationof a neo-liberal agenda (also called the WashingtonConsensus), notably through international lendingorganisations. Indeed, structural adjustment loansthroughout the 1980s and 90s were tied to specificeconomic reformpackages (the case of India, Perú andBrazil),which imposed particularmodelswith regard toeconomic regulation andpublic administration, tonameonly two broad areas. It is a powerful example of howparticulartypesofknowledge,herehegemoniceconomictheories,arediffusedandreproducedthroughspace.Weshouldrecallhoweverthatthemodelisneverreproducedinexactlythesameform,givingrisetovarietiesofcapitalism(HallandSoskice2001),adynamicfieldofstudy.

India’sdecisiontocontractaloanwiththeIMFin1991andadopta structuraladjustmentprogrammehasbeenhotly criticized on the grounds that itwas taken in thehighestechelonsofgovernment,andevenParliamentwasnotconsulted.Notwithstandingthisexample,whichraisesquestionsabout internationalpower relationsaswell asinternal governance, it should be pointed out that thediffusionofneoliberalismcannotbeexplainedsimplyasatop-downprocessimposedbytheglobaleconomicsystemorbyWashingtonbasedinstitutions.Theparticularforms

1 See for instance the debate on the autonomy of local levels (Peck and Tickell 1995).

6


norms about institutional arrangements (withoutforgetting the silent but clear presence of illegal cocaproduction and commercialization), all of which havegeneratedsomehowdifferenttypesofpoliticalscandalsrelated to corruption problems (mainly under formerPresident Fujimori presently in jail), and whereconstructionandrealestatecompanieshavenotbeenanexception.So,inPeruviancitiesthe“extractive”modelisthe way the neoliberal agenda is being deployed,manifested by the deregulation of construction andurbanizationpermits,byvariousformsofprivatizationofcity investments, which have become the rule. Forinstance, big shopping malls have appeared all overPeruviancitiesdriving intobankruptcysmallbusinessesandtraditionallocalmarkets.Additionallynewhigh-risebuildingsarebeingbuiltinseismiccities,whichtraditionallydidnotbuildtallerthan5storeystoavoidrisk.Nowadays,Lima has plenty of 12 to 20 storey buildingswith veryexpensive department stores as well as fancy officebuildingshostingthosecorporations,aswellassmalltoverysmallmediumclassapartments,allofthemwithoutthenecessarytransport,greenareas,norwaterorwastewater treatment services and even worst securitysituation.“Themarketwillrule,theeconomyforceswillorganizeit”saidindifferentwaysFujimoriandhisfollowers(1993)whenhedecidedtoliberalizethetransportsysteminthecitiesaswellastoabolishtheentireplanningsystemof thecountry.Asa result,MetropolitanLimadoesnothaveanUrbanDevelopmentPlan;indeed,plannersweresuspected of being communists! Overcoming theconsequencesofthosepoliciesisstillatragiclegacywithwhichPeruviancitiesarestruggling.

InBraziltoo,authorsofcriticaltraining,especiallythoseof theMarxist tradition, have countered the dominantthinking (pensamento único). Two types of criticism areformulated: theoretical andmore practical in terms ofcomplaints and claims of popular movements. In thetheoreticalsphere,wefindanalysesseekingtodismantlethediscoursesthatconcealthepracticesofstrategicurbanplanning, the so-called coercive policies of internationalfunding agencies like theWorld Bank and IDB (Arantes,2004),ordiscursivepractices.Forexample,CarlosVaineranalyzeshowthestrategicplanningofthecitycametobeviewed simultaneously in threeways. First the city as a“entreprise”, whose leader, like an executive of a largemultinational,mustactasifinthecorporateworldtryingto compete and attract investment. The city is also acommodity as it starts to be seen in terms of concreteattributesthatshouldbenice(gardens,parksandculture)thatwould invariablybesoldtocorporate interests.Andfinally,thecityisseenasa“homeland”independentfromtherestofthenationbyopeningtheideologicalfrontfortheso-calledwarofthecities(Vainer2002).

The formation of Brazilian thought, especially in thehumanities,hasbeenstronglyinfluencedsincethe1960sbyCelsoFurtado’sworkonunderdevelopment.ThisviewsoughttodeconstructtheideologyofdevelopmentandledauthorssuchasMiltonSantos to formulate the ideaof “CorporateMetropolis”asopposedtoanothertypeofurbanizationmorecommittedtodemocracyandsocialjustice.

Urban residents, new and old are calling formoreservices,butbusiness,economicactivitiesalsoneedtheso-called agglomeration economies, i.e., the generalmeansofproduction.Thecitybudgetdoesnotgrowatthesamepaceasthenewneedsthatarise.Thedominantdevelopmentideologythatprevailedinthe1950sandespeciallythereigningideologyofgrowthsincethelate1960s that help to create what we call corporatemetropolis, is much more concerned with theeliminationofso-calleddiseconomiesofagglomerationthan with the production of services social andcollectivewelfare.4(Santos1990).

Theobjectivespursuedbycurrentpracticesofstrategicplanning are thus familiar in the context of unevendevelopment typical of underdeveloped countries, andexplainwhythedebateinBrazilisalmostunanimousinconsideringthatstrategicplanning is incompatiblewithdemocracyandthepracticesofparticipatoryplanning.Atthecoreoftheideologyofstrategicplanningistheideaofdevelopingspecificareasofthecity,meetingtheneedsofcertainpopulationgroups,i.e.,thosewhoareabletopay for services. For this, the instruments intended tosharethebenefits-wheretheyexist-areineffectiveoronly serve to legitimize the actions designed in otherdeliberativebodies. Suchpracticesaredefended in thenameoftechnicalandadministrativeefficiency.Especiallyin recentmonthswithdemandsarising fromthemajorsportingeventsthataretakingplaceinthecountry,theurgencyofurbanreformsisleadingtoanearlyabsolutelackofpublicconsultationorpublicdebate.

But this does not completely inhibit popular claims.Thereareorganizedresistanceonthepartofgroupsthatarebeing threatenedanddisplaced from theirplacesofresidence and use. An example is the “3rd Rally ForAdequateHousing”held inSãoPauloon26-27February2011,jointlyorganizedbytheOmbudsmanfortheStateofSaoPaulo,theNationalMovementofHomelessness,theCentre forPopularMovements (CMP),UnionofHousingMovements(UMM),FACESP,LegalUSPXIAugust,NucleusUrbanDevelopmentandRighttotheCityofCress-SPModelOffice of PUC / SP, Caico, Pastoral House of Ipiranga,Network Live Stream, Gaspar Garcia Centre for Human

4 Translation by J. Andrade.


7

Another body of academic work currently influencingpublic policy centres on the notion of “agglomerationeconomies” and is used toexplainwhyeconomic activityconcentratesincities.5Brieflystated,theterm(agglomeration

5 This section is adapted from Glen Robbins’ note on Agglomeration and Chance2Sustain 2010.

economies)refersbothtopositiveexternalitiesorgainsthataccrue to all firms as a result of city size and themix ofactivitiesandservices(alsocalledurbanisationeconomies)andtogainsthatarisefromthespatialclusteringofmultiplefirmsinrelatedindustries(oftencalledlocalisationeconomies)(Strange2008).Sourcesofagglomerationeconomiesincludelabour market pooling, input sharing, and knowledge

4 Agglomeration Economies

RightsandCommunicationNetworkStreet.Accordingtothemovementsinvolved,thismodelofurbanizationresultsin evictions, including evictions in areaswell served byinfrastructure, occupied by low-income communities,jeopardizingtherighttoadecenthomeforalargenumberofworkingfamilies.Forthisgroupthefocusofactionfromthegovernmentaretheurbanmegaprojects.Large-scaleworksundertakenontheroadsystemorthoseallegedlyaimed at environmental improvement for the city haveresulted in the forced eviction of low-income residents,whoseleadersoftenendupbeingarrestedandprosecuted.

Theglobal cities literature,whichhasbeenextremelyinfluential in the last twodecades,engagesdirectlywiththemacroscale.Buildingontheworldsystemapproach,itfocusesonthestrategicroleplayedbyalimitednumberoflarge cities in the international economy. These arecommand centres for transnational corporations,“advancedproductionsites”forcriticalproducerservicesand financialgoods (Sassen1991).Akeypremiseof thistheoryisthatcertainlargecites,termed‘globalcities’,havebecome delinked from their national economies, andfunctioninalargelyautonomousfashion.Althoughthereare historical precedents of this kind pattern, the trendduringthe19thcenturyuntilthe1970swascharacterizedbythestrongdegreeofintegrationofcitiesintheirnationaleconomies,andtheirpoliticalsubordinationtothenationstate(Brenner1998).Thetheorycontendsthattodaylargecities and their inter-city networks are replacing nationstates as the basic territorial infrastructure of capitalistdevelopment(Brenner1998:5).

Ofparticularinteresthereistheinfluencethisliteraturehashadoutside academia,servingasamodelforrealworldcitiestoreplicate.Indeed,theglobalsystemofcitiesisanimplicitorexplicitreferenceusedbyconsultingfirmshiredtochurnoutblueprintsforbuildingandmarketing‘world-class’ cities across the planet. It is an example of how

particular types of knowledge circulate, hownorms areproduced,forinstanceaboutwhatisadesirableoutcomeofurbandevelopment.Ascriticalauthorshaveremarked,suchscholarshipproduceshierarchiesthroughcityrankingbasedonselected criteria;intheprocesscertaincategoriesof cities, notably those of the South get marginalised.Robinsonhasarguedthat“widelycirculatingapproachesto contemporary urbanization – global andworld cities,together with the persistent use of the category ‘thirdworldcities’–imposesubstantiallimitationsonimaginingorplanningcitiesaroundtheworld”(2002,531).Thishassignificant implications for understanding growth,developmentandurbanizationincitiesoftheSouth,sincetheworldcitiesapproachassessesand‘ranks’citiesoutsideofthewestagainstthisstandardof‘city-ness’derivedfromanunderstandingofthedominantwesterncities.

Thislinksupwithamoregeneralcritiqueofwhathasbeen termed “western urban theory”, as beinginapplicable to cities of the South (Oldfield, 2007;Ramutsindela,2007,Roy2009).ItcondemnsthepracticebywhichtheNorth inconceivedasthesiteof ‘theoryproduction’while theSouth is thesourceofempiricaldata.Thisapproachiscontrastedwiththatof‘ordinarycities’,whichallowsforanunderstandingofthediversityofexperiencesacrosscitiesintheworldandisnotonlyapplicabletocitiesincertaincategories,suchas‘Thirdworld cities’ or ‘Western cities’. Its proponents arguethatthisallowsforthedistinctivenessofcitiestocomemore plainly into view, and importantly, allows for amore “inclusive and redistributive policies” to beimagined(Robinson,2008,75).Clearly,thesedifferentapproachesrelyondifferenttypesofknowledge.Takinganotherperspectiveontheissue,Roy(2009)arguesthaturban theory-makingmust be shifted to the South inordertotakeintoaccountphenomenathatarerelevantfor all cities (e.g., informality, migration, power andresistance,relationshipbetweencityandnation).

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AgglomerationEconomies

spillovers.[footnotereads:ThissectionisadaptedfromGlenRobbins’noteonAgglomerationandChance2Sustain2010.The 2009World Development Report (WDR), Reshaping Economic Geography (World Bank 2009),which explicitlymobilises the concept, advocates policies that promoteurbanisation, i.e., spatial concentrations of population,economic activity and infrastructure, inorder todriveupgrowthrates.Urbanisationeconomieswouldarisefromthegreateravailabilityofformsofskills,servicesandinfrastructurewithawiderapplicationacrossanarrayofactivitiessupportedbydensityofeconomicactivities.Ineconomictheory,scalebrings increasing returns toeconomic actors as the scaleeffectsputdownwardpressureontheunitcostsofincreasedproduction.Hereitisworthnotingthatmorerecentanalyseshavesuggestedthatoneshouldnotonlylookatscalebutalsoatdiversityeffects(intermsofrangeofchoicesandoptions):“A diversified economy is plainly less vulnerable to thevagariesofindividualindustries,butinacomparativelysmallurbaneconomytheremaybeatrade-offbetweendiversityandagglomerationbenefits.Thelattermightonlysurfaceifanindustryisonasufficientscaletogeneratethepoolsoflabour and the subcontracting networks that underpineconomiesofscale.”(Beggetal.,2002:105).Thisresonateswith the literature on resilience, which considers thateconomicdiversitycanhelpreduceriskfromexternalshocks.

Drawingonthetheoreticalframeworksofagglomerationeconomicsthe2009WDRseekstoalleviatewhatitconsidersamisplacedfearofurbanisationanddispelthenotionthaturbaneconomiesindevelopingcountriesaredysfunctional.Drawingonmultiple studies, itmakes the case thaturbancentresindevelopingcountriesincreasinglyserveasenginesofeconomicgrowth.Itisarguedthatdespiteconcernsaboutspatialandincomeinequalities,whichcharacterisemanyoftheseenvironments,workingwithprocessesofurbanisationinsuchamannerthatsupportstheforcesofagglomerationisnecessaryandessentialtosecurelongruneconomicgrowth.Althoughtheauthorsrecognisethatdynamicurbanchangebringscongestion,informalsettlements,andrisingdemandsforservices,itcautionsagainstgovernmentseekingtoworkagainstmarkettrendsorinterferingindynamicprocessesofurbanisation beyond a focus on progressively enhancingaccesstoservicesandsupportinggrowth-orientedinvestment:

Governmentsintervene(usuallyincorrectly)tospreadthe benefits of economic growthmore evenly acrossspace.Evenwhentheimperativesarepolitical,theyhaveeconomicconsequences.Andeveniftheobjectivesareeconomic, theyhave social andenvironmental effects.Policy makers thus face sharp tradeoffs and mustcompromise.(…)Governmentscandobetterbypromotingthemarketforcesthatdeliverboththeconcentrationofeconomic production and the convergence of livingstandards, and augment themwithpolicies to ensure

affordablebasicserviceseverywhere.Theycandothisbyhelping people and entrepreneurs take advantage ofeconomicopportunities,wherevertheyarise.Themarketforcesthathelpmostareagglomeration,migration,andspecialization.(WorldBank,2009:34).

The economics of urban agglomeration literature hasstimulated some very robust critiques, one of the mostprominentbeingthetendencytoneglect‘negativeexternalities’ofscalewhereavarietyoffactorscombinetoeithercurtailbenefitsthataccruefromexternalitiesorwhererisingcostsofconcentrationinspacedetractfromincreasingreturns(Riggetal,2009).Someofthisworkpointstosocialcoststhatmightarisefromurbanisationatscale–moreoftenthannotbornebytheurbanpoorwheretheirneedswerebeingsubjugatedtothedemandsforspaceandservicesbypowerfuleconomicinterests(cf.infra).Morerecently,therehasbeenconsiderableattentionallocatedtotherisksofrisingnegativeexternalitiesaroundtheenvironmentwithimpactsnotonlyonpeople,butalsointermsofclimatechangeandbiodiversity.

Yet further criticism has emerged around the policydimensions that emerge from the growing tendency toplace processes of agglomeration at the centre offrameworksthatinfluencepolicyonurbanisationandurbandevelopment. Here it is pointed out thatmuch of theeconomic-related literature informingpolicyprescriptionshasatendencytofocusonallocationdimensionswithlessconsideration given to distributional dimensions. Forexample,localisationeconomiescouldallowforfirmsinageographic cluster to share in benefits from enhancedsuppliesofspecialisedskillsbutexactlyhowcertainfirmsmightactuallysecurethesebenefitsandothersmightnot,andfurtherhowthebenefitstoemployersmightrelatetothebenefitsofemployeesisoftengivenlesspolicyattention.WorksuchasthatofPeck(1992)hashighlightedsomeofthese challenges inmaking the case that processes thatmight serve goals of growth and competitivenessmightimposeburdensonlabour.6

IntermsoftheC2S‘knowledgemanagement’analyticalframework, the WDR offers compelling material forreflection to the extent it explicitly derives its policiesprescriptionsfromaparticularbodyoftheory.WorkbyRiggetal.providesafruitfulstartingpointforacriticalanalysisoftheWDRapproach.Amongothercritiques,theypointoutseveralmethodological and/or ethicalweaknesses: thetendencyfortheWDRtoover-simplifythecasematerialitsmobilises as “evidence” and to classify countries intocategoriesforthesakeofderivingaratherformulaicsetof

6 Recent research in the Tiruppur garment cluster, one of India’s largest industrial clusters, corroborates this finding (Vijayabaskar 2009).

AgglomerationEconomies

9

Dominantmodelstendtoassumeagenericprocessofurban development across space, and posit thepredominanceofglobaleconomicprocessesinparticularforshapinglocaleconomies.Theresultingimageisaflatworld where all cities are competing with each otherwithinaglobalmarketplace. Implicitly then,acommonpremiseinmanystudiesisthatlocallevelsaremerefiltersforglobalprocesses(Paul2005).

In examining local economic and social processesacross cities, this research project is particularlyconcerned with local agency. The aim is to conductanalysesthatbalancestructuralforcesthatbearuponcitieswith localpoliticalagency. Indoingso,wewillexamineworkbyauthorswhoarguethatthesourcesof expansion of local initiatives “often tracemore toactorsand interestswithinurbanpoliticaleconomiesthantopressuresfromwithout”andthatthediversityof paths, even among similar urban regime types,suggests how much conditions and choices withinurbanregionsmatter(Sellers2002).Workinthisveinis critical of the overly central role assigned in thethesis of global urban dualization (or “global cities”thesis) to international business elites and to thedecisive influence of external capital or markets onpolicy-makingwithincities,whereasitunderplaysthelevelofthenation-state(Sellers2002).

Whereasmacro-levelstudiesdiscussedabovestressthe role of global economic processes on the urbanregions, scholarship on urban regimes and urbangovernance has highlighted the power strugglesbetweendifferentgroupsofinterestswithincitiesandshownhowlocalpoliticaleconomyisinfluencedbythespecificnatureoflocalgoverningcoalitionsor‘regimes’,as well as by institutional forms defining inter-governmentalrelations.

Theconceptofurbangovernancebecameincreasinglypervasive throughout the 1990s, most notably in thediscourseandprogrammesof internationaldevelopmentorganisations.Althoughthefuzzinessoftheconceptisnotdoubt partly responsible for its appeal, its fundamentalambiguity lies in the fact that“it isbothdescriptiveandprescriptive”(Chandoke2003:4);inotherwords,itrefersatthesametimetoapoliticalprojectandtoanempiricalreality (Mooij 2006)” (Tawa Lama-Rewal 2009: 6). TheWorldBank’suseof“goodgovernance”underscores thenormativedimensiongiventotheterm,andillustratesthepoliticalprojectitconveys.Ithasbeencriticisedasavehicleoftheneoliberalagenda,synonymouswith‘rollingbackthestate’,depoliticisingdevelopment(Chhotray2007,Harriss2001)andamanagerialapproachtopublicservicedelivery.7

Althoughnotwithoutproblems,theconceptofurbangovernance isuseful in that it recognises thatdecision-making involves informal actors and institutions, inaddition to formal ones.8 According to Sellers, urbangovernancerefersto“actionsandinstitutionswithinanurban region that regulate or impose conditions for itspoliticaleconomy”(2002:9).

Animportantdimensiontogovernancethenishowvarious local scales interact inmanaging thecityand

7 For a detailed discussion on the concept of urban governance, see Tawa Lama-Rewal 2009.

8 It can be noted that the definition proposed by the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II) in 1996: “Urban governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, plan and manage the common affairs of the city. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action can be ta-ken. It includes formal institutions as well as informal arrangements and the social capital of citizens”.

5 Meso and Micro Scales of Analysis

policyresponses;thetendencytosuggest linearformsofdevelopmentprogressassociatedwithstagesorphasesofurbanization,thelatteralsobasedonaparticulartheoriesofdevelopment;thenarrowfieldofsourcematerialdrawnoninthewritingofthereport,whichgivesprominencetoneweconomicgeographywithitsbiastowardsthedisciplineofeconomicsandneglectsalargearrayofscientificresearchonpatternsofurbangrowthanddevelopment.

OthercritiquespointoutthemethodologicalweaknessoftheWDR,forinstancewithregardtothestatisticsusedin the analysis,which reflect very diverse definitions ofurbanphenomena(Moriconi-Ebrardetal.2010).Thislackof rigour introduces a bias in the analysis, notably theoverestimationoftheimportanceofmetropolitancitesandtheworldmetropolitansystem,andthrowsintoquestionthediagnosisandprescriptionsoftheWDR.

10

MesoandMicroScalesofAnalysis

pursuing growth and development. Typically, variouslayersofgovernmentoverlapinmetropolitanregions,and it is important to understand the parameters oflocalgovernmentindifferentcountriesorsubnationalstates. Like in the European context, there is muchdebate in the countries we are studying aboutappropriate institutions and optimal scales ofgovernanceformeetingthechallengesfacedbylargemetropolitan cities. To what extent are countriesrestructuringtheirterritorialorganizationtoadapttothe metropolitan regions (merging municipalities,creating umbrella organisations)? Havemetropolitancities become full-fledged political entities or rathermanagedbyparastatalagencies(waterandsanitation,publicworks,metropolitanplanning)?

InSouthAfrica,inthepost1994period,largescalelegislative and policy reform has resulted in newMunicipal legislation which served among otherpurposes tocreateadministrativeunits that combinepreviously white towns, commercial white ruralagriculturalareas,triballandandinformalsettlements,and operate as integrated functional units. It alsocreated a hierarchy of administrative units, rangingfromlargermetropolitanareas(includingJohannesburg,Cape Town and Durban), to District Municipalities,which in turn are made up of a cluster of localmunicipalities. In the1996Constitutionmetropolitancitiesaredesignatedasthethirdsphereofgovernmentwiththeprovincesandcentre.Withintheirdesignatedjurisdictions, the metros have a large degree ofautonomy,exclusiveexecutiveandregulatorypowersandasinglecitytaxregime.Inadditiontotheirwide-ranging powers, democratically elected metrogovernments also have considerable socialresponsibilities: according to the national policies(GEAR,RDP)and theConstitution, local governmentsaremandatedtoreducepoverty,providehousingandservices, redress inequality and promote economicdevelopment.(CountryReport,p26).

ThiskindofmandateisnotfoundinIndiancitiesofsimilarsize.Ofparticularimportance,alegalframeworkin South Africa imposes a governance structure thatbrings together different stakeholders (e.g. wardcommittees, p31), for evolving plans (e.g. land-useplanning frameworks) andpolicies and implementing

them,inaccordancewithacollectivelyimaginedvisionfor the city’s future (source?). Naturally, imposing agovernance frameworkdoesnotensure that it is thesole or even the dominant decision-making channel,empiricalresearchonongoingplanningprocesseswillprovideinputsforassessment.

Thedevolutionofpolicy-makingandfiscalpowersinmanycountrieshashadanimpactonurbangovernance,butpatternsvaryevenwithincountriesandwillrequirecareful study. In particular, the consequences ofdecentralisation on popular participation and socialredistributionarenotclearcut.9Moreover,decentralizedinstitutionsmaywellcoexistwithahighconcentrationofpower,ashasbeenobservedinBrazilwhere“fiscaland administrative decentralization at themunicipallevel are combined with a strong centralization ofdecision-makingpowersatthefederalexecutivelevel”(CountryReport2010:8).Thebasicexplanationforthispattern is the conditional transfer of funds from thefederalgovernment,ensuringsimilarsocialpoliciesandlevelsofspendingacrossmunicipalities.Whataretheimplicationsforlocalparticipation?

In India decentralisation reforms in themid 1990salongwith contemporaneouseconomic reformshavecontributedtoreshapingurbangovernance,andnewformsofparticipationhavebeendocumented (Baud,de Wit eds 2008). Notwithstanding, studies alsoindicate that local urban governments remain weak,andthatregional(provincial)statescontinuetoimposetheirpoliticalprerogatives,evenonIndia’slargestcities(Ruet, Tawa Lama-Rewal eds 2009). Cities do notdispose of sufficient resources nor administrativecapacity to undertake social and economic policymaking; others levels of government, central andprovincial, are driving the process, for instance withregard to urban infrastructure development (e.g.,JNNURMprogramme).Someobservershavesuggestedthere is a concomitant re-centralisation taking place.Notwithstanding, there is considerable institutionalchangeunderwayassome largeurbanregionscreategovernmentstructuresatthemetropolitanscale(e.g.,GreaterHyderabad)(Kennedy2007),(Zerah2008).

9 See for instance Schneider 2003..

MesoandMicroScalesofAnalysis

11

Asmentioned,urbangovernancewillbeamajorentrypointforourexaminationoflarge-scaleprojects,aswewillstrivetounderstandhowlocaldecisionsaretakenandbywhom. For this, scholarshiponurban regimesprovides auseful framework, although again the theory has largelybeenderivedfromobservationofAmericanandsubsequentlyEuropean cities. The urban regimes framework, buildingprimarily on Oliver Stone’s work on Atlanta (1989) andenhancedwith the vast critical literature it inspired, hasgeneratedarichcorpusforthestudyofurbanpoliticsandspecifically agenda-setting.Mainly developedbypoliticalscientists,thisliteratureaimstounderstandthefunctioningofcitypolitics,theprocessesthatexplaintheemergenceofspecificpoliticalchoices.10Thebasicpremiseoftheurbanregimeconceptisthatpublicofficialsandprivateinterestsformanalliance,agoverningcoalition,andthatthispoliticalarrangement isstable,able toweatherachange in rulingparty.Althoughonecanimaginevarioustypesofcoalitions,mostoftheempiricalliteratureshowsquiteunambiguouslythatbusinessinterestsdominatelocalpoliticsresultinginabiastowardthisgroup’sinterests.Organisedbusinessgroupsacttogetherwithelectedandnonelectedpublictoadvancetheinterestsofa‘growthcoalition’,whetherthoseinterestsareorganisedornot.Growthcoalitionsor‘growthmachines’(Molotch1976) are ledby land-basedbusiness interests,mainly property developers, who seek to gain from theintensificationoflanduse.

Giventhatlarge-scaleprojectsgiveexpressiontoagrowthagenda, this literaturecanbeprofitablymobilised forourresearch. Some strands of the mega-project literature(cf.infra)explicitlymobilisetheconceptofurbanregimes:

(…)regimetheoryisquitehelpfulinthinkingaboutthepolitics of mega-project authorization and financing.Mega-projectsaregenerallynonroutine.Theynormallyrequire special authorizing, funding, revenue, landacquisition,andregulatoryactionsbytwoormorelevelsofgovernment.Theyareallatleastinitiallycontroversial.Andtheytypicallyproceedsoslowlythattheirpoliticalbasemustholdfirmthroughelectoralandbusinesscycles.Thestableandoverwhelmingsupportrequiredtokeepamega-project on course for many years clearly doesinvolvepublic-privatecooperationofthesortthatregimetheoristsdescribe(AltshulerandLuberoff2003:267).

10 Kennedy, Dubresson 2009. „Questioning ‘urban regime’ and ‘growth machine/coalition’ concepts in Indian and South African contexts.“ In CORUS/ISA Workshop. Cape Town, South Africa.

But these same authors clarify that this does notmeanmega-projectcoalitionsneedastableregimes,but it isanadditionalassetwhereitexists(AltshulerandLuberoff2003:268)

Although compelling in its seeming relevance formany cities, the urban regimes literature does notoffer a satisfactory response to explain why cityofficialsformallianceswithbusinessinterestsandwhythesearethedominantregimetypes,at leastacrossmostcitiesstudied.Externaleconomicconstraintsareoftenputforward,theideathatinter-citycompetition,ontheriseinrecentdecades,compelsofficialstofocusonattracting investment.Thisexplanation reinforcesthe theoretical suppositions of the restructuring/re-scaling literature examined above, i.e., that globalcapitalismisdrivingchangeatvariousterritorialscales.But whatever the influence of exogenous marketforces,suchstructuralfactorscannotexplainvariationsacrosscities,whichmustnecessarilyderivefromtheinternal dynamics of local governance. Internaleconomicresourceconstraintsisanotherfactorcitedin this literature to explain what pushes localgovernments to form alliances with the businesscommunity, endowedwith resources and knowledgeabouthowtopromotethe localeconomy(Imbroscio1997). A sociological explanation sometimes putforwardistheideathatpoliticiansandbusinessgroupsare ‘natural’ allies’, promoting a vision of citydevelopmentbasedonsharedvaluesoratleastsharedconceptions about desirable patterns of urbandevelopment. This resonates with the knowledgemanagement framework, and there is scope forexploringthisfactorcomparativelyacrosscasestudies.(Thisargumentwouldappeartoresonatewithrecentresearch conducted in India on the increasingmobilisationofmiddleclassesaroundneighbourhoodissues (Tawa Lama-Rewal 2007, Zerah 2007). Somesimilar themes are found in work on urban elites inSouthAfrica(MoffettandFreund2004).

Lastly,thefactthatbusinessgroupsarethosewiththemosttogainfromagrowthagendawouldexplainthat they are moremotivated than other groups toengagecloselyincitypolitics.Indeeditisoftendifficultforothersgroups tomobilize support coalitions can,althoughtheycangenerallyblockormodifyinitiativesthat threaten them, a pattern that has been called‘negativepluralism’(Altshuler&Luberoff2003:261).According to Altshuler & Luberoff, the important

6 Urban Regimes

12

UrbanRegimes

Thisraisestheimportantquestionoflandmanagementinstitutionsandpractices,whichvaryacrossregions.Manycountries are struggling to find solutions to issues like:faultyor incomplete land records, insecurityofpropertyrights,managementofcollectivelyownedland,illegallandoccupationandsettlements.Theseissuescomeintoplaywith regard to large-scale projects since they requireassemblinglargetractsofland.Inmanycases,butthiswillvaryacrosscountries,they involveacquisitionof landbypre-emption, i.e., the right of governments to seize orappropriate land for ‘public purpose’, or through othermeansofstateenablingofprivatepurchase,bothofwhichmay lead to property disputes or dispossession ofunrecognisedstakeholdersviaeviction.

AccordingtothePeruvianeconomistHernandoDeSoto(De Soto 2000) the main obstacle to development ofcapitalismisinformality,includingtheunderutilizationoflandassetslinkedtotheabsenceofalegalpropertysystem(GonzalesdeOlarte2001).Heproposesaseeminglysimplesolutiontocapitalistdevelopmentthroughthereformofproperty systems, giving life to ‘dead capital’ by turninginformalpropertyintoformalpropertythatcouldbeusedas collateral for loans. The automatic nature of thistransformationhasbeenquestioned, includingby fellowPeruvians,forvariousreasons:thepoormaynothaveaninterest in formalizing their property, indeed in somecontextsinformalitycanofferprotection;moreover,evenifallinformallandinPeruweretransformedandusedascollateral,therewouldnotbeenoughcreditinthebankingsystem to meet the demand; more fundamentally, DeSoto’sconceptionofcapitalistdevelopmentdoesnottakeintoaccounthumancapital,andthefactthatinformalityisaneconomicandsocialproblem,notsimplytheresultoflegalorpoliticalobstacles(GonzalesdeOlarte2001).

From a theoretical perspective, De Soto appears toconsider institutions as exogenous, i.e., institutionalreform can improve material conditions. De Soto’s

prescriptionsclearlypromoteanideologicalagenda:“DeSotoproposesasystemofrepresentationsbasedontheideathatpropertygeneratessurplus,capitalandwealth.Theseideascouldbringthewholesocietytogetherand,moreover, make it progress and increase welfare. Hisproposalof formalizationwouldbea sortof revolutionwithoutsocialconvulsion,attainablebysheerpoliticalwillandperseverance.(…)Theproblemisthatnotalloftheseideas survive the reality check. A characteristic ofideologiesisthattheyemphasizefactsthatbenefitcertaininterests,failingtoprovidewithawideviewofreality.DeSoto’s argument suffers from such shortcoming.”(GonzalesdeOlarte2001).

InPerutheworkofdeSotoandhisinstituteILD(theInstitute of Liberty and Democracy) have had a lot ofinfluence.ItinspiredtheFujimorigovernmenttostartalarge-scaleregularisationpolicyviatheCOFOPRI(Comisionde Formalizacion de Propiedad Informal). This highlycentralizedgovernmentorganismwascreatedtodesignandexecuteaprogrammefortheformalizationofurbaninformalpropertyrights,withthefinancialsupportoftheWorld Bank, but without participation from localgovernments or other public sector entities (Miranda2002). According to COFOPRI the project resulted inimprovement of the legal and institutional framework,stimulation of investment and socio-economicimprovementsinthetargetpopulation.Butotherstudieshave contested this interpretation pointing out forinstancethattheprobabilityofapprovalofapplicationsfor loans is similar for thosehaving a title as for thosehavingnoownershipdocument(MorrisGuerinoni,2004,pp. 23-24, cited by Arrunada, Benito 2005), althoughthere was a slight increase in the total number ofmortgagesregistered(idem).

Inaninterestingillustrationofhowideastravel,inIndiapowerfuladvocacygroups,supportedbytheWorldBankand USAID, are lobbying for a land titling programme

7 Land Management Institutions and Practices

questionthatordinarycitizensface,“theonlyaspectoflocal development policy that most residents caremuch about”, iswhether they can protect their “usevalue” interests (home, plot, neighbourhood) in thefaceofthreatsemanatingfromthepublicandbusiness

sectors(Altshuler&Luberoff2003:261).ThislinksupwithLogan&Molotch’scontentionthatthemajorfaultlineinurbandevelopmentpoliticsisbetween‘exchange’and ‘use’ value interests (Logan andMolotch 1987)citedinAltshuler&Luberoff2003:268).

LandManagementInstitutionsandPractices

13

Thereisagrowingbodyofliteraturedealingspecificallywithmega-projectsthatisusefulforidentifyingresearchquestionsandhypotheses(AltshulerandLuberoff2003),(Flyvbjergetal.2003)(Barthel2010).

One strand of this literature sets out to explain thechangingroleof infrastructure,“fromsimplepreconditionforproductionandconsumptiontobeingattheverycoreoftheseactivities(…)”andwhy“infrastructureisincreasinglybeing built as megaprojects” although the performancerecordofmanysuchprojectsisverypoorinbotheconomicandenvironmentalterms(Flyvbjergetal.2003:2-3).Costoverrunsareendemic(overrunsof50%to100%inrealtermsarecommon,above100%arenotuncommon),projectedbenefits,notablyintermsofpositiveregionaldevelopment,oftenturnouttobeinsignificantorevennegative:

Inconsequence,thecost-benefitanalyses,financialanalyses and environmental and social impactstatements thatare routinely carriedoutaspartofmegaproject preparation are called into question,criticised and denounced more often and moredramaticallythananalysesinanyotherprofessionalfieldweknow.Megaprojectdevelopmenttodayisnotafieldofwhathasbeencalled‘honestnumbers’(…)projectpromotersoftenavoidandviolateestablishedpractices of good governance, transparency andparticipation inpoliticalandadministrativedecisionmaking,eitheroutofignoranceorbecausetheyseesuch practices as counterproductive to gettingprojectsstarted.Civilsocietydoesnothavethesamesay in this arena of public life as it does in others;citizens are typically kept at a substantial distance

8 Mega-Projects and Mega-Events

inspiredbyH.DeSoto’swork(Denis2011).11Theargumentisthesame:thattitlingwillsupportmortgageaccessandenhancethecapacityofthepoortobecomeentrepreneursandparticipateinthegrowthmachine.TheyarechoosingtoignorethenegativeevaluationofthefewprogrammesinAsiathathavebeenimplementedfollowingthismodelinJakarta,IndonesiaandDavaoCity,Philippines(Payneandal.,2009),whichindicatesthattitlingprogrammesincreasedcommercialisationofhousingininformalsettlements,andledtosharpappreciationof landvaluesandincreases inrental price, thereby reducing access to the urban poor(KeivaniandMattingly2007:462).TheobjectiveinIndiaisclearlytoeaseaccesstotheurbanlandscurrentlyoccupiedbythepoorandworkingclass,whichareprotectedinmanywaysbytheirunclearstatusandthesegmentationoflandand housingmarkets that keep apart, as a submarket,transactionsonillegalandpoorlydocumentedproperties.

According to critics, the consequencesof this reform,whichignoresthecaseofpoortenants,arenotdifficulttopredict:aftertheunificationofthemarketandcleartitlesareissued,evictionwillbedrivenbythemarketandsmallparcelsscaledupforspeculativerealestatedevelopmentsupportedby corporate capital (Durand-Lasserve, 2006).

11 In July 2010, H. De Soto was in Delhi to advise the Indian government on urban housing and property right issues as part of its agenda for a slum-free India and its overall Policy on inclusive growth.

Already efforts are underway inmany Indian States torevise the land registration system and digitalise thecadastreviae-governanceinitiatives.Butthereappearstobeatrade-off,anincompatibility,betweentheseeminglyinnocuous aim of ensuring ‘security of tenure’ and thepreservationofcollectiverightsoverland(grazing),whichareverycommonplaceinIndia,givingrisetodispossessionamongthemorevulnerablegroups(Benjaminetal.2007).

Although it was not frequently mentioned in theliteratureunderreview,itwouldprobablybefairtosayinmany contexts that not only business groups, butpoliticiansandbureaucrats toohaveadirectpecuniarystake(landorbusiness)infavouringa‘growthcoalition’.12In this context, attentionwill be paid to collusion andpublic graft, as well as to the diverse ‘impersonal’mechanisms(marketforces, institutionalvoids)throughwhich vulnerable groups in particular tend to bemostaffectedbylarge-scaleprojects(Denis2006).InDurban,forinstance,butitholdsformanyothercontexts,itwasnoted that because land values are lower in urbanperipheries,itiswheresuchprojectsareplanned,butitisalsopreciselywheremanypoorpeopleliveandwhereinformal (often illegal) settlements are located, puttingthemonanobstaclecoursewith‘urbandevelopment’.

12 In India there are regular press reports about cases of collusion between officials and real estate developers. See for instance on Mumbai, Weinstein 2008.

14

Mega-ProjectsandMega-Events

from megaproject decision making (Flyvbjerg et al.2003:5,italicsadded).

Such studies underscore the necessity to take ahealthy distancewhen analysingmaterial provided byprojectpromoters,e.g.,demandforecastsfortransportinfrastructureorprojectedemploymentforproductionplatforms,inpartbecauseofthemodelstheyuse,poordata, and the capacity for consultants tomanipulatemodels to show desired outcomes. But more thantechnicalskillsordata,thekeyproblemidentifiedislackof accountability: absence of clear objectives andarrangementsformeasuringhowtheyaremetandforrewarding/punishingpoorperformance(Flyvbjergetal.2003: 107). This raises the question of whethermegaprojects should be publicly or privately led.Flyvbjergetal.,whoarguethatprojectsonthisscalecannever be entirely private,make recommendations forincreasing accountability on the basis of experiencegainedinbuildingmegaprojects;theseincludestepstostrengthen public sector involvement in some ways(engaging stakeholders and the public; definingregulatoryregimes,…)andweakenitinothers(sovereignguaranteesshouldnotbegiventolenders;governmentshould not act as project promoter); likewise theysuggest strengthening private sector involvement insomeways(privateriskcapital;involveprivateconsortiainperformance-basedprojectdesign)anddiminishingitinothers(lobbygroupslessopportunityforrent-seekingbehaviour)(Flyvbjergetal.2003:109-10).

ForAltshulerandLuberoff,whoaremoreinterestedin the politics of mega-project development, suchprojects are “fundamentally an expression of publicauthority” evenwhen only partially financed throughpublicmoney.This isbecausepublic sector leadership(also referred toas ‘publicentrepreneurship’ inpublicchoice literature) is almost always required to seethrough effective implementation of mega-projects,regardless of whether theywere initiated by politicalleadersorbybusinessenterprises(2003:220).

StudiesoflocalurbanpoliticsintheUSshowthatevenin the ‘great mega-projects era’, roughly 1950-1970,municipalitiesreliedonfederalaidforrealizinglarge-scaleprojects,startingwiththeurbanrenewalandinterstatehighwayprogrammes (Fainstein&Fainstein1983, citedbyAltshuler&Luberoff2003:251).Itwillbenecessarytostudythefundingpatternsformega-projectsandidentifythevariousactorsandinstitutionallevelsinvolved.

Likewise,itisimportanttoanalysetheimpactofmega-project on city resource allocation decisions: do citybudgets contribute directly or are there independent

sourcesoffunding?Forinstance,inSouthAfrica,theCapeTownPartnership(CTP)13,anot-for-profitprivatecompanyinchargeofmanagingthecentralcity‘CityImprovementDistrict’ (CID), handles a largebudget constituted fromsurtaxesonpropertieswithintheCID.Infact,CIDshavealargedegreeofdiscretionaryspendingpower;althoughinitiallytheaimwastofacilitateprivate investmentsbyimproving infrastructure and service levels, it hasbeenobserved that they are now starting to self-financeinfrastructure and engage in urban planning (e.g.,pedestrianareas)(Dubresson2008).14

In addition to “who finances?” the question of “whoimplements?”isequallyimportant.Ithasbeennotedthatmega-projectsaregenerallydirectedtospecializedagencies“well insulated from normal politics” (Fainstein andFainstein 1983:248, cited byAltshuler& Luberoff 2003:251).ForIndia,Denisnotes:

(…) in parallel to the decentralization process thatdevolves land management powers to local bodies,various state-level agencies and parastatal bodies areincreasinglyactiveonthescene(…).Theyundertaketoassemblelandtoestablishindustrialparksbutalsorealestate projects, without bothering to involve theserecently ‘empowered’ local bodies. The parastatal landdevelopment agencies are aligning their strategies andpracticeswithregionalindustrialandinvestmentpoliciesandcultivateacoalitionofinterestswithprivategroupsin the spirit of aggressively pursuing economic growth.They strive to facilitate investors’ access to land in acontext of inter-state and inter-city competition (CNRSCountryReportInputs2010:6).

Swyngedouwetal.(2002,195)contendthatUrbanDevelopment Projects (UDPs) are a product ofexceptionalist planning policies and proceduresdirectedbythenewurbaneliteaspartofa‘newurban

13 Its institutional members include the former Cape Metro-politan Council, the former City of Cape Town municipality, the provincial government, Cape Town Regional Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the South African Property Owners Association (SAPOA), Cape Town Heritage Trust, Cape Town Tourism, Business Against Crime, City Community Patrol Board and Cape Town Business Forum.

14 The CTP has been directly involved in defining and implementing large-scale development programmes that have significantly shaped urban space. In general, it ensures that the business interests it represents are defended and that their ‘vision’ for the future of the city is promoted. Ken-nedy, Dubresson 2009. „Questioning ‘urban regime’ and ‘growth machine/coalition’ concepts in Indian and South African contexts.“ In CORUS/ISA Workshop. Cape Town, South Africa.


15

policy’approachtomanagingcities,‘characterisedbylessdemocratic andmore elite driven priorities’. They alsoconcludethatsuchdevelopmentsfollowlessdemocraticparticipatory processes, that UDPs are not properlyintegrated intowider city planning processes and plansand that they increase socio-economic polarisation anddirectbudgetingawayfromsocialprojects(Swyngedouw,etal,2002).Soja(2001)inhisunderstandingoftheshifttowards‘postmodernurbanisation’concludesthatoneofthe most important outcomes of the process is therestructuringoftheurbanform.Thisismostevidentintheemergence of the ‘mega-cities’ and the internalrestructuringofcities.Hepostulatesthat‘de-centralisationandre-centralisation’hasgivenrisetotheperipheralisationofthecentre(toformthe‘Exopolis’and‘Edgecities’),thecentralisation of the periphery (gentrification anddensification in the inner-city) and the breakdown ofconventional density gradients apparent in themoderncity(Soja,2001).LocalstatefacilitationofUDPsformspartoftheprocessofrestructuringtheurbanformbycreatingareas in the city with accompanying infrastructure toservice large scale development projects. These arecommonly found in inner city renewal areas, or inperipheralgreenfieldsitesinthecity,drawinginvestmentawayfromtheestablishedmoderncentralbusinessareas(see Michel and Scott, 2005, for an example of theperipheralisation of UDP development in Durban). Theimplementation of large-scale projects insulated frompublic oversight, and which exclude or favour specificspaces, and recognize or exclude specific actors, is alsoquestionedbyliteratureontherelationsbetweenjusticeand urban planning (Harvey 1973) (Fainstein 2005)(SwyngedouwandMerrifield1996),andmoreparticularlybytheconceptofspatial justice(Soja2010).Focusingontheroleofspaceindealingwithinjustice,thisconceptisdeployed at different scales (and at the articulation ofthese scales), both in a distributive (reallocation ofservices, access to urban resources), and in a decision-makingprocessperspectives(powerrelationsbetweentheactors,mechanismsofexclusion,variousrepresentationsand definitions of the justice, place-basedmovements,drawingofboundaries,politicalorganizationofspace,andissues of representational space). WP2 could usefullyinvestigatetheadoptionofthisapproachasitprovidesacriticalperspectivetoinvestigatetheimplicationsoflarge-scaledevelopmentprojectsforsustainableurbanplanning,democraticplanningprocessandforaddressingsocialandenvironmentalissueswithincityplanningprocesses.

Aspecial issueofBuilt EnvironmentonArabmega-projectsoffers relevant insights for comparingmega-

projects in non-Western contexts (Barthel 2010).Althoughtherearemanysimilaritieswithregardtothegrowingimportanceofneoliberalurbanplanningwithitsemphasisonlarge-scaleprojectstoconstruct‘worldclass’ spaces, targeting consumption and affluentlifestyle, iconic architecture, etc., as well as theoutcomes in terms of social segregation, there aresome important differences. Firstly the presence ofauthoritarian states conditions the degree ofinvolvement of various stakeholders; mega-projectstendtoemanatedirectly fromthe ‘throne’especiallyin southern Mediterranean countries. “From onecountry to another, the mega-projects listed as‘presidential’ (in Tunisia) or ‘royal’ (Morocco) confertheideathatanycontestationis impossible(…).Such projects take place outside the formal framework of decision-making and are based on exemptions from and exceptions to existing planning laws” (idem:9, italicsadded).Although theremaybeadifferenceof scale,one does find in most countries some degree ofexceptionalisminmega-projectmanagementandit isanaspectwewillconsiderinourstudies.

AspecificfeatureofArabmega-projectsinthecriticalinvolvement of Gulf investors in a new trans-Arabcapitalism seeking “to implement high-end urbandevelopments (…) targeting spaces with potential forspeculation and fast return on investment such aswaterfronts,hyper-centres,andbrownfieldorgreenfieldsites inprimeoutskirts locations”(idem:10). Butthispatternmayunderscoreaweakstate,“unabletosetarealstrategyforitscapital,buteagerforbribes”.Indeed,theanalysissuggeststhatmega-projectsoftenserveasa substitute formore comprehensive urban strategiesthat would plan for future growth, take into accountenvironmentalrisks,etc.,acritiquethatalsoappliestoWesterncountries.

With regard to governance, there are experimentswithmoredecentraliseddecision-makinginvolvingthecentralstate,localauthorities,investorsandsometimescivilsociety:“Theriseofmetropolitanlocalauthoritiesmay become a reality, even if the political agendadiffers from one country to another in this highlysensitive issue of local public institutions becomingmore independent of central government andpresenting strong skills. (…) this new projectmanagementdoesnotleadtoupheavaleverywhereofthewaysandmeansofdecision-making.Oldfeaturesof urban governance are often intertwinedwith newones”(Barthel2010).

16


Inmostcases,mega-projectsarean integralpartofastrategicplan,a“projet urbain”(Pinson2009)ora“vision”document, a detailed blueprint aimed at creating aparticular kind of city and, often, marketing it tointernational investors.Thisvisioningprocesswill formacentral part of our research. Such “imagineering” (Paul2004)and“worlding”(Roy2009)processes,whichtendtoinvolvetransposinggeneric‘solutions’andstrategies,havebeencriticallyanalysed in the literature.Waterfronts forexample, a common type of mega-project, have beendevelopedincitiesoftheNorthandSouth(e.g.CapeTownwaterfront) often as a component of urban renewal ofcentralhistoricalprecinctsinthecity(Hoyle,etal,1988).

AuthorslikePaulremindusthattherealizationofthedevelopment agenda takes place in the urban builtenvironment, through city building, in both the literalandmetaphoricalsense:

Landuse and capital investment aswell as imagecreation and/or preservation—both increasinglyintegrated through the enactment of ‘‘symbolic andconcreteimaginations’’(Short&Kim,1999:p.101)inthe cityscape—are the core elements in buildingphysicalmanifestations of the city’s (desired) globalqualities and infusing festivals, sporting events,buildings, parks, squares, roads, even wholeneighborhoods, with symbolic meaning. Thisconstitutes the ‘‘imagineering’’ (Archer, 1997;Rutheiser,1996)oftheworldcity,apoliticalaswellaseconomic project inwhich particular actors, classesandcoalitionspursuetheirownvisionsofglobalstatusandconnectivity(Paul2004:573).

In India, several large cities have prepared visionstatements (e.g.,VisionMumbai,MasterPlan forDelhi2021),usuallywiththehelpofinternationalconsultancyfirms, a process contested for its opacity and lack ofimagination.Thesestudiesprovidesagoodstartingpoint:Bangalore(Goldman2010);Delhi(Dupont2011),MumbaiandHyderabad(Kennedy2004;KennedyandZérah2008).

InSouth AfricaaspartoftheaforementionedIDPprocessesallmunicipalitieshavesought todocument theirgoalsandprogrammes. The eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality(Durban)makesthefollowingstatement:“By2020,eThekwiniMunicipalitywillbeAfrica’smostcaringandliveablecity…Torealisethisvision,webelievetherearebasicelementsthatallcitizens,thebusinesscommunityandvisitorsmusthave:

• Easeofmovementinthecity.

• Asafeenvironmentinallpartsofthemunicipalarea.

• Accesstoeconomicopportunities.

• Resourcestoaffordwhatthecityoffers.

• Acleanandgreencity.

• Homelyneighbourhoods.

• Access to services, in particularmunicipal, healthandeducationservices.

Withdeliveryofthese,thepeopleofeThekwinishouldbeableto:

• Liveinharmony.

• Beproudoftheircity.

Mega-Events

Large-scale projects are also critically analysed inconnectionwithmega-eventssuchastheOlympicsandother sporting events, which involve massive urbanrestructuring (stadia, public transport, housing), andusuallyincludebeautificationschemes,slumevictions,etc(Broudehoux 2007, Chalkey, Essex 1999, Heitzman,Srinivas2005,Monclus2003,Vinayak,Ghosh2006,Yuen2008). These studies are particularly relevant in thecontextofthisprojectastwocasestudiesspecificallydealwithmega-events:theYamunaRiverfrontredevelopment

project in Delhi for Commonwealth Games and theOlympicGamesinRiodeJaneiroin2016.Regardingthelatter, the Brazilian president recently appointed theformerpresidentoftheCentralBankofBraziltochairtheOlympicPublicAuthority,demonstratingtheimportancegiventotheevent.Theneedtofollowarigorousscheduleforsucheventsoftenprovidesjustificationforsuppressingpublicdebate.TheBrazilianteamiscloselyfollowingthismega-event and the related megaprojects, and theirimplicationsforurbanpolicy.

9 Visioning / Imagineering

Visioning/Imagineering

17

• Feelprotected.

• Feeltheirbasicneedsarebeingmet.

Achieving the vision means addressing the keydevelopment challenges by making key interventions.”(http://www.durban.gov.za/durban/government/policy/vision)accessedon10June2010)

Theintentionssetoutareclearlyaimedatseekingtopositionthecityascognisantofitscompetingobligations.AnanalysisofsupportingdocumentsidentifiesthattheMunicipalityseesitselfasacentraldriverofdevelopmentprocessesandthattheuseofcatalytictypelargescaleurban projectswill be central to not only overcomingproblemsofpovertybutalso intermsofrepositioningthecity’seconomytogrowandcreatejobs.EspeciallywiththerecentWorldCupacursoryanalysisofthecity’srecent budgets reflects significant portions of capitalexpenditurebeingallocatedtothesemega-projectsandthese interventions are given some prominence inrelevantdocumentation.Forinstance,intheEconomicDevelopmentStrategyitisstated:

Thestrategyprovidesaframeworkwithinwhichtodevelop partnerships with business and society todriveeconomicinitiatives,andguidancetomaintainhigh quality core infrastructure that serve keyeconomicnodesintheEMA.TheEDSseekstoimprovethebusinessenvironmentwithinkeyeconomicnodesto encourage growth and further investment. Itprovides the framework for the identification anddevelopmentofcatalyticprojects,whichacttoinitiatedevelopment in key sectors and priority areas.(eThekwiniMunicipality,2008:5)

Oneofthemostsystematiccritiquesofthevisioning/imagineering processes, which tend to be formulaic,has been offered by Robinson (2008)who advocatesthatallcitiesshouldbeinterpretedratheras‘ordinary cities’, a product of unique social, political andeconomicconditionsandhistory.Shesuggeststhatascities create their visionsof the future for thewholecity,citymanagementhastocontendwithawiderangeofdifferentdemands.Thefocusofthisapproachisthuson‘diversity’ratherthan‘specialisation’inthevisioningprocess.Ratherthanrankingthecityandvisioningitsfuturebasedonanarrowsphereofeconomicactivities(pro-growthprojects), theemphasis isoncapitalizingon thebroad rangeof social andeconomicnetworksand economies that circulate through the city. Thisbringsforward“muchmoreofthecityanditsdiverseeconomy intoview” (Robinson,2008,75) inplanningfor the future. Robinson, (2008, 74) contends that

within this approach “the benefits of supporting thegeneralised agglomeration economies of a city asopposedtospecializedglobalisingclusters,emergeasimportant”.

A similar approach is being advocated by socialactivists in Peru, who calls on city governments topursue appropriate growth strategies that cater to alow-income urban economy. “Urban informality is astrategicelementinthedevelopmentofalow-incomeurban economy. The design of future urban policiesshouldbeginbyaccepting,promotingandmodernizingthis sector. These policies should consider the basicrequirementsofthepoor-theneedtoincreaseincomesand to reduce expenditures.” (Miranda 1994). Inparticular, the importance of informal commerce orstreet vending is underscored as a major source oflivelihoods;thisisthecaseinIndiaalso.Inadditiontoproviding work to unskilled rural migrants, streetvendingabsorbsworkerswhocannotfindemploymentin the formal sector either for lack of skills oropportunities. In India for instance, although theeconomyisgrowingfast,workintheorganizedsectorisshrinking;onestudyfoundthat30%ofstreetvendorsin Ahmedabad and 50% inMumbai and Kolkata hadpreviouslybeenemployedintheformalsector(mainlytextilefactories)(Bhowmik2003).

Theseapproachessuggestalternativestostrategiespremised on global competition buttressed bymegaprojects;suchalternativepolicieswouldfocusonpromotingthelocaleconomyincludingactivitiesintheinformal sector. Inmanydevelopingeconomies smallenterprises,includinghouseholdindustries,contributevery significantly to GDP, exports, and employment.Carefully designed policies can target SMEs and helpthem improve their performance (skill development,access toquality infrastructureandcredit,marketingassistance,etc).Startinginthe1990s,therehasbeenabundantliteratureonindustrialdistrictsandclustersshowingthatSMEbasedproductioncanbeaneffectivestrategyforbothdevelopedanddevelopingcountries.Selectiveinputs,includingfromlocalgovernments,canimproveclusterperformance,whosecompetitivenessusually rely on joint action among competing firms.Otheralternativepoliciesincludealivelihoodsapproachto target localdevelopmentefforts towardtheurbanpoor(RakodiandLloyd-Jones2002).Usingspatialisedknowledge to better target policy interventions toconcentrations of urban deprivation can serve as astartingpointforimprovingthevariousassetsoflow-incomehouseholds(human,financial,physical,social)(Baudetal.2008).

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Visioning/Imagineering

Thestudyoftheimplementationoflarge-scaleprojectswillbeconductedincollaborationwithresearchersfromother workpackages (WP 3-6), specialised on specificthemessuchasurbaninequality,substandardsettlements,environmentalrisksandcosts,fiscaldecentralisationandparticipatory budgeting and integrated forms of urbansustainable development.We briefly outline some keyresearchquestionsandworkinghypotheses.

Mega projects are symptomatic ofmetropolisation processes.Theconceptofmetropolisationaddressesthetrendof accumulationof values in the largest cities bylookingatitsspatialoutcomes:newlocationsofcapital,mostlyintheperiphery,specificspatialandarchitecturalforms - enclaves, spatial trends that are reinforced -namely segregation (Lévy and Lussault 2003). Byquestioningthebuiltenvironmentaswellasgovernanceissues, it offers a useful framework to consider theconsequencesofmegaprojectsatallscales.Itespeciallyhighlightsthedevelopmentofnewperipheralcentralities(e.g.edgecities)whoseexocentriclocationchallengestheexistingmetropolis,itsadministrativeboundariesandthewayitismanaged;italsounravelsthecomplexdynamicstriggeredoffatthelocalscalebysuchnewlocations.Inthatsenseitoffersaninterestingperspectivetoaddressthe various impacts ofmegaprojects by considering allscalesasembeddedandintersected.

Fromaspatialpointdeview,thewaycapitalisinvestedin megaprojects differs according to the activity andeconomic sector and evolves over time. Export-orientedzones or corporate campuses, for instance, aremanifestationsofpreciselydefinedmomentsofcapitalism,afactthatisreflectedinthebuiltform.TakingtheexampleoftheITsectorinIndia,RoleeAranyadistinguishesthreedifferent“generations”oflocationsandbuiltformsinthemetropolitan area of Bangalore, the big IT parks andcorporate campuses located in the outskirts of the citycorrespondingtotwodifferentstagesofthecomingofageoftheIndianITsector,butalsototwodifferentcontextsintermsofurbandevelopment (Aranya2008). Ithighlightstherelevanceoflocatingthemegaprojectasaspatialforminitsbroadereconomicandspatialenvironment,aswellasanarchitecturalform:whereisitlocatedinthemetropolitanarea?Whichbuiltformwasselected?Wereotheroptions(intermsoflocationandbuiltform)availableinthesamecity/countryforthiskindofactivity?Thesequestionsneed

to be raised as theymay highlight hidden agendas (e.g.redevelopingandbeautifyinganarea,extractingthelandvalueofareasbelongingtopowerfulactors).

The literaturedocumentshowthe implementationof large-scale projects can entail risks of aggravatingsocio-spatial exclusion, both at the time of theestablishment of the project (land acquisition,displacement of population) and as a result of thecreated infrastructure (reduction of employmentopportunities,environmentaldestabilization) (see forexample Gellert & Lynch 2003). The increasingspecializationofurbanspaces(strictlycommercialorindustrial, strictly residential) that is fostered bymegaprojectshasbeenidentifiedasoneofthefactorsleadingtourbanfragmentation(Mayetal.1998).Theterm ‘fragmentation’hasbeenhotlydebated (Navez-Bouchanine 2002), and some authors are inclined tolimit its use to instances of splintering of materialnetworks (separate networks for water, electricityprovision, privatized transport network, toll roads)(ibid)(Jaglin2001).Thiscorrespondstoalargeextenttothewaymegaprojectsarecurrentlydesignedasself-contained (e.g. economic zones, townships) and self-sustained, especially in metropolises of the South,wherepublicinfrastructureandservicesdonotcoverbasic needs. In that sense such enclaves that arelocated in themetropolitan area butwhose territoryand functioning are separate, question the political,economic, material, financial viability of the urbanbody as a whole. The consequences of spatialfragmentationhavenotbeenverydocumentedinthiscontextatthemicroscale, throughthestudyofbothdisplacement processes (displacement of livelihoods,ofpopulation)andresilience(howdolocalpopulationscopewithit)intheimplementationofamegaproject.

WritingaboutAmericancitiesinthemid-1970s,butwith surprising contemporary relevance, Molotchinsisted on the liabilities of the growth agenda withregardto lowerclassresidents inparticularwhobearthehighercostsresultingfromthesepoliciesincludingfor utilities and other public services, and to theenvironment(airpollution,traffic).Hevigorouslyrefutedtheclaimthatgrowthcreatesemployment,callingitthe“key ideological prop” for the growthmachine (1976:320). Other authors also highlight the ‘regressive

10 Implementation of Large-Scale Projects: Examining Impacts at the Micro and Metropolitan Scales

ImplementationofLarge-ScaleProjects:ExaminingImpactsattheMicroandMetropolitanScales

19

functionallymixed-use,theyarerarelysociallymixed:suchresidentialprojectsareessentiallyupscaleones,targetingprivileged sections of the society. They are enclaves,characterized spatiallyby restrictionofaccessandgating(thoughtheterm“gated communities”maynotberelevanttoalltypesofenclavese.g.,new“integratedtownships”and“privatecities”).Thereisascarcityofresearchonthisissueindevelopingcountries,exceptforthedenseproductiononLatinAmerica.TheC2Sresearchprojectoffersanopportunityto bridge this gap. The literature on gated communitiesin the 1990s mainly documented the spread of thisphenomenon throughout theAmerican continent (NorthandSouth)(Blakely&Snyder1997,MacKenzie1994).Theliteratureondevelopingandemergingcountriesthathasdeveloped in the 2000s remains largely descriptive andfocusedontheseenclavesthemselves,notaddressingtheissuesthatarereinforcedinthatcontext:segregationanditsconsequencesforlocalpopulationsintermsoflivelihoods,fragmentationandtheviabilityoflocaldemocracies,fiscalsustainability,governanceissues.Asawholethisliteraturedoes not really address the specificities of cities of theSouth:eithertheanalysisremainslimitedtotheinvestigationofa“global”form,oritaddressesdirectlythemetropolitanandnational scales, bypassing the local one.Herein liesconsiderablescopeforresearch.

Robbins(Robbins2005)providesananalysisofimpactdimensions deemed important by the Municipality inDurban,SouthAfrica in someof its largescaleprojectsandexaminestheextenttowhichthesemightbeseenas“pro-poor”. He concludes that, “the experience ofDurban’s capital spending for economic developmentpurposeshas,toalargedegree,lackedinintenttoimpactmeaningfully and directly on the lives of the poor.”(Robbins,2005:70).AsubsequentanalysisoftheCity’sbroadereconomicdevelopmentprogrammesbeyondthisperiodwithaspecificfocusonemploymentrevealsthatdirectemploymentimpactshavenotreceivedsustainedattention inmajor economic development projects buthavebeguntobenotedinsocially-orientedpublic-worksinfrastructureactivities(Robbins2010).

distributional effects’ of policies pursued by thedominanturbanregimes,which“tendtoreinforceandextendanextremelevelofmaterialdeprivationamongcertaincitizens,whichisultimatelyincompatiblewithaconditionofpoliticalequality”(Imbroscio,1997:10).Inthe literature on US cities, examples of policies withadverse effects include regeneration projects thatdisplaceinnercityresidents,largelyminorities,orreduceneighbourhood employment opportunities andeconomic policies that promote skilled employment,therebypenalisingrelativelylesseducatedgroups.

To assess the social and environmental costs ofmegaprojects,aswellastocriticizetheinstrumentalizationof the green agenda, the concept of environmental justiceisusedinBrazil(Acselradetal.2004).Theconceptwas forged in the1980s in theworkofRobertBullardandothers,basedonstudiesshowingthattoxicwastedumps and polluting industries in the US wereconcentrated inareas inhabitedbyAfricanAmericans.Themovementgavevisibilitytotherelationshipbetweenenvironmental degradation and social injustice15. ToOtilia Arantes (2000) strategic planning and urbanmarketing ofmega-projects, especiallymajor culturalandentertainmentinfrastructureandequipment,reflectthe logic of competitiveness. Thus, according to theArantes,gentrificationisnotanunintendedconsequenceof the logic of urban investment, on the contrary,gentrification is a key component for revitalization,urbanredevelopmentandupgrading.

Somemega-projects,suchasspecialeconomiczonesorindustrial townships in India, oftenhave either a built-inresidential component or an impact on residentialdevelopmentintheimmediatesurroundings.Theworldwiderealestatebubbleduringthe2000sfuelledthistrendandthe evolution towards “mixed use” projects (includingcommercialactivities, servicesandresidential space)andprivate cities projects. However, although they are

15 Cf. http://www.justicaambiental.org.br/_justicaambiental/

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ImplementationofLarge-ScaleProjects:ExaminingImpactsattheMicroandMetropolitanScales

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EADIKaiser-Friedrich-Strasse11D-53113BonnTel.:(+49)228.2618101Fax:(+49)228.2618103www.eadi.orgwww.chance2sustain.eu

Chance2Sustain examineshowgovernmentsandcitizensincitieswithdifferingpatternsofeconomicgrowthandsocio-spatialinequalitymakeuseofparticipatory(orintegrated)spatialknowledgemanagementtodirecturbangovernancetowardsmoresustainabledevelopment.Consortium partners:EuropeanAssociationofDevelopmentResearchandTrainingInstitutes(EADI,Germany),GovernanceforInclusiveDevelopment(GID)attheAmsterdamInstituteforSocialScienceResearch(AISSR-UvA,Netherlands),CentreNationaldelaRechercheScientifique(CNRS,France),CentroBrasileirodeAnáliseePlanejamento(CEBRAP,Brazil),CitiesforLifeForum(FORO,Peru),NorwegianInstituteforUrbanandRegionalResearch(NIBR,Norway),SchoolofPlanningandArchitecture(SPA,India),UniversityofKwaZulu-Natal(UKZN,SouthAfrica)

EUROPEAN COMMISSIONEuropean Research Area

Funded under Socio-economic

Sciences & Humanities

the politics of large-scale economic and infrastructure projects in

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