the political economy of china-myanmar relations: strategic and economic dimensions

8/14/2019 The Political Economy of China-Myanmar Relations: Strategic and Economic Dimensions

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The Po l i tical Econom y of China-Myanm ar Relat ions:Strategic and Economic Dimensions

Poon Kim SHEE

Abstract

The main th esis of this paper is to ar gue tha t Myanmar is neither a str ategic

pawn nor an economic pivot of China in the short and immediate term. Since

1 9 8 8 , S i n o -My an m ar en t en t e i s u n ev en , a s y m m et r i ca l , b u t n ev e r t h e l e s s

reciprocal and mutually beneficial. The strategic entente and economic relations

ar e a ma rr iage of convenience. However, Myan ma rs st ra tegic locat ion on a

tr i junct ion between South Asia, Southeast Asia and China is nevertheless

economically and strategically significant. Economically, Myanmar is important

for China as a t rading out let to the Indian Ocean for i ts landlocked in land

prov inces o f Yunnan and S ichuan . S t ra teg ica l ly , Myanmar i s po ten t ia l ly

importa nt for China t o achieve its str ategic presence in t he Indian Ocean and its

long- te rm two-ocean ob jec t ive . Fur thermore , a Ch ina-Myanmar nexus i s

str at egically useful for China t o cont ain I ndia s influence in South east Asia.

Fina lly, Myan ma r is pa rt an d par cel of China s gran d str at egic design to achieve

its goal of becoming a grea t power in th e 21st centur y. Despite th e more exten sive

growing Chinese influence over Myanm ar , i t i s u nl ikely tha t Rangoon will

b eco m e a s t r a t eg i c s a t e l l it e b a s e fo r C h i n a . Myan m a r s s t r o n g s en s e of

nationalism, its past ability to successfully deal with foreign powers to preserve

its independence and cultural identity, will l ikely make Myanmar withstand

most odds.

Is Myanma r a Strategic Paw n of China?

T h e a rg u me n t t h a t M y a n ma r i s a s t r a t e g i c p a wn o r a n e c o n o mic p iv o t i s

predicat ed on Myan ma rs geo-str at egic position, sin ce it sha res comm on border s

with it s two giant neighbour s, China a nd In dia. The logic of th is reasoning is tha t

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Visting Professor at College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University, Japan.

The Int ern at iona l Studies Associat ion of Ritsum eikan U niversity:

Ritsum eikan Annua l Review of Intern at iona l Stu dies, 2002. ISSN 1347-8214. Vol.1, pp. 33-53


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Myanmar is sandwiched between India on the Northwest and China on the

Nort heast and th erefore, as weak power an d potential unst able Union plagued by

internal e thnic and pol i t ica l confl ic t , Myanmar wil l inevi tably succumb to

external pressure, lose its independence and sovereignty. Indeed, one observer

ha s ar gued th at even if Myanm ar is successfully wedged between t he Sino-Indian

str at egic rivalries, Ran goon st ill can not escape th e reality th at it ha s become pa rt

of Chinas sphere of influence, as a result of its entente with China from 1989

onwards.1

Besides geographical proximity , h is tory is another factor condit ioning

Myanm ar s perception of extern al r elations. Historical evidence ha s sh own t ha t

Myanmar did become a victim of expansionism of the great powers. In the 13

th

centur y, Myanm ar was invaded by the Mongols and later on in t he 19th centu ry

by the British and finally in the 20 th century by the Japanese. Will history be

repeated again in the 21st century for Myanmar to succumb to external pressure

to get its independence reduced to a vassal state of a rising super power? Can an

economically weak, politically divided and socially fragmented small power

sur vive the a mbitions of a rising neighbour ing super power?

The main thesis of this paper is that Myanmar is neither a strategic pawn

nor a n economic pivot of China . Sino-Myanm ar ties a re u neven, asymm etr ical but

nevertheless reciprocal and mutually beneficial. The entente is a marriage of

convenience.

China-Myanmar relations since diplomatic recognition in 1950 until today

can be br ief ly d ivided in to the fol lowing phases: f i rs t , ambivalent peaceful

coexistence: 1949-1961; second, temporary setback: 1962-1970; third, improving

relationship: 1971-1988; fourth, closer entente since 1989-2002. The last phase

saw t he m ost s ignif ican t chan ge in Myan ma rs China pol icies , th at is from

str at egic neut ra lity to str at egic alignm ent with China after th e m ilita ry coup,

when the present military junta took power in 1988. The focus of this paper is to

an alyse Sino-Myanm ar ent ent e in th e post-coup er a since 1988.

In o rd e r t o p r e d ict t h e fu tu r e t i e s b etwe e n M y a n ma r a n d C h in a , i t i s

pertinent to first analyze Chinas foreign policy objectives, in particular i ts

str at egic goal towar ds Myanm ar ; second, to ana lyze Myanm ar s perception a nd

34 34

Poon Kim SHE E

1. J. Mohan Malik, Myanmars Role in Regional Security: Pawn or Pivot? Contemporary

S outheast As ia , Volume 19, Number 1, June 1997, pp.52-73; see also S.D. Muni, Chin as

S trategic En gagem ent with th e N ew AS EAN , An Exploratory S tud y of Chinas post-Cold Wa r

Political, Strategic and Economic Relations with Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam ,

Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies IDSS Monograph No. 2, (Singapore: Institute of

Defence and Strategic Studies, 2002).


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responses to China s Myanm ar policies, and t hen In dias an d ASEANs responses

to th e cha llenges from a rising China s inr oads a nd in fluences over Myanm ar

since the 1990s.

China s Myan ma r Polic ies : Objec tive s

Chin as objectives in Myan ma r can be su ccinctly sum ma rized as follows:

First , since 1979, Chinas Myanm ar policy has been in line with its genera l

policy of ensuring a stable external environment with the neighbouring states so

t h a t B e ij in g c a n c on t i n u e t o im p l e m e n t i t s d o m e s t i c m o d e r n i z a t i on a n d

development policy.S e con d , C h i n a s M y a n m a r p ol i cy ca n b e s e e n i n t h e c on t e x t o f t h e

continuation of maintaining the spirit of Bandungs policy of peaceful coexistence

with its n eighbours since 1955.

Third, in the geo-economic dimension, Myanmar is important for China in

th e cont ext of being a lan dr idge2 for Chin a to revive its southwest silk r oad from

Yunn an province to Myanm ar and westward to Bangladesh, India an d th e West.

The link up with Myanmar could help to develop the poor economies in the

sou t hwes te rn par t of in lan d China to t r ade wi th th e g rowing economies o f

South east Asia an d India.3 Furthermore, with the realization of the ASEAN Free

Trade Area (AFTA) with a population of 500 million, China could promote trade

sout hwa rd using Myan ma r as a landr idge, linkin g China s inla nd provinces with

th e rest of Sout hea st Asia.

Fourt h, with Myanm ar , Laos an d Thailan d, China can form a sub-regiona l

grouping for economic cooperation. Thus China can export an abundance of

cheaper goods to these countries. Myanmar is important to China to implement

i t s w e s t e r n d e v e l o p m e n t s t r a t e g y . 4 K u n m i n g , in p a r t i cu l a r , w i ll b e n e fi t

economically by linking up with Myanmar for trade and investments. Together

with the formation of a sub-regional grouping including the f ive mainland

Southeast Asian economies (Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar),

which have a potential market of 200 million people, they can be the goods and

products outlets for Kunming and other southwestern provinces. The link up

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The P olitical Economy of China -Myan ma r Relat ions: Str at egic an d Economic Dimensions

2. For a study on the strategic landridge see, Yuan-Li Wu, The Strategic Landridge,

(California: Stanford University Press, 1975).

3. J . Moha n Ma lik, Myanm ar s Role in Regional Secur ity: Pawn or Pivot?op. cit., p.57.

4. Tian Xiaowen, China s Dr ive to Develop It s West ern Region (I): Why Tur n To This Region

Now? EAI Background Brief No.71, (Singapore: East Asian Institute, National University of

Singapore), 28 September 2000.


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between China s southwestern provinces and th e ma inland South east Asian

sta tes can mitigat e th e gap of economic dispar ities between Ch inas a ffluent

coast al an d its povert y stricken sout hwester n inlan d provinces.

Myan mar in Chinas Strateg ic Thinkin g

Does China h ave long-term grand stra tegic designs on Myanma r and th e Indian

Ocean?

M y a n ma r i s g e o g ra p h ic a l ly l o c a t e d a t t h e so u th we s t o f C h in a a n d i s

st ra tegically import an t a s a lan dridge for t he P eoples Libera tion Army N avy

(PLAN) in the long term to reach the Indian Ocean via the Myanmar-controlledCoco Islands, which are about 30 km north of the Indian-controlled Andaman

Islands. By the year 2050, China is expected to achieve world-class blue water

navy s ta tus .5 Myanmar would be strategically important for China to achieve

direct access to the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. The PLAN would be able to

shorten the distance by 3000km reducing the voyage by five to six days by not

passing through the Stra i t of Malacca to reach the Bay of Bengal . In 1994,

Japanese sources reported that China had completed construction of radar and

electronic surveillance facilities on the Coco Islands, which were on lease to

China.6 There was also a report that China and Myanmar were interested in

joint development of a deep-water port at Kyaukpyu on Ramree Islands in the

Bay of Bengal.7 Furthermore, the alleged military installation at the Zadetkyi

Islan d on Myan ma rs south ern tip of its t err itory close to Indonesias Saba ng

Islan d, (off nort her n Aceh in Su ma tr a) ra ised suspicions a bout China s futu re

mar itime ambitions in th e Indian Ocean.8 Thus Chin as str at egic alignment with

an d inr oads in to Myan ma r could h ave long-term serious securit y implicat ions n ot

only for Indonesia, Thailand and ASEAN as a whole, but also for the long-term

stra tegic interests of India, Ja pan a nd th e US.

Since the 1988 post-military coup period, Rangoon has cemented closer

military cooperation with China. In l989, the first military delegation arrived in

Beijing to negotiat e the pur cha se of ar ms from China . A deal was str uck wort h

36 36

Poon Kim SHE E

5. Shee Poon Kim, The South China Sea in Chinas Strategic Thinking, Contemporary

Southeast Asia, Vol. 19, No. 4, Mar ch 1998, Sin gap ore, p.369-387.

6. Asia Y earbook1994, p.98-100; Peter W. Rodma n, China Woos Bur ma ,International Herald

Tribun e, 30 May 1997.

7. International Herald Tribun e, 7 April 1995.

8. Dona ld M. Seekins, Burm a-China Relations: Playing with Fire, Asian S urvey, Vol. 37, No.

6, Ju ne 1997, p.535.


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about US$ l.4 billion.9 Besides the supply of arms, (jet f ighters, tanks, naval

ships, etc.) China also agreed to tra in Myanm ar s a ir force, military a nd ar my

personnel.10 The motivation for t hese ar ms pu rchas es was to upgrade Myanm ar s

m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y a n d t o u s e t h e m t o s u p p r e s s t h e m i n o r i t y s e p a r a t i s t

insur gencies. In 1994, Myanm ar bought about U S$400 million worth of arm s.11 If

such arms purchases continue, Myanmar may emerge as the only garrison state

in Southeast Asia. In October l996, Army Chief, General Maung Ayes visit to

Beijing resulted in further military and intelligence cooperation between the two

countries. China again agreed to train 300 Myanmar air force and naval officers

and to provide additional places for them in Chinese Staff colleges.12 China also

offered favour able ter ms for Myanm ar s a rm s pu rchases offering free loan s a ndgranting credit to the junta, as well as economic aid and investments for the

const ru ction of Myanm ar s basic infrast ru ctu re, such as da ms, bridges, roads an d

ports as well as for industrial projects. Of particular strategic significance is the

construction of strategic roads along the Irrawaddy River trade route linking

Yun na n pr ovince to th e Bay of Bengal.

Chinas intention to seek closer strategic alignment and economic cooperation

with Myanmar could be seen from the visit to Rangoon of a high-power delegation

(about 100 members) led by Li Peng from 26 to 28 December 1994. Both Li Peng

a n d h i s cou n t e r p a r t , Ge n e r a l T h a n S h w e a g r e e d t o r e a f fi r m a n d f u r t h e r

strengthen the closer relationship between the two countries. The communiqu

issued at th e end of th e visit st at ed th e two leaders n oted with a ppreciat ion t he

all round strengthening of relations between the two countries in recent years,

and reaffirmed their desire to further promote co-operation in the economic,

agricultural, environmental, cultural, tourism, forestry, education and scientific

fields, an d in combat ing illicit dru gs.13 It is doubtful Myanmar can contribute

significantly to the creation of a new East Asian political and economic order. But

the price Myanmar will have to pay for deviating from its strategic neutrality

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9. ht tp://www.cnn .com/AIANOW/as iaweek/99/0528/na t4h tm l; International Herald Tribune, 3

J une 1997;Asia 1996 Yearbook, p.97; D.M. Seekins, Bur ma -China Relat ions: Pla ying with Fir e,

op. cit., p.534. See also Den ny Roy, Chin as Foreign Relations , (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman &

Litt lefield Pu blishers , Inc, 1998), p.174.

10. The arms purchases include among others, helicopters, attack aircrafts, trucks, artillery,

an ti-ship cruise m issiles, petrol boat s, ta nks, r ockets, mortar s, assa ult rifles, etc. D.M. Seekins,

Bur ma -China Rela tions: Playing with F ire, ibid., p.534.

11. Mary P. Ca llaha n, New Dr agon or Still Dra gging? Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 2, Febru ar y

1995, p.206.

12. Peter W. Rodman, China Woos Burma, International Herald Tribune , 30 May 1997, op. cit.

13. S outh China Morning Post, 30 December l994.


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prin ciple might be to potent ially become a useful pa wn for China s long-ter m

strategic interests. Of course, Li Peng refuted as sheer fabrication western

intelligence report s of th e inst allat ion of a sophisticat ed r ada r facility in th e Coco

Island.14 Li Peng also made it unequivocally clear that China has no intention to

seek a spher e of influence in t he In dian Ocean. Ra ngoons a ut horities endorsed

Lis comments.15

Although Myanmar and China have c loser mil i tary t ies , China has a lso

encouraged Rangoon to have military links with other countries, such as having,

for example, defence supply relations with Pakistan.16 China claims t hat most of

th e ar ms sold to Myanm ar were for defensive pur poses.

China is a positive ra ther tha n n egat ive factor in ensuring to maint ain st ableSino-Myanmar re la t ions . Though China remains a s taunch a l ly s ince 1988,

Beijing is concerned about Myanmars long-term political and social stability

because of Rangoons failing economy and lack of political legitimacy. China

support s th e idea of UN mediat ion t o bring a bout political dialogues between t he

ru ling militar y jun ta an d th e Nat iona l League for Democra cys Secret ar y-Genera l

Aun g San Suu Kyi.

China a lso endorsed the ASEAN idea of construct ive in tervent ion or

compreh ens ive engagement wi th Myan ma r , in pa r t icu la r Dr . Mah a t h i r s

initiat ive to persua de Rangoon t o un dert ake political reform s.

Myanma rs P erception a nd Respo nses

Why was str at egic ent ent e between Myan ma r an d China possible in 1989? The

ma in r eason was th e Wests diploma tic isolation of Myanm ar . The m ilita ry coup

and the killings of the students in 1988 in Rangoon, as well as the killings of

Chinese students during the Tiananmen crisis in June 1989, received strong

criticism and triggered off western economic sanctions. Beijing saw a golden

opportunity to fill the strategic vacuum in Myanmar and decided to make some

in ro a d s in t o Ra n g oon . T h e e c on o mic s a n ct io n s b y th e W e s t h a d a d d e d to

Myan ma rs economic difficulties. Due to isolat ion a nd necessity, Ra ngoon decided

to move closer to China so as to seek both military and economic assistance from

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Poon Kim SHE E

14. China News, 20 April 1995.

15.Renmin ribao, 28 December 1994; Ta Kung Bao, 6 May 1998.

16. S.D. Muni, China s Str at egic En gagemen t with th e New ASEAN, An E xplora tory Stu dy of

Chinas Post-Cold War Poli t ical , Strategic and Economic Relat ions with Myanmar, Laos,

Cambodia a nd Vietna m, op. cit., p.80.


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Beijing. It is in this context th at one can a rgue tha t Myanma r was n ot a player in

th e str at egic game vis--vis China. Myanm ar s militar y never completely tr ust ed

an y exter na l major power, including China, its north ern gian t n eighbour, becau se

the Myanmese leaders have deep sea ted fee l ings o f s inophobia as we l l a s

xenophobia. The Myanmese politicians were socialized in an environment of

political cultu re of distru st.17

Myanmar has no intention, nor is willing to be a strategic pawn of China. In

fact, Myanma rs militar y leader s ar e awa re of th e poten tial da ngers t o be too close

to China to feel comfortable. By the late 1990s, Myanmar decided to adopt a

counter hedging strategy by diversifying its diplomacy welcoming India 18 a nd

consol idat ing i ts t ies with ASEAN as well as encouraging Japan and otherindust rialized sta tes like Singapore an d th e EU to invest in Ran goon.

To minimize Myan ma rs m ilita ry dependen cy on China , Rangoon, in August

2001 decided to pur cha se 12 MIG-29 fight ers from Rus sia at a bar gain price of

b e t w e e n U S $ 1 3 0 m t o U S $ 1 5 0 m f o r t h e e n t i r e b a t c h . M y a n m a r h a s a l s o

dispa tched 300 milita ry personn el to Moscow for tra inin g to fly th e MIGs an d to

acquire rocket technology.19 The strategic significance of this purchase is that

Russia offers another potential alternative to Rangoon to balance China and

India.

The closer strategic and economic ties between Myanmar and China have

presented a dilemma for Rangoon. How can it keep its independence, strategic

n e u t r a l i t y a n d a t t h e s a m e t i m e m a i n t a i n a g ood r e l a t i on s h i p w it h i t s

neighbour ing sta tes, especially China ?

In order to minimize Myanmars economic dependence on China, Rangoon

needs t o d ivers i fy i t s economic con t ac ts wi th th e indu s t r ia l ized coun t r ies ,

especially the US, the EU, Japan, the ASEAN states and India so as to attract

more foreign dir ect investmen ts (FDI) an d a cquire new t echn ology and skills for

its labour force to overcome the structural weaknesses and backwardness of its

economy. To achieve greater efficiency of its economy, the military regime has no

choice but to undertake political reform and accept democracy. Political reforms

can s trengthen i ts f ree market economy. Improvements of human r ights are

necessary, as th ey are tied to aid and investm ent . So far , evidence ha s shown th at

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17. See Lucian Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation-Building: Burmas Search for Identity ,

(New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962).

1 8 . Fo r t h e con cep t of Cou n te r -Hed g in g S t r a t eg y , see Ch u n g Ch ien -p en g , Ch in a s

Engagement with Southeast Asia After the Leadership Transi t ion, A Counter-Hedging

Str at egy?, EAI Work ing Pa per N o. 87, (Singapore: EAI, NUS), 9 May 2002.

19. Stra tford Global In telligence Updat e, 22 Augus t, 2001, see www.bur ma project.org/082201.


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the current military junta is reluctant to transfer its political power to civilian

rule. But in the long run, sharing political power with civilian politicians is

inevitable.

Indias Strateg ic Pe rspectiv e

Myanmar and India share a border of about 1331km (827 miles). Furthermore,

Myanm ar ha s a long coast line of 2276km (1414 miles) th at sha res certa in par ts of

the Bay of Bengal, in particular the surrounding areas of the Coco Islands and

th e Anda ma n Sea, which is very import an t in In dias str at egic considera tions.

In In dias str at egic th inking, Myan ma rs locat ion is centr al t o str ength eningNew Delhis geopolitical position in Sout hea st Asia. Myan ma r is a k ey steppin g

st one in Ind ias n ew look Ea st policy which seeks to develop a nd expan d political,

economic and security ties with ASEAN.

Indias growing int erest in Myanm ar could be seen from t he sh ift of its low-

key policy in the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, which emphasized human

rights and democracy to one of emphasis on a strategic realist policy towards

Rangoon . The main reason fo r Ind ia s sh i f t was the g rowing concern and

un easiness of Myan ma rs a bandonment of i ts t ra ditiona l str at egic neutra lity

policy an d st ra tegical t ilt toward s China . Since th e beginn ing of the 1990s, India

has been extremely sensitive to the growing influence and presence of China in

th e Bay of Bengal, part icula rly so when Ch ina h elped to upgr ade Myan ma rs

radar facili t ies in the Cocos Islands and the construction of a naval base in

Sittwe.

With th e expan sion of Indias IT indust ry (in par ticular in t he softwa re a rea s)

and knowledge economy,20 India is interested to build a Trans-Asian Highway

from Pat na t o Kalemyo in Myan ma r, a north ern t own border ing India , as well as

gas pipelines from Calcut ta to Myanm ar .

With th e developmen t of th e AFTA in J an ua ry 2002 with a populat ion of 500

million, South east Asia is t her efore a n im porta nt region for In dias look E ast

policy. In 1994, as part of its look East policy, and growing concern over Chinas

strategic presence, India seems to have moved away from supporting the pro-

democra cy movement s to endorsing the m ilita ry leadersh ip.

India stepped up high-powered visits to Rangoon aimed primarily to move

Myanmar away from forging close ties with China. Besides playing on security

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Poon Kim SHE E

20. J ohn Wong & Wong Ch ee Kong, China s Softwa re Ind ust ry (II): The Race with India , EAI

Backgroun d Br ief No. 118, (Singapore: EAI, NU S), 26 March 2002.


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and s tra tegic issues , India a lso used re l ig ion as a card in cementing c loser

In d ia n /My a n ma r c u l tu r a l a n d r e l ig iou s t i es . Bu d d h i sm a n d H in d u i sm a r e

depicted by th e Indian leadersh ip as bra nches of the sa me t ree.21 In August 2000

for example, the military junta allowed a Hindu extremist movement, Rashtriya

Swayam sevek Sangh t o open a br an ch in Ran goon.22

In order to achieve India s s t ra tegic object ive an d t o minimize China s

growing presence and influence in Rangoon, New Delhi has decided to shift its

libera l policy concern ing hu ma n r ight s a nd d emocra cy to a rea list policy, main ly

emph asizing str at egic/secur ity inter ests. Thu s In dias m ain objective is to rem ove

Myan ma r from China s orbit or sph ere of influence.

D e s p i t e t h e r e c e n t o v e r a l l i m p r o v e m e n t i n p o l i t i c a l t i e s a n d t h estrengthening of bilateral trade between China and India, New Delhi, from the

str at egic point of view, still perceives China as a poten tial th rea t in t he N ort h a s

well as the East.23

However , Ch ina has more leverage than Ind ia in seek ing in f luence in

Myanm ar . First, there are more Chinese than Indian imm igran ts in the northern

towns of Myanmar, engaging in different kinds of trade and business. Thirty

percent of the populat ion in Mandalay for example , are new migrants f rom

China.24 China also produces more cheap goods to sell than India. A communist

s ta te h as t he a dvan ta ge in pursu ing i t s s t r a t eg ic and po li t ica l object ive in

Myanm ar , wher eas a dem ocra tic sta te like India can be disadvan ta ged becau se of

domes t ic pol i t ica l oppos i t ion a nd in t e res t g roups . F ina l ly, Ind ia s la gging

economy, the ba ckwardn ess of the a reas bordering Myanma r and the separat ist

insurgencies in the Northeast regions make it difficult for India to compete with

China in seeking influen ce and a pr esence in Myan ma r.25

41 41


21 . See Bruce Mat th ews, Myanma r 2000, Beyond t he Rea ch of In t erna t ional Rel ief?

S outheast Asian Affairs 2001, (Singapore: Inst itut e of Sout hea st Asian S tu dies, 2001), p.235.

22. Bru ce Mat th ews, Myanm ar 2000, Beyond t he Rea ch of Int ern at iona l Relief? ibid., p.235.

23. J. Mohan Malik, Myanm ar s Role in Regiona l Security: Pa wn or Pivot? op. cit., p.56.

24. Anthony Davis, Chinas Shadow, Asiaweek, 28 May 1999, p.30; see also Mya Maung, On

the Road to Mandalay, a case study of the Sinonizat ion of Upper Burma, As ian S urvey,

Vol.XXXIV, No.5, May 1994, pp.447-459.

25. Ross H., Mun ro, China s Cha nging Relat ions wit h South eas t, South an d Cent ra l Asia, in

Hafeez Malik, ed., The Roles of the United States, Russia and China in the New World Order,

(New York : St. Ma rt ins P ress , 1997), p.282.


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Chinas Yunnan province which has a population of about 43 million, was

historically a southwest Silk Road trade route, linking Myanmar with Southwest

Asia. It has now emerged as a potential target of Chinas long-term strategic

am bition, t ra nsform ing th e whole region as par t of a golden Qua dra ngle regiona l

trade zone involving Yunnan, Myanmar, Thailand and Laos.27 This zone could

become China s landr idge to the In dian Ocean for its ma ritim e tr ade. Yun na n, in

par ticular, could emer ge as an integra ted pa rt of th e symbiotic relationship

established by the SLORC to seek economic and military aid from its giant

neighbour.28 The growing importance of Yunnan in China-Myanmar economic

ties could be seen in November 1989, a year after the military coup, when the

SLORC s igned a mul t ip le t rade and economic agreement wi th the Yunnanauthorities, including geological surveys, coal and tin mining and a television

station.29 A mont h later , in December 1989, th e two coun tr ies signed a n economic

an d technical coopera tion agreement in which China agreed to offer an int erest

free loan of Rmb 50 million (US$15million) for the Rangoon-Thanhyin rail and

road bridge construction project.30 According to a Taiwanese source, from l961 to

l994, Beijing has given a total of Rmb 500 million in aid to Rangoon and China

had completed 18 out of 20 projects for Myanmar. 31 The increasingly closer

economic ties between t he t wo coun tr ies could be seen from t he sh ar p jump in th e

trade volume between them. In 1988, for example, the total trade between China

and Myanmar reached US$9.51 million. In 1989, it jumped to US$76.03 million,

which was eight t imes th at of th e previous year .32 In 1995, the tota l value of tr ade

grew to US$767 .40 mi l l ion . 33 I n 1 9 9 8 , Ch i n a - M ya n m a r t r a d e d e cl in e d t o

U$576.49 m illion,34 but in the year 2000, the total trade increased to US$621.26

million.35

43 43


27. Mya Maung, Th e Burm a Road to Capitalism, Economic Growth versus Democracy, op. cit., p.186.

28. Mya Maung, Th e Burm a R oad to Capitalism, Economic Growth versus Democracy, ibid., p.190.

29. Liang Chi-shad,Burmas Relations with the Peoples Republic of China: From Delicate

Fr iendsh ip to Genu ine Co-operat ion, in P eter Car ey, ed.,Burm a, Th e Challenge of Chan ge in a

Divided S ociety, (London: MacMillan Pr ess, 1997), p.81.

30. Liang Chi-shad, Burmas Relations with the Peoples Republic of China: From Delicate

Fr iendsh ip to Genuin e Co-operat ion, ibid., p.81.

31. Qiao Yiming, China and Burma: Political and Economic Relations, Mainland China

Studies , Taipei Vol. 39, No. 1, J an ua ry 1996, p.87.

32. Table 1, p.19; see also Liang Chi-shad, Burmas Relations with the Peoples Republic of

China : Fr om Delicate Fr iendsh ip to Genu ine Co-opera tion, ibid., p.83.

33. Table 1, p.19.

34. Table 1, p.19.; see also China S tatistical Year Book2000, (Beijing: China Statistics Press,

2000), p.593.

35. Table 1, p .19; see also h tt p:www.china .org.cn/english/2001/December23577.htm


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Borde r and Illegal Trade

The volume of border trade between both countries increased and in l988, i t

rea ched Rm b 789.52 million a nd t hen jumped t o Rmb 965 million in l989, a 26%

increase over l988. In l990, the total border trade went up to Rmb 1006.978

million another increase of 11% over l989.36 If one ta kes in to considera tion illegal

contr aband, such as opium, heroin a nd t he jade tra de along th e border, then th e

total a mount of tra de would be mu ch lar ger an d its implicat ions for Myan ma rs

militar y regimes su rvival, economic an d security int erests far more importa nt

than it appears. Myanmar is the world largest opium producer. In 1995 alone, it

produced about 2340 t ons of which 98% were for export .

37

What are the implications of this illegal trade? Mya Maung mentioned that

some of th e top milita ry junt a wer e involved in t he illegal dru g tra de.38 Par t of the

earnings f rom this i l legal t rade went to service the purchase of arms from

China.39 The pr ofits m ak e it possible for th e militar y to expand its forces. Becau se

of the huge amount of money involved, the region of the Golden Triangle has

become an area of politics of drugs and political intrigues as well as power

struggle among the Myanmar military elite, ethnic Chinese ex-warlords, l ike

Khun Sa, i .e . Chang Chifu, etc. , ethnic separatist insurgencies, and the local

authorities of China and Thailand in a complicated chain of partnerships. 40 This

symbiotic part ner ship ena bled th e Rangoon m ilita ry au th orities to uproot t he

eth nic min ority insu rgent s cont rol of th eir respective na tu ra l resour ces an d border

trade with a number of bilateral cease-fire agreements struck between the ethnic

rebels a nd th e SLORC beginn ing in 1993.41 Finally, the symbiotic cooperation for

th e drug tr ade am ong th e relevant a ut horities was one of th e main r easons for t he

success of the SLORC in averting international economic sanctions by the West. 42

Hen ce, the SLORC, with t he h elp of its pa rt ner s, ha s been par t of th e problem n ot

th e solut ion of th e under ground lucra tive dru g tra fficking in Myanm ar .43

44 44

Poon Kim SHE E

36. Liang Chi-shad, Burmas Relations with the Peoples Republic of China: From Delicate

Fr iendsh ip to Genuin e Co-opera tion, op. cit., p.83.


38. Mya Maung, Th e Burm a R oad to Capitalism, E conom ic Growth v ersus Democracy, ibid.,

pp.201-204.

39. Mya Maung, Th e Burm a R oad to Capitalism, Econom ic Growth versus Democracy, ibid., p.205.


41. Mya Maung, Th e Burm a R oad to Capitalism, E conom ic Growth v ersus Democracy, ibid.,

pp.192-193.




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Is the Trade De fic i t Unde rmining Sino -Myanma r Entente ?

One of the features of Myanmar-China trade is that Rangoon had consistently

suffered from t ra de deficits vis--vis China in t he l990s. From l990 to l995, Myan ma r

incurred a trade deficit from about US$105 million in l990 to more than US$468.30

million in 1995.44 In 2001, the t ra de deficit amounted to US$363.16 million.45

Though Myanmar consistently suffers trade deficits with China, it will not

lead t o tra de dependence on China , becau se it only const itut es about 10.5% (1999-

2000) of tota l extern al t ra de. Myanm ar s largest t ra ding part ner is ASEAN. It

am oun ts t o 44% of its t ota l tr ade volume (1999-2000). Singapore, with a sha re of

24 .3%, is th e la rges t ind iv idua l t ra d ing par t ner , wherea s Tha i lands t r adeam oun ts to 10.5%.46 The above data suggest th at t here is no danger th at China is

overwhelmingly domina ting Myanm ar s tr ade.

While the West cont inues t o criticize Myan ma rs hu ma n r ights r ecords, it

d oe s n o t p r e v e n t t h e M u l t i N a t ion a l C orp o ra t ion s (M NC s) fro m p le d g in g

investments for Rangoon. In the year 2000, the FDI flow into Myanmar was

US$203million, with Singapore (28%), UK (24%), USA (18%), France (10%),

J ap an (8%), (Ind onesia (4%), Hong Kong (2%), Mala ysia (2%), others (4%).47 Most

o f t h e F D I w a s c h a n n e l l e d i n t o t h e a r e a s o f o i l a n d g a s e x p l o i t a t i o n ,

manufactur ing and tourism rela ted industr ies (hote ls , e tc) . China is not the

leading foreign investor in Myanmar, although for the first ten months in 2001,

Chinese companies signed 87 deals for projects totalling US$186m.48

Theoret ically, with a GN P per capita of about US$200.- in 1999, Myanm ar is

one of the poorest states in Southeast Asia.49 Since China is relatively better off

th an Myanma r, it should purchase more from the latter r at her th an enjoy a trade

sur plus with Rangoon. How does one explain th is tr ade deficit with China ? Firs t,

i t has to do with the s t ructures of the economy of both s ta tes . Myanmar is

basically an agrarian economy whose exports to China are mainly confined to a

few primary commodities, such as teak and rice. In l986 to l987, teak exports

constituted about 45% whereas rice amounted to about 27% of its total exports.50

45 45


44. Table 1, p.19.

45. www.myanm ar pi.com 2 J an ua ry 2002.

46 . ASEAN Investment Report 2001 Foreign Direct Investment and Regional Integration,

(Ja kar ta : ASEAN Secretar iat, 2001), p.52.

47.AS EAN Investment Report 2001, Foreign Direct Investment an d Regional Integration, ibid., p.53.

48. www.atim es.com/China /CL15Adol.hml.

49.Asiaweek, 18 Februar y 2000.

50. Mya Tan and Joseph L.H. Tan ed., Myanm ar Dilem m as and Options , (Singapore: ISEAS,

1990), p.170.


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In the l980s, the manufacturing sector accounted for less than 5% of the total

export value, consisting ma inly of l ight indu str ies, such as textiles, leath er,

cement , an imal feed products, et c.51 These dat a sh ow th at Myanm ar s economy is

very much agro-based and underdeveloped. Unless Rangoon divers if ies i ts

economy away from a primarily agrarian economy to a more sophisticated one

with manufacturing and service sectors, the trade deficit with China is likely to

persist.

S o fa r , M ya n ma r p r od u c es v e ry fe w ma n u fa ctu r in g i t e ms t h a t c a n b e

export ed t o China. The problem of this pr imar y comm odity economy is t ha t prices

are su bject t o fluctua tion in t he intern ational mar kets an d can be manipulated by

th e big buyers. China or oth er buyers from Ra ngoons neighbour ing sta tes su ch a sVietnam and Thailand can easily purchase what is produced by Myanmar from

elsewhere. Since China is much more industrialized and has a larger economy

than Myanmar, China therefore has many items to sell to Myanmar, especially

household items, such as electrical appliances, cosmetics, textiles, shoes, watches,

medical products and instru ments, etc.52 Because of the size of Chinas economy,

it can produce vast quantities of cheaper goods at very competitive prices. Thus

the Myanm ese tra ders an d merchan ts a re going to the outposts of such Chinese

towns as Wantin and Ruili in Yunnan province to buy Chinese goods and then

bring them back t o Myanma r to sell the items at a h igher pr ice.

Second, Myanma rs economy has m ore t ha n just str uctur al weakn esses. From

1962 to 1988, under Genera l Ne Wins leader ship, th e Bur mese r oad to socialism

p r o gr a m h i gh l i gh t e d t h e i m p or t a n ce of e q u i t y a n d i d e ol og y r a t h e r t h a n

productivity and efficiency.53 The nat ional izat ion of both local and foreign

ent erp rises a nd t he a doption of an inwa rd -lookin g model of economic development

str at egy resu lted in Myanm ar s equality of poverty. Par t of th e reasons why t he

economy has not been doing well is because the military has not been able to

mobi l ize su f f ic ien t domes t ic cap i ta l and inves tments .54 Third , Myanmars

economic weakness is also due to the administrative measures and bureaucratic

ethos of the military regime. As Mya Maung argued, the trade deficit was due to

the inefficiency of the Burmese military command economy and the import

inelasticity of Burma with respect to Chinese manufactured goods together with

the import elasticity of China with respect to Burmese agricultural and forest

46 46

Poon Kim SHE E

51. Mya Tan a nd J oseph L.H. Tan ed.,Myanm ar Dilem m as and Options, op. cit., p.169.

52. Mya Tan a nd J oseph L.H. Tan ed.,Myanm ar Dilemm as and Options, ibid., p.208.




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products.55 Since Myanmar suffers trade deficits vis--vis China, constituting

about one t hird of its total t ra de deficit, th is new developmen t if un checked, can

lead to eth nic an d political ten sions between China an d Myan ma r.

After one decade of closer entente, China has emerged as one of the most

importa nt players in Myan ma rs domestic economy an d foreign r elations. There

ar e signs t ha t Myanm ar s north east ma y become an economic spher e of influence

of China. The developmen t of new roads, r ails, bridges a nd th e ma ssive influx of

Chinese int o Myan ma rs northern towns point t o signs th at th e nort heast ma y

b e c o me a n e c o n o mic sp h e re o f i n f lu e n c e o f C h in a . S in c e 1 9 8 8 , C h in e se

immigration to Myanmar, in particular from Yunnan, has been growing rapidly

ranging from one to two million. About 250,000 to 300,000 Yunnanese Chinesemigrated to Mandalay and half of the population in Lashio is Chinese.56 There is

a tendency toward sinicization of Mandalay not only in the economic but also in

th e cultu ra l and social dimensions.

China has now replaced Thailand as the most important economic partner of

Myanm ar . From l962 to l988 under N e Wins leadersh ip, Tha iland dominat ed th e

t r ade (both lega l a nd i llega l ) with Myanma r . In l990 , however , Ch ina was

cat ching up an d its sh ar e of tota l import s from Ran goon wa s 15% as compa red t o

Thailands, which was 16%. In 1991, Chinas share jumped to 22% of Myanmars

tota l imports, an d Tha iland s sha re wen t down to 17%. From 1992 to 1995,

Tha ilan ds an d Chin as sh ar es decreased from a bout 13% to 10% an d 18% to 12%

respectively.57 The decline in Myanmar-Thai economic ties was partly due to

border conflicts th at resu lted in th e cancelling of a nu mber of logging an d fishing

concessions gran ted t o Tha i compa nies a t th e end of 1993.58 China s inr oads into

Myanm ar were also par tly due t o the su ccess in its economic modernizat ion sin ce

1978. By the end of the l990s, the dependency model or patron-client model had

already taken shape in the economic and military closer ties between the two

count r ies . Af te r a decade o f in t roduc ing a s t ra tegy o f l imi ted f ree marke t

economy, the foun dat ion of Myanm ar s economy rem ains weak a nd sha ky an d it

is unlikely that Myanmar can get out from its closer economic and military

entene with China.

The pertinent question is whether Myanmar will become an economic and

47 47



56. www.georget own.edu/sfs/program /Asia/bur ma Conferen ce.ht m. See also Mya Maun g, On

th e Road to Manda lay, a case st udy of the Sinonization of Upper Bur ma , op., cit., pp.447-459.




16/21

military colony of China in the 21st century? So far there is no evidence to

suggest t ha t Ch ina h as t he int ent ion of colonializing Myanm ar s economy an d th e

mil i tary . Firs t , judging from past examples , due to long-term poli t ica l and

strategic considerations, trade deficits with China and the neighbouring states

can be adjusted for long-term strategic and political investments. 59 To offset the

tr ade deficit with Myanm ar , China can pur cha se more goods besides giving more

aid and credits to Rangoon. In other words, Chinas future economic ties with

Myanma r can be assessed from Chinas perspect ive in t he lar ger cont ext of

China s political a nd st ra tegic inter est n ot only towards Rangoon bu t also towar ds

Sout hea st Asia a nd t he Asia-Pa cific region in general.

Pros pects of Myan mar-China Relation s

What wi ll be the fu tu re p r ospects o f Myanma r-China re la t ions in th e 21s t

ce n tu ry ? T h e re a r e t h r e e s ce n a r ios , t h e a l a r mis t , t h e p e s s imis t i c a n d th e

guardedly optimistic. The alarmists argue that Myanmar is playing with fire by

se e k in g close r m i l it a ry c u m s t r a t e g ic a n d e c on o mic t i e s w i th C h in a . T h e

alar mists th inking is based on thr ee reasons. Firs t , i t will lead to in tern al

tensions between Chinese and Myanmese which could possibly result in future

anti-Chinese riots (such as in Rangoon in 1967) due to growing Chinese economic

d om i n a t i on i n M y a n m a r . S econ d , C h i n a s a r m e d s u p p or t m a y le a d t o

militarization of the military junta who may be reluctant to contemplate political

reforms which are necessary for economic development. Third, Chinas inroads

ma y lead t o conflicts with its n eighbours becau se of Myanm ar s a ban donm ent of

its t ra ditiona l policy of neut ra lity.60

The pessimists believe that Myanmar will become a colony of China as a

result of growing political influence, economic domination and sinicization of

Myanmar.61 The guar ded optimist s believe th at China will be a benign power a nd

will seek genuine friendship and cooperation. 62 Regar ding China s s t ra tegic

inten tions towards t he In dian Ocean, using Myanm ar as a landr idge for i t s

ma rit ime am bitions, no conclusive evidence has been p resent ed by the pr oponen ts

48 48

Poon Kim SHE E

59. Shee Poon Kim, The Politics of Chinas Trade Relations with Thailand, Asian S urvey,

March 1981.

60. D.M. Seekins, Bur ma -China Rela tions: Playing with Fir e, op. cit., p.539.

61. Mya Mau ng, The Burma Road to Capitalism, Economic Growth versus Democracy, op. cit.,

p.277.

62. Liang Chi-shad, Burmas Relations with the People's Republic of China: From Delicate

Fr iendsh ip to Genuin e Co-opera tion, op. cit., pp.71-93.


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of th e alar mist s cena rio.

Which scenario is likely to evolve depends on the following questions: first,

how long can the military hold on to power? Second, can the military survive in

th e 21st centu ry? Third, how does Myanm ar s m embersh ip in ASEAN a ffect its

str ategic relationship with China? Fourt h, what will be the a tt itude of the US, the

EU, Japan and Ind ia towards Myanmar? F i f th , how fa r wi l l Myanmar t i l t

towards Ch ina? The an swer to th is last quest ion will also depend on th e exten t of

th e success a nd failur e of Myanm ar s economic developmen t an d its free m ar ket

policy.

Conclus ion

The above case study shows that the evolution of Myanmars China policies from

posi t ive s t ra tegic neutra l i ty to s t ra tegic isola t ionism and f inal ly temporary

str at egic alignment with Chin a wa s th e result of a combina tion of various factors

ranging from i ts geostra tegic posi t ion and i ts proximity to China, in ternal

political a nd economic needs, as well as extern al pr essur es. In sh ort , Myan ma rs

China policies since 1948 have been a combination of i ts internal needs and

responses to external threats. Despite Myanmar becoming independent since

l948, the political system remains problematic and unstable, plagued by ethnic

insurgencies and the difficulty of achieving a viable united Union. Myanmar is

also faced with challenges from the rising political and economic aspirations of its

people. The military junta still has to face the problem of how to find a political

fra mework which can accomm odat e th e aspir at ions of the civilian politicians an d

the people.

Fr om China s per spective, Chinas Myan ma r policies ha ve also un dergone

changes. During Maos period from l949-l976, combinations of Maoist ideology

an d str at egic-cum securit y factors were the ma in determ inan ts sh aping Chinas

policies. However, since 1978, with the rise of Deng Xiaoping and thereafter, in

th e post-Cold War era , Chinas policies towards Myanm ar were m ainly motivated

by economic and long-term strategic-cum security considerations.

Fr om 1962 to l988, China s Myanm ar policy was m ore of a rea ctionar y sta nd

towards Myanm ar s China policies, an d th e cha nging regiona l environm ent in

Sout hea st Asia. The exten t of China s friendliness or hostility t owar ds Myanm ar

depended on the extent of Rangoons friendliness or hostility. When Myanmar

adopted an ant i -Chinese pol icy as Ne Win did in the 1960s, China reacted

harshly. When Myanmar adopted a friendlier policy towards China in the 1970s,

49 49



18/21

Beijing rea cted favoura bly and positively. Fur th erm ore, Chin as friendliness or

hostil i ty towards Myanmar in particular and other Southeast Asian states in

genera l , depended on China s favour able or u nfavour able percept ion of th e

str at egic an d secur ity situa tion on t he south ern flank of its border . China rea cted

positively when Myanmar did not join the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation

(SEATO) and refrained from endorsing the Manila Pact in the 1950s. China was

also pleased when Myanm ar did not join th e Soviet cam p in t he 1970s. So long as

Myanmar was not a pawn of any super power rivalry against China, Beijing was

content to maintain a cordial relationship with Myanmar irrespective of the

ideology of the r espective govern men ts .

Conversely, when Myanmar decided to receive aid from the West, Chinarea cted negat ively. When Myan ma r did not a ct ively support China s b leed

Vietnam white policy in the 1980s, China reacted negatively. When Ne Win

adopted a ha rd-line policy towards t he et hn ic Chinese in 1967, China condem ned

th e Ne Win govern men t a s fascist. All these examp les serve to prove th at Chin as

Myanm ar policy was m ain ly sha ped by Ran goons Ch ina policy. In n o way did

Maoist ideology and the overseas Chinese factor and nationalism play important

roles in China s Myan ma r policy th rough out t he wh ole period from l949 to 1988.

External security and long-term strategic considerations were the overriding

factors in Ch ina s Myan ma rs policies. In t he post -Cold War era , regiona l geo-

economics cum long-term strategic interests have become the central focus of

China s Myan ma r policy. From t he year 2000 onwa rds, Ch inas Myan ma r policy

can be assessed in t he cont ext of China s growing int erests in promoting an Ea st

Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) and economic integration with ASEAN within

the framework of ASEAN Plus China and eventually ASEAN Plus China, Japan

and Korea.

In short, although at the moment or in the foreseeable future, Myanmar is

not a str at egic pawn nor a n economic pivot of China, Myanm ar s st ra tegic locat ion

on a trijunction between South Asia, Southeast Asia and China is nevertheless

economically and strategically significant. Economically, Myanmar is important

for China as a t rading out le t to the Indian Ocean for i ts landlocked in land

p ro vin c es o f Yu n n a n a n d S ic h u a n . S t r a t e g ica l ly , M y a n m a r i s p ote n t i a l l y

important for China to achieve its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean and its

lo n g - t e rm two -o c e a n o b je c t iv e . F u r th e rmo re , a C h in a -M y a n ma r n e x u s i s

str at egically useful for China to cont ain Indias influence in Sout hea st Asia.

Fina lly, Myan ma r is par t a nd pa rcel of China s gran d str at egic design t o achieve

its goal of becoming a gr eat power in t he 21st centu ry. Despite growing Chinese

50 50

Poon Kim SHE E


19/21

influence over Myanmar, i t is unlikely that Rangoon will become a strategic

sat ellite base for Chin a. Myanm ar s str ong sense of na tionalism, its past ability t o

successful ly deal with foreign powers , a nd i ts det erm inat ion to preserve i ts

independence and cultural identity, will likely make Myanmar withstand most

odds.

Table 1. Myan ma r s Tra de with Ch ina : 1950-2001

(US$million)

Year Tota l Volume Exports Impor ts Ba lance

1950 3.37 1.40 1.97 0.57

1960 31.50 6.60 24.90 18.30

1970 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.50

1980 34.19 4.89 29.30 24.41

1988 9.51 1.81 7.70 5.89

1989 76.03 24.60 51.43 26.83

1990 171.00 33.00 138.00 105.00

1991 411.00 96.00 315.00 219.00

1992 404.00 119.00 285.00 166.00

1993 507.00 150.00 357.00 207.00

1994 536.00 130.00 406.00 276.00

1995 767.40 149.55 617.85 468.30

1996 658.63 137.41 521.12 383.71

1997 643.50 73.41 570.09 496.68

1998 576.49 62.05 514.44 452.39

1999 508.21 101.68 406.53 304.85

2000 621.26 124.82 496.44 371.62

2001 631.54 134.19 497.35 363.16

Sources:

Statistics for 1950-1994, see: Statistics on the Burmese Economy : The 19th and 20 th Centuries,

Teru ko Sait o an d Lee Kin Kiong (Singapore: Inst itu te of South eas t Asian Stu dies, 1999), p.188.

Statistics for 1995-1999, see: China Statistical Yearbook 2000 , No. 19, National Bureau of

Sta tistics, China St at istic Pr ess, p.593.

Statistics for 2000, see: China S tatistical Y earbook 2001, No.20, National Bur eau of Stat istics,

China St at istics Pr ess, p.591.

Stat ist ics for 2001, see: China-ASEAN, International Seminar on China-ASEAN Trade,

Investmen t Cooperat ion, Kunm ing China, J une 6t h-7th 2002, p.9.

51 51



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Table 2. Yun na ns Ext ern al Tra de 1999

(US$10,000)

Count r ies Total Impor t /Expor t % of tota l t rade

Myanmar 29952 18.05

HongKong 29246 17.62

J apan 13467 8.11

US 12836 7.73

Vietnam 7221 4.35

Aust ra lia 6613 3.98Indonesia 6516 3.93

Germany 6113 3.68

Ita ly 5183 3.12

South Korea 4190 2.52

Source: Yunnan Yearbook 2000, Editorial Depart ment , Yunn an Nianjian 2000 of Yunn an

Source: Yearbook, p.267.

Table 3. Yun na ns E xport s (Ten Largest Tra ding Pa rt ners 1999)

(US$10,000)

Count r ies Total Expor t % of tota l t rade

Myanmar 24599 23.78


J apan 11154 10.78

Indonesia 6424 6.21

Vietnam 6252 6.04

US 4858 4.70

South Korea 3173 3.07

Nether lands 2950 2.85

Taiwan 2423 2.34

Singapore 2084 2.01



52 52

Poon Kim SHE E


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Table 4. Yun na ns Im port s (Ten Largest Tra ding Pa rt ners 1999)

(US$10,000)

Count r ies Tota l Expor t % of tota l t rade


US 7978 12.76

Aust ra lia 5365 8.58

Myanmar 5353 8.56

Germany 4097 6.55

Russia 3138 5.02Ita ly 3114 4.98

Canada 3002 4.80

J apan 2313 3.70

Chile 2069 3.30



Table 5. Chinas F oreign Tra de with th e ASEAN S ta tes

2000

(US$million)

Tota l Exports Impor ts

Singapore 10,820.67 5,761.04 5,059.63

Malaysia 8,044.87 2,564.87 5,480.00

Indonesia 7,463.77 3,061.82 4,401.95

Tha iland 6,624.04 2,243.25 4,380.79

Philippines 3,141.73 1,464.41 1,677.32

Vietnam 2,466.41 1,537.26 929.15

Myanmar 621.26 496.44 124.82

Cambodia 223.55 164.06 59.49

Brunei 74.37 13.02 61.35

Laos 40.84 34.42 6.42

Tota l 39,521.51 17,340.59 22,180.92

Source: China S tatistical Y earbook 2001, No. 20, National Bureau of Statistics,

Source: China St at istics Pr ess, p.591.

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the political economy of china-myanmar relations: strategic and economic dimensions

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