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The Perceived Impact of Customary

Marine Resource Management on

Household and Community Welfare in

Northern Sumatra, Indonesia

Adityo Setiawana

, Joshua E. Cinnerb

, Stephen G. Suttona

&Ahmad Mukminin

c

aSchool of Earth and Environmental Sciences, James Cook

University, Townsville, Queensland, Australiab

Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef

Studies, James Cook University, Townsville, Queensland, Australiac

Wildlife Conservation Society, Indonesia Program, Sabang,

Indonesia

Available online: 11 May 2012

To cite this article: Adityo Setiawan, Joshua E. Cinner, Stephen G. Sutton & Ahmad Mukminin (2012):The Perceived Impact of Customary Marine Resource Management on Household and Community

Welfare in Northern Sumatra, Indonesia, Coastal Management, 40:3, 239-249

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Coastal Management, 40:239249, 2012

Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

ISSN: 0892-0753 print / 1521-0421 online

DOI: 10.1080/08920753.2012.677626

The Perceived Impact of Customary MarineResource Management on Household

and Community Welfare in Northern

Sumatra, Indonesia

ADITYO SETIAWAN,1 JOSHUA E. CINNER,2

STEPHEN G. SUTTON,1 AND AHMAD MUKMININ3

1School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, James Cook University,

Townsville, Queensland, Australia2Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies,

James Cook University, Townsville, Queensland, Australia3Wildlife Conservation Society, Indonesia Program, Sabang, Indonesia

This article examines the influence of socioeconomic factors on the perceived success ofcustomary management systems in Indonesia. We test the hypothesis that socioeconomicconditions will differ between fishermen who perceive the system has positive impacts

on household and community well-being compared to those with negative or neutralperceptions. We found out that a majority of respondents think that this system isbeneficial. The socioeconomic conditions that are related to the different perceptions

are wealth, local participation in resource management, level of trust, and involvementin community events.

Keywords customary management, common property, fisheries, Indonesia, socialecological systems

Introduction

Around the world, many coastal communities rely heavily on marine resources. In some

cases, communities use sociocultural norms (e.g., taboos) to limit certain aspects of resource

use; such systems are commonly referred to as customary management (Dahl 1988;

Berkes, Colding, and Folke 2000; Cinner and Aswani 2007). Cinner and Aswani (2007)describe customary management as traditions that control resource utilization, including

the rights to access resources and how those rights are transferred. In principle, customary

management limits the extraction of marine resources by applying some combination of

spatial restrictions, temporal restrictions, species restrictions, and gear restrictions (Cinner

and Aswani 2007).

This research was funded by the Australian Research Council and made possible by field supportfromthe Wildlife Conservation Society. A.S. was supported by an AusAID scholarship to attend JamesCook University. Thanks to Sarah Keiluhu and Ifa Hanafi for their helpful comments.

Address correspondence to Joshua E. Cinner, Australian Research Council Centre of Excellencefor Coral Reef Studies, James Cook University, Townsville, Queensland 4811, Australia. E-mail:[email protected]

239


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240 A. Setiawan et al.

In some parts of the world, these customary systems create a foundation for contem-

porary conservation efforts (Johannes 2002). Yet, critical questions remain as to whether

and how customary management systems can conserve resources and provide benefits to

coastal communities. A number of scholars have approached this topic anecdotally (Foale

and Manele 2004; Polunin 1984; Johannes 1978), and there are increasing efforts to do

so empirically (McClanahan et al. 2006; Bartlett et al. 2009; Cinner et al. 2006; Aswani

and Sabetian 2010). The burden of evidence suggests that customary management sys-

tems have ecological impacts by maintaining levels of fish biomass (Bartlett et al. 2009;

McClanahan et al. 2006), in some cases coral cover (Baird et al. 2005), or by influenc-

ing the behaviour of fishes, making them easier to spear when temporary restrictions are

lifted (Feary et al. 2011; Januchowski-Hartley et al. 2011). However, customary manage-

ment systems appear to break down under certain socioeconomic transformations (Cinner,

Sutton, and Bond 2007; Novaczek et al. 2001; Ruddle 1994). Ruddle (1994) provides a

comprehensive review of the external socioeconomic forces that can influence whether

communities can employ customary management institutions, including population size,

level of economic development and stratification, commercialization of natural resourcesthat had no former value, and community heterogeneity. For example, Dahl (1988) notes

that aspects of monetization can weaken customary management systems because moneti-

zation can create greater demand for access to natural resource utilization and trade thereby

encouraging people to break the rules to gain more resources to trade. Likewise, Cinner,

Sutton, and Bond (2007) found that it was not the overall level of wealth in a community,

but rather the level of economic stratification that influenced the breakdown of customary

systems.

One customary management system that gained international recognition because of its

substantial role in the post-tsunami recovery process (Abdullah and Mutaqin 2010; Kurien

2009; Hashim 2007) is known as the Panglima Laot (PL) system in Aceh, Indonesia. PL

refers to both an individual leader of fishermen in fisheries communities (Kurien 2009;Siregar 2002) and the system of governance itself (Kurien 2009; Garces et al. 2006). The

task of the PL leader is to implement and maintain marine customary law and practice which

controls fishing activities and resources exploration from the coastal area to offshore (Umar

2006; Kurien 2009; Hashim 2007). The individual PL leaders function as leaders of the

local fishing community, and as liaisons between government and the fishing community

(Abdullah and Mutaqin 2010; Kurien 2009; Nurasa, Naamin, and Basuki 1993; Siregar

2002; Syarif 2003). The PL system is generally considered to be a customary institution

that has authority to manage everything that is related to fishing and coastal activities,

resolve conflict as well as disputes among fishermen, manage the existence of all sea

customary laws as well traditional values, and conserve coastal resources (Garces et al.

2006; Hashim 2007; Kurien 2009; Nurasa, Naamin, and Basuki 1993; Syarif 2003; Witanto

2007). In 1990, the government of Aceh Province legalized the PL institution by issuing

local government decree (Perda) number 2, 1990, which officially recognizes the PL as

the leader who maintains customs in fishing activities (Nurasa, Naamin, and Basuki 1993;

Witanto 2007; Abdullah and Mutaqin 2010).

The 2004 tsunami brought devastation for people in Aceh, especially the coastal and

fishing community who were the first victims hit by the massive waves. More than 18,000

fishermen were killed as the tsunami hit Aceh and destroyed 9,500 vessels (Stobutzki and

Hall 2005). During the post-tsunami recovery, the PL institution took a leading role in

helping the fishing, as well the broader coastal communities (Pomeroy et al. 2006; Sarma

2009; Stobutzki and Hall 2005). The PL institution also became a liaison body with aidand donor foundations (Abdullah and Mutaqin 2010; Garces et al. 2006; Hashim 2007;


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Customary Marine Resource Management 241

Kurien 2009). Because of its important post-tsunami role, the PL system has been widely

recognized by the international community as well as the Indonesian government.

The success of the PL institution during the post-tsunami development is due to the

deep and enduring embeddedness of this institution in the social life of Aceh society

(Syarif 2003; Umar 2006; Witanto 2007). Although the PL system has existed since the

17th century, few studies have evaluated the success of this system in terms of meeting

either social or conservation goals. An empirical study of the PL system found that sites

where this system has been well enforced have a higher percentage of coral cover because

of effective exclusion of destructive fishing practices (Baird et al. 2005; Campbell et al.

2010; Rudi et al. 2009). However, the social dimensions of success for this system have

been largely unexplored. In this article, we examine peoples perceptions of the PL system

in terms of its benefits to their livelihoods and the broader community.

To complement existing studies on how socioeconomic conditions may influence the

ability of communities to employ customary management, we also explore aspects of the

political ecology of the PL system by testing the hypothesis that there are differences in key

socioeconomic characteristics between those who perceive benefits from the PL systemand those who do not. Based on theoretical and empirical work in customary management

systems and common property more broadly, we examine several key socioeconomic

factors that are expected to influence the attitudes of rural communities toward resource

management (Pomeroy et al. 1996; Pomeroy, Katon, and Harkes 2001). We examine the

socioeconomic conditions and perception toward management of coastal fishermen in

eighteen villages where the PL system exists and determine how fishermen perceived the

impact of the PL system on their livelihood and community. This novel exploration differs

from many previous studies by examining the success of customary management at the

scale of the household, rather than the community-scale.

Methods

Research was conducted in Aceh Province, Indonesia from October 2008 until March

2009. Two hundred and forty-four fishing households were systematically surveyed in

eighteen villages (fifteen villages in Weh Island, one village in Nasi Island; and two

villages in Aceh Island). Villages were selected because they had active Panglima Laot

systems (Baird et al. 2005). Surveys targeted the head of the household and asked questions

about respondents perceptions of the PL system and about their social-economic conditions

(including education, wealth, different types of jobs the household engaged in, fortnightly

expenditure, level of trust in people, participation in resource management decision-making)

(Table 1).

In order to examine aspects of success of the PL system, respondents were asked

questions about the perceived impact of the system on their livelihood. Their answers were

grouped into five degrees of agreement categories, which comprised from very negative,

to slightly negative, neutral, slightly positive and very positive. This response was then

converted to a score from 1 to 5 for further analysis (Pollnac and Crawford 2000). If the

respondents answers indicated that he or she did not know, this was given score 0 and

excluded from the analysis. Likewise, responses to the questions about how the respondents

perceived the impact of the PL system on the community were recorded and scored in the

same manner. Then, respondents were grouped into two categories based on whether theyresponded positively or not. This means that fishermen who responded with answers of


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Table 1

Description of indicators of socioeconomic indicator variables

Variables Description

Occupational diversity Number of type of jobs done by the household earningincome. Sectors include fishing, fish trading,

farming, cash crops, salaried employment, informal

sector, tourism, and other. See Cinner and Bodin

(2010) for description of categories.

Bi-weekly expenditure Average expenditures over two weeks (Recorded in

Indonesian Rupiah)

Migrant The places where the respondents were born. 0 if

originated from the surveyed village, 1 if born in

another village.

Resource management

participation

Degree of respondents involvement in resource

management. 0 if not involved, 1 if passivelyinvolved, and 2 if actively participated

Number of community

events attended annually

Continuous, it is the total number of community events

that respondents were involved in, in one year.

Age Continuous

Years of education Continuous, the years of formal education obtained by

the respondent

Material style of life (MSL) Presence or absence of TV, VCR, fan, mobile phone,

satellite disk, motorbike, cement walls, cement

floors, and toilet inside the house.

Trust Measure of respondents self-scale of trust of other

people and institutions among the community. 0 if

dont know, 1 if no trust at all, 2 if feel more distrust

than trust, 3 if half trust, 4 if feel more trust than

distrust, and 5 if very trusted.

slightly positive and very positive were grouped into Positive. Moreover, the rest were

grouped as Non Positive. Hereinafter, these two variables are called dependent variables.

The independent variables are described in Table 1 and distributions presented in Table

2, but below, we describe data reduction techniques for two independent variables: Material

Style of Life (MSL) and trust. MSL is based on the presence or absence of household

possessions (e.g., TV, motorbike) and the type of material used in house construction

(Pollnac, Pomeroy, and Harkes 2001; Pollnac and Crawford 2000). We used a nine-indicator

additive index to measure MSL for our respondent households. To examine levels of

trust, fishermen were asked a question regarding how much they trusted different types of

people and institutions in the community. These were; people they worked with, people in

the village, community leaders, police, government, and nongovernmental organizations

(NGOs). Respondents were asked to describe their level of confidence in these groups

using a five point Likert scale ranging from do not know scoring as 0 to trust all of the

stakeholders scoring as 5. Like the MSL analysis, the total score was then counted so that

the highest score for respondents who trusted all of the 5 stakeholders was 30. We examinedthe correlation among independent variables to ensure that they were all independent.


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Table 2

Statistic summary of socioeconomic indicator variables

Variables Statistic summary (n = 224)

Occupational diversity Mean

SD=

(2.1

0.85), Minimum=

1,Maximum = 5

Bi-weekly expenditure Mean SD = (Rp868,976 773,055), Minimum =

Rp100,000; Maximum = Rp8,400,000

Migrant 63.4% originally come from surveyed village, 33%

come from other parts of Aceh, 3.6% originally

come from another province in Indonesia

Resource management

participation

21% not involved, 35% passively involved, 44%

actively involved

Number of community events

attended annually

Mean SD = (16.1 11.61), Minimum = 0,

Maximum = 69

Age Mean SD = (42.9 13.08), Minimum = 20,Maximum = 80

Years of education Mean SD = (7.5 3.60)

no education = 4.9%,

dropped out of elementary school (less than 6 years) =

17.4%, finished elementary = 24.5%,

dropped out of secondary school (less than 9 years) =

5.9%,

finished secondary school = 23.2%,

dropped out of high school = 3.6%,

finished high school = 17.9%,

higher education = 2.7%

Material style of life (MSL) Mean SD = (5.5 2.24), Minimum = 0,

Maximum = 9

Trust Mean SD = (20.9 4.51), Minimum = 6,

Maximum = 30

To examine difference between socioeconomic indicators of respondents who per-

ceived positive impacts of the PL system and those who perceived negatively, each of the

mean values of description indicators were compared. We tested for normality and where

it could be assumed, we used a T-test to compare mean socioeconomic characteristics

between respondents with positive versus non-positive views about PL. For independent

variables that were not normally distributed, we employed the Mann Whitney U test to ex-

amine differences between the mean rank of socioeconomic indicators among respondents

with positive compared to non-positive perceptions about PL. Due to the exploratory nature

of the article, we also report differences with a statistical significance level of p = .1. To

complement the statistical significance of differences, we also report the Cohen effect size

(d) to measure the strength of differences (Vaske 2002), where appropriate. The effect size

is the difference between the means of two groups divided by the standard deviation (Co-

hen 1988). For ordinal or nominal independent variables (participation in decision-making

and migration, respectively), we used the Chi-Squared test to examine the distributions ofpositive versus non-positive responses.


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Results

The majority of fishermen believed that the PL system had a very positive (55%) or a slightly

positive (14%) impact on their livelihood (from here, grouped as positive impact). Thirty

one percent of respondents reported that the PL system had a negative impact or no impact

on their livelihood (from here, grouped as non-positive impact). Likewise, a majorityof respondents believe that the PL system had a very positive (56%) or a slightly positive

(20%) impact on their community. Only 1% of respondents considered that the PL system

impacted negatively on their community, whereas 23% believed that the PL system had

no impact on their community. Descriptive statistics for the independent variables are

presented in Table 2.

Respondents that had positive views of PL on their livelihoods had significantly higher

levels of trust, material wellbeing and were more involved in decision-making about re-

source management (Table 3). Additionally, minimal effect size and marginal statistical

significance also suggest that users with positive views of PL are slightly wealthier (in

terms of fortnightly expenditures) and have less diverse livelihoods (Table 3). Respondents

that had positive views of PL for the community had significantly higher MSL and were

more involved in community events. Additionally, marginal statistical significance and

Table 3

Socioeconomic differences between respondents that had positive versus non-positive per-

ceptions of Panglima Laot for their livelihood and the broader community

Impact on livelihooda Impact on communityb

Non-positive/positive Non-positive/positive

Variable Test statisticc Sig. d Test statisticc Sig. d

Occupational diversity 1.73d 0.07 0.3 0.41d 0.68 0

Bi-weekly expenditure 1.79 0.07 0.2 1.89d 0.06 0.3

Origin 0.23e 0.62 NA 0.32e 0.57 NA

Resource management

participation

8.8e 0.012 NA 3.6e 0.16 NA

Number of community

events attended

annually

0.35 0.73 0.1 2.05 0.04 0.4

Age 0.85 0.40 0.2 1.34 0.18 0.2

Years of education 1.08 0.28 0.1 0.20 0.84 0

Material style of life

(MSL)

2.37d 0.019 0.3 2d 0.05 0.3

Trust 3.0d 0.005 0.4 1.55d 0.12 0.3

an = 214 respondents.bn = 209 respondents.cz-statistic unless otherwise noted.dt-statistic.e

2 statistic.

significance at level p = .1.significance at level p = .05.


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effect size suggest that users with positive views about PL for the community have slightly

higher fortnightly expenditures.

Discussion

This research is the first to quantitatively examine social dimensions of success in the PL

customary management system. We found that resource users had overwhelmingly positive

perceptions of the PL system at both household and community scales. This positive

perception may stem in part from the critical role the PL plays in managing the fishery

(Abdullah and Mutaqin 2010; Hashim 2007; Kurien 2009; Nurasa, Naamin, and Basuki

1993; Syarif 2003; Witanto 2007) and facilitating disaster relief after the 2004 tsunami

(Pomeroy et al. 2006; Sarma 2009; Stobutzki and Hall 2005). The positive perception is

also likely related in part to the high level of familiarity that local people have with this

system that has existed for hundreds of years (Nurasa, Naamin, and Basuki 1993; Panglima

Laot Aceh.org 2010; Syarif 2003; Umar 2006; Witanto 2007). However, not all views were

positive and we found that fishers socioeconomic characteristics were related to theseheterogeneous perceptions.

Respondents with positive views of PL for both their own livelihoods and for the

community had higher MSL scores and also marginally higher fortnightly expenditures.

Together, these results suggest that the wealthy are more likely to perceive benefits from

this type of management. Poverty can play a critical role in how people perceive natural

resources (Cinner and Pollnac 2004), whether they comply with fisheries rules (Tobey

and Torell 2006), whether they engage in destructive fishing or resource extraction tech-

niques (Cinner 2010), whether they feel trapped in a declining fishery (Cinner, Daw, and

McClanahan 2009), and their capacity to engage in resource management.

Respondents who perceived that the PL system had a positive impact on their livelihood

also had higher levels of trust in people and organizations. Trust is a key component ofsocial capital, which has been shown to be an important factor in the success of customary

management and other commons institutions (Cinner, McClanahan, and Wamukota 2009;

Hashim 2007; Jentoft, McCay, and Wilson 1998). As Pomeroy, Katon, and Harkes (2001)

suggests, level of trust is one major key success factor in arranging co-management. Because

fishery management is a complex system that involves multi-stakeholders, gaining trust

from constituents involved is crucial (Adger 2003). However, the civil conflict that occurred

from 19762005 has weakened the trust of Acehs people in government authorities in Aceh

and in the police force that used to be part of the military (McCulloch 2003; Ross 2005).

Yet, despite the lack of trust in government and law enforcement officers, most fishermen

in Aceh still have faith in both the PL institution and in community elders (Hashim 2007;

Sarma 2009; Syarif 2003). The reason for this is the strong attachment of the Aceh people

to customary law and their acquaintance with the PL institution that has been practiced

by coastal societies in Aceh for a long time (Nurasa, Naamin, and Basuki 1993; Panglima

Laot Aceh.org 2010; Syarif 2003; Umar 2006; Witanto 2007). Indeed, respondents with

positive perceptions of PL for the community were also involved in more community events

(another potential indicators of social capital).

We found that households that perceived a positive impact of PL both on livelihood

have higher levels of participation in managing the fisheries through the PL system. This

finding is consistent with a study in the Philippines (Pomeroy et al. 1996) that found the

involvement of users in resource management can nurture a sense of empowerment. Thus,

fishermen are more aware of how the resources they depend on are managed, and becausethey are engaged in management decisions they are more likely to be supportive of those


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decisions and they systems in which those decisions are made (Pomeroy et al. 1996). In

addition, users active involvement will allow them to share the knowledge and information

that they need, and satisfy their curiosity about processes undertaken (Sesabo et al. 2006).

Occupations diversity had a marginal relationship with respondents perceptions about

PL. Consistent with local studies (Witanto 2007) and many coastal areas around the world

(Allison and Ellis 2001; Cinner and Bodin 2010), a majority of fishermens households in

Sabang engage in several different occupations to earn money. However, our results show

that fishermen with positive perceptions of the PL system had slightly fewer alternative

sources of income (i.e., those whose livelihoods depend on the success of the commons

institution are more likely to perceive benefits from it). This finding is broadly consistent

with common property studies finding positive relationships between dependence on re-

sources and the strength of commons institutions (Lise 2000; Ostrom 1990; Agrawal 2002).

Fishers with fewer different types of occupations may have more incentives to engage in

and benefit from local commons institutions (Cinner 2005; Zanetell and Knuth 2004; Lise

2000).

Findings from this research show that fishermens perceptions of the PL system werenot related to demographic factors such as age, migration, and educational background.

This finding is similar to studies in South West Madagascar and Mexico that also found

that these factors did not influence the perspectives of fishers toward resource management

(Davies and Beanjara 2009; Cinner and Pollnac 2004). With respect to years of education,

fishermen in Sabang, Aceh, have a better formal education compared to other empirical

studies from other coastal communities in Asia and Africa. The fishermen in Sabang spend

an average of 7.5 years in school. This figure is higher than the average for fishermen

in Madagascar (3.2 years) and people in Tumbak, South Sulawesi, Indonesia (6.4 years)

(Cinner, Fuentes, and Randriamahazo 2009; Pollnac and Crawford 2000). Despite the result

that education was not related to peoples attitude toward the PL system, formal education

complementary to environmental education can raise rural households awareness of theneed for conservation (Sesabo et al. 2006) and may help to create livelihood options outside

of fisheries (Turner et al. 2007).

Conclusion and Management Implications

Overall, a large proportion of fishermens households perceived a positive impact of the

PL system on their own livelihood and on their community more broadly. These generally

positive perceptions were possibly because: (1) the main goals of PL are creating social har-

mony by ensuring that everyone has the same the opportunities to extract marine resources

(as opposed to regulating resources for conservation); (2) it functions as a conflict reso-

lution mechanism (Syarif 2003; Witanto 2007); and (3) it has existed in Aceh society for

several centuries (Nurasa, Naamin, and Basuki 1993; Panglima Laot Aceh.org 2010; Syarif

2003; Umar 2006; Witanto 2007). However, not all users had positive perceptions about the

PL system and we found several socioeconomic factors that differentiate fishermen with

positive perceptions of the impact of the Panglima Laot system from those with neutral or

negative perceptions. These results provide crucial information about which segments of

society are receiving benefits from management and how benefits could be more equitably

distributed. For example, poorer respondents felt like they did not benefit from PL, so local

leaders and managers need to find ways ensure that livelihood benefits are delivered to thepoorer fishers.


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