the people's republic of china and africa

The People's Republic of China and AfricaAuthor(s): Tareq Y. IsmaelSource: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Dec., 1971), pp. 507-529Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/160211 .

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The Journal of Modern African Studies, 9, 4 (1971), pp. 507-529

The People's Republic of

China and Africa

by TAREQ Y. ISMAEL*

CHINESE involvement in Africa may be conveniently dated from the Bandung conference of April I955, which marked the initiation of a policy of Chinese Communist co-operation with the states of Afro-Asia. Inasmuch as the movement in Africa which resulted in the independence of many states in the next decade had hardly begun at that time, the most significant African contact made by China at Bandung was with President Nasser. The development of contacts between the two states led Egypt in May 1956 to become the first African country to give its official recognition to the Chinese People's Republic (C.P.R.). There- after the Suez crisis served to bring the two countries still closer together.

Other Chinese activity at this time included exhibitions at trade fairs in Morocco and Tunisia, and the opening of a New China News Agency office in Cairo in early 1958. The C.P.R. also recognised the Sudan upon the latter's independence in I956, but the Sudan failed to respond until after the military coup in October 1958. In March I957 the Chinese Vice Premier, Nieh Jungchen, attended Ghana's independence celebration, but formal recognition of China by Ghana was delayed until I960.

Mali, until the fall of Modibo Keita in 1968, was the most openly pro-Chinese of the African states. The language used by Keita and his associates in many pronouncements is highly reminiscent of Chinese usage, and considerable affinity existed between Mali and China from Mali's independence onwards. Of significance is the fact that, of all the states visited by Chou En-Lai in I963-4, only Mali issued a joint communique fully in accordance with Chinese wishes.

Ghana's President Nkrumah was increasingly friendly to China from the time of his visit to Peking in August 1961. At that time he signed a Treaty of Friendship with China, and the relationship grew closer as his pan-African aims became frustrated.1 During the Sino-Indian border

* Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, Canada. This article is part of a forthcoming book on China and Africa, which has been facilitated by a research grant from the University, for which the author is grateful.

1 Richard Lowenthal, 'China', in Zbigniew Brzezinsky (ed.), Africa and the Communist World (Stanford, I963), pp. 183 and I93.

34-2



TAREQ Y. ISMAEL

dispute of 1962, Nkrumah condemned the British for aiding the Indians, which angered New Delhi and was construed as pro-Chinese. However, it appears that his motives were complex, involving a general dis-

approval of the interference of Britain in the affairs of Commonwealth

states, and his statement was not intended to support China.l In Colin

Legum's opinion, the tenets of Nkrumah's ideology differed in basic

respects from Maoism.2 In particular, his 'Consciencism' rejected an inevitable class struggle and supported an evolutionary development of socialism.

Other West African nations, notably the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and

Niger, have opposed the Chinese People's Republic in Africa quite consistently. In Cameroun, the Ahidjo Government has been opposed, chiefly because of the Chinese sponsorship of the 'armed struggle' of the Union des populations de Cameroun, led by Dr Roland-Felix Moumie. His death by poison, on 3 November I960, led to considerable specula- tion and recriminations, but the U.P.C.'s illegal wing continued to conduct guerrilla warfare against the Cameroun Government.

In West Africa, the Chinese worked through Conakry in attempting to establish their influence. Guinea had been the only nation to reject de Gaulle's French Community, in September 1958, and its leaders were Marxist-oriented revolutionaries. As an indication of Guinea's influence in Africa, it may be noted that at the first All-African People's Conference, held in Accra in December I958, the new All-African

People's Organisation nominated a Guinean, Abdoulaye Diallo, as its

general secretary. The Chinese supported Sekou Toure from the first more enthusiastically than they supported Nkrumah. Among the reasons were the manner in which Guinea gained her independence; the

long-standing relations between Toure and various Communist organisations; and the relations of Guinea with the leaders of the U.P.C. in

Cameroun, arising from common membership of the old Rassemblement

democratique africain.3 A treaty of friendship between Guinea and the C.P.R., signed by

Toure in Peking in September I960, established a special relationship between the two countries. In line with their policy of supporting militant groups in opposition to governments which were pro-western, they supported a training programme in Guinea for a revolutionary cadre. From May I959, Moumie directed U.P.C. activities from an office in the national assembly building in Conakry. Modibo Keita,

1 G. H. Jansen, Nonalignment and the Afro-Asian States (New York, 1966), p. 327. 2 Colin Legum, 'Africa and China: symbolism and substance', in A. M. Halpern (ed.),

Policies toward China: views from six continents (New York, I965), p. 422. 3 Lowenthal, loc. cit. pp. I65-6.

508



THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND AFRICA 509

later President of Mali during the period when the present Mali (the former French Soudan) and Senegal were united in the Mali Federa-

tion, established the headquarters of his radical wing of the U.S.- R.D.A. (Union soudanaise-Rassemblement democratique africain), the ruling party of the Mali Federation, in Conakry, where he was in contact with the Chinese. Also in Guinea, and in touch with the Chinese, was a

group of exiles from the Ivory Coast. Antoine Gizenga, later head of the

Congo Stanleyville regime, studied in Guinea in I959, although it would appear that the Chinese were giving little support at this time to actual revolutionary activities in Africa.' An exception was the case of the Gouvernement provisoire de la revolution algdrienne (G.P.R.A.); Peking supported the F.L.N. and was the only Communist state to recognise the

Algerian Provisional Government when it declared its independence in I958.

Throughout this early period the Chinese were acting largely as a force supplementary to the Soviet Union's activities. In 1959, however, a difference of opinion arose concerning the efficacy of the approaches of

peaceful coexistence and revolutionary action. The Chinese placed more emphasis upon 'armed struggle', while the U.S.S.R. had relied

upon peaceful competition in its dealings with the west. On 16 September I959, President de Gaulle offered terms of self-

determination to Algeria, which were rejected by the Algerian Com- munist Party, but supported by the French C.P. The G.P.R.A. proposed cautious terms for the start of negotiations. Delegations from both

Algerian groups attended the celebrations in Peking marking the tenth

anniversary of Communist rule. On 17 October I959 the Chinese announced their opposition to the de Gaulle proposals. Khrushchev, shortly thereafter, announced his approval of de Gaulle's offer. The

Chinese, alone among world Communist parties, opposed the Soviet

position, going so far as to offer planes and volunteers to the G.P.R.A. Tension mounted for some time thereafter, as Khrushchev was maintain-

ing a pacific stand in view of the approaching summit meeting in Paris. The issue quietened, however, in the light of the failure of these negotiations and the subsequent increase in Soviet militancy.

During this same period the Cameroun provided another theatre for the dispute. However, the granting of independence, on I January I960, removed much of the heat from that issue, although Moumie became a firm Chinese supporter. Also in I960, the Soviet Union and China were engaged in competition in the Afro-Asian secretariat and the Second All-African People's Conference at Tunis in January. Although the

1 Ibid. pp. I66-7.



conference rejected one of the more provocative Chinese resolutions, support for the two powers was quite evenly divided.1 At the behest of both, the Solidarity Council became the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation (A.A.P.S.O.), but the U.S.S.R. and U.A.R. blocked a Chinese attempt to move the secretariat from Cairo to the more con- genial atmosphere of Conakry.2

The Congo provided another arena for both Russian and Chinese action, and further points of contention between the two Communist states arose in I960. Khrushchev's initial support for the U.N. inter- vention was disapproved of by the Chinese, who considered the U.N. a tool of the United States. When the United Nations action became obviously detrimental to the ambitions of Antoine Gizenga and Patrice Lumumba, the Chinese were able to accuse the Russians of a lack of

revolutionary militancy and of naivete about the operations of imperialism. After Lumumba's death in 1961 the Chinese supported the Gizenga regime in Stanleyville with propaganda, although they did not attempt to provide actual military aid. The C.P.R. withdrew from the Congolese scene in August I96I when the Gizenga regime was united with the Government of Cyrille Adoula, although they continued to regard Gizenga as the only true 'patriotic' leader in the Congo.3

We have noted that Chinese involvement in Africa began only in

I955, and that at that time it was primarily a ramification of China's

policy towards the new states of Asia and the Middle East. By 1959, however, the level of Chinese involvement had risen substantially and the C.P.R. was establishing itself as an influential factor in African affairs. From I959 we find the competition between the U.S.S.R. and the C.P.R. becoming a dominant factor in the relations of the two states with African nations. This coincided with the rapid dissolution of colonial empires in Africa. Thus the instability of the African scene, most dramatically revealed in the Congo, was exploited and intensified

by the growing Sino-Soviet rift. As W. A. C. Adie has noted, the third

period from I959 on was 'marked by increasingly open struggle in

Tropical as well as North Africa and in the Communist international front organizations which operate in Africa, between orthodox, or Soviet-oriented Communism and what Khrushchev has denounced as "Mao Tse-tungism".'4

Richard Lowenthal also saw this competition becoming a decisive factor in Communist-African relations, and identified it with the

1 Ibid. pp. 173-8. 2 Ibid. p. 177. Ibid. pp. 180-2. 4 W. A. C. Adie, 'Chinese Policy towards Africa', in Sven Hamrell and Carl Gosta

Widstrand (eds.), The Soviet Bloc, China and Africa (Uppsala, I964), p. 46.

5Io TAREQ Y. ISMAEL



THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND AFRICA

different concepts of'national democracy' held by the Chinese and the Russians.1 The Russians expect that the first stage in development will be a revolution of the 'national bourgeoisie'. After the success of this, the Communist Party may overthrow the nationalist leaders and assume

power on their own. The Chinese experience in the I920S, however, convinced them that in their circumstances this tactic would be

disastrous, and that the Communist Party must lead the revolution, although in co-operation with a broad united-front organisation in-

cluding workers, peasants, national bourgeoisie, and petty bourgeoisie. This difference of opinion had a direct application to Africa after

1959. As the African states gained their independence, the Soviet Union tended to support the national democratic states, while the Chinese

supported the exponents of armed struggle. The fact that the leaders of

many of the new states were hardly revolutionary, and often suppressed the Communist Party, revealed serious flaws in the Soviet position. On the other hand, the Chinese were able to stimulate successful armed

struggles in only a few African states. As the policies of each power derive from its position and its historical experience, and as the failures each reinforce the opinions of the other, there seems to be no easy solution to their differences. As was noted by Laurence Martin in 1962, the greater the involvement of the two states in Africa, the more opportunities for conflict arise between them.2

The first phase of this disagreement between Russians and Chinese was not essentially harmful to the Communist cause.3 That the two powers supported different countries or different groups had little effect upon their positions, and appeared to fulfil some of the functions of a division of labour. The effect was to render their efforts more

complementary than competitive, although they may have been uncomfortable playing this role. From 1961 on, however, the issue was carried more into the organisations of the Afro-Asian states, whose workings were disrupted, decreasing the confidence of African leaders in both the organisations and the Communist states. The Soviet representatives 'defeated' the Chinese at the World Peace Council's Stock- holm meeting in December 1961, but the Chinese were 'victorious' at

1 Lowenthal, "'National Democracy" and the Post-Colonial Revolution', in Kurt London (ed.), New Nations in a Divided World: the international relations of the Afro-Asian states (New York, 1963), pp. 56-74. See also Lowenthal, loc. cit. pp. i84-203; and Lowenthal, 'The Sino-Soviet Split and its Repercussions in Africa', in Hamrell and Widstrand, op. cit. pp. I31-45.

2 Laurence W. Martin, 'Introduction: the emergence of the new states', in Laurence W. Martin (ed.), Neutralism and Nonalignment: the new states in world affairs (New York, i962), p. xx.

3 Lowenthal, 'The Sino-Soviet Split and its Repercussions in Africa', loc. cit. pp. 140-3.

5I I



the Afro-Asian Writers' Conference in Cairo in February I962. The Chinese were again successful at the Third Afro-Asian Conference held at Moshi, Tanzania, in February 1963.

There was a tendency for the U.S.S.R. to rely upon the World Peace Council while the Chinese worked through the Afro-Asian machinery. However, at the time when the Maoist phase of Chinese foreign policy began, after the signing of the nuclear test-ban treaty, the Russians were more influential than the Chinese in the Afro-Asian Executive Com- mittee meeting in Cyprus. The Chinese regarded the test ban as a

'betrayal' and as trafficking with imperialism; the fact that they were then developing their own nuclear capacities, and felt that the agreement was directed against them, contributed to the Chinese bitterness. As the Afro-Asians rejected the militant Chinese view, the Russians were able to gain their support. This divergence on tactics, growing into an

organisational competition, marked the beginning of the real Sino- Soviet split. At that point, the question ceased to be one of tactics, of

emphasis, or of priorities, and became one of strategy and doctrine. In summary, we may say that from their assumption of power in 1949

until the Bandung Conference in I955 the Chinese People's Republic showed little interest in Afro-Asian affairs, and no interest in Africa. From Bandung until I959 their policy was one of co-operation with the Soviet Union and of developing ties of friendship with the Afro-Asian states. In this period their involvement in Africa was limited severely by the largely colonial status of Africa. From 1959 until 1961 they were involved in a number of tactical disagreements with the Soviet Union, which created tension between the two states and led them to compete for influence in Africa. Throughout this period, the activities of the U.S.S.R. and the C.P.R. were complementary in their effects, though competitive in origin. From I96I until 1963 the dispute involved

competition for dominance over various organisations of the Afro-

Asian, non-aligned countries. This made the dispute more apparent and more unsettling to the African states, and it cost both the Chinese and the Russians much of their influence in Africa. From 1963 onwards it is impossible to separate Chinese policy in Africa from the ideological dispute within the Communist world.

INAUGURATION OF AN AFRICAN POLICY

Chou En-Lai's African tour in I963-4 marked a new Chinese

attempt to enlarge their contacts in Africa. At that time, Chinese policy favoured the establishment of an International United Front, including

512 TAREQ Y. ISMAEL



THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND AFRICA 513

even those European countries which were not associated with United States policies.1 Chou En-Lai, during his visits to African countries, attempted to secure expressions of solidarity from various political leaders - in the form of agreement on certain principles expounded by China - and support for a 'Second Bandung' conference of Afro-Asian states. The Chinese favoured an Afro-Asian conference (from which the Soviet Union might be excluded) of non-aligned nations, such as was supported by Yugoslavia and India.

Chou also presented the Africans with the 'five-eight' formula: five principles for Sino-African political relations and eight principles for economic relations. The formula may be summarised as follows: (i) China would lead the struggle against 'old and new imperialism' for the establishment of totally independent, sovereign, African states; (ii) China would provide aid on the most favourable terms, directed towards creating self-sufficient, diversified economies in the shortest possible time; (iii) China approved of, and would support, the strong African desires for peace and non-alignment, basing her actions on the Bandung principles; and (iv) China favoured any activities leading to the greater unity of Africa and the Afro-Asian world - the settlement of internal disputes by peaceful means, and the creation of such regional organisations as met with the approval of the African people. 'It would be nearly impossible to enunciate a program more in tune with all of the aspirations of the African people than this one.'2

An important aim of Chou En-Lai's tour was the presentation of a Chinese image at once revolutionary and peaceful. That is, one dedi- cated to the eventual overthrow of capitalism, but willing to co-operate with non-aligned states. Chou had also to project the image of a China which was powerful enough to aid the less-developed African states, but which shared, at the same time, their problems of underdevelop- ment. Since both China and Africa had suffered from colonialism, Chou contended that they should co-operate against imperialist states. As he put it in an interview in Tunisia: 'We Asian and African countries created brilliant cultures as early as the dawn of history. Today we are comparatively backward economically and culturally. This is the outcome of foreign aggression and repression.'3

The Sino-Indian dispute and the Chinese denunciation of the test- ban treaty were major stumbling blocks in his image-casting, and he

Michael B. Yahuda, 'Chinese Foreign Policy since 1963: the Maoist phases', in The China Quarterly (London), 36, October-December i968, pp. 97-102.

2 Robert A. Scalapino, 'Africa and Peking's United Front', in Current Scene (Berkeley), 26, I September 1965, p. 5.

a Peking Review (Peking), 17 January i964, p. 25.



engaged in a spirited defence of the Chinese positions.' Chou's final aim was to observe, assess, and reconnoitre the African scene in order to give China's policy makers the information they needed.2

The tour provided several disappointments for the Chinese leader. In North Africa, the area to which China had devoted the most energy, the response to his visit was less than enthusiastic. At a banquet given in honour of Chou, President Nasser of the U.A.R., before supporting China's bid to enter the United Nations, first stressed the importance of the international organisation, praised Soviet aid for the High Dam, and implied that Egypt had avoided class struggles.3 In West Africa and the Sudan, in January I964, Chou En-Lai received friendlier welcomes than he had in North Africa. Modibo Keita of Mali was the only African head of state to agree with Chou on the eight principles of economic aid, but he was less enthusiastic than Nkrumah of Ghana about an Afro-Asian conference. In the Sudan, the official welcome was friendly, but Chou had 'little success' on substantive issues.4

Chou had originally been scheduled to visit Kenya, Tanganyika, and

Uganda, but the revolution in Zanzibar and the army mutinies in the three East African states led to the cancellation of these visits. Instead, Chou accepted Emperor Haile Selassie's invitation to Ethiopia (he was not received at Addis Ababa, the capital, but at Asmara). Chinese aid to Somalia and China's general revolutionary stance were not approved by the Emperor, who criticised China's position on the test-ban treaty, the U.N., and the dispute with India.5 At the time of Chou's visit to

Mogadiscio, there was considerable agreement between China and Somalia, but the usefulness of the Chinese to the Somalis, whose

primary motive in establishing the connexion was to force the Russians to give them aid, was decreasing; and in mid-1964 the President of Somalia removed 'pro-Chinese' elements from his Government.6

The French recognition of Peking, on 27 January 1964, coincided with Chou En-Lai's tour of Africa. The effect of this action upon the

francophone states of the Union of African and Malagasy States was considerable. Congo-Brazzaville, the Central African Republic, Senegal, and Dahomey, all of whom had previously maintained

1 Robert A. Scalapino, 'Sino-Soviet Competition in Africa', in Foreign Affairs (New York), July 1964, pp. 642-5.

2 Ibid. p. 645; W.A.C. Adie, 'Chou En-lai on Safari', in The China Quarterly, 36, October-December 1968, pp. 97-102.

3 United Arab Republic, President Gamal Abdel-XNasser's Speeches and Press Interviews, January- December, 1963 (Cairo, n.d.), pp. 286-90.

4 Adie, loc. cit. pp. 189-90 and 192. 5 Ibid. pp. i92-3. 6 Legum, op. cit. pp. 404 and 422-3.

5I4 TAREQ Y. ISMAEL




relations with Nationalist China - although Senegal claimed to recognise both Chinas - switched to relations with Communist China. However, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, and Cameroun refused to follow the French lead. Diplomatic relations were subsequently established by Burundi, Kenya, and Tunisia in January I964, by Congo-Brazzaville in February, by the Central African Republic and Zambia in October, and by Dahomey in November.

The January 1964 revolution in Zanzibar was not originally the work of a pro-Peking group. However, the Umma Party of Abdulrahman Mohammed Babu joined the revolutionary group shortly before the revolt and displaced the actual leader of the revolution, John Okello, within a few weeks of the coup d'etat. Babu, a strong admirer of the C.P.R., became Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence.1 When Zanzibar was united with Tanganyika in April I964, Chinese influence was extended to Dar es Salaam. In I964 the Chinese provided aid of some $45'5 million to the United Republic of Tanzania (including Zanzibar), which was nearly half of all Chinese aid to Africa in that year.2 Thus I964 saw the introduction of a partly pro-Peking Govern- ment into East Africa.

In that year, the prospects for expanded Chinese-African relations

appeared well founded. The new African nations, eager to tap all sources of aid and impressed with China's development, responded to Chou's probings for friendship. But China's penchant for revolution and revolutionaries, reflected in the following examples, proved anathema to the flowering of Chinese-African relations. According to Gilbert Comte, a veteran French political analyst of African affairs,

Peking's envoys faced the difficult choice of either sacrificing their radical ideology in order to placate existing governments or supporting various vaguely Marxist opposition groups in the name of a common struggle against imperialism. The first course would involve the tacit abandonment of their revolutionary ambitions. The second, for which Peking opted, com- mitted them to compromising themselves with underground or semi-legal organizations...

At times Peking backed both established governments and the revolutionary groups opposing them.3

1 Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics (Boston, 1966), p. I95. 2 Alexander Eckstein, Communist China'sEconomic Growth and Foreign Trade (New York, 1966),

P. 307. 3 Gilbert Comte, 'Peking Shows its New African Look', in Africa Report (Washington),

xvI, 3, March I97I, p. 19.

515



TAREQ Y. ISMAEL

The Congo rebellion The Leopoldville regime had been subjected to numerous assaults,

following its independence, gained in 1960. The U.N. troops brought into the Congo to quell disorders in September I960 were scheduled to leave on 30 June 1964. Early that year a new wave of unrest developed against the Government. A National Liberation Committee (C.N.L.) had been founded by exiles from Leopoldville in I962; in I964 the Massamba-Debat regime gave them refuge in Brazzaville, an action linked with Chinese support for the C.N.L. Guerrilla attacks began in January I964, under the direction of Chinese-trained Pierre Mulele in Kwilu province. In addition to this threat, Moise Tshombe's Govern- ment in Leopoldville was faced with rebellions, allegedly associated with the Mulelist action, that reduced Kasai and part of Katanga to anarchy.

Meanwhile, possibly the most substantial threat to the Leopoldville regime was offered by the movements of Gaston Soumialot, who emerged from hiding in late 1963 and joined the C.N.L. in Brazzaville. In January I964 he went to Bujumbura, Burundi, where he received advice from the Chinese embassy.l He organised a military force which held much of Kivu and North Katanga provinces. The extent to which Soumialot's group was aided by the Chinese is uncertain, although it is

probable that he did receive support.2 It is certain, however, that the

special position of the Chinese in Congo-Brazzaville gave considerable aid to the C.N.L. and its military forces by encouraging the Brazzaville regime to tolerate their presence.

The Burundi episode Burundi had recognised Communist China on 21 December I963,

and Chiang Yen, a temporary charge d'affaires, established relations with

Bujumbura on 13 January I964. His revolutionary credentials were

indisputable, as in 1960 he had been 'thrown out' of Indonesia for his activities among the Chinese there.3 Burundi's primary attraction for the

1 'Congo: a jigsaw-puzzle of insurrection', in France Observateur (Paris), 744, 6 August I964, p. 9; Yves-Guy Berges, 'Soumialot: is Lenin with the troops of du Guesclin?', in

L'Express (Paris), 22 August 1964. 2 'The Role of the Chinese Communists in the Congo (Brazzaville) and Central Africa', in

La Libre Belgique (Brussels), 15 October I964, p. Io2, and I6 October 1964, p. 3. For a

dissenting view, see Jules Chome, 'Congolese Rebels Animated by Desire for Independence', in L'Essor (Bamako), vI, 270, I4 September I964. It is of interest that Chome attributes to Soumialot's rebels the eight rules of conduct which Legum (op. cit. p. 407) asserts that Mulele had borrowed from Mao Tse-Tung's writings.

3 Donald W. Klein, 'Peking's Diplomats in Africa', in Current Scene, II, 36, i July 1964, p. 7.

5I6



THE PEOPLE S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND AFRICA 517

Chinese was its position as the centre for the Watusi refugees from Rwanda. The presence of the Watusi was a problem in Burundi, whose own society was divided between aristocratic Watusi and Bahutu

peasants. The Chinese utilised this conflict to sponsor unrest in Central

Africa, even going so far as to help organise Watusi expeditions against Rwanda. Despite the defection, in May I964, of a Chinese diplomat to the American embassy, where he revealed many details about Chinese

plans and methods, Chinese influence continued to grow in Burundi. In August I964 the Burundi Government prohibited the entry of

Belgians and Americans into Burundi. Anxiety about the extent of Chinese influence was increasing among the Catholic authorities and the Bahutu university students.' The Prime Minister, Pierre Ngendan- dumwe, resigned and was replaced by Alban Nyamoya, a Watusi of

pro-Chinese reputation. Dissension within the governing Party of Unity and National Progress aggravated the growing crisis, and the finishing touch was the discovery at Kitega of an arms shipment, apparently for Rwandan refugees. Mwami (King) Mwambusta asked for the

resignation of Premier Nyamoya, whose power he perceived as a threat to himself. Nyamoya refused to resign, but was replaced by Ngendan- dumwe- who was assassinated on 15 January I965 by a Rwandan

refugee who claimed to have been paid by the Chinese.2 The pro- Chinese faction was arrested, the Workers' Federation and Rwagasore National Youth dissolved, and diplomatic relations with Peking were broken. Within a short time, all the members of the embassy were ex-

pelled from Burundi. Chinese diplomatic relations with, and influence in, Burundi had lasted barely a year.

The Portuguese territories

The Angolan liberation campaign began in 1961 and continued to

develop during the following few years. Two groups vied for power: the M.P.L.A. (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and the F.L.N.A. (National Liberation Front of Angola) with G.R.A.E. (Re- public of Angola Government in Exile), the political arm of F.L.N.A.3

1 Ibid. pp. 31-2. 2 ' Interview with Senon Nicanyenzi concerning Bishops' Note regarding Danger Threaten-

ing Burundi', an interview conducted by Jacques Ceulemans, Remarques congolaises et afri- caines (Brussels), vr, 20, I November I964, pp. 470-2 and 485. The text of the note is also given. Nicayenzi, who was later arrested as pro-Chinese, denigrated the bishops' fears (p. 471). See Nicolas Lang, 'Chinese Communists Pull the Strings in Congo-Brazzaville', in Est et Ouest (Paris), xvII, 349, 16-31 October I965, pp. 33-4.

3 The F.L.N.A. was formed in I962 by the merger of the U.P.A. and the P.D.A. For a detailed account see Paul M. Whitaker, 'The Revolutions of "Portuguese" Africa', in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), VIII, 2, I970.



TAREQ Y. ISMAEL

In 1963 the G.R.A.E. was recognised by Congo-Leopoldville, in whose territory it was based, and subsequently by the O.A.U. The M.P.L.A. established itself in Brazzaville. At Kenya's independence celebrations in December I963, Holden Roberto of the U.P.A. met and conferred with Ch'en Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister. Early in I964, Roberto announced that he would henceforth seek aid from China and other Communist countries.

However, Mulele's revolt, causing a deterioration in Sino-Congolese relations, interfered with Chinese aid to Angola. And, while the M.P.L.A. has been relatively successful in Cabinda, the Portuguese have contained the revolution in Angola proper. Ensconced in Leopold- ville, Roberto has lost most of his early prestige, and the M.P.L.A., backed by the U.A.R., the U.S.S.R., and Mali, has gained ascendancy. It would thus appear that the Chinese gained little or nothing by their

support of the U.P.A.1 Meanwhile, the U.S.S.R. and her allies con- tinue to support the M.P.L.A., and have gained anti-imperialist prestige from such support.2

In Mozambique, the dominant movement is Frelimo (Mozambique Liberation Front), which turned to Peking in February I964.3 Frelimo has also remained on friendly terms with the U.S.S.R. The African

Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cap Vert (P.A.I.G.C.) and the Committee for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe are associated with the M.P.L.A. and Frelimo in the Council of National

Organisations of the Portuguese Colonies and - while Amilcar Cabral of the P.A.I.G.C. has been friendly to Peking4 - reliance on the U.S.S.R. and the African radical states, rather than on China, has been their policy.

Congo-Brazzaville After Brazzaville's recognition of Peking in I964, Chinese influence

there grew rapidly. The Chinese maintained a large embassy and a branch office of the New China News Agency in Brazzaville and dis-

patched a number of cultural and economic missions to the former French Congo. The leaders of the Government included pro-Chinese

1 Robert Davezies, 'Division: the weakness of the Angolan liberation movements', in Le Monde diplomatique (Paris), in, I43, February I966, p. 5; Andre Givisiez, 'Fifth Anniversary of the Angola Insurrection', in Bulletin bi-hebdomadaire de l'agence centrafricaine de presse (Bangui), 136, 4 March 1966.

2 'Czech Assessment of the Angolan National Liberation Movement: biographical data on

leaders', in Dokumentacne Prehled (Prague), 6, 28January 1966, pp. E 7-I 9, c 9; N. Khokhlov, 'The Fight for Independence of Angola is Spreading', in Izvestya (Moscow), I I June I966, p. 3

3 Legum, op. cit . p4. . 4 Ibid.

5I8




elements, especially the Prime Minister, Dr Pascal Lissouba, whose wife was connected with the left-inclined government newspaper, Dipanda. In

addition, the presence of Chinese Communist advisers and sympathisers at C.N.L. bases in Congo-Brazzaville was an apparent source of influence upon the regime.1

The President, M Massamba-Debat, visited Peking in September and October I964. During this visit, a treaty of friendship, including economic and technical co-operation agreements, was signed. In

addition, the Chinese extended a loan of some $25*2 million to the Brazzaville Government in that year. The Massamba-Debat Govern- ment grew more revolutionary, establishing the National Movement for the Revolution as the only political party.2

Chinese influence in Brazzaville, while substantial and growing stronger at this time, should not be exaggerated. The Congo also established friendly relations with other Communist countries, maintained its old relations with France - if to a somewhat diminished extent - and enjoyed normal relations with a number of western nations. In speeches made during the visit of a North Korean delegation to Brazzaville, the tone, while militantly anti-imperialist, was hardly Maoist.3 However, the action of the United States in withdrawing its

diplomatic and consular mission from Brazzaville at this time gave added reasons for Brazzaville to turn to the east, and all the while the

Congolese economy was suffering from the reduction of its involvement with France. Subsequently a five-million-franc credit agreement was reached with the Chinese in June 1965, and their aid flows increased

dramatically.4 Either directly, as in subsidies to Dipanda, or indirectly, as in the following of the Chinese line by the Congolese General Students' Union, it is apparent that Chinese Communist ideas, if not China's influence as a state, had become an important - and perhaps a

permanent - part of the politics of Congo-Brazzaville by I965.

The' Second Bandung' conference One of Chou En-Lai's main lines of endeavour during his tour of

Africa in 1963-4 was to persuade the African leaders to hold a Bandung- style conference rather than another Belgrade. This effort failed. With

1 'The Subversive Activity of World Communism in Africa', in Neue Ziircher Zeitung (Zurich), 27 August 1965.

2 Lang, loc. cit. pp. IO-I . 3 'Congolese Brazzaville-North Korean Relations', in Dipanda (Brazzaville), 7 August

1965, pp. 2-3, and August I965. 4 Pierre Brune, 'New Orientation of Congo/Brazzaville's Foreign Policy Arises from

Economic Considerations and Ideological Options', in L'Observateur du Moyen-Orient et de l'Afrique (Paris), Ix, 36, 3 September 1965, pp. 1-I3.

5I9



the exceptions of Guinea and Mali, all the leaders Chou En-Lai had visited sent representatives to Colombo, Ceylon, in March 1964 to plan a non-aligned nations' conference, scheduled for October I964, in Cairo. This was to follow immediately upon the conclusion of the African and Arab summit conferences; thus there was no possibility that a 'second Bandung' could be held before a 'second Belgrade'.l

China, of course, did not attend the Cairo Conference of Non-

Aligned Nations, but made her presence felt through a group of nations known as the 'new emerging forces', led by Indonesia. The conference refused to support the Chinese-inspired motion to repudiate both

'peaceful coexistence' and the United Nations, but gave priority to anti-colonial struggles. Six days after the conference closed, the Chinese

exploded an atomic device in Sinkiang, in direct defiance - perhaps deliberate contempt - of a resolution discouraging nuclear proliferation passed by the Cairo conference.

A preparatory meeting for a 'second Bandung' was held in Djakarta, IO-I5 April I964. Although the location of the conference and the attendance of Malaysia were in dispute, the major issue was that of Russian attendance. While only India and Ceylon supported U.S.S.R.

membership, no definitive agreement was reached by the sub-committee. An ambiguous settlement was arranged at 2 a.m. on the last day of the

meeting.2 This was a setback for the U.S.S.R., but not a real victory for the Chinese.

The first attempt to hold the 'second Bandung' was made in Algiers in June I965, when the preliminary meeting of foreign ministers, at which the question of Russian membership was to be decided, took

place. Only about half the nations invited to the conference actually sent their representatives, and the uncertainties surrounding the meet-

ing were greatly increased by the coup of 19 June, which replaced the Government of Ahmed Ben Bella with that of Houari Boumedienne. In the wake of street demonstrations in Algiers, the explosion of a bomb in the conference hall, and a request for a postponement by 13 Common- wealth Afro-Asian heads of state, the Chinese yielded to the inevitable and secured the postponement of the 'second Bandung' until November

I965, with a foreign ministers' meeting scheduled to begin on 30 October.3

1 Jansen, Nonalignment and the Afro-Asian States, p. 375. 2 Ibid. p. 38I. 3 John K. Cooley, East Wind over Africa: Red China's African ofensive (New York, I965),

pp. 222-3.

520 TAREQ Y. ISMAEL




PROBLEMS OF CHINESE POLICY

The interval between the June postponement of the conference and the October opening of the foreign ministers' meeting witnessed a reversal of China's support. The weakening of the Chinese position, due to events in India and Vietnam, and the near certainty of Russian

participation eventually brought China into opposition to the conference.1

On 29 September 1965, China's Foreign Minister, Ch'en Yi, held a

press conference, at which he placed so many conditions upon the Afro-Asian conference that he virtually precluded any possibility of

success, and ended his statement with an ultimatum: 'The African- Asian conference must be made a success. If there are assurances that it will be a success, the Chinese Government is for its convocation. Without such assurances, the Chinese Government is in favor of waiting till the conditions are ripe.'2 Either the conference would follow the Chinese line, or the Chinese would not participate. The participating countries had no wish either to accept this dictum or to exclude the Chinese. When the Chinese conditions were rejected, especially when the Afro-Asians agreed to Russian participation, the Chinese demanded the cancellation of the conference. In order to avoid the creation of a 'battlefront', this was agreed to.

After this, Peking suffered other diplomatic setbacks, particularly regarding the attempted Communist coup and military counter-coup in Indonesia. At the same time, relations between China and several African states were deteriorating. The discovery, late in I964, of a

plot by the Chinese-supported Sawaba party to overthrow the Govern- ment of Diori Hamani of Niger led to his denunciation of the Chinese, followed by those of President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast and President Maurice Yameogo of Upper Volta.3 On 23 July 1965 the Government of Kenya expelled a Chinese journalist, one Wang Te-

Ming, for security reasons.4 Later in 1965 there were coups in Congo- Leopoldville and Dahomey; and, early in 1966, military regimes took

power in the Central African Republic, Upper Volta, Nigeria, and Ghana. None of these coups strengthened pro-Chinese elements in

1 Jansen, op. cit. pp. 395-6. 2 Quoted in Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, Communist China: revolutionary

reconstruction and international confrontation, 1949 to the present: vol. in of The China Reader (New York, I966), pp. 544-8.

3 Gilbert Comte, 'The Plan for Niger's Destruction', in France Eurafrique (Paris), XVII, 161, April 1965, p. 9.

4 Nicolas Lang, 'The Chinese "Journalists" in Black Africa', in Est et ouest, xvII, 349, 16-31 October 1965, p. 32.

35

521



these countries, and in Ghana and the Central African Republic the Chinese lost much ground. Their influence on African governments was thus restricted to a relatively small number of countries - Guinea, Mali, Congo-Brazzaville, and Tanzania.

How weak China's position in Africa had become is evident from the

apparent movement of Guinea towards the Soviet Union, and the

opportunist nature of Mali's relations with China, noted by one observer.' Further evidence of China's loss of status was provided by the Tricontinental Conference in Havana in January 1966, which generally preferred the Soviet to the Chinese attitude. By early 1966 it had become

apparent that African confidence in Peking was ebbing.2 The chief reasons for this decline in influence were (i) China's uncompromising call to revolution, (ii) her subversive activities, and (iii) her support for African Communist and revolutionary parties, often in opposition to established governments. In addition, the Chinese were at the beginning of a great internal crisis.

The Cultural Revolution In one sense, the militant line indicated by Marshal Lin Piao's

'Long Live the Victory of the People's War!' was the beginning of the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' - that is, it marked the end of

compromise with capitalism and revisionism, at least in theory.3 In

fact, relations with France, Japan, and the Republic of South Africa were maintained after this call to arms. However, in January 1966 most Chinese ambassadors were recalled to Peking, with embassies left in the care of charges d'affaires. Through 1966 and much of 1967 the Chinese

severely reduced their activities in Afro-Asia, particularly in Africa. Chinese offers of aid to Africa - which had fallen from $I95 I million in I964 to $I5 million in I9654 - did not rise in 1966 and declined further in 1967. On 20 September 1966 the Chinese ordered all foreign students to leave China, thus terminating one of their most important foreign programmes.

The chief tendency in this period was to move away from normal

diplomatic relations, and towards informal, sometimes subversive, 1 'Mali Profits from Veering between Moscow, Peiping and the West', in Neue Ziircher

Zeitung, 23 February 1966. 2 Philippe Decraene, 'Peking Encounters Rising Distrust from Leaders of Black Africa',

in Le Monde, 4 March 1966. 3 Lin Piao, 'Long Live the Victory of the People's War', in Peking Review, 2 September

I965. 4 Milton Kovner, 'Communist China's Foreign Aid to Less Developed Countries', in

U.N. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, An Economic Profile of Mainland China (Washing- ton ,1967), p. 612.

522 TAREQ Y. ISMAEL




'people-to-people' relations. Whereas the U.S.S.R. for some time maintained correct intergovernmental relations with other states, even while the Comintern was pursuing a revolutionary policy, the Chinese in 1966 abandoned the channels of diplomacy to an unprecedented extent.' Besides damaging the morale of their foreign service, antagonising many overseas friends, and isolating themselves from most of the Communist and non-Communist world, the Chinese, through their cultural revolution, have so subordinated foreign to domestic policy that they seem to have lost touch with reality.2 Myths - for example 'the "Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" inspires all the people of the world' - are essentially internal legitimising devices, with little relation to global realities.

None the less, Chinese activities in Africa, though curtailed, continued in I966. In March of that year, for instance, they became em- broiled in a controversy in Kenya.3 Apparently, money had been distributed for subversive purposes, and the Kenyan Government responded by expelling 1 Russian, Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Chinese embassy officials and journalists. While the Russians denied any involvement, the Chinese neither confirmed nor denied their alleged activities.

Chinese weakness in Africa was marked in Congo-Brazzaville, where the army mutinied in June 1966, partly in protest against the influence of Cuban advisers. Although the mutiny was quelled, the army gained influence from the incident, at the expense of pro-Chinese elements.4 Some observers reached the conclusion that Chinese influence in Africa could not be maintained over a long period, simply because it was unsuited to African realities, to which the U.S.S.R. had been more successful in adapting their policy.5

It should be noted, without involving ourselves too deeply in a discus- sion of foreign aid at this point, that China's inability to provide substantial aid to her friends in Africa weakened her position there considerably. Given the weak economies of the African states, and their

consequent need for aid, Chinese influence was replaced in some areas by that of Taiwan, the U.S.S.R., and France. The Chinese have tended

1 Yahuda, op. cit. p. o04. 2 Scalapino, 'The Cultural Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy', in Current Scene, VI, 14,

I August 1968, pp. 9-io. 3 'Communist Chinese Subversion in Kenya', in L'Etoile du Congo (Leopoldville), o0, II,

and 2 May 1966. 4 Decraene, 'Rapprochement with Eastern Countries and Economic Difficulties Noted in

Congo (Brazzaville)', in Le Mois en Afrique (Paris), i, 9, September 1966, pp. 30-4. 5 J. Van Broekhuizen, 'Moscow and Peking in Africa', in Afrika Heute (Bonn), 2 I, I Novem-

ber I966, pp. 309-I2; Werner Holzer, 'The Overestimated "Yellow Peril"', ibid. 22, I5 November 1966, pp. 325-7.

35-2

523



524 TAREQ Y. ISMAEL

to identify as 'class treason any co-operation with the West';1 but a Soviet writer could state, 'The acceptance of a loan and the signing of a profitable contract with the U.S.A. does not always and necessarily mean the country's enslavement to the U.S.A. and the transformation of its leadership into America's puppets.'2

Despite the fact that the Chinese were disabled by their weakness and inflexibility, some aid to Africa continued, mostly to complete projects begun in an earlier period. Thus we find President Sekou Toure of Guinea, at the inauguration of the Kinkon power-station in February 1967, speaking in praise of China, which had aided in its construction.3 However, he reserved his praise solely for the example set by the Chinese, rather than their policies.

If the chief influence of the Chinese was in their example, their subversive activities rather poisoned the well for them; many considered that they were being outdone by the Nationalist Chinese. It was reported in April 1967 that, 'in mid-1965, 18 African states still had diplomatic relations with Peking and only 15 with Formosa. Today (I967) Formosa has exchanged ambassadors with 19 African states, Peking with only 15 ', and that this may have been largely because of the greater success of the Nationalist Chinese in their aid programmes, which were both effective and disinterested.4 The steady decline of Peking's influence on the African vote in the U.N., relative to that of Taipeh, provides further evidence of the greater effectiveness of Nationalist programmes. In addition, the deteriorating economic and political situation in Congo-Brazzaville, where pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet factions engaged in street battles in April 1967, tarnished the Com- munist image.

THE NEW CHINESE APPROACH

Having suffered a decline in their influence in Africa, contrasting painfully with their presence in I965, the Chinese undertook a new approach to Africa in I967, based upon the one area in which they remained a real force. The Chinese racial line, rejected elsewhere, was acceptable where Portuguese, South African, and Rhodesian racism was

1 Pierre Alexandre, 'A Few Brief Observations on the Activities of Communist Powers in French-speaking Africa', in L'Afrique et l'Asie, 75, third quarter 1966, p. 25.

2 Benik Deknazar-Yuzbashew, 'Soviet Writer Feels Climate in Kinshasa More Favourable for Restoration of Diplomatic Relations', in Literaturnaya Gazeta (Moscow), I o December I 966, p. 4.

3 Horoya (Conakry), vii, I, II8, 5 and 6 February 1967. 4 'Rice and Revolutionaries', in Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 17 April 1967, pp. I26-34.



THE PEOPLE S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND AFRICA

active. In addition, the local Communist parties were better developed in Southern Africa than elsewhere.

Zambia presented a special opportunity, as a landlocked nation, the

export of whose chief product, copper, depends upon access to the sea. Former routes traversed either Rhodesia or Mozambique, and Zambia had long been dissatisfied with this situation. As early as 1965 the idea of a railway from the Copperbelt of Zambia to Dar es Salaam - a project considered but rejected as uneconomic by the U.S.A. and the World Bank - was offered aid by China; but at first this was put aside, following China's other setbacks on the continent. Zambia's desire for the railway and dissatisfaction with the western attitude persisted. In April I967, President Kaunda warned that, 'if the western industrial states do not shake off their apathy towards Africa, then the influence of the East will soon dominate this continent'.l In June he visited Peking, and upon his return announced that China had agreed to finance the building of the 'Tan-Zam' railway. The total cost of the project was estimated at between $225 million and $400 million. The immediate offer was

$I4 million as an interest-free loan, for a route survey.2 On the Tan- Zam project, Gilbert Comte has noted:

For the first time in five years the Chinese are no longer on the diplomatic defensive. The Tan-Zam railroad agreement is bound to have far-reaching consequences. Governments anxious to obtain aid but convinced that there was none forthcoming from poverty-stricken China, were stupefied by the $400 million railway investment. Several of them, even among the francophone countries, will renew contracts with Peking broken after the aggression against Niger, in the hope of obtaining benefits rather than subversion this time.3

China's policy in Africa now seems to favour concentration in a few countries, rather than her former widespread activities. An effort to establish sound relations with certain countries, and to recreate the

feeling of goodwill experienced in 1964, appears to be the Chinese programme for the near future. By utilising their resources in only a few areas, the Chinese may be laying the foundations for a new Chinese

policy in Africa. Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea, Mali, Tanzania, Zambia, and possibly Mauritania, are the chief centres of Chinese influence in Africa. The instability of African regimes, however, may forestall the creation of firm inter-government relations. Since the Massamba-

1 F. Pelerin, 'Africa's Relations with the Eastern Bloc', in Afrika Heute, I November 1968, p. 303?

2 David K. Willis, 'Peking Woos Africa - Coyly', in The Christian Science Monitor (Boston, Mass.), Io October 1967.

3 Comte, 'Peking Shows its New African Look', loc. cit. p. 2I.

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Debat regime fell from power in Congo-Brazzaville in September 1968, and that of Modibo Keita in Mali collapsed later the same year -

although the new Mali regime remains friendly to China1 - it is still not apparent if Chinese influence will be curtailed.

China's original appeal to Africa, following the Bandung Conference, was based upon a common anti-imperialist attitude and on China's position as a model of development for the Third World. The ideological appeal of Mao Tse-Tung's thought, the effects of propaganda, trade and aid, and Chinese participation in the affairs of the developing world, all gave China stature among the Afro-Asian states. By 1964 the Chinese, now independent of Soviet influence, were ready to attempt a broad revolutionary action in Africa; but by late 1965 this action was being seriously hampered. The Chinese have since attempted to rebuild their prestige, but Africans are suspicious and the effort is more difficult. Now that most African states have won their political independence, and most governments are both conservative (in a formal sense) and in- secure, the Chinese penchant for subversion is unwelcome. Further, colonialism is no longer a major threat; solidarity in the face of the great powers is no longer an urgent need. In the present situation in Africa, Peking cannot find the same place as in the Congo and Algeria a decade ago.

The foreign policy of the Chinese People's Republic has, in the past few years, been not so much an expression of external goals as of internal needs. In order to project the image of strength, unity, and the revolutionary struggle necessary to maintain the regime's ideological purity, the alienation of other states through the derogation of normal diplomatic activities to a place behind that of informal connexions has seemed a necessary result, or perhaps by-product. In addition, the activities of the Red Guards in 1966-7 led to confusion in Peking's foreign ministry, whose information services were seriously hampered; the recall of ambassadors in 1967 was only partly reversed in mid- I969.2 One result is that there exists no necessary connexion between much of Chinese foreign policy, especially official pronouncements, and the out- side environment in which that policy must operate. When the setbacks

1 New fork Times, I4 July I969. 2 Tillman Durdin, 'Posting of Envoys Halted by Peking', in New Tork Times, 6 September

1969. The replacement of ambassadors continued through mid-1970, with new appointments to Algeria, Brazzaville, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Sudan, Tanzania, the United Arab

Republic, and Zambia. Henry S. Hayward, 'Peking Parts Bamboo Curtain', in The Christian Science Monitor, 20 July 1970.

526 TAREQ Y. ISMAEL




of i965-6 made a reassessment of China's foreign policy necessary, this was made nearly impossible to undertake or to implement by the militancy demanded by the Cultural Revolution.

China's ideological example has not been as important as her development example in influencing Africans. The development model that China presents is more important in Africa than any other Chinese asset for long-term effect. Commenting on this, Oginga Odinga stated: 'It was impossible not to be impressed with life in China. So many of the problems of poverty and illiteracy were those of our people, and those problems were being overcome at an impressive rate. 1 Similarly, Kwame Nkrumah remarked: 'African workers, once they are liberated from colonialism, will soon show the world what they are capable of, in the same way as workers in Russia and China have done.'2

More recently, the Algerian Minister of Information devoted a large part of a speech, discussing the revolution in his country, to developing a Maoist model of socialism for Algeria. He stressed, apparently deni- grating Russian communism, that: 'We have encircled and avoided the reef of state capitalism and the development of a new class of bureau- crats and technocrats.' He also accepted the Maoist emphasis on the necessity of armed struggle, declaring that, 'By definition, the revolutionary struggle is an organised collective combat.'3

However, the catastrophe of the Great Leap Forward and the ex- cesses of the Cultural Revolution have dulled this image. China cannot compete with other powers in the amount of aid to be dispensed, and so cannot demonstrate her model fully on the African scene. Taiwan seems to have been just as successful as Peking in the field of aid. China's only major aid project in Africa, the Tan-Zam railway (the contracts for which were signed in November 1969), has not increased China's influence in Zambia to any significant extent, although it has demon- strated China's ability to undertake long-term projects and her willing- ness to work with ideologically incompatible governments.

Although a number of African leaders have accepted the Chinese revolution as an example of development from which much can be learned, few, if any, have accepted the Chinese model of the state as appropriate to Africa. Kwame Nkrumah was impressed with Chinese development, but he noted that this model was not strictly applicable to Ghana, nor to the rest of Africa, and he considered that he was building socialism in Ghana by a different path.4 The Government of

1 Oginga Odinga, Not ret Uhuru (London, 1967), p. I90. 2 Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite (London, I963), p. 37. 8 Mohamed Sadek Benyania, Revolution africaine (Algiers), i4-20 March 1970, p. 23. 4 Kwame Nkrumah, op. cit. pp. 37, 54-5, I64-5, I65-7, and I 8-23.

527



Mali has been well disposed to China, and the present regime accepts a line closely resembling that of Peking;' but it does not reject the idea of friendship and co-operation with developed states in Europe or elsewhere.2

Since 1968, China has been pursuing a policy of slow and steady forging of links, rather than a swift revolutionary pace. In this sense, China's recent resurgence in Africa is due largely to some compromise of her own ideological goals and her recognition of Africa's development goals. Rather than seeking ideological ties, today China concentrates on

essentially economic forms of aid, directed either to spectacular projects (the Tan-Zam railway) or to immediate practical achievements (textile factories in Congo-Brazzaville and Tanzania). Always bilateral, aid takes the form of credit on the supply of equipment, rather than money, and is released in instalments. Its distribution appears to be balanced:

agricultural aid, mine prospecting (Mali, Congo-Brazzaville), indus- trialisation (cigarettes and matches in Mali and a sugar mill in Congo- Brazzaville), and infrastructure (dams in Guinea). Cultural and military aid is also significant. Between 3,000 and 5,000 Chinese experts are at work in Africa. Several hundred study-scholarships have been extended to young Africans. Military aid consists of the training of personnel (Somalia, Zanzibar) and the formation of militias (Congo-Brazzaville).3

Two recent events demonstrate the Chinese move towards prag- matism. When the Sudanese Government narrowly defeated an al-

legedly Communist coup attempt of mid-July I97I the Chinese sent a

message congratulating General Jafaar Numeiry, although he was

conducting an anti-Communist witch-hunt in Sudan. The more striking of the two events was the Kissinger-Nixon demarche, following the 'ping- pong diplomacy' episode.

The effects of the new Chinese attitude are likely to be mixed in Africa. The C.P.R. may have undercut Taiwan with its move toward a

partial reconciliation with the U.S., and it may have weakened the Soviet position in Africa with both moves. However, the gains are

likely to be compensated by three kinds of losses. First, the Chinese may lose followers among the radical revolutionaries in Africa. Secondly, the Chinese may lose among those who had viewed Peking as an exception to the devotion to power politics among the great powers.

The third 'loss' seems to sum up much of the evolution of Chinese

1 'In the Course of Days and Events', in L'Essor Hebdomadaire (Bamako), x, 440, 3 January 1968.

2 Bassaoura Traore, 'Chinese Aid in Malian Textile Mill', ibid. 13 April 1970. 3 Le Moniteur africain (Dakar), 23 April I970.

528 TAREQ Y. ISMAEL



THE PEOPLE S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND AFRICA

African policy in the past twenty years. Gradually, as a result of events in Africa and elsewhere, the Chinese Government has moved away from its original view of world politics. Although the Chinese view of the world is still constricted by narrow experience and rigid ideology, the

tendency is away from Communist idealism, and towards a more flexible realism. This does not mean that Maoist principles are to be

given up, but rather that they are to be applied to a world conceived in less ideological terms. The dialectical process by which a Maoist thesis was counterposed to traditional diplomacy has resulted in a synthetic product, the application of which should become evident in Africa to an increasing extent over the next decade.

China's admission to the United Nations emphasises the new approach and Africa's readiness to deal with China. Following the vote, African

delegates in particular, according to The Christian Science Monitor, 'were in a frenzy of delight - their arms swooping above their heads and

jumping up and down in their seats as wild applause engulfed the circular chamber'. Twenty-six African nations voted in favour of the resolution to seat Peking and expel Taiwan, while 14 opposed and none abstained.1 Peking is making some dramatic changes in its foreign policy - as shown by the recent attempt to seek a rapprochement with the United States. If this trend continues, it should become clearly apparent in China's relations with Africa within this decade.

1 The Christian Science Monitor, and New York Times, 27 October I97I.

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the people's republic of china and africa

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