THE__________Pearl Harbor

MYTH

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Friends in Peace and War:The Russian Navys Landmark Visit to Civil War San

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Forgotten Raiders of 42:The Fate of the Marines Left Behind on Makin

by Tripp Wiles

ALSO BY GEORGE VICTOR

Hitler: The Pathology of Evil

THE__________Pearl Harbor

MYTH

Rethinking the Unthinkable

GEORGE VICTOR

Copyright 2007 Potomac Books, Inc.

Published in the United States by Potomac Books, Inc. Allrights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced inany manner whatsoever without written permission fromthe publisher, except in the case of brief quotationsembodied in critical articles and reviews.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataVictor, George.

The Pearl Harbor myth : rethinking the unthinkable /George Victor. 1st ed.

p. cm.(Potomacs military controversies)Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 1-59797-042-5 (alk. paper)

1. Pearl Harbor (Hawaii), Attack on, 1941. 2.World War, 1939-1945Diplomatic history. 3.World War, 19391945United States. 4. UnitedStatesForeign relations19331945. I. Title.

D767.92.V53 2006940.54-26693-dc22

2006024130

ISBN 10: 1-59797-042-5ISBN 13: 978-1-59797-042-6

(alk. paper)

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paperthat meets the American National Standards Institute Z39-48 Standard.

Potomac Books, Inc.22841 Quicksilver DriveDulles, Virginia 20166

First Edition

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

CONTENTS

Preface

1. Birth of a Myth2. Establishing the Myth3. Warnings of the Pearl Harbor Attack4. Challenges to the Myth5. Secrecy and Cover-Up6. The Accused7. Background to War Between Japan and the United

States8. Japans Moves to Dominate East Asia9. Roosevelts Tentative Moves against Germany10. Secret Alliance and Undeclared War11. Countdown in Washington: The July Turning

Point12. Countdown in Tokyo13. Countdown in Washington: The November

Turning Point14. Awaiting the Blow

Afterword: History and the UnthinkableNotesReferences

IndexAbout the Author

PREFACE

Twelve days before the attack on Pearl Harbor,President Franklin Roosevelt surprised his advisers bysaying that war with Japan was about to begin. Secretaryof War Henry Stimson noted in his diary:

the question was what we should do. Thequestion was how we should maneuver them intothe position of firing the first shot without allowingtoo much danger to ourselves.1

Stimsons apparent meaning was unacceptable to

generations of scholars. Most ignored his diary note.Others explained it away, saying he wrote it in haste,inadvertently making a poor choice of words. Lackinginformation about how he wrote it, they were expressingtheir belief: Stimson simply could not have meant what hiswords seemed to say. But according to Stimson, that waswhat he meant (chapter 13).

Japan had completed her preparation to attack PearlHarbor, but her decision to carry it out awaited theoutcome of a final offer to negotiate differences with theUnited States. After meeting with his advisers, Rooseveltdecided to reject her final offer, in the expectation that

Japan would then attack the United States.Stimsons words suggest a picture of Roosevelt and

his advisers as Machiavellians. By long tradition, ourpresidents are not seen as conspirators, manipulating ournation into war. The tradition is strong despite the factthat, like other nations, the United States entered most ofher wars by manipulation.

Charles Beard had achieved recognition as a leadinghistorian before writing President Roosevelt and theComing of the War . His book was dismissedcontemptuously as history through a beard, and he waslabeled a conspiracy theorist and a revisionist.(Revisionist used to be a neutral-to-positive term forattempts to improve on prior accountsan essential partof historical work. After World War II, especially as areaction to Holocaust denial, it became a dismissiveterm.) A historian blasted Beards picture of PresidentRoosevelt engaged in a colossal and profoundly immoralplot to deceive the American people into participating inthe war Gordon Prange, long considered the leadingauthority on Pearl Harbor, rejected data and analysesabout Roosevelt following such a plan because to acceptthem meant Roosevelt was a traitor (which is whatsome writers who presented the material called him).According to Prange, such a conspiracy was impossiblebecause, Somewhere along the line someone would haverecalled his solemn oath to defend the United States

and have blown the whistle. Another reason was thatnothing in [Roosevelts] history suggests that this mancould plot to sink American ships and kill thousands ofAmerican soldiers and sailors.2

History has recorded many, many rulersmanipulations of their people into war without theirsubordinates blowing the whistle. Presidents James Polk,Abraham Lincoln, William McKinley, and WoodrowWilson did it before Roosevelt; and others have done itafter him. Another historian wrote:

The main point is that anybody who thinksthat George Marshal, upright, honorable andincorruptible, could have been persuaded even bya President to mislead his subordinatecommanders, by the devious suppression anddistortion of vital information, in order toprecipitate a war with Japan is living in adream world.3

In my view, General Marshall was indeed an

outstanding chief of staff, upright, honorable, andincorruptibleas much so as his position permitted.Testifying to various tribunals investigating the PearlHarbor disaster, other military officers vigorously deniedthat they had withheld vital information from fieldcommanders. The denials were false. Marshall was an

exception; he testified to a congressional committee thatwithholding vital information from commanders wasroutine practice. World War II documents show not onlywithholding of information from field commanders, butalso distortion of it to mislead them.

That such manipulation of subordinates wascommonplace is unacceptable to many. Some friends whohelped with this book were troubled by my Machiavellianpresentation of Roosevelts leadership and my avoidanceof judging him for it.

The book The Pathology of Politics by thephilosopher of history, Carl Friedrich, helped me avoidmoral judgments. His survey of government practicesacross the world was an effective reminder of something Ishould already have known: rulers ordinarily operate byconspiracy. We accept that foreign rulers do it, but deny itin our own. On matters considered patriotically sacred,denial is often so strong that a historical accountnomatter how well supported by datacan be dismissedeffectively by labeling it a conspiracy theory.

Friedrich did not advocate Machiavellian action byrulers, but only Machiavellian writing of historyproviding accounts of political events in terms of causeand effect, without moralizing. In his view, beginning withThucydides, the best political histories wereMachiavellian.

More important in deciding to avoid judgment was

my strong impression that for six decades the history ofPearl Harbor has been distorted by defenders andattackers of Roosevelt. I found the best histories of howthe United States entered World War II to be those mostfree of moral judgment (e.g., accounts by RaymondDawson, Robert Divine, John Haight, James Leutze,Arnold Offner, and David Reynolds). Unfortunately thebest-known books on what follows were written bydefenders and attackers of Roosevelt.

In thinking about Roosevelts place in history, Ottovon Bismarck often came to mind. Bismarck achieved anextraordinary record of political successes. As chancellorof Prussia, he fostered creation of the German nation, andled it in limited wars that improved its position. He camefrom Prussias upper class and remained devoted to theirinterests. Nonetheless he fathered Prussias and thenGermanys welfare systemsboth rather advanced. Anadmiring biographer described him as ruthless, andcommented:

He has often been accused of despisinghumanity; he did so no more and no less thanevery great statesman or general prepared to usehuman forces and sacrifice human lives for theattainment of great ends.4

Bismarcks political challenges were limited compared to

one that Roosevelt confrontedthe menace of an Attilabent on conquering and destroying much of the world.

Presidents who succeeded Roosevelt also orderedsacrifices, but toward smaller and sometimes meanerends. Here Roosevelts manipulations and the sacrificeshe ordered are compared to those of Polk, Lincoln,McKinley, and Wilson, all of whom were implementingends considered noble in the light of traditional values.

I am not the first admirer of Roosevelt to present himin Machiavellian terms. James MacGregor Burns, whoserved in his administration, called the first volume of hisbiography Roosevelt: the Lion and the Fox. Heexplained:

A prince, wrote Machiavelli, must imitate thefox and the lion a prudent ruler ought not tokeep faith when by so doing it would be against hisinterest, and when the reasons which made himbind himself no longer exist. If men were all good,this precept would not be a good one.5

Burns added, It was not strange that [Roosevelt] shouldfollow Machiavellis advice for this had long been thefirst lesson for politicians.

A deception that Roosevelt worked hard at whilepresident was to keep people ignorant of how severely

polio had ravaged him. He considered that secretnecessary to maintain his position as national leader, andwith the help of family and aides he simulated being ableto get to his feet and to walk. Many moralists forgave himthat deception, but not those that follow.

A time when people are all good is only a dream,although we hope for civilization to advance enough forrulers and their people not to be well served by deceptionand manipulation. For now a realistic expectation is thatrulers will continue to operate that way, and thatgovernment conspiracy will continue substantially tomean customary government operations. In my view,denying that and putting a patriotic gloss on actions by ourown leaders is an obstacle to the advance of civilization.

Governments ordinarily cover up their conspiracies.When threatened with exposure of secret operations, theyintensify their cover-ups. Across the world,administrations under attack have commonly resorted todisappearancesto imprisonment, torture, and killing.In the Pearl Harbor cover-up, at least that did not happen.

This book features data and conclusions from officialmilitary histories of the United States and other nations.Compared to histories by civilians, military ones are freerof moral judgment. And more importantly, U.S. Army andNavy historians had access to secret records. I have alsorelied on memoirs by people who worked closely withRooseveltspeechwriters Samuel Rosenman and Robert

Sherwood, and, his closest confidant on foreign policy in1940 and 1941, Harry Hopkins.

Soviet secret agent Ishkak Akhmerov, whocontrolled Soviet espionage agents in the United States,said Hopkins was an agent in 1941the year duringwhich Hopkinss activities and statements figure in thisbook. According to Akhmerov, Hopkins was anunconscious (unwitting) agent. Information bearing onsuch allegations about Hopkins is too vague forevaluation. Whatever the truth may be, I found no evidencethat Hopkins did anything for the Soviet Union in 1941,except what Roosevelt told him to do. (The only concreteallegation of an unauthorized act by Hopkins that may havebenefited the Soviet Union is that he was the source of anitem of information that someone else passed to her in1944.) There are speculations that Hopkins influencedU.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in 1941, but noevidence of it. The published conclusion that SovietPremier Joseph Stalin instilled in Hopkins completefaith when they met in 1941, and consequently Hopkinsinfluenced Roosevelts decision to support the SovietUnion, rests on no data.6 On the contrary, after meetingStalin, Hopkins reported to Roosevelt a statement Stalingave him intended to influence Roosevelt, but advisedRoosevelt not to believe it (chapter 11). Robert Sherwoodand others who knew Hopkins and Roosevelt wellemphasized that Hopkins was wholly devoted to

implementing Roosevelts policies and wishes.Military ranks changed during the period covered. I

have simplified ranks to avoid confusion from the changesand to minimize errors. Lieutenant Commanders andCommanders are both called Commander. LieutenantColonels and Colonels are both called Colonel. AndAdmirals and Generals of all ranks are called Admiralor General.

In China, Japan, and Korea, family names come first.American writers have followed this usage for theChinese, but put family names last for Japanese andKoreans. Here family names are put first for all of them.The name of Japans prime minister during most of theevents described here will be spelled Konoe Fuminaro.In most books his family name is spelled Konoye,fostering mispronunciation of what should sound likeKoh-noh-eh.

In dispatches sent by radio, punctuation marks wereindicated by words: a period by period, stop (orX), and a comma by comma. For clarity in quoting thedispatches, punctuation marks are substituted.

Some original sources are available in only oneplace (e.g., Stimsons diary and his other papers, at YaleUniversity). For these, I cite secondary sources whenpossible.

I received much valuable help, and am especiallygrateful to the late Edward Beach, Daryl Borquist, Morton

Davis, Tore Kapstad (my son-in-law), the late EdwardKimmel and Thomas Kimmel (Husband Kimmels son andgrandson), Joseph Nevins, William ONeill, Jerry Piven,David Richardson (no relation to James Richardson),Irwin Schulman, the late Joseph Schulman, DonaldShowers, John Taylor, Nik ten Velde (with translations ofDutch), Elizabeth and Marian Victor (my daughter andwife), and the staff of the West Orange library. Amongthose who helped, Davis ONeill, Joseph Schulman, andAdmiral Showers disagreed strongly with some of myinterpretations. Admiral Richardson was extraordinarilypatient in helping with naval matters, which were new tome.

CHAPTER 1BIRTH OF A MYTH

Early on a Sunday morning in Hawaii, carrier-basedJapanese planes struck, catching U.S. Army and Navyforces unprepared. Army antiaircraft guns were notmanned. Planes were destroyed before they could take off.Trapped in Pearl Harbor, much of the Pacific Fleet,including most of its battleships, was destroyed. The portwas left a wreck, clogged with sunken warships. Japansdevastating air strike aroused the people of the UnitedStates as no other event in their history ever had.1 Whatmany called the worst military disaster in the nationshistory left U.S. citizens stunned and angry. In addition, onthat same December 7, 1941, Japan struck other U.S. andBritish territories, winning victories everywhere.Americans could not understand how the Japanese, whomthey considered far weaker, could inflict such defeats onthe powerful United Statesa question that still provokesangry controversy.

As history has shown, National disasters and theirattendant shock need scapegoats,2 and this was noexception. The nation suffered a crisis of trust in itsleaders, and many people feared a Japanese invasion of

the West Coast. Desperate to regain confidence,Americans grasped at wild ideas and sought people toblame. Political enemies of President Franklin Rooseveltaccused him of responsibility for the disaster, and even hisfriends were dismayed.

Although he was among the most beloved ofpresidents, Roosevelt was also hated. His welfareprograms had upset conservatives, some of whom saw theprogramsand himas Communist. Among hispassionate enemies was a powerful newspaper, theChicago Tribune, to whom his welfare measures hadstamped him a traitor. And those opposed to involvementin a European war3 suggested that his efforts to intervenein the European conflict came from the failure of hisdomestic programsthat intervention was a desperateeffort to pull the United States out of the Great Depression.

The noninterventionist movement seemingly becamepowerful during the summer of 1940, with the founding ofthe Committee to Defend America First (better known bythe selfish-sounding name of the America FirstCommittee). It won much publicity and appeared moreinfluential than it was. Its members held a variety ofbeliefs, but agreed that U.S. interests were insufficientlythreatened by Germany to justify war. At one extremewere pacifists; at the other were Nazis, Nazi sympathizers,and non-Nazi admirers of Germany. Among the admirerswas the aviation hero Charles Lindbergh, who quickly

became the committees chief spokesman. In this capacityhe declared that the only people who wanted the UnitedStates to enter Europes war were the Rooseveltadministration, the British, and the Jews. Lindberghs anti-Jewish statements made him an embarrassment to thecommittee, which restricted his speeches on its behalf.The committee dropped another officer, Henry Ford, formaking even stronger anti-Semitic statements.

During 1941 rumors arose about a secret alliance thatRoosevelt was making with Great Britain, and thesespurred a move to impeach him. (The move came tonothing, but probably sensitized him to risks in exposureof secret operations.) In August, when his secret meetingwith British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was madepublic, the Chicago Tribune wrote, He comes of a stockthat has never fought for this country and now he betraysit.4

Fortunately for Roosevelt, his enemies did not knowon December 7 that the government had received warningsof Japans coming attack.

What form would [public] anger have taken ifthe American people had known the most closelyguarded secret and realized that [intelligenceofficers] had been reading the most confidentialJapanese ciphers even before the attack, and thatthe Japanese war plans were no secret to

American intelligence?5

A few dozen people in the government knew aboutthe code breaking and other intelligence, and the warningsthey had produced. During investigations of the PearlHarbor disaster in 1944, the question, did Rooseveltknow? became hotly controversialand remains so.

As soon as news of the disaster came in, peopledemanded an explanation. Within days, newspapers acrossthe nation charged officials in Washington withresponsibility for it, and on December 19, 1941 the HouseNaval Affairs Committee called for an investigation.While suppressing knowledge of the warnings of Japansattack, the administration took the position that there hadbeen no such warnings, and this became its main defenseagainst spreading accusations. The administration hastilythrew together an explanation of the disasteranexplanation that could be sustained only by keeping a lidon events leading to the attack. For the duration of WorldWar II the administration managed to keep crucialinformation hidden. During 1942 the administrationsaccount solidified into an official history, seized on bypeople desperate for a way to carry on and eager forvengeance against Japan.

War plans drawn up at Roosevelts direction hadgiven priority to defeating Germany. As a result, U.S.outposts in the Pacific had been only partly defended. The

plans specifically anticipated a series of defeats if warwith Japan broke out. To military and civilian leadersfamiliar with the plans, the losses on December 7 were nosurprise, but the severity of the destruction at Pearl Harborwas.

Ignorant of those plans, the public was dumbfoundedby the severity of U.S. losses. To many, their nation was aleading military power; to some, the strongest in theworld. And a popular stereotype pictured the Japanese asa puny, backward race, incapable of competing militarilywith any Western power. Americans thought the Japaneselacked inventiveness and initiative because their educationfostered rote learning and passivity. Their society seemedfeudal, lacking science and technology, struggling toachieve industrialization with manufacturing assets limitedto cheap labor and imitation of western methods andmachines. An extreme piece of propaganda picturedJapanese soldiers as naked, childish pygmies, going intobattle wearing diapers! More common were cartoonspicturing Japanese pilots as so short that they could hardlysee out of their fighter planes cockpits and so nearsightedthat, despite their thick eyeglasses, they could hardly seebeyond their own planes or fly straight. Japanese troopswere said to be handicapped by an inability to see in thedark. And their planes were purported to be cheapversions of obsolete western models, made from bamboo,metal scrap, and plastics, because the Japanese were

incapable of producing modern military equipment.6The opposite was closer to the truth. Japanese sonar

equipment and torpedoes were better than U.S. ones. Herbattleships were much faster and carried heavier guns.Her aircraft carriers were also faster, and she had more ofthem. And her new navy fighter planethe MitsubishiZerohad superior range, speed, maneuverability, andfirepower (its shortcoming was a lack of armor).According to a U.S. naval historian, the then availableU.S. fighter plane Wildcat was no match for a Zero. AndJapans new army fighterthe Nakajima Oscar alsowas superior.7

Not all U.S. military leaders shared the stereotype,but it influenced some of them. While others warnedcivilian officials that Japans forces were powerful,advisers to Roosevelt, including Army Chief of StaffGeorge Marshall, expected that even a surprise attack onPearl Harbor could be fought off with minimal loss.Cabinet members assured the nation that Japan posed noserious military threat; Navy Secretary Frank Knoxdeclared that Pearl Harbor was beyond the effectivestriking power of her Fleet. Some Navy officers said theycould destroy the Japanese navy any morning beforebreakfast.8 These misperceptions led the administrationgravely to underestimate Pearl Harbors vulnerability.

Great Britain, the U.S. partner in planning for war inthe Pacific, had similarly relied on racist judgments of

Japanese military power. Air Marshal Robert Brooke-Popham said in autumn 1941:

I had a good close-up [view] of various sub-human specimens in dirty grey uniforms, which Iwas informed were Japanese soldiers. If theserepresent the average of the Japanese army Icannot believe they would form an intelligentfighting force.9

Pophams officers in Malaya shared his impression.

On December 7, expecting a Japanese invasion shortly,one said, Dont you think [our troops] are worthy of somebetter enemy than the Japanese?10 Another said, I dohope we are not getting too strong in Malaya, becauseif so the Japanese may never attempt a landing.11

As a result of this misconception, A bitter andhumiliating price was paid [T]he full extent was notappreciated until February-March 1942, with thesurrender of Malaya.12 In that British territory, morethan 100,000 men surrendered to the Japanese army of30,000. The speed and flexibility of the attackers ledGeneral [Arthur] Percival to believe he was actuallyoutnumbered.13 British General Henry Pownall wrote, Ifear that we were frankly outgeneralled, outwitted andoutfought. From the beginning to the end of the campaignwe have been overmatched by better soldiers. A very

painful admission, but it is an inescapable fact.14Pownall was more candid than American leaders, whostressed Japanese sneakiness and treachery to explainthe Pearl Harbor disaster.

After catastrophes, the beliefs people have relied onare shaken and events make no sense. The world seemsstrangeshifting crazily and dangerouslyand peoplecast about for ways to regain a sense of order by which tocarry on. From loss of trust in their leaders, people maymove to suspecting them of having betrayed the nation.Often they focus their suspicions on a minority group thathas been a scapegoat in the past. And they question theirown acts: Why is this happening to us? What have wedone to deserve it? Vague suspicions sometimes turn toideas of a secret plot carried out by a mysterious groupoperating in their midst. The more unexpected andincomprehensible the catastrophe, the more severe thestress. Most severe is a series of unexpected disasters,and this is how the United States experienced the defeatsthat began on December 7, 1941.

A nation often pulls itself out of such a crisis bycreating a mytha melodramatic account, mixing fact andfantasywhich becomes a sacred part of its history.Twenty-seven years prior to the Pearl Harbor attack,Germany declared war with high enthusiasm. Herconfidence became overweening as she won sweepingvictories on the Western Front and even greater ones on

the Eastern Front, where Russia surrendered, cedingenormous territory to Germany. Public confidenceremained high despite the stalemate that developed inFrance and despite the U.S. entry into the war.

Patriotic German propaganda was supported by thefact that in 1918 the battle lines were still in FranceGermany had not been invaded. This helped Germans tobelieve in their own invincibility and to disregard crucialfacts. Their nation had lost more soldiers than otherparticipants in the war and was industrially exhausted.And her alliesBulgaria, Turkey, and Austria-Hungaryhad surrendered. Yet, right up to the end, as Germanystood alone against a growing alliance, many Germansbelieved not only that they were winning, but also thatvictory was at hand.

As a result of this wishful thinking, Germansexperienced their surrender as an incomprehensiblecatastrophe. Other traumas followedsocialist andrightist coups, civil war, the crushing terms imposed onGermany by the victors, and a devastating economiccollapse. The series of disasters gave birth to the myth ofthe stab in the back: Germany had not been defeated inbattle. Instead, her noble soldiers, on the verge of victory,had been betrayed by their government leaders. A moreextreme idea, held by a small minority, was that theleaders responsible for the surrender were not trueGermans. They were Jews, aided by German Christians

serving as the Jews dupesagents of an internationalJewish conspiracy bent on destroying Germany. While thisJewish conspiracy myth was not widely believed, mostGermans suspected that it contained an element of truth.

The German myth of the stab in the back sharedfeatures with the myth that began to unfold in the UnitedStates after December 7, 1941. In California, people ofJapanese descent became scapegoats during the early1900s, as dread of a Yellow Peril and animosity towardJaps and Chinks took hold, and then spread across thenation. After Pearl Harbor, European Americanssuspected that people of Japanese descent had engaged inespionage and sabotage, aiding the fleet attacking Hawaii.When Roosevelt proceeded to put Japanese Americansinto concentration camps on suspicion that they might aidJapan in the war, Americans of European descent feltsafer.

Suspicious of their leaders, searching for scapegoats,they focused on a crucial question: why had the Japanesecaught U.S. forces in Hawaii off guard? A small group ofpeople thought the commandants thereGen. Walter Shortand Adm. Husband Kimmelhad betrayed the nation. Andmost dangerouswhen unity was needed for the warwas a small groups suspicion that Roosevelt hadengineered the attack on Pearl Harbor to help the UnitedStates enter the war and save Great Britain from defeat byGermany.

U.S. Nazis and a minority of conservatives had longsuspected Roosevelt of being a Jew, claiming his realname was Rosenfeld. A book widely circulated amongconservatives in 1936 declared that he had achievedmore of the revolutionary Socialist program in a fewmonths than all of the American Reds have in years.15 Itaccused him of being part of a Jewish-Communistconspiracy to undermine the Constitution, seize absolutepower, and destroy the nation.

These beliefs and suspicions possessed more than akernel of truth. When France fell in 1940, leaving Britainstanding alone against Germany, Roosevelts greatestworry had been that Britain would fall too, and thatvictory in Europe would enable Adolf Hitler to mobilizethat continents vast resources for conquest of theAmericas. Roosevelt had been exceptional in his realisticperception of Hitlers menace. Well before Hitlers firstconquest, Roosevelt had begun to prepare the UnitedStates for war with Germany, arousing the suspicion andenmity of noninterventionists.

Suspicion of Roosevelt also had roots in World WarI. In 1917 the United States had been led by PresidentWoodrow Wilson into a crusade to end oppressionthewar to end war. The cynical carving up of enemyterritory by the European victors, combined with postwarrevelations of profiteering by U.S. arms makers, hadcaused bitter disillusionment and a resolve not to be

drawn into another European war. In deference to thewave of noninterventionist sentiment, Roosevelt hadpresented himself as a peacemaker, disguising his hesitantmeasures to prepare for war. But the measures, which hadbeen only partly hidden, had fed suspicion of his intent.

Since the summer of 1940 Great Britain had beenhanging by a thread, saved temporarily by Hitlersdecision to invade the Soviet Union instead of England.But Roosevelts military advisers predicted an earlySoviet collapse to be followed by a successful Germaninvasion of England. Therefore, as the possibility of warwith Japan loomed in 1941, Roosevelts main concernas noninterventionists suspectedwas how to get hisunwilling nation into the war against Germany. He and hiscabinet discussed the possibility that, if Japan attackedU.S. territory, Congress would declare war not only onJapan but also on her ally, Germany.

By the end of November 1941, relations with Japanhad reached a crucial point. The United States thenrejected Japans final proposal for negotiation, andinstead made a counterproposal which some historianslater called an ultimatum. It precipitated the Japaneseattack, and Roosevelts political enemies inferred that ithad been intended to.

For thirty years Japan and the United States hadconsidered war with each other to be a possibility and hadplanned for it. Japanese plans had centered on destroying

the U.S. Fleet at the outset, specifically when the fleetvisited Hawaii. U.S. plans had centered on keeping thefleet safe, and Hawaii had been fortified for that purpose.The planning and the administrations expectation sinceNovember that Japan was about to attack were hardlyknown by the public, but some in the government didknow. That knowledge, and documents supporting it,posed a threat to the administration.

The administrations first public response to thePearl Harbor attack was a statement to the press bySecretary of State Cordell Hull on December 7, whichbegan, Japan has made a treacherous and utterlyunprovoked attack on the United States.16 (He did not saythe attack came as a surprise.) That afternoon Rooseveltmet with his cabinet and planned his speech to Congresshis request for a declaration of war. Then he called incongressional leaders, both Democrats and Republicans.They listened respectfully to his account of the disasteruntil Senator Tom Connally interrupted. A Democrat andstrong supporter of the president, Connally sprang to hisfeet, banged the desk with his fist, and shouted atRoosevelt:

How did it happen that our warships werecaught like tame ducks in Pearl Harbor? How didthey catch us with our pants down? Where wereour patrols?17

Roosevelt answered weakly, I dont know, Tom. I justdont know, and fell silent, obviously upset.

By Connallys own account, he was unable to controlhis anger. After directing some of it at Roosevelt, hevented the rest on Knox.18 Others then joined in belaboringFrank Knox.

After the meeting the Democrats closed ranks behindRoosevelt. However, he may not have realized this, as heturned again to the speech he would give the next day.During the night he was evidently much troubled, andconsulted with Undersecretary Sumner Welles, his closestadviser in the State Department, as he worked further onhis speech. According to an insider, Roosevelt stayed upuntil morning, which was unusual for him.19 What troubledhim probably was the danger to administration credibilityposed by Connallys angry question. In any case, hedecided to defend the administration by taking a riskypositiona position contradicted by government recordsand known by members of the State Department and bymilitary intelligence officers to be false.

The formal requirements of the speech were simplyto report that hostilities had occurred and ask Congress fora declaration of war against Japan. In addition Rooseveltneeded to justify and to rally the nation for a war whichsome noninterventionists were still calling unnecessary

and that promised to be a long, hard one. And this requiredheading off criticism over the defeats and providing anexplanation for them that would be accepted by the publicand heal the nation. In view of Connallys outburst,Roosevelt may have feared his administration would beunable to prevent grave division in the nation. Providing afactual explanation of the defeats ran counter toRoosevelts and the nations political needs. To say thedefeats resulted from a war strategy that gave priority toaction in the Atlantic and the defeat of Germany whileleaving Pacific outposts inadequately defended waspolitically self-destructive. (Winston Churchill had alsokept secret the war strategy adopted in August 1940 bywhich British Pacific territories were defended onlyweakly. As a result, Japans easy overrunning ofSingaporethe Gibraltar of the Far East and a symbol of imperial might and invincibility an impregnablefortress against which no enemy could prevailshockedBritain much as the Pearl Harbor disaster shocked theUnited States.20) It was similarly counterproductive forRoosevelt to say that he and his advisers hadoverestimated U.S. military strength and underestimatedthat of the Japanese. This information would come outlater, but to say so on December 8 would provideRoosevelts enemies with ammunition and confound thenation, splitting it further when unity was badly needed. Itwas suicidal. In such circumstances, for a ruler to give a

factual account is rare indeed.Wars ordinarily are preceded by strategic decisions

based on secret intelligence about enemy intentions andcapabilities, and U.S. decisions preceding Japans attackwere no exception. War announcements customarily omitsecret strategies and intelligence, and rulers on both sidesclaim to have been acting openly in good faith. Trickiness(the root meaning of treachery) is imputed to the enemy,while the conduct of ones own nation is characterized asinnocent and just, lacking subtlety and deception, even tothe extent of navet. Both sides commonly hide their ownintentions, claiming to have been forced into war by anevil enemy.

Roosevelts speech to Congress was a typical call towar in that, in explaining the defeats, counteringaccusations against the administration, and rallying thenation, it gave a misleading account of events which ledthe United States to enter World War II. Roosevelt was acharismatic orator. People who have not heard him speakmay imagine the vibrancy of his voice and his ring ofrighteousness:

Yesterday, December 7, 1941a date whichwill live in infamythe United States of Americawas suddenly and deliberately attacked by navaland air forces of the Empire of Japan. The UnitedStates was at peace with that Nation and, at the

solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation withits Government and its Emperor looking towardthe maintenance of peace in the Pacific It willbe recorded that the distance of Hawaii fromJapan makes it obvious that the attack wasdeliberately planned many days or even weeksago. During the intervening time the JapaneseGovernment has deliberately sought to deceivethe United States by false statements andexpressions of hope for continued peace .[A]lways will our whole Nation remember thecharacter of the onslaught against us.21

By saying the Japanese Government sought to deceivethe United States, Roosevelt suggestedbut did not saythat the administration had been caught by surprise.

His speech was effective; with only one nay,Congress declared war on Japan. Roosevelt hadconsidered also asking for a war declaration againstGermany, but had put it off. He thought that the public andCongress were more willing to fight Japan than Germany.While holding back, Roosevelt probably failed to realizethat Japans attacks had killed the noninterventionistmovement. But on December 11, Hitler solvedRoosevelts problem by declaring war on the UnitedStates.

Roosevelts prophecy was borne out; December 7,1941, has lived in infamy ever since. Nowhere in thisspeech or the next one did Roosevelt use the phrasesneak attack or suggest that deceptiveness was aJapanese trait. Nonetheless the idea of the sneak attackbecame the basis on which Americans came to terms withthe defeats. It provided a simple explanation and fitted theprevailing stereotype of the Japanese. Much was made ofthe fact that Japan had attacked before declaring war, as ifthat were deviant and evil. But, Contrary to popular myth,it has been normal practice for centuries for fighting tostart before an actual declaration of war.22 And monthsbefore, Roosevelt had secretly ordered naval combat inthe Atlantic without a war declaration.

On December 9 Roosevelt repeated key parts of hiscongressional speech in a radio address to the nation:

The sudden criminal attacks provide theclimax of international immorality. TheJapanese have treacherously violated the long-standing peace between us . I can say withutmost confidence that no Americans today or athousand years hence, need feel anything butpride in our patience and our efforts through allthe years toward achieving a peace in the Pacificwhich would be fair and honorable to every nation,large or small. And no honest person, today or a

thousand years hence, will be able to suppress asense of indignation and horror at the treacherycommitted by the military dictators of Japan,under the very shadow of the flag of peace borneby their special envoys in our midst. We mayacknowledge that our enemies have performed abrilliant feat of deception, perfectly timed andexecuted with great skill.23

In saying the Japanese had performed a brilliant feat ofdeception, he virtually stated that the administration hadbeen caught by surprise. In another speech to Congress onDecember 15, he went further: We did not know then, aswe know now, that they had ordered and were even thencarrying out their plan for a treacherous attack upon us.24

Perhaps until then Roosevelt had been wrestling withthe question of what position to take in defending hisadministration. After his second speech to Congress, heand his advisers insisted they had received no warnings ofJapans coming attack. In investigations that followed,ranking military officers testified that not a single warningof the attack on Pearl Harbor had been received. By thetime a congressional committee published twentywarnings in 1946, a great war had been foughtsuccessfully with the slogan Remember Pearl Harbor!By then the administrations account was established

history, and it remained established history. It was evendeclared by a federal court of appeals to be the law ofthe land.25

That Japan had taken pains to surprise the UnitedStates at Pearl Harbor was true. As will be seen,however, her efforts at secrecy had failed, and Washingtonhad received about 230 indications that Japan wouldattack. This dramatic number does not tell who knew whator when. Most of the warnings were in code, and only afraction were decoded before the attack. The questionsthen became: which of the warnings were decoded in timeand how clear were they and uncoded warnings?

In addition, despite Roosevelts claim that Japan haddeceived the United States with false talk of peace, herforeign officers had repeatedly told U.S. officials thatfailure of diplomatic talks between the two nations wouldlead to war. Early in September 1941 the Japanesegovernment had made a fateful decision to make war onthe United States unless a compromise could benegotiated. Three weeks later Ambassador NomuraKichisaburo had given Hull a note including:

Eager as we are for peace, we will not bowunder the pressure of another country, nor do wewant peace at any price. It is a characteristic traitof our people to repel, rather than submit to,external pressure.26

On November 18, Nomuras associate, Kurusu Saburo,had told Hull that economic sanctions imposed by theUnited States had aroused a sense that Japan must go towar with America while she still could. On November 26,Foreign Minister Togo Shigenoro had hinted the same toU.S. Ambassador Joseph Grew. And on December 1 and2, Kurusu had warned Hull that Japan would go to warwith the United States.27

That Nomuras and Kurusus statements were notempty threats was known in Washington from interceptedcables between Togo and Nomura.28 Having receivedthese warnings and independent intelligence of Japanspreparations to attack, the United States rejected Japansfinal proposal for negotiation on November 26,responding with a note expected to bring on a quick attack.Hull later said,

I and other high officers of our Governmentknew that the Japanese military were poised forattack. We knew that the Japanese had set atime limit for acceptance by our Government oftheir proposal of November 20.29

And he testified,

Before and after presenting that proposalAmbassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu talkedemphatically about the urgency of the situationand intimated vigorously that this was Japans lastword and if an agreement along these lines wasnot quickly concluded ensuing developments mightbe most unfortunate.30

To put Roosevelts insistence on Japanese deceit in

another perspective, it is worth noting that two yearsearlier Germany had invaded Poland without warning or adeclaration of war. The attack came while Germany waspretending to negotiate her differences with Poland. Thenext year Germany invaded Denmark, Norway, Holland,Belgium, Luxembourg, and Franceall without warning.And early on a Sunday morning in June 1941, she invadedthe Soviet Union, with whom she had a nonaggression pactstill in force. But the stereotype of Germans did notinclude treachery, and Americans did not consider thoseattacks as sneaky as they considered Japans attacks on theUnited States.

Despite the realities of warfare and despite U.S.leaders anticipation of Japans attack, the idea of thesneak attack served two important functions. It helpedAmericans overcome their fear and despair by reaffirmingtheir belief that the United States was more powerful thanJapan and had been defeated because she was taken by

surprise. The sneak attack became the administrationsbulwark against accusations of treason; the keystone wasthe claim that no intelligence had revealed Japansintention to attack Pearl Harbor.

Roosevelt noted in his December 8 speech toCongress that Pearl Harbor was only one of five U.S.territories attacked by Japan. The commanders in Hawaiihad not expected to be attacked, while commanders in theother territories were expecting the attacks that fell onthem. Nonetheless, Japanese forces overwhelmeddefenders everywhere. Although the United States had amuch larger population and a far greater military-industrial potential, Japan deployed far greater militarypower in the Pacific at the time. Unpreparednessincreased U.S. losses at Pearl Harbor, but Japans militarypower and efficiency were the main reasons for hersuccesses.

For Roosevelt to say so, however, offered no reliefto his bewildered nation or his besieged administration.With people still clinging to stereotypes of Japaneseinferiority, such a truth was likely to increase their fear.Rather, like Germans after the defeat of 1918, manypeople preferred to hear that the United States hadsuffered defeats despite her superioritythat she had beenbetrayed. Rumors to this effect were already beginning tocirculate and, after his speech, Roosevelt counteredaccusations by building on these rumors.

According to one rumor, the army and navy inHawaii had been lax, with much partying and derelictionof duty and weekends marked by drunkenness andhangovers, which rendered military personnel unfit forduty on December 7. According to another, General Shortand Admiral Kimmel had been on poor terms and hadfailed to cooperate with each other in defending PearlHarbor.

Investigations from 1941 to 1946 established thatlaxity and drinking had been no more of a problem inHawaii than elsewhere and that on the morning ofSunday, December 7, 1941, Army posts and Naval vesselsand stations were adequately manned by men fit forduty.31 The first investigation of the Pearl Harbordisaster, done by the Roberts Commission, concludederroneously that Short and Kimmel had failed tocooperate. Perhaps relying on the Roberts Commissionsreport, in 1944 Vice President Harry Truman wrote thatShort and Kimmel had not even been on speaking termsand that their lack of cooperation had been a root causeof the defeat.32 And in 1958 Representative ClarenceCannon declared in the House:

The catastrophic defeat need not havehappened.[A]t the time of the attack the NavalCommander, Admiral Kimmel and the ArmyCommander General Short were not even on

speaking terms. And although both had beenrepeatedly alerted over a period of weeks priorto the attack they did not confer on the matter atany time. At one of the most critical periods in thedefense of the nation, there was not the slightestcooperation between the Army and the Navy Itwas not the Japanese superiority winning thevictory. It was our own lack of cooperationbetween Army and Navy throwing victory away.33

A striking feature of Cannons statement is its

similarity to the German stab-in-the-back myth. His wordsreflected rumors and ignored findings that were longavailable by then, including the conclusion of the NavalCourt of Inquiry on Pearl Harbor:

the relations between Kimmel and Short were friendly, cordial and cooperative . therewas no lack of interest, no lack of appreciation ofresponsibility, and no failure to cooperate.34

Investigations that followed that of the Roberts

Commission established that Kimmel and Short had beenfriends and had cooperated rather well (and far better thanthe commanders in the Philippines). Nonetheless belief inthe rumors persists into this century.

After December 7, opponents of Roosevelt raised in

public the question Connally had asked in private.Government leaders said they had ordered Short andKimmel to go on the alert against an attack. These orderswere introduced as evidence at the tribunals investigatingthe disaster, but they specified Japans expected targets asthe Philippines and Samoa, Guam, Wake, Midway, andterritories not belonging to the United States. Pearl Harborwas omitted as a possible target. To explain why militaryintelligence had apparently failed to obtain advancewarning of the Pearl Harbor attack, the chiefs of army andnavy intelligence testified that they had lacked adequateintelligence operations because Congress had hardlyfunded them. In brief, the administration defended itselffor not having sent adequate warnings to Short andKimmel to prepare for an air attack by claiming it had hadno way of knowing the attack on Pearl Harbor wascoming. Nonetheless, it took the position that warnings itsent them were sufficient for Kimmel and Short to havegone on full alert for the attacka position examined inchapter 6.

Book after book accepted the claim that lack of fundsand staff had prevented military intelligence fromdiscovering plans for the Pearl Harbor attack; the claimbecame an enduring part of the myth. Military intelligence,however, had been well staffed and had producedexcellent resultsphenomenal penetrations of Japanscodes and an accurate, detailed picture of her war plans,

which specifically identified Pearl Harbor as her target.The administrations barricade was breached in

1944, when the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the above-mentioned Naval Court of Inquiry conductedinvestigations and reported warnings of the attack. Buttheir reports were kept secret until a public congressionalinvestigation held in 19451946 revealed some of thewarnings. Military intelligence documents obtained bythese tribunalsand published by Congressconfirmedthat Pearl Harbor had been Japans most likely target.Documents and testimony also showed that the intelligencehad been withheld from Short and Kimmel. On that basis,the army and navy tribunals rejected the administrationsposition and charged leaders in Washington withnegligence. The congressional investigation resulted inmixed findings about who was responsible for the lack ofpreparedness in Hawaii. But, despite the warnings of thePearl Harbor attack it uncovered, its majority reportlargely upheld the administrations account.

Revelation of warnings received in Washington hadlittle impact on the public, and by 1946 the myth of PearlHarbor was well established, including that leaders inWashington had been deceived and had not expected theattack, and that Short and Kimmel had disobeyed orders todefend Pearl Harbor. Since 1946, even historians havebeen influenced by the myth and uncertain about thesignificance of warnings that Pearl Harbor would be

attacked. What the warnings were, when they werereceived, and who knew about them are vital tounderstanding how the United States went to war, and willbe examined in detail in later chapters. Here the point isthat the claim of having been deceivedthe key part of themythwas at first simply patriotic rhetoric, typical of warannouncements. Then, as the administration cameincreasingly under attack, it stuck to the story, even thoughgovernment records contradicted it.

The claim that Japan attacked the United Stateswithout provocation was also typical rhetoric. It workedbecause the public did not know that the administrationhad expected Japan to respond with war to anti-Japanesemeasures it had taken in July 1941.

Criticism and justification of Roosevelts acts areoutside the purpose of this book. As president, he had aduty to set foreign policy in accordance with the nationsinterests as he saw them. That included a duty to takemeasures risking war. He also had a duty to unify thenation for war after Japan attacked.

Roosevelt said that before December 7 the UnitedStates had negotiated in good faith while Japan, bent onattacking, had lulled the United States with false talk ofpeace and pretended to negotiate. The opposite is closerto the truth. Expecting to lose a war with the United Statesand lose it disastrouslyJapans leaders had tried withgrowing desperation to negotiate. On this point, most

historians have long agreed. Meanwhile, evidence hascome out that Roosevelt and Hull persistently refused tonegotiatethat, knowing Japans September decision,they used the diplomatic talks to stall while they built upmilitary forces in the Pacific. A few weeks afterRoosevelts speech to Congress, Hull said privately thathe had purposely prolonged the conversations with theJapanese in order to enable the Army and Navy to get menand supplies to the Far East.35

According to the myth, the United States offeredcompromises, but Japan refused to compromise. It wasJapan, however, who offered compromises andconcessions, which the United States countered withincreased demands. Hull later wrote, I credit Nomurawith having been honestly sincere in trying to avoidwar.36 Despite the diplomatic recordswhich have longbeen in the public domainthis part of the myth alsopersists.

World War II left us with questions crucial tocivilization. Why did a highly civilized nation give Hitlera madmanthe power to carry out his destructiveobsession? What is it in charismatic mass killers that sobeguiles followers to carry out their wishes? Why dopeople who are not beguiled ignore what is coming? Whydo they obey destructive orders? Specifically, why didmillions of ordinary people not only acquiesce to theHolocaust but also help carry it out? And why were

European leaders blind to the menace Hitler posed, notonly to start a world war and not only to commit genocide,but also to destroy Western civilization?

As Germany began to prepare for conquest, genocide,and destruction of civilization, the leader of only onemajor nation saw what was coming and made plans to stopit. As a result of Roosevelts leadership, a plannedsequence of events carried out in the Atlantic and moredecisively in the Pacific brought the United States into oneof the worlds greatest cataclysms. The Americancontribution helped turn the wars tide and save the worldfrom a destructive tyranny unparalleled in modern history.But the accusations against Roosevelt after the PearlHarbor attack, and the defense mounted by hisadministration, obscured the way the United States enteredthe war.

In October 2000, Congress passed a resolutioncalling on President William Clinton to restore thereputations of Short and Kimmel. It provoked a flurry ofaccusations that Congress was usurping the job ofhistorians, revising history, and reviving a long-discredited conspiracy theory. Clinton took no action onthe resolution.

Wars begin and are fought with manipulation ofinformation for patriotic and other purposes. Accountsprovided during wartime are notoriously misleading andsometimes foster national myths. Government control of

information decreases after wars end, facilitating theunearthing of secrets and writing of history. But patrioticmyths tend to endure after they have served the needs thatprompted them. The crisis of confidence that began onDecember 7 is long past, as are Roosevelts needs to rallythe nation and defend his administration. Most lay peopleand scholars now have a more detached view of the issuesand events of 1941. Nonetheless, because the myth ofPearl Harbor has served as history for decades, thisintroduction and much of what follows may be surprising.As events sketched above are taken up, they will bedocumented, heavily for those still obscure orcontroversial. The myth still stands in the way of workingout how the United States entered World War II and needsto be put in perspective before the sequence of eventsleading to the Pearl Harbor attack can be understood.

CHAPTER 2ESTABLISHING THE MYTH

Pressed by friends and enemies for an explanation ofwhy our warships were caught like tame ducks,Roosevelt authorized quick navy and army inquiries. NavySecretary Knox left to interrogate the navy command atPearl Harbor. (An army officer also left to interrogate thearmy command there; but he died in a plane crash en route,and Knox took over his task.) Knoxs inquiry was limitedto what had happened in Hawaii. He later wrote about it:Immediately the air was filled with rumors. There was aprospect ahead of a nasty congressional investigation,and his mission was intended to head it off.1

In Hawaii he asked Kimmel if a warning sent fromWashington on Saturday night, December 6, had beenreceived. Astonished by Kimmels no, he asked Kimmelsstaff, and then Short and his staff, the same question. Allthe officersabout a dozensaid no.2 Sure that a warninghad been sent, Knox would not drop the question.

Writers speculated that Knox made a simple error:when asking about a warning sent by the Navy DepartmentSaturday night, he meant one sent by the War DepartmentSunday, December 7, at noon, Washington time. He did

confuse the War Departments warning with one he wasconvinced the Navy Department had sent, but the errorwas not a simple one. Writers further suggested that hiserror was used wrongly to blame Roosevelt, as in:Certain revisionists insinuate that this means a warningmust have been prepared on the sixth but was suppressedin Washington.3

What happened to the War Departments warning isno mystery; it reached Short after the attack, as he toldKnox. But Knox continued to ask about a message sent bythe Navy Department. And after finishing his questioningof officers in Hawaii, Knox told his aide, Capt. FrankBeatty, to investigate what happened to the NavyDepartments warning when he returned to Washington. 4Apparently there was no record of such a warning, andBeatty discovered nothing about it.

Returning to Washington on December 14, Knoxpresented his report to Roosevelt. It concluded that thecommands in Hawaii were unaware of the plainintimations of some surprise move, made clear inWashington, through the interception of Japaneseinstructions.5 This referred to instructions from Tokyo(known as the pilot message), intercepted and sent incode to Washington and decoded by U.S. intelligence onSaturday, December 6. U.S. cryptographers took themessage to mean that Japan was likely to attack the UnitedStates the next day.6 Specifically, continued Knoxs

report, the Hawaiian commands had not received awarning sent them Saturday night. On the basis of earlierinstructions, they had made thorough preparations, but notfor an air attack. Kimmel had prepared for a submarineattack; Short, for sabotage. Despite being taken bysurprise, the navy and army had performed well once theattack began.

Knox found no dereliction of duty by Kimmel, Short,their staffs, or their troops. According to a subordinate ofRoosevelt, Knox and Roosevelt stayed up together throughthe night, going over the findings, which disappointed anddepressed the president.7 Knoxs mention of theinterception of Japanese instructions suggested a failure inWashington. The mystery of the warning not receivedwould be spotlighted by congressional investigators fouryears later in questions to Marshall and Adm. HaroldStark, who were heads of the army and navy in 1941questions they would evade. And it would remain amystery until 1973, when a friend of Knox would explainit.8

On December 15 Knox again discussed his reportwith Roosevelt, who gave him detailed instructionsverbatim wording, according to Beattyabout whatto make public.9 The revised report omitted mention ofintelligence received in Washington and a resultantwarning not received in Hawaii, and said, The UnitedStates services were not on the alert against the surprise

air attack on Hawaii. This fact calls for a formalinvestigation. Knox added that Roosevelt was appointinga commission to investigate any error of judgment whichcontributed to the surprise any dereliction of duty priorto the attack.10 Knox meant an error of judgment anddereliction of duty only in Hawaii, and he mentioned thepossibility of punishment to follow the investigation. Fromthen on administration statements would either assert orimply that laxity and dereliction of duty by Kimmel andShort caused the disaster at Pearl Harbor. And theadministration would focus on Pearl Harbor, as if onlythere had the United States suffered a disaster that calledfor investigation.

On December 16, Roosevelt appointed a commissionheaded by Owen Roberts of the Supreme Court. JusticeRobertss high reputation inspired confidence in theAmerican people. The San Francisco Chronicle wrote,From such a board we shall learn the truth, the wholetruth, and nothing but the truth, and whatever action itrecommends will be just and fair and constructive.11Among those impressed was Representative Carl Vinson,who decided to forgo an investigation by his NavalAffairs Committee.12

Roosevelt personally instructed Roberts about histask, and he received further orientation from Knox andWar Secretary Henry Stimson. Then members of theRoberts Commission received still further instruction from

Marshall and Stark.13 As critics of the commission laterpointed out, its operation was shaped by people who wereaccused or suspected of responsibility for the disaster.

Marshall and Stark told the commission that they hadkept Short and Kimmel fully informed of developmentsaffecting their commands. On their orders, however,intelligence of Japans coming attack had been withheldfrom Short and Kimmel.14 The administration alsowithheld that intelligence from the commission. Because itspecified Pearl Harbor as Japans target, keeping it fromthe commission was crucial. Roberts later said he hadmistakenly believed that the army and navy had given thecommission every document that could have bearing onthe situation at Pearl Harbor.15

Robertss instructions were to investigate whetherthe commands in Hawaii had shown poor judgment ordereliction of duty. What had happened in the Philippines,Samoa, Guam, Midway, and Wakeor in Washingtonwas outside the scope of his investigation. An unhappymember of the commission, Adm. William Standley,would later complain that Roberts ran it as crooked as asnake in order to bring in a predetermined verdict againstKimmel and Short.16 Not only did the commissionvindicate Marshall and Stark, it also gave them theopportunity to edit its findings about them!17

As the commission brought in its report, Stark wasrelieved as head of the navy, for unstated reasons. His

successor, Adm. Ernest King, became responsible forcontrolling secret naval intelligence documents and forcontrolling testimony given by naval officers to tribunalsinvestigating the Pearl Harbor disaster.18 He was in aposition to know what was in the suppressed evidence,and later wrote that the Roberts Commission

did not get into the real meat of the matter butmerely selected a scapegoat to satisfy thepopular demand for fixing the responsibility forthe Pearl Harbor debacle Admiral Kimmel and General Short were sold down the river asa political expedient.19

What later investigations brought to light supportedStandleys complaint and Kings conclusion.

Great Britain, too, had just suffered a series ofstunning defeats by Japans forces, and Churchill, likeRoosevelt, was under pressure to produce explanationsand lay blame. He responded in the House of Commons:

no one is more accountable than I am. Why,then, should I be called upon to pick outscapegoats, to throw blame on generals or airmenor sailors? Why, then, should I be called upon todrive away loyal and trusted colleagues and

friends to appease the clamour [over] ourreverses in the Far East, and the punishmentwhich we have yet to take there? I would beashamed to do such a thing I feel entitled tocome to the House of Commons and ask them notto press me to act against my conscience andbetter judgment.20

The House of Commons gave him a vote of confidence.Britain had already been at war for two years,

enabling Churchill to be more open with his people aboutwar strategy than Roosevelt had been. For that reason,Churchills long speech to Commons was rather candid,unlike Roosevelts speeches to Congress after the PearlHarbor attack. And clamor for scapegoats was stronger inthe United States than in Britain, as were threats ofinvestigations that Roosevelt might not be able to control.And the clamor in the U.S. for scapegoats came after priorefforts to impeach him. Under the circumstances, he dealtwith threats to his administration much as other presidentshave dealt with threats to theirs.

Restriction of the Roberts Commission investigationrested on a variety of considerations. Samoa, Guam, andWake were small possessions of little importance. Inplanning for a coming war with Japan, the administrationhad conceded their loss and provided them only with

small military forces. But the situation in the Philippineshad been different, and no evidence of Rooseveltsreasons for excluding the Philippine disaster frominvestigation has come to light. With war raging there, animmediate on-the-spot investigation was impossible, butnone was ever undertaken.

Reasons for sweeping the Philippine disaster underthe rug may be inferred from what an investigation couldhave revealeda disturbing chain of events that remainslittle known. Those events are described here in detailbecause strategy in the Philippines contributed to the PearlHarbor disaster and because a look at the Philippinedisaster provides a realistic balance to distortions thathave framed the Pearl Harbor controversy since 1941. Theevents preceding the Philippine attack highlight howcommon sacrifice is in ordinary war plans and how topbrass routinely mislead field commanders deliberatelyand sometimes tragicallyfor strategic purposes. Finally,the Philippine story sheds light on political considerationsin the punishment of Kimmel and Short.

The Philippine commands had received intelligenceabout Japanese war plansintelligence withheld fromHawaii. The army commander in the Philippines, Gen.Douglas MacArthur, had received a warning that specifiedthe Philippines as a likely target. And days before theattack there: For many hours Japanese planes actuallyrehearsed their attacks on the Philippines, flying right to

their allotted targets and back.21 And hours before themain attack there, Japanese planes bombed a Philippineradio station and hit two planes and a tender. In addition,MacArthurs air chief, Gen. Lewis Brereton, received awarning from Army Air Corps Chief, Gen. Henry Arnold,that Japan was about to strike the Philippines. Arnoldspecifically cautioned Brereton not to be caught with hisplanes on the ground. And MacArthur received a similarwarning from Marshalls assistant, Gen. Leonard Gerow,and assured Gerow that he was fully prepared to meet theattack effectively.

MacArthur had recently received a large force ofnew, long-range bombers. And Army Intelligence knewJapan had established a striking force of planes in Taiwanthree hours awaywith the capability of bombing thePhilippines. Despite all that and despite knowing for hoursbefore the main attack on the Philippines that Pearl Harborhad already been hitthat war with Japan was onarmyforces in the Philippines were taken as if by surprise, withtheir planes largely destroyed on the ground. For hoursarmy pilots heard rumors about the Pearl Harbor attack butwere not officially informed of it, or alerted for action, orgiven orders.22 Then Japan invaded the Philippines,beginning a rout of the large army recently establishedthere, and inflicting enormous civilian casualties.

Despite MacArthurs bungling, One of the strangethings in popular psychology is the different reaction of the

American people to disaster at Pearl Harbor and todisaster at Manila.23 The disasters were unequal. In PearlHarbor, a large part of the U.S. Fleet was destroyed; in thePhilippines, a few small warships were lost. The numberof army planes destroyed was roughly equal in the twoterritories. Except for Pearl Harbor and some airfields,Hawaii was nearly untouched and remained in U.S. hands.The Philippines suffered widespread destruction and wascaptured. Twenty-four hundred troops and seventycivilians were lost in Hawaii. In the Philippines, onehundred forty thousand troops were lost, and civiliandeathsstill unreportedare estimated to have been ashigh as three million.24 Nonetheless, the defeat at PearlHarbor became a wrenching tragedy, and theadministration sacrificed the commanders there to restorepublic confidence, while the defeat in the Philippinesbecame a noble defense. Despite devastation and loss ofthe Philippines, a public relations operation turnedMacArthur into a hero and he was promoted.25 The publicreaction is not strange, however, when seen in the light ofgovernment control of informationa usual wartimepractice.

Kimmel and Short stood officially accused ofcontributing to the Pearl Harbor disaster by failing tocooperate with each other, but it was in the Philippinesthat there had been a gross lack of cooperation. And mostobservers attributed the lack to MacArthurs arrogant

treatment of Adm. Thomas Hart, commander of the AsiaticFleet, stationed at Manila. Disclosure of MacArthursperformance was to be expected in an investigation ofwhat happened in the Philippines.

Hart had worked well with with MacArthurspredecessor. On MacArthurs return from retirement tocommand the U.S. Army detachment in the Philippines,Hart made overtures to him for cooperation in militaryplanning and operations. Instead of answering him,MacArthur sent a letter to Harts superior, Admiral Stark,complaining about Hart as arbitrary and illegal [and]dictatorialwords that more aptly described MacArthurthan Hart.26 Later MacArthur answered a proposal by Hartfor joint action by insulting him directly:

I find [your] proposal entirely objectionable It would be manifestly illogical to assign such apowerful army air striking force to an element ofsuch combat inferiority as your command.27

Not surprisingly, Hart developed a negative attitudetoward MacArthur, which contributed to their lack ofcooperation.

Stark brought MacArthurs high-handedness toMarshalls attention. Marshall then wrote to MacArthur, Iwas disturbed to receive your note of November 7th

transmitting correspondence between Hart and yourself. Iwas more disturbed when Stark sent over to me your letterto him of October 18th. This was a sharp rebuke, whichMarshall followed with an order for MacArthur to placesome of his forces under Harts command.28

MacArthur was a brilliant military leader, and hispostwar achievements as Supreme Commander of AlliedOccupation Forces in Japan earned him a high place inhistory. His shortcomings are described only to emphasizepolitical factors in the punishment of Short and Kimmel.

In 1941 MacArthur already had an internationalreputation, while Short and Kimmel were unknown to thepublic. MacArthur also had friends in high places and wasknown for his pugnacity. In 1933, then head of the army, hehad been troubled by an impending reduction of its officercorps. To prevent this he had asked to see Roosevelt. Inthe ensuing quarrel, both were unyielding. Rooseveltangrily insisted the decision was his alone and MacArthurmust accept that. MacArthur replied:

Mr. President, if you pursue this policy, whichwill lead inevitably to the destruction of theAmerican Army, I have no other choice but tooppose you publicly. I shall ask for my immediaterelief as Chief of Staff and for retirement fromthe Army, and I shall take this fight straight to thepublic.29

MacArthur then walked out; it was Roosevelt whosubsequently yielded. MacArthurs influence andcombativeness may have been considerations inRoosevelts decision about what the Roberts Commissionshould investigate. In addition Roosevelt neededMacArthur, and the public was not seeking scapegoats forwhat happened in the Philippines.

Roosevelt had long ago thought that, if war came, hewould bring MacArthur out of retirement and give him acommand again. In 1941 the United States made plans forcombined military operations with forces of Great Britainand her commonwealths and the Dutch East Indies. AfterDecember 7 the Australian government suggestedMacArthur be made Supreme Commander of AlliedForces in the southwest Pacific, and Roosevelt decided todo it. Consequently, while the Japanese were overrunningthe Philippines, Roosevelt raised MacArthurs rank toprepare him for his new position and awarded him theCongressional Medal of Honor.

The United States had acquired the Philippines in1898 by war with Spain. Problems in defending the newterritory soon became apparent, and President TheodoreRoosevelt said, If we are not prepared to establish astrong base for our navy in the Philippines, then we hadbetter give up the Philippine Islands entirely.30 But hissuccessors had done neither. The Navy Department

opposed independence for the Filipinos, considering abase there important to protect U.S. trade in East Asia.The United States had formally assumed the obligation ofdefending the Philippines but had not carried it out,stationing only a small military force there. The StateDepartment did work out temporary agreements withJapanthe nation considered the main threat to thePhilippinesin 1905, 1908, and 1917. Through theseagreements, Japan accepted U.S. control of the territory inreturn for U.S. acceptance of Japanese control in areas ofChina.

From time to time, Washington began projects toreinforce the Philippines, and then dropped them.Meanwhile, in 1906, U.S. military planners had begun todevelop strategies for a possible war with Japan. If itcame, the fate of the Philippines would be a problem. Theplanners considered stationing a larger U.S. force there orcreating a Filipino army. But if Japan invaded, neitherforcenor both togetherwould be adequate for morethan a holding action until a major force from the UnitedStates arrived. If one could be sent from a near enoughoutpost, it might arrive in time to defeat the invasion. Butif one had to be sent from the United Statesfrom seventhousand miles awaymilitary planners expected it couldnot reach the Philippines in time.31

In 1919 Japan acquired Germanys Pacific islandscalled the Mandates, giving her potential bases nearer to

the Philippines. In 1921 Japan and the United Statesagreed that Japan would not fortify the Mandates and theUnited States would not fortify the Philippines and someother Pacific islands (excluding Hawaii). When in 1925Washington learned of Japanese plans to build oil tanks inthe Mandates, war planners considered themcorrectlya step toward establishing naval bases there. The WarDepartment then concluded that the Philippines wereindefensible and a military liability.32

The United States normally kept her fleet on her ownwest coast. Occasionally the fleet went to Hawaii for wargames. In the event of an invasion of the Philippines, if thefleet was in Hawaii it might be near enough to reach thePhilippines in time. The Orange War Plan of 1924projected an army force in the Philippines strong enoughto hold out until relieved by the navy. (Orange in thetitle of the plan designated Japan as the enemy.) Butfortification of the Philippines stopped, and no significantarmed force was established. Subsequent Orange plansconceded to Japan loss of the Philippines, along withother small Pacific possessions at the outset of war, butnot the Hawaiian Islands. During the 1920s and 1930s,those plans were hypothetical because no war between theUnited States and Japan was in prospect.

After completing his tour as commander of thePhilippine Department in 1929, Gen. Johnson Hagoodadvised President Herbert Hoover:

It is not within the wildest possibility tomaintain or to raise in the Philippine Islands asufficient force to defend it against any probablefoe.33

Hagoods successor as commander there, Gen. StanleyEmbick, advised in 1933:

To carry out the present plan [for war withJapan], with the provisions for the early dispatchof our fleet to the Philippine waters, would beliterally an act of madness.34

The navy conducted large-scale Pacific war games in1935, leading to the conclusion that defense of thePhilippines would be impossible without a prohibitivelyexpensive naval buildup.

Hagoods and Embicks strong languagerarelyused by military officers in official reportsreflectedtheir grave concern that Washington was not takingseriously the disastrous possibilities for the Philippines ofa war with Japan. Planners may easily decide from afar tomake only a token defense of a territory. A commanderassigned to the territory, however, tends to take thesituation seriously and to be troubled if its defense isimpossible. MacArthur took defense of the Philippines

very seriously.Another who took the problem seriously was

Philippine independence leader Manuel Quezon. He got anagreement from Roosevelt that The United States would negotiate with foreign governments for theneutralization of the islands in case of war between theUnited States and Japan.35 In hindsight the agreement wasunrealistic; the U.S. made no such attempt.

Quezon was seriously troubled, anticipating that, ifJapan went to war with the United States, she was likelyto attack his country. In 1935 he turned to his old friendMacArthur, who was retiring as Army Chief of Staff, toask if he thought a Philippine army adequate for defensecould be built. MacArthur replied, I dont think so. Iknow that the Philippines can be protected, provided that you have the money. Asked if he wanted the job ofbuilding a Philippine army, MacArthur said, there isnothing I would like more America has a greatresponsibility for the future safety of the Filipino people.We cannot just turn around and leave you alone.36 Uponarriving in the Philippines, he declared, By 1946 I willhave made of the Islands a Pacific Switzerland, meaningthey would bristle with defenses strong enough todiscourage a potential invader. The next year he told thePhilippine nation that his mission was to build a defensiveforce so strong that no Chancellory in the World willever attack the Philippines.37 MacArthur viewed his

task as vital to U.S. interests, declaring in 1939, I mustnot fail! Too much of the worlds future depends uponsuccess here. These Islands [are the key] to control ofthe Pacific for America. I dare not allow that key to belost.38

To an extent, MacArthur did succeed in building aFilipino army and obtaining more U.S. troops for theislands. (During autumn 1941 he would be misled bypromises from Marshall of far more aid than he would getbefore Japan attacked.) But the combined increase inPhilippine forces was still inadequate to meet a Japaneseattack, and MacArthur relied on U.S. forces coming to hisaid.

Quezon, who had become president of thePhilippines in 1935, was well aware that Washington hadnot provided for their security. During 1938 he made tripsto Japan in an unsuccessful quest for an agreementguaranteeing Philippine neutrality in case of war with theUnited States.39

In 1940 Roosevelt stationed most of the U.S. Fleet inHawaii. In 1941 he ordered a major buildup in thePhilippines. These two measures made successful defenseof the Philippines feasible, provided war did not beginuntil March 1942the projected completion time for thebuildup.40

In August 1941, trying to avoid war with the UnitedStates, Japan offered to respect Philippine neutrality. The

United States rejected the proposal.41 By NovemberQuezon realized that his nation was about to be drawn intowar, and under disastrous conditions. Not knowing that adecision to let the Philippines fall had already been made,he pressed Roosevelt harder, without success. Quezonthen foresaw that the Japanese would overrun his nation,and he denounced Roosevelt for betraying the Filipinos.Nonetheless, when he heard of Japans attack on PearlHarbor, before her attack fell on the Philippines, Quezonissued a public statement: I expect every Filipinomanand womanto do his duty. We have pledged our honorto stand to the last by the United States.42

When the fleet at Pearl Harbor had been crippled byJapan, it could no longer aid the Philippines. With no U.S.forces coming, loss of the territory became a virtualcertainty. Roosevelt, however, wanted Philippineresistance prolonged, and the War Department cabledMacArthur that U.S. forces were on their way to supporthis armies (see the afterword). But no such operation wasin progress or even planned.

On February 2 Quezon asked the United Statesimmediately to grant independence and negotiatePhilippine neutrality with Japan, in order to save hispeople and land from further destruction. The request wassupported by the U.S. commissioner in the Philippines,Francis Sayre, and by MacArthur, who forwarded it toWashington, adding, The temper of the Filipinos is one of

almost violent resentment against the United States. Everyone of them expected help and when it was notforthcoming they believe they have been betrayed.43Roosevelt did not accede; the sacrifice of the Philippineswas part of U.S. war strategya sacrifice common inwar.

To brace their morale, Roosevelt made a radioaddress to the Filipinos on February 28:

I give the people of the Philippines my solemnpledge that their freedom will be redeemed andtheir independence established and protected. Theentire resources, in men and in material, of theUnited States stand behind that pledge. It is notfor me or the people of this country to tell youwhere your duty lies. We are engaged in a greatand common cause. I count on every Philippineman, woman, and child to do his duty. We will doours.44 (Italics added.)

The phrase italicized here baffled Filipinos. It may

have been a reminder of the 1934 U.S. agreement to grantthe Philippines independence in 1946, used here to inspireFilipinos to fight on. Despite his earlier disappointments,Quezon still clung to hopes of U.S. forces coming to defeatJapans invasion. Less credulous, Quezons cabinet tookindependent action. Japan had offered the Filipinos

independence if they stopped fighting. To compelQuezons acceptance of Japans offer, the cabinetinformed him they were sending a cable to Roosevelturging him to arrange a separate peace for the Philippinesand that they were accepting the Japanese offer.45 But thecabinet lacked effective power to accept the offer, andQuezon rallied his people to fight on. MacArthur, who hadhad a long, positive relationship with Filipinos, wassympathetic to the cabinet. Nonetheless, he obeyedRoosevelt and prolonged the fighting. The devastation ofthe Philippines continued.

These events are what an investigation could haverevealed. In addition, secret strategic considerations hadgoverned orders to MacArthur before Japan attacked,limiting his defense of the Philippines (see chapter 6). Theorders were similar to orders that limited Short andKimmel in defending Pearl Harbor.

A full investigation of the Philippine disaster wouldhave embarrassed the administration and raiseduncomfortable questions. Probably for this reason, theadministration not only limited the scope of the RobertsCommissions investigation, but also manipulatedevidence presented to it.46 Army and navy officers wereordered to withhold certain data and to lie about it ifpressed. General Miles, Chief of Army Intelligence, latersaid so in an affidavit and in testimony, and Marshallconfirmed it (see chapter 5). The suppressed evidence

was exculpatory to Short and Kimmel, and implicatedofficials in Washington.

The withholding of intercepted warnings of thecoming Pearl Harbor attack from the Roberts Commissionand Short and Kimmel was justified on the grounds ofnational security. The administrations idea was that ifShort and Kimmel learned about the interception anddecoding of Japanese messages, the Japanese might alsolearn of it and change their codes. The United States had,of course, an interest in keeping the code breaking asecret. But the justification was most puzzling inconnection with Short and Kimmel before December 7,because their counterparts in ManilaMacArthur andHartwere given access to the messages.

Lacking access to this suppressed evidence duringthe investigations, Short and Kimmel were unable todefend themselves adequately. With the restrictions placedon it, the Roberts Commission concluded that Short andKimmel were responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster,and it exonerated officials in Washington.47 After thecommission found Short and Kimmel guilty of grave errorsof judgment and dereliction of duty, an outcry arose acrossthe nation for them to be punished severely, and Rooseveltdirected that court-martial charges be brought againstthem.

Because of Justice Robertss prestige, because hisinvestigation was the first, and because it provided a

simple explanation for the Pearl Harbor disaster, hiscommissions findings were accepted by most people. Themyth of Pearl Harborthat because of Japanese deceptionthe administration had not expected the attack and thatShort and Kimmel had failed to carry out orders to defenditwas established as U.S. history. And although piecesof it were later controverted in very extensiveinvestigations by the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the NavalCourt of Inquiry, and a joint congressional committee, theRoberts Commissions report shaped the history of PearlHarbor.

CHAPTER 3WARNINGS OF THE PEARL

HARBOR ATTACK

The crucial information withheld from the RobertsCommission was warnings of the Pearl Harbor attack.Defensive over criticism of his report, Roberts latertestified that he had requested all documents bearing onthe attack and been assured thatwith the exception ofintercepted Japanese diplomatic messagestheadministration had provided all of them to him.1 Theadministration also withheld most of the warnings fromsubsequent investigations by the Army Pearl HarborBoard, the Naval Court of Inquiry, and the jointcongressional committee, while insisting it had notreceived them. The committee asked Adm. TheodoreWilkinson, who had been chief of the Office of NavalIntelligence (ONI) in autumn 1941, Well, did you haveany information, written or oral, prior to the attack, whichspecified Hawaii as a point of attack? He answered,Not the slightest.2

By December 1945 the committee had receivedcopies of twenty warnings3nineteen of which had comein during Wilkinsons tenure as intelligence chiefand he

was asked the question over and over. He kept insistingthat he had seen no warnings prior to the attack.

Even though the congressional committees reportcontradicted such denials, they had an enduring effect.Histories written after World War II carried flatstatements such as: Nobody in Washington could warnHawaii of something he neither knew nor suspected.4Then, as more and more warnings were uncovered,controversy about whether Roosevelt and his keysubordinates had expected the attack became passionate.Some of his defenders dismissed the idea as unthinkable,as in: There exists in law a rule that accusations whichare beyond the capacity of human credence need not berefuted.5

General Miles explained that his divisionArmyIntelligence (G-2)failed to anticipate the Pearl Harborattack because Congress did not provide adequate fundingfor necessary intelligence.6 Military intelligence had been,of course, only a fraction of what it grew to after PearlHarbor. But even before the attack it had been large andprovided many warnings of the coming attack.

Even with small staffs, foreign intelligenceaccomplished impressive feats. With a staff of about ten,Dutch intelligence in Java broke Japans main naval code.With staff of a few hundred, British intelligence did thesame.7 Three Army units in Washington decryptedintercepted Japanese messages before December 7: G-2,

with a staff of 425; the Signal Intelligence Service (abranch of the Signal Corps), with 330; and the smallerArmy Air Corps intelligence unit. The army also hadintelligence offices in Hawaii, the Philippines, Tokyo,Hong Kong, Shanghai, and the Dutch East Indies. ONI hada staff of seven hundred in Washington, aided by about onethousand intelligence workers in various naval districts.Those on the U.S. West Coast and at Pearl Harbor andManila were devoted to information on Japanparticularly to intercepting and decoding Japanese navalmessages. Combining all units, military intelligence had astaff of a few thousand in December 1941. In addition,military attachs and observers across the globe gatheredintelligence, especially in Japan and her territories.8

Other U.S. government agencies also had intelligenceunits that focused on Japans war plansthe Departmentsof Commerce and Agriculture, the Board of EconomicWarfare, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the SecretService, the Customs Service, and the FederalCommunications Commission. Some of these agencies sentspies to Japanese-occupied China and Korea or hadinformants in those places. The Treasury Department hadseveral intelligence-type organizations. And Hawaii had acivilian intelligence corps. In addition, foreigngovernmentsnotably Great Britain, the Dutch EastIndies, China, and the Soviet Unionprovidedintelligence to the United States in 1941.9

Additional sources of intelligence were ship mastersreports, business representatives abroad of theRockefeller family, and a group of private citizens withextraord