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The peace process in SriLankaKristine Höglund a & Isak Svensson aa PhD candidate in the Department of Peaceand Conflict Research , Uppsala University ,SwedenPublished online: 20 Sep 2007.

To cite this article: Kristine Höglund & Isak Svensson (2002) The peace processin Sri Lanka, Civil Wars, 5:4, 103-118, DOI: 10.1080/13698240208402519

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The Peace Process in Sri Lanka

KRISTINE HÖGLUND AND ISAK SVENSSON

This article sets out to analyse the current peace process in SriLanka. It is argued that the prospects for peace are better than atany other time since the inception of the armed conflict in 1983,because the parties' concerns about the consequences of continuedconflict, as well as the consequences of settlement, have changed. Inthe first section of the article we demonstrate how the costs —militarily, financially and politically -for continuing the war havedrastically increased for the parties. Furthermore, with theinvolvement of the international community and the specialapproach to the peace process by the Wickremasinghe government,the perceived risks involved in a peaceful settlement have decreased.These parallel developments in the incentives structures of war andpeace, explain the readiness of both primary parties to engage inserious efforts to solve the protracted conflict. From thisperspective, the roles of Norway as a mediator, and the Nordiccountries as ceasefire monitors, are analysed. The second sectionanalyses the prospects for a solution, by looking at thereconciliation of positions that have taken place between the parties.The major obstacles, such as the LTTE's intentions, the Muslimminority and divisions within the Singhalese community, are alsodiscussed. We end the analysis with the observation that even thoughthe prospects for a stable, negotiated settlement between theadversaries appear promising, several problems related to post-conflict reconstruction and democratic development, are likely toremain obstacles in the future.

The armed conflict in Sri Lanka between the Tamil rebel group,Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the Sinhalese-dominatedgovernment is at a historical juncture. Compared to numerous previouspeace initiatives and five peace processes aimed at solving the conflict,the prospects for finding a negotiated solution now indeed appearpromising. Although the outcome is still uncertain, fighting has ceased forthe longest period of time since the intense, long and bloody conflict

Civil Wars, Vol.5, No.4 (Winter 2003), pp. 103-118PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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emerged in 1983, which no doubt is a considerable achievement. Theconflict has its roots in two competing forms of nationalism, and has beenmanifested in the LTTE's demand for an independent Tamil state in thenorth and east of Sri Lanka.1

Following the ceasefire between the Tamil Tigers and the Sri Lankangovernment in February 2002, the economic sanctions in LTTE-held areashave been relaxed, the four-year-old ban on the LTTE has been removedand the rebel group has been allowed to open political offices in thegovernment-held areas in the north and north-east. Consequently, theexpectations for peace were high when representatives of the Tamil Tigersand the government met in Thailand in mid-September 2002 to initiatenegotiations for the first time in seven years.

Since then, the process has progressed in a rapid manner. At a pressconference held in Oslo at the beginning of December, after only threerounds of talks, the parties announced that they had decided to 'explore asolution founded on the principle of internal self-determination in areas ofhistorical habitation of the Tamil-speaking people based on a federalstructure within a united Sri Lanka'.2 Thus, the parties had agreed on aformula for the resolution of the conflict, which by itself is a historicalevent and an indication of the commitment by the adversaries to finding anegotiated solution. Never before in the 19 years of war, has a commonground, upon which a solution could be based, existed. What promptedthe government and the LTTE to pursue peace negotiations at thisparticular point in time? What explains the impressive track record of theone-year-long peace process? What are the main obstacles andchallenges? What are the prospects for peace?

This article is divided into two sections. In the first section, it is arguedthat the prospects for peace in Sri Lanka are promising because theparties' basic incentives have changed. The costs of continued armedconflict have drastically increased and at the same time the risks involvedin a peaceful settlement have substantially decreased. In the secondsection of the article, we discuss a possible solution to the conflict andargue that the adversaries have made important concessions, which haveclosed the gap on their divergent positions. Some of the main obstaclesand challenges to a negotiated settlement of the conflict, are alsohighlighted. Nonetheless, as the forthcoming analysis will make clear,given that the current composition of the parties remains intact, there arerealistic possibilities for a negotiated settlement in Sri Lanka.

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THE PEACE PROCESS IN SRI LANKA

SEEKING PEACE

105

Generally speaking, the literature on conflict resolution and wartermination underlines two factors that parties to a conflict take intoconsideration when seeking a negotiated settlement: the consequences ofcontinued armed conflict as well as the consequences of a negotiated peaceagreement.

Compelling arguments have been presented, which indicate thatparties to a conflict seek a negotiated settlement 'not out of desire forpeace, but because military and political conditions compel them to stopfighting'.3 This situation has aptly been captured through the concept'mutually hurting stalemate', which signifies a state in which the 'partiesfind themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate tovictory and this deadlock is painful to both of them'.4 Initially theconcept was related to perceptions about military realities. However, amutually hurting stalemate can also arise from changes in the politicalenvironment, such as alterations in the internal composition of theparties.5 Consequently, it has been suggested that belligerents can beencouraged or forced to seek a negotiated settlement, if the fear ofcontinued conflict is increased through, for instance, the cutting off ofmilitary or financial resources, or the loss of political or moral support(external or internal).

Another strand of research points to the fact that parties will onlyremain engaged in negotiations as long as they perceive it as morebeneficial than not to engage in negotiations. Thus, equally important inthe calculation about negotiation, at least theoretically, are concerns aboutthe consequences of a prospective peace settlement. As put by Kelman:'[negotiation is only possible when both parties define the situation, atleast at some level, as a win-win, mixed motive game. To engage in theprocess, each must be able to conceive of some outcome that would bebetter than the status quo.'6 However, parties may fear alternativestrategies to conflict, because they may threaten the survival and unity ofthe group or because they believe the other party is not sincere in itsattempt to pursue peace.7 Thus, the decision-makers' concern for theconsequences of settlement can constitute a considerable obstacle toconflict resolution.

Many scholars see these aspects as complementary in an explanationof the most favourable conditions for a negotiated settlement.8 Animportant strategic rethink towards negotiation comes about when the twofactors point the decision-makers in the same direction: the lesser theperceived risk of settlement and the greater the cost of continued conflict,

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the greater the willingness to negotiate a settlement. Fears of furthernegative experiences, combined with expectations of positive goals,provide the adversaries with the incentives to seek a negotiatedsettlement.

The period preceding the current peace process in Sri Lanka and theprocess itself, have considerably changed the factors influencing theparties' perceptions of the consequences of continued armed conflict andthe consequences of a prospective peace agreement. In the following, wedemonstrate how the costs - militarily, financially and politically - forcontinuing the war have drastically increased for the parties.Furthermore, with the involvement of the international community andthe special approach to the peace process by the Wickremasinghegovernment, the perceived risks involved in a peaceful settlement havedecreased. These parallel developments in the incentives structures ofwar and peace, explain the readiness of both primary parties to engage inserious efforts to solve the protracted conflict. From this perspective, theroles of Norway as a mediator and the Nordic countries as ceasefiremonitors, are analysed.

After 11 September 2001

International and domestic developments over the past few years haveresulted in an increase in the political and economic costs to both parties tothe conflict to continue the war. This has led to a realisation by thegovernment and the LTTE alike, that the conflict has to be resolved throughother means than the military option.

The attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the UnitedStates in September 2001 affected international politics in many differentareas. Sri Lanka is no exception. After 11 September, non-governmentalactors' use of violence has lost most of its legitimacy, and at the sametime, the means and opportunities for these groups to finance theiractivities have drastically changed. The former Sri Lankan government,under the leadership of President Chandrika Kumaratunga's People'sAlliance (PA), had for many years pursued an international campaignaimed at cutting off the sources of finance for the LTTE. Part of theLTTE's budget stems from an international network of Tamilorganisations, private persons and illegal trade, spread around the world,in particular Western Europe, the United States and Canada. Previousestimations have stated that about 60 per cent of the LTTE's total budgetcomes from its international network.9

The campaign to have the LTTE proscribed internationally wassuccessful in February 2001, when Britain decided to classify the LTTE as a

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terrorist organisation. The United States and India had already done thesame. Thus, questions of financing and legitimacy for the LTTE had alreadybeen on the agenda prior to 11 September. The LTTE was fighting a losingstruggle to be recognised as a legitimate actor in the internationalcommunity.

The events of 11 September brought these questions to the centre ofattention into sharp focus. Overnight, the question of the financing ofterrorist organisations became a top priority on the international agenda.Both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE condemned the attack on theWorld Trade Center in New York. Of course, in this context, governmentrepresentatives pointed out that the LTTE had carried out a bomb attack onthe World Trade Centre in Colombo in 1998. The LTTE, for its part, arguedthat the al-Qaeda attack and the LTTE struggle could not be compared, anddenounced the attack as a 'brutal crime' .I0

Thus, the prospects of financing LTTE activities through internationalsources were made more difficult, and it is reasonable to assume that thisinfluenced the leader of the LTTE, Velupillai Prabhakaran, to seek anegotiated settlement instead of continuing the armed struggle. This wasindicated in the annual Heroes' Day speech, in which he stated that: 'Wecan't ignore the realities of today's world. We have to realise this and adjustour path to freedom."1 Whether or not the LTTE will continue the nationalstruggle with military or political means, the organisation is in need ofresources to sustain itself. To finance the organisation, the Tamil Tigersneed, to a larger extent than before, to turn towards the local population. TheLTTE's demands to lead an independent and recognised administration canbe viewed against this background, since this would give the organisationthe opportunity to collect taxes from the population under its control. Thepeace process has already provided the LTTE with revenues from a toll(5-25 per cent) on items transported through its territories.

Economic Pressures

Even though the long-term balance-of-power between the parties wasaffected by the events of 11 September, the Tamil Tigers have shown theircapacity and strength as a rebel group in the shorter run. Throughout theconflict, the month of July has always been an exceptionally violent period,as the LTTE has performed armed attacks in memory of the pogromsagainst Tamil civilians in July 1983. (The 1983 pogroms are widely seen asthe starting date of the armed conflict.) On 24 July 2001, a group of youngsuicide bombers attacked Sri Lanka's highly protected international airportand an adjoining air base, outside Colombo, shutting down the country'sonly international air link.

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In the spring, the Tamil Tigers had announced a unilateral ceasefire,which had not been reciprocated by the Kumaratunga government. Instead,the government decided, directly after the ceasefire had run out, to carry outa major military operation, the so-called Agni Khiela /, in which about 150government soldiers and almost 200 rebels lost their lives, without any realterritorial gains. The Tamil Tigers responded to the government offensivewith the attack on the international airport, and thereby demonstrated thecapacity of the organisation and the devotion of its followers.

The consequences for Sri Lanka's reputation and economy weretremendous. The government of Sri Lanka had, for several years, madeefforts to put the country back on the international tourist map, a position ithad lost after a promising time in the 1970s. But when the attack in SriLanka became world news - with personal stories told by Western touristsstuck inside the airport - revenues from the tourist sector decreasedconsiderably. Flights were cancelled, hotels were forced to close down: thetourist industry was on its knees. After the attack, the hotels had anoccupation rate of only five per cent of capacity. This of course affected thepropensity of international investors to place their money in Sri Lanka, andthe country's economy as a whole. Economically, 2001 was the worst yearsince independence in 1948, with a shrinkage of 1.4 per cent. Incombination with the enormous military expenses - the government hadbeen building up its military capacity considerably since 1995 - theeconomic situation looked very dim. Altogether, there were few reasons tohope for an economic recovery if the war continued.

War Weariness and the Elections of December 2001

The economic situation and the civil war became the most important issuesin the quest for voters in the December 2001 elections. The message fromthe opposition leader Ranil Wickremasinghe about the necessity foreconomic recovery and the need to initiate talks with the LTTE to solve theconflict, found its way to a majority of the people.

It was obvious that the people were tired of war and the continuousworsening of the situation that the war had brought about. This was clear notleast among the Tamil voters in the north and the east, who have suffered themost from the war. In the elections of 1994, the voters supported ChandrikaKumaratunga, who won the presidential elections when she ran on acampaign based on promises of negotiations with the LTTE, democraticreform and an improved human rights situation. When Kumaratunga failedto reach a negotiated settlement of the conflict and the war insteadintensified, many war weary citizens lost faith in her. During 1995-2001, thegovernment pursued a new strategy - War for Peace - which consisted of a

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combination of constitutional reforms and military offensives to defeat theLTTE. In the elections of 2001, Kumaratunga lost her government support inthe parliament. In addition, her party had to give up the prime minister'sposition to UNP leader Wickremasinghe, although Kumaratuga remainedpresident.

Ceasefire and Normalisation

The election result not only gave expression to the war weariness of thepeople, but also created incentives for the government for a renewedinitiative to pursue a negotiated settlement to the conflict. Several factorspointed in the same direction.

The ceasefire, signed in February 2002, was not preceded by direct talksbetween the parties, but was arranged through Norwegian facilitation. In theagreement, the parties committed themselves to cease all offensive militaryoperations, hold their positions on the ground while separating their forcesand undertake confidence-building measures with the aim of restoringnormalcy.12 The ceasefire was signed with the overall objective of finding anegotiated solution to the conflict. However, nothing was stated about thedesign or provisions of a final solution of the conflict. Consequently, it isnot a peace agreement, but an agreement which regulates a cessation ofhostilities.

In the ceasefire agreement, the government committed itself to lift theembargo that has targeted LTTE-held areas, with the exception of somespecific military strategic products. The dismantling of the embargo hasbeen a LTTE demand for a long time. The government has now relaxed thesecurity restrictions on the import of commodities to LTTE-held areasincluding some of the fishing restrictions. At the beginning of April 2002,the strategically important Kandy-Jaffna road (A9), the only landconnection between the Jaffna peninsula and the mainland, was opened.This means that it is now possible to travel freely between LTTE-held areasand other parts of the country.

The result of the government's confidence-building measures, which arein line with the LTTE's position that the negotiations should proceed in astep-by-step manner, has been a normalisation in the war-torn areas.Reports give evidence of increased economic and social activity in theseparts of the country. Consequently, the people in these areas have plenty tolose from a return to fighting. Hence, the stakes for failure have been raised,which makes it more costly both for the government and the LTTEto withdraw from the peace process, because they risk losing part of theirsupport base.

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During the peace process, President Kumaratunga has beensignificantly more sceptical towards negotiations and conciliationbetween the parties, than the current government under Wickremasinghe.Kumaratunga has warned that the Tamil Tigers will take advantage of thesituation as was done in previous peace attempts. She has also beencritical of the increased role of the Norwegian government and hasclaimed that the country's sovereignty is threatened though itsinvolvement.

Consequently, the local elections held during 2002 became a de factoreferendum on the peace process. The result showed, leaving no room fordoubt, that the people desired a continuation of the peace process in aneffort to reach a negotiated settlement in Sri Lanka. The picture was furtherstrengthened by public opinion polls published by the Centre for PolicyAlternatives, which demonstrated that a majority of the people support anegotiated solution to the conflict, in particular the people in the north andthe east.13 Simply put, people are utterly weary of the war.

The Internationalization of the Conflict

The incentives for peace have been increased by the involvement of theinternational community, which to an unprecedented extent has united inits efforts to find a solution to the conflict in Sri Lanka. The internationalcommunity has been acting in favour of a negotiated settlement, not leastthe US and India, who are both central actors in the region. Thesecountries have, in all importance, set the framework for a negotiatedsettlement of the conflict: a united Sri Lanka, with respect for Sri Lanka'sterritorial integrity and sovereignty, combined with increased self-determination and decentralisation of political power to the Tamil peopleon a regional basis.

The renewed security interest by the US in the region has to beunderstood in the context of the developments after the 11 Septemberattacks, with the war in Afghanistan as well as the war in Iraq, theincreased tensions between India and Pakistan, and between the US andIran. The US is taking the issue seriously, which became clear at aninternational donor conference in Oslo in November 2002, where the USwas represented by the Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage. Thereason for sending such a high-ranking politician to the meeting and itsmessage to the LTTE (and other 'terrorist' groups) leaves no doubts: giveup the armed struggle or we will do everything in our power to force youto do so. Thus far, the LTTE has dismissed any demand to renounceviolence and disarm, with the motivation that this will not happen until theTamil question is resolved.

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As a result of enlarged international support to solve the conflict, PrimeMinister Wickremasinghe has been able to take greater risks in pursuing apeace agenda than his predecessor. He has dared to remove the securitybarriers, lift the ban on the LTTE and allow the organisation to growstronger, because he relies on what he refers to as the 'international securitynet'. If the LTTE, after the international attention it has received, takes uparms again, it is very likely that the international war on terrorism will beextended to include Sri Lanka also. In any case, the internationalcommunity will, most likely, take a more active stand on the governmentside in a war against the Tamil rebels. Well aware of this, the parties nowrealise that they have been given a last chance for peace.

As a result of the internationalisation of the conflict the LTTE feel moresecure. The propensity of the government to defect from a bilateralagreement with the LTTE decreases when the world's attention is directedtowards developments on the island. The international community will wantto see that respect for human rights is upheld. The government side, whichhas a track record of torture and other human rights violations, is keen toimprove its international reputation. In addition, the question ofdiscrimination against the Tamil minority must move higher on the agenda.Their rights are regulated in the Constitution, but have to be put intopractice in everyday life. With the upsurge of the international community'sinvolvement, demands will follow.

The LTTE has also made serious attempts to improve its tarnishedinternational image. Most notable is the April 2002 press conference,held by the LTTE leader, Prabhakaran. Prabhakaran, (who has kepthidden in the jungle and has often dismissed interviews by the media)when he stepped forward and - in civilian clothes rather than themandatory military uniform - met the gathered international press in aLTTE-held area in the north of Sri Lanka. The message was clear: LTTEwelcomes a negotiated settlement to the conflict and, given that asettlement which meets its aspirations is reached, will transform itselfinto a political party. By exposing itself to the media, the LTTE hasshown that it seriously has committed itself to seek a peaceful solution tothe conflict. A return to war would deal a serious blow to theorganisation's credibility.

The Tamil Tigers have regained some of their lost legitimacy through theparticipation in the peace process. The government's tarnished reputation hasalso improved parallel to the progress made in the peace process. Thus,the parties have made considerable investments in their own legitimacy,investments that are dependent on the continued success of thepeace process.

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Norway's Role

The momentum towards peace in Sri Lanka has also been strengthened byNorway's involvement as a peace-broker. The most distinct differencebetween the current peace process and all previous attempts to solve theconflict, is that for the first time there is an independent mediator who hasboth parties' confidence. Previous Sri Lankan governments have seen theethnic conflict as an internal problem, with no reason for other countries toget involved. However, the difficulties in overcoming problems of mistrustand misunderstandings, have demonstrated the need for a third party whocan facilitate communication between the parties.

Over the past three years Norway has functioned as an independentchannel to arrange a ceasefire and negotiations between the parties. Thework by Norwegian peace envoy Erik Solheim has been complemented bycontributions by State Secretary Vidar Helgesen, Ambassador Jon Westborgand Foreign Minister Jan Petersen. Norway's involvement has considerablelegitimacy in Sri Lanka. In addition to receiving international support,Norway was officially invited to facilitate a solution when the Kumaratungagovernment was in power.'4

Norway continues to play an important role in the peace process. Inthe ceasefire agreement, the Norwegians, in cooperation with otherNordic countries, have the task of observing any violation of theceasefire and facilitating the resolution of disputes over itsimplementation. In order to perform this task, the Nordic counties areorganised into the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), led by TrondFuruhovde, a retired Norwegian army general. The mission consists ofabout 60 personnel from the Nordic countries located in six districts withits headquarters in Colombo. The local monitoring committees are madeup of field-monitors from the Nordic countries and representatives fromthe government and the LTTE. Their task is to 'conduct internationalverification through on-site monitoring of the fulfilment entered into'.15

The SLMM has largely been successful in its mission to oversee theceasefire. In September 2002, the SLMM reported that the number ofcomplaints had decreased by 40 per cent since June, indicating asubsiding trend.

A POSSIBLE SOLUTION?

The achievements of the peace process and the process itself, have createda dynamic of their own, with a situation where both parties have plenty tolose from a return to war. This section analyses the concessions made byboth parties. In addition, the major hurdles to a negotiated settlement and a

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durable peace - LTTE's intentions, the Muslim minority, spoilers anddivisions within the Sinhalese community - are discussed.

A Reconciliation of Positions?

Regarding a possible solution to the conflict, important concessions havebeen made by both sides. Prime Minister Wickremasinghe declared early inthe peace process, just after he was elected, that he is prepared to discussanything, besides a separate state. LTTE has for several years stated that itsis open to considering possible solutions other than a separate state, oncondition that the government puts forward a proposal which satisfies thefundamental aspirations of the Tamil people. The first round of talksbetween representatives of the government and the LTTE that took place atthe Sattahip navy base in Thailand in September 2001 strengthened the viewthat there is a greater bargaining range than before. Even though thenegotiations largely set the framework for upcoming rounds of talks, andfocused on how the situation in the war-affected areas can be improved,generally they were considered a success. Subsequent talks have madeprovisions for the establishment of sub-committees to promote structureddialogue between the parties in three areas: (1) de-escalation andnormalisation, (2) immediate humanitarian and rehabilitation in the northand east, and (3) political matters.

As the peace process has developed, the parties have to a considerableextent altered their political positions. At the press conference followingthe negotiations, the LTTE's chief negotiator, Anton Balasingham,declared that the group's aim is not necessarily independence: 'We operateaccording to the concepts of homeland and self-determination. Homelanddoes not by itself mean a separate state."6 In the world media, thisstatement was seen as a major concession and a step away from theprevious position and the demand for a separate state. The change inposition was confirmed by Prabhakaran in his Heroes Day speech of 27November 2001, in which he declared that the LTTE's goal was 'internalself-determination'. It is only if the current peace process breaks downthat the LTTE would have to seek 'external self-determination', that is,secession.

Just a few days later, on the last day of the third round of talks, whichwas held in Oslo in December 2002, the parties agreed on internal self-determination as a solution, based on a federal model within a united SriLanka. Federalism has been an ill-regarded concept among the Sinhalesemajority, with connotations of separatism and destruction of the Sri Lankanstate. The Federal Party was the main Tamil party from the mid-1950s andthe LTTE sought to radicalise the Tamil struggle both with regard to ends

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(from federalism to separatism) and means (from parliamentarian processesto armed struggle). Thus, it is noteworthy that the LTTE has acceptedfederalism as a solution. The result is that both parties have taken large stepsto close the gap between their divergent positions.

Obstacles

Some analysts have argued that the LTTE has largely been pressured tonegotiate because of external factors, previously mentioned, such as warweariness and the cut-off of funds. The reasons for negotiation thus wouldhave more to do with the costs of negotiation than the incentives for peace,and have made many analysts sceptical of the LTTE's motives for engagingin talks with the government. The LTTE's intentions have also beenquestioned after incidents such as one in October 2002 when, for twoweeks, the LTTE held six government soldiers hostage after the police hadarrested two rebels carrying arms in government-held areas (which was notallowed according to the ceasefire agreement).

State formation conflicts such as the one in Sri Lanka can be solvedthrough various constitutional arrangements. A possible solution wouldinclude a high degree of autonomy for the northern and eastern parts ofthe country in combination with power-sharing of the central power andincreased protection for human rights. While autonomy is one kind ofcompromise solution for territorial conflicts, there is also a risk thatincreased self-determination will serve as a platform for separatism.Consequently, the question remains whether the LTTE will abandon itsaspirations for an independent state completely, even if autonomy isagreed upon.

Other ethnic groups have been critical of increased self-determination.The Muslim minority - who make up about eight per cent of the population- have been deeply concerned that they will be politically marginalised ina decentralised political and administrative structure. The demography inthe eastern province, in which the Tamils are only 40 per cent of thepopulation in contrast to the north where they are in a majority, is aconsiderable obstacle towards the creation of a province or regionconsisting of the northern province and parts or all of the eastern province.In 1990, the Tamil Tigers expelled a large number of Muslims from theJaffna peninsula. A positive development with regard to this issue is that atthe beginning of April 2002 the LTTE asked the Muslim minority forforgiveness for the expulsion of the Muslims in the north. The leaders ofthe LTTE and the Muslim minority have also reached an agreement whichgives the Muslims the right to return to the Jaffna peninsula. If the Muslimand Sinhalese minorities in the eastern part of the country are to accept a

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Tamil administered autonomy, their needs and grievances have to beaddressed.

There is always a risk that actors who have an interest in a continuationof the conflict - so-called spoilers - will use any means, including violence,to sabotage the peace process. Several groups have come out stronglyagainst the peace process, in particular the maoist-nationalist party, JanathaVimukti Permuna (JVP), which today represents some of the most extremenationalist Sinhalese elements in Sri Lanka. On several occasions, the partyhas organised demonstrations where thousands of (militant) Buddhistmonks have protested against the ceasefire and the peace process. Alsowithin other influential sectors of society, in particular the hardline SriLankan Navy, there are strands of opposition towards a resolution of theconflict.

In addition, there is a considerable risk that potential violations of theceasefire will give credence to extremists on both sides. A particularlyserious incident occurred at the beginning of October 2002 when ademonstration got out of hand and seven civilians were killed in theAmapara district. The police Special Task Force (STF) fired at some 1,000protesters, when a large crowd forcefully entered one of the STF camps.According to the police, several LTTE members were among the attackers,but the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission has not been able to provide any hardevidence for their involvement.

A further complicating factor is internal Sinhalese party politics, whichever since the independence of Sri Lanka, have obstructed a potentialsolution to the conflict. Repeatedly, the problem has been that every attemptby the party in government to strike a bargain with representatives of theTamils, has been resisted by the opposition. To further its power position,Sinhalese-nationalist arguments have often been used by the party inopposition.

Disunity and conflict among the Sinhalese have also imposed hurdles inthe current peace process. While President Kumaratunga has given hersupport to the peace process, her party has been critical toward theunbanning of the LTTE and eager to point out that peace should not beobtained at any price. In addition, Kumaratunga's party, Sri Lanka FreedomParty (SLFP), has appeared on stage with the JVP at various politicalmeetings. The SLFP and the JVP together command about 3 5 ^ 0 per centof the public's support and can mobilise important interest groups, such asthe Buddhist Maha Sangha. Although the scenario is not particularly likely,the President has the constitutional ability to declare the peace processillegal at any given time and return to a state of war. Prime MinisterWickremasinghe has a difficult balance to strike, when attempting to

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negotiate with and accommodate the LITE, without alienating importantSinhalese groups.

CONCLUSIONS

This analysis has sought to demonstrate that the conditions for a negotiatedsettlement of the armed conflict in Sri Lanka appear promising. Based on ananalysis of the consequences of continued conflict versus the consequencesof a prospective settlement, we argue that while the cost of armed conflict- financially, militarily and politically - has decreased, the risk of pursuinga negotiated settlement has decreased substantially. Normalisation on theground and increased international involvement has made both the partiesto the conflict and the people stakeholders in the peace process. Renewedinternational attention has also made the parties more willing to take therisks to pursue peace. In addition, major concessions by both sides haveindicated their willingness to find a solution. This, hopefully, will contributeto a peaceful solution of the conflict.

However, the analysis has also illustrated some of the challenges thatremain and could potentially disrupt the peace process. If the negotiationsbreak down, much points to the fact that the consequences would be serious.In the ceasefire agreement, there are no provisions for the reduction ofarmaments and nothing prohibiting continued military build-up. While boththe LTTE and the government side are negotiating peace, there areindications that both parties are taking the opportunity to consolidate theirmilitary capacity in the shadow of the ceasefire. Both sides have continuedrecruitment and procurement of arms.

If the peace process is to prevail, the parties themselves and theinternational community alike must take measures to advance the situationon the ground. In the short term, the human rights situation must improve.It means, among other things, that the Tamil Tigers will have to fulfil theirpromise to the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fundnot to recruit underage persons to the movement.17 The Sri Lankangovernment must also uphold respect for human rights and, for instance,abolish torture. The question remains, whether the LTTE, a hierarchicalorganisation, is capable of transforming itself into a viable political party.Even if the Tamils of Sri Lanka, through the political parties, have statedthat the LTTE is their spokesperson at present, a plurality of Tamil voicesneed to be heard.

In the wake of the ceasefire and the subsequent rounds of talks, boththe government and the LTTE have had meetings with donor countries tostart the long and difficult work of rebuilding the war-affected areas of

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the country. The increased support of the international community hasmanifested itself in promises of development assistance. At theinternational donor conference in Oslo in November 2002, offers ofapproximately $70m within the six months were made. The need issubstantial. Resources are required to rebuild roads, schools, healthclinics and so on, which have been destroyed during the war. More than100,000 refugees have returned to the north and eastern areas during thelast year. The UN World Food Program has, for instance, initiatedprojects in which the refugees assist in reconstruction work in exchangefor food. A considerable obstacle to development is the large number ofmines in the area. Continued international support is essential toconsolidate the peace.

Implementation of a potential peace agreement is made more difficultbecause of the deep mistrust and fear that exist between groups which havebeen involved in armed conflict with each other for decades. Althoughhopes remain high, the challenges are considerable.

NOTES

1. For an overview and analysis of the Sri Lankan conflict and previous peace efforts, see,e.g., K. M. de Silva and G.H. Peiris (eds.), Pursuit of Peace in Sri Lanka. Past Failuresan Future Prospect (Kandy/Washington, DC: Int. Centre for Ethnic Studies/USIP 2000);Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation(Washington DC: Brookings 1999); Kumar Rupresinghe (ed.), Negotiating Peace in SriLanka: Efforts, Failures and Lessons (London: International Alert 1998).

2. BBC News, 5 Dec. 2002, 'Sri Lanka Peace Breakthrough' (http://news.bbc.co.uk/).3. John Stephen Stedman, 'Negotiation and Mediation in Internal Conflict' in M.E. Brown

(ed.), The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge and London: TheMIT Press 1996).

4. William I. Zartman, 'The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and RipeMoments', The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 1/1 (2001) pp.8-18. 'Mutually hurtingstalemate' is closely associated with theories on ripeness. See also, William I. Zartman,Ripe For Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (NY: OUP 1985/1989); WilliamI. Zartman (ed.), Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil War (Washington DC:Brookings 1995) For a review of the development of the concept and its differentmeanings, see C. R. Mitchell, 'The Right Moment: Notes on Four Models of Ripeness'.Paradigms 9/2 (1995).

5. John Stephen Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe1974-80 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1991).

6. Herbert C. Kelman, 'Social-Psychological Dimensions of International Conflict' inWilliam I. zartman and J.L. Rasmussen (eds.), Peacemaking in International Conflict:Methods and Techniques (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press 1997).

7. The problem of credible commitment on the part of the belligerents as an obstacle toconflict resolution has been developed by several scholars. See, for instance, the work by

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Barbara F. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars(Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton UP 2002).

8. See, for instance, Thomas Ohlson and John Stephen Stedman, The New Is Not Yet Born:Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa (Washington DC: Brookings 1994); John StephenStedman, 'Negotiation and Mediation in Internal Conflict' in M.E. Brown (ed.), TheInternational Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge and London: The MIT Press1996); Zartman, Ripe For Resolution (note 4).

9. Rohan Gunaratna, 'Internationalisation of the Tamil Conflict (and Its Complications)' inS. Gamage and I.B. Watson (eds.), Conflict and Community in Cotemporary Sri Lanka(London: South Asian Studies Association 1999).

10. BBC News, 5 Dec. 2002, 'Sri Lanka Peace Breakthrough' (http://news.bbc.co.uk/).11. Daily Mirror, 28 Nov. 2002.12. The provisions of the Ceasefire Agreement are available at the official website of the Sri

Lankan Government's Secretariat for Coordination of the Peace Process (www.peaceinsrilanka.org).

13. 'Peace Confidence Index (PCI): An Opinion Poll On Peace', 2002. Social Indicator,Centre for Policy Alternative. The report is available on the Centre for Policy AlternativeWeb Site (www.cpalanka.org).

14. Norway has been involved as a facilitator from the beginning of 1997, but its involvementwas made public first in Dec. 1999.

15. See the Ceasefire Agreement, article 3.16. Tamil Net, 18 Sept. 2002, 'Tigers demand "substantial autonomy, self government'",

(www.tamilnet.com).17. Underage recruitment by the LTTE has constituted greatest number of the complaints

made to the SLMM since the ceasefire was signed in Feb. 2002.

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