The Paris Conference on Cambodia: A Multilateral Negotiation that ''Failed''

Tommy T B Koh

Measures of success in any form of human endeavor are generally relative. And, when an effort is made to evaluate the success of a negotiation, particularly one involving many nations and a variety of complex issues, subjectivity plays a dominant role. Does ''success'' in international negotiation equate with reach­ing an agreement? Sometimes, but certainly not always. If a negotiation fails to end with an agreement, is it a failure? Yes and no, depending on who is evaluating the negotiation.

In this brief article, I shall focus on the International Conference on Cam­bodia, a multilateral negotiation that was convened in Paris by the French government from}uly 30 to August 30, 1989, and concluded without a resolu­tion of the major issues that afflict that sorely troubled portion of the world. Because of that lack of agreement, some would call the Paris meeting a "failed" multilateral negotiation. However, an examination of the institutional and procedural aspects of this conference reveals many valuable insights into the' negotiation process from which future negotiators may gain. The following dis­cussion, then, will focus on the process adopted at the conference, rather than the substance of the conflict itself. Nevertheless, some background on Cambo­dia is essential to a full understanding of the negotiations that took place in France during the summer of 1989.

Background In 1970, Prince Norodom Sihanouk was overthrown by his prime minister, General Lon Nol, in a coup d'etat. Sihanouk sought refuge in China and entered into an alliance with the Khmer Rouge to fight Lon Nol. At the same time, Siha­nouk gave his support to North Vietnam and the Vietcong in the Vietnam War. In April 1975, the Khmer Rouge, with the help of the Vietnamese, defeated Lon Nol and seized power, proclaiming itself the Government of Democratic Kampuchea.

'Ibmmy T B Koh is Ambassador of the Republic of Singapore to the United States. His mailing address is: Embassy of the Republic of Singapore, 1824 R Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009.

0748-4526190/0IOO.OOSIS6.00/0 © 1990 Plenum Publishing Corporation Negotiation journal january 1990 81

Seeking to build a new communist society in Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge set out to exterminate all those associated with the old regime, as well as mem­bers of the intelligentsia, the clergy, and minorities. During the years when these massacres were taking place, neither Vietnam nor the members of the Soviet bloc protested. On the contrary, they protected the Khmer Rouge and charac­terized Western criticisms as lies fabricated by the imperialists. On December 25, 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia, overthrew the Khmer Rouge regime, and imposed in its place a puppet government largely composed of former mem­bers of the Khmer Rouge. The regime styled itself the People's Republic of Kam­puchea (PRK).

Since 1979, three guerilla forces-the Khmer Rouge; the FUNCINPEC, led by Prince Sihanouk; and the KPNLF, led by Son Sann-have been fighting against Vietnam and the PRK regime. Although the Khmer Rouge regime was over­thrown by Vietnam in December 1978, Cambodia's seat at the United Nations was occupied by the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1981. In 1982, a coalition government was formed comprising the Khmer Rouge, Sihanouk, and Son Sann. Since that time, Cambodia's seat at the U.N. has been occupied by the coali­tion government.

Vietnam has been unable to exterminate the resistance on the battlefield or to win international recognition for its puppet regime. Vietnam had earlier announced that it would pull its troops out of Cambodia by 1990. It subse­quently revised the timetable and announced that all its troops would leave Cambodia by September 26, 1989. However, in the absence of international verification, we do not know whether all of Vietnam's troops have left Cambodia.

The International Conference on Cambodia France convened last summer's International Conference on Cambodia (ICC) rather than the U.N. for several reasons. First, both Vietnam and the PRK regime had stated that they would not attend a conference held under the auspices of the U.N. Because the General Assembly has, since 1979, annually adopted a resolution on Cambodia that is critical of Vietnam, the Vietnamese and the PRK regime claim that the U.N. is not an impartial forum. They further object to the fact that Cambodia's seat at the United Nations has been occupied by the coalition government opposed to Vietnam instead of by the PRK regime. The second reason for French sponsorship was that nation's historical links with Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, which made it acceptable to Vietnam and the four Cambodian parties. According to various sources, both Vietnam and Siha­nouk had appealed to France to convene the conference. France's good rela­tions with the other countries in Southeast Asia-as well as with China, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom-also worked in its favor ..

Co-Presidency Although the\ ICC was convened by France, it was co-chaired by France and Indonesia. Indonesia had previously convened two rounds of meetings, referred to as the Jakarta Informal Meeting, JIM I and JIM II, which had been attended by representatives of the four Cambodian parties, Vietnam, Laos and the ASEAN countries. 1 The two meetings had succeeded, to some extent, in defining the

82 1bmmy T B Kob Paris Conference on Cambodia

issues and in narrowing the gap between the two sides. Because of the contri­butions Indonesia had already made to the Cambodian peace process, France invited Indonesia to serve as co-president of the ICC.

On the whole, the two co-presidents appeared to work together harmoni­ously. There were occasions, however, when France acted unilaterally, to the considerable embarrassment and resentment of Indonesia. On one such occa­sion, the Indonesian Embassy in Paris went so far as to issue a statement to explain that a proposal put forward by France was a French proposal, and not a proposal of the two co-presidents.

Participation in the Conference One of the first problems confronted by the co-presidents was the issue of who should attend the conference and how should the troublesome question of the participation of the four Cambodian parties be resolved? After much wrangling and negotiation, the co-presidents decided to seat the four Cambodian delega­tions side-by-side behind a large nameplate reading, "Cambodia." Each dele­gation was referred to by the name of its leader. Thus, we had the delegation of Son Sann, the delegation of Prince Sihanouk, the delegation of Khieu Sam­phan (the Khmer Rouge), and the delegation of Hun Sen (PRK). In addition to the four Cambodian parties, the co-presidents invited Vietnam and Laos; the six ASEAN countries; the other four permanent members of the Security Council (China, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom); Austra­lia, Canada, India, and Japan; Zimbabwe as the chair of the Non-Aligned Group; and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

It was, of course, essential to have all four Cambodian parties at the con­ference. Vietnam's presence was also vital because the Cambodian conflict is essentially a conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia. The ASEAN countries were invited because they are the countries of the region and because ASEAN has taken the lead in opposing Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia, as well as in the quest for a comprehensive political settlement to the conflict. It was wise to invite the flve permanent members of the Security Council because the Soviet Union has substantial leverage with Vietnam; because China, the Soviet Union and the U.S. have influence with the Cambodian parties; and because if the Paris conference had succeeded, the Security Council would have to be involved in the implementation of the Paris Agreement.

Canada and India were invited because they were the co-chairs of the Inter­national Control Commission under the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Indochina. Australia and Japan were included because they are in the region, have taken an active interest in the Cambodian peace diplomacy, and could assist in fmanc­ing the U.N. peacekeeping force in Cambodia and in the reconstruction of Cam­bodia. Zimbabwe, the chair of the Non-Aligned Group, was invited because the group has a Standing Committee on Cambodia. Zimbabwe did not, however, take an active part in the conference. In contrast, the delegation of the U.N. Secretary-General, ably led by Rafeeuddin Ahmed, played a very active role in the conference and submitted a number of helpful papers.

Structure of the Conference An unusual feature of the ICC was that it was not preceded by a preparatory meeting of senior officials. The co-presidents did not circulate any draft text

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or draft rules of procedure before the conference. Instead, the ICC began with a short ministerial meeting during which the attending foreign ministers made their general statements, adopted the rules of procedure, and reviewed the agenda. After the departure of the ministers, the conference continued its work in four committees. The ministers returned to Paris for the concluding phase of the conference.

The ftrst committee was given the mandate of deftning the modalities of a ceasef1re and the terms of reference, as well as the principles, that should guide the creation and operation of an effective international control mechan­ism. The second committee was charged with defming the commitments that participating states should undertake to guarantee the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and neutrality of Cambodia; to ensure the cessation and nonrecurrence of all foreign interference and external arms supplies; and to prevent the recurrence of genocidal policies and practices and the return of foreign forces. The goal of the third committee was to deftne the conditions that would enable refugees and displaced persons to return home, if they so desired, and to prepare the main elements of a national plan for the recon­struction of Cambodia.

A fourth committee, called the Ad Hoc Committee, was also established and consisted of the four Cambodian parties, co-chaired by France and Indone­sia. The co-chairs, in consultation with the Cambodian parties, could invite other conference participants to join the committee. At one meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee, for instance, all ftve permanent members of the Security Coun­cil were present, along with Thailand and Vietnam. The mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee was to examine questions regarding the implementation of national reconciliation and the establishment of a quadripartite interim authority under the leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, which would assume responsibility for organizing internationally supervised free elections within a reasonable period of time.

It is clear that of all the four committees, the Ad Hoc Committee was by far the most important. Failure on its part to arrive at an agreement on the internal aspects of the Cambodian conflict would doom the conference itself to failure. After several meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee, it was clear to many of us that, left to themselves, the four Cambodian parties were unable to arrive at a compromise. We therefore welcomed the decision of the co-presidents and the Cambodian parties to include Vietnam, Thailand, China, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom in the next meeting. Although the co-presidents considered this expanded meeting a success, they never explained why they did not invite these additional members to subsequent meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee. In my view, this was a mistake, for there could be no agreement either on the external or the internal aspects of the Cambodian con­flict without the active participation and agreement of Vietnam, China, the Soviet Union, and the United States.

Rules of Procedure There are a number of interesting features of the rules of procedure adopted by the ICC. For one thing, the concept of co-presidency was extended to each of the committees. Thus, the ftrst committee was co-chaired by Canada and India; the second committee by Laos and Malaysia; and the third by Australia

84 1bmmy T B Kob Paris Conference on Cambodia

and Japan. The conference chose a system of co-chairmanship rather than appointing a single chairman for each committee in order to maintain a politi­cal balance in the leadership of each of the committees, an arrangement that was particularly desired by Vietnam and her allies. Of the co-chairs of the ftrst committee, Canada had opposed Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Cam­bodia, whereas India has recognized the PRK regime. Of the co-chairs of the second committee, Laos is an ally of Vietnam, whereas Malaysia had opposed Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia. In the third committee, the co-chairs were Australia and Japan.

In general, I have found that it is better to have a single committee chair rather than co-chairs who may, on occasion, lead a committee to deadlock and paralysis. However, the system of co-chairs worked reasonably well in the ftrst, third, and Ad Hoc Committees of the ICC. The Canadian and Indian co-chairs of the ftrst committee, the Australian and Japanese co-chairs of the third com­mittee, and the French and Indonesian co-chairs of the Ad Hoc Committee were able to conduct their business harmoniously and efficiently. In the second com­mittee, however, progress was impeded by the Laotian chairman's refusal to acquiesce to the wishes of the overwhelming majority in that committee.

The conference also adopted the French proposal that decisions would be made unanimously rather than by consensus or majority vote. I think the French felt, and the conference participants agreed, that if the decisions of the conference were made by a simple majority, it would be impossible to impose them on those who had opposed the decision. The issues on the agenda were of such grave importance to the Cambodians and to some of the participating states that their concurrence would be essential if the agreements arrived at in Paris were to have any prospect of being implemented. The unanimity rule means that every delegation has the right of veto. The power to veto was some­times used in a rather cavalier fashion, especially by the Cambodian parties, in considering amendments submitted by various delegations to the proposals of the co-chairs of the ftrst committee. The option of making decisions by con­sensus was not seriously considered because the consensus rule is susceptible to abuse.

The draft rules of procedure submitted by France also proposed the estab­lishment of a conference bureau, consisting of the co-presidents of the confer­ence, the co-chairs of the committees and the Secretary-General of the conference. This proposal was rejected because many delegations feared that the conference bureau might abuse its power and seek to impose its views on the conference at large. In the absence of a conference bureau, the function of coordinating the work of the conference was given to the coordinating com­mittee, which consisted of all members of the conference. This alternative worked reasonably well because of the limited size of the conference. If the ICC had had a much larger membership, a smaller bureau or steering commit­tee would probably have been required.

Role of the Five Great Powers It is my impression that the ftve permanent members of the Security Council­China, France, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom­wanted to resolve the Cambodian conflict. Prior to the Paris conference, the representatives of the ftve great powers had held a series of meetings at the

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United Nations and, in a remarkable show of unanimity, they had adopted a paper on the mandate of the international control mechanism. This paper was submitted by the French delegation, on behalf of the five delegations, to the ftrSt committee. During the Paris conference, the representatives of the five met regularly. They did not, however, produce any texts or solutions to the out­standing problems. And, despite the collective desire of the five great powers to settle the Cambodian conflict, the Paris conference failed. The lesson I learned from this experience is that the agreement of the five great powers is a neces­sary, but not a sufficient, condition for the resolution of regional conflicts.

Why the Paris Conference Failed The conference failed because Vietnam and the four Cambodian parties could not agree on five core issues. These were: (1) power-sharing in the quadripar­tite interim authority, pending free elections; (2) the auspices under which the international control mechanism would be established; (3) the use of the term genocide to describe the atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge; ( 4) the ques­tion of Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia; and (5) the modalities of a ceaseftre. Of these five central issues, the most important was the question of power­sharing. If this issue could have been resolved, agreements concerning the others would have fallen into place.

The conference therefore broke down because of the participants' failure to arrive at a compromise on power-sharing in the interim period prior to the holding of free elections. Hun Sen was not prepared to give Sihanouk substan­tive executive powers. This was amply demonstrated by the fact that he rejected a French proposal of August 19 that named him as the prime minister of an interim coalition government and gave him substantially greater powers than Sihanouk. Hun Sen was prepared to accept Sihanouk only as a figurehead. Viet­nam and Hun Sen also backtracked from an earlier agreement to consider the inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in an interim government as contained in the paper on the organization of work of the conference.

The Timing of the Conference One might assume that timing was another factor in the conference's failure to produce agreements. The timing of any multilateral conference is critical. The convener must be satisfied that the problem is ripe and that the parties are genuinely ready to seek a solution before calling a conference. In this case, I do not think it would be fair to blame the French government for mistiming the conference. Like France, I thought we had a 50 percent chance of achiev­ing a breakthrough and, at the outset, I was encouraged by the following fac­tors: (1) it was my impression that China and the Soviet Union wanted to settle the conflict; (2) the fact that the five permanent members of the Security Council were able to adopt a common paper on the mandate of the international con­trol mechanism led me to believe that the five great powers also wanted a solu­tion to the Cambodian conflict; (3) the two superpowers' desire to extricate themselves from the regional conflicts of the Third World, and their coopera­tion in resolving some of them; (4) I thought Vietnam wanted a settlement because it would end her international isolation, lift the barrier blocking the flow of Western aid and give Vietnam a chance to resuscitate her stagnant econ­omy; (5) I also thought that the four Cambodian parties wanted a settlement;

86 Tommy T B Kob Paris Conference on Cambodia

and (6) the Jakarta Informal Meetings had improved the atmosphere and appeared to have narrowed the gap between the adversaries.

Why then, did Vietnam and Hun Sen harden their positions at the Paris conference? It appears that in the midst of the conference, from August 14 to 21, the Politburo and the Central Committee met in Hanoi. According to vari­ous reports, the hardliners prevailed and the Vietnamese leadership retreated into ideological orthodoxy, deciding that they would make no concessions in Paris. The survival of Najibullah in KabuF may also have encouraged Vietnam to believe that Hun Sen could survive against his opponents. Hun Sen could count upon the massive supply of arms from Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Vietnam has also announced, on two occasions, that, if necessary, it would re-intervene in Cambodia.

Conclusion What lessons can we learn from the ICC about multilateral negotiations? First, it is always helpful, perhaps necessary, to prepare carefully before convening an international conference. If France had held preparatory meetings with the senior officials, either the prospects of the conference would have improved, or France would have realized that Vietnam was not ready to strike a com­promise. Second, the agreement of the five permanent members of the Secu­rity Council is a necessary, but not a sufficient, reason for successful resolution of regional conflicts in the Third World. The Soviet Union was either unwill­ing or unable to persuade Vietnam to seek a compromise in Paris. Third, in the case of regional conflicts in the Third World, the key to the solution is often held not by the great powers alone, but in concert with the regional players. Fourth, although it is preferable to have a single chair presiding over a conference or committee, a system of co-chairs can sometimes work-if the co-chairs are carefully chosen and if they were able to work in tandem. Fifth, timing is of the utmost importance. In the case of the Cambodian conflict, the Vietnamese have not yet given up their aspiration for hegemony over Cambo­dia. This is why Vietnam and its surrogate, Hun Sen, rejected compromise at the conference table and preferred to take the contest to the battlefield. We must now await a stalemate on the battlefield in order to force Vietnam and Hun Sen back to the conference table.

NOI'E

This article is an adaptation of a talk presented by the author to the American Academy of Diplomacy and the School of Advanced International Studies at Georgetown University on November 1, 1989 in Washington, D.C.

1. The acronym ASEAN refers to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, whose six mem­bers are Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.

2. Najibullah is the head of the Kabul, Afghanistan regime that was placed in power by the Soviet Union following its invasion in December 1979. The Najibullah regime is opposed by the Afghan freedom fighters called the "Mujahiden."

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