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The Paradox of Altruism

Can the Meme Concept Contribute to the Explanation of

the existence of Altruism?

by

Theo Jef Clark, BEd, BSc

A thesis submitted as partial fulfilment for the Degree of Bachelor of

Science with Honours

in the

Faculty of Science,

Griffith University,

Queensland.

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Abstract

One of the cental theoretical problems of sociobiology is the 'paradox of altruism'. How

can altruists survive when the selfish can take advantage of them? I examine the three

favoured biological theories for the evolution of altruism, and show that they fail to

completely explain human altruism. Susan Blackmore in her book The Meme Machine,

argues that it can be explained by the evolution of units of culture, memes. I will give

detailed consideration to her claims, and advance some of my own. My own claims

mainly consist of the major role group selection (of memes) has had in the evolution of

altruism. I find that if we accept meme theory, then memetic group selection has

considerable explanatory power. I also analyse meme theory as a general, scientific,

causal explanation (specifically the ontology of cause and effect as proposed in some

recent philosophy of science). This is important because when we are trying to explain

a phenomenon, we search for its cause. If we find the cause, we have then explained

why the phenomenon has come to be. Altruism is one such phenomenon, and memes

for altruism seem to potentially offer a genuine causal explanation to the 'paradox of

altruism'.

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Declaration This work has not previously been submitted for a degree or diploma in any university.

Also, to the best of my knowledge, no material in this dissertation has been previously

published except where due reference is made.

Signed:

Date:

Place:

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Contents

PREFACE ........................................................................................................................................................... 4

INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM STATED.......................................................................................... 7

The ‘Paradox of Altruism’...........................................................................................................................7

Human Nature.............................................................................................................................................9

Evolutionary Theory ..................................................................................................................................10

Ends and Means ........................................................................................................................................13

Hobbes vs Rousseau...................................................................................................................................14

CHAPTER 1: THE BIOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF ALTRUISM ............................................................... 17

Kin Selection..............................................................................................................................................17

Reciprocal Altruism and Tit-for-Tat ..........................................................................................................19

Group Selection .........................................................................................................................................21

What Remains to be Explained? ................................................................................................................25

CHAPTER 2: THE NEW REPLICATOR................................................................................................ 29

The Misunderstood Metaphor....................................................................................................................31

Familial Evasion and Dipteran Mastication..............................................................................................32

Replication and Lamarckian Acquisition ..................................................................................................34

CHAPTER 3: THE MEMETIC ACCOUNT OF ALTRUISM .................................................................... 38

Memetic and Genetic Interaction ..............................................................................................................39

Kev and Gav ...............................................................................................................................................41

Greed is Good! ...........................................................................................................................................42

The Coevolution of Memes and Genes.......................................................................................................43

A Modest Altruistic Act ..............................................................................................................................46

The Ultimate Altruistic Act ........................................................................................................................48

Group Selection Revisited ..........................................................................................................................52

CHAPTER 4: EXPLANATION AND CAUSATION ................................................................................. 58

The Ontology of Cause...............................................................................................................................58

Wittgenstein's Meme..................................................................................................................................61

Information Transfer.................................................................................................................................63

CONCLUSION: HAS THE 'PARADOX' BEEN RESOLVED?.................................................................. 68

A Possible History of Altruism ..................................................................................................................69

The Real Question .....................................................................................................................................72

BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................................................. 74

INDEX.............................................................................................................................................................. 81

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Preface

My original intention with this work was for it to be an evaluation of the 'paradox of

altruism' and the theories that have attempted to resolve it. The hypothesis advanced

by Susan Blackmore in The Meme Machine was the inspiration and was to be the

main focus of this dissertation. As the writing and research on this subject advanced,

however, I started to develop ideas (or rather memes) of my own. As consequence, I

have not only evaluated current evolutionary theories of altruism, but also thrown in

my own 'ten cents worth' as it were, and forwarded hypotheses of my own. Of most

note, is the major role I have given group selection (of memes) in the evolution of

altruism. This was not my original aim. Indeed, I had always considered group

selection to be at best an extremely minor force in evolution. It still probably is when it

comes to biological evolution, but as my work progressed it became apparent that

memetic group selection has considerable explanatory power. Consequently, this

thesis is not only an examination of the 'paradox of altruism'; it also builds upon

current theories.

There are a few points to note regarding the consistency of referencing in this thesis.

If there is no page number given, it is for one of three reasons:

1. I have taken some references from The Science Show on the ABC's Radio

National as well as the documentary series Evolution. So there is obviously no

page number to give. For example, '(Dawkins, 2000)' is a reference to The

Science Show. (Transcripts are available from the ABC's web site.)

2. '(Forge, 2002a)' refers to a chapter from his yet to be published book Science

and Responsibility, and '(Forge, 2002b)' refers to a personal communication with

my supervisor John Forge.

3. All other references without page numbers are from online material.

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Otherwise all references have page numbers. I use quite a few footnotes for either

interesting digressions that may or may not be directly relevant to the main text, or to

qualify or add to a point that I am making.

This thesis is grounded in the world of science, yet it is essentially philosophical. Thus

parts of it are quite speculative. This, I believe, is what makes the most interesting

science writing – the most interesting. Many of the authors in the bibliography who do

this have been my inspiration. With regard to writing about biology and evolution, of

most note are Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Stephen Jay Gould, Matt Ridley,

Edward Wilson, and of course the man who started it all, Charles Darwin. To them I

give my thanks and to the reader I highly recommend their works. They understand (or

understood) that good science has never been just about unearthing 'facts'. It is about

unearthing our place in the cosmos. Philosophy ignorant of science is often vacuous –

it lacks the 'knowledge' to find the wisdom it so boldly proclaims to love. And science

ignorant of philosophy is often insipid and soporific – it lacks the 'wisdom' to know

what knowledge is worth knowing.

Though I have been inspired by the writings of those above, inspiration has its

greatest effect when it is personal. First and foremost, I would like to thank my

supervisor Assoc. Prof. John Forge for, not only his encouragement and support, but

also for his ability to see the 'overall picture' and place things in the right context and

the right order. (And also for giving me the freedom to tackle the topic of my choice in

my own way.) I also would like to thank my parents, Jef and Kathy Clark, for their

genes and memes, without which I would not have been able to write this. In particular

my father for his help in clarifying some of my ideas. He has always been my

intellectual sounding board, and even when I was 'knee high to a grasshopper' he has

always treated me as capable of understanding the most interesting and important

ideas of science and philosophy. I also need to thank two friends, Evan Chalk and

Ben Retschlag. Both of them helped shape and select many of the memes in this

thesis, and Evan started me down this path by lending me his copy of Matt Ridley's

The Origins of Virtue and buying me a copy of The Meme Machine as a birthday

present. Knowing these two has tripled my research capabilities. The one person who

I owe the greatest thanks, who inspires me to be the best I can, is my beautiful wife

Catherine. She has given me incredible support, not just in my academic endeavours,

but in all the areas of my life. May we pass on many memes (and maybe some genes)

in the years to come.

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Introduction: The Problem Stated

"[With Darwin] Nature became a seething slum, with everyone scrambling to get

out, rushing to break from the rat-pack. Only the few survived, bettering

themselves by creating new dynasties. Most remained trapped on the breadline,

destined to struggle futilely, neighbours elbowing one another aside to get ahead,

the weak trampled underfoot." (Adrian Desmond & James Moore, 1991: 449).

"It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we

expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest." (Adam Smith, 1776:

27).

"It is extremely doubtful whether the offspring of the more sympathetic and

benevolent parents, or of those who were the most faithful to their comrades,

would be reared in greater numbers than the children of selfish and treacherous

parents belonging to the same tribe. He who was ready to sacrifice his life, as

many a savage has been, rather than betray his comrades, would often leave no

offspring to inherit his noble nature. The bravest men, who were always willing to

come to the front in war, and who freely risked their lives for others, would on an

average perish in larger numbers than other men. Therefore it hardly seems

probable, that the number of men gifted with such virtues, or that the standard of

their excellence, could be increased through natural selection, that is, by the

survival of the fittest..." (Charles Darwin, 1871: 130).

The ‘Paradox of Altruism’

A young man, riding his horse in the country, comes across a leper. Perhaps feeling a

sense of pity, he springs from his horse, throws his arms around the leper and kisses

his hand. He gives the man what money he can afford and rides on, beginning what

would become a long vocation in aiding lepers (Chesterson, 1923: 60). Swearing off

all worldly goods, this same man then lived with a self-inflicted paucity of possessions

compared to even the most wretched and downtrodden; he grovelled for the blackest

and worst bread he could get and even swapped clothes with a beggar (Chesterson,

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1923: 76-77). How do we explain such altruism? For this young man was indeed an

altruist throughout his entire life.

I’m not sure that it is possible to explain altruism of the likes of St Francis of Assisi,1

but the example of his life leads to the more general question: "Why are humans

altruistic?" Not all humans are altruistic of course, but we can still ask why are some

humans altruistic and, at the very least, why do most humans seem to have some kind

of altruistic tendency? The answer may seem obvious to many people, but for

biologists and philosophers who have an understanding of Darwinian theory, the

'paradox of altruism' is a seemingly grave problem. Indeed, it can been can be seen

as the central theoretical problem with regards to the biological basis of behaviour

(Wilson, 1975: 3). It is the central problem because altruism is an act performed by an

individual that increases another individual's welfare, at the expense of its own

(Dawkins, 1976: 4).2 Within the ‘nature is red in tooth and claw’ Darwinian paradigm,

altruism is a behaviour that, seemingly, should not be able to evolve as an adaptive

strategy. Yet, unless we think altruism is a frequently occurring ‘accident’, apparently it

has.

What kind of account/explanation have evolutionary theorists attempted to build? If

altruism was restricted to only certain periods of time, and to only certain locations, it

would then appear that altruism is only a product of specific local factors, such as

culture, economics, religious beliefs, etc. However, altruism seems to be universal, in

that it can be seen in some shape or form in all human societies (Ridley, 1996: 6-7).

We need a form of explanation which accounts for this. As we shall see, humans are

the products of evolution. So any explanation needs to take into account of, or at least

not be in direct conflict with, Darwinian theory.

1 There are many incidents in his life that led to such extreme altruism, including religious dreams and visions, which he believed dictated his destiny, that of a life of altruism. Sadly, and ironically, the order which St. Francis founded, the Franciscans, came to represent much of what he despised, including the direction of the Inquisition in many countries. Of course, many notable men were Franciscans: Roger Bacon, Duns Scotus and William of Occam (Russell, 1946: 442-443). 2 This accords well with our usual understanding of what an altruist is, namely, someone who puts the interests of other before his or her own. Altruistic acts need to be distinguished from acts that would be considered morally right or wrong, for moral acts normally encompass everyone's interests, including the agent (Singer, 1993: 11-12). From the universal standpoint, the perspective of an ethicist, altruistic acts can seem superfluous.

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Human Nature

Central to the evolutionary perspective is the following premise – there is a

fundamental human nature. This fundamental nature is elusive, as culture plays such

a large role in shaping behaviour. But there must be a fundamental human nature, or

(as pointed out by Ridley 1993: 3 & 1996: 6) a psychiatrist would not be able to

assume that a patient understands love, envy, fear, anger, laughter, dreaming etc.,

which are universal themes in all human cultures. In 1945, the American

anthropologist George P. Murdock listed the universals of culture for every one of the

hundreds of societies studied at that time. He found that there were sixty-seven

universals, including cooking, sport, gift-giving, medicine, luck superstition, religious

ritual, games... the list goes on (Wilson, 1998: 162). There seems to be a core base of

behaviours and emotions that are not solely the products of culture. These

fundamentals are simply the product of being human. Once we accept this, we must

also accept that this fundamental nature is a product of human evolutionary history.3

Humans are products of evolution. We still have, as David Buss calls it, stone-age

minds in a modern environment. He comes to this belief because human recorded

history is an 'eye blink' compared to human evolutionary history. For the last several

million years our hominid ancestors (including our direct Homo sapien ancestors) lived

in hunter-gatherer groups (Buss, 2000). From this line of reasoning, we can conclude

that our brains have been adapted to suit this lifestyle, and have only just recently

(comparatively speaking) been thrust into this new non-hunter-gatherer world of our

creation. There simply hasn't been enough time for natural selection to work on

civilised humans in any discernible way.4

Another way of demonstrating this is by considering the percentage of hominid

evolution that has not been of the hunter-gatherer variety. Hominids separated from

ancestral apes between 10 and 6 million years ago and the first stone artefacts date

3 Though not all these behaviours are necessarily the products of evolution (Wilson, 1998: 162). 4 Some minor evolutionary changes have occurred. 70% of Western Europeans by descent have a lactose tolerance, compared to only 30% of non-Europeans. Evolutionary theory suggests that because Dairy production started in Western Europe a few thousand years ago, Western Europeans have evolved a tolerance for lactose to a greater extent than non-Europeans (Ridley, 1999: 192-193). Of course, psychological changes are not minor.

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back to about 2.4 or 2.5 million years (Klein, 1989: 399-403). These ancestral species

were hunter-gatherers. Agricultural food production and animal domestication only

began about 11,000 years ago (Diamond, 1997: 86). Using these figures (2.5 million

and 11,000) we can see that from the Stone Age to the present, humans have only

used agriculture for 0.44 percent of this time. 99.56 percent of hominid evolution has

consisted of groups that hunt and gather. Even if I am extremely conservative and

only consider the evolution of anatomically modern humans, coming into existence

between 200,000 and 50,000 years ago (Klein, 1989: 344), taking the value between

these two numbers (125,000 years), 91.2 percent of modern human evolution has

been spent in hunter-gatherer societies. This is merely another way of emphasising

Buss's point; though our societies may be modern, our baser instincts are not. They

are the products of our evolutionary history.5

Evolutionary Theory

In order for this paradox to make any sense, one needs a firm understanding of

Darwin’s evolutionary theory of descent with modification by means of natural

selection. Put in an explicit form, biological evolution by natural selection requires the

following three conditions:

Condition 1: Variation – Individuals within a species (as well as species

themselves) vary in many ways. Offspring vary amongst themselves, and are not

carbon copies of an archetype.

Condition 2: Hereditary – Some of the variations in characteristics that affect

survival and reproductive success are transmitted to offspring.

Condition 3: Competition – All organisms tend to be superfecund. They produce

more offspring than can possibly survive, due to the fact that there are a limited

number of resources for individuals to compete for (nature is finite).

When these conditions are met, we have the inevitable consequence:

5 A recent article in Nature has argued that the gene FOXP2 (specifically the human allele) is essential to the development of language. Emphasising that language is a prerequisite for the development of complex culture, they believe that the human FOXP2 allele became dominant within the last 200,000 years of human history (Enard, W. et al., 2002: 869-871). That is, the evolution of language coincided with the evolution of anatomically modern humans. This may be the birth date of (the yet to be introduced) memes.

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Process and Result 1: Adaptation – Individuals survive and reproduce with varying

degrees of success. The reason why some are more successful is the principle of

Natural Selection. If many offspring must die, then statistically, on average,

survivors will tend to be individuals whose characteristics are best 'adapted' to the

local environment.

Process and Result 2: Divergence and Speciation – Since heredity in organisms

exists, the offspring will tend to resemble their surviving parents. The surviving

parents have the successful characteristics and thus, over time, the general

population will come to resemble the most successful procreators. The

accumulation of successful characteristics over time produces evolutionary

change.6

Given that both physical and behavioural variation amongst individuals within a

species occurs, there will be some variations that give survival and reproductive

advantages to the individuals who have them. Thanks to hereditary, over time these

advantages will accumulate in the general population by natural selection. That is,

nature ‘selects’ the individuals who are the best adapted, to survive and reproduce. If

a certain behaviour gives an organism a survival and reproductive advantage, then it

will be selected for. Given this, how could altruism evolve when we know it increases

the welfare of another at the expense of the individual who is performing the altruistic

act? Altruistic acts are disadvantageous to the survival and reproduction of the

organism that performs them. Performing an altruistic act decreases the organism’s

fitness and in ‘the struggle for existence’, only the fit will survive. The 'fact' of altruistic

human behaviour, combined with the acceptance of the above principles, leads to the

'paradox of altruism'.

Before we move on, it is important to understand what, exactly, is meant by the term

'fitness'. A plain and simple definition for fitness is how well an organism is adapted.

Though fitness can be conceptually useful (which is why I use it), it is actually

unnecessary for explaining evolution by natural selection. Darwin never used the

expression, 'survival of the fittest' in the first edition of The Origin; it was coined by

6 This outline of natural selection is from (Clark, 2002).

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Herbert Spencer (Ruse, 1999: 208).7 In my outline of evolution by natural selection

there was also no mention of fitness. The concept of fitness, it has been argued, has a

fundamental problem – it is essentially tautological. The definition of fitness 'begs the

question'. Karl Popper claimed that the statement 'survival of the fittest', actually

means, 'survival of those who survive', which tells us nothing (Popper, 1972: 241-242).

This is because fitness is defined as surviving. According to Popper, even adaptation

runs the risk of tautology. Thus a large part of Darwinian theory, Popper concluded,

was not empirical, but based on a logical truism (Popper, 1972: 69).

Defining the adaptation and fitness of an organism simply as having qualities that

allowed it to survive is a mistake. It says nothing about the niche an organism inhabits

nor the instincts it displays which affect survival and reproduction. With these

qualifications, natural selection, 'survival of the fittest', is empirical. One can

hypothesise on the adaptive advantage or disadvantage of a particular characteristic

of an organism, its 'fitness', in its environment. As we will see, this is exactly what

evolutionary biologists do, and have done, with great success. With regards to the

'paradox of altruism', fitness is an extremely useful concept, simply because of its lack

of prolixity. It enables clarity and precision with evolutionary explanations.8

How can we give an evolutionary account of altruism? Certainly there are many

examples of the seemingly unavoidable and nasty consequence of the 'struggle for

existence' and Howard Bloom provides them in The Lucifer Principle: a pride of lions

slaughtering a gazelle, sea birds feasting on thousands of freshly hatched turtles with

less than a dozen making it to the safety of the ocean, and warring troupes of

7 As a matter of fact, Darwin didn't particularly like the word evolution, which literally means unfolding, as it implies some sort of progress or goal. Darwinian evolution, as we now call it, was in Darwin's vernacular, 'descent with modification'. As with 'survival of the fittest' the word evolution gained currency through promotion by Spencer (Gould, 1996: 137). 8 We could say, for example: "With two or more organisms competing with each other, on average, the organism with the greatest fitness will win. In general, therefore, we would expect selfish organisms to out-compete altruists, as performing an altruistic act decreases the altruist's fitness". We can reframe this explanation replacing 'fitness' with 'adaptation'. "With two or more organisms competing with each other, on average, the organism that is best adapted will win. In general, therefore, we would expect selfish organisms to out-compete altruists as selfish organisms' instincts and behaviours are better adapted to their social environment. Altruists, through their behaviour, give selfish organisms survival and reproductive advantages." The second explanation is less preferable because, not only is it convoluted, it required greater effort on my part to write it than did the first. As long as we are aware of the potential for tautology when we frame our evolutionary explanations, especially for behaviour, fitness is a useful concept.

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chimpanzees killing males of a rival group for their sexually active females. With good

reason he entitled his chapter, Mother Nature, the Bloody Bitch (1995: 23-29). The

simple logic of natural selection would seem to dictate the inevitable descent into

discordant behaviour. As Robert Wright explains (perhaps somewhat overstating the

case):

Think of it: zillions and zillions of organisms running around, each under the same

hypnotic spell of a single truth, all these truths identical, and all logically

incompatible with one another: "My hereditary material is the most important

material on earth; its survival justifies your frustration, pain, even death." And you

are one of these organisms, living your life in the thrall of a logical absurdity (1994:

338).

With this we enter the domain of sociobiology. Sociobiologists argue that first and

foremost, the social behaviour of animals is firmly under the control of genes. Through

natural selection, this behaviour has been shaped into forms that give survival and

reproductive advantages to animals. Sociobiologists take the view (rightly I believe)

that although humans seem to be able to make conscious decisions and have culture;

we are, nevertheless, still animals (Ruse & Wilson, 1985: 50).9 'Sociobiology' is a term

coined by Edward Wilson (in his book Sociobiology (1975)). Wilson saw the role of

sociobiology as that of placing the social sciences within a biological framework

(Wilson, 1976: 342). It seeks to explain behaviour, by showing it as an adapted

strategy to secure the fitness (survival and replication) of the individual and their

genes (Rosenberg, 1998: 892). As pointed out by Robert Wright (2000): "There’s one

commandment of natural selection, which is do anything it takes to keep your genes

into the next generation. That’s not a commandment that I think we should try to live

by... [But] that is the logic that shaped all life on this planet, including ours, and we

really can’t profess to know ourselves in any profound way unless we understand

Darwinian theory". As humans are Darwinian creatures, and as most of us act

altruistically at one time or another, the 'paradox of altruism' applies directly to us.

Ends and Means

9 Sociobiology applied to humans is now generally called evolutionary psychology – theories about human psychology grounded within the Darwinian paradigm. For the sake of simplicity I will still refer to evolutionary psychology as sociobiology.

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My intention in this dissertation is to examine the three favoured biological theories for

the evolution of altruism, and show that they fail to completely explain human altruism.

The reason for the inadequacies of these explanations is that culture has such a large

affect on human behaviour. Though we cannot explain human altruism completely

when we limit evolutionary explanations to the world of biology, Susan Blackmore in

her book The Meme Machine (1999a), argues that it can be explained by the evolution

of units of culture, memes. I will give detailed consideration to her claims, and advance

some of my own. I will try to be sympathetic to meme theory and grant Blackmore (and

others) the ‘benefit of the doubt’ and give them a 'fair go'. This is done in order to see

the kinds of memetic explanations that may be possible. Meme theory offers a

refreshingly different way to dissect culture. As a method of breaking culture down into

discrete units, memetics seems to have the potential to be a causal account of

altruism.

This thesis is comprised of this introduction, four chapters and the conclusion. Chapter

one examines the current thinking in evolutionary biology with regards to the evolution

of altruism. Specifically, I look at the successes and the shortcomings of kin selection,

reciprocal altruism and group selection. Chapter two gives a brief history of the

concept of memes and examples of some of the kinds of problems meme theory

seeks to explain.10 Chapter three delves further into meme theory – part exegesis,

part extension – of Blackmore’s memetic theory of altruism. It consists of the main

arguments for the memetic account of altruism. As a result, it is the longest chapter.

Chapter four consists of an analysis of meme theory as a general, scientific, causal

explanation (specifically the ontology of cause and effect as proposed in some recent

philosophy of science). We are then able to judge whether it is possible that memes

are the 'cause' of much human altruism. The conclusion is a recapitulation and

reiteration of the main points of the thesis. This includes my own account of a possible

history of the evolution of altruism in humans and whether or not the 'paradox' can

finally be laid to rest.

Hobbes vs Rousseau

The central question of this dissertation then, is this:

10 NB: Parts of this chapter are drawn from my book review of Susan Blackmore's The Meme Machine in Australian Rationalist (Clark, 2000).

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If 'do anything it takes to propel your genes into the next generation' is the one

commandment of natural selection, and human psychology has been shaped by

natural selection, and natural selection more often than not is 'red in tooth and

claw', then how can we explain any altruistic behaviour, let alone human morality?

This became an important question once we understood that human beings are

Darwinian creatures. Altruism can be seen as the basis of a moral sense in humans; a

sense of right and wrong. The evolution of altruism was an essential precursor to the

development of social cohesion, which in turn has led to morality and ethics. The

implication of evolutionary theory is that given our understanding of how altruism

evolved, can we say that we are truly altruistic? And, depending on this answer, can

we say we are truly moral?11

Was Hobbes correct in Leviaththan? Without the protection of society, government,

and laws; in a natural state, is there: "... continuall feare [sic], and danger of violent

death; And the life of man, solitary, poore [sic], nasty, brutish, and short" (Hobbes,

1651: 186)? Or was Rousseau correct in believing that in a natural state men are

compassionate, good, assist those who are suffering and live a life free of misery

(Rousseau, 1754: 162-166)? I must admit to stacking the deck in this introduction, in

that it would seem (with our Darwinian goggles on at least) we must agree with

Hobbes. However, there are ideas in evolutionary biology that argue the opposite.

Perhaps Rousseau was closer to the truth? Hobbes and Rousseau were both writing

without the benefit of Darwin's theory, and so we cannot expect their understanding of

the natural world to be on par with our own. Yet, in many ways, they were both correct.

The paradox of altruism is that logically we would expect Hobbes to be right. In nature,

as governed by natural selection, it would seem that life should be nasty, brutish, and

short. But evidently, when we go and look for ourselves, Rousseau's beliefs are not

without merit. There are plenty of examples of compassion – of the strong assisting

the weak.

11 Indeed, as I mentioned in a previous footnote, an altruist is not necessarily moral. If one was to take the deontological view of Kant – where a moral action is one that is done from a respect for duty – one is not moral even if one is naturally inclined to perform a moral act. To be moral, it must be done out of a sense of duty for the act itself (Popkin & Stroll, 1993: 45). If we hold this view, we would consider an act of altruism such as saving a child from a house fire moral, only if it was performed because the altruist felt it was their duty to do so, not merely as an act of instinct. Although altruistic acts and moral acts are not necessarily the same, without a basis of altruism it is hard to imagine that we would have the concepts of morality and ethics at all.

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As we shall see, in a given system of evolving behavioural strategies, often it is the

altruistic ones which fare the best. This conclusion works for both biologically and

culturally based altruism. Most people understand that evolutionary theory applies to

biology, which in turn leads to the conclusion that biologically based behaviour must,

at least to some degree, be the product of evolutionary processes. But I said cultural

as well as biological. If there are universals of human culture, and assuming the

majority of these universals are the product of human nature, then when we find

differences in cultures, they are not likely to be biologically based. They may still be,

however, the product of a Darwinian process. But this is getting ahead of myself.

Before we examine the memetic theory of altruism, we must see where the state of

play now lies with the biological account.

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Chapter 1: The Biological Account of Altruism

"There’s one commandment of natural selection, which is do anything it takes to

keep your genes into the next generation ...that is the logic that shaped all life on

this planet." (Robert Wright, 2000).

"We must however acknowledge as it seems to me, man with all his noble

qualities, with sympathy which feels for the most debased, with benevolence which

extends not only to other men but to the humblest living creature, with his godlike

intellect which has penetrated into the movements and constitution of solar

system, with all these exalted powers, man still bears in his bodily frame, the

indelible stamp of his lowly origin." (Charles Darwin, 1871: 619)

Now that I have outlined the 'paradox of altruism' we need to look at the various

solutions to it, that have been proposed within the Darwinian worldview. There are

three main contenders, all of which could in fact be at work together. That is, they are

not mutually exclusive. They are kin selection, reciprocal altruism and group selection

(Segerstrale, 2000: 53). The purpose of this chapter then, is this: by examining these

attempts at explaining the evolution of altruism, we shall see how they have only been

partially successful; hence the problem still remains. Once this has been established,

as we still are lacking a complete explanation for altruism, we have reason enough to

give careful consideration to other evolutionary accounts. In this case we will go on to

consider the evolution culture, of memes.

Kin Selection

Kin selection was the first and most obvious breakthrough to the 'paradox' resulting

from the idea that what really counts in terms of fitness and survival of the fittest, is not

the survival of the organism itself, but the number of copies of its genes that are

brought into existence. Understanding evolution in this way leads to the conclusion

that the best way to ensure the propagation of one’s genes, may not just be by having

18

children. Genes can make it into the next generation by way of relatives such as

nephews, nieces, brothers, sisters, etc. This can be a very effective way of bringing

more genes into the world, as has been successfully demonstrated with ants and bees

(Ridley, 2000).

The biologist J.B.S. Haldane was once asked if he would risk death by drowning to

save his own brother. "No," replied Haldane, "but I would to save two brothers or eight

cousins." (cited by Morton, 2000).12 Though this was a facetious reply, the answer was

a good illustration of the principle behind kin selection. If a behaviour that is costly to

an individual but benefits its relatives (such as sharing food with siblings), is coded for

by a gene (or genes), it will increase its frequency in the gene pool by natural

selection, because the individual's relatives, more likely than not, will carry the same

gene themselves. Genetically based altruism can evolve as long as the cost of the

altruistic behaviour is offset by its benefit to relatives (Okasha, 2002: 139). The units

of selection are the genes. Altruistic acts towards kin are considered merely as

strategies that increase the likelihood of genetic replication. Here is an evolutionary

explanation for the saying 'blood is thicker than water'.13 Humans tend to love and

value family to a greater extent than non-family, so we can see this as a form of kin

selection.

Of course, true kin selection only requires altruistic behaviour to be aimed at relatives.

Given this, how do we then explain altruistic behaviour of humans and other animals

towards non-relatives? Robert Trivers developed the idea of reciprocal altruism, an

answer that covers many scenarios, and certainly seems to be one of the most

promising answers to the 'paradox of altruism'.

12 I am reminded of the Christian parable of the father left with a similar choice. His fishing boat is sinking, and on it is his son and his son's friend, both who cannot swim. The father, left with the choice of saving one or the other, against kin selection, opts to save his son's friend. What possible reason could he have for such a strange choice? He yells to his son: "I'll see you in heaven son! Your soul is already saved as you are a Christian." He didn't know if his son's friend was a Christian, so on the chance that he wasn't, he saved him in order to save his soul. 13 It is important to note that the strategy of kin selection (in its strictest sense) does not automatically apply and indeed is quite rare (Dennett, 1995: 478). A large number of animals including – praying mantises, some birds, wild dogs and pigs – practice siblicide and kill their own brothers and sisters. The current thinking is that parents deliberately produce too many offspring for the limited resources, thus fierce competition has led to siblicide (Millar & Lambart, 2000: 30). Even so, the idea of kin selection has been well establish with many species.

19

Reciprocal Altruism and Tit-for-Tat

Richard Dawkins uses vampire bats as an example of reciprocal altruism. These bats

go out at night and look for an animal to suck blood from. If a bat is lucky and

manages to find an animal, it usually engorges itself and has much more blood than it

actually needs. There are other nights when a bat will come home hungry having not

found any blood. This can be fatal as they need constant topping up in order to

survive. This situation is tailor-made for reciprocal altruism. There is a lot to be gained

by the bats who have a lot of blood, if they give some to the bats who do not. They

can expect to get paid back by those same individuals on another night when the luck

has been reversed (Dawkins, 2000). Reciprocal altruism of this kind is a real life

example of a game theory strategy known as Tit-for-Tat.14

Tit-for-tat has its origins in a game called the Prisoner's Dilemma (this explanation is

based on Nicholson, 2002: 254). It goes by the name Prisoner's Dilemma because the

best known way to explain this game is to imagine a situation where two prisoners

have been caught for the same crime; they are faced with the choice of giving

evidence against each other to reduce their sentence. If neither of them ‘defect’

(acting in a fashion that is unfavourable to another individual, in this case giving

evidence against the other person), due to lack of evidence, they can only be

convicted on a lesser charge (a two year sentence). If one defects he will get a 'slap

on the wrist' (six month sentence), as long as the other one stays quiet (who will be

charged for all the crime and get ten years).15 Of course, if they both defect, they will

both be charged for the crime (and get three years each). The mathematical

representation of this dilemma can be seen in the following payoff matrix: 14 Game theory is a method of analysing the strategies of 'actors' in situations of potential cooperation or conflict (Dowding, 1999: 348). 15 Throughout this dissertation I have chosen to use the impersonal masculine pronoun, 'he' or 'him', rather than 'he/she' or 'him/her'. I have done this simply because I prefer to use the normal 'evolved' English vernacular, rather than the awkward or inelegant construction sometimes mandated by self-appointed controllers of speech and writing. As Irish writer Brigid Brophy says, it is a product of: "...leaden literalness of mind... [and] their tin ear and insensibility to the metaphorical contents of language." (cited in Fowler's Modern English Usage.) I could also have alternated between 'she' and 'he' in order to avoid offending those who care, but this would have been somewhat disingenuous. To me at least, it has never implied that one is biased towards a particular sex, it just happens to be the nature of the English language. Just as it is the nature of the French and German languages for all nouns to fall into specific gender groups. The simplest solution to this rather pointless manifestation of 'political correctness' is for male writers to use 'he', 'him', and for female writers to use 'she', 'her'. This also has the bonus

20

B - Defect B – Stay Silent

A – Defect A: 3 years

B: 3 years

A: 6 months

B: 10 years

A – Stay Silent A: 10 years

B: 6 months

A: 2 years

B: 2 years

In a one-off situation the rational thing for either individual to do is to defect, as there

is potential to given only a minor sentence of 6 months. If you stay silent there is

potential to be held accountable for the full crime and face 10 years in prison. To

people studying the Prisoner's Dilemma it seemed that it would be completely

irrational to cooperate, yet when it was tested, more often than not, people did

cooperate (Ridley, 1996: 59).

The idea that it is rational to defect was turned on its head in a series of computer

tournaments held by political scientist Robert Axelrod, which in turn became the

guiding mathematical principles of work in sociobiology, pioneered most significantly

by John Maynard Smith, Robert Trivers and William Hamilton. Axelrod set up a

tournament of Prisoner's Dilemma games where each different strategy played against

every other strategy 200 times. Each possible outcome (both stay silent, both defect

and one defect/other silent) were given points. A strategy earned five points if it

defected and the other stayed silent, and zero points when the opposite occurred.

They both earned three points each if they both stayed silent, and they both earned

one point each if they both defected. The strategy that accumulated the most points

by the end was the winner (Ridley, 1996: 60).

Anatol Rapoport submitted the simplest strategy of all, which went on to be the winner.

Tit-for-Tat was his strategy and it became justifiably famous. As a strategy, the first

move of Tit-for-Tat is to cooperate (i.e., stay silent). It then simply does whatever the

other strategy did last time (Ridley, 1996: 60). Tit-for-Tat always holds its own and it

'encourages' cooperation. Dawkins points out that Tit-for-Tat is another word for

reciprocal altruism. It cooperates until the other strategy plays defect; it then retaliates

by playing defect, so it could be called a ‘defection alert punishing strategy’. It is

outcome of allowing easy identification of the gender of the writer (in those cases where the first name, e.g., 'Kim', could be either male or female).

21

fundamentally cooperative but it won't be taken advantage of.16 Axelrod concluded

that interactions like the Prisoner’s Dilemma and an unconscious strategy like Tit-for-

Tat, are going on in the natural world and in the human world all the time (Dawkins,

2000).17

It is important to remember that these kinds of strategies (kin selection and reciprocal

altruism) are generally unconscious. Dawkins developed the metaphor of a two-tier

calculator as an explanation. The example he uses to illustrate this is of the

unconscious, yet highly complicated, calculations that are done to catch a cricket ball.

When it comes to calculating costs and benefits of altruism it can be done at a

conscious level. Or, as with catching the ball, it can be done at an unconscious level.

When bats and other animals do reciprocal altruism 'calculations', they are doing them

unconsciously. Natural selection has tailored their brains over many generations to

come up with the right decision, given the right circumstances. Humans presumably

also have an unconscious calculator, but it can be confusing, as we have

superimposed upon it the conscious calculator, which society and culture has played a

significant part in shaping (Dawkins, 2000).18

Group Selection

Group selection is: "...natural selection based on the differential fitness of groups."

(Sober & Wilson, 1998: 37). With regard to altruism specifically, groups with altruistic

individuals will out-compete groups made up of selfish individuals. The world,

therefore, becomes populated with groups of altruists. On the surface, this seems

reasonable enough, but ever since George Williams published his classic book

Adaptation and Natural Selection in 1966, group selection has generally been seen as

16 Though reciprocal altruism is fundamentally cooperative, it does not really count as 'pure' altruism. The altruist is only temporarily decreasing his own welfare (the individual will benefit in the long run, whereas with kin selection the individual may not). Like a bank account, he is making a deposit on the promise of a profitable return in the future. In this way, reciprocal altruism seems to explain the evolution of cooperation, rather than the evolution of (pure) altruism. 17 Given the chance, does one cut in front of a long queue? Does one deal with a conflict by stonewalling or compromising? How does one respond to annoying fundraisers? Each of these cases is similar in nature to the prisoner's dilemma: is one best off behaving selfishly? (Macrone, 1995: 117). 18 This 'superposition' of culture we will turn to with the theory of memetics in the following chapters.

22

implausible, especially when trying to account for the evolution of altruism (Sober &

Wilson, 1998: 5).

The argument against group selection as an explanation for the evolution of altruism is

quite simple. In a group of altruists there may be one individual who refuses to be

altruistic, he is selfish. He can then benefit from the altruism of others, and gain in

fitness, but does not commit any act of altruism himself that would lower his fitness.

He gains everything and loses nothing. This means he is more likely to survive and

have more children. Given that his selfishness is a genetic tendency, each of these

children has an even chance of inheriting his selfishness.19 This in turn means they

will have a greater fitness than the altruists will. Like the parent, on average, they will

also survive for longer and have more children. After several generations the altruists

will be completely overrun by the selfish types (Dawkins, 1976: 7-8). Even though

altruistic groups may out-compete selfish groups, they are open to exploitation from

the inside (subversion from within) and are doomed to failure.20

Recently a more complex picture of group selection has been advanced. In 1998,

Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson published Unto Others, which argued that group

selection played a major role in the evolution of altruism, especially in humans.

Leaving aside, for the moment, their arguments for group selection and human

altruism, how can group selection work at all, given the criticisms that have been

levelled at it? In order to appreciate Sober and Wilson’s argument we need to consider

one of their examples in some detail, so I shall have to ask the reader for patience and

perseverance.

Sober and Wilson ask us to consider the life cycle of the parasite Dicrocoelium

dendriticum. It spends the adult stage of its life cycle in the livers of cows and sheep.

The eggs of the parasite exit with the faeces of the host mammal. The faeces, in turn,

are eaten by land snails, which then become the hosts for the asexual stage of the

parasite’s life cycle. Two generations are spent inside the snail before the parasite

transforms into the next stage, the cercaria, which leaves the snail and is eaten by

19 As with all arguments involving 'genes for this' and 'genes for that', we need not worry about the specific way this gene has come about. The 'gene for selfishness' could be a recessive relative to the 'gene for altruism' or it could be a mutation. Either way the argument works. 20 Not only this, but many accounts of group selection can be reinterpreted as individual or gene selection (Dawkins, 1976: 169).

23

ants. Each ant ingests approximately 50 parasites. Once inside, one parasite enters

into the ant's brain (the subesophagal ganglion) where it forms a cyst, called the 'brain

worm'. The parasite, as the brain worm, changes the ant's behaviour; it makes it

spend more time on the tips of grass blades. The consequence of this is that the ant is

more likely to be eaten by livestock. As such, the parasites (that are inside the ants

that are eaten) are more likely to be able to start off a new lifecycle in the liver a host

mammal. The parasite that becomes the brain worm altruistically sacrifices itself for

the other 49 parasites, so they can restart the whole process again in the liver of the

animal that eats the ant (Sober & Wilson, 1998: 18). Sober and Wilson use group

selection to explain the evolution of the altruistic brain worm.

Imagine that the population contains two types of parasites, A (altruistic) and S

(selfish), with only the A types 'willing' to turn into the sacrificial brain worm. We will

start off with only S types and assume that the average snail eats five parasite eggs.

In one particular snail, five parasites are eaten, but one is a 'mutant', the first A type.

During asexual reproduction in this snail, the population increases to 50, with the

relative frequency of A types to S types remaining unchanged. As such, in the next

stage of the parasite’s life cycle an ant will eat 10 A types and 40 S types from this

snail. At this point in time, the whole parasite population lives in a large number of

isolated groups (the ants). The group size in each ant is 50. The vast majority of

groups consisting of only S types, but one group has 40 S types and 10 A types. Now

the advantage of being in the group containing the A types becomes apparent. One of

them will make the altruistic sacrifice and become a brain worm, This parasite dies and

the population is reduced to 40 S types and 9 A types. Obviously at the individual

level, A types will be selected against because they have the lower fitness within the

group. But we can now calculate the fitness at the group level (Sober & Wilson, 1998:

27-30).

Though some ants will be eaten by livestock even if they don't have the brain worm,

an ant that has it will have a higher probability of being eaten. The fitness of the group

with the worm, therefore, is higher than the fitness of groups without the worm. All the

remaining parasites that are ingested by the livestock have the same number of

offspring. This altruistic trait increases fitness through survival, rather than fecundity.

To see if altruism can evolve this way, the fitness of the altruistic trait within the groups

needs to be weighed against the fitness between groups. With this comparison we will

see which level of selection prevails (Sober & Wilson, 1998: 27-30).

24

A types will always have a greater chance of being eaten by the livestock, but one of

them will always have to make the ultimate sacrifice. S types will sometimes find

themselves in groups containing A types, and as such get a free ride, but they will also

find themselves in groups with only S types and have less chance of being ingested

by the livestock. Sober and Wilson go on to show that even a modest increase in the

chance of being eaten – a benefit for the group – can outweigh the suicidal behaviour

of the one altruist – the individual cost. The decline of A types within single groups is

outweighed by the increase of A types globally (Sober & Wilson, 1998: 27-30).

This is a behaviour that is difficult, if not impossible, to explain from the individual or

genetic level of selection, but turns out to be quite easy to explain as a (genetic) group

level selection. This kind of group selection occurs in special circumstances. The

groups need to be isolated when it comes to the benefits of altruism, but they then

need to compete in the formation of new groups. The brain worm is only of benefit to

the other individuals in its own group, and the groups with brain worms out-compete

the groups without them (Sober & Wilson, 1998: 27-30).21 The late Stephen Jay Gould

clearly captured the nature of group selection:

...the frequency of altruistic alleles can increase within a species, so long as the

rate of differential survival and propagation of demes with altruistic members (by

group selection) overcome the admitted decline in frequency of altruists within

successful demes by organismic selection. The overall frequency may rise within

the species even while the frequency within each surviving deme declines (2002:

648).22

As we can see, this is a complex process. Given the complexity of the conditions

needed for group selection to be the primary mechanism for the evolution of altruism

(conditions that are necessary for it to be able to handle subversion from within) it is

fairly restricted in its explanatory scope. Sober and Wilson's argument for the

21 The actual details of the evolution of the brain worm are unknown. Are some parasites selfish and some altruistic? The required empirical studies have not been performed (Sober & Wilson, 1998: 30), and as such, Sober and Wilson's work remains an untested but, nevertheless, convincing thought experiment. It seems there are certain circumstances under which altruism can evolve by group selection. 22 Demes are a subdivision of a population, typically breeding mainly within the group.

25

evolution of altruism in humans goes further than this. But we will leave it for the

moment and come back to it in chapter three.

What Remains to be Explained?

Given what we know of kin selection and reciprocal altruism, how can we explain

altruistic behaviour that has no foreseeable advantage to our genes or us?23 For

example, human blood donation involves strangers giving blood to strangers. Ridley

(1996: 138) still views these acts as a form of reciprocal altruism, not with the

benefactor of the act, but with others who learn of it. Altruistic acts of this type

enhance the reputation of the altruist, which is of benefit in the long run. Richard

Alexander considers it to be an act of 'indirect reciprocity'. Donors may feel a sense of

social obligation and a sense of social approval for what they are doing. They are

giving blood for indirect benefit. Donors are only really altruistic (apparently) if they

keep their donation a secret. But even these secret acts need further examination,

because of the possibility that by convincing themselves they are selfless, private

donors may become better able to convey an appearance of selflessness to others.24

In other words, being an altruist enhances one's (good) reputation, which is to one's

advantage (Alexander, 1987: 160).25

Even if there is some truth to this explanation, it certainly doesn't explain all altruistic

acts. What about a case where the altruist knows they will have to die to save a non-

relative, yet they still commit the act? A soldier jumping on a grenade to save the life

of a comrade is difficult to explain from the standard sociobiological line of

reasoning.26 James Wilson offers a more general explanation for many acts of

altruism. He suggests that the psychological predispositions evolution has selected,

23 Or (of course) of advantage to the group. The examples I give next may be of advantage to the group, but if they are not genetically predisposed acts, then it is not biological group selection. 24 This kind of argument, on closer examination, is quite specious. The hypothesis, that ultimately we are all selfish, has been ‘immunised’ from any kind of opposing evidence. No matter what the act of altruism, proponents build increasingly convoluted stories to support their hypothesis. 25 Of course, even with this explanation, we are still faced with the problem of why these acts enhance the altruist's reputation in the first place. Ergo, this 'solution' only pushes us back to the need of another explanation. 26 We will come back to this question in Chapter three.

26

such as kin-selection and reciprocal altruism, will by necessity not be precise with

regard to human behaviour, simply because we have complex brains that can not only

perform complex tasks, but imagine them as well. This predisposition manifests itself

in attachment, not only to kin (especially offspring), but to non-kin and other creatures

and things we anthropomorphise as well (Wilson, 1994: 16). Our basic instinct is to

look out for relatives and those who will reciprocate with us, but our complex nature

has created a situation where we unconsciously do the same for others when there is

no possible benefit to us.

Blackmore asks us if explanations like this are adequate (Blackmore, 1999a: 152).

She thinks not and, on the whole, I agree with her. As she points out, altruism is

deeply embedded in human lives, including altruistic careers such as nursing, social

work, psychotherapy, looking after delinquent children, etc., careers that are often

poorly paid, not only financially, but in terms of social status also. The reasons people

choose to do these jobs (besides necessity; i.e., if the job is their only opportunity for

employment) cannot be for financial or genetic gain (that is, the increase in likelihood

of reproductive success). The reasons they give tend to be psychological – it makes

them feel good, and so on. This, as argued by Wilson, could be explained as the by-

product of kin selection, reciprocal altruism and group selection, but Blackmore argues

against this. Natural selection being ruthless and the cost of such generosity being

high, these behaviours, if based on genetic tendencies, would most likely be removed

from the gene pool (Blackmore, 1999a: 153-154).

It is important to understand what it meant by terms such as 'genetic tendencies',

'psychological predispositions' and 'unconscious calculations'. They are what Edward

Wilson calls 'epigenetic rules' (Ruse & Wilson, 1985: 51). Epigenetic rules are the

regularities of sensory perception and mental development, prescribed by genes,

which animate and channel the acquisition of culture (Wilson, 1998: 173). Though

they do not lock us into ant-like behaviour, they enable us to learn rapidly, things such

as a fear of heights and snakes (Ruse & Wilson, 1985: 51). Noam Chomsky's theory

of Universal grammar – that the circuitry of children’s brains allows them to learn their

parents' language (Pinker, 1994: 538) – is another example of an epigenetic rule.

Wilson recognises two types of epigenetic rules. Primary ones are the automatic

filtering and coding of stimuli by the brain. That is, the unconscious 'decisions' our

brain makes are simply the result of following primary epigenetic rules. Past

experience only has a minor role in shaping these rules. Secondary epigenetic rules

27

are the regularities in the integration of large amounts of information. Drawing from

past experience, perception, memory and emotional colouring, secondary rules lead

the mind to predisposed 'decisions' by the choice of certain ideas over others (Wilson,

1998: 166). Epigenetic rules are determined by genes, but to a certain extent they are

malleable (the secondary ones at least). A brain is the product of the genotype that

codes for it, but the phenotype, to a certain degree, can be altered by the environment

it is exposed to: the ideas, the culture, the people it meets.

From the sociobiological perspective, these epigenetic rules must have been shaped

by evolution. People do not execute them via conscious calculation; they follow their

feelings, which have been designed as the 'logic executors' of natural selection

(Wright, 1994: 190). For scientists in this field, working out exactly what these

epigenetic rules are will be quite a difficult, but certainly not impossible, task. The

future Darwin predicted is finally here:

In the distant future I see open fields of far more important researches. Psychology

will be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each

mental power and capacity by graduation. Light will be thrown on the origin of man

and his history (Darwin, 1859: 458).

Though the biological mechanisms of kin selection, reciprocal altruism and group

selection, combined with the idea of epigenetic rules, seem to offer some resolution to

the 'paradox of altruism', we are still left with anomalies. These explanations may well

cover the evolution of altruism in non-human animals and may well explain many of

our underlying altruistic tendencies. They do not, however, seem to cover all altruistic

acts sufficiently. Kin selection doesn't explain altruistic behaviour of humans and other

animals towards non-relatives. Reciprocal altruism, advanced to cover these gaps in

our understanding (besides not actually being altruistic overall), doesn't explain cases

where the altruist dies to benefit a non-relative. And group selection may explain some

of these acts (as with Dicrocoelium dendriticum), but given the complexity of the

conditions needed for group selection to be at work (necessary conditions for it to be

able to handle subversion from within) it is fairly limited as an explanation. Added to

this is the problem that group selection, when conceived of solely in biological terms,

certainly doesn't help explain very many specific acts of altruism.

28

Given this, it would seem that further explanation is required. This is exactly what

Susan Blackmore has attempted in The Meme Machine (1999a). She argues along

the same line. These biological explanations, though extensive and often sound, only

take us so far; they don't explain the 'oddities of human altruism' (Blackmore, 1999a:

152). Oddities such as blood donation to anonymous recipients (as already

mentioned), leaving a large tip at a restaurant you will never visit again, going

overseas to give aid to a famine affected country, handing in found items to lost

property, cleaning up rubbish left by another person, recycling, the list could go on...

(Blackmore, 1999a: 152).

If we accept this point, that the 'paradox of altruism' is yet to be completely resolved,

then we must also accept that further explanation is required. This will be the purview

of the remainder of this thesis, which also brings into focus the major component (the

fulcrum if you will) of this dissertation – the evolution of culture, specifically, units of

culture – memes.

29

Chapter 2: The New Replicator

"Most of what is unusual about man can be summed up in one word: 'culture'."

(Richard Dawkins, 1976: 189)

"...as soon as the progenitors of man became social (and this probably occurred at

a very early period), the principle of imitation, and reason, and experience would

have increased... Now, if some one man in a tribe, more sagacious than the

others, invented a new snare or weapon, or other means of attack or defence, the

plainest self-interest, without the assistance of much reasoning power, would

prompt the other members to imitate him; and all would thus profit. ...If the new

invention were an important one, the tribe would increase in number, spread, and

supplant other tribes." (Charles Darwin, 1871: 129)

'Meme' was coined by Richard Dawkins in his 1976 book The Selfish Gene. That book

forcefully argues the neo-Darwinian case – that evolution occurs, not at the species or

individual level, but at the level of genes. Genes are to be viewed as 'replicators'

whose only 'goal' is to make copies of themselves. This is based on William Hamilton's

idea of 'inclusive fitness', that what really counts in biological evolution is not the

survival of the organism itself, but the number of copies of its genes that are brought

into existence. Dawkins explains how genes evolve and build 'vehicles', namely

organisms, by natural selection. Dawkins' intention, when he conceived of memes,

was to demonstrate that Darwinian thinking need not be limited to biology, and that

biology might not be the only explanation for human behaviour. In his own words: "As

an enthusiastic Darwinian, I have been dissatisfied with explanations that my fellow-

enthusiasts have offered for human behaviour". (Dawkins, 1976: 191).

The fellow enthusiasts to whom he refers, sociobiologists, attempt to explain animal

(including human) behaviour within a Darwinian paradigm. Dawkins' point is that

sociobiology can only go so far in offering explanations for human behaviour. It can

explain the evolution of our basic psychology but not of our sophisticated, complex

and varied cultures. Memes are offered as a neo-Darwinian account of cultural

30

evolution. Dawkins affirms that he is an enthusiastic Darwinian, and it is certainly not

the case that he doesn't believe in sociobiology. He just believes that his colleagues

have been rather myopic in their Darwinian thinking. Darwinism is too big a theory to

be confined to genes. We need to have memes as well as genes. Memes are the unit

of cultural replication, analogous to genes, the unit of biological replication (Dawkins,

1976: 191-192). Memes must be passed on, between individuals and across

generations, by some other mechanism than that used by genes (Hoelzel, 1999: 517).

This is not just a figurative analogy with genes, but a literal one. Both genes and

memes are replicators, and as such they both obey the laws of natural selection

exactly (Dennett, 1991: 202). Natural selection is 'substrate neutral'. Memes and

genes are different replicators evolving in different media at different rates (Dennett,

1991: 202).27

What, specifically, are these units of culture that are passed on? Ideas such as the

wheel, the alphabet, calculus, evolution by natural selection; other kinds of cultural

artefacts such as Greensleeves, The Odyssey, chess, are all distinct memorable units

of culture, they are memes (Dennett, 1995: 344). According to Blackmore, memes are

everything that is learned through imitating someone else (Blackmore, 1999a: 6-7).

Dawkins coined these units of cultural replication 'memes', because he considered

them units of imitation, and 'mimeme' comes from the Greek for 'that which is imitated'.

He then abbreviated 'mimeme' to 'meme' because it sounds a bit like 'gene' (Dawkins,

1976: 192).

Imitation is understood in the very broadest sense. It can be as basic as remembering

the gist of someone's story, but not every single action and word. Any idea, story,

joke, song, belief or fad, etc., that an individual picks up from someone else or tells

another, is a meme (Blackmore, 1999a: 6-7). Memes are semantic rather than

syntactic. Memes are not about exact syntactic replication, but rather, semantic

replication – the replication of meaning (Dennett, 1995: 356). Just as only good genes

survive and replicate due to natural selection, only good memes survive and replicate.

By 'good', it is simply meant that they are good at being replicated. This is tautological,

27 Most assume (myself included) that memes replicate with far greater speed than genes. This is not necessarily the case. Viruses and bacteria reproduce with far greater frequency than most memes (Hull, 2000: 55). As for the problem at hand, human altruism, we are only considering human evolution, so it is safe to say that memes replicate with a greater frequency than human genes.

31

so I'll qualify this by saying that this is a generalisation for all memes. There could be

any number of reasons why one particular meme is better at being replicated than

another. Some reasons are obvious, some are not. In this dissertation, therefore, I will

attempt to explicate some of Blackmore's reasons, and to build some of my own.

As meme theory is a Darwinian view of culture, it is important to see how far the

analogy with gene can be (or rather, should be) taken. Indeed, some argue that the

analogy is not there to be made at all, that cultural evolution is 'Lamarckian' not

Darwinian. The rest of this chapter then, will not only consider how analogous gene

and meme are, but will also illustrate the kinds of arguments forwarded by meme

theorists. The first analogy to take account of is a direct one – 'selfish gene' and

'selfish meme'.

The Misunderstood Metaphor

At the outset, it is important to be aware of one particular source of misunderstanding.

There has been, in the past, a good deal of confusion when discussing works on neo-

Darwinism such as The Selfish Gene. When talking about memes and genes, authors

have found it convenient, for the sake of lucidity, to use a particular rhetorical device

and write in shorthand. 'Selfish gene' is a metaphor, as Dawkins explains:

Throughout this book, I have emphasised that we must not think of genes as

conscious, purposeful agents. Blind natural selection, however, makes them

behave rather as if they were purposeful, and it has been convenient, as a

shorthand, to refer to genes in the language of purpose. For example, when we say

'genes are trying to increase their numbers in future gene pools', what we really

mean is ‘those genes that behave in such a way as to increase their numbers in

future gene pools tend to be the genes whose effect we see in the world'. Just as

we have found it convenient to think of genes as active agents, working

purposefully for their own survival, perhaps it might be convenient to think of

memes in the same way. In neither case must we get mystical about it. In both

cases the idea of purpose is only a metaphor, but we have already seen what a

fruitful metaphor it is in the case of genes. We have even used words like 'selfish'

and 'ruthless' of genes, knowing full well it is only a figure of speech. Can we, in

exactly the same spirit, look for selfish or ruthless memes? (Dawkins, 1976: 196).

32

This is very important when we are discussing memes. Generally when we think about

culture, we think about how it benefits the human being and the human society the

culture is a part of. A meme, on the other hand, does not necessarily spread because

it is beneficial to its host (though this will obviously help rather than hinder the meme).

It spreads when it has a property such that it is helpful to itself. This is the sense in

which the word 'selfish' is meant when referring to memes (and genes).28

Blackmore's book offers the first serious, all-embracing account of culture in terms of

memes.29 One of her main lines of argument is to point out the shortcomings of

sociobiological explanations and then advance a memetic account, which seemingly

offers a better explanation. The first part of her approach is quite successful, as

sociobiology is hard pressed in attempting to explain specific human behaviours as

being for the benefit of successful genetic replication. The memetic view, on the other

hand, explains many of these behaviours as 'benefiting' the replication of memes. In

many situations such an approach, as she shows, does not have to make the giant

leaps in reasoning that the traditional sociobiological explanations have had to make.

To get an idea of the kind of explanation offered by the meme thesis, I will now look at

an example.

Familial Evasion and Dipteran Mastication

Celibacy is something that sociobiologists have been hard pressed to find an

evolutionary explanation for. If human psychology, driven by biology, has one main

goal – pass on genes – and this goal is reflected in society, in our customs and

behaviour; how do we then explain celibacy? Blackmore points out that biological

explanations for this phenomenon are not impossible. A celibate man or woman might

be better able to promote the survival of their genes by looking after their siblings or

nephews and nieces (kin selection). But what about a celibate priest in a wealthy

28 An important point to note is that all memes (the successful ones at least) are 'selfish', in that they 'want' to be copied. But there are also memes 'for selfish behaviour' and memes 'for altruistic behaviour', of which I will be referring to later. 29 There are other books devoted to memes, Richard Brodie's Virus of the Mind – The New Science of the Meme (1996), Aaron Lynch's Thought Contagion – How Belief Spreads through Society (1996), and of course Dennett takes up the 'meme meme' in Consciousness Explained and Darwin's Dangerous Idea. But I think Blackmore's work stands out thanks to its comprehensive scope and development of the theory. She also devotes two chapters exclusively to the 'paradox of altruism'.

33

society? He would have no need to care for other family members (Blackmore, 1999a:

138).

Richard Dawkins' account of the memetic explanation of religious celibacy argues that

the success of a meme may depend on the time and effort people spend on spreading

it. From the point of view of the meme, doing anything else other than spreading the

meme is a waste of time.30 If a priest was married and as a consequence had to

spend time with his wife and children, he would not be able to spend as much time

propagating religious memes. With this we have the beginnings of a memetic

explanation for celibacy. It explains why a meme such as celibacy, which goes against

the human sexual (and thus genetic) instinct, could manage to survive and replicate

itself. Once created, this meme gets a lot more time devoted to it than other memes

do (Dawkins, 1976: 198-199).31 The idea that the success of a meme, on average,

depends on the amount of time and effort people spend spreading it, obviously makes

sense. 'Mr Formulate' may come up with one of the greatest theories of all time, but if

he doesn't spend any time telling people about it, it won't spread.32

Another type of argument, used to show the worth of memes, is of the genes-vs-

memes kind. Sociobiologists argue that 'genes hold culture on a leash'. Cultural

characteristics evolved in the service of our genes. Genes are the driving force of

human culture. Blackmore believes that once a second replicator was on the scene,

more often than not the situation was (and is) reversed. Memes are the main driving

force of cultural evolution and, not only this, quite often they can be the driving force

of biological evolution as well (Blackmore, 1999a: 119-120). She gives one small

example of the ability of a new idea (meme) that would change the behaviour of a

creature and thus become a new selection pressure on a species.

Imagine a salamander-like creature that eats flies. The biological selection pressure

on this creature is to be able to reach higher than the other individuals, out-competing

30 This is what is meant by 'selfish meme' (and gene). We have to take the 'meme's eye view'. 31 Of course, a priest could have it both ways and surreptitiously visit the local brothel. 32 The classic case being that of Gregor Mendel and his revolutionary discoveries, which only came to light after his death (Dawkins, 1976: 34). This meme eventually succeeded because of its worth as a scientific theory, but it certainly would have gotten off to a flying start had Mendel 'advertised' it.

34

them for the flies. Selection favours those with genes that give them the longest reach.

Now suppose one of these creatures comes across the 'idea' of jumping to get the

flies (either by 'thinking' of it first or seeing something else jump). It can now out-

compete all the non-jumping creatures easily. All things being equal, those who don't

take up the meme of jumping will starve. Of those who survive by taking on this new

meme, the selection pressure of jumping will favour creatures with the genes for

strong legs and good jumping skills (Blackmore, 1999a: 116-117). This new meme has

been the driving force of genetic evolution.33

Replication and Lamarckian Acquisition

As already mentioned, genes and memes are replicators. In order to make sense of

meme theory; I now need to make clear the attributes of memes that classify them as

replicators. Dawkins argues that evolution by natural selection can only work on things

that replicate, things that make copies of themselves (Dawkins, 1986: 158). The

biological replicator is the gene.34 The cultural replicator is the meme. To be

successful, replicators must have certain properties. There needs to be a certain

amount of fidelity – accurate copying (otherwise it could hardly be said to be a

replicator). But there must be occasional copying errors to provide the variation that

natural selection works on (Dawkins, 1986: 158). They also need to have a property

that has an influence on the likelihood of them being replicated. That is, those that are

more likely to be replicated will out-compete those that are less likely to be replicated

(Dawkins, 1986: 158). The fecund will triumph over the barren. They must also be

reasonably long lived. The longer they survive, the more copies of themselves they will

make (Blackmore, 1999a: 100).

Genes have all these properties, which is why they have been such successful

replicators (Blackmore, 1999a: 100). Do memes also have these properties?

Blackmore believes so. They are 'inherited' when we copy someone else's action, or

pass on an idea or story, print a book, or broadcast on the radio. Memes vary, simply

33 As occurred with the lactose tolerance. The meme of dairy farming became a biological selection pressure (Laland & Odling-Smee, 2000:136). 34 Though technically it is DNA that replicates, where genes are made of DNA. But it is genes that produce effects in the world and it is these effects (specifically altruistic ones) that we are interested in. Thus genes are the 'unit' of replication – the smallest amount of hereditary information on which there is selection (Williams, 1966: 25).

35

because humans have a less than perfect memory. And there is memetic selection.

We hear many different things each day, read many different things, are exposed to

many different ideas and we remember (and pass on) few of them (Blackmore, 1999b:

41). Though memes and genes are both replicators, there are differences between the

two. These differences are sufficient enough, some argue, to discredit the idea that

Darwinian theory can be applied to cultural evolution.

Alfred Russel Wallace believed that cultural evolution was 'Lamarckian'

(Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998: 190). Other notable people, including Stephen

Gould, have also argued this point. As we move forward in time, culture inherits

acquired characteristics and evolves. "Any cultural knowledge acquired in one

generation can be directly passed on to the next by what we call, in a most noble

word, education." (Gould, 1996: 222). The concept of Lamarckian evolution has long

been discredited in biology. The inheritance of acquired characteristics does not

happen.35 Blacksmiths' sons are not born with bigger muscles in their arms than other

children. This is because the genotype of the parents is what is inherited by the

children, not the phenotype. Culture, on the other hand, does seem to be Lamarckian.

If this is the case, some see it as a problem for memetics (Blackmore, 1999a: 59).36

Given that meme is the analogue of gene, people have attempted to find a similar

analogue for cultural genotype and cultural phenotype in order to ascertain whether

cultural evolution is indeed Lamarckian. Blackmore manages to sidestep this criticism

by arguing that the analogy between memes and genes only goes so far.

She asks us to imagine how we could learn to make a particular soup. By analogy, the

soup itself is the phenotype and the recipe is the genotype. One way to learn how to

make it is to watch it being made, and then make it ourselves (copying the

phenotype). Another is to get a copy of the recipe and then make it ourselves (copying

the genotype). With the first method, there is potential for Lamarckian inheritance. The

person we watch make the soup may make a mistake and add too much salt, which

35 Though there may be some minor exceptions. The book Lamarck's Signature – How Retrogenes are Changing Darwin's Natural Selection Paradigm (1998) by Steele, Lindley and Blanden, argues the neo-Lamarckian case. 36 Gould goes even further, wishing that we wouldn’t even speak of cultural evolution. "Using the same term – evolution – for both natural and cultural history obfuscates far more than it enlightens... I do wish that the term 'cultural evolution' would drop from use." (Gould, 1996: 219-220).

36

we will then copy when we make the soup. That is, we have replicated the phenotype

which has acquired different characteristics to the genotype. In the true teleological

sense of evolution as envisioned by Lamarck, the person we copy may deliberately

add too much salt, striving to make the soup taste better, a modification that we then

adhere to as well. With the second method, using a copy of the recipe, the inheritance

is non-Lamarckian. Even if a mistake is made in cooking the soup, inadvertently

making the soup taste better, this characteristic will not be passed on as it is not in the

recipe. In this sense, memes can be both Darwinian and Lamarckian in their evolution

(Blackmore, 1999a: 61).

Blackmore argues that this can start to get confusing, so we should use different

terminology for memes. For this she coins 'copy-the-instructions', for the Darwinian (or

rather, Weismannian) process, and 'copy-the-product', for the Lamarckian process.

The reason why we should not characterise one as Darwinian and the other as

Lamarckian is that, unlike the clear-cut example of cooking soup, in general, the two

modes of replication may be inextricably mixed (Blackmore, 1999a: 61-62). In asking

us to not refer to memetic evolution as Lamarckian (which I do believe makes good

sense) Blackmore is invoking 'Campbell's Rule'. The theory of evolution describes the

creation of design through the competition between differing replicating entities.

Genes are one kind of replicator and memes another. Evolutionary theory applies to

both, but the specific details of how each replicator works, more than likely, will be

different (Blackmore, 1999a: 17).37 Though the ideas of both Darwin and Lamarck

were originally developed to explain biological evolution, Darwinian evolution works for

any replicator and replicators do not need to behave in exactly the same way.

"Memetics at present remains linked conceptually but not ontologically to biology."

(Aunger, 2000: 8).

Memes provide a whole new way of looking at culture – a Darwinian view of culture

with the meme as the replicator. The main difference between memetics and other

ways of trying to understand culture, is that it forces us to take the 'meme's eye view'

(Blackmore, 1999a: 37). We have to look at culture from the point of view of culture

itself. This novel idea is an essential aspect of memetics. Given that memes are

replicators we can then apply Darwinian theory to the study of culture. This does

37 This rule was named after American psychologist Donald Campbell, who saw the analogy between biological and cultural evolution in 1965, but realised it did not have to be exact (Blackmore, 1999a: 17).

37

make a certain amount of sense, in that once an idea is 'born', it no longer relies on its

originator, it is a thing unto itself. Independent of its creator, an idea – a meme – in the

true Darwinian sense, evolves by descent with modification, struggling for existence,

adapting to its environment, competing against rivals and spreading through the

'meme pool'.38 Here we have the basics of memetics.

38 Bertrand Russell makes a similar point when discussing Greek metaphysics in History of Western Philosophy. "Progress in metaphysics, so far as it has existed, has consisted in a gradual refinement of all these hypotheses, a development of their implications, and a reformulation of each to meet the objections urged by adherents of rival hypotheses... Now almost all the hypotheses that have dominated modern philosophy were first thought of by the Greeks... I shall regard them [the Greeks] as giving birth to theories which have had an independent life and growth, and which, though at first somewhat infantile, have proved capable of surviving and developing throughout more than two thousand years." (1946: 57).

38

Chapter 3: The Memetic Account of

Altruism

"...if any one strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also; and if any

one would sue you and take your coat, let him have your cloak as well; and if any

one forces you to go a mile, go with him two miles. Give to him who begs from

you, and do not refuse him who would borrow from you." (Matthew 5.39-42).

"When two tribes of primeval man, living in the same country, came into

competition, if (other circumstances being equal) the one tribe included a great

number of courageous, sympathetic and faithful members, who were always

ready to warn each other of danger, to aid and defend each other, this tribe would

succeed better and conquer the other... Selfish and contentious people will not

cohere, and without coherence nothing can be effected. A tribe rich in the above

qualities would spread and be victorious over other tribes: but in the course of

time it would, judging from all past history, be in its turn overcome by some other

tribe still more highly endowed. Thus the social and moral qualities would tend

slowly to advance and be diffused throughout the world." (Charles Darwin, 1871:

130)

Now that we have covered the basics of memetics, a brief recapitulation is required

(regarding the progress evolutionary theorists have made in relation to the 'paradox of

altruism') in order to see where memetics can be of help. As we saw in Chapter one,

evolutionary theorists have proposed three types of mechanisms for the evolution of

altruism: kin selection, reciprocal altruism and group selection (Segerstrale, 2000: 53).

These three theories, in their own way, seem to account for all altruistic acts in the

animal world – but what about human altruism? We are obviously altruistic creatures,

yet we are also Darwinian creatures. If this is the case, then these three theories

should be able to take into account all acts of human altruism. But if there is one thing

that makes humans different from other animals, it is culture (Dawkins, 1976: 189). In

light of this, and though many sociobiological explanations for human altruism are

39

convincing (specifically for unconscious acts that can be explained in biological terms),

many of these explanations tend to be stretched for other aspects of human altruism.

The memetic account of altruism, as argued by Susan Blackmore in The Meme

Machine, takes into account human culture in terms of the Darwinian paradigm. This is

what I will now turn to.

According to Blackmore, until now there have only been two real explanations for

human altruistic behaviour. The first, based on the findings of sociobiology, is that all

behaviour comes back to a genetic basis, and acts of (almost) inexplicable altruism (in

terms of a neo-Darwinian account) are 'mistakes' made by epigenetic rules (1999a:

154). The reason we make the mistakes is because we execute evolutionary logic, not

by a conscious calculator, but by our feelings which have been designed by our

evolutionary history as logic executors (Wright, 1994: 190). They are not big enough

mistakes (apparently) for natural selection to remove from the human gene pool. The

second explanation for human altruism has been to try and elevate humans above

being 'mere animals' and argue that humans have a true morality, an independent

(from our biology) moral conscience or spiritual essence which overcomes the inherent

selfishness of our genes (Blackmore, 1999a: 154). Blackmore claims that we can find

a third explanation. The answer to the types of altruism that sociobology is stretched

to explain is memetic; simply because some of the most successful memes are those

that involve altruistic, cooperative, and generous ways of behaving (Blackmore,

1999a: 154).

Memetic and Genetic Interaction

Dawkins argued in The Selfish Gene that Darwinism is too big a theory to be confined

to genes (1976: 191).39 Genes are obviously important in shaping human behaviour,

but they interact with culture, and this interaction is ill understood. The application of

Darwinian theory to culture in an effort to find a scientifically acceptable explanation

for all aspects of human altruism needs to take this interaction into account. A

particular kind of explanation stems from this, the essence of which I have

summarised as follows:

39 In this sense, memes can be deemed as a facet of 'Universal Darwinism'.

40

Human brains have in-built innate biological predispositions – epigenetic rules –

that have been shaped by evolution. The principles of sociobiology offer valid and

testable explanations for these epigenetic rules. Rules that form the basis of

human psychology, including general altruistic tendencies. This is the ground floor

of explanations for altruistic behaviour. These types of explanations, however, are

stretched a long way when attempting to explain specific acts of altruism; acts that

appear to have no sound biological explanation. Most sociobiologists argue that

these kinds of acts are 'mistakes' that are not costly enough for natural selection to

remove. There is another Darwinian account of altruism that does not resort to

calling these acts mistakes. It is the memetic account.

Given this outline, the core of this problem is akin to a description given by Edward

Wilson in his book Consilience:

We know that virtually all of human behaviour is transmitted by culture. We also

know that biology has an important effect on the origin of culture and its

transmission. The question remaining is how biology and culture interact, and in

particular how they interact across all societies to create the commonalities of

human nature (1998: 138).

Human behaviour is neither solely genetic, nor cultural. Locke believed that the mind

was a tabula rasa – a white paper. He believed that ideas came from experience and

that these ideas supply the material of thinking; ergo, they are the foundation of

knowledge (Locke, 1690: 212-122). He was partially correct. Though the mind is not a

tabula rasa, ideas do come from experience, including the experience of the ideas

themselves. It is just that the epigenetic rules that shape our minds can, to a certain

extent, affect which of these ideas we like and how they are used. In this vein, Wilson

goes on to say that the majority of people who believe in gene-culture evolution (or in

Blackmore's terminology, gene-meme coevolution) would agree with the following

proposition:

Culture is created by the communal mind, and each mind in turn is the product of

the genetically structured human brain. Genes and culture are therefore

inseverably linked. But the linkage is flexible, to a degree still mostly unmeasured

(1998: 139).

One of the best ways to think about the ways in which memes and genes interact, I

believe, is to employ an analogy with computers. Brains are the hardware and memes

41

are the 'virtual machines' – that is, the software (Dennett, 1991: 210). The hardware is

made up of epigenetic rules, which means that it can run certain types of virtual

machines with greater ease (or rather, increased likelihood of success) than others.

But with greater and greater programming, with the build up of certain kinds of virtual

machines; new virtual machines, that initially would not have been able to be

'installed', can 'run' in the brain. The nature of the human brain means certain types of

memes have the best chance of being picked up, but with sufficient exposure to many

different memes, this biological nature can be overcome or over exaggerated.

In terms of the problem at hand – human altruism – there can be little doubt that it is a

product of epigenetic rules, as well as culture, or rather, memes.40 Our brains have

some underlying altruistic tendencies, but with the addition of memes these

tendencies can be suppressed, or as we shall see, exaggerated. As Wilson points out,

the proportion of the influence of genes and memes is unmeasured (and perhaps

unmeasurable) (1998:139). This is certainly the case with altruism, and this state of

affairs has not changed with Blackmore's book. But what she has done is to strongly

argue the cultural aspect of altruism, independent (to a degree) from biology but still

within the Darwinian paradigm. This in itself is something new. Leaving the problem of

proportion aside (though remembering that in the end, it could actually be the most

interesting and important problem) it is time to focus on Blackmore's memetic account

of altruism.

Kev and Gav

After discussing the successes and failures of sociobiology in solving the 'paradox of

altruism' (1999a: 147-154), Blackmore begins her argument by posing her stock

question: "Imagine a world full of brains, and far more memes than can actually find

homes. Which memes are more likely to find a safe home and get passed on again?"

She suggests that some of the most successful memes will be altruistic, cooperative

and generous in nature (Blackmore, 1999a: 154). Her mechanism for the spread and

dominance of such memes is demonstrated with a simple thought experiment.

40 Wilson came up with and used to use the term 'culturgen', but has since (somewhat magnanimously) declared 'meme' the victorious locution (though his definition of 'meme' is physiologically specific – it is a node of semantic memory and its associated brain activity) (Wilson, 1998: 149).

42

She asks us to imagine two people, Kevin and Gavin. Kevin is a nice guy. He is kind

and thoughtful. He is generous with his time, throws good parties, buys people drinks

and sends out birthday cards. If his friends are in trouble he helps them out. Gavin,

on the other hand, is the opposite. He is mean and selfish. He resents buying drinks

for others, thinks birthday cards are a waste of money, doesn't throw parties and if any

of the few friends he has are in trouble, he always seems to have something more

important to attend to. Who, all other aspects being equal (perhaps they are identical

twins?), will spread the most memes? It seems a safe assumption that Kevin will,

simply because he will have more friends. As a consequence, he spends more time

with more people, which means he will expose them to his memes more often than

Gavin would expose people to his memes (Blackmore, 1999a: 154-155). On top of

this, psychological studies have shown that people are more likely to be influenced

and persuaded by people they like, rather than people they dislike (Blackmore, 1999a:

155). Included in the memes that make up Kevin – the memes he exposes to others –

are his altruistic memes. Blackmore summarises her argument in the following way:

... if people are altruistic they become popular, because they are popular they are

copied, and because they are copied their memes spread more widely than the

memes of not-so-altruistic people, including the altruism memes themselves. This

provides a mechanism for spreading altruistic behaviour (Blackmore, 1999a: 155,

original italics.).

Greed is Good!

Blackmore argues that ‘we imitate people we like’ as a general rule for the spread of

altruism, because more often than not we like people who are altruistic towards us.

Therefore, we copy their memes for altruism. I suggest that while this is not wrong, it is

a little simplistic. It is not that we imitate people we like, we imitate people we want to

be like. It may be the case that often we want to be like people we like, but not

necessarily so. Sometimes we may want to be like people who have status, wealth,

resources, etc., which were garnered through selfish behaviour. Surely then, this will

propagate memes for selfishness. A more general rule for the spread of memes would

be, 'we imitate people we want to be like'. Blackmore is not entirely wrong with her

mechanism, but she has missed an important point. This is a point that adds to the

complexity of the overall picture, and of most significance, it is a more realistic

mechanism for why memes spread.

43

I am reminded of the Eighties meme, 'greed is good', propagated by Michael Douglas

in the film Wall Street. How far would an altruist go in the corporate world? Let's use

Kevin and Gavin again. With out a doubt, socially, Kevin is the winner. He has far

more genuine friends. But in the corporate world I don't think it would be beyond belief

to suppose that Gavin might do better. Surely selfish Gavin would take advantage of

altruistic Kevin. He would get Kevin to cover up his mistakes, 'borrow' Kevin's ideas,

ask Kevin for favours but never return them, 'stab him in the back', etc. Gavin would

easily 'climb the ladder' at the expense of Kevin. In the corporate world, following the

more general rule that we imitate people we want to be like; if we want to get to the

top (ergo; we want to be like Gavin) and Gavin had to crush Kevin (and many others)

underneath to get there, then this behaviour is what we will imitate. We will pick up

(and then pass on) memes for selfishness. Though Kevin may end up loathing Gavin,

he might also want to be like him – want to imitate him – simply because Gavin has

been successful, which is how Kevin wishes to be also. The only kind of altruism that I

can imagine would fare well in the corporate world would be of the reciprocal kind. As

Hume noted in A Teatise of Human Nature:

I learn to do service to another, without bearing him any real kindness: because I

foresee, that he will return my service, in expectation of another of the same kind,

and in order to maintain the same correspondence of good offices with me or

others. And accordingly, after I have serv'd [sic] him and he is in possession of the

advantage arising from my action, he is induc'd [sic] to perform his part, as

foreseeing the consequences of his refusal (1740: 521).

The Coevolution of Memes and Genes

Returning to Blackmore's account, she then goes on to speculate on the initial

evolution of memes for altruism. This time we imagine two hunter-gatherers, Kev and

Gav. As before, Kev is the altruist and Gav is not. As Kev has genes which have been

shaped by kin-selection and reciprocal altruism to a greater extent than Gav's, Kev

shares his meat with the surrounding tribe members and Gav does not. Applying her

mechanism for altruism, it follows that Kev will spread more memes – his style of

quiver, his style of clothes and ways of behaving, etc. – including the altruistic memes

(Blackmore, 1999: 157). These memes for altruistic behaviour are initially the product

44

of epigenetic rules These rules provide the basis, but memes are born of them and

begin to take on a 'life of their own'.

Are such explanations helpful? Can we not still explain it in the sociobiological terms

of human psychology and evolutionary 'mistakes'? It seems to me that generally, we

need to be able to rule out epigenetic rule 'mistakes' as an explanation for specific

acts, otherwise a memetic explanation has little to offer. If we can't, memetics would

be reduced (at best) to a trivial footnote of sociobiology (Blackmore, 1999a: 116). At

the very least, we need to be able to show that in some circumstances altruistic

memes act in spite of epigenetic rules. What evidence is there for this, specifically with

regards to altruism?

There actually shouldn't be a great deal of evidence of memes opposing genes, as

memes that work with genes are generally going to have an advantage over memes

that do not. Of course, if a memetic account is valid, there should at least be some

instances of this, otherwise sociobiological based altruism will suffice. Blackmore uses

as an example 'potlatch', a practice of native Americans and some other tribal groups,

where opposing groups try to out-do each other with acts of generosity by giving away

or even destroying extravagant gifts. This is not like ordinary reciprocal altruism, where

both parties tend to benefit. With potlatch, in material terms, everyone loses

(Blackmore, 1999a: 159). This means survival may be less likely, and as such, the

meme of potlatch is counter to any biological interest. While Blackmore does suggests

that we could regard the tradition of potlatch as a parasitic meme, unfortunately that is

as far as her account goes. She doesn't offer a reason as to how it could be

successful, given its obvious disadvantages (Blackmore, 1999a: 159).41

Given that examples of memes and genes in conflict are likely to be rare, generally we

can expect meme-gene coevolution. If Kev is the more popular because of his

altruistic memes, it also means he will be more likely than Gav to attract members of

the opposite sex for the purpose of begetting offspring. As such, memes for altruism

would spread along with genes for altruism (Blackmore, 1999a: 160). Here we have a

positive feedback loop. Genes for altruism give rise to memes for altruism. Memes

spread quickly through the population compared to genes (in that human behaviour is

41 Speculation is simple enough. Perhaps it could be the product of a meme for giving gifts gone awry, under the influence of a positive feedback loop similar in nature to the evolution of the Peacock's tail?

45

somewhat malleable and even those without epigenetic altruism rules would still, in all

likelihood, be influenced by altruistic memes). Memes now influence mate choice, and

altruistic people are more attractive. Over time this would lead to a greater number of

individuals in the population with genes for altruism, which in turn would facilitate an

even greater spread of altruistic memes, and so on.

Blackmore sees this process as memetic driving (Blackmore, 1999a: 160), but I think it

must be a case of memes and genes driving each other. As previously mentioned, the

proportion of the influence of genes and memes is unmeasured (Wilson, 1998: 139).

In this case, and often in others, it probably is memes doing a lot of the driving as they

can replicate with a higher frequency. But in saying this, it should also be recognised

that certain memes may be constrained by epigenetic rules. Our brains are the

environment in which memes are selected, and it is an environment that to a certain

extent is 'hard-wired'. An analogy might be that of the non-living parts of an ecosystem

and their relationships to the biota of that system. The biota is constrained by the

geography of the system, the terrain and climate, etc. But given enough time, the biota

can influence and change the geographical features of an ecosystem; even the

climate of the entire planet was changed by the evolution of various organisms. The

same can be said for meme-gene interactions. Memes are constrained by genes, but

given enough time they can also cause dramatic genetic evolution.42

Many acts of altruism may have evolved by meme-gene coevolution. Blackmore goes

on to argue that modern humans we can ignore meme-gene coevolution, even though

there still is interaction (Blackmore, 1999a: 162). This is because over short time

periods, memes can evolve quite dramatically, whereas genes cannot. The influence

of natural and sexual selection on genetic predispositions for altruism is negligible

over a century (say), as we are only talking about a few generations, but memes go

through innumerable generations in the same period of time.43 Altruistic memes,

therefore, should be greater in their effect than altruistic genes.

42 Memes can also have a massive effect on geography, climate, etc. Driving cars, building factories, cutting down forests, turning on air conditioners (all arguably memes, or the products of memes) have changed the atmosphere so much that the climate of the globe is predicted to change dramatically as well (McKibben, 1990: 45) 43 Remembering my analogy that the non-living parts of an ecosystem (the brain) may constrain the biota (the memes) of that system.

46

This kind of reasoning is for the evolution and spread of general altruistic tendencies.

In this way, it is not a great deal different to the overall sociobiological account. If the

memetic account is to be of use, it should be able to give us explanations for specific

acts of altruism. Dawkins (1976) does this (with hypothetical genes). He uses specific

behavioural strategies (applied to animals) and argues how they evolved. Blackmore,

on the other hand, argues for general altruistic tendencies. This in itself is not

necessarily an error, but arguments for specific memes are more convincing. When

speaking about the general attributes of human nature, such as 'being nice means

you will be popular' (as with Kevin), she isn't really telling us something that we didn't

already know. For this reason, this insight could seem a little trivial. Dawkins' strategy

of using thought experiments involving specific 'genes for behaviour' is far more

potent, as it allows us to take the 'gene's eye view' and see why such a behaviour

would be so adaptively effective. To be fair, Blackmore does start to look at specific

memes for altruism in the next chapter The Altruism Trick, but not to the same extent

or with the same force as Dawkins.

Given all this, I am left to conclude that epigenetic rules may be able to explain the

underlying tendency to be altruistic, but memetics should be able to make further

progress and explain why one specific meme has been more successful than another.

When looking at altruism memetically, we need to realise that only certain kinds of

memes for altruism and certain kinds of memes for selfishness are likely to be

successful. A memetic account of altruism needs to be able to identify the properties

of these successful memes. Not only for memes for altruistic behaviour, but also

memes for selfish behaviour. Sociobiologists have demonstrated how a gene for

altruism or a gene for selfishness could spread through a population. Should it not be

possible to apply similar techniques in order to understand the propagation of a meme

for altruism and a meme for selfishness? With this in mind, I have constructed a

thought experiment regarding a specific meme for altruism.

A Modest Altruistic Act

Consider a meme for holding doors open for other people, especially those who are

unknown to us. The 'anti-meme' of this (by which I mean the behaviour which is its

complete opposite) is pushing past people to get into or out of a building. I will

consider the fight over 'space' in a human brain between these two opposing memes.

As they are opposing each other, there is only a position for one of them in the

47

particular niche of a human brain. For the sake of brevity I shall refer to them from this

point on as P (the 'Polite meme') and R (the 'Rude meme'). We can consider P to be

an oddity of human altruism, as it is for the benefit of strangers – we cannot assume

that they will pay us back in the future. Though it would be possible to house both of

these memes concurrently (the decision to be polite or rude could depend on mood or

if the person is late, and so on) for the sake of this thought experiment we will assume

that these two behaviours are typically found in different individuals. That is, if one

adheres to P then one would generally not be predisposed to R, and vice-versa. I will

now explore the competition between these two memes by considering the case of

'Joe Average'.

Joe Average has the same number of memes for altruistic behaviour as he does for

selfish behaviour. He was raised in the country, in a town named Trustworthyville,

where there were no such things as doors (as everybody trusted everybody). Thus our

friend Joe Average had never experienced P or R. At the tender young age of 15, Joe

went on his first trip to the city. He experienced two things on his entrance and exit

through a door into and out of a building. On the way in, a man rudely pushed past

him. Joe experienced R. On the way back out, another man held the door open for

him. Joe experienced P. This happened several times throughout the day. There was

no obvious correlation between the two memes and the age, or gender of the people

whose behaviour Joe witnessed, or the direction Joe was travelling.

Joe has absolutely no one who can tell him which meme he should 'take on'. So which

meme will have the most chance of being replicated in Joe's brain and consequently

shape his behaviour? To answer this we should go back and ask Blackmore's

question. "Imagine a world full of brains, and far more memes than can possibly find

homes. Which memes are more likely to find a safe home and get passed on again?"

We will assume, as argued above, that there is room in Joe's brain for only one of

these memes, either P or R. Joe's 'memeplex'44 is unbiased in this matter, so the

environment in his brain, made up of other memes is equally hospitable to both these

44 Dawkins initially used the terminology ‘coadapted meme complex’ to describe all the memes that have adapted and coevolved together. If you have a meme for ‘carbon emissions cause global warming’ (say) you are more likely to have a meme for using public transport and walking, than one for driving everywhere you go. (Assuming you believe global warming is a bad thing of course!) This is the ‘environmental memeplex’. ‘Coadapted meme complex’ has since undergone a memetic selection itself, to the more snazzy, ‘memeplex’ (Dawkins, 1999: xiv).

48

memes. How will he 'decide' which meme to accept? If we go along with Blackmore

and hold that people tend to imitate nice people, or people they like, then there would

be a greater likelihood that P will be successful over R. Joe is hardly going to like the

individuals who rudely push by him and he will most likely like people who open doors

for him. In a person whose memeplex is not heavily biased towards memes for

altruism or memes for selfishness, the 'Polite meme' is more likely to have success

than the 'Rude meme'.45

This is a very simple model of the competition between two specific acts. Of course,

often an essential ingredient may be left out using simple models. But we need to start

with the uncomplicated before we move up to the complicated. Simple models are

used to give us a general idea of how a system might work. Once this has been

covered, models can be upgraded to include greater complexity to give us a more

accurate picture of the system (Sober & Wilson, 1998: 22). This is the kind of

advantage a memetic account may have to offer though. We could be able to analyse

specific acts of altruism that are based on culture rather than biology, with a level of

understanding that so far has been absent in all other accounts.

The Ultimate Altruistic Act

Let's make Kevin join the army. Why would he throw himself on a hand-grenade to

save an unrelated fellow soldier? This has no obvious genetic advantage. He

obviously won't be able to reproduce. He isn't related to the other soldier so his genes

won't make it into the next generation by kin selection. Reciprocal altruism seems

somewhat unlikely (Kevin is dead after all). And (biological) group selection is doubtful,

because not only does there need to be a genetic basis for this behaviour, even if

there is, the genes of altruistic Kevin die with him (assuming he has no children). But

in terms of memetic fitness, such a sacrifice is fantastic for this particular altruistic

meme. Genes can only be transmitted vertically from the parent to the offspring.

Memes, on the other hand, can be transferred horizontally. They are not restricted by

biological lineages. With Kevin's death, therefore, all his genes become extinct, but

not necessarily all his memes, and certainly not the meme for suicidal sacrifice. As

Dawkin's noted with religious celibacy, the success of a meme is likely to be directly

45 In 1993 I lived in the Seychelles (in the Indian Ocean) where the Rude meme was dominant. Obviously the reason why one meme becomes dominant over another is going to be of greater complexity than my account.

49

correlated to the amount of time spent spreading it. Stories will be told over

generations about Private Kevin's heroic act. He will be upheld as the ideal soldier, a

movie may even be made about him. From the meme's point of view, Kevin's act

couldn't have been of greater value.46

This kind of example involves modern memetic altruism, as opposed to altruistic acts

that would have initially been based solely in biology. It presupposes altruistic

epigenetic rules, but goes beyond this, arguing for an already complex meme pool

from which new kinds of altruistic memes can arise. Behaviours of this kind would not

survive simply as instinctive biological acts. The animal world is one that is dominated

by genes. It generally operates in the absence of a separate and influential culture. If

one could find an example in the animal world that is comparable to Kevin sacrificing

himself as above, then the memetic theory of altruism (certainly for this particular act)

would be in trouble. This kind of act is pervasive in human culture. At the very least, if

it is not actually often performed, it is ubiquitous in human mythology and storytelling.

Sacrificing oneself for others is generally held to be a moral act of the highest order.

But this kind of act will only occur in an environment that is greatly influenced by

culture, not just genes.

Indeed, this kind of act is unheard of in the human world when culture is less complex.

In his book Guns, Germs and Steel (1997), Jared Diamond discusses why states

usually triumph over smaller groups (tribes and the like) in war. The most obvious

reason is the superior size, and more advanced weapons and technology of states,

compared to that of smaller groups. States also have a centralised command that can

direct resources with great efficacy. Perhaps a less significant reason, but of interest

to our discussion, is that official religions and patriotic fervour often encourage soldiers

to fight suicidally for their state (Diamond, 1997: 281). A classic example is the Battle

of Thermopylae (480 B.C.).

46 One can offer counter arguments to this. Wouldn't people watching the act be horrified? Is there actually any evidence that such behaviour is imitated? In regards to the first objection, I would agree that the people witnessing the act may be horrified, but they would also be extremely grateful (I would assume) as their lives were saved. Though the meme might not 'infect' them, that is, entice them to perform the act, they would at least spread it by telling the anecdote of Kevin's sacrifice. Moving to the second objection, I would submit that suicide bombers and Kamikaze pilots are evidence for the imitation of such behaviour. These answers are not necessarily what actually happens, but these objections and my responses are of the sort that can be put to the test.

50

Thermopylae was a narrow mountain pass through which the invading Persian army

would have to navigate in order to conquer Greece. A small Greek force of around

5000 troops, commanded by the Spartan king, Leonidas, was charged with the task of

holding the Persians at Thermoplyae. The Greeks held the pass for three days until

the Persians were guided around their position by a Greek traitor. Sending the majority

of his troops to safety, Leonidas remained behind with 300 Spartan troops in order to

delay the Persians. They were eventually overcome, with every Spartan making the

supreme altruistic sacrifice of death (Hammond, 1959: 231-236). In themselves acts

like this are remarkable, but consider the actual mindset of the Spartans. Two men

had been absent as they were affected with a disease of the eyes, a symptom of

which is near blindness. One of them forced his helot (a slave of the state) to lead him

to the battle, where he was promptly despatched to 'the house of Hades'. The other,

thinking himself too ill, didn't fight. On his return to Sparta he was deemed

ignominious. No one would speak to him as he was branded a coward (Russell, 1946:

116).47 It seems that in Spartan society, even an illness (including one that obviously

meant the afflicted individual would be next to useless in a battle) was not a good

enough excuse to avoid suicidally sacrificing oneself. I believe the Spartan's had a

motto along the lines of: "Come back with your shield, or on it!"

The willingness of citizens of modern states to behave in such fashion is at odds with

much of human history. Private Kevin's act of heroism would be almost

incomprehensible to the members of a band or tribe. Diamond claims that in all his

encounters with native New Guineans, they maintain that in all their previous acts of

tribal warfare, tribal patriotism, suicidal charges and deliberate strategies that carry a

high risk of injury or death, are unheard of (1997: 282).48

So why and how did such a behaviour only evolve in large groups? I doubt the

explanation is purely biological – that it is an epigenetic rule – given that human

groups can behave very differently without being genetically different, and differences

in behaviour can develop in extremely short periods of time (Sober & Wilson, 1998:

149).49 As with private Kevin act of self-sacrifice, I will now consider this behaviour to

47 A year later he made up for his supposed pusillanimity by dying in another battle. 48 Note that this contradicts Darwin's claim which I previously cited: "He who was ready to sacrifice his life, as many a savage has been..." 49 If one was to take healthy babies from their countries of birth and swap them around, they could all learn the 'non-native' languages, count, use tools, etc. The essentially human parts of

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be a meme (arguably the most altruistic meme of all). It makes sense that a meme of

this sort could only flourish in a large population. In small bands and tribes, there are

less resources for memes (brains, books etc.). The competition for these resources,

therefore, is far fiercer. It then follows that any meme that significantly reduces the

quantity of resources will find the going tough. In a band of 20, for example, if one

person sacrifices himself for the rest, 1/20th of the population is eliminated and only

19 people are actually exposed to the meme. Whereas when Kevin throws himself on

a grenade, he reduces the population by 1/20 million (if he was an Australian, say)

and could potentially spread his memes to far more than 20 million people (if a movie

is made). From this we can see that for memes of this kind, when the population

increases, the meme becomes less harmful (proportionally) and can spread even

further.

This is all well and good, but now we must ask ourselves: "Why would such a

behaviour be seen as a good thing in the first place?" This is a fair question that

deserves an answer. Obviously, once it became associated with religious memes that

suggest this sacrifice has its reward in the afterlife (such as martyrdom), it has a great

chance of being replicated (the Middle East as a case in point). How did it initially

come about (and how does it still exist) without theistic conviction?

One possible reason I can hypothesise is that in a small group (again a band of 20),

the sacrifice of one individual, at the most, could save 19 others, and more than likely

would only save a few. From the point of view of those left behind, though they would

be grateful, they might not see the utility of such a sacrifice. After all, why kill yourself

just to save a few other people? It may as well be them rather than you.50 But the

utility of such a sacrifice becomes far more obvious if one individual saves hundreds

of others, or more (or hundreds saving thousands, as with the battle of Thermopylae).

Given the human ego, given that stories of such bravery will be told and retold, others

who are left behind may see this kind of action as their route to immortality. If given

the opportunity, they may make a similar sacrifice and start the cycle again. As Darwin

noted:

our intelligence were in place before our anatomically modern human ancestors spread throughout the globe (Pinker, 2001). That is, behavioural differences among human groups are cultural, not biological. This is why group selection driven only by biology is unlikely to be the explanation. 50 This is not an ethical position to take, but a rational one for the purely self-interested.

52

A man who was not impelled by any deep, instinctive feeling, to sacrifice his life

for the good of others, yet was roused to such actions by a sense of glory, would

by his example excite the same wish for glory in other men, and would strengthen

by exercise the noble feeling of admiration (1871: 132).

For this to occur it is essential for the sacrifice to be made within a large enough

society. Who knows where the 'largeness threshold' lies, but I suspect that it would

need to be in the hundreds, if not thousands of citizens. Treating this phenomenon as

a meme, it is possible to come up with quite a plausible explanation for its evolution.

Group Selection Revisited

This is memetic spread within the society itself, but as Diamond has argued, this

meme may give the survival advantage to the group that has it over the group that

doesn't (when they are involved in direct conflict). It will be especially powerful when

combined with religious memes. Peter Singer makes this point too:

But when most members of a group believe that to die in battle for the survival of

the group is to go straight to a realm of eternal bliss, the group will be more

formidable in war than other groups who can offer their soldiers no comparable

spur to self sacrifice. Paradoxically, even the soldiers who hold this false belief

may be less likely to die in war than the soldiers of other societies that lack the

belief; for armies made up of soldiers who fight without fear of dying are more

likely to be victorious, and victorious armies suffer fewer casualties than those that

they rout (1993: 103).

A meme, primarily, doesn't survive and spread for the benefit of the group. It is only of

benefit to itself. But if a meme does have a property that makes it of benefit to an

individual or to the group, it has an advantage over one that doesn't. I have shown

how the meme for suicidal sacrifice could spread within the group, even though it is

obviously disadvantageous to many of the individuals who make up the group. But it

does have a 'bonus property' of being beneficial when the group competes against

other groups that lack the suicidal sacrifice meme. This is memetic group selection. As

we saw with the brain worm, group selection can occur when the benefit for the group

outweighs the individual cost. The suicidal sacrifice trait gives the group that has it a

53

greater chance of surviving than a group that doesn't. The altruistic group will more

than likely win, and the memes and genes of the losing group will become extinct.

Blackmore agrees with this kind of reasoning. She sees the group as a very large

'meme vehicle' and does contend that group selection of memes could be quite a

significant force. However, she only actually applies memetic group selection to

religions. Her argument for the memetic selection of religious beliefs is parallel to my

own for the group selection of altruism. The meme for suicidal sacrifice gives

advantage to the group when they are in violent conflict (Blackmore, 1999a: 198-200).

I think Blackmore has made an error with her memetic account of altruism by missing

a major part of the story – memetic group selection. This error is puzzling given that

she does apply group selection to religions. Leaving this query aside, I will now return

to Sober and Wilson's account of the evolution of altruism via group selection, this

time for humans. As we shall see, their account is not at odds with the memetic one.

In the second chapter I used the parasite Dicrocoelium dendriticum to illustrate how

group selection could account for some forms of altruism. Group selection with

Dicrocoelium dendriticum was purely biological, but Sober and Wilson argue that with

humans, much of group selection is culturally driven, specifically by social norms

which delineate acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. Within-group selfishness is

punished if is considered unacceptable behaviour. "In most human social groups,

cultural transmission is guided by a set of norms that identify what counts as

acceptable behaviour." (Sober & Wilson, 1998: 150). In terms of prescribing

behaviour, social norms seem little different to memes.51 Consider one of their

examples.

They propose two imaginary cultures, squibs and squabs. Squibs follow the social

norms: be altruistic to fellow squibs, punish those who don't, and punish those who fail

to punish. Squabs follow the norm: solve your own problems. In any between-group

competition, the squibs will obviously outperform the squabs. Thanks to the squibs'

norms (or rather, memes) they will not be exploited from within, as cheaters and

51 Even if Sober and Wilson would not agree that social norms and memes are the same (when it comes to prescribing behaviour), at the very least they conclude that altruism and group selection with humans is driven by culture, as well as genes (1998: 149).

54

freeloaders will be punished.52 If every year there is movement between groups,

squibs who become squabs are exploited unless they change their ways and squabs

who become squibs are punished unless they change their ways. People are good at

changing their ways so the group differences have a greater stability than the

individual differences (Sober & Wilson, 1998: 151). We could call this phenomenon

'social inertia'.

Given this, within the group it then seems arbitrary as to which social norm prevails.

However, within a world of squibs and squabs who compete in the formation of new

groups, the squibs will win. The reason is that: "Within-group selection can favour any

behaviour, depending on the social norm of the group. Between-group selection

favours only social norms that lead to functionally adaptive groups." (Sober & Wilson,

1998: 152). Squibs cannot be subverted from within thanks to punishment of

unacceptable behaviour, and when squibs compete as a group against squabs, they

have a greater chance of being the victor. Computer modelling has demonstrated that

altruists do well by forming into groups with each other, but selfish types do not.

Selfish types do well by evolving long dispersal distances, spreading out towards the

altruistic 'suckers' and avoiding other selfish types. Altruists fare better by clustering

together in groups (Netting, 2002).

As we have seen, Sober and Wilson argue that one of the most important conditions

for group selection of altruism is competition for the formation of new groups. If groups

split up and reform, with altruists seeking out other altruists (as computer models have

shown), they are protecting themselves from 'subversion from within'. With humans,

biology has given most of us the potential to be altruistic, but culture can subdue or

reinforce this instinct. If human groups split up and reform, with the reformation based

on people with memes for altruism seeking out other altruists, altruism should flourish.

This is not a difficult proposition to agree with. The majority of us seek out like-minded

individuals for companions. I am reminded of an episode of The Simpsons. We are

given a history lesson on the foundation of Springfield (the Simpsons' home town) and

52 Sober and Wilson point out that this then requires investigation of the evolution of punishment. At the end of the investigation we should find that it is a behaviour that benefits the group at a minor cost to the individual, which is not a problem if the individual cost is sufficiently small (1998: 151). Of course, in some ways punishment just seems like a more developed form of reciprocal altruism.

55

their neighbouring town (and bitter rivals) Shelbyville. The settlers originally came as

one large group to form a town and start new lives together. When they arrived, a

dispute broke out (about the laws by which they would live) between two factions. One

faction wanted to live as good, moral Christians, while the other faction wanted to get

drunk all the time and marry their cousins. Like-minded people had sought each other

out until they eventually formed rival factions, with the first group going on to form

Springfield and the second Shelbyville. This fictitious (and amusing) example

demonstrates the group sorting of memes – in this case, memes for Christian morality

and memes for getting drunk and marrying cousins.53 But it is also a general argument

for the group selection of memes, when one set of memes give advantages to the

group when they are competing against another.

Memetic group selection could be a major reason why we see such a high prevalence

of altruism in human societies today. Splitting up and reforming, as well as self-

reinforcing memes (social norms) protect groups from 'subversion from within', and in

direct competition, altruistic groups are likely to fare better than selfish groups. It is

important to be aware of what I am not arguing. Group selection is often thought of as

'for the good of the species', as if animals are making a deliberate and reasoned

choice. This is clearly untrue. I am speaking of group selection as the differential

fitness between groups engaged in competition. As we have seen, memetic group

selection is significantly different to genetic group selection. The genes of an altruist

suffer when engaged in within-group competition, but this is not necessarily the case

with their memes. Thanks to horizontal transmission, memes are not bound to their

'vehicle'.

We have many different types of memes for altruism. When looking at specific acts of

altruism, memetics may be a useful analytic tool. However, it needs to be

acknowledged that examples as I have just given are extremely simplified. This

simplification is necessary if we are to have a starting point. The real world is likely to

be far more elaborate. This is only natural when we think about the complex interplay

of human culture, let alone when epigenetic rules are thrown into the mix. The reason

we have such memes in the first place is because of the epigenetic rules that create

the 'geographical features' of the environment that is our brain, and the other memes

53 Darwin succumbed to this meme and married his cousin Emma Wedgwood (Desmond & Moore, 1991: 279). (I don't think he drank too much though.)

56

already residing there, the other 'biota'. As Edward Wilson pointed out, the extent of

the influence of genes and memes on human behaviour is unmeasured (1998: 139).

Blackmore has begun to provide the basics of a memetic theory of altruism. The next

step would be to actually conduct empirical research, to try and quantify the influence

of genes and memes on altruistic behaviour. A memetic theory of altruism needs to

take into account accepted biological principles and then go further. For species other

than humans, species that lack culture, evolutionary explanations for altruism (kin

selection, reciprocal altruism and group selection) are sound (even if there is yet a

general consensus). As an explanation for the basis of human psychology, again,

these evolutionary accounts are sound. But there it is apparent that there are gaps in

our understanding of human altruism, gaps that the memetic explanation seems to be

able to fill. Human culture is amazingly complex – so complex that many social

scientists have given up on a quantitative approach to understanding it. They favour a

holistic, qualitative description. But the human brain is also amazingly complex, for

example, and incredible progress has been made in neuroscience by breaking down

the complex whole into analysable chunks, forging ahead bit by bit (Laland & Brown

2002: 43). This is precisely what meme theory offers.

Though I have been concerned with altruism only, memetics could offer new insights

into the history of human culture. Jarred Diamond, in his epilogue to Guns, Germs and

Steel, discusses the nature of historical research. This discipline of history is generally

considered to not be a science. But this is if we take a narrow view of what it is that

science does. He asks us to recall that the word 'science' comes from the Latin word

scientia, which means 'knowledge'. This knowledge should to be obtained by whatever

methods are appropriate to the field of investigation. Historical sciences share many

features, but the four he singles out are methodology, causation, prediction and

complexity. The investigation of history is primarily concerned with, not historical

'facts', but chains of causes (Diamond, 1997: 420-422). Given that history is about

explaining chains of causes, does investigating history from the 'meme's eye view'

help with this? In order to come to a conclusion on whether the memetic account is

worth serious consideration, it is necessary to say something on memetics as a whole.

Is it a solid, causal, evolutionary account of culture? How can memes 'cause' things to

happen? If memes do offer a solid causal explanation for why things are as they are,

in this case for why we have altruism, then memetics should be taken seriously. This

will be the focus of Chapter four.

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Chapter 4: Explanation and Causation

"When I see, for instance, a Billiard-ball moving in a straight line towards another;

even suppose motion in the second ball should by accident be suggested to me,

as the result of their contact or impulse; may I not conceive, that a hundred

different events might as well follow from that cause? May not both these balls

remain at absolute rest? May not the first ball return in a straight line, or leap off

from the second in any line or direction? All these suppositions are consistent and

conceivable. Why then should we give preference to one, which is no more

consistent or conceivable than the rest? All our reasonings [sic] a priori will never

be able to shew [sic] us any foundation for this preference." (David Hume, 1748:

26-27).54

"So there is a world out there, independent of us, waiting to be discovered. The

things out there in the world are called phenomena, and most would agree that

science has at least two principle aims, that of predicting and explaining these

phenomena." (Wesley Salmon, 1978: 684).

"...I mean by nature, only the aggregate action and product of many natural laws,

and by laws the sequence of events as ascertained by us." (Charles Darwin, 1859:

64).

The Ontology of Cause

Generally when we are trying to explain a phenomenon, we search for its cause. If we

find the cause, we have then explained why the phenomenon has come to be, or why

it is the case. This seems simple enough. Science, at the very least, is based on a

54 Of course, though Hume's argument may be epistemologically sound, following it to its logical conclusion leads to some strange beliefs. One which no-one could actually believe (including Hume I'd be willing to bet) is that when at a firing range, one should hold the same preference for pointing a loaded gun at one's own head as one holds for pointing it at the target, and firing it! Ironically, sometimes being logical would lead one to be irrational.

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belief in cause and effect, or so common sense would have us believe.55 Hume

argued that we are actually mistaken in our belief about cause and effect. If we

observe that event A is followed by event B, we may feel that there must be some

property of A which causes B, but all we actually see is the contiguity and succession

of the events (Popkin & Stroll, 1993: 265). "We have no other notion of cause and

effect, but that of certain objects, which have been always conjoin'd [sic] together, and

which in all past instances have been found inseparable. We cannot penetrate into the

reason of the conjunction. We only observe the thing itself, and always find that from

the constant conjunction the objects acquire an union in the imagination." (Hume,

1740: 93). We cannot actually say that one event caused another. All we know for

sure is that one event is correlated to another. For this Hume coined the term

'constant conjunction'. That is, when we see that one event alway 'causes' another,

what we are really seeing is that one event has always been 'constantly conjoined' to

the other. As a consequence, we have no reason to believe that one caused the

other, or that they will continue to be 'constantly conjoined' in the future (Popkin &

Stroll, 1993: 268).56 The reason we do believe in cause and effect is not because

cause and effect are the actual way of nature; we believe because of the

psychological habits of human nature (Popkin & Stroll, 1993: 272).

If we agree with Hume, then how can we have science, let alone argue that these

perhaps non-physical entities, memes, do anything at all?57 How can they be the

'cause' of altruism? Recall that 'Joe Average' came into contact with two memes on his

first journey to the city. The Polite meme (P) and the Rude meme (R). If we accept

Hume's argument and we observe Joe being polite after he had observed P, there is

only one conclusion we can draw. Joe's observation of the polite behaviour, and then

the subsequent polite behaviour of Joe, were merely 'conjoined'. For this reason, with

55 With the one notable exception being quantum mechanics. 56I call this the 'sh_t happens' account (pardon my descent into scatology). There is no way to explain why something occurred, or to predict when it will occur again. "Sh_t just happens man!" 57 With regards to science, some still hold Hume's view. The scientific 'fact' that water boils at 100 degrees Celsius, means, that it has been observed many times that an impression, called water boiling, has been constantly conjoined with another impression, a thermometer reading 100 degrees Celsius. Scientific information doesn't tell us about relationships in nature, it tells us about regular sequences that have been observed. On the basis of these observations we expect and predict (without actually having a better reason than psychological habit) that the same conjunctions will occur in the future (Popkin & Stroll, 1993: 272).

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regard to my overall account of P, all we can say is: "It has been observed that, in

general, people who come into contact with polite behaviour tend to behave politely

themselves". Thus we have no explanation, in terms of any real connection between

cause and effect, for why polite behaviour spreads, and certainly no room for an

intermediary entity such as the meme.

If science is just about telling us what was observed, it is deeply unsatisfying – we are

robbed of any prospect of genuine scientific explanations. This is where I shall turn to

some recent philosophy of science, with the hope of finding a satisfactory account of

causality, which I can then apply to meme theory.

What we seem to need for a scientific explanation is a connection between cause and

effect. Wesley Salmon contends that a scientific explanation is the state of affairs of

something fitting into or being a part of a pattern in the world, where the pattern is

constituted by at least one causal process (Forge, 1999: 10). A process is the real

physical connection between cause and effect. For example, the heat from the flame

of a gas stove excites the molecules in the water via the iron atoms in the bottom of

the pan. This is a process where every step from the cause, the flame, can be traced

to the effect, boiling water. This view has come to be known as the ‘ontic’ account of

explanation. It is thoroughly realist and rests on an ontology that is designed to answer

the question: "Just what is a causal process?" (Forge, 2002b).

Needless to say, Salmon's ratiocination of his ontology of cause and effect is complex.

It is not in the purview of this dissertation to critically examine his views in any detail.58

What I intend to do is use his ontology to argue that memes fulfil the criteria of a

genuine causal processes. They have the potential to be a genuine scientific account

of culture, and specifically of altruism. I will begin with some detailed examples before

I move on to the generalities of the memetic account.

58 For this I would suggest (Forge, 1999: Chapter 2).

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Wittgenstein's Meme

...I taught a young woman who affected an unusual habit. When asked a question

which required deep thought, she would screw her eyes tight shut, jerk her head

down to her chest and then freeze for up to half a minute before looking up,

opening her eyes, and answering the question with fluency and intelligence. I was

amused by this, and did an imitation of it to divert my colleagues after dinner.

Among them was a distinguished Oxford philosopher. As soon as he saw my

imitation, he immediately said: "That's Wittgenstein! Is her surname _______ by

any chance?" Taken aback, I said that it was. "I thought so", said my colleague.

"Both her parents are professional philosophers and devoted followers of

Wittgenstein." The gesture had passed from the great philosopher, via one or both

of her parents to my pupil. I suppose that, although my further imitation was done

in jest, I must count myself as a fourth-generation transmitter of that gesture. And

who knows where Wittgenstein got it? (Dawkins, 1999: vii).

Dawkins' example illustrates how memes are transmitted and what they transmit.

Wittgenstein's gesture has been transmitted from Wittgenstein to the pupil's parents,

to the pupil, and then to Dawkins by imitation. Thus imitation is how it has been

transmitted. But the imitation itself is not the meme. The gesture is. The information of

how to do the gesture is what is transmitted. In Dawkins' account, through imitation,

information has been transferred visually. But we know that it must be information that

is transmitted, because we don't need to see someone else do it to take up

'Wittgenstein's meme' ourselves. Reading Dawkins' description of it should be enough

for us to take it up, and Dawkins' written description is information in the most literal

sense. As we will see, information is extremely important if we are to consider

memetics as a genuine causal account.

According to Salmon, causal processes transmit 'structure', or energy and momentum

or 'information' from one spatio-temporal location to another (Forge, 1999: 19). The

important word to note here is 'information'. Dawkins originally termed meme as: "...a

unit of cultural transmission, or a unit of imitation." (Dawkins, 1976: 192). When

discussing exactly what memes are, Blackmore and others do not give careful enough

ontological distinction between how memes are transmitted and what they transmit. As

I have shown with Dawkins' example, the meme is information that, generally, is

transmitted by imitation. But Blackmore and Dawkins commonly speak of memes as

units of imitation:

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A meme is anything that is copied from person to person by imitation. It comes

from the Greek for that which is imitated. So the idea is that if you pass anything

on from person to person, copying it, that counts as a meme. So, for example,

songs, stories, habits, ways of doing things, like the clothes you wear, driving on

the left or the right, the kind of foods you eat, these are things you do because

you’ve picked them up from other people, so they all count as memes (Blackmore,

2000).

Here we can see that Blackmore is actually proposing how memes are transmitted.

What a meme is, on the other hand, is a distinct memorable unit of culture (Dennett,

1995: 344) Units of culture such as the examples Blackmore uses are units of

information. Imitation is how memes are transmitted (remembering this is only when a

meme is transferred directly from person to person and not via another medium such

as a book, or indeed a thesis) and information is what they transmit.59

Even though it is information, we cannot yet be sure that it is a genuine causal

process. There are two ways, in principle, by which it is possible to demarcate causal

processes from 'pseudo-processes' – how causal processes are transmitted through

space-time and what they transmit (Forge, 2002a). As for how causal processes are

transmitted, the theory holds that the transmissions must be continuous, with no

discontinuities or 'jumps' in space-time. Unfortunately this is not enough to be sure

that it is a genuinely causal process, as 'pseudo-processes' can also be continuous.

Therefore we need to look at what causal processes transmit – in this case,

information. Salmon argues that given causal processes transmit information, we should

be able to 'mark' a process by modifying it, to see if the modification is transmitted. This

'marking principal' serves to demarcate causal process from pseudo-processes, as the

latter cannot be marked (Forge, 2002a).

Can the marking principle be used to see if memes are genuine causal processes? I

believe so. For example, I could 'do Wittgenstein' the correct way to half the people I 59 I think Dawkins and Blackmore would agree with this point. "[A meme] is a new replicator; that is a new kind of information that can be copied with variation and selection." (Blackmore, 2000). "At its heart [evolution] is the information that is copied, or the replicator." (Blackmore, 1999b: 40). It is just that such careful ontological distinction wasn't really necessary for their purposes. However, it is important apropos memes being genuine causal processes. Also worth noting is that the online Journal of Memetics has the sub-title Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission.

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meet and make up my own version of it (a slight variation like poking my tongue out as

well) for the other half. If this new version spreads along with the old then it should

fulfil the criteria of the marking principle. For a given process, if it can be interfered

with, or marked, such that the structure, etc., that it transmits is modified, then that

process is a genuine causal process (Forge, 1999: 19). I don't believe it is too much of

a stretch of the imagination to presume that both versions of Wittgenstein's meme

would spread. If this is the case, we have a genuine causal process, as one version of

the meme has been marked. However, there is a problem with this. If no one ever

bothered to imitate my variation, it would seem that the process had not been marked.

We would conclude, therefore, the meme is not a genuine causal process.

Blackmore's soup might be a better example.

The soup, consisting of ingredients that make up the recipe, is literally information. As

with Wittgenstein's gesture, person B can learn how to make this recipe from person A

by 'copy-the-product' or 'copy-the-instruction'. The first method is via visual and

auditory information. B watches A make it and then makes it himself. The second

method works via written information. B gets a copy of the recipe from A and then

makes it himself. With either method A can 'mark' the process by making a change to

the recipe. He could add too much salt, for example. B will then copy this change

when he makes the soup. This fulfils the 'marking criteria'. If a process can be marked,

such that the information that it transmits is modified, then that process is a genuine

causal process. These processes of memetic replication, either 'copy the product' or

'copy the instruction', are genuine causal processes. It is not very surprising that this is

a causal process. Though this may seem mundane, it has laid the foundation for a

further, more interesting and more speculative application of Salmon's ontology.

Information Transfer

Things are 'causal agents' if they are originators of causal chains and not merely

'passers on' of causes. They are 'uncaused causers' (Forge, 2002a). The 'uncaused

causer' is the first cause in a new causal chain. It is the initial cause in the chain of

causal events we are interested in explaining.60 Could memes be causal agents of this

60 The ‘uncaused causer’, though an Aristotelian notion, is not the ‘unmoved mover’ of Aristotle and St Thomas Aquinas – the first ever cause in the universe. The uncaused causer obviously

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type? Are they 'uncaused causers'? We have seen that they fulfil the 'marking criteria',

therefore they are genuine causal processes. But we need more than this. We need to

know how they actually cause behaviour. Specifically, the way they cause acts of

altruism. Before I speculate on how a meme for altruism causes altruistic behaviour, it

is worthwhile to examine how genes cause things to happen – to examine genes as

'causal agents'. Genetics has had a head start on memetics. We know far more about

how genes work than how memes work. The causal genetic account has greater detail

– a mass of empirical evidence – compared to the causal memetic account I will

speculate upon. Analysing genetics in this way may suggest a future direction for

memetics, or at least give us some idea of what a causal memetic account should look

like.

We certainly know that genes pass the marking criteria. For example, scientists have

inserted the 'antifreeze' genes from flounders into the genetic code of tomatoes, which

then protects the tomatoes from frost damage (Rifkin, 1998: 81). A process (normal

reproduction) has been marked, such that the information that is transmitted (the DNA)

is modified (the addition of the flounder gene). We know that genes are a part of a

genuine causal process. How do they work specifically? Genes are made up of DNA

(deoxyribose nucleic acid). Inside the nucleus of a cell, a particular nitrogen-base

sequence of DNA controls precisely what proteins are formed in the cytoplasm. By

controlling the synthesis of proteins, DNA determines what chemical reactions take

place in the cell (Morgan, et al., 1991: 854). The chemical reactions of cells affect the

chemical reactions of the body. A small chemical change to the way a particular

molecule forms can produce a considerable effect on the phenotype (Morgan, et al.,

1991: 845). Here we have a detailed account of the way genes cause phenotypic

effects. DNA is information that tells the cell what kind of proteins to form. This, in turn,

governs the chemical reactions in the cell, which then produces a phenotypic effect.

The gene is the 'uncaused causer' in the chain of causal events we are trying to

explain. A causal memetic account should be somewhat similar.

If a meme is a causal agent, there needs to be a connection between the meme and

the behaviour it 'causes'. Memes, therefore, need to be antecedent to the behaviour.

Suppose we wish to know why someone has behaved as they have. Why, for

had a cause of its own, but in terms of the phenomenon that we are attempting to explain, the uncaused causer's cause is irrelevant.

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example, did Private Kevin act in the way he did and suicidally sacrifice himself by

jumping on the hand-grenade? A causal explanation might go something like this. The

meme for suicidal sacrifice, travelling via language, writing or images (on TV etc.)

transmits ‘structure’ in the form of information, which changes the patterns of neural

activity in Kevin's brain. (If this explanation is valid, one has to show that information

does alter brain activity.) From this we would need to demonstrate that these new

patterns of neural activity are what 'makes up Kevin's mind' and, given the right

condition (war), produce his act of suicidal sacrifice.61

What goes on in Kevin's brain is a matter for neuroscience and other specialist

disciplines to solve. We are not in a position to give a detailed description of human

action in terms of the underlying brain processes. Though we don't know exactly how

it works, evidence suggests that acts are the products of various chemical and

physical brain processes. These are causal processes (Forge, 2002a). "Mental

phenomena, all mental phenomena whether conscious or unconscious, visual or

auditory, pains, tickles, itches, thoughts, indeed, all of our mental life, are caused by

processes going on in the brain... mental phenomena are just features of the brain..."

(Searle, 1984: 18).

Dawkins sees this point. Going back to the analogy with genes, there ought to be

something equivalent to DNA. Genes are the unit of replication but DNA is the actual

information that is transmitted.62 When a meme is passed on from one individual to

another, something is reproduced from brain to brain. We don’t yet know what that

something is (besides information), but there must be 'something' there (Dawkins,

2000). The arrangement of data in the brains of the two individuals should be

recognisably similar, just as the two thoughts of the two individuals are recognisably

similar. Memes get passed from person to person to person to person. If the semantic

content of the meme is not distorted as it goes down the line (which definitely

happens, most, if not all of the time) there must be some material explanation.

61 As with genes, there is not likely to be a one-to-one correlation with the meme and the behaviour. The behaviour will be caused by the interaction of many memes and epigenetic rules. For the sake of simplicity I have ignored this complication, understanding that in principal, arguments for 'memes for this' and 'memes for that' would work for one meme or for entire memeplexes. 62 "In evolutionary theory, a gene could be defined as any hereditary information for which there is favourable or unfavourable selection..." (Williams, 1966: 25, emphasis added).

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Dawkins suggests, again by analogy with genes, that we are in the pre-Watson and

Crick phase of genetics. We know from Mendelian genetics that something gets

passed on – we just don’t know what it is (besides hereditary information). Memes still

await their Watson and Crick (Dawkins, 2000).63

My account of why Kevin sacrificed himself is an immediate causal explanation. We

can give it greater depth depending on how complete an explanation we require. We

could trace the history of the meme back to a previous act of suicidal sacrifice (the

Spartans at Thermoplyae, for example), to see how Kevin came in contact with it at all.

Where we start from, in terms of causes, depends on what we are trying to explain. If

we want to know: "Why did Kevin act as he did at that particular moment?" then we

probably don't need to trace the history of that meme all the way back to Sparta and

beyond. The explanation I gave above is sufficient. But if we are trying to give an

explanation for the question: "Why would anyone act as Kevin did at all?", we need to

not only trace the history of the meme, but find (evolutionary) explanations for its

occurrence in the first place. If our explanations are correct we must show that the

processes that figure in a (correct) causal explanation are causally responsible for the

occurrence (Forge, 2002a).

Memetic altruism may be an even more powerful force than genetic altruism, in view of

the fact that causal processes more readily transmit memes than genes. There is only

one natural way that genetic information can be transferred – reproduction – vertical

transmission from parent to offspring. Using non-genetic means of transmission,

memes can not only be transmitted vertically, but also horizontally, to non-relatives.

At least in theory, memes conform to the causal account. Given our present

understanding of the operations of the brain, I have shown how memes 'cause'

behaviour. That is, a meme transmits information, which changes the patterns of

neural activity in the brain, which then 'makes up the mind' and produces the act. This

is the 'little picture' of a causal/memetic account. The 'big picture' is the overall

evolution of altruism. It follows that the overall evolution of altruism is made up of lots

63 Others also believe that memes will ultimately have a physical basis. Robert Aunger thinks that memes are patterns of electrical discharges in neural networks in the brain. These patterns can be reproduced, they can be passed along to other networks and they can group together to form larger units (Morton, 2000). The reader may recall that in a previous footnote I mentioned Edward Wilson's definition of memes. He defines them specifically by a supposed physiology. A meme is a node of semantic memory and its associated brain activity (Wilson, 1998: 149).

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of 'little pictures'. If, as with Kevin's act of altruism, we can explain all these 'little

pictures', the 'big picture', the evolution of altruism becomes a solid, causal (therefore,

potentially scientific) evolutionary account.

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Conclusion: Has the 'Paradox' Been Resolved?

"Scratch an 'altruist' and watch a 'hypocrite' bleed." (Michael Ghiselin – cited by

Ridley, 1996: 68).

"It was assumed formally by philosophers of the derivative school of morals that

the foundation of morality lay in a form of Selfishness [sic]... the reproach is

removed of laying the foundation of the noblest part of our nature in the base

principle of selfishness; unless, indeed, the satisfaction which every animal feels,

when it follows its proper instincts, and the dissatisfaction felt when prevented, be

called selfish." (Charles Darwin, 1871: 120-121).

Now it is time to reflect. We have seen that altruism, though initially a paradox, is not

really so. The apparent paradox arises because the principle of natural selection,

when first comprehended, does seem to suggest that the nasty and selfish will prevail.

"What a book a Devil's Chaplain might write on the clumsy, wasteful, blundering low &

horridly cruel works of nature" Darwin once wrote in a letter to friend Joseph Hooker

(cited in Desmond & Moore, 1991: 449). With greater understanding of the

evolutionary process, biologists realised that given the right conditions, altruists could

indeed fare well, often even better than the selfish. Altruism could evolve through the

mechanisms of kin selection, reciprocal altruism and group selection. As we have

seen, these explanations are powerful and convincing, yet they only take us part of

the way. We understand why altruism seems to be a fundamental part of human

nature, but we cannot adequately account for the 'oddities' of human altruism or for

many specific altruistic acts. This is where memetics provides potentially valuable

insights.

Blackmore argues that people who are altruistic are generally well liked, which leads to

them being imitated, including imitation of their altruism. Memes for altruism spread

better than memes for selfishness, not only because we like altruists, but also

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because we don't like people who are selfish. This view, though not entirely wrong, I

found to be simplistic. I have argued that we tend to imitate people we want to be like,

people we hold in high regard. In a dog-eat-dog environment, such as a corporation,

many people are not pure altruists. They may be altruistic to a point, but they also

require similar behaviour from the other people they interact with (i.e., reciprocal

altruism). Memes for pure altruism that allow the holder to be taken advantage of will

be exploited by memes for selfish behaviour. They will, therefore, not fare well in the

'memepool'. However, in some cases the altruistic act has a large memetic pay-off.

When this is the case, and even if the act of altruism results in the death of the person

who exhibits the behaviour (as with Private Kevin's act of heroism when he threw

himself on the grenade), it should spread through the population with ease. If it is of

benefit to the group, and this benefit outweighs the cost to the individual, then a meme

for altruism, even at the level of 'the supreme sacrifice', will also be successful.

So, has the 'paradox' been completely resolved? It would be arrogant for anyone to

answer "yes" to this question. However, I am sufficiently convinced that memetics

does provide another avenue to explore, perhaps even a further step in the right

direction. Though I couldn't possibly claim that a memetic explanation is 'true', I can at

least speculate on a plausible evolutionary story that has the potential to explain the

emergence of altruism as we now see it in modern humans. My account is purely

speculative, but the purpose of it is to demonstrate the possibility of a complete

account that includes memes.64

A Possible History of Altruism

For the sake of argument we will consider a hypothetical group of pre-hominid

ancestors consisting of selfless altruists. In the account to follow, when there is a

change in strategy of a member of a group, I call this change a 'mutation'. This is a

broad usage – the new strategy may be a genetic mutation or it may not. 'Mutations'

could also arise through the introduction into the group of an outsider, or simply

because it is a fairly obvious strategy.65

64 For the sake of simplicity I am ignoring biological group selection, though it could have been a component of this historical account. 65 As pointed out by Dennett, in every culture so far dicovered, hunters throw the spear pointy end first. We would not think that there is a pointy end first gene, just that it is the most obvious strategy (1995: 486).

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1. In the beginning the group is made up of altruists so everything is working well.

Everyone is helping everyone else. But this leaves the group wide open to 'subversion

from within'.

2. There is a mutation that brings a selfish individual into the group. This,

consequently, begins the subversion from within. The selfish type monopolises all the

resources and has greater fitness than the altruists. Sure enough, soon more selfish

types are produced and eventually the altruists are all but wiped out.

3. A group made up of only selfish individuals will not be successful for too long. The

inherent 'dog-eat-dog' competition of this group leads to the monopolisation of

resources by a powerful few. This produces a decrease in the overall population size.

A mutation now produces a 'gene' that predisposes individuals to be altruistic to other

individuals with the same gene. It is likely that individuals with the same gene are from

the same family. Thus kin-selection is 'born'. A family that looks out for each other,

but ignores non-relatives in the group, out-competes the selfish types. As a family they

can gain greater control of the resources, ensuring the fitness of their gene pool.

4. Another mutation occurs. It gives individuals with it the ability to remember the past

deeds of others. This enables the strategy of reciprocal altruism to develop.

Individuals with this mutation are the most successful. In the kin selectionist group,

reciprocal altruism builds mutually beneficial relationships with relatives as well as non-

relatives. If reciprocal altruists do come into contact with selfish types, they will not be

taken advantage of. Reciprocal altruists perform acts that are of mutual benefit to

each other in the long term. Reciprocal altruists maximise their access to resources

and have greater fitness than others. Here we have the origin of non-familial

cooperation.

5. All these behaviours can be seen, predominantly, as the products of epigenetic

rules. Once culture developed to a sufficient point, especially once language evolved,

cultural evolution became a significant force in the evolution of human altruism.

Memes and genes are now coevolving and do so via complex causal processes. In

general, individuals with memes for altruism are more popular than individuals with

memes for selfishness. Altruists are more likely to attract members of the opposite

sex. Memes for altruism, therefore, spread along with genes for altruism. Over time

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this leads to a greater number of individuals in the population with genes for altruism,

which in turn leads to an even greater spread of memes for altruism. Memetic altruism

may be an even more powerful force than genetic altruism, in view of the fact that

causal processes more readily transmit memes than genes. There is only one way

which genetic information can be transferred – reproduction – vertical transmission

from parent to offspring. Using non-genetic means of transmission, memes not only

have the vertical means of reproduction, but are also transferred horizontally to non-

relatives. Those who are not genetically predisposed to be altruists, but wish to be

popular, may simply copy memes for altruism.

Memes that promote the survival of the group also play a significant role in the

evolution of altruism. When two or more groups of humans violently interact, those

groups with memes for altruism, such as fighting to the death on behalf of the group,

(all else being equal) are likely to fare better. Not only this, but with competition for the

formation of new groups, altruists will do better because memes for altruism lead to

functionally adaptive groups whereas memes for selfishness do not. Group selection

has played a major role in the evolution of altruism in humans. Not biological group

selection (though it too may have played a role), but cultural group selection. For

humans, natural selection therefore not only occurs at the genetic level, as with other

animals, but at the cultural level, with memes.

If we accept this explanation, it is not solely genes or solely memes that have

produced human altruism. It is a self-reinforcing conglomeration of both. Genes for

altruism took to the stage first, but once memes were born thanks to language and the

ability to imitate, memes for altruism developed. Genes and memes for altruism have

coevolved, driving each other. This Darwinian process is the 'engine' that has given

rise to the extraordinary variety of altruism we see today.

With careful ontological distinction it became clear that imitation is how memes are

transmitted and information is what they transmit. Therefore, memes are genuine

causal processes, because causal processes transmit 'structure', or energy and

momentum or 'information' from one spatio-temporal location to another. This

information changes the patterns of neural activity in the brain, which 'makes up the

mind' and produces the act. This process (the information changing patterns of neural

activity in the brain) is the real physical connection between the cause (the meme) and

the effect (the behaviour).

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Memes are an interesting idea because they may help us fill the apparent gaps in our

understanding of how something so paradoxical as altruism could have evolved. Kin

selection doesn't explain altruistic behaviour of humans and other animals towards

non-relatives. Reciprocal altruism doesn't explain cases where the altruist dies to

benefit a non-relative. Group selection may explain some of these acts (as with

Dicrocoelium dendriticum), but given the complexity of the conditions needed for

group selection to function (necessary conditions for it to be able to handle subversion

from within) it is fairly limited as an explanation. There are 'oddities' of human altruism

that have yet to be resolved by the standard sociobiological account. Added to this is

the problem that these accounts do not always offer explanation for specific acts of

altruism. It is often argued that these specific acts are based on general altruistic

tendencies, sometimes they are seen as evolutionary 'mistakes'. I have (hopefully)

shown that these explanations, though not wrong, can be taken further by the

memetic account. This account does not aim to supersede the biological theories that

have come before it; it aims to add to them. The evolutionary account of altruism is on

a firm biological foundation, but it can be developed further to include the evolution of

culture.

The Real Question

How altruism evolved is not actually the question that fascinates people the most. It is

whether or not we can say that we are truly altruistic, and then from that, can we say

that we are truly moral? To some, the idea that in the end, altruism is just another

strategy for securing fitness (either genetic or memetic), is a seemingly woebegone

message. Pure altruism is a figment of our imagination. As Randolph Nesse explains:

"Understanding this discovery can undermine commitment to morality – it seems silly

to restrain oneself if moral behaviour is just another strategy for advancing the

interests of one's genes. Some students, I am embarrassed to say, have left my

course with a naive notion of selfish gene theory that seemed to them to justify selfish

behaviour, despite my best efforts to explain the naturalistic fallacy". (1994: 654).

Though I can understand Nesse's point (and agree that justifying behaviour by arguing

from biology is to invoke the 'naturalistic fallacy'), this view is actually misguided.

Michael Ruse and Edward Wilson suggest that this error is often made simply

because ample distinction has not been made between individuals and genes.

Biologically there are acts of 'pure' altruism. With kin selection, the genes of the

73

individual who makes an altruistic sacrifice towards kin are said to be 'selfish', but the

individual who performs the act itself is altruistic (Ruse & Wilson, 1985: 50). He is

increasing another's welfare at his own expense. In this way, it can be said that

humans are truly altruistic towards kin (even if our genes are selfish). If we make the

same distinction between individuals and memes, we can see that 'pure' altruism can

be aimed towards non-kin as well, as we saw with Private Kevin's act of heroism. The

memes and genes may indeed be 'selfish' but individuals who perform altruistic acts

are not. They are truly selfless.

74

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81

Index A

adaptation.................................................. 11 Alexander, Richard ............................. 24, 72 altruism ... 1, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17,

18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 62, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70

ants ................................................ 17, 21, 22 Aristotle...................................................... 61 Axelrod, Robert ......................................... 19

B

bacteria ...................................................... 29 bees ........................................................... 17 behaviour (acts) ...7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17,

21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 31, 32, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 57, 58, 62, 63, 64, 67, 69, 70

biota, analogy with memes ................ 44, 54 Blackmore ...................................................1 Blackmore, Susan....4, 12, 13, 25, 26, 27, 29,

30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 51, 54, 59, 60, 61, 66, 72, 73

blood donation..................................... 24, 26 Bloom, Howard.................................... 11, 72 brain .21, 22, 23, 25, 39, 40, 44, 45, 46, 51, 54,

63, 64, 69 Buss, David ....................................... 8, 9, 72

C

Campbell, Donald ..................................... 35 causer, uncaused................................ 61, 62 causes...................................55, 57, 61, 62, 64 celibacy................................................ 31, 47 Chomsky, Noam ....................................... 25 Christianity........................................... 17, 53 computers............................................ 19, 53 constant conjunction ................................. 57 cooperation.......................................... 18, 19

'

'copy-the-instructions' ......................... 35, 61 'copy-the-product'................................ 35, 61

C

culture ... 7, 8, 9, 12, 15, 16, 20, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 37, 38, 39, 40, 47, 48, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58, 60, 67, 68, 70

D

Darwin, Charles5, 6, 9, 10, 16, 26, 31, 35, 49, 53, 66, 72, 73, 74

Dawkins, Richard .. 4, 5, 7, 18, 19, 20, 21, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 37, 38, 44, 45, 46, 59, 60, 63, 64, 73

defection, strategy of ..........................18, 19 Dennett, Daniel...5, 17, 29, 31, 39, 60, 67, 73 Desmond, Adrian.................................53, 66 Diamond, Jared ................... 8, 48, 49, 51, 55 DNA ................................................ 33, 62, 63

'

'dog-eat-dog' competition .......................67, 68

E

effects............................................ See causes environment (social, physical, etc.) ....8, 10, 11,

26, 35, 44, 46, 48, 54, 67 epigenetic rules 25, 26, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44,

45, 48, 54, 63, 68 evolution1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 20,

21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 42, 43, 44, 50, 52, 60, 64, 68, 69, 70

evolutionary psychologySee sociobiology. See sociobiology

F

fitness, genetic and memetic .10, 11, 12, 16, 20, 21, 22, 28, 47, 68, 70

Forge, John.....4, 5, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 73

G

game theory...............See prisoner's dilemma genes. 5, 12, 13, 16, 17, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31,

32, 33, 34, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 47, 48, 51, 52, 54, 62, 63, 64, 68, 69, 70

Gould, Stephen Jay ................ 5, 10, 23, 34, 74 group selection ...4, 13, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,

25, 26, 37, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 66, 67, 69, 70

H

Haldane, J. B. S ........................................17 Hamilton, William................................19, 28 Hobbes, Thomas ........................... 13, 14, 74 hominids.............................................8, 9, 67 Hooker, Joseph .........................................66 human nature ................ 8, 15, 39, 45, 57, 66 Hume, David ............................. 42, 56, 57, 74 hunter-gatherers ..................................8, 9, 42

I

imitation ........................29, 48, 59, 60, 66, 69 information..25, 34, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64,

69

1

inheritance .................................................. 34

'

'Joe Average' ......................................... 46, 57

K

Kant, Immanuel......................................... 14 kin selection 13, 16, 17, 20, 24, 25, 26, 31, 37,

47, 54, 66, 70

L

lactose.................................................... 8, 33 Lamarckian evolution.................30, 33, 34, 35 Leonidas .................................................... 48 liver ............................................................ 22 Locke, John ................................................. 39

M

Maynard Smith, John ............................... 19 Meme Machine............................................1 memeplex.................................................. 46 memes .. 4, 5, 9, 13, 16, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32,

33, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71

memetics ........................................See memes Mendel, Gregor ......................................... 32 mind...............................25, 39, 45, 63, 64, 69 Moore, James ...... See Desmond, Adrian. See

Desmond, Adrian morality .................................7, 14, 38, 48, 53

N

natural selection...8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 20, 26, 28, 29, 30, 33, 38, 39, 66, 69

neuroscience.......................................... 54, 63 New Guineans, native .............................. 49

O

ontic account ............................................. 58

'

'paradox of altruism', the .. 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 26, 27, 31, 37, 40, 66, 67

P

parasite .......................................... 21, 22, 52 phenotype ...................................... 26, 34, 62 philosophy ................................. 5, 13, 36, 58 Pinker, Steven............................... 25, 49, 75 Popper, Karl ........................................ 11, 76 potlatch ...................................................... 43 Prisoner's Dilemma....................... 18, 19, 20 processes, causal .........................See causes

Q

quantum mechanics ................................. 56

R

Rapoport, Anatol .......................................19 reciprocal altruism . 13, 16, 18, 20, 24, 25, 37,

42, 43, 54, 66, 67, 68 religions................................................48, 51 replicators ................................ 28, 29, 33, 35 Ridley, Matt.............5, 7, 8, 17, 19, 24, 66, 76 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques ............. 13, 14, 76 Ruse, Michael ...................... 10, 12, 25, 70, 76 Russell, Bertrand....................... 7, 35, 49, 77

S

Salmon, Wesley ...........56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 77 science ........................... 5, 13, 55, 56, 57, 58 selfishness ..11, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 30, 31, 32,

40, 41, 45, 46, 53, 54, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71 semantic, memes are ............. 29, 40, 63, 64 siblicide ......................................................17 Simpsons, The (TV show) ........................53 Singer, Peter..........................................7, 51 Smith, Adam ................................................6 Sober, Elliott .....20, 21, 22, 23, 47, 49, 52, 53 social norms................................... 52, 53, 54 sociobiology ......12, 13, 19, 28, 31, 38, 40, 43 Sparta...................................................48, 49 Spencer, Herbert .......................................10 squibs and squabs...............................52, 53 St Francis of Assisi ...............................7, 72 St Thomas Aquinas...................................61 Stone Age ....................................................9 suicidal sacrifice ................ 23, 49, 51, 63, 64 survival of the fittest......See natural selection

T

tabula rasa ..................................................39 Thermopylae, battle of ........................48, 50 Tit-for-Tat ..................See Prisoner's Dilemma tribes .....................................................42, 49 Trivers, Robert.....................................17, 19

V

vampire bats..............................................18 variation ......................................... 10, 33, 60 viruses........................................................29

W

Wall Street (film) .........................................41 war .................................................. 48, 51, 63 Wedgwood, Emma....................................53 Williams, George .................... 20, 34, 63, 77 Wilson, David Sloan ..........See Sober, Elliott Wilson, Edward. O .. 5, 7, 8, 12, 20, 25, 39, 40,

44, 54, 64, 70, 76, 77 Wilson, James.....................................24, 25 Wittgenstein, Ludwig..................... 59, 60, 61 Wright, Robert ........11, 12, 16, 26, 38, 77, 78