the oxford history of philosophy

THE OXFORD HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

French Philosophy, 1572–1675Desmond M. Clarke

The Lost Age of Reason: Philosophy in Early Modern India 1450–1700Jonardon Ganeri

American Philosophy before PragmatismRussell B. Goodman

Thinking the Impossible: French Philosophy since 1960Gary Gutting

British Ethical Theorists from Sidgwick to EwingThomas Hurka

British Philosophy in the Seventeenth CenturySarah Hutton

The American PragmatistsCheryl Misak

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 31/3/2018, SPi

The Golden Ageof Indian BuddhistPhilosophy

Jan Westerhoff

1


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Contents

Analytical Table of Contents xiiiDiagrams of Schools and Thinkers xxiii

Introduction 11. Buddhist Philosophy in India: A Wheel Ever Turning 12. Philosophy as a Game 23. Factors Determining the Game 4

a. Arguments 6b. Sacred texts 7c. Meditative practice 8

4. Narrating the Game: How to Structure the Material 95. The Sources of the Game 11

a. The bases of Buddhist philosophy 11b. Debates 13c. Commentaries 15d. Doxographies 21

6. The Game’s View of the Game 24

1. Abhidharma 351. Introducing the Abhidharma 35

a. Matrices 37b. Question-and-answer format 38c. Providing a comprehensive theory 39

2. The Question of Authenticity 413. The Abhidharma Schools 43

a. Mahāsa :mghika 45b. Sthaviranikāya: Theravāda 49c. Sthaviranikāya: Pudgalavāda 53d. Sthaviranikāya: Sarvāstivāda 60e. Sthaviranikāya: Sautrāntika 73

2. Madhyamaka 841. The Rise of the Mahāyāna and Its Relation to Buddhist Philosophy 842. The Madhyamaka School 893. The Teachings of the Perfection of Wisdom 99

a. Criticism of the Abhidharma project 99b. The doctrine of illusionism 101c. An explicit acceptance of contradictions 104


4. Key Themes of Nāgārjuna’s Thought 107a. Nāgārjuna and the criticism of the Abhidharma project 107b. Illusionism in Nāgārjuna’s thought 115c. Contradictions and Nāgārjuna’s thought 117

5. The Commentators 120a. Buddhapālita 121b. Bhāviveka 123c. Candrakīrti 131

6. The Great Synthesizers: Śāntarak:sita and Kamalaśīla 1397. Madhyamaka and Nyāya 142

3. Yogācāra 1471. Five Stages of Yogācāra’s Development 147

a. Stage 1: The early Yogācāra sūtras 148b. Stages 2 and 3: Maitreya and Asa :nga 150c. Stage 4: Vasubandhu 154d. Stage 5: Later Yogācāra 160

2. Proofs of Buddhist Doctrines 161a. Rebirth 161b. Other minds 164c. Momentariness 166

3. Key Yogācāra Concepts 168a. cittamātra 168b. ālayavijñāna and the eight types of consciousness 179c. trisvabhāva 182d. svasa :mvedana 184e. Three turnings 186f. tathāgatagarbha and Yogācāra 186

4. Factors That Shaped Yogācāra Philosophy 193a. Argumentative factors 193b. Textual factors 193c. Meditative factors 194

5. Yogācāra and Other Schools of Buddhist Philosophy 2006. Yogācāra and Vedānta 212

4. The School of Di :nnāga and Dharmakīrti 2171. The lives of Di :nnāga and Dharmakīrti 2172. Epistemology 2203. Inference 2254. Metaphysics 2315. Language 2356. Scriptural Authority and Yogic Perception 238

a. Scriptural authority 238b. Yogic perception 247


x CONTENTS

7. How to Classify Di :nnāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy 2508. The School of Di :nnāga and Dharmakīrti and Its

Relation to Mīmā :msā 259a. Mīmā :msā epistemology 261b. Mīmā:sā philosophy of language 263c. Mīmā :msā, historiography, and history 267

9. The End of Buddhist Philosophy in India 270a. Śāntideva 271b. Atiśa Dīpa :mkaraśrījñāna 276

Concluding Remarks 282

Bibliography 287Index 308


CONTENTS xi

Analytical Table of Contents

Introduction 11. Buddhist Philosophy in India: A Wheel Ever Turning 1

The wheel: metaphor for the Buddhist doctrine · Buddhist thought in India:permanence and change

2. Philosophy as a Game 2The game as a heuristic device for understanding philosophy · Four factorsshaping a game · Narrating the game · Sources the narration is basedon · Foundational texts and commentaries · Philosophical debates inancient India · Doxographical works · The game’s view of the game

3. Factors Determining the Game 4Histories of Buddhist philosophy as partial pictures · Period covered:Abhidharma up to Dharmakīrti · Social, economic, political factors

a. Arguments 6Arguments as driving the history of philosophy · Development of Buddhistphilosophy: three stages · Debates with non-Buddhist schools

b. Sacred texts 7Interpretable/definite distinction as source of variation in Buddhistphilosophy

c. Meditative practice 8The need to classify meditative experiences · Three factors as gravitationalforces · Exaptation of philosophical concepts

4. Narrating the Game: How to Structure the Material 9Challenges in structuring a history of Indian philosophy · A hybridstructure · Four schools · Buddhist–non-Buddhist debates · Keythinkers · Key texts · Key concepts

5. The Sources of the Game 11a. The bases of Buddhist philosophy 11

Early discourses and Mahāyāna sūtras · The ‘original teachings’ of theBuddha · Different ways of construing‘original teachings’ · Frameworks of philosophical activity:debates, commentaries, doxographies

b. Debates 13Public debates · Debate manuals · Nyāya: three kinds ofdebate · Influence on philosophical works · Debate andVasubandhu’s Vi :mśikā · Texts as responses to philosophical rivals

c. Commentaries 15Characteristics of a sūtra · Different types of commentaries · vivara :na ·bhā:sya · vārttika · kārikā · Buddhist commentaries · Buddhistkārikās and their auto-commentaries · Commentarial practice andauthorial intent · Conflicting commentarial interpretations · Sterilityand arbitrariness? · The text’s true intent? Example of theAbhidharmakośa · Commentary as connecting past andpresent · Commentarial activity as a creative enterprise · Buddhistphilosophy as a commentary on the sūtras


d. Doxographies 21List of objections vs. doxographies · Buddhist interest indoxography · Establishing uniqueness · Anti-substantialism · Typesof doxographies · a. Defender and interlocutors · b. Exposition andrefutation · c. Non-hierarchical presentation · Example of b:Bhāviveka · Doxographic hierarchy · Example of c:Haribhadra · Doxography and soteriology

6. The Game’s View of the Game 24Conflicting assumptions about the existence of the past · Maximof charity · Nāgārjuna’s lifespan · The Nālandā tradition · ‘theway it really was’ · Canon formation · 4 criteria for authenticity ·Historical and hermeneutic understanding of buddhavacana · Buddhistphilosophy and the existence of the past · 1. Presentism · The past as aconceptual superimposition · 2. Absence of a common perception of theworld · Perception depends on karmic conditioning · 3. Trans-historicalactivities · Mystical manifestations of teachers · 4. History asteaching · Examples from Tibetan authors · Accounting for differentversions of the same events · Avoidance of relativism · Tension betweencharity and naturalism · Bracketing naturalist assumptions · Soteriologicalpurpose of histories of Buddhism · Existence of the past as a theoretical posit

1. Abhidharma 351. Introducing the Abhidharma 35

Abhidharma: the 3rd basket · Systematizing the sūtras · Theterm ‘abhidharma’ · Motives for composing the Abhidharma

a. Matrices 37Matrices as mnemonic devices · Matrices as maps ofmeditative states · Matrices and oral culture

b. Question-and-answer format 38Q&A and debate · Q&A as an aid to understanding

c. Providing a comprehensive theory 39Analysis as an end in itself ? · The Buddha’s omniscience · Abhidharmaas representing the Buddha’s omniscient mind · View of the supernaturalstatus of the Buddha & its consequences · Motives for composing theAbhidharma & three factors

2. The Question of Authenticity 41Why is the Abhidharma buddhavacana? · Strategies forestablishing authenticity · Supernatural origin of the Abhidharma

3. The Abhidharma Schools 43The 18 schools · Five Abhidharma schools discussed here · Reasonsfor the division · Division at the second council · Monastic rules ·Nature of the arhat

a. Mahāsa :mghika 45Limitations of the arhat · Consequences of thisidea · The omniscient Buddha · The Buddha assupramundane · The illusory Buddha · Two kinds ofemptiness · Mahāsa :mghika and Madhyamaka · Mahāsa :mghikaand Yogācāra · Foundational consciousness · Luminosity ofconsciousness · Buddha-nature · Source of innovations inBuddhist philosophy


xiv ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

b. Sthaviranikāya: Theravāda 49Kathāvatthu · Refutation of views opposed to Theravāda · A defenceof orthodoxy? · Additions to the text · The Kathāvatthu as apedagogical tool · The Kathāvatthu as a depository of philosophicalconcepts · Docetism · Illusory teaching · Dreams andreality · tantra · Orthodoxy and deviation

c. Sthaviranikāya: Pudgalavāda 53Reductionism about the self · Special case of mereologicalreductionism · Origins of the non-self theory: doctrinaland meditative · Non-self theory: argumentative support · Soteriology vs.theory-building? · Mutual support of meditation and argument · Thepersonalists · Their status amongst the other schools · The notion of thepudgala · Its theoretical use · Inexpressibility of the pudgala · Thepudgala as accounting for the apparent existence of persons · Challenge forthe Abhidharma’s network view · Pudgala explained as a specialcausal connection · An alternative solution · Maximally connected causalnetworks · Ethical considerations · Substitute selves? · Foundationalconsciousness · Buddha-nature

d. Sthaviranikāya: Sarvāstivāda 60The Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma · Jñānaprasthāna · Vibhā:sā · sarvamasti & arguments for this position · 1. Testimony · 2. Consciousnessneeds a presently existent object · 3. Karmic responsibility · 4. Three timesas mutually interdependent · Possible responses · The notion ofkaritrā · Present existence without efficacy? · Different interpretations of‘everything exists’ · 1. Dharmatrāta · 2. Gho:saka · 3. Vasumitra ·4. Buddhadeva · sarvāstitvā as a form of substantialism · Substantialism asa rhetorical strategy · Substantialism and inclusivism · Centralityof causation · Causation and existence · Simultaneity of causeand effect · Epistemology · Momentariness andrepresentationalism · Variable speed of moments · Simultaneity andrealism · Sautrāntika criticism of simultaneous causation · Sarvāstivādaresponse · Direct perception and self-cognition · svabhāva · TheAbhidharma notion of dharmas · 1. Mereological independence ·2. Conceptual independence · dravya and prajñapti · Existential statusof prajñapti

e. Sthaviranikāya: Sautrāntika 73Emphasis on sūtra over śāstra · Limited information available · Rejectionof Sarvāstivāda view of time · The Dār:s:tāntikas · Momentariness ·Cinematographic conception of reality · Vasubandhu’s argument formomentariness · Criticism of Sā :mkhya · Three kinds of arguments formomentariness · Doctrinal reasons for momentariness · Meditativefactors influencing the theory of momentariness · Soteriological implications ofrealizing momentariness · Belief vs. realization · Theoryof perception · Perceiving non-existent objects · The ākāra and itsfunctions · Perceiving past and future · Sautrāntika view ofnirvā :na · Mental continuity and karma · Similarities betweenSautrāntika and Yogācāra · Yogācāra as continuation ofSautrāntika? · Sautrāntika as bridging Abhidharma andMahāyāna


ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS xv

2. Madhyamaka 841. The Rise of the Mahāyāna and Its Relation to Buddhist Philosophy 84

Mahāyāna: new developments · What the Mahāyāna was not · Mahāyānaas a textual movement · An alternative vision of the Buddha · Connectionbetween Mahāyāna, Madhyamaka, and Yogācāra · Philosophical consequencesof the Mahāyāna view · De-ontologizing of reality · Illusionism as constitutinga link · Illusionism and meditative practice · Sight of theBuddha in the present world · The world as mentally constructed

2. The Madhyamaka School 89Nāgārjuna’s life · The prophecy · The biography · Magicalelements · Nāgas and the Perfection of Wisdom · The Perfection of Wisdomsūtras · Different lengths of these texts · Contents of the Perfection ofWisdom texts · Practices of a bodhisattva · Emptiness · Developmentof the Perfection of Wisdom literature · 1. The early phase · 2. The phaseof expansion · 3. The phase of contraction · Significance of the texts forall Mahāyāna schools · 4. The tantric phase · Multiple Nāgārjunas? ·Nāgārjuna the philosopher · Other Nāgārjunas · Advantages of the ‘multipleNāgārjunas’ account · Coherence of the traditional claims made aboutNāgārjuna’s life · Nāgārjuna’s works is with Homer · Philosophical works:the yukti-corpus · Letters · Nāgārjuna and the Sātavāhana dynasty · Hymns

3. The Teachings of the Perfection of Wisdom 99a. Criticism of the Abhidharma project 99

Criticism of the soteriological ideals of early Buddhism · Criticism ofthe metaphysical assumptions of early Buddhism · Rejection ofAbhidharma’s ontological foundations

b. The doctrine of illusionism 101Comprehensive illusionism applicable to allentities · Illusionism and meditative experience · Ontologizingmeditative phenomenology · Meditative phenomenology need not begrounded in ultimate reality · Illusionism and the development of differentBuddhist schools · Illusionism and the bodhisattva ideal · Consistencyof the Prajñāpāramitā’s position

c. An explicit acceptance of contradictions 104Non-existence of bodhisattvas · Developing arguments for Prajñāpāramitāpositions · Was Nāgārjuna a Mahāyānist? · Nāgārjuna did not see himselfas a philosophical innovator · Salutary verses of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā

4. Key Themes of Nāgārjuna’s Thought 107a. Nāgārjuna and the criticism of the Abhidharma project 107

Nāgārjuna’s endorsement of the Abhidharma · Emptiness of persons anddharmas · svabhāva · svabhāva and causation · The causal argumentagainst svabhāva · Causation essentially involvesconceptualization · Abhidharma and Madhyamaka views of svabhāvaand causation · The mereological argument against svabhāva · Aredharmas the same as their conceptual parts or different? · dharmas as property-particulars · How are property-particulars told apart? · The argumentfrom change · Change as arising and ceasing · Change asrecombination · Argumentative support for the claims of the Perfectionof Wisdom texts

b. Illusionism in Nāgārjuna’s thought 115Not a view of ‘appearance vs. reality’ · The charge ofontological nihilism · svabhāva is not required for functionality · Thecharge of moral nihilism


xvi ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

c. Contradictions and Nāgārjuna’s thought 117Explaining the tetralemma · Non-classical logic · The theory of thetwo truths · The interpolation procedure · Ultimately real simulacra

5. The Commentators 120Commentaries on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikāa. Buddhapālita 121

The Akutobhayā · Its relation with Buddhapālita’scommentary · Buddhapālita’s life · Buddhapālita’s commentary

b. Bhāviveka 123The Prajñāpradīpa · prasa :nga methodology · Supplementingdestructive by constructive reasoning · An example: absence ofself-causation · Absurd consequences of self-causation ·Three-membered syllogisms · A syllogism establishing absence of self-causation · Misunderstanding prasa :nga as reductio · Two kinds ofnegation · Nāgārjuna as employing non-implicative negations ·Absence of syllogisms in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā · Madhyamakaarguments and philosophical theses · Preventing the wrong positivethesis · svabhāva-free theses · Different kinds of conventionaltruth · Theses and debates · The Madhyamaka thesis about the natureof reality · Theses and doxography

c. Candrakīrti 131Legends about Candrakīrti: their philosophical significance · Candrakīrti’sworks · His status in Tibet · His status in India · Connection betweenargumentative procedure and philosophical content · Syllogisms and epistemicinstruments · Madhyamaka and debate · svabhāva at the level ofconventional reality? · Ontological disagreement between Candrakīrti andBhāviveka · No stratification of conventional reality · The Prāsa :ngika–Svātantrika distinction · The distinction as a doxographicfiction · Candrakīrti’s rise from obscurity · Candrakīrti andtantra · Tantric works by Mādhyamikas · Madhyamaka andtantra · A backwards reflection of popularity?

6. The Great Synthesizers: Śāntarak:sita and Kamalaśīla 139Śāntarak:sita’s main works · The Tattvasa :mgraha · Śāntarak:sitaand the transmission of Buddhism to Tibet · Kamalaśīla and the council ofbSam yas · Gradual vs. sudden conceptions of enlightenment · Unclaritiesabout the council of bSam yas · Kamalaśīla’s Bhāvanākrama · Criticismof the absence of mental activity · Later development of Madhyamaka ·Waning of the synthetic approach · Madhyamaka beyond India

7. Madhyamaka and Nyāya 142Nāgārjuna and Nyāya · Mutual influence of the two systems ·Pervasive influence of the Nyāya system · Criticism of Nyāyalogic and epistemology · Negation · Problems with negatingsvabhāva · Nyāya syllogisms · No discordant example foremptiness · Reference to non-existent objects · Use of logic withoutaccepting its ontological implications

3. Yogācāra 1471. Five Stages of Yogācāra’s Development 147

a. Stage 1: The early Yogācāra sūtras 148


ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS xvii

La :nkāvatārasūtra · Date of the La :nkāvatārasūtra ·Introducing key Yogācāra concepts · Sa :mdhinirmocanasūtra ·The opening of the text · Magic and illusion · Mental natureof the world and of the Buddha’s teachings

b. Stages 2 and 3: Maitreya and Asa :nga 150Asa :nga and his brothers · Yogācāra andAbhidharma · Asa :nga and the Perfection of Wisdom · Asa :nga’spropitiation of Maitreya · Maitreya’s five treatises · Connection ofwisdom and compassion · Role of karma in perception · The natureof Maitreya · Maitreya as a ‘real person’ · Questionable assumptions ·Asa :nga’s own works

c. Stage 4: Vasubandhu 154Diversity of his works · Vasubandhu’s life · Compositionof the Abhidharmakośa · Its bhā:sya · Vasubandhu andthe Mahāyāna · The philosopher vs. the meditator · Vasubandhu’sMahāyāna works · Multiple Vasubandhus? · The split between theĀbhidharmika and the Mahāyāna scholar · Problems with the hypothesisof multiple Vasubandhus · The main force behind thehypothesis · Difficulties with doxographic frameworks

d. Stage 5: Later Yogācāra 160Di :nnāga and Dharmakīrti · Di :nnāga’s Ālambanaparīk:sā · Conditionsfor supporting a perceptual state · Representations as supports

2. Proofs of Buddhist Doctrines 161a. Rebirth 161

Arguing for the Buddha’s epistemic authority · Infinitecompassion during infinitely many lives · Conditions for the arisingof consciousness · Infinite regression of consciousness · Cārvākamaterialism · Two challenges · Proof of past lives, not ofrebirth · Accounting for unconsciousness

b. Other minds 164Solipsism as problematic for Buddhism · Dharmakīrti’sSantānāntarasiddhi · Our knowledge of other minds isinferential · Ratnakīrti’s Santānāntaradū:sa :na · Solipsism at thelevel of ultimate reality

c. Momentariness 166Argument from the momentariness of cognition · Mental momentarinessinherited from momentariness of percepts · The argument fromchange · Ratnakīrti’s indirect argument · Ratnakīrti’s direct argument

3. Key Yogācāra Concepts 168a. cittamātra 168

Arguments against material objects · 1. Inferring material objects ·Dream example · Postulating matter as explanatorily idle · Example ofthe ‘three cups of liquid’ · Restriction to invariable co-cognition · 2.Scriptural authority and the existence of material objects · Interpretablevs. definite teachings · Atomism as internally contradictory · Lining upthree atoms · Atoms and optics · Atomism cannot be a basisfor epistemology · 3. Perceiving material objects · Representationalistargument · Reality of representational forms · sākāravāda vs.nirākāravāda · satyākāravāda vs. alīkākāravāda · Representational formsand the three natures · Is Yogācāra a form of idealism? · Ontology vs.epistemology · The ‘lack of evidence’ principle · The principle oflightness · Non-idealist interpretations and philosophicalzeitgeist · Wrong appeal to the maxim of charity · Absence of explicitdenial of material objects · Ultimate reality only knowable


xviii ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

through meditation · Yogācāra arguments clearing away the wrongbelief in matter

b. ālayavijñāna and the eight types of consciousness 179Disappearance of consciousness in meditative states · Thedefiled mind · The foundational consciousness: explanatorybenefits · 1. Meditation and the continuity of consciousness ·The ‘bi-polar bīja-model’ · 2. Transmigration and karma

c. trisvabhāva 182Mirage example · Three kinds of absence · Three naturesand two truths · Three natures from a Madhyamakaperspective · Two truths from a Yogācāra perspective

d. svasa :mvedana 184No fundamental division between minds · Di :nnāga’sregress argument · Di :nnāga’s memory argument

e. Three turnings 186Historical and philosophical sequence

f. tathāgatagarbha and Yogācāra 186Conceptual predecessors of the concept oftathāgatagarbha · Natural purity of mind · ‘transformation of thebasis’ · tathāgatagarbha as a substitute self · The tathāgatagarbhaand the acceptance of an ātman · Positions that appear to conflictwith the Buddha’s teachings · Substantial self · Nihilism · Antinomianinjunctions · Hermeneutic strategies for restoring consistency · Thetathāgatagarbha in different modes: Madhyamaka and Yogācāra ·Madhyamaka: tathāgatagarbha as a conventional teaching · tathāgatagarbhaas potential · Yogācāra: tathāgatagarbha as emptiness of defilements · Self-emptiness vs. other-emptiness

4. Factors That Shaped Yogācāra Philosophy 193a. Argumentative factors 193b. Textual factors 193c. Meditative factors 194

The ‘practice of yoga’ · The nature of meditativeexperiences · Their merely mental nature · Generalizationof this claim to include other objects · Meditative cognition as an epistemicinstrument · Superiority of meditative perception over other epistemicinstruments · Meditative perception and the dissolution ofobjects · Yogācāra position based on meditative experience · Yogācāraand tantra · Yogācāra as explaining the efficacy of tantric techniques

5. Yogācāra and Other Schools of Buddhist Philosophy 200Yogācāra and Abhidharma · Mind-only · Foundationalconsciousness · anudhātu · bījabhāva · Yogācāra andMadhyamaka · Fundamental divide in Mahāyāna philosophy? · Bhāvivekaand the Yogācāra/Madhyamaka distinction · Yogācāra and Madhyamakaas inconsistent · Foundationalism vs. non-foundationalism · Mutualaccusations of realism and nihilism · Yogācāra as part ofMadhyamaka · Śāntarak:sita’s synthesis · Madhyamaka as part ofYogācāra · The 2nd and 3rd turnings as not differing incontent · ākāra, Yogācāra, and Madhyamaka · Śāntarak:sita rejectsboth accounts of representational forms · Ratnākaraśānti onākāra · alīkākāravāda and Madhyamaka · Progressive evaporation ofontological content · The four stages of yoga: Ratnākaraśānti · The fourstages: Kamalaśīla · Tibetan developmentsof alīkākāravāda · Mutual subsumption and the unity of Mahāyāna


ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS xix

thought · Yogācāra and Madhyamaka as aiming at the same inexpressibletruth · Different conceptions of inexpressibility

6. Yogācāra and Vedānta 212Early Vedānta and Yogācāra · Dreams and illusions · Identity of knowerand known · vijñāna-spandita · asparśayoga · Vedānta criticism ofYogācāra · How can mental objects be like external objects? · Ourarguments must not undermine the epistemic instruments · Qualified andqualifier must differ · Foundational consciousness and momentariness areincompatible · Madhva on momentariness · Reasons for Śa :nkara’sattitude towards Yogācāra

4. The School of Di :nnāga and Dharmakīrti 2171. The Lives of Di :nnāga and Dharmakīrti 217

Dates of Di :nnāga and Dharmakīrti · Di :nnāga’sPramā :nasamuccaya · Dharmakīrti’s Pramā :navārttika · Dharmakīrtiand Kumārila · Dharmakīrti and Śa :nkara · Increased importance of debatewith non-Buddhists · Focus on logic and epistemology · More argumentsfor Buddhist claims

2. Epistemology 220svalak:sa :na and sāmānyalak:sa :na · Relationto the Abhidharma project · Perception and ultimate reality ·How can perception access the impartite non-conceptual? ·Not a singular entity, but a singularity of effect · Droppingrealism about external objects · Perception, conceptualization,and Madhyamaka · Epistemic foundationalism? · Perception as immunefrom error · What still counts as perception? · Connection with Nāgārjuna’scriticism of epistemic instruments · Nāgārjuna does not pursue a scepticalagenda · Three kinds of perception

3. Inference 225Inference and conceptual construction · Inference and debate · Characteristicsof inferences · The triple mark · Pervasion · anumāna is not formallogic · Inference for oneself and others · Mental models · Ways offormulating ‘inference for others’ · Inferences as tokens · The role of examplesin inferences · Logical and epistemological dimension of anumāna · Positiveexample · Negative example · Pseudo-reasons · Fallibilism andexternalism · ‘good reasons’ and validity

4. Metaphysics 231Causal efficacy · Momentariness and causalefficacy · Dharmakīrti’s arguments for momentariness · Argument fromcessation · Argument from existence · Consequences of rejecting objectsin general · ātman · The creator god · Caste · The bifurcationof knowledge

5. Language 235apoha theory · Absences as less real than presences · apoha and two kindsof negation · The two negations do not cancel each other out · apoha andcausal power · Causal power relativized to human desires · The role ofconceptualization

6. Scriptural Authority and Yogic Perception 238a. Scriptural authority 238

Authority of texts arising from their source · Di :nnāga’spraise of the Buddha · Scriptural authority arising frominternal characteristics · Three degrees of epistemic distance · Inductiveargument for long-distance reliability · Scripture as subsumed underinference · A different kind of inference? · Scepticism about appealing


xx ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

to the Buddha’s authority · Scepticism about appealing to the internalcharacteristics of texts · Conventionality of language · Scepticism aboutinduction · Scripturally based inferences cannot be objective · Practicalnecessity of relying on scriptures · No necessity for a leap offaith · Historical context of the critical view of scriptural authority · Purposeof the arguments for the Buddha’s authority · Imperfect access to a perfectsource of knowledge · Coherence with externalist outlook · Thedouble nature of the logico-epistemological school · Interpenetrationof philosophical schools · Maximizing impact on non-Buddhistaudience · ‘double reading’ of Dharmakīrti’s arguments · Apologeticcharacter of Dharmakīrti’s writings · Negative reactions · Neutralityvs. orthodoxy

b. Yogic perception 247Its characteristics · Yogic perception as epistemicsuper-power · Dharmakīrti: directed at concepts · Yogic perception anddeluded states of mind · Mīmā :msā criticism of yogic perception · Yogicperception as validated through its goal · Yogic perception needs to beproperly directed

7. How to Classify Di :nnāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy 250Did Di :nnāga and Dharmakīrti form a distinct school? · What kind of thinkerwas Dharmakīrti? · Sautrāntika? · Dharmakīrti and the Mahāyānaschools · The Abhidharma consensus · ‘sliding scales of analysis’ · Gradedteaching · Four levels of philosophical analysis · 1. Ordinarybeings · 2. Reductionism · 3. Particularism · 4. Idealism · Historicaland systematic significance of the four levels · The neither-one-nor-manyargument · Specific features of the ‘sliding scales of analysis’ model’ ·Particularism is not Dharmakīrti’s final view · Heuristic use of particularism ·Dharmakīrti on the reality of causation · Criticism of the causalrelation · Dharmakīrti and Madhyamaka · Denial of the ultimate realityof causation · Motivation for reading Dharmakīrti in a Madhyamaka way ·Lack of final level of analysis · Philosophical development rather thandoxographic categorization

8. The School of Di :nnāga and Dharmakīrti and Its Relation toMīmā :msā 259Debate between the two schools · Mīmā :msā’s aim · dharma and the Vedas

a. Mīmā :msā epistemology 261pramā :nas cannot be established by other pramā :nas · Possible responses tothe regress · pramā :nas as intrinsically authoritative · pramā :nas producejustification, not knowledge · Fundamental trust in pramā :nas

b. Mīmā :msā philosophy of language 263Vedas as authorless · Primordial connection between wordsand referents · How could conventions ever have begun? · Conventionneeded for knowing word–world link? · Possibility of misunderstandingthe Vedas · Mīmā :msā and efficacy of rituals · Why the truth of theVedas is implied · Dharmakīrti: truths need to be backedby speakers · Connection of Mīmā :msā epistemology and philosophyof language · arthāpatti

c. Mīmā :msā, historiography, and history 267The (ahistoric) Vedas as a model of excellence · Mīmā :msā and Buddhistthought: the big picture · Epistemic optimism vs. pessimism · Historical


ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS xxi

background of this disagreement · Brahmins and Buddhists atroyal courts · Different degrees of philosophical emphasis on the status quo

9. The End of Buddhist Philosophy in India 270The last 500 years · A decline in quality? · Continuing performance butno new characters

a. Śāntideva 271Śāntideva’s life · The Bodhicaryāvatāra · Śāntideva and Nālandā ·Nālandā’s curriculum · Nālandā and its patrons · Nālandā and theBodhicaryāvatāra

b. Atiśa Dīpa :mkaraśrījñāna 276Atiśa’s early life · His studies · Teacher at Vikramaśīla · Thevoyage to Tibet · His work in Tibet · Indian Mahāyāna’s ambivalencetowards tantra · Atiśa’s connection with tantra · Tantra in Tibet ·Atiśa on the suitability of tantric practices · Political dimension of the statusof tantra · Buddhist scholasticism beyond India · Looking back from Tibet

Concluding Remarks 282


xxii ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

Diagrams of Schools and Thinkers

The following two diagrams are intended to provide the reader with a synopticsurvey of the main schools and thinkers discussed in this book. For the sake ofsimplicity I have omitted schools and thinkers that only play a subsidiary rolein the following pages. Both diagrams take the form of a ‘subway map’, eachline represents a school, and each stop or circle its approximate date of origin.Connections between lines represent linkages between individual schools. Evenwhere there is no explicit ‘interchange’, spatial proximity indicates conceptualaffinity; it is no accident that tantra and tathāgatagarbha run on either side ofthe Yogācāra line.The first diagram simply identifies the different lines in terms of the different

schools they represent. In the second diagram all the names of schools areomitted for the sake of simplicity; instead, the names of thinkers and of somekey texts associated with these schools are superimposed on the respectivelines. A section at the right-hand side lists names of the main non-Buddhistthinkers that make an appearance in the following pages.These diagrams are supposed to supplement the discussion in the following

pages, not to replace it. Given the considerable uncertainty about the dates ofindividual thinkers, about what constitutes a ‘school’, how these schools areinterconnected, and which thinkers are supposed to be associated with whichschools the pieces of information provided by the diagrams should be taken aspointers, not as facts. Unfortunately, the history of Indian Buddhist thought isconsiderably more complicated than what can be summarized in two diagrams.Nevertheless, I hope that the simplified picture they represent will help thereader to navigate the complexities of the development of Buddhist philosophyin India.


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The Main Schools of Indian Buddhism

Mahāsam· ghika

Sarvāstivāda

Sthaviranikāya

Vibhajya-vāda

Theravāda

Pudga-lavāda

Mahāyāna

Madhyamaka

Yogācāra

Tathāgata-garbha

Svātantrika Prāsan· gika

Tantra

Sautrāntika

Yogācāra-Sautrāntika

Madhyamaka-Yogācāra

Diagram of philosophical schools


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Śankara(Vedānta)

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Vātsyāyana(Nyāya)

Aksapāda(Nyāya)

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Kumārila(Mīmāmsā)·

Buddhaghosa·300

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Major Indian Buddhist Philosophers and Texts

Prajñā-pāramitā-sūtra

Āryadeva

Atiśa

Ratnakīrti

Candrakīrti

Śāntideva

Śānta-raksita·

Bhāviveka

Ratna-gotra-vibhaga

Dinnāga·

Dharmakīrti

Samdhinir-mocana-sūtra

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Buddhapālita

DharmatrātaGhosaka Vasumitra

Buddhadeva·

Lankāvatārasūtra·

MaitreyanāthaAsanga·

Nāgārjuna

KamalaśīlaHevajra-tantra

Uddyotakara(Nyāya)Gaudapāda(Vedānta)

Ratnākara-śānti

Vasu-bandhu

Non-Buddhistphilosophers

Diagram of thinkers and texts


the oxford history of philosophy

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