the outcomes of copenhagen - indiaenvironmentportal...the outcomes of copenhagen: the negotiations...

UNDP EnvironmEnt & EnErgy group climate Policy series

the outcomes of copenhagen

the negotiations & the Accord

february 2010

capacity development for policy makers: addressing climate change in key sectors

The UNDP Environment & Energy Group project, “Capacity development for policy makers to address climate change”, seeks to strengthen the national capacity of developing countries to develop policy options for addressing climate change across different sectors and economic activities. The overall goals of the project are twofold: • To increase national capacity to co-ordinate Ministerial views and participate in the

processes of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), particularly in the context of the Bali Action Plan;

• To assess investment and financial flows to address climate change for selected key sectors and enhance sectoral planning capacity to address climate change.

In support of the first goal, UNDP has produced a series of briefing documents on the negotiations. These include: • The Bali Road Map: Key Issues Under Negotiation, October 2008 • Financing under the Bali Road Map: Designing, Governing, and Delivering Funds, July 2009 • Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions: Key Issues Under Negotiation, August 2009

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the substantive results of the Copenhagen Conference, including the status of the negotiations on the key issues under the formal negotiating tracks and the provisions of the Copenhagen Accord, and to draw implications for implementation of actions in developing countries.. it is important to note that the analysis in this paper is based upon the unFCCC negotiating texts as they stand in February 2010. Discussions of many of the terms used in this paper are still going on within the context of the negotiations; therefore the use of some terms is speculative. Also, the positions of parties may have changed since this paper was prepared in August 2009. While the author believes that she have accurately portrayed the positions of parties, not all the nuances intended by parties may have been captured.

acknowledgementsThe views presented in this paper are the personal ones of the author. The author would like to thank the following reviewers for their valuable comments: Mirey Atallah, Simon Billett, Javier Blanco, Hernan Carlino, Rebecca Carman, Anilla Cherian, Tim Clairs, Bhujang Dharmaji Rao, Cassie Flynn, Mamunul Khan, Robert Kelly, Juan Mancebo, Susanne Olbrisch, Oscar Paz, Martha Perdomo, Daniela Stoycheva, and Veerle Vandeweerd.

The project and this publication are made possible through the generous support from the governments of Norway, Finland, Switzerland, and Spain, the United Nations Foundation and UNDP.

DisclaimerThe views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the United Nations, including UNDP, or their Member States.

the outcomes of copenhagen:

the negotiations & the accorD

Dr. alina averchenkova, senior analyst, first climate

the oUtcomes of coPeNhageN: the NegotiatioNs & the accorD ithe oUtcomes of coPeNhageN: the NegotiatioNs & the accorD i

contents

list of acronyms ii

1. introduction 1

2. Bali road map and outcomes of copenhagen 2

3. shared Vision 6

4. enhanced action on mitigation and its associated means of implementation 8 4.1 Commitments and actions by developed countries 8 4.2 mitigation actions by developing countries 11 4.3 rEDD-plus 14 4.4 other topics under action on mitigation 15

5. adaptation 17

6. enhanced action on the provision of financial resources and investment 21

7. enhanced action on technology development and transfer 24

8. conclusions: implications for implementation of climate action 26

references 28

the oUtcomes of coPeNhageN: the NegotiatioNs & the accorDii

List of Acronyms

AOSIS AllianceofSmallIslandStatesAWG-KP Ad-HocWorkingGrouponFurther

CommitmentsforAnnexIPartiesundertheKyotoProtocol

AWG-LCA Ad-HocWorkingGrouponLong-termCooperativeActionundertheConvention

BAP BaliActionPlanBAU BusinessasUsualCA CopenhagenAccordCDM CleanDevelopmentMechanismCMP ConferenceofthePartiesservingasthe

MeetingofthePartiesCOP ConferenceofthePartiesEU EuropeanUnionG-20 GroupofTwentyG-8 GroupofEightGEF GlobalEnvironmentFacilityGHG GreenhouseGasIPCC IntergovernmentalPanelonClimate

ChangeIPCCFAR IPCCFourthAssessmentReportIPRs IntellectualPropertyRightsLDCs LeastDevelopedCountriesLULUCF LandUse,Land-UseChangeandForestryMRV Measurement,ReportingandVerificationNAMAs NationallyAppropriateMitigationActionsODA OfficialDevelopmentAssistanceREDD-plus ReducedEmissionsfromDeforestationand

ForestDegradationplusConservationSBSTA SubsidiaryBodyforScientificandTechno-

logicalAdviceSIDS SmallIslandDevelopingStatesUNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgrammeUNFCCC UnitedNationsFrameworkConventionon

ClimateChange

the oUtcomes of coPeNhageN: the NegotiatioNs & the accorD 1

Overthepasttwoyearstheinternationalnegotiationsonclimatechangehavefocusedonnegotiatingacompre-hensiveframeworkforenhancedactiononclimatechange.Thesenegotiations,progressingalongthetwotracks,oneundertheKyotoProtocolandanotherundertheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC),wereexpectedtodeliveranagreedoutcomeoutliningthemainelementsofthefutureframeworkattheUNFCCCclimatechangeconferenceinCopenhageninDecember2009.

InCopenhagenbothnegotiatingtrackspresentedunfinishednegotiatingtextstotheConferenceofthePartiesoftheUNFCCC(COP)andtotheConferenceofthePartiesservingasthemeetingofthePartiestotheKyotoProtocol(CMP),whichserveasthegoverningbodiesoftheConventionandtheKyotoProtocolrespectively.SomefurtherworkwasundertakenandprogressachievedinthetechnicalnegotiationsundertheCOP,whichisreflectedintherevisedtextissuedafterCopenhagen.1Howeveritwasnotpossibletofinalisethetechnicalnegotiationsandtoadoptformaldecisions.

InaparallelsettinginCopenhagen,agroupofHeadsofStatesrepresentingthemajoremittingcountriesandmainnegotiatinggroupsnegotiatedthe“CopenhagenAccord”2,whichoutlinedthemainelementsofthefutureframeworkandcommittedasignificantamountoffinancefromdevelopedcountriestoassistdevelopingcountriesincombatingclimatechange.TheAccordhoweverwasnotformallyadoptedattheclosingplenarybytheCOPandCMP,but“takennoteof”,whichleftitatthelevelofapoliticaldeclarationratherthanaformaldecisionundertheUnitedNations.

TheCopenhagenconferencefellshortofthehigh

expectationstodeliveraUN-levelagreementonafutureinternationalframeworkonclimatechange.However,theresultsthathavebeenachievedshouldalsonotbeunderestimated.EventhoughtheCopenhagenAccordwas

notformallyadoptedbyallParties,itreflectsapoliticalconsensus–eveniffragile–onthemainelementsofthefutureframeworkamongthemajoremittersandrepre-sentativesofthemainnegotiatinggroups,3reachedatthelevelofHeadsofState–anunprecedenteddevelopmentininternationalclimatechangeprocessestodate.Moreo-verimportantprogresswasalsomadeonseveralissuesintheformaltechnicalnegotiationsundertheConvention.

WhilesomeuncertaintyoverhowtheCopenhagenAccordfitsintothemultilateralnegotiationsundertheUNFCCCprocessremains,thenegotiationsscheduledtoreconveneinApril2010maytakeintoaccounttheguidanceprovidedbythepoliticalleadersthroughtheCopenhagenAccord.

ThepurposeofthispaperistoevaluatethesubstantiveresultsoftheCopenhagenconference,includingthestatusofthenegotiationsonthekeyissuesundertheformalnegotiatingtracksandtheprovisionsoftheCopenhagenAccord,andtodrawimplicationsforimplementationofactionsindevelopingcountries.

1. introDuction

1 FCCC/CP/2010/2: Work undertaken by the Conference of the Parties at its fifteenth session on the basis of the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention.

2 http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/application/pdf/cop15_cph_auv.pdf3 There are several negotiating groups in the UNFCCC process including, among others, the Group 77 and China (includes most developing countries), Umbrella

Group (includes US, Australia, Canada, Russia, Japan, New Zealand, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan), Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), and Least Developed Countries (LDC) group.

the oUtcomes of coPeNhageN: the NegotiatioNs & the accorD2

The Bali Road Map: Background

Theinternationalnegotiationsonfutureactiononclimatechangesofarhaveproceededalonga“two-track”approach:thefirsttrackwaslaunchedin2005andthesecondin2007.

Thefirsttrackdealswiththecommitmentsfortheindustrialisedcountries(AnnexIParties)undertheKyotoProtocolfortheperiodbeyond2012whenthefirstperiodofemissionreductioncommitments(2008-2012)expires.Itdealsinparticularwithemissionreductiontargetsandmeansofimplementation.ThesenegotiationswerelaunchedinDecember2005atthefirstsessionoftheConferenceofthePartiesservingastheMeetingofthePartiestotheKyotoProtocol(CMP1)inMontreal.Theworkisbeingcarriedoutunderaspeciallyestablishedsubsidiarybody–theAdHocWorkingGrouponFurtherCommitmentsforAnnexIPartiesundertheKyotoProtocol(AWG-KP).

ThesecondnegotiatingtrackwaslaunchedundertheConventiontwoyearslaterinDecember2007.TheConferenceofthePartiesatitsthirteenthsession(COP13)heldinBaliadoptedtheBaliActionPlan.4Itlaunched“acomprehensiveprocesstoenablethefull,effectiveandsustainedimplementationoftheConventionthroughlong-termcooperativeaction,now,uptoandbeyond2012,inordertoreachanagreedoutcomeandadoptadecisionatitsfifteenthsessioninCopenhageninDecem-ber2009”.TheBaliActionPlanidentifiedfourmainbuildingblocksforenhancingactiononclimatechange:mitigation,adaptation,technologyandfinancing,andrequestedthenegotiationstoarticulateasharedvisionforlong-termcooperativeaction,includingalong-termglobalgoalforemissionreductions.TocarryouttheworkanewsubsidiarybodywasestablishedundertheConvention–theAdHocWorkingGrouponLong-termCooperativeActionundertheConvention(AWG-LCA),whichwasrequestedtocompleteitsworkbyCopenhagen.

Whileeachnegotiatingtrackhasitsownclearmandate,therearemanylinkagesbetweenthetwoprocesses,in

particularinrelationtomitigation.AstheAWG-KPisdiscussingthenextroundofcommitmentsforindustrial-isedcountriesthatarePartiestotheKyotoProtocol,theAWG-LCA,inadditiontootherissues,islookingatcommitmentsfordevelopedcountriesthatarenotPartytotheKyotoProtocol.Moreoverthediscussionsonmitiga-tionactionsbydevelopingcountriesundertheAWG-LCAarepoliticallylinkedtoprogressinrelationtocommit-mentsbydevelopedcountries.Similarlythediscussionsonsharedvisionandlong-termgoalforemissionreductionintheAWG-LCAareofdirectrelevancetothedebateintheAWG-KP.Bothbodiesalsolookatthedifferenttoolstoreachemissionreductiontargetsandwaystoenhancecost-effectivenessofmitigation,includingthroughmarket-basedapproaches.Inaddition,negotiationsareunderwaythatarerelatedtothefuturepolicyarchitectureunderthetwoSubsidiaryBodiesoftheUNFCCC(i.e.,negotiationsonthemethodologicalissuesrelatedtoreducingemissionsfromdeforestationandtechnologytransfer,tomentiontwo).

InadditiontotheBaliActionPlan,theBaliConferencein2007adoptedanumberofotherdecisionsrelatedtothefutureframework.Apackageofforward-lookingdecisionsrepresentingbothnegotiatingtracksundertheConventionandtheProtocolthatwasadoptedattheBaliConferencewaslabelledas“theBaliRoadMap”.5TheBaliRoadMaplaunchedanintensivetwo-yearprocessofnegotiationsonanenhancedfutureclimatechangeregime,whichwastoculminateinDecember2009attheclimatechangeconferenceinCopenhagen.

Negotiations in the AWG-KP and AWG-LCA: main issues and outcomes

TheAWG-LCAinitsfirstyearofworkin2008hadaratherslowstart.ThefirstyearwasdevotedtobuildingmutualconfidenceamongtheParties,planningthework,andclarifyingideasandproposals.Atthesametime,theAWG-KPin2008focusedontheanalysisofmeanstoreachemissionreductiontargetsandtheidentificationofwaystoenhancetheeffectivenessoftheimplementation,includingflexiblemechanisms;landuse,land-usechange

2. the bali roaD map anD outcomes of copenhagen

4 Decision 1/CP.13.5 For a detailed analysis, see ´The Bali Road Map: Key Issues Under Negotiation´, UNDP Environment & Energy Group, UNDP 2008.


onclimatechangeprecedingtheconferenceinthelastquarterof2009–includingtheAllianceofSmallIslandStates(AOSIS)ClimateChangeSummit,theSecretary-General’sSummitonClimateChange,theUNGeneralAssembly,andothers.TheCopenhagenconferencewasattendedbyover45,000participants,includingobserversandnegotiators,and119HeadsofState.Accordingtothereportsbythemedia,thisconferencewasthelargestoneinthehistoryoftheUnitedNations,andcertainlythelargestpoliticaleventeverfocusedonclimatechange.

However,despitethishighlevelofpoliticalattentiontotheissue,itwasbecomingalreadyclearbeforetheconferencethatreachingacomprehensivepost-2012agreementinCopenhagenwouldnotbepossible.WhilesomeprogresshadbeenmadeatthetechnicallevelinthevariousnegotiatingtracksundertheBaliRoadMapduring2008-9,high-levelpoliticalguidancewasrequiredtoresolvethemaincrunchissues–inparticular,commit-mentsbyindustrialisedcountries;mitigationactionsbydevelopingcountries;financingandtechnologytransfer;andmeasurement,reportingandverification(MRV)ofactionsandofsupport.

InCopenhagenboththeAWG-KPandAWG-LCApresentedtheoutcomesoftheirworkaswasrequestedbytheirmandates.6TheAWG-KPforwardedtotheCMP5foritsfurtherconsiderationasetofdraftdecisions,includ-ingproposeddraftamendmentstotheKyotoProtocol,allofwhichstillcontainedoptionsand“brackets”intheproposedtextindicatingaconsiderablenumberofunresolvedissues.Similarly,theAWG-LCApresentedtotheCOP15asetofunfinisheddraftdecisionsencompass-ingallbuildingblocksoftheBaliActionPlan.TheCOPandCMPlaunchedcontactgroupsinCopenhagentoadvancethenegotiationsontheunresolvedissues.Whileitwaspossibletomakefurtherprogressonsomeissuesinaninformalsetting,thenegotiationsinCMPandCOPstalledduetodisagreementoverprocedureandorganisa-tionofwork.

Asaresult,nosubstantivedecisionswerefinalisedforadoptionontheworkdonebytheAWG-LCAand

andforestry(LULUCF);abasketofgreenhousegases(GHGs);andcoveredsectors.

In2009theAWG-LCAandtheAWG-KPheldfivenegotiatingsessionspriortotheCopenhagenconference.Discussionsontherelatedissuesalsotookplaceinvariousotherformalandinformalsettings,includingtheGreen-landDialogue,theMajorEconomies’ForumonEnergyandClimateChange,theGroupofEight(G-8),theGroupofTwenty(G-20),andatglobalandregionalclimatechangesummits.

NegotiationsundertheAWG-KPmadelittleprogressin2009.DevelopingcountriesurgedAnnexIPartiestocommittoambitiousemissionreductiontargets,whiledevelopedcountriesarguedthatmakingprogressonaggregateandindividualemissionreductiontargetsandingeneraleffectivelyrespondingtoclimatechangerequiredtheinvolvementoftheUnitedStatesandmajordevelop-ingcountries.Moreover,therewasnoagreementoverthelegalstructureofthefutureframeworkandonthecontinuationoftheKyotoProtocolbeyond2012.Developedcountriessawasinglenewagreementcomingoutofbothnegotiatingtracks(AWG-KPandAWG-LCA)asanoutcome,whiledevelopingcountrieswantedtoseetheKyotoProtocolamendedandcontinuedpost-2012.

TheAWG-LCAin2009developedaverycomplexnegotiatingtext,nearly200pageslong,presentingvariousproposalsandcontainingnumerousareasofdisagreement.Whilesomeprogresswasmadeonadaptation,reducingdeforestationandforestdegradationindevelopingcountriesplusconservation(REDD-plus)andtechnology,negotiationsonfinanceandmitigationdidnotmovemuchforward.Overall,bythetimeoftheCopenhagenconference,thenegotiationsinthetwoAWGshadachievedlessthanwhatwasneededforanambitiousoutcome.

The Copenhagen Conference

TheexpectationsforCopenhagenhadrisenveryhigh,withalargenumberofhigh-levelinternationalmeetings

6 For the report of the AWG-KP see FCCC/KP/AWG/2009/17. For the AWG-LCA report see FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/17.7 FCCC/CP/2010/2: Work undertaken by the Conference of the Parties at its fifteenth session on the basis of the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term

Cooperative Action under the Convention.


supportoftheagreementthroughwrittensubmissions.Countrieswerefurtheraskedtosubmitbythesamedatetheirpledgesforemissionreductiontargets(forindustrial-isedcountries)andformitigationactions(fordevelopingcountries)fortheperiodupto2020,whichwouldthenbereflectedintheAppendicestotheAccord.

IntheAccord,countriescommittokeepingglobaltemperaturerisebelow2oCthroughdeepcutsinGHGemissions,achievingpeakingofglobalemissionsassoonaspossible,whilenotingthatemissionsindevelopingcountrieswilltakelongertoreachtheirpeak.AnnexIPartiescommittoimplementindividuallyorjointlyquantifiedeconomy-wideemissionstargetsfor2020.Non-AnnexIPartieswillimplementnationallyappropri-atemitigationactions(NAMAs).LeastDevelopedCountries(LDCs)andSmallIslandDevelopingStates(SIDS)mayundertaketheseactionsvoluntarilyandonthebasisofexternalfinancialsupport.Mitigationactionstakenbynon-AnnexIPartieswillbesubjecttodomesticMRVproceduresandreportedoneverytwoyearsthroughNationalCommunications.However,internationallysupportedNAMAswillbesubjecttointernationalMRVprocedures.FurthermoretheAccordmakesareferencetotheKyotoProtocol,requestingPartiestotheKyotoProtocolto“furtherstrengthentheemissionreductionsinitiatedbytheKyotoProtocol”andnotestheimportantroleofmarketsinfutureclimatechangepolicy.

TheAccordfurthernotesthatsocialandeconomicdevelopmentandpovertyeradicationarethefirstandoverridingprioritiesofdevelopingcountriesandthatalow-emissiondevelopmentstrategyisindispensabletosustainabledevelopment.

TheAccordalsocallsfortheimmediateestablishmentofamechanismincludingsocalledREDD-plus,aimedatreducingdeforestation,forestdegradationandpromotingforestconservation,toenablethemobilisationoffinancialresourcesfromdevelopedcountries.Newandadditionalresourcesfromdevelopedcountriesintheamountof“approachingUSD30billion”fortheperiod2010-12,withbalancedallocationbetweenadaptationandmitiga-

AWG-KPinthecontactgroupsundertheCOPandCMPrespectively.TheprogressmadebytheCOPinthedraftinggroupsinCopenhagenwasreflectedinthedocumentissuedbytheUNFCCCSecretariataftertheconference,7whichisreferredtointhisdocumentas“theCOPtext”.

Atthesametime,duringthelasttwodaysinCopenha-gen,agroupofHeadsofStaterepresentingthemajorGHGemittersandthemainnegotiatinggroupsundertheUNFCCCnegotiatedaCopenhagenAccordinaparallelinformalsetting–adocumentoutliningapoliticalcompromiseonthemainelementsofenhancedactiononclimatechangebythosecountries.TheCOPneitherauthorisedtheformationofthisparallelnegotiationprocess,norwasitinformedaboutthecourseofthesenegotiationsastheyprogressed.TheCopenhagenAccordwaspresentedtoallPartiestotheConventionwithanintentiontofurtherconsultandgainsupportforitsadoptionthroughdecisionsbytheCOPandCMP.Thiseffortfailedduetooppositionfromseveralcountries.Asaresult,bothCOP15andCMP5“tooknote”oftheCopenhagenAccordintheirfinaldecisions.PartieswereaskedtoformallycommunicatetheirassociationwiththedocumenttotheUNFCCCSecretariatby31January2010.ItwasalsodecidedtoextendthemandatesoftheAWG-LCAandAWG-KPbyonemoreyearandthebodieswereaskedtocompletetheirworkforadoptionoftheoutcomesatthenextclimatechangetalksinDecem-ber2010inMexico.8TheAWG-LCAwasaskedinitsfutureworktotakeintoaccounttheresultsoftheworkcarriedoutbytheCOPinCopenhagenonthebasisofthetextsforwardedbytheAWG-LCAinitsreport.TheprogressmadebytheCOP,asnotedearlier,iscapturedinthe“COPtext”.9

The Copenhagen Accord

TheCopenhagenAccordwasnotformallyadoptedasadecisionundertheUNFCCCbutrathernotedbytheConferenceoftheParties(bothCOPandCMP)asapoliticaldeclaration.PartieswereaskedtocommunicatetotheUNFCCCSecretariatby31January2010their

8 For a detailed account of the negotiations during the Copenhagen Climate Change Talks see Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Summary of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: 7-19 December 2009, Vol. 12 No. 459, Tuesday, 22 December 2009. Online at http://www.iisd.ca/climate/cop15/

9 FCCC/CP/2010/2: Work undertaken by the Conference of the Parties at its fifteenth session on the basis of the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention.


tion,ispledged,withUSD100billionperannumenvisagedfrom2020onward.Fundingforadaptationwillbeprioritisedforthemostvulnerabledevelopingcoun-tries,suchasLDCs,SIDS,andAfrica.

EventhoughtheCopenhagenAccorddoesnothavealegalstandingwithintheUNFCCCprocess,itdoesrepresentapoliticalconsensus,albeitafragileone,onthemainelementsofthefutureframeworkamongthemajoremittersandrepresentativesofthenegotiatinggroupsjointlyaccountingformorethan80%oftheworld’sGHGemissions.ItisbeingconsideredandsupportedbymanyParties.Asof24February2010,ofthe193PartiestotheConventionmorethan100countries(includingthe27-memberEuropeanUnion)hadofficiallycommuni-catedtheirsupportto,orassociationwith,theCopenha-genAccordthroughwrittensubmissions,10andmanyofthesecountrieshadfurtherprovidedinformationonthemitigationcommitmentsoractionsthattheywouldundertake.11

ThesubsequentchaptersreviewthemainissuesundernegotiationundereachofthefourbuildingblocksoftheBaliActionPlan(mitigation,adaptation,financing,andtechnology)andthesharedvisionandanalysesthestatusasattheendoftheCopenhagenconference,inthecontextofimplementationofactionsindevelopingcountries.

10 See the UNFCCC website at: http://unfccc.int/home/items/5262.php11 At the time of writing India and China have indicated their planned national mitigation actions in a written submission to the Copenhagen Accord, but have not

explicitly stated whether they would like to be formally associated with the Accord.


Main issues under the Bali Action Plan and in the AWG-LCA

ThefirstcomponentoftheBaliActionPlanconcernsasharedvisionforlong-termcooperativeaction,includingalong-termglobalgoalforemissionreductions,toachievetheultimateobjectiveoftheConvention12.Thissharedvisionshouldprovideacontextforglobalaction,outlinethekeyprinciplesonwhichactionshouldbebased,andsettheobjectives,includingaglobalgoalforemissionreductions.

Inthecourseofthenegotiationsonsharedvisionin2008-9,themaindiscussionscenteredonthefollowingkeyissues:

• Thescopeofasharedvision• Thebasisfor,andthelevelof,thelong-termgoal,

includingthefollowingoptions: o Temperatureincreasegoal; o Globalemissionreductiongoal; o Emissionreductiongoalsfordeveloped

countries; o GHGconcentrationlimitintheatmosphere;• Thepeakingyearforglobalemissions;• Provisionforassessmentoftheeffectivenessof

globalaction.

Whilethenegotiationsonsharedvisionmostlyhap-penedintheAWG-LCA,someissueswerealsodiscussedintheAWG-KP,e.g.theemissionreductiongoalsfordevelopedcountries.InthenegotiationsuptoCopenha-gen,thescopeofthesharedvisionwaswidelyagreedtobebroad;providingaframeworkforactiononmitigation,adaptationandprovisionoffinancialandtechnologicalsupportandcapacity-building;andgivingequalweighttoactiononadaptationandmitigation.

Shared Vision in the Copenhagen Accord

TheCopenhagenAccorddoesnotspecificallyusetheterm“sharedvision”.However,alargepartofthedocu-mentaddressespreciselytheissuesthatPartieshavebeennegotiating.IntheAccord,countriescommittokeeptheglobaltemperaturerisebelow2oCthroughdeepcutsinGHGemissions,achievingpeakingofglobalemissionsassoonaspossible,whilenotingthatemissionsindevelopingcountrieswouldtakelongertoreachtheirpeak.

Progress achieved in Copenhagen

Thecontactgrouponlong-termcooperativeactionundertheCOPestablishedadraftinggrouptoundertakeworkonthesharedvision.Thegroupmadesomeprogress,clarifyingmostoftheprinciplesforthepreamble,withtheexceptionoftheissueofthelegalnatureoftheoutcomeandofthecommitmentsbydevelopedcountries.Atthesametime,mostofthefundamentalissuesrelatedtosharedvisiondescribedabove–suchasthetemperaturegoal,long-termglobalgoal,peakyear,andemissionreductiongoalsforthegroupsofcountries–remainedopen.IntheCOPtext,theyarestillpresentedasoptions(seetable1).

TheCopenhagenAccordaddressedsomeoftheseoutstandingissues.Inparticularitgaveastrongmessageofpoliticalcommitmenttoaddressthechallengeofclimatechange.Italsoprovidedguidanceonthetempera-tureincreaseandontheassessmentofimplementation.

Outstanding issues

TheAccordleftopenthequestionofaglobalquantita-tivegoalforemissionreductions.WhilethedatabytheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)isreferredto,therangeisnotformallyset.Further,thepeakingyearofemissionshasnotbeenspecified,leavingitatthelessambitiouslanguageof“assoonaspossible”.

3. shareD vision


Implications for developing countries

ProvisionsoftheCopenhagenAccordrelatedtosharedvisiongenerallyfallonthelowerendofambitionamongtheoptionsdiscussedintheAWG-LCA.Somedevelopingcountrieshavebeenparticularlydisappointedwiththe2oCgoal,asitmaybeassociatedwithahighlevelofadverseclimatechangeimpactsfortheircountries.Theprovisionforareviewoftheadequacyofthisgoalin2015,includ-inginrelationto1.5oC,mayaddresssomeoftheseconcerns.

AlthoughtheCopenhagenAccorddoesnotmentionthe

globalreductiongoalexplicitly,thereferencetotheIPCCandthe2oCgoalimplicitlyimpliesthatareductionintheorderof85%to50%inglobalCO2emissionslevelwith

respecttoemissionsin2000needstobeachievedby2050(accordingtotheIPCCFAR),butamoreprecisegoalmayneedtobeclarifiedinthenegotiations.Similarly,inregardtothejointemissionreductiontargetfordevelopedcountries,theapproachtakenintheCopenhagenAccordsuggeststhattheindividualpledgesbydevelopedcountrieswouldsimplybeaddeduptoarriveattheaggregategoal.Howeverthisapproachgenerallyhasnotbeensupportedbydevelopingcountries.

TakingtheCopenhagenAccordasageneralguidanceto

theAWG-LCAnegotiationscouldallowresolutionofsomeissuesrelatedtosharedvisionasdiscussedabove,howevertheissueofglobalemissionreductions,andpotentiallyajointemissionreductiontargetfordevelopedcountriesasagroup,wouldstillneedtobedetermined.

issUe ProPosals iN the coP text coPeNhageN accorD

long-term goal for emission reduction - based on the best available scientific knowledge

- supported by medium-term goals for emission reductions

- takes into account historical responsibilities and an equitable share in the atmospheric space

- climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time

- consistent with science - on the basis of equity- principle of common but differentiated

responsibilities and respective capabilities- social and economic development and pov-

erty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of developing countries

- low-emission development strategy is indispensable to sustainable development

temperature goal not to exceed 2oC or 1.5oC or 1oC Keep below 2oC. Assessment of implemen-tation of the Accord by 2015, including in relation to temperature rises of 1.5oC

global (collective) emission reduction goal

At least 50 or 85 or 95% below 1990 levels by 2050

no concrete figureDeep cuts in global emissions are required, reference to the ipCC Fourth Assessment report (FAr) for holding the temperature increase below 2oC

emission reduction goals for developed countries

various ranges: 75-95% or more than 95% below 1990 levels by 2050 or more than 100% by 2040

not addressed

the peaking year for global emissions in 2015 or as soon as possible As soon as possible, recognising that the time frame for peaking will be longer in developing countries

assessment of implementation in 2013/2014-2015/2016 and every 4-5 years thereafter

in 2015

12 Fourth Assessment Report

table 1: shared vision and long-term goal: cop text vs. copenhagen accord


Mitigationofclimatechange,encompassingthereductionofGHGemissionsandenhancementofGHGsinks,isatthecoreoftheBaliRoadMap.Asnotedearlier,differentaspectsofmitigationarebeingaddressedinboththeAWG-KPandAWG-LCAandalsobyothersubsidiarybodiestotheConvention.

UndertheBaliActionPlan,enhancedactiononmitigationshouldbeconsideredalongsevenmainthemes:

• commitmentsoractionsbyalldevelopedcountryParties;

• NAMAsbydevelopingcountryParties;• approachesandincentivesonissuesrelatingto

reducingemissionsfromdeforestationandforestdegradationandtheroleofconservation,sustain-ablemanagementofforestsandenhancementofforestcarbonstocksindevelopingcountries(REDD-plus);

• cooperativesectoralapproachesandsector-specificactions;

• variousapproaches,includingmarkets,toenhancethecost-effectivenessof,andtopromote,mitiga-tionactions;

• economicandsocialconsequencesofresponsemeasures;and

• waystostrengthenthecatalyticroleoftheConvention;14

ThenegotiationsundertheAWG-KPconcerncommit-mentsbydevelopedcountryParties.15

4.1 commitments and actions by developed countries

Main issues under the Bali Action Plan and in the AWG-LCA and AWG-KP

DevelopedcountrieshavecommittedundertheConventiontotaketheleadincombatingclimatechange.Therefore,theirstrongcommitmenttoambitiousemissionreductiontargetsisimperativeforeffectiveglobalmitiga-tionaction.Thecentralquestionsinthedebateonthese

issueshavebeen:theformofactionsandcommitments(i.e.,quantitativeeconomy-widetargetsorsomeotherform);theirlegalnature(i.e.,legallybindingornot);andthelevelofthetargets(includingbothindividualandcollectivetargetsfordevelopedcountries).Relatedissuesincludethemeansofimplementation,inparticulardesignofthemarket-basedmechanismsandsupplementaritylimits;rulesforland-useandland-usechangeaccounting;ensuringcomparabilityofeffortsandestablishmentofarobustcompliancesystem;anddeterminingtheGHGstobecovered.Inaddition,thesystemforMRVofmitigationactionsandfinancialsupportareamongthecentralissuesundernegotiation.

TheAWG-KPdevelopedasetofproposalsforamend-mentstotheKyotoProtocol;inparticularitsAnnexBthatcontainsemissiontargetsforAnnexIcountries,andotherrelevantArticlesoftheProtocoldealingwiththemeansofimplementation.TheCOPtextismuchshorterandfocusesonthelevelofindividualandcollectiveemissionreductiontargets.Table2belowsummarisesthemainoptionsproposedintheAWG-KPtextandtheCOPtextonthemainissuespertainingtomitigationactionsbydevelopedcountries.

SomeAnnexIPartiesmadepledgesfortheirnationalemissionreductionstargetspriortoorduringtheCopen-hagenconference.Manyofthesepledgeswereintheformofranges,indicatingthelowerandupperlimitsofemissionreductionsthatPartieswerepreparedtounder-takeprovidedothercountrieswouldundertakecomparablelevelsofeffort.Someproposalsalsoincludedtheleveloftargetsthatweretobemetthroughdomesticeffortsonlyandthenoveralltargetsthatcouldbemetwiththeuseoftheflexibilitymechanisms.

4. enhanceD action on mitigation anD its associateD means of implementation

13 For the precise list of sub-elements see Decision 1/CP.13.14 For a detailed analysis of the issues under negotiation on mitigation see ‘ Climate Change Mitigation Negotiations, With an Emphasis on Options for Developing

Countries’ by Harald Winkler, Energy Research Centre University Of Cape Town, pp. 23-47 in ´The Bali Road Map: Key Issues Under Negotiation´, UNDP Environment & Energy Group, UNDP 2008.


Mitigation actions by developed countries in the Copenhagen Accord

TheCopenhagenAccordprovidesonlylimitedguidanceonmitigationactionsbydevelopedcountries.Itdeter-minesthatsuchactionsshouldbebasedonquantifiedeconomy-wideemissionstargetsanddeterminesthelengthofthecommitmentperiodtobeupto2020.However,theAccorddoesnotprovideanyguidanceonthejointmid-orlong-termreductiontargets.IndividualemissionreductionpledgesbyAnnexIPartieswillberecordedin

AppendixItotheAccord,andPartieswererequestedtocommunicatetheirpledgesby31January2010.Accord-ingtoanalysisbytheWorldResourcesInstitute,thecurrentpledges,whenaddedtogether,couldrepresenta12%to19%reductionofAnnexIemissionsbelow1990levels,dependingontheassumptionsmade.However,theystillfallfarshortoftherangeofemissionreductionsof25%to40%that,accordingtotheIPCC,isrequiredtokeepinlinewiththescenarioofstabilisingGHGconcen-trationsat450ppmandkeepingwitha2ºCgoal.18

issUe ProPosals iN the aWg-KP aND coP texts coPeNhageN accorD

type of action/ commitment - range between targets/objectives/commitments- comparability of effort- historic responsibility

- Quantified economy-wide emissions targets for 2020

- parties to the Kyoto protocol to further strengthen the emissions reductions initiated by the protocol

commitment period 2013-2017 or 2013-2020 2020

Joint reduction targets by annex i countries(aWg-lca text)

- 25–40% / 30, 40, 45, 49 % below 1990/2005 levels by 2017/2020

- X% by 2050 from 1990 level16

- 75–95% or more below 1990 levels by 2050 or more than 100% by 204017

no overall numerical target determined, but suggests that it will be determined by the aggregation of individual emission reduction pledges (bottom-up approach).

Joint reduction targets by annex i countries(aWg-KP text)

- X/49/45/33/30/15% below 1990 levels by 2017 or 2020

- 80/95% or more below 1990 by 2050

no numerical target determined

individual reduction targets by annex i countries

Cop text makes reference to an Annex to be elaborated.AWg-Kp text contains several proposals for Annex B, containing individual numbers that vary greatly from one proposal to other

no numerical targets determined in Copen-hagen, but parties were to communicate their emission reduction pledges to be recorded in the Appendix i to the Accord. most pledges still contained the ranges presented before Copenhagen

table 2: mitigation actions and commitments by developed countries: cop and aWg-kp texts vs. copenhagen accord

15 In the section on mitigation.16 In the section on shared vision.17 Comparability of Annex I Emission Reduction Pledges, by Kelly Levin and Rob Bradley, Working Paper February 2010, WRI on the web at http://pdf.wri.org/work-

ing_papers/comparability_of_annex1_emission_reduction_pledges_2010-02-01.pdf



TheemissionreductiontargetsforAnnexIcountries,evenwithranges,thataretoberecordedintheAppendixtotheCopenhagenAccordprovideagoodbasisforadvancingthenegotiationsundertheUNFCCC.

Outstanding issues

Asstatedpreviously,oneofthemainissuesthatstillneedstoberesolvedundertheCopenhagenAccordisthejointemissionreductiontargetforAnnexIcountries.Secondly,thelegalnatureoftheindividualemissiontargetsisunclear:whilenationalpledgeswillberecordedintheAppendix,theprocessforensuringimplementationofemissiontargets(compliance)isnotdetermined.Thisissueisalsorelatedtotheoveralltypeandlegalstatusofanagreement.WouldtheKyotoProtocolbeamendedwithnewnumbersforAnnexIcountries,coupledwithanew

legallybindingagreementundertheConvention?Orwouldtheapproachofvoluntaryemissionpledges,asinthecaseoftheCopenhagenAccord,bethemainbasisfordeterminingactionsbydevelopedcountries?And,ifthelatteristhecase,howtoensurethatvoluntaryemissionpledgesadduptotherequiredstringentlevelofreductionsneeded?


Whiletheemissionreductiontargetsbydevelopedcountriesmayseemtohaveonlyindirectimpactonimplementationofactionsindevelopingcountries(i.e.,throughthelevelofdemandforCleanDevelopmentMechanism(CDM)andeventuallyforNAMAssupportedthroughmarketsshouldthatbedecided),thelevelofambitionofthetargetsandthedegreeofcompliancewillhavesignificantimplicationsforchangesinclimateandtheassociatedimpactsindevelopingcountries.

table 3: emission targets pledged by selected annex i countries in their submissions to the copenhagen accord (as at 8 february 2009)

emissioN reDUctioN By 2020 Base year reDUctioN to 1990 leVels18

Australia -5% up to -15/25% 2000 - 3.89 - 24.1%

Belarus - 5 -10% 1990

Canada - 17% 2005 + 0.25%

Croatia - 5% 1990

EU-27 - 20 -30% 1990

Iceland - 30% 1990

Kazakhstan - 15% 1992

Japan - 25% 1990

Liechtenstein - 20 - 30% 1990

New Zealand - 10 - 20 % 1990

Norway - - 30 - 40% 1990

Russian Fed. - 15 - 25% 1990

United States Around - 17%, the final target to be reported in light of enacted legislationthe pathway in pending legislation is a -30% by 2025 and -42% by 2030, and -83% by 2050

2005 -3.67%

18 Calculations by the US Climate Action Network: http://www.usclimatenetwork.org/policy/copenhagen-accord-commitments (accessed on 10 February 2009).


4.2. mitigation actions by developing countries

Main issues under the Bali Action Plan and AWG-LCA

TheBaliActionPlandeterminedthatenhancedactiononmitigationshouldalsoincludeNAMAsbydevelopingcountryPartiesinthecontextofsustainabledevelopment.TheseNAMAswouldbesupportedandenabledbytechnology,financingandcapacity-building,inameasur-able,reportable,andverifiablemanner(paragraph1.b(ii)oftheBaliActionPlan).


the nature and scope of Nama various proposals, including: - voluntary actions- substantial deviation in emissions/ 15–30%

by 2020 below business-as-usual- gHg emission intensity target

- non-Annex i countries will undertake miti-gation actions consistent with Article 4.1 and Article 4.7 of the Convention and in the context of sustainable development

- LDCs and SiDS may undertake actions voluntarily and on the basis of support

self financed or supported - Autonomous/self-financed- Supported

provisions for both self financed and sup-ported actions

Domestic or international mrV of actions - Domestic and/or international mrv - Domestic mrv for actions that are not supported, with the result to be reported through national Communications

- Supported nAmAs will be subject to inter-national mrv

mechanisms for mrV - international review through consultative process

- Subject to a review process under the Convention

- Building on an existing expert review system

- Actions to be communicated through national Communications every 2 years

- on the basis of guidelines to be adopted by the Cop, with provisions for international consultations and analysis under clearly defined guidelines ensuring that national sovereignty is respected

recording of Nama and matching ac-tions with support

- Coordinating mechanism- through national Communications and

inventories- mechanism to record mitigation Actions and

Facilitate matching of Support

nAmAs seeking international support will be recorded in a registry along with relevant technology, finance and capacity building support

Supported nAmAs are subject to interna-tional mrv

frequency of reporting on Namas - national Communications and inventories every 1-5 or X years

- inventories annually starting in 2011

national Communications every 2 years

ThenegotiationsonmitigationactionsbydevelopingcountriesintheAWG-LCAhavebeenverydifficult.Whilethenegotiatorsidentifiedthemainissuestobeaddressedandpresentedproposalsonsomeofthem,limitingtheoptionsrequiredimportantpoliticalchoicestobemade–whichwasnearlyimpossibleuntilprogresswasmadeonotherissues(inparticular,emissiontargetsofdevelopedcountries,finance,technologyandcapacitybuilding).

table 4: mitigation actions by developing countries: cop text vs. copenhagen accord


AnotherkeyissueincludedthenatureandscopeofNAMAs,including,amongothers:

• whetherNAMAsarevoluntaryandwhattypesofactionscouldbeconsideredasNAMAs;

• shouldNAMAsbeself-financedorsupportedthroughinternationalfinance,technologyandcapacity-building,orshouldbothtypes(self-financedandsupported)beenvisaged:

• shouldactionsbesubjecttodomesticorinternationalMRV;and

• howshouldMRVactionsberecordedandmatchedwithfinancialsupport.

Mitigation actions by developing countries in the Copenhagen Accord

AccordingtotheCopenhagenAccord,non-AnnexIPartiestotheConventionwillimplementmitigationactions.ThisformulationisstrongerthansomeoftheoptionsproposedintheAWG-LCAnegotiationsandintheCOPtext,wherethevoluntarynatureofactionswasspecificallyemphasised.LDCsandSIDSaregivenspecialconsideration,inthattheymayundertakeactionsvoluntarilyandonthebasisofexternalsupport.

table 5: mitigation actions announced by selected non-annex i countries in their submissions to the copenhagen accord (as at 24 february 2010)19

coUNtry Nama By 2020 BaseliNe sPecific actioNs

Brazil - 36.1 – 38.9% reduction in emissions below BAu

BAu - reduction in Amazon and Cerrado deforestation and restoration of grazing land

- increase use of biofuels, hydro power and alternative energy, no till farming, energy efficiency

China 40 – 45% reduction in carbon intensity of gDp

2005 - increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consump-tion to around 15%

- increase forest coverage by 40 million hectares and forest stock volume by 1.3 billion cubic meters; all by 2020

india 25 – 30% reduction in carbon intensity of gDp

2005 - Actions are voluntary in nature and will not have a legally binding character

indonesia 26% emission reduction not specified Focus areas: peat land, forestry, agriculture, industry, waste, energy and transportation

mexico 30% reduction in emissions below BAu BAu total annual reduction of 51 million tons of Co2e by 2012

South Africa - 34% reduction in emissions below BAu BAu - 42% reduction below BAu by 2025- implementation will depend upon the provision of financial, tech-

nological support and capacity building by developed countries.

republic of moldova -25% by 2020 1990 through implementation of global economic mechanisms focused on climate change mitigation

republic of Korea - 30% reduction in emissions below BAu BAu

maldives Achieve carbon neutrality as a country by 2020

n/a - the government is undertaking detailed work on implementation of this action

- the submission of the present mitigation action is voluntary and unconditional.

Costa rica implement long-term economy-wide transformational effort to achieve carbon neutrality

BAu Significant deviation by 2021

ghana range of actions in various sectors with no numerical reference to emission reduction

n/a range of measures identified in electricity, transport, residential, industrial sectors, as well as related to liquid and gaseous fuels, metal production, crop production, forestry, solid waste disposal and waste handling.

19 For full list of submissions and submissions by individual countries see UNFCCC website at http://unfccc.int/home/items/5265.php


ItisalsoimportanttonotethatwhiletheBaliActionPlanreferredto“developed”and“developingcountries”,theAccordisbacktothetraditionaldifferentiationofcountriesinrelationtomitigationthathasbeenusedundertheConvention:AnnexIandnon-AnnexI.CountrieswereaskedtomakesubmissionstotheUNFCCCSecretariatby31January2010indicatingmitigationactionsthattheyplantoundertake.Themitigationactionspledgedbynon-AnnexIcountriesintheirsubmissionswillberecordedintheAppendixIIoftheCopenhagenAccord.PartieswillalsohaveanopportunitytosubmitpledgesforNAMAsthroughtheirNationalCommunicationsandthroughdirectcommunicationtotheUNFCCCSecretariatinthefuture.

Asof24February2010,manydevelopingcountries,includingthemajoremitters,hadsubmittedtheirplannedmitigationactionstoberecordedintheAppendix.MostoftheactionsareexpressedintermsofreductionofcarbonintensityoftheeconomyorintermsofreductionofGHGemissionsbelowthebusiness-as-usual.ManycountriessubmittedalistofNAMAswhichwerenotexpressedinexpectedGHGreductions.Somecountriesalsoindicatedspecificmeasuresorsectorsthatwouldtakepriority.Insomecases,mostlyinthesubmissionsbyLDCs,countriesindicatedthatimplementationofactionswouldrequireinternationalsupportintermsoffinance,capacitybuildingandtechnology.ManysubmissionshaveemphasisedthattheidentifiedNAMAsarepreliminaryandfurtheranalysiswouldberequired.Table5describessomeexamplesofmitigationactionsplannedbynon-AnnexIcountries.

ThepledgesmadebydevelopingcountriesonnationalmitigationactionsthathavebeenregisteredintheAccordrepresentasignificantstepforwardininternationalclimatechangepolicy.


Oneofthemainstumblingblocksinthenegotiationsfordevelopingcountries,priortoandinCopenhagen,wastheprovisionsonMRVofactions.WhileitwasnotpossibletoreachagreementonthispointintheAWG-LCA,theCopenhagenAccordsettoresolvethisissuebyrequiringthatNAMAsimplementedunilaterallywithoutexternalsupportbesubjecttonationalMRVandreportedthroughtheNationalCommunicationseverytwoyears.However,

someprovisionswouldbemadeforinternationalconsulta-tionsandanalysisunderclearlydefinedguidelinestoensurethatnationalsovereigntyisrespected.Mitigationactionsforwhichinternationalsupportisrequiredwouldberecordedinaregistry,whichwouldalsorecordtherelevanttechnol-ogy,financeandcapacitybuildingsupport.SuchsupportedactionswillhavetogothroughaninternationalMRVprocess.TheguidelinesforMRVwouldbedevelopedandadoptedbytheCOP.

Outstanding issues

TheCopenhagenAccordthusaddressedmostofthefundamentalpoliticalissuesinrelationtonationalmitiga-tionactionsbydevelopingcountries,includingprovidinggeneralguidanceonthenatureofactions,MRVandcreationofaregistryformatchingNAMAswithsupport.Theagreementreachedamongthemajorplayersonthedistinctionbetweensupportedandnon-supportedNAMAintermsofMRVcouldthereforepotentiallyallowunblock-ingofthenegotiationsonmitigationintheAWG-LCAmovingforward.Anumberofdetailsstillremainunre-solved,however.ItisnotspecifiedwhattypesofNAMAswouldbeeligibleforinternationalsupport.Institutionalissues,inparticularrelatedtothegovernanceofthesystem,suchasdecision-makingontheallocationofsupportandcriteriaandmethodologicalbasisforMRV,willbeatthecoreoffuturediscussions.

TheCopenhagenconferencealsodidnotresolvetheissueofwhetherNAMAsshouldbeeligibleforcreditinginthecarbonmarket.Somecountrieshaveproposedthatemissionreductions(orpartofthereof)achievedunderNAMAsshouldgeneratecarboncreditsinsimilarmannerasisdoneundertheCleanDevelopmentMechanismorundertheJointImplementationcurrently.OthersbelievedthatNAMAaredistinctlydifferentandrepresentdevelopingcountry’sownmitigationaction,whichshouldbeeligibleforpublicfinance,butnotbepartofanyemissionoffsettingmechanism.WhiletheCOPandtheAWG-KPtextsstillcontainproposalstothiseffect,theAccorddoesnotmentionthisissue.ArelatedissueisthetreatmentofCDMprojectsincountriesandsectorsthatfallunderNAMAs,inparticularinthecaseofsupportedactions.Thisissuecouldberesolvedthroughtransparentaccountingandrecordingofemissionsandcarboncredittransfertoavoiddoublecounting.


entireglobaltransportationsectorandsecondonlytotheenergysector.Howevertheseemissionsarenotadequatelyaddressedinthecurrentregulatoryframework.Partieshavebeenconsideringapproachesandincentivesonissuesrelatingtoreducingemissionsfromdeforestationandforestdegradationandtheroleofconservation,sustainablemanagementofforestsandenhancementofforestcarbonstocksindevelopingcountries.Thesenegotiationsareusuallyreferredtoas“REDD-plus”.

REDD-plusactivitiesrelatetomitigationactionsbydevelopingcountriesinaspecificsector.ThistopicwasbeingnegotiatedinaseparategroupundertheAWG-LCA,asitwasrecognisedasapriorityforafutureframeworkonclimatechange.

ThenegotiationshavefocusedprimarilyonprovisionofpositiveincentivestopromoteREDD-plusactivitiesand,inparticular,whethertheseactivitiesshouldbefinancedprivately(i.e.,withtheuseofcarbonmarkets)orpublicly.Inaddition,measuresfordealingwithanumberofmethod-ologicalissues,suchasmeasuringemissionreductions,wereagreedinadecisionbytheSubsidiaryBodyforScientificandTechnologicalAdvice(SBSTA).


REDD-plusisoneofthefewissuesonwhichtheAWG-LCAandsubsequentlytheCOPinCopenhagenmadesignificantprogress.TheCOPtextpreparedinadraftinggroupinCopenhagen,onthebasisoftheoutputoftheAWG-LCA,containsalimitednumberofbracketsandcouldbefinalisedratherquicklytomaketheREDD-plusmechanismoperational.However,whilethetextadvancedinCopenhagen,ithasnotyetbeenadopted.

ThetextidentifiedalongsetofprinciplesonwhichimplementationofREDD-plusactivitiesshouldbebased.Someofthemostimportantprinciplesfordevelopingcoun-tries,amongothers,requirethatimplementationofactivitiesshouldbecountry-driven;undertakeninaccord-ancewithnationalcircumstancesandcapabilitiesofthecountryandrespectsovereignty;andbeconsistentwithnationalsustainabledevelopmentneedsandgoals.

Thetextfurthersuggestedthatdevelopingcountriescontributetomitigationactionsintheforestsectorby


Manydevelopingcountrieshaveidentifiedmitigationactionsthattheyplantoundertake,withorwithoutinternationalsupport.EvengiventhelackofformalstatusoftheCopenhagenAccordwithintheConvention,itisadocumentthatbothcommitsnewfinancingfromdevel-opedcountriesandclearlyidentifiesmitigationactionsbydevelopingcountriesasoneoftheareasforthisfinancingtobeused.Therefore,financialinstitutionsusedtochannelthefast-startfinancecouldusetheprovisionsoftheAccordandthecontentoftheAppendixIIastheguidanceforprovid-ingsupporttomitigationactionsindevelopingcountriesontheinterimbasis,untilaformalagreementisadoptedundertheUNFCCC.

Asnotedearlier,theCopenhagenAccordrecognisestheimportanceoflow-carbondevelopmentstrategies,howeveritdoesnotmakeanexplicitdirectlinkbetweensuchstrategiesandimplementationofNAMAs.Atthesametime,developingcountriesmayneedtodevelopnationalmitigationorlow-carbondevelopmentstrategiestoensureeffectiveimplementationoftheirplannedNAMAsandmayrequireassistancefromtheinternationalinstitutionsinthisrespect.

ThosedevelopingcountriesthathavenotyetbeenabletodeterminetheirpotentialNAMAswouldneedtoundertakeanassessmentatthenationallevel.Furthermore,manydevelopingcountriesexplicitlystatedintheirsubmissionsontheCopenhagenAccordthatfurtherelaborationofNAMAsandevaluationofemissionreductionsassociatedwithNAMAsthattheyhadcommunicatedwouldberequired.Thatwillbeanadditionalareawherefinancialandtechnicalsupportandcapacitybuildingwillberequired.

ImplementationofinternationalMRVguidelineswillrequiresignificantcapacity-buildingindevelopingcoun-tries.TheseeffortscouldbuildonthecurrentactivitiesinsupportofdevelopmentofNationalCommunications.

4.3 reDD-plus

Deforestationandforestdegradation,throughagriculturalexpansion,conversiontopastureland,infrastructuredevelopment,destructivelogging,firesetc.,accountfornearly20%ofglobalGHGemissions–morethanthe


thisworkatthispointwillbetoensuresufficient“readi-ness”fundsareavailableandcanbedeployedquickly,usingexistingREDD-plusreadinessinitiatives(USD3.5billionhasalreadybeenpledged).

4.4. other topics under action on mitigation

ThereareothertopicsundertheBaliActionPlanthathavebeendiscussedintheAWG-LCAnegotiationsonmitigation–namely,cooperativesectoralapproaches;approachestoenhancecosteffectivenessofmitigation;andeconomicandsocialconsequencesofresponsemeasures.NotmuchprogresswasmadeonthesetopicsinCopenhagen.

TheCOPtextonsectoral approaches20stillcontainsmanybrackets,whiletheCopenhagenAccorddoesnotmentionsectoralapproachesorspecificsectorsapartfromREDD-plus.Atthesametime,adraftinggroupundertheCOPmadegoodprogressonadraftdecisiononcoopera-tivesectoralapproachesandsector-specificactionsinagriculture.Iffinalisedandadopted,thisdecisionwouldpromotecooperationamongcountriesontheresearch,developmentandtransferoftechnologies,practicesandprocessesthatcontrol,reduce,orpreventGHGemissionsintheagriculturalsector.ThedecisionwouldalsorequestSBSTAtolaunchaworkprogrammeonagriculture.

Thelatesttextonvarious approaches, including opportunities for using markets, to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote, mitigation actions,preparedinthedraftinggroupundertheCOP,makesadistinctionbetweennon-marketandmarketapproaches.Intermsofnon-marketapproaches,thedrafttexturgesPartiestopursuetheadoptionofappropriatemeasurestoprogres-sivelyreducetheproductionandconsumptionofhy-drofluorocarbonsundertheMontrealProtocol.ItalsocallsforestablishmentofaworkprogrammeunderSBSTAonnon-marketapproaches.Thepartofthetextonmarketapproachesismorecontroversialandstillcontainsanumberofoptions,rangingfromnodecisiononthetopictoestablishingnewmarket-basedmechanismsandrequesting

undertakingthefollowingactivities:• Reducingemissionsfromdeforestation;• Reducingemissionsfromforestdegradation;• Conservationofforestcarbonstocks;• Sustainablemanagementofforest;and• Enhancementofforestcarbonstocks.Thedrafttextalsosuggestedthatcountriesintendingto

implementREDD-plusactivitiesdevelopanationalforestreferenceemissionlevel;arobustandtransparentnationalforestmonitoringsystemforthemonitoringandreportingoftheactivities;andanationalstrategyoractionplan–po-tentiallyaspartoftheirlow-carbonemissionstrategies.ThelatterissuestillremainscontentiousinthenegotiationsandwasnotresolvedinCopenhagen,includinghowsuchstrategieswouldrelatetoNAMAs.

TheCopenhagenAccordalsorecognisedthecrucialroleofreducingemissionfromdeforestationandforestdegrada-tionandtheneedtoenhanceremovalsofGHGsbyforests.ThroughtheAccord,PartiesagreedontheneedtoprovidepositiveincentivesthroughtheimmediateestablishmentofamechanismincludingREDD-plustomobilisefinancialresourcesfromdevelopedcountries.Inthesectiondealingwithfinancing,theAccordalsospecificallyidentifiedREDD-plusasoneoftheareasforwhichsupportwouldbescaled-up.


ThedrafttextonREDD-pluspreparedundertheCOPgivesmoreclaritytodevelopingcountriesanddevelopmentagenciesonwhatislikelytobenecessaryfordevelopingcountriestoparticipateinthemechanism.Furthermore,theagreementintheCopenhagenAccordtolaunchaREDD-plusmechanismassoonaspossiblepotentiallygivestheissueahigherpoliticalstatusandreaffirmsthecommitmentofdevelopedcountriestoprovidesupporttoitsimplemen-tation.

Toprepareforimplementation,itwillbeimportantforcountriestodevelopthenationalstrategiesdescribedaboveandtocarryoutworkondeterminingnationalreferencelevelsandmonitoringsystems.Thechallengeinlaunching

20 There is no accepted definition of sectoral approaches in the negotiations and this term for some time meant different things to different groups of Parties. The Bali Action Plan in the context of enhancing actions on mitigation requires Parties to consider cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions, in order to enhance implementation of Article 4, paragraph 1(c), of the Convention.


SBSTAtodevelopappropriatemodalities.TheCopenhagenAccordstatesthatvariousapproacheswouldbepursued,includingopportunitiestousemarkets.Therefore,theuseanddesignofnewmarket-basedapproachesinafutureframeworkremainsanunresolvedissue.

Inrelationtotheeconomic and social consequences of response measures,21thetextpreparedbytheCOPdraftinggroupstillcontainsanumberofoptions,touchingupontheissuesof:takingintoaccounttheimpactofresponsemeasureinimplementingmitigation;unilateralmeasures,includingfiscalandnon-fiscalbordertrademeasuresagainstgoodsandservicesfromdevelopingcountriesongroundsrelatedtoclimatechange;andproposalstoestablishaforumtoundertakeactivitiesthatincludeidentifyingandaddressingnegativeeconomicandsocialconsequencesofresponsemeasures;sharinginforma-tion,promoting,andcooperatingontheseissues;andexploringwaystominimisenegativeconsequences,inparticularindevelopingcountries.TheCopenhagenAccordinturnrecognisedtheimportanceofaddressingpotentialimpactsofresponsemeasuresinthecontextofacompre-hensiveadaptationprogramme.

20 The Convention requires that Parties in the implementation of mitigation measures take into consideration the specific needs and concerns of developing countries arising from the adverse effects of climate change and/or the impact of the implementation of response measures. The Kyoto Protocol further commits Parties to strive to minimise adverse economic, social and environmental impacts on other Parties, especially developing country Parties. Response measures are being addressed in the context of the Bali Road Map process, both in the AWG-KP and AWG-LCA.


Despitecurrentmitigationefforts,acertaindegreeofclimatechangeisinevitable.Thereforeadaptationtotheimpactsofclimatechangeneedstobeanintegralcompo-nentofthearchitectureofafutureclimatechangeregime,havingequalimportancetomitigationefforts.Inrecentyears,thisneedhasbeenwidelyrecognisedintheinterna-tionalclimatechangeprocess.TheBaliActionPlanidentifiedenhancedactiononadaptation–andthesupportingfinance,technology,andcapacitybuildingneeds–asoneofthefourmainbuildingblocks.22

Theapproximatecostsofadaptationarehighbyallestimates.TheWorldBank(2006)estimatedannualadaptationneedsatUSD10-40billionin2030,OxfamInternational(2007)atmorethanUSD50billionannually,andtheUNDP2007/2008HumanDevelop-mentReportprojectsthatannualadaptationinvestmentneedswillbearoundUSD86billionannuallyby2015.TheUNFCCC(2007)estimatedthatthetotalfundingneededforadaptationby2030couldamounttoUSD49-171billionperannumglobally,ofwhichUSD27-66billionwouldberequiredfordevelopingcountries.HoweveramorerecentstudybyM.Parryetal(IIED,2009)concludedthattheUNFCCCestimateofinvest-mentneedswasprobablyunder-estimatedbyafactorofbetween2and3fortheincludedsectors.

MostoftheexistinginternationalfinancinginstrumentsforadaptationarereplenishedthroughODA-typevoluntarycontributions.TheAdaptationFundundertheKyotoProtocolusesaninnovativeapproachofgeneratingresourcesthroughalevyonthetransactionsinthecarbonmarketundertheCDM.Underthismechanism,financeisraisedfromtheprivatesectorandcollectedanddis-bursedbyamultilateralinstitution.However,evenwiththeAdaptationFundnowoperational,thefundingcurrentlyavailableundertheUNFCCCisinsufficienttomeettheprojectedadaptationneeds.


Overthepasttwoyearsinthenegotiations,significantprogresshasbeenmadeonidentifyingthemainelementsofinternationalactiononadaptation.Giventhecloselinkagesbetweenadaptationanddevelopmentplanningandimplementation,ithasbeenrecognisedthatmecha-nismsmustbecreatedtosupportnationalandregionalactiononboththeseissues.

TheAWG-LCAnegotiationsundertheBaliActionPlanfocusedfirstonidentifyingthemainelementsofenhancedactiononadaptationandformingabasicunderstandingamongthePartiesofwhattheyentail.Thefirstgroupofissuesunderthenegotiationsrelatedtotheimplementa-tionofadaptationaction,includingdeterminationofthescopeofadaptation(whetherthisischallengefacedbyallPartiesoronlyappliestodevelopingcountries);identifica-tionofactionsthataretobeimplemented;andoftheprinciplesthatimplementationshouldfollow.Oneofthemostdifficultissueswasriskmanagementandreductionstrategies,includingrisksharingandtransfermechanismssuchasinsurance.Developingcountriesproposedtheestablishmentofaninternationalmechanismtoaddresslossanddamage.Itwasproposedthatsuchamechanismcouldreceiveacertainpartofthefinancinggeneratedforadaptation,aswellasbeingsupportedbyinnovativefinancialinstruments,suchasventurecapitalandclimateinsurancefunds.However,thisproposalsofarhasnotbeensupportedbymostdevelopedcountries–withmostcontentiousissuebeingcompensationofthelossanddam-agetodevelopingcountries.

Thenextgroupofissuesconcernedthemeansofimplementation–namely,theadaptationactivitiesindevelopingcountriestobesupportedbymeansofimplementation,suchasfinance,technologyandcapacity-building.Thesenegotiationswerecloselylinkedtothoseontheprovisionoffinanceandinvestmentflows.Whileitwasdecidedthatissuesrelatedtothedeliveryofmeansofimplementation(inparticular,provisionofsupport)

5. aDaptation

22 For a more detailed account of the main issues related to adaptation, see “Adaptation to climate change: The new challenge for development in the developing world”, by Dr. E. Lisa F. Schipper, Stockholm Environment Institute; Maria Paz Cigarán, Libélula Communication, Environment and Development, Peru; and Dr. Merylyn McKenzie Hedger, Climate Change Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, in ´The Bali Road Map: Key Issues Under Negotiation´, UNDP 2008.


ingcountries,especiallyinthosethatareparticularlyvulnerable,andespeciallyLDCs,SIDSandAfrica.IftheAccordistakenasguidancetotheAWG-LCAnegotia-tions,thisformulationcouldresolvetheopenquestiononwhichgroupsofcountriesshouldbespeciallynotedasparticularlyvulnerable.

IntheAccord,developedcountriescommittoprovidingadequate,predictable,andsustainablefinancialresources,technology,andcapacity-buildingtosupporttheimple-mentationofadaptationactionindevelopingcountries.

shouldbedealtwithintherelatedgroups,thenegotiatinggrouponadaptationstillputplaceholderstothisregardinthetextandheldsomeotherrelatedissuesopenuntilthenegotiationsonfinancingforadaptationwouldcometosomeresult.OneofimportantpointsofdiscussioninthisregardwasmonitoringandreviewofadaptationactionandsupportandwhetherthisshouldbeonlysupportoralsosupportedadaptationactionsthatundergoMRV.

Finally,thenegotiationsworkedtodefinetheinstitu-tionalarrangementsattheinternationallevelthatwouldguidetheimplementationofactionsandsupport.AkeyissuewastheroleofexistingfinancialinstitutionsundertheConventionandtheKyotoProtocolversuscreationofanewinstitutionalmechanism.Arelatedissuewastheprinciplesofgovernanceforaninstitutionalmechanism.Therewasgeneralrecognitionthattransparency,efficiency,andequitableandbalancedrepresentationshouldformthebasisofanyexistingornewinstitutionalarrangement,buttheoperationaldetailswouldstillbeupfornegotia-tion.InthecourseoftheAWG-LCAnegotiationsnumerousproposalshavebeenmade,includingaframe-work,programme,fund,subsidiarybody,etc.

Adaptation in the Copenhagen Accord

IntheCopenhagenAccord,thecriticalimpactsofclimatechangeandthepotentialimpactsofresponsemeasuresoncountriesparticularlyvulnerabletotheadverseeffectsofclimatechangearerecognised.TheAccordstressestheneedtoestablishacomprehensiveadaptationprogramme,includinginternationalsupport.TheAccordincludesimpactsofresponsemeasuresintothescopeofactiononadaptation–apointthathasbeenhighlycontentiousinthenegotiationsforyears.23Itdescribesadaptationasachallengefacedbyallcountries,takingabroaderdefinitionofthescopeofadaptation.

TheAccordfurtherrecognisesthatenhancedactionandinternationalcooperationonadaptationisurgentlyrequiredtoensuretheimplementationoftheConventionbyenablingandsupportingadaptationactionsaimedatreducingvulnerabilityandbuildingresilienceindevelop-

23 The Buenos Aires Programme of Work on Adaptation and Response Measures, while recognising the links between these issues, still treats them distinctly.



Goodprogresswasmadeinthenegotiationsonadapta-tioninCopenhagenandcameveryclosetoreachinganagreementonmostofthekeypoints.Mostoftheissuesleftopenwerepoliticallyrelatedtoanagreementonfinancialandtechnologicalsupportandcapacitybuilding.

ThedraftinggroupundertheCOPmostlyresolvedtheprinciplesforimplementationofadaptationaction,emphasisingthatitshouldbeundertakeninaccordance

withtheConvention;followacountry-driven,gender-sensitive,participatory,andfullytransparentapproach,takingintoconsiderationvulnerablegroups,communitiesandecosystems;andbebasedonandguidedbythebestavailablescience,and,asappropriate,traditionalknowledge;withaviewtointegratingadaptationintorelevantsocial,economicandenvironmentalpoliciesandactions.

Furthermore,thedraftinggroupmadeprogressonidentifyingtheactivitiestobeundertaken,including,amongothers:


scope of adaptation issue for all or only for developing countries? no agreement, both options still on the table

Challenge faced by all countries

What is being established to address adaptation (how)

Adaptation Framework [for implementation] need for comprehensive adaptation programme including international support

response measures part of adaptation or not

Both options still on the tableresponse measures included or not

response measures are to be covered under the adaptation framework

adaptation actions to be undertaken identifies a list of actions remaining points are the inclusion of the compensation and rehabilitation measures and of measures to adapt to impacts of response measures

no detail on actions: those aimed at reducing vulnerability and building resilience

support for adaptation in developing countries

not finished, as it was decided to keep consist-ency with the text to be negotiated on finance.

no detail, besides indication that support should be provided

institutional arrangements options include:- Adaptation Committee- Strengthening the existing institutional

arrangements and considering the need for new ones, including a Subsidiary/Advisory Body

- Arrangements for adaptation are not specifically addressed

- the Copenhagen green Fund suggested as the main institution for channelling support

addressing loss and damage options include:- Establishing international mechanism to

address loss and damage - Considering in the future the need for

creating a mechanism

not addressed

monitoring and reporting - monitoring and review of support and only information sharing on supported action

- monitoring and review of both adaptation support and associated adaptation action

not addressed

Prioritisation of most vulnerable A number of options for definition of most vulnerable countries; issue was not resolved

“the most vulnerable developing countries, such as the least developed countries, Small island Developing States and Africa”

table 6: enhanced action on adaptation: cop text vs. copenhagen accord


Outstanding issues

Theissuesonwhichagreementisstillrequiredmainlyconcerntheinstitutionalarrangementsforimplementa-tionofadaptationactionanditssupport.Negotiatorsalsostillneedtoresolvehowtoaddresslossanddamage.

WiththecommitmentofdevelopedcountriesintheCopenhagenAccordtoprovidefinance,thenegotiationsintheAWG-LCAshouldbeabletomakefurtherprogressontheoutstandingissuesonadaptation.


TheCopenhagenconference,boththroughtheCopen-hagenAccordandthedrafttextundertheCOP,affirmedastrongpoliticalcommitmenttoenhanceactiononadaptation,includingprovisionofsupporttodevelopingcountriestothisend.

AdaptationwasindicatedintheCopenhagenAccordasoneofthetwoareas(alongsidemitigation)towhichthebalancedallocationof“fast-start”financecommittedbydevelopedcountriesupto2012shouldbechannelled.

AgeneralagreementachievedintheCOPdraftinggroupontheprinciplesforadaptationaction,thesetofpriorityactivitiesandenhancementofregionalcoopera-tion,asdiscussedabove,isimportantforfacilitatingimplementationoffast-startactiononadaptationindevelopingcountries.Thissetofactions,eventhoughnotformallyadopted,couldbeusedasanindicationofwhattheimplementationatthenationalandinternationallevelandsupportforadaptationactionsshouldfocusonintheinterim.Manyoftheactionsidentifiedhavebeenbroughtbydevelopingcountriesandwillbeindispensableforpromotingclimate-resilientdevelopmentandadaptingtoclimatechangeimpacts.

• Planning,prioritising,andimplementingadaptationactions;24

• Impact,vulnerabilityandadaptationassessments,includingassessmentsoffinancialneedsaswellaseconomic,social,andenvironmentalevaluationofadaptationoptions;

• Strengtheninginstitutionalcapacitiesandenablingenvironments,includingthoseforclimate-resilientdevelopmentandvulnerabilityreduction;

• Buildingresilienceofsocio-economicandecologicalsystems,includingthrougheconomicdiversificationandsustainablemanagementofnaturalresources;

• Enhancingclimatechangerelateddisasterriskreductionstrategies;earlywarningsystems;riskassessment,management,andsharingandtransfermechanisms;

• Measurestoenhanceunderstanding,coordinationandcooperationrelatedtonational,regionalandinternationalclimatechangeinduceddisplacement,migrationandplannedrelocation;

• Research,development,demonstration,diffusion,deployment,andtransferoftechnologies,practices,andprocesses;andcapacity-buildingforadaptation;

• Strengtheningdata,informationandknowledgesystems,education,andpublicawareness;

• Improvingresearchandsystematicobservationforclimatedatacollection,archiving,analysis,andmodellingforimprovingdecision-makingatnationalandregionallevels.

TheCOPtextalsoincludedprovisionsforenhancingregionalcooperationonadaptation.Partieswereinvitedtostrengthenand,wherenecessary,establishregionalcentresandnetworks,inparticularindevelopingcountries,withsupportfromdevelopedcountriesandrelevantorganisa-tions.

Thegroupalsomanagedtonarrowdowntheoptions,butwasnotabletofullyresolvetheissueofinstitutionalarrangementsonadaptation,asshowninTable6.Inaddition,theissuesofthescopeofadaptationandsupportforadaptationwereleftopen.

24 Including projects and programmes and actions identified in national and subnational adaptation plans and strategies, national adaptation programmes of action of LDCs, National Communications, technology needs assessments and other relevant national planning documents.


TheprovisionsoftheConventionandtheKyotoProtocolforeseefinancialassistancefromdevelopedtodevelopingcountryPartiesthroughthefinancialmecha-nismoftheConvention,aswellasthroughbilateral,multilateralorregionalchannels.TheGlobalEnvironmentFacility(GEF)hasbeenactingastheentityentrustedwiththeoperationofthefinancialmechanismoftheUNFC-CC,subjecttorevieweveryfouryears.Inaddition,severalspecialfundshavebeencreatedundertheConventionandtheKyotoProtocol,including:theSpecialClimateChangeFund,theLeastDevelopedCountriesFund,andtheAdaptationFund.

TheCDMundertheKyotoProtocolisalsocontribut-ingtofinancinglower-carbondevelopmentindevelopingcountrieswhileassistingdevelopedcountriesinmeetingtheiremissionstargets.TheCDMalsogeneratesresourcesfortheAdaptationFundthroughashareofproceeds.

Financeisoneofthekeyissuesinthenegotiationsonenhancedfutureactiononclimatechange.Developingcountrieswillneedconsiderablefinancialassistanceformitigation,adaptation,technologycooperation,andcapacitybuildinginordertoensureeffectiveresponsestoclimatechange.Theamountofinvestmentandfinancialflowsneededisestimatedtobeintheorderoftenstohundredsofbillionsofdollarsperyear–muchhigherthanwhatiscurrentlyavailablethroughvariousmecha-nismsundertheUNFCCCandbilateralchannels.


Thenegotiationsonfinanceandinvestment25havebeenamongthemostdifficultintheAWG-LCAprocess.Financialsupportisacross-cuttingissue,whichishighlyrelevantformitigation,adaptation,technology,andcapacitybuilding.Thereforethelackofprogressinthenegotiationsonfinanceimmediatelyaffectsthedynamicsofwhathappensonotherissues.Thesenegotiationswerecomplicatedbythelackofgoodunderstandingoftheamountofresourcesrequiredforclimatefinancing,asthecurrentestimatesvarygreatly(asdiscussedintheadapta-tionchapter).

ThenegotiationsintheAWG-LCAcentredonthefollowingkeyissues:

• generationandprovisionoffinancialresources;• accesstofinance,includingactivitiestobefunded;• institutionalarrangements;and• compliance.

Inthediscussionsongenerationandprovisionoffinance,Partiesmadevariousproposalsonthesourcesoffinance,includingbothpublicandprivate.Arangeofproposalswasalsomadeontheoverallscaleoffinancetobeprovidedandwhatshouldbethebasisfordeterminingindividualcontributionsofcountries.Animportanttopicwasalsocreationofincentivesfordirectingprivateinvestmentflowsandtheroleofcarbonmarketsingeneratingrequiredclimatefinance.

Thedebateonaccesstofinancewashighlypoliticisedandfocusedonhowtoimproveaccessfordevelopingcountriestoexistingandfuturefinancialresources.Developingcountriesadvocatedfor“directaccess”toavoidundergoingexcessivebureaucraticandcumbersomeproceduresforaccessingfinance,whiledonorswishedtoretaincertaindegreeofcontroloverhowtheresourcesarespent.Anotherimportantissueinthisdebateconcernedpriorities,i.e.,ensuringthatfundingcorrespondstothenationalneedsofthehostcountriesandisnotdominatedbydonorpriorities,whilestillensuringtransparencyandeffectivenessofthefundedactivities.Therelatedissueofprioritisationofthelimitedfundingoftencauseddisagree-mentamongtheParties.TherewasageneralagreementintheAWG-LCAthatthemostvulnerableandtheleastcapableshouldhavepriority;however,theproblemwastospecifythosecountries.Furthermore,theforminwhichsupportwastobeprovided(i.e.,grantsorloans)isstillnotresolved.

Theinstitutional arrangements fortheprovisionoffinancialresourcesandinvestmentswilldeterminehowtheissuesdiscussedabovewillbeimplemented.Thecentraldisagreementbetweendevelopedanddevelopingcountrieswastheroleofexistinginstitutionsversusthecreationofnewmechanismsforprovisionofresources.

6. enhanceD action on the provision of financial resources anD investment

25 For detailed overview of the key issues in the negotiations on finance see “Negotiations on additional investment and financial flows to address climate change in devel-oping countries” by Erik Haites, Margaree Consultants, Inc. in ´The Bali Road Map: Key Issues Under Negotiation´, UNDP 2008.


Whilethiswasaverypositivedevelopment,itisnotentirelyclearfromthetextwhethertheUSD100billionannuallywouldonlybeprovidedformitigation,orwhetheritalsoincludedresourcesforadaptation.

AccordingtotheCopenhagenAccord,newmultilateralfundingforadaptationwillbedeliveredthrougheffectiveandefficientfundarrangements,withagovernancestructureprovidingforequalrepresentationofdevelopedanddevelopingcountries.Howeveritdoesn’texplainhowitwouldrelatetotheexistingfinancialmechanisms.

IntheAccord,severaldecisionsaresuggestedinrelationtoinstitutionalarrangements,includingaHighLevelPaneltobeestablishedundertheguidanceof,andaccountableto,theCOPtostudythecontributionofthepotentialsourcesofrevenuetowardsmeetingthefinancialgoal.Furthermore,aCopenhagenGreenClimateFundistobeestablishedasanoperatingentityofthefinancialmechanismoftheConventiontosupportprojects,programmes,policies,andotheractivitiesindevelopingcountriesrelatedtomitigation(includingREDD-plus),adaptation,capacitybuilding,andtechnologydevelop-mentandtransfer.TheFundwouldreceiveasignificantportionofthefundingcommittedundertheAccord.

Developingcountriesgenerallyadvocatedforcreationofnewinstitutions.Governanceoftheinstitutions,aswellasmonitoringandreviewoftheprovisionofthesupportandactions,arerelatedissuesthatremainedunresolved.

Finance in the Copenhagen Accord

AgreementontheprovisionofsignificantfinancialsupportbydevelopedcountrieswasamongthemostsignificantoutcomesoftheCopenhagenconference.IntheCopenhagenAccord,developedcountriescollectivelycommittedtoprovidenewandadditionalresources,includingthroughinternationalinstitutions,approachingUSD30billionfortheperiod2010to2012,withbalancedallocationbetweenadaptationandmitigation.Fundingforadaptationwillbeprioritisedforthemostvulnerabledevelopingcountries,suchastheLDCs,SIDS,andAfrica.

Inaddition,inthecontextofmeaningfulmitigationactionsandtransparencyonimplementation,developedcountriescommittedtoagoalofjointlymobilisingUSD100billiondollarsayearby2020toaddresstheneedsofdevelopingcountries.Thisfundingwouldcomefromawidevarietyofsources:publicandprivate,bilateralandmultilateral,includingalternativesourcesoffinance.

issUe ProPosals iN the coP Draft text coPeNhageN accorD

Provision of financial resources Scaled-up, predictable, new and additional, and adequate funding to be provided to developing country parties

- Approaching uSD 30 billion for the period 2010 to 2012 with balanced allocation between adap-tation and mitigation

- Developed countries committed to mobilising jointly uSD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 from a wide variety of sources

generation/ sources of finance variety of proposals, including options covering both public and private sources and contribution by only developed or all countries.issue was not resolved.

- include public and private sources, but no detail- Established a High Level panel to study the con-

tribution of the potential sources of revenue

form of finance Loans and/or grants not specified

institutional arrangements proposals vary widely, depending on the specific proposal, but include:- A Finance Board of the financial mechanism- Climate Fund/Facility- reforming the existing institutional arrangement to

ensure the gEF responds more effectively to needs of developing countries

the Copenhagen green Climate Fund is to be established as an operating entity of the financial mechanism

table 7: provision of finance and investment: cop text vs. copenhagen accord



Atfirstsight,theCopenhagenAccordresolvedsomeofthemainpoliticalissueswithrespecttotheframeworkforprovisionoffinancialresourcesthathasbeenunderthenegotiationintheAWG-LCA.Itdefinedtheoverallamountoffinancetobeprovidedbydevelopedcountries,clearlydefinedtheneedforMRVoffinancialcommit-mentsofAnnexIcountriesandfordevelopingarobustandtransparentsystemtoaccountforfinanceprovided;andsuggestedtheinstitutionalarrangements(theCopen-hagenGreenClimateFund)forimplementation.

Outstanding issues

ThedecisiononestablishmentofanoperatingentityofthefinancialmechanismoftheConventioncanonlybetakenbytheCOP.TobeaccountabletotheCOP,aHighLevelPanelshouldthereforebeestablishedbytheCOPitself.SincetheCopenhagenAccordhasnotbeenformallyadoptedbytheCOP,theproposedstepsintheAccordoninstitutionalarrangementscannotbetakenuntiltheCOPdecidesso–unlesstheinstitutionsarecreatedoutsideoftheUNFCCC.

Furthermore,theprovisiononfinanceundertheCopenhagenAccordhasbeencriticisedbysomedevelop-ingcountriesonthecountthatitwasnotclearwhetherthepledgeswerenewandadditional,orperhapssimplymeantdirectingfundingfromotherareasofdevelopmentassistance.26

Anotherissuethatremainsopenishowtoensurepredictabilityoffunding.TheAccorddoesnotprovideanyguidanceonthegenerationoffundsasthisdecisionwaslefttobetakenbasedonthefindingsoftheHighLevelPanel.Similarly,nodecisionhasbeenmadeontheshareoffinancingfordifferentfocusareas(i.e.,thedivisionbetweenmitigationandadaptation,etc.).Itislikelyforfast-startfinancingthesedecisionswouldbetakenbythoseinstitutionsthatwilldisbursefunding.


GiventheuncertainstatusoftheCopenhagenAccord,thefast-startfinancingthatwaspledgedinCopenhagenwouldlikelyneedtogothroughthevariousexistinginstitutions.

ThedraftCOPtext,eventhoughithasnotbeenfinalisedyet,canbeusedtoguideprovisionoffast-trackfinanceincertainareasonaninterimbasis.Inparticular,thelistsofactionseligibleforsupportthatwerenearlyfinalisedinthenegotiations(onadaptation,REDD-plus,andtechnologydevelopmentandtransfer)couldbeusefulforfinancialinstitutionsandhostcountriesasbasicguidance.

Furthermore,aHighLevelPanelonsourcesoffinancecouldbeformedandstartitsworkonaninterimbasis,soastoprovideaninputtotheCOP16inMexicotofacilitatedecision-making.Inthemeantime,theGEFwouldremainasanoperatingentityofthefinancialmechanismoftheConventionuntiltheCOPdecidesotherwise.

TakingtheCopenhagenAccordasguidanceintheAWG-LCAnegotiations(inparticular,thepointsrelatedtothecreationoftheGreenFundandtheHighLevelPanel),mightallowthenegotiationsonprovisionoffinanceandinvestmenttomakequickprogress.

26 Copenhagen´s Climate Finance Promise, IIED Briefing Note, February 2009.


Technologyisatthecentreofthesourceoftheclimatechangeproblem,asitlargelydeterminesthelevelofemissions,butitisalsoattheheartofthesolution–bothformitigationandadaptationactions.Financialandotherincentivesarecriticaltoensuretechnologyresearchanddevelopment,deployment,andtransfertodevelopingcountries.Thelatterhasbeenoneofthemostheatedtopicsinthenegotiationsbetweendevelopedanddevelop-ingcountriesformanyyears.

ThereisnoestablisheddefinitionoftechnologyandtechnologytransferintheConvention,butincreasinglyabroaderdefinitionsuggestedbytheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChangeisbeingimplied,whichdefinestechnologynotonlyintermsofequipment,butalsocoverseveryrelevantflowofhardware,software,informa-tion,andknowledge.Despitetherecognitionofthecentralroleoftechnologyandtechnologytransferformitigationandadaptation,therehasbeenlittletransferofclimate-friendlytechnologyundertheUNFCCC.Theapplicationoftheprinciples,theestablishmentofmecha-nisms,andtheactualtransferoftechnologieshaveyettobeputintoeffect.


TheBaliActionPlanrecognisedenhancedactionontechnologyasoneofthefourmainbuildingblocksofafutureagreementonclimatechangeandapreconditionforenhancingactiononmitigationandadaptation.ThemainissuesintheAWG-LCAinclude:

• Mechanismsforremovalofobstaclesto,andprovisionof,incentivesforscalingupofdevelop-mentandtransferoftechnology;

• Waystoacceleratedeployment,diffusion,andtransferoftechnologies;

• Co-operationonresearchanddevelopmentofcurrent,new,andinnovativetechnologies;

• Effectivenessoftoolsandmechanismsfortechnol-ogyco-operationinspecificsectors.

Oneofthemostcontentiousissuesinthenegotiationsontransferanddevelopmentofclimate-friendlytechnol-ogyconcernstheroleoftheintellectualpropertyrights(IPRs).DevelopingcountrieshavearguedthatIPRshindertechnologytransferandcalledforthecreationofinternationalmechanismstopurchaseIPRsforkey

technologiesandlicensingpolicies.Developedcountries,ontheotherhand,stressthatIPRsarenecessarytopromotetechnologyinnovationanddonotsupportrelaxingtheIPRregimes.

Technology under the Copenhagen Accord

IntheCopenhagenAccord,establishmentofaTechnol-ogyMechanismisproposedtoacceleratetechnologydevelopmentandtransferinsupportofactiononadapta-tionandmitigationthatwillbeguidedbyacountry-driv-enapproachandbebasedonnationalcircumstancesandpriorities.


NegotiationsontechnologyintheAWG-LCAandlateroninthedraftinggroupundertheCOPinCopenhagenmadesignificantprogressinnarrowingthenumerousoptionsdowntothemostcriticalissues.TheCOPtextisverycomprehensiveanditshouldnottakemuchtimetofinalise.Itcontainsalistofactionsthatwouldbeeligibleforsupportunderthetechnologymechanism,including,amongothers:

• Developmentandenhancementofendogenouscapacitiesandtechnologiesofdevelopingcoun-tries,includingcooperativeresearch,development,anddemonstrationprogrammes;

• Deploymentanddiffusionofenvironmentally-soundtechnologiesandknow-howtodevelopingcountries;

• Increasedpublicandprivateinvestmentintechnologydevelopment,deployment,diffusion,andtransfer;

• Deploymentofsoftandhardtechnologiesforimplementationofadaptationandmitigationactions;

• Improvedclimatechangeobservationsystemsandrelatedinformationmanagement;

• Strengtheningofnationalsystemsofinnovationandtechnologyinnovationcentres;and

• Developmentandimplementationofnationaltechnologyplansformitigationandadaptation.

7. enhanceD action on technology Development anD transfer


issUe ProPosals iN the coP Draft text coPeNhageN accorD

mechanisms for scaling up of develop-ment and transfer of technology

proposes establishment of a technology mechanism, comprised of:- A technology Executive Committee - A Climate technology Centre and network

proposes establishment of a technology mechanism

governance arrangements for the mechanism

to be developed:- Full mandate, composition and modalities for

the operation of the technology Executive Committee and the Climate technology Centre

not specified

activities to be supported identifies a list of activities eligible for support guided by a country-driven approach and based on national circumstances and priorities

linkage with finance - technology Executive Committee to provide information on the financial arrangements

- provides guidance for funding

technology identified among areas for financial support. no detail provided.

intellectual Property rights not resolved. A number of options:- no reference to iprs- range of options on how iprs can be

addressed

not addressed

table 8: enhanced action on technology: cop text vs. copenhagen accord

Outstanding issues

OnecontentiousissuethatwasnotresolvediswhetherpurchasingofthelicencesandotherIPRissuesshouldbeincludedamongtheeligibleactivities.Mostoftheoptionsproposedinthecourseofthenegotiationsarestillinthetext.

Governancearrangementsforthetechnologymecha-nism–includingthefullmandate,compositionandmodalitiesfortheoperationoftheTechnologyExecutiveCommitteeandtheClimateTechnologyCentre–alsoneedtobedetermined.


Asnotedabove,theCOPtextcontainsalistofactionsthatwouldbeeligibleforsupportunderthetechnologymechanism,onwhichnodisagreementwasregisteredapartfromoneitem(purchasingoflicences).Thislistcanbeusedbyhostcountriesanddevelopmentagenciestoguidesupportintheinterim,untilacomprehensivedecisionontechnologyisadoptedbytheCOP.

SincetechnologydevelopmentandtransferwasidentifiedintheCopenhagenAccordasoneoftheeligibleareasforthefinancialsupport,itseemsthereisasufficientbasistomoveaheadwithimplementationonthebasisofthefast-startfinancingthathasalreadybeenpledged.Inthiscontext,therecognitionoftheimportanceofacountry-drivenapproachandofthenationalcircumstanc-esandprioritiesintheAccordissignificantfordevelopingcountries.


TheCopenhagenconferencefellshortofacomprehen-siveagreementonafutureframeworkonclimatechange.ItdidhowevermakeprogressbothintermsofidentifyingthekeypointsofapotentialpoliticalconsensusonthefundamentalissuesforthefutureagreementthroughtheCopenhagenAccordandintermsofclarifyingfurtherimportanttechnicalpointsrelatedtotheimplementationoftheenhancedactiononmitigation,adaptation,technology,andfinance.Furthermore,theconferencedeliveredacommitmentfromdevelopedcountriestoprovidesignificantfinancetosupportactionsindevelop-ingcountriesandfacilitatedpoliticalcommitmentfromdevelopedcountriesonemissionreductionpledgesandfromdevelopingcountriesonNAMAs.

TheseachievementsprovideagoodbasisforadvancingthenegotiationsundertheUNFCCCtowardsthenextclimatechangeconferencetobeheldon29November-10December2010inMexico.TheanalysisinthisdocumentshowsthatifPartiesweretotaketheCopenhagenAccordasoverarchingpoliticalguidanceonthecrunchissues,thetechnicalnegotiationsundertheAWG-KPandAWG-LCAcouldbesignificantlyadvancedandthetextsfinalisedmorequickly,whiletakingintoaccounttheconcernsofthosecountrieswhichcouldnotagreetotheAccordinCopenhagen.

Table9summarisesthekeyoutcomes,aswellastheoutstandingissues,foreachofthemainelementsofthefutureframeworkandthemainimplicationsfordevelop-ingcountries.ThemostsignificantoutcomesfortheimplementationofactionindevelopingcountriesconcernthefinancialcommitmentandthepoliticalcommitmenttolaunchtheREDD-plusandtechnologymechanisms.Moreover,agreementonthetreatmentoftheMRVissueforNAMAs,dependingonwhethertheyareself-financedorsupported,hasallowedmanydevelopingcountriesthathadreservationstomoveaheadwiththeirself-financedNAMAssincetheCopenhagenconference.

ThedrafttextundertheConvention,inparticularontheprinciplesandpriorityactionsforeachofthekeyareas,providessufficientguidanceforstartingimplemen-tationoffast-startactionindevelopingcountriesonmitigation,adaptation,andtechnologydevelopmentandtransfer,sothatnotimeislostinwaitingforthenegotia-tionstodeliveracomprehensiveagreement.

Atthesametime,anumberofissuesthathavedirectimplicationsfortheimplementationofactionsindevelop-ingcountriesstillneedtoberesolved.Inparticular,theinstitutionalarrangementsforfinance,includinggovern-ancearrangementsandproceduresforprioritisation,allocation,anddisbursementoffunding–bothamongandwithinthekeyissueareas–needtobedevelopedandagreed.Itisalsounclearhowthefundingalreadycommit-tedbydevelopedcountrieswillbeallocatedbetweenthekeyissueareas.WhileitwasnotedintheCopenhagenAccordthatfast-startfinanceapproachingUSD30billionin2010-2012wouldbebalancedbetweenmitigationandadaptation,itisnotclearwhethertheUSD100billionperannumcommittedforthelongertermwouldalsoincludeadaptationand,ifnot,howandhowmuchfundingwillbeprovidedforadaptationinthemid-andlong-term.

WithmanycountrieshavingformallysupportedtheCopenhagenAccord,therearegoodprospectsforadvanc-ingthenegotiationsthisyear.However,negotiatorsstillneedtoovercomethedamagecausedbythelackofagreementinCopenhagen.SignificanteffortswillbeneededonallsidesforrebuildingtrustamongtheParties.Someobserversalsonotedthat,inthiscontext,thepaceandthesuccessoftheinternationalnegotiationswilldependtoalargeextentonhowfastandeffectivelydevelopedcountriesfollowthroughontheirfinancialcommitmentsmadeinCopenhagentosupportfast-startactionindevelopingcountries.

8. conclusions: implications for implementation of climate action


issUe Progress achieVeD iN coPeNhageN

oUtstaNDiNg issUes imPlicatioNs for DeVeloPiNg coUNtries

shared vision - political commitment- temperature goal - Assessment of implementation in 2015

- global goal for emission reductions- peaking year for global

emissions

- Copenhagen Accord is on the lower end of ambition

- 2oC goal: associated high adverse impacts

- review in 2015 for 1.5oC

mitigation by developed countries

- Bottom-up pledges by Annex i parties- Basis for advancing negotiations

- Joint target for Annex i countries- Legal nature of targets/compliance

- Demand for CDm credits- Level of reductions affects climate

impacts

mitigation actions by develop-ing countries (Namas)

- most political issues on nAmA resolved- guidance on the nature of actions- principles for mrv of nAmA- registry for matching nAmAs with

support- pledges for nAmA made

- types of actions eligible for support- procedure for matching nAmAs with

support - mrv guidelines- Eligibility for carbon crediting - CDm & nAmAs

- Basis for supporting nAmAs as part of fast-start finance

- Low-carbon development strate-gies

- Assessments to determine nAmAs - Capacity-building for mrv systems

reDD-plus - Establishment of rEDD-plus mechanism- Cop text almost ready - principles for implementation - Actions that host countries should

undertake - Commitment on finance

- role for market finance- Sub-national measures- governance arrangements- Amount of financing to be allocated,

although uSD 3.5billion was pledged as initial support over the next 2 years

- Clarity on what is necessary to participate in rEDD-plus

- Can start preparation for implementation

- Financing will be provided

action on adaptation - principles for adaptation action- List of priority activities - Enhancement of regional cooperation - political commitment to launch frame-

work and provide finance

- institutional arrangements - Loss and damage

- Commitment to support developing countries

- one of the main areas for fast-start finance

- Adaptation actions in the Cop text can guide fast-start action

financing and its governance - Amount of finance to be provided - Suggestion on institutional arrange-

ments (Copenhagen green Climate Fund and High-Level panel on sources of funding)

- Decision on institutional arrange-ments

- Ensuring predictability/ generation of funds

- Share of financing for various focus areas

- Finance committed for support- Fast-start financing likely through

the existing institutions- gEF remains the operational entity - Cop text can guide fast-track

finance - High Level panel could start on

interim basis

technology development and transfer

- most issues agreed- mechanism to be established- List of eligible activities

- iprs- governance, incl. full mandate,

composition and modalities for technology Executive Committee and Climate technology Centre

- List of eligible actions for support can guide fast-start action

- Country-driven approach , national circumstances/priorities

table 9: implications of the copenhagen conference for developing countries


1. The Bali Action Plan, Decision1/CP.13.2. The Copenhagen Accord,AdvancedUneditedVersion,

http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/application/pdf/cop15_cph_auv.pdf

3. ́The Bali Road Map: Key Issues Under Negotiation´,UNDPEnvironment&EnergyGroup,UNDP2008.

4. ReportoftheAdHocWorkingGrouponFurtherCommitmentsforAnnexIPartiesundertheKyotoProtocolonitstenthsession,heldinCopenhagenfrom7to15December2009,FCCC/KP/AWG/2009/17.

5. ReportoftheAdHocWorkingGrouponLong-termCooperativeActionundertheConventiononitseighthsession,heldinCopenhagenfrom7to15December2009,FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/17.

6. WorkundertakenbytheConferenceofthePartiesatitsfifteenthsessiononthebasisofthereportoftheAdHocWorkingGrouponLong-termCooperativeActionundertheConvention,FCCC/CP/2010/2.

7. Earth Negotiations Bulletin,SummaryoftheCopenhagenClimateChangeConference:7-19December2009,Vol.12No.459,Tuesday,22December2009.Onlineathttp://www.iisd.ca/climate/cop15/

8. “Climate Change Mitigation Negotiations, With an Emphasis on Options for Developing Countries’ byHaraldWinkler,EnergyResearchCentreUniversityOfCapeTown,inTheBaliRoadMap:KeyIssuesUnderNegotiation,UNDP2008.

9. Comparability of Annex I Emission Reduction Pledges, byKellyLevinandRobBradley,WorkingPaperFeb-ruary2010,WRI(http://pdf.wri.org/working_pa-pers/comparability_of_annex1_emission_reduc-tion_pledges_2010-02-01.pdf )

10. AppendixII-NationallyappropriatemitigationactionsofdevelopingcountryParties,athttp://unfccc.int/home/items/5265.php

11. “Adaptation to climate change: The new challenge for development in the developing world”,byDr.E.LisaF.Schipper,StockholmEnvironmentInstitute;MariaPazCigarán,LibélulaCommunication,EnvironmentandDevelopment,Peru;andDr.MerylynMcKenzieHedger,ClimateChangeInstituteofDevelopmentStudiesattheUniversityofSussex,in´TheBaliRoadMap:KeyIssuesUnderNegotiation´,UNDP2008.

12. Assessing the costs of adaptation to climate change: A review of the UNFCCC and other recent estimates, byM.Parryetal,InternationalInstituteforEnviron-mentandDevelopment,August2009.

13. TheBuenosAiresProgrammeofWorkonAdapta-tionandResponseMeasures,Decision1/CP.10.

14. “Negotiations on additional investment and financial flows to address climate change in developing countries” byErikHaites,MargareeConsultants,Inc.in´TheBaliRoadMap:KeyIssuesUnderNegotiation´,UNDP2008.

15. Copenhagen´s Climate Finance Promise,IIEDBriefingNote,February2009.

16. WorldBank(2006)Clean Energy and Development: Towards an Investment Framework.http://siteresourc-es.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/Documenta-tion/20890696/DC2006-0002(E)-CleanEnergy.pdf.

17. OxfamInternational(2007)Adapting to Climate Change: What’s needed in poor countries, and who should pay,http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/adapting%20to%20climate%20change.pdf

18. UNDP2007/2008HumanDevelopmentReport,Fighting climate change: Human solidarity in a divided world.http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-2008/

19. UNFCCC(2007),Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change.http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/application/pdf/background_paper.pdf.

references

For further information:

veerle vandeweerdDirectorunDp Environment & Energy group304 East 45th Streetroom FF-982new york, ny 10017Email: [email protected]: +1 (212) 906 5020

© Copyright united nations Development programme, February 2010. All rights reserved.

the outcomes of copenhagen - indiaenvironmentportal...the outcomes of copenhagen: the negotiations...

Documents