the oresund region2

7/29/2019 The Oresund Region2

1/31

THE RESUND REGION SIX YEARS WITH THE BRIDGE

Richard Ek

The Department of Service Management

Lund University, Campus Helsingborg

Box 882

S-251 08 Helsingborg

Sweden

[email protected]

Towards a New Nordic Regionalism? Conference arranged by the

Nordic Network of the Regional Studies Association in Balestrand,Norway, 4-5 May 2006

First Draft

1


2/31

Introduction

In July 2000 the bridge between Copenhagen and Malm in the south ofSweden was inaugurated. The bridge was a prerequisite of the realization

of the resund region, a cross-border region politically delimited to

include Sjlland and Bornholm in Denmark and the Swedish county

Skne (figure 1). Of course, the vision of an integrated resund region

goes way back in time (a hundred years, fifty years, fifteen years,

depending on the criteria emphasized)1 but it has all the time been a

mutual understanding among the region-building actors that the resund

region would really exist first when a fixed link was materialized in

resund. The 1st of July 2000 was the day when the region stepped out

into the real world, leaving visions, dreams and romantic notions of

bridges behind (SDS 2000.07.01). Since that day the rate of the regional

integration has been discussed as if regional integration could be

measured on a scale or indexed (there is actually an resundintegration index). Even if the regional integration, beginning with the

inauguration of the resund Bridge, often has been argued to be a

fundamental, even paradigmatic societal change,2 the discussion the six

last years has been narrowly instrumental and technocratic in character.

Even simplistic. How fast forward goes the integration? Not fast enough!

In this paper I argue that one way to characterize the public discourse on

and region building practices in the now six-year-old resund region is

through the concept of simplicity. The resund region process is to a

high degree regarded by its advocates as simple in the sense of not

1 For a historical account in English, see Boye 1999: 84-141.2 It is not only an evolution, but a revolution, and the changes that are boundto come can hardly be imagined (Sven Landelius, managing director for theresund Consortium in SDS 1999.06.18) [Det r inte bara tal om en evolution,utan om en revolution, och de frndringar som kommer kan vi knappastfrestlla oss fullt ut].

2


3/31

being complicated or complex (but not in any way in the sense of being

gullible or feeble-minded). It is regarded as a difficult process, as the

region builders are up against sinewy national institutions and

regulations as well as intangible national cultural differences. It isregarded as a heterogeneous process as it involves a multitude of

different actors (even if the actors that set the tone are quite few) from

local football clubs to the Chambers of Commerce. But still, the

integration process is regarded as simple, imagined as similar to an

organic process and possible to fulfil through an almost causal formula:

better infrastructure, communications and transportation higher

mobility and interaction regional integration. Here, the simplicity of

the discourse of the resund region is discussed based on two aspects of

region building. Firstly, that the integration is regarded as politically

simple, since there is no disagreement among the politicians about the

regional idea per se. This means that the resund region is not

considered to be a political project, an apprehension with political and

democratic consequences that will be discussed below. Secondly, thegeographical imagination of the resund region is simplistic (perhaps

also starry-eyed) in the sense that it is not sensitive towards its intra-

regional political geographies. As a consequence, intra-regional tensions

are not addressed and handled in a thorough way and are instead

popping up as (geographically based) disputes around specific projects

and co-operations.

The paper is divided into five sections, including this introduction. Next

section consists of a recapitulation of the resund integration process so

far, that is, from year 2000 until today (spring of 2006). Without trying to

answer whether the integration is a failure so far or not, this section will

through snapshots discuss and comment different integration

variables highlighted in the public discourse. In the third section, theresund region as a political project that do not seem to be regarded as

3


4/31

political by the leading region-building actors (many of them political

organizations) is discussed (integration regarded as politically simple).

Following Slavoj ieks discussion on the post-political, I argue in this

section that the resund region (and maybe other cross-border regionsas well) are managed by management technologies rather than

governed by a political polity. This gliding from polity to management at

the same time constitutes a tendency towards political simplicity. In the

fourth section, the argument that integration seems to be regarded as

geographically simple is presented. The dominant geographical

imagination about regions in Europe today gives a simplified picture of

Europes political and economic geographies, emphasizing centripetal

forces on the behalf of centrifugal ones. Since the complexity of the

resund region is not addressed in the region-building process, conflicts

and disagreements rise instead around specific issues in the process of

the managing of the region. One such example is highlighted in the

section, the organization of hosting the Americas Cup in Malm in July

and August 2005. Finally, in the conclusion, a rather bleak picture of thedemocratic potential of regions, at least the resund region, is put

forward.

Snapshots3 From a Regions First Years

The resund region is a quite well researched cross-border region,

especially prior to the inauguration of the bridge.4 In public discourse, the

3 The recollection of a regions first years can be presented in many ways. HereI have chosen to focus on the public discussion that ran high especially duringthe time of the bridges birthdays (one year with the bridge, two years withthe bridge etc.).4 References in English include Lyck & Berg 1997, Andersen 1999, Maskell &Trnqvist 1999, Jerneck 1999, Matthiessen 2000, Berg 2001, Bucken-Knapp2001, Linnros & Hallin 2001, Ceccato & Haining 2004, Jensen & Richardson2004, Stber 2004.

4


5/31

resund-talk increased to a crescendo in the summer 2000 when the

bridge was officially declared opened under celebratory conditions

(primarily adapted to look good on the TV-screen since the main target

was 30 seconds on CNN, but nevertheless with a good public influx).Thereafter, a kind of devotional hangover seemed to seize the regional

project and the region-building actors started to quietly observe the most

tangible measure of integration at hand at that moment: the number of

vehicles that drove over the bridge (easily measured since it is a toll-

bridge) and the number of people using the resund trains to travel to

the other side. The owner of the bridge, the resund Consortium (owned

jointly in its turn by the Swedish and Danish states) had made forecasts

regarding the traffic flow after the opening of the bridge, and after some

time it was evident that those forecasts had been far to optimistic. When

the resund Consortium calculated that close to on average 12 000

vehicles should cross the bridge each day the first year

(resundskonsortiet 1999), the actual traffic in 2001 was on average

7000 vehicles each day. Thereafter the traffic has increased each yearand in 2005 the actual traffic had catched up with the traffic forecasts

done six years before (and doubled in relation to the traffic in 2001 (SDS

2006.03.16)). At the same time, people who traveled by train increased

from 4.2 million 2001 to X.X million 2005 (SDS 2005.07.01,). Even if less

and less people travel by ferry over resund (primarily between

Helsingborg and Helsingr in Northern resund) there is no doubt that

the traffic has increased (SDS 2005.03.10).

Nevertheless, from the start different voices in the public discourse has

argued that the bridge is not used as effective as it could be. Being a toll

bridge after all, it can cost up to 25 Euro to drive a car single journey

over the resund Bridge. But, as the argument goes, if the bridge was

free to use, the integration process should be sped up. Here, the financialagreement between the Danish state and Swedish state regarding the

5


6/31

bridge, its repayment conditions, etc. has been pointed out as an

immanent problem (with a clear state-level dimension, as the two central

states are accused of preventing growth on a (trans-) regional scale) (KvP

2004.10.09, SDS 2005.06.29). The central regional conflict dimension isexplicit in other areas as well. Actually, the regions first six years is in a

sense a declaration of the tough persistence of national institutions. The

governments of Sweden and Denmark have been in constant

negotiations around issues like how the trans-border commuter should

be taxed (in the country he or she lives in or works in) and differences in

social security systems and labor-market policies (SDS 2002.06.17). This

where issues which were supposed to be solved quite easily back in

1999-2000, and some steps towards a harmonization between the two

national systems has been taken,5 but a lot of big issue remain to be

solved. In the frustration that has turned up, the region-building actors

blame the Danish and Swedish governments (SDS 2003.03.30,

2004.09.30, 2004.10.02) while the two national governments blame each

other.

Besides that the financial issues between Denmark and Sweden have

been unexpectedly difficult to solve, region-building actors has generally

lamented over that politicians on state level have not engaged

sufficiently in the whereabouts of the resund region (SDS 2004.09.16).

A special resund Minister has been called for repeatedly (Metro

resund 2005.09.06). In Sweden, the geographical distance between

Skne and Stockholm has been put forward as a reason for this, and in

Denmark has the territorial and administrative structural reform that was

initiated a couple of years ago (and will be implemented in January 2007)

5 In 2003, a taxation agreement was reached where it was decided that peoplewho live in Sweden and work in Denmark pay their taxes in Denmark, but thatSweden at the same time is compensated financially (SDS 2003.11.05). Thiswas an agreement that was questioned by actors on the Swedish side thatmeant that it would only benefit the Danish economy (SDS 2003.10.30).

6


7/31

drawn political interest away from the resund cooperation project (BT

2004.06.27). But not only some politicians seem to be not interested in

the resund region. Quite a small part of the regions companies showed

initially an explicit interest in resund cooperation (SDS 2001.05.02). Butnevertheless, the interest has increased, however from a low level, and

for instance the number of Swedish owned companies in Denmark are

higher than ever (SDS 2003.12.22). In a survey made in 2005, about half

of the companies that was questioned responded that the bridge had had

a positive influence on theirs businesses (SDS 2005.07.02a). Whether the

increased interaction and cooperation (if that is what defines integration)

between companies in Skne and Sjlland are primarily a result of

regional factors and imperatives or rather a general internationalization

of business can be discussed in length.6 Of course, the region-building

actors use whatever statistical results, success stories and arguments at

hand that are useful for them, which is hardly surprising. But interpreting

tendencies in the region in a specific way that favors an already

established image (we have integration, but not in a pace quickenough) and blocking other interpretations (increased interaction is not

necessarily the same as integration) seems to me to be a good way to

create a discourse of regional integration that is simplistic in its

character.

However, the established image of the integration process (we have

integration, but it should go faster) held by region-building actors is not

as coherent as it may seem at first glance. For some debaters, the

integration was a utopia (due to familiar arguments as to high toll-bridge

fees) while other has argued that there is a silent bottom-up integration

(SDS 2005.07.02b). The Swedish ambassador in Denmark argued for

6 According to Lennart Berntson, historian at Roskilde University, the size of thecommuter traffic is a result of how Danish and Swedish states of the marketand business trends are related to each other rather than an integration rate(SDS 2003.06.25).

7


8/31

instance that the integration goes on but that the development will take

longer time7 (2005.07.01b). In this reasoning, as in the public discourse

in general, integration is given a process meaning (integration as

something that goes on) and is at the same time imagined as some kindof end-station (when the integration is complete). Whatever defines

complete integration is a source of interpretation, but to Ilmar Reepalu,

the chairman of the city executive board in Malm, it is the day when the

traffic over the resund Bridge between Malm and Copenhagen is as

intensive as on the freeways between Malm and Lund and between

Copenhagen and Helsingr (SDS 2004.12.24). Again, regional integration

is on an equal footing with interaction in a region (the region as an

absolute space, a container of society, in itself a simplistic

characterization of space).

At the same time, within the public discourse of regional integration in

resund, the cultural differences between the two countries have been

highlighted (especially in connection to the bridges birthday). When thebridge was three years old Danish academics and journalists argued that

they where quite indifferent towards the bridge (SDS 2003.06.20,

2003.06.22). According to Tine Eiby, journalist on the Danish

Weekendavisen (SDS 2003.06.20):

For the citizens in Copenhagen, the bridge has primarily meant that

they are meeting Swedish-speaking people everywhere in the central

parts of the Danish capital. The retail trade is enthusiastic. But

generally you have to admit that people in Copenhagen speak about

the Swedish visitors with a slight irritation. And it hurts me, because I

know exactly how it feels. I recognize it from my own shopping in

rkelljunga. You notice how the locals sigh at us Danes. And thinks

7 Utvecklingen tar lngre tid.

8


9/31

something like: Here they come again. Having vacation all the time

and keeps their money tight8

In a similar vein, ethnologist Orvar Lfgren argues that the flow of one-day tourists can be more irritating than integrating (SDS 2003.06.11). To

him, the increased interaction increases the need to stereotype the other

(on the other side of resund). Since Swedes and Danes are quite alike,

it is the small differences that are important (like the Danes wears

jogging suit when they are visiting the local pub). Nevertheless, the

small stereotyped differences works self-reassuring (Swedes dress

themselves better, we do not wear jogging suit when on the local pub).

Apart from legal and cultural differences in the resund, the increased

interaction does have material and constant consequences. The resund

Consortium work actively to get people to live and work on different

sides of the sound. Integration in this sense seems to imply a constant

crossing of the sound in peoples everyday life (wake up, bring children

to school, go to work, shop something on the way back home after work,

drive the children to sport activities etc.). The resund should be crossed

at least twice each day in a plausible time-geographical diagram (and not

just something you do from time to time, visit to a concert etc.). The

resund Consortium therefore for instance help real estate agents to sell

real estates in Skne to Danes (SDS 2006.03.19a), and even if the house

prizes in Malm has increased by 78% from year 2000 to 2006, they arestill much cheaper then the house prizes in the Copenhagen area. As a

consequence, the migration from Sjlland to Skne has increased

8 Fr kpenhamnarna har Bron vl frst och frmst betytt att man mtersvensktalande verallt i de centrala delarna av den danska huvudstaden.Detaljhandeln r begeistrad. Men generellt sett mste man nog erknna attkpenhamnarna talar om de svenska gsterna med viss irritation. Och detplgar mig fr jag vet precis hur det knns. Jag knner igen det frn mina egnashoppingrundor i rkelljunga. Dr mrker man hur lokalbefolkningen suckarver oss danskar. Och tnker ngot i stil med: Dr kommer de igen. Harsemester stndigt och jmt och hller i pengarna.

9


10/31

fivefold between 2000-2006 (SDS 2006.03.19b) and between 2004 and

2006 the number of Danish income-tax return forms sent to habitants in

Skne increased from 6 000 to 16 000 (SDS 2006.04.119).

However, even this seemingly more tangible integration variable

(migration) can be discussed whether it implies a genuine regional

integration. As a Danish couple answered about the thought of and

possibility to move to Malm: If we should be honest, we should not be

interested if it was not for the nearness to Copenhagen and the much

lower house prizes10 (SDS 2006.03.19c). Among the questions asked

about housing in Scania by Danes, a majority seems to be about how

close the house or apartment is to the freeway and the train station back

to Copenhagen (ibid.). But on the other hand, in the visions of the

resund region it is very much imagined and presented as a traffic- and

infrastructure region, a regional monotopia constituted by functional non-

places of transport and communication.11

From Polity to Management, Towards the Post-Political Cross-

Border Region.

9 About half of these were sent to Danes living in Skne and half to Swedesworking in Sjlland (SDS 2006.04.11).10 Ska vi vara rliga s hade vi inte varit intresserade alls, om det inte var frnrheten till Kpenhamn och de betydligt lgre priserna.11 Monotopia is an analytical term presented by Jensen and Richardson (2005),indicating a conceptualization of Europe as a transnational territory organizedand physically arranged in order to gain frictionless mobility and highestpossible speed in transport and communication. Non-places (Aug 1995: 77-78)then, is the places of a hypermodernity, where: people are born in the clinicand die in the hospital, where transit points and temporary abodes areproliferating under luxurious or inhuman conditionswhere a dense network ofmeans of transport which are also inhabited spaces is developinga worldsurrendered to solitary individuality, to the fleeting, the temporary andephemeral(Aug 1995: 78, compare Relphs (1976) notion ofplacelessness).

10


11/31

The history of the social production of the resund region revolves

around (besides the focalization on the fixed link) the establishment of

region-building organizations, inter-organizational co-operations through

networks and the implementation of projects that in some sense promoteregional integration. Actually, a distinction between organizations,

networks and projects has not always been easy to make, as several

organizations are formed as networks and as projects has

metamorphosed into organizations/networks. As has been stated

elsewhere,12 the inter-organizational structure, or maze, of new and old13

actors working to create an resund cross-border region is clearly

adapted to fulfill the conditions for funding from the EU, primarily from

the INTERREG programmes. To just give one example of the organizational

maze, or haze (particularly from a democratic point of view, see below),

the branding project Birth of a Region was initiated by the resund

Committee14 in April 1997 (together with at least 15 private, public and

quasi-public organizations) in collaboration with the London-based

marketing/branding company Wolff-Ohlins.15

The project was financedpartly by INTERREG IIA funding. Two years later, a brand-book was

presented to the public (on the theme the Human Capital). At the same

time, Wolff-Ohlins recommended that a more tangible regional identity

should be anchored among the public, and a network-based organization,

resund Identity Network, was established in order to work towards that

goal in the year 2000.

12 See further Perkmann 2002 and 2003.13 New in the sense that they were obviously created in an resund regionalintegration context (for instance Medicon Valley Acadeny, resund FoodNetwork, Copenhagen Malm Port). Old in the sense that they existed beforethe attempts to create a CBR (cross-border region) in the resund, for instancelocal and regional municipalities, regional chambers of commerce and localplace marketing organizations like Wonderful Copenhagen and CopenhagenCapacity.14

The resund Committee consists of political representatives from regional and local authoritiesfrom both sides of the border and a secretariat that is responsible for carrying out the daily work.15 See further Hospers 2004 and Pedersen 2004.

11


12/31

At the same time, even if the amount of organizations, networks and

projects can be seen as staggering,16 the really important and active

organizations are quite few, maybe around 20 or so [check who is linked

to whom on the Internet]. If these organizations are studied a bit further,it is quickly revealed that they are connected to each other not just by

co-operation but by being represented in each other boards, advisory

boards etc. A study of the individuals involved discloses that the

organizational core of the regional integration process revolves around

quite a few leading politicians and civil servants (Ek 2003: 38-41). This

close involvement and centralization increases the isomorphic

mechanisms working in this organizational field17 and crystallizes a self-

acclaimed regional elite (Lovering 1995 & 1999) that all know each

other, professionally as well as in a personal sense. An important

contributory cause to the establishment of these tight organizational and

personal ties was the many conferences in the 1990s. To Christian

Tangkjr, these, at least a hundred region-building conferences and

workshops (on themes like When vision becomes reality andChallenge: resund) could be described as a travelling road show

(Tangkjr 2000). These numerous conferences are to P. O. Berg another

indication that the resund region to a high degree was evoked and

incanted, a sort of social alchemy that brought the region to life (Berg

2000: 82).

These attempts to dream up a region are quite typical for its time, the

late 1990s. Strategic long-term planning increased and was regarded

more and more important in the context of deepened European

integration. The more ad hoc based planning philosophy of the 1980s

was to some degree replaced by a more complex planning philosophy

and planning policy, especially regarding a sensitiveness regarding16 According to Berg (2000: 60), more than 500 organizations had been involvedin the production of the region.17 See Meyer & Rowan 1977, DiMaggio & Powell 1983, Scott 1991.

12


13/31

spatial scale. Different national and regional planning policies were

explicitly related towards the EU (Healey 1998). At the same time, a

more ambitious and active planning apparatus crystallized on a EU-level,

manifested through documents like the ESDP (Faludi 2004). This returnof strategic planning was not, however, a return to the ambitious, spatial

science based planning of the 1960s (like locational analysis) (Barnes

2003) but more of a corporate management-like planning, management

planning, a discursive practice that incorporated a business-like set of

concepts (like vision), tools (SWOT-analysis, bench marking) and

(growth above all) philosophies.

In the case of the resund region, the geographical vision of a

competitive resund cross-border region became a semantic magnet, a

word-driven process that almost got a life on its own.18 Right before the

opening of the bridge, this geographical vision almost seemed to have a

strong narrative control of the organizations involved in the region-

building process. Whatever circumstance, the vision about the resundas an integrated trans-border region that would oust Stockholm and

Berlin was incanted. Even if the vision worked as a message towards the

regions inhabitants (you should like this region!, see below) and a place

marketing phrase in general, in retrospection, it also seemed to work

autocommunicative (Luhmann 1995). The different resund

organizations communicated primarily with themselves rather than to

the public sphere in the region, and in the process, legitimated their own

existence (Falkheimer 2004: 205).

However, in order to be able to gather around a vision that every

organization could accept, the vision became by necessity a simplistic

one, reduced to a set of rhetoric catch-all slogans like increased

18 For a discussion regarding the importance of visioning in planning, see Shipley & Newkirk 1998& 1999, Shipley 2000 & 2002.

13


14/31

competitiveness, enlarged labor market, unique possibilities and

the most dynamic region in the Europe of the regions. Seemingly an

inclusive vision (come join us!), the vision of the resund was actually

excluding, a rhetoric tool that colonized the future by claim that this isthe only way towards development and progression (Ek 2003: 102). Due

to its need to be simplistic, the geographical vision of the resund region

left out more difficult and complex issues regarding democracy,

transparency, social and spatial equality and the future citizen of the

region. Especially, in order to keep the geographical vision simplistic, the

resund citizen was given an instrumental and obedient rather than a

participatory and active role.

The instrumental role given the citizen of the region is of course a result

of the management planning practices and philosophies. As the

formulations of vision in companies can be seen as a leadership

technique that disciplines the employed, the geographical visions

created by the resund region-building organizations had a distinctdisciplinary function. And as according to critical management theory

approaches (Parker 2002, Alvesson & Willmott 2003) the employees are

primarily resources for the companies (the realisation of the company

managements goals and ambitions and the shareholders wishes and

demands), the management planning practices and philosophies indicate

a view of the regions citizens as resources that can fulfil the vision. In

order to fulfil the vision, the citizens should preferably (besides accept

the vision per se, and become marketing ambassadors for their

region (Kotler et al 1993)) be a part of the implementation of the region

with their bodies, that is, travel across the whole region, especially over

the resund, in their everyday life (as the region is constituted by

regional and trans-border interaction, leading to integration etc.

according tot the formula mentioned above).

14


15/31

The instrumental view on the citizen is also reflected in the selection of

integration stimulating project focused on culture, history and language.

Here, a multitude of INTERREG based projects have been crucial. These

projects can be broadly categorized into three groups. Projects that aimto strengthen a regional identity and a regional imagined community

(stressing aspects like the close affinity between Swedish and Danish

culture, tradition and language, and common historical ties (Scania was a

part of Denmark until the middle of the 17th Century)), projects that

direct peoples awareness of the regional benefits regarding societal

utilities (larger supply of employment and education possibilities) and

projects that allude to peoples need for hedonism, pleasure and

recreation (a regional future implies enlarged supply of entertaining and

cultural activities).

The attempts to create a regional identity are central here. The

characters of this identity are based on ethnicity, culture, historical ties,

(almost a) common language, in large essential factors. People shouldpreferably have a regional rather than a national identity, have an

resund identity above all. Here, the focus on language, history and

culture, especially directed towards children and young people, shows

parallels to how national identities was created and institutionalised in

the 19th Century. The regional imagined community is, in sum, based on

ethnicity and culture rather than civilian or political membership (with

implies that it is an obvious exclusive dimension present, the resund

citizen, in the place marketing material for instance, is strikingly often a

white Scandinavian, even if both Malm and Copenhagen are the most

multicultural (and in Malms case, segregated) urban agglomeration in

Sweden and Denmark). The resund citizen is usually described as an

ancestor to the Vikings, Christian and a spokesperson for the

Scandinavian welfare state model (ironically, since the resund region-building is based on neo-liberal principles and guidelines) (Ek 2003: 184-

15


16/31

190). Often, romantic stories about two people on the either side of the

resund that has fallen in love are highlighted (heterosexual couples

that is) and exposed in media, symbolising the marriage between

Scania and Sjlland. The representation of the resund citizen is never apolitical, actively participating human that, for instance, questions the

motives behind the integration, questions the methods and strategies

chosen by the resund regime, or, argues that it lacks a substantial

social vision that outline a future with less ethical and employment-based

segregation and reduced social and economic inequality.

In a recent study by the political scientists Patrik Hall, Kristian Sjvik and

Ylva Stubbergaard (2005) it is obvious how the civil servants and the

politicians working to create a functional resund region do not regard

the resund project as political, as non-political politics (Hall et al

2003: 83). After interviews with 20 higher civil servants and politicians

Hall et al conclude from the answers they have received that (what the

authors regards as) political questions about democracy, transparencyand public participation are by the interviewed redefined as

administrative or technical issues and that the citizens has been de-

politicised to utility optimizers. The citizens of the region are regarded by

the interviewed as economic individuals rather than members of a

political collective. The idea that the region has to be publicly anchored

(folklig frankring) is not related to democracy, but about identity,

information and the solution of functional problems (Hall et al 2003: 102)

in the eyes of the self-acclaimed regional elite in resund. The resund

citizen is primarily a commuter, consumer and clients in the cross-border

region, that has to be enlightened how much he or she can benefit on

the realization of an integrated region and postfordist trans-border

regional economy (Ek 2003: 199-201, Hall et al 2003: 108).

16


17/31

Writing about the political condition in a more general sense, the

psychoanalytic social thinker Slavoj ieks (1998: 198) that:

we are dealing with another form of the degeneration of thepolitical, postmodernpost-politics, which no longer merely represses

the political, trying to contain it and pacify the return of the

repressed, but much more effectively forecloses itPost-politics

thus emphasizes the need to leave old ideological divisions behind

and confront new issues, armed with the necessary expert knowledge

and free deliberation that takes peoples concrete needs and

demands into account.

To iek, post-politics is characterized as the replacement of conflicts

among global ideological visions with collaboration of enlightened

technocrats (economists, public opinion specialists) and liberal

multiculturalists, via the process of negotiation of interest, a compromise

is reached in the guise of a more or less universal consensus (ibid.). In

order to apply ieks thoughts in the context of this paper, a stronger

clarification has to be made, but the strata of enlightened technocrats

could eventually be likened with the regional elite, knitted together as a

regime of multi-level governance (politicians and civil servants on local,

regional, national and EU-level). This thought will be briefly returned to in

the conclusion.

From an resund that would not become one city, to the

resund as a spatial billiard ball

17


18/31

The discussion about an integration of an resund region (or recity as it

was called then) was evoked in the end of the 1950s and in the

beginning of the 1960s, Torsten Hgerstrand declared some years laterin an interview that recity will never become one city (Tidningen Vi

1967, original emphasis). The recity discussion was in several ways a

predecessor to the region-building process in the 1990s. The discourse

focused on the building of (several) fixed links over the resund, the

importance of infrastructure and transportation, and the cross-border

urban agglomeration as a strong economic competitor to other urban

centers in Northern Europe. Some similarities are evident. Regional

identity, cultural kinship and ethic similarity was not an issue, as it has

been in 1990s and forward. Further, the recity of the 1960s was a

public planning project; private actors and the business life did not have

such a central role in the discussion or in the visioning practice (see

further Ek 2003: 234-261).

Eventually, the recity discourse ran out of steam in the end of the

1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, for several reasons (among

them economic recession in the 1970s and increased environmental

awareness canalized as an outspoken resistance towards the plans to

build both bridges and tunnels over and under resund). One prominent

reason was also, however, that the idea of a strong center, Malm and

Copenhagen, as an engine that should by necessity dominate the

future trans-border recity met a strong resistance among different

actors, especially municipalities and cities in the geographical periphery.

Actually, the history of the resund integration process from the late

1950s and forward is filled with different conflicts within the region, and

among the regime of regional organizations (besides the inter-regionalconflict lines between Copenhagen and Stockholm as geo-economic

18


19/31

rivals in the Baltic Sea Region and between Scania and Stockholm, as a

national centre and periphery based conflict). One intraregional conflict

line could (and perhaps still can) be drawn between Northern

(Helsingborg and Helsingr) and Southern resund (Malm andCopenhagen). Initially, in the 1950s, it was planned that the fixed link

should be build between Helsingr and Helsingborg, but through a

mobilization of support, and arguments, the planned position of a fixed

link was changed, and placed between Malm and Copenhagen (Ek

2003: 86-90).

Another geographically based conflict line could (and can to some degree

still) be drawn between Western and Eastern Scania, at the same time a

centre periphery relationship. The arguments against the idea of a

recity was that Scania should capsize if Copenhagen and Malm

should be allowed to be a strong urban agglomeration. The

development in the Ruhr district, with urban sprawl, pollution and heavy

industries was set up as a warning example, not only by localmunicipalities in East and Northeast Scania, but also by primary regional

organizations like Sknes planeringsinstitut. For instance, the county

governor of Malmhus County argued that: it is untenable to form an

opinion of recity as an administrative unit, and secondly, the region

that relates to the name must be protected from a coherent urban

settlement on both sides of the most beautiful channel in the world. That

would be a pollution of the environment without equal with such an

abnormity of city buildings (SkD 1966.12.21).19

The fear that a realized recity should imply a regional urbanization in

the resund, and that the regional balance should be altered in a not

19 Det r ohllbart att bedma restad som en administrative enhet och fr detandra mste den region som namnet avser bevaras frn en sammanhngandestadsbebyggelse p mse sidor om vrlden vackraste farled. Det vore enmiljfrstrelse utan like med en sdan abnormitet i ttortsbebyggelse.

19


20/31

acceptable way was thus a strong argument in the planning discourse of

resund in the end of the 1960s and even more so in the 1970s. In the

1990s, this state of unrest is still present, and the different geographical

conflict lines can still be drawn, but this is nothing that affects thecontemporary regional discourse, and particularly, is not especially

discussed among the regional actors that are engaged in the integration

process. When in the 1960s the recity vision revolved around ideas

how to organize the territory when it came to societal needs and

functions, and questions regarding regional balance and social equity the

vision of a resund region in the 1990s had much more focus on

economic growth and competitiveness, everything else has been

secondary in importance. Rather than an inward-looking developmental

perspective, the 1990s management planning introduced an outward-

looking competition perspective. The (cross-border) region is not an end

in itself, but a means to secure growth, a concept that is seldom, actually

never, discussed or questioned in the regional resund discourse

(growth to whom, where, at what costs etc.).

As a consequence, the eagerness to keep the regional vision and

integration together has been much more pronounced. Here, rather than

to see the center periphery relationships from an intra-regional

perspective, the center periphery relationship is regarded from an

inter-regional point of view. The center of the resund region is primarily

competing with other centers in other regions, and by a fruitful

collaboration between center and periphery and a mobilization of all

regional resources, the center would be able to compete effectively with

Berlin, Amsterdam and Hamburg, the story goes. If increased inequality

is a necessity, something that is needed in order to rival Berlin, then

increased inequality is something that the periphery will gain from as

well. Europe of the regions has been an geographical imagination thereincreased rivalry and competition between regions has been discursively

20


21/31

framed within a geo-economic logic of grammar, the functional region is

bound to compete for economic lebensraum (Ek 2005). In a sense, there

is a parallel here to how the Europe of the nations was, according to

classic geopolitical thinking (for an overview, see for instance Tuathail1996, ch. 2), bound to compete for political lebensraum.

In order to keep the regional vision simple, not risking the unity of the

regional regime and loose competitiveness because of internal

disagreement, the center periphery relationship that do exist has not

been thoroughly contemplated, but been reformulated as a win-win

situation. But the territorial conflict lines can still be observed as they

are actualized in different circumstances (but never outspoken).

Municipalities in Eastern Scania, market themselves as the front side of

the resund region (which they are regarded from the other side of the

Baltic Sea), Helsingborg and Helsingr cooperate in order to be a mayor

player in the north of the region, and among at least some civil servants

on the Swedish side think that cooperation with Danish organizationsshould be kept to a minimum since they always try to push us around

(higher civil servant, Position Skne).

In the organization of one recent event, the hosting of Malm-Skne

Louis Vetton Acts 6 and 7 of the 32nd Americas Cup Valencia between

the 24th of August and the 4th of September, the latent conflict line

between the center and the periphery in Scania was revealed. To be able

to host the event, Malm and Scania had to bid over competing cities like

Kiel, and offered 20 million Skr. It was decided by the leading politicians

that Position Skne, the common place marketing organization of every

municipality in Scania, should pay this and other costs. In order to do

that, Position Skne had to cut down or skip planned projects all

together. This was tourist and marketing projects that was either aimedto strengthen the resund co-operation or market the periphery against

21


22/31

tourists. The estimated total cost of 40 million Skr was to optimistic, and

the real cost was later calculated to over 100 million Skr. The event was

said to be a major happening that the whole of Scania should benefit

from, but quite quickly an anxiety rose in the periphery that only Malmshould benefit (and perhaps Copenhagen as the closest major city)

among politicians in the peripheral municipalities (Ek forthcoming).

Several politicians in Scania also expressed a discomfort about how the

process had been handled. The initiative came from resund Yacht Club,

an exclusive network that tries to attract different sailing competitions to

Malm, that contacted a few leading regional and Malm-based

politicians. They in there turn decided that Malm and Scania should try

to attract the Americas Cup qualifying match without allow any true

transparency or wider engagement from other political actors in the

region. Not even the management of Position Skne was allowed to have

any say in the process, something that also raised protests from the

periphery, especially from the southern periphery (Ystad) where amarketing campaign about Wallander tourism (after the writer Mankells

crime stories taking place in and around Ystad) aimed for the German

market (where Mankells police crime books are very popular) was

skipped due to Position Sknes new financial situation (Ek, forthcoming).

In the aftermath of the event, including several evaluations that have

been slightly or very critical about how the event was organized and

executed, in no way the center periphery dimension has been

discussed. The promoters of the event have either dismissed the more

critical evaluations that actually treat the center periphery aspect or

admitted that next time we will handle this better. The region is still

regarded as almost singular entity, not the least in the explicit

assumption what is good for the region is good for everyone in theregion and the implicit assumption growth is good for the region, that

22


23/31

is, for everyone in the region. The resund region is regarded as simple

geographically speaking, as containing local and regional actors that in

every situation has an agreement what should be done, how and why, in

the context of regional development. This mean that the complexity ofthe region, and the regional regime are not addressed in the continuous

debate about what way the region should take in the future. Conflicts

and disagreements, and in this case, objections from actors in the

periphery to how specific high profile strategies and projects are decided

and executed, are not treated seriously and sometimes even dismissed

as ignorant and mislead. In a sense, this neglect could be counter

productive when it comes to the work of continue the regional

integration process.

A bleak conclusion

In their very constructive disquisition on making European monotopia,Ole B. Jensen and Tim Richardson discuss the increasingly influential

discursive conceptualization of Europe or the European Union as a

transnational territory organized and physically arranged in order to

obtain frictionless mobility and the highest possible speed in transport

and communication (Jensen & Richardson 2004). Here, mobility is

especially stressed and infrastructure has a special significance in the

political and economic discourses of European integration as in the

European spatial planning and policy discourse. As a consequence, the

importance of a strengthened infrastructure network permeate, even

constitute as its raison dtre, strategic programmes and visionary policy

plans, like INTERREG and ESDP. In the example of the resund region,

focus has been on infrastructure as well, combined with the above-

discussed rather instrumental view on the regional citizen. Jensen andRichardson further discuss, after Weiler 1999, the infranational character

23


24/31

of EU governance. Increasingly large sectors of European policy making

are carried out at meso-governance level, in committees, commissions,

directorates etc. These ways of working have the character of a quite

informal network approach that increases the autonomy being given tothe bureaucracy:

because of its managerial, functional and technocratic bias, [it]

operates outside parliamentary channels, outside party politics. There

is nothing sinister or conspiratorial in infranationalism, but its

processes typically lack transparency and may have low procedural

and legal guaranteesIn general, the classic instruments of controland public accountability are ill-suited to the practices of

infranationalism (Weiler 1999: 284-285).

Since these policy making network contains a complex web of

negotiations between public and other forms of non-public actors, the

decision-making process may be just as opaque and exclusive as

traditional bureaucratic forms (Atkinson 2002: 784). Striving for an

efficient and pragmatic decision-making process, some actors may

actually prefer informality and opaqueness, making European space in

obscure policy spaces, away from the public gaze (Jensen & Richardson

2004: 5).

Again, the cross-border region is at least sometimes a telling example ofthis. In the EU rhetoric, cross-border co-operation is often argued to be a

step towards a higher degree of subsidiarity and a solution to the

democratic deficit, but since the EU has encouraged a consensual and

negotiated procedure in these matters, border policy continues to be

relatively undemocratic with consequences for the EU as a transnational

policy (ODowd 2001: 96). The resund region, at least, fit into this

rather bleak characterization, and following the thereabouts of the

24


25/31

continued regional co-operation and integration process, by living in it, I

really cannot see any tendencies that a change should be on its way.

References

Atkinson, R (2002): The White Paper on European Governance: Implications for

Urban Policy. European Planning Studies 10, 781-792.

Alvesson, M. & Willmott, H. (eds.)(2003): Studying Management Critically.

Sage, London.

Andersen, B. (1999): Danish-Swedish co-operation in the resund region. InBaldersheim, H. & Sthlberg, K (eds.). Nordic Region-Building in a European

Perspective. Ashgate, Aldershot, 75-82.

Aug, M. (1995): Non-Places. Introduction to an Anthropology of

Supermodernity. Verso, London.

Barnes, T. J. (2003): The place of locational analysis: A selective andinterpretive history. Progress in Human Geography27, 69-95.

Berg, P-O (2000): Dreaming up a region? Strategic management as invocation.

Invoking a Transnational Metropolis. The Making of the resund Region. Berg,

P-O.; Linde-Laursen, A. & Lfgren, O. (eds.) Studentlitteratur, Lund, 55-94.

25


26/31

Berg, P-O (2001): The summoning of the resund region. In Czarniawska, B. &

Solli, R. (eds.). Organizing Metropolitan Space and Discourse. Liber, Malm,

175-191.

Berg, P-O.; Linde-Laursen, A. & Lfgren, O. (eds.) (2000): Invoking a

Transnational Metropolis. The Making of the resund Region. Studentlitteratur,

Lund.

Boye, P. (1999): Developing Transnational Industrial Platforms. The Strategic

Conception of the resund Region. School of Economics and Management,

Lund University.

Bucken-Knapp, G. (2001): Just a train-ride away, but still worlds apart:

prospects for the resund region. GeoJournal 54: 51-60.

Ceccato, V. & Haining, R. (2004): Crime in border regions: the Scandinavian

case of resund, 1998-2001.Annals of the Association of American

Geographers 94: 807-826.

Decker-Linnros, H. & Hallin, P.O. (2001): The discursive nature of

environmental conflicts: the case of the resund link.Area 33: 391-403.

DiMaggio, P. J & Powell, W. W (1983): The Iron Cage revisited: Institutional

isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields.American

Sociological Review 48, 147-160.

Ek, R. (2003): resundsregion bli till! De geografiska diskursernas diskursiva

rytm. PhD-thesis. Department of Social and Economic Geography, Lund

University.

Ek, R (2005): Regional experiencescapes as geo-economic ammunition.

Experiencescapes. Tourism, Culture, and Economy. ODell, T & Billing, P. (eds.),

Copenhagen Business School Press, Copenhagen.

26


27/31

Ek, R (in press): Malm och Americas Cup: Det koloniala evenemanget.

Platsens kommersialisering. Ek, R & Hultman, J. (red.). Studentlitteratur, Lund.

Falkheimer, J. (2004):Att gestalta en region. Kllornas strategier och

mediernas frestllningar om resund. Makadam, Gteborg.

Faludi, A. (2004): Spatial planning traditions in Europe: their role in the ESDP

process. International Planning Studies 9(2/3), 155-172.

Hall, P; Sjvik, K & Stubbegaard, Y (2005): Ntverk sker frankring:

resundsregionen i ett demokratiperspektiv. Studentlitteratur, Lund.

Healey, P (1998b): The place of Europe in contemporary spatial strategy

making. European Urban and Regional Studies 5, 139-153.

Hospers, G-J (2004): Place marketing in Europe. The branding of the Oresund

Region. Intereconomics, September/October 2004, 271-279.

Jensen, O. B. & Richardson, T. (2004): Constructing a transnational mobility

region on the resund region and its role in the new European Union spatial

policy. In Dosenrode, S. & Halkier, H. (eds.). The Nordic Regions and the

European Union. Ashgate, Aldershot, 139-158.

Jensen, O. B. & Richardson, T. (2004): Making European Space. Mobility, Power

and Territorial Identity. Routledge, London.

Jerneck, M. (2000): East meets West. Cross-border co-operation in the resund

a successful case of transnational region-building? In Gidlund, J. & Jerneck, M.

(eds.). Local and Regional Governance in Europe: Evidence from Nordic

Regions. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 197-230.

27


28/31

Kotler, P; Haider, D. H & Rein, I. (1993): Marketing Places. Attracting

Investment, Industry, and Tourism to Cities, States, and Nations. Free Press,

New York.

Lovering, J. (1995): Creating discourses rather than jobs: The crisis in the cities

and the transition fantasies of intellectuals and policy makers. Managing Cities.

The New Urban Context. Healey, P; Cameron, S; Davoudi, S; Graham, S &

Madani-Pour, A. (eds.). Wiley, Chichester, 109-126.

Lovering, J. (1999): Theory led by policy: The inadequacies of the 'new

regionalism' (illustrated from the case of Wales). International Journal of Urban

and Regional Research 23, 379-395.

Luhmann, N (1995): Social Systems. Stanford University Press, Stanford.

Lyck, L. & Berg, P-O. (eds.) (1997): The resund Region Building. Copenhagen

Business School Press, Copenhagen.

Maskell, P. & Trnqvist, G. (1999): Building a Cross-Border Learning Region.

Emergence of the North European resund Region. Copenhagen Business

School Press, Copenhagen.

Matthiessen, C. W. (2000): Bridging the resund: potential regional dynamics.

Integration of Copenhagen (Denmark) and Malm-Lund (Sweden). A cross-

border project on the European metropolitan level.Journal of Transport

Geography8: 171-180.

Meyer, J & Rowan, B (1977): Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as

myth and ceremony.American Journal of Sociology83, 340-363.

ODowd, L (2001): State Borders, Border Regions and the Construction of

European Identity. Will Europe Work? Integration, Employment and the Social

Order. Kohli, M & Novak, M (eds). Routledge, London, 95-110.

28


29/31

Tuathail, G (1996): Critical Geopolitics. The Politics of Writing Global Space.

Routledge, London.

Parker, M. (2002):Against Management. Organization in the Age of

Managerialism. Polity, Cambridge.

Pedersen, S. B (2004): Place branding: Giving the region of resund a

competitive edge.Journal of Urban Technology11:1, 77-95.

Perkmann, M. (2002): Euroregions: Institutional entrepreneurship in the

European Union. Globalization, Regionalization and Cross-border Regions.

Perkmann, M & Sum, N-L (eds.). Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 103-124.

Perkmann, M. (2003): Cross-border regions in Europe. Significance and drivers

of regional cross-border co-operation. European Urban and Regional Studies

10, 153-171.

Relph, E. (1976): Place and Placelessness. London: Pion.

Scott, W. R (1995): Institutions and Organizations. SAGE, Thousand Oaks.

Shipley, R (2000): The origin and development of vision and visioning in

Planning. International Planning Studies 5, 225-236.

Shipley, R (2002): Visioning in planning: Is the practice based on sound theory?

Environment and Planning A 34, 7-22.

Shipley, R & Newkirk, R (1998): Visioning: Did anyone see where it came from?

Journal of Planning Literature 12, 407-416.

Shipley, R & Newkirk, R (1999): Vision and visioning in planning: What do these

terms really mean? Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design 26, 573-

29


30/31

591.

Stber, B. F. (2004): Space, Mass Media and the resund Region. The Role of

Mass Media in a Cross-Border Region Building Project. Institute of Geography,

University of Copenhagen.

Tangkjr, C. (2000): resund as an open house strategy by invitation. Invoking

a Transnational Metropolis. The Making of the resund Region. Berg, P-O.;

Linde-Laursen, A. & Lfgren, O. (eds.) Studentlitteratur, Lund, 165-190.

Weiler, J. H. H (1999): The Constitution of Europe: Do the New Clothes Have an

Emperor? and Other Essays on European Integration. Cambridge UP,

Cambridge.

iek, S (1999): The Ticklish Subject. The Absent Centre of Political Ontology.

Verso, London.

Newspapers, news material

Berlingske Tidende 2004.06.27: Syge kbenhavnere bliver dyre for ny

hovedstadsregion.

KvP 2004.10.09: ppna broarna.

Metro resund 2005.09.06: Unga vill ha resundsminister.

SkD 1966.12.21: restad en sammanhngande stad lngs resund r en

abnormitet.

SDS 2001.05.02:tta av tio fretagare struntar i samarbetet.

SDS 2002.06.17: Skattekrnglet kvar trots alla lften.

SDS 2003.03.30: Bron som brjade tnka.

30


31/31

SDS 2003.03.25: Bron strker inte integrationen.

SDS 2003.06.11: Bron frenar olikheterna.

SDS 2003.06.20: Lngre till Sverige.

SDS 2003.06.22: Den inre bron.

SDS 2003.10.30: Danska nlpengar.

SDS 2003.11.05: Danmark skattevinnare p sikt.

SDS 2003.11.18: resundsvisionen var en utopi.

SDS 2003.12.22: kad integration ver Sundet.

SDS 2004.09.16: Smgnabb om resundssamarbetet och visionerna.

SDS 2004.09.30: Skattefrslag retar Reepalu.

SDS 2004.10.02: Regeringen vill enkelrikta Bron.

SDS 2004.12.24: Toppmte om framtiden.

SDS 2005.03.10: resundsbron drar ifrn frjorna.

SDS 2005.06.29: Brotaxa hindrar integration.

SDS 2005.07.01a: Trafiken ver Bron tar fart lagom till jubileet.

SDS 2005.07.01b: Integration i det tysta.

SDS 2005.07.02a: Bron ett lyft fr hlften av Sknes fretag.

SDS 2005.07.02b: Integration i det tysta.

SDS 2006.03.16: Brotrafiken vertrffar alla prognoser.

SDS 2006.03.19a: Mannen som lockar danskarna ver Bron.

SDS 2006.03.19b:Andra vgen ver Sundet.

SDS 2006.03.19c: Danskarna invaderar.

SDS 2006.04.11: 16 000 deklarerar ver Sundet

resundskonsortiet (1999): Sund och Bro nr 36, juli 1999 (news material).

the oresund region2

Documents