the offensive-defensive balance of military technology - a theoretical and historical (jack s. levy)
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The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and HistoricalAnalysisAuthor(s): Jack S. LevyReviewed work(s):Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Jun., 1984), pp. 219-238Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The International Studies Association
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Internationaltudies uarterly1984)
28, 219-238
The Offensive/Defensive
alance of
Military Technology: A Theoretical and
Historical Analysis
JACK S.
LEVY
The Universityf Texas at Austin
Thisstudy xamines arious ttempts o define he oncept f he ffensive/defen-
sive
balance of military
echnology,o trace the theoretical onsequences f an
offensiver defensivedvantage, nd to measure r classifyhebalance
for he ast
eight enturies.t is concluded hatthe ast two tasks
re
flawed
ecause of the
ambiguity f the concept f
the offensive/defensivealance. Thereare multiple
definitionsnd multiple ypotheses,
ut hese renot nterchangeable,articularly
between he pre-nuclear
nd nuclear
ras,
where
he concept
means omething
fundamentally
ifferent.
ypotheses ppropriate
for
one
definition
may
be
implausible r tautological
or nother. t is concludedthat thenotionof the
offensive/defensive
alance
is
too
vague
and
encompassing
o be useful
n
theoretical
r
historical
nalysis, utthat ome f he ndividual
ariables hat ave
been
incorporated
nderthisbroader
onceptmay
themselves
e
useful.
Much
more analysis s needed,however, o demonstrate hat theseconceptshave
important heoreticalonsequences.
The literature on international relations and military history
contains numerous
references o
the offensive r
defensivebalance
of
military
echnology
nd its
mpact
on
war. Historians often haracterize
a
particular
era
as
favoring
he offense
r the
defense,
and theorists
often
hypothesize
that
technology favoring
the offense
ncreases
the
likelihood of
war or contributes to
empire-building.
More
generally,
it
has
been
suggested
that the
history
of
warfare and
weaponry
can
be viewed
in
terms
of
the
interplaybetweentheoffense nd thedefense Snow, 1983:83). These analysesare not
generallymeaningful, owever,
because they
re
rarelyguided byany explicit
definition
of the
keyconcept
ofthe
offensive/defensive
alance.
The
concept
tself
as been
defined
in a
variety
f
ways
which
are
often ontradictory nd
which confuse he
meaning
of the
hypotheses
n
question. Attempts
o
classify
he balance
historically
re also inconsistent.
These inconsistencies
re
obscured by
the failure of both
the theoretical and historical
literature o
acknowledge
and
build
upon
earlier
scholarship
nd also
by
the
absence
of
any general
review
ofthe
iterature.
As a
result,
ittle
s
known about the
offensive/defen-
sive balance and
its
mpact
on war.
Author's
ote: his
research
was
supported y
a
Fellowship
or
ndependent tudy
nd Research rom
he
National
Endowment
or
heHumanities.
wish o thank
HarrisonWagner, liff
Morgan,RogerBeaumont,
and
theeditors
f
SQfor
their elpful
omments
n
earlier ersions f
this
rticle.
0020-8833/84/02
219-20
$03.00
?)
1984 nternational
tudiesAssociation
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220
The
Offensive/Defensive
alance
fMilitary
echnology
Much more work needs to be done ifthe concept of the
offensive/defensivealance is
to
have
any utility
for
explaining
international conflict.
This
work must
begin
with a
critical assessment of the existing
iterature n
order to synthesizeand evaluate the
numerous but disparate
and
generally superficial
treatmentsof the
concept.
Three
aspects of the problem which are integrally related but which are often treated
separately
in
the literature
must
be
incorporated: hypothesis
construction, oncept
definition,
nd historicalmeasurement.
The
Hypotheses
One of the first ttemptsto generalize about the consequences
of
either
n
offensive
r
defensive
alance
was that of Clausewitz
(1976: 293), who suggested
hat the
uperiority
of the
defense may
leave
both sides
with
no incentive to attack and thus 'tame the
elementary impetuosity
of War.'
More explicit propositions were made
by
the
proponents of the qualitative principle' in the 1920s and 1930s. Their argument that
offensive nd defensive
weapons
can
be distinguished nd that the former
and only
the
former) hould be abolished was based on the explicit assumption
that offensive ut not
defensive
weapons
are conductive to
war,
an
assumption shared by most of the
participants at the 1932 League of Nations Conference
for the Reduction and
Limitation of Armaments (Wheeler-Bennett, 1935; Boggs,
1941). Hart, for example,
wrote that 'any strengthening f the defensive at the expense
of the offensive
s a
discouragement
to
aggression' (1932: 72).
A
more systematic ttempt
to
delineate the consequences ofthe offensive/defensive
balance
of
military echnology
was
suggestedby Wright
n his classic A
Study f
War. He
argues
that
the
superiority
f
the
offense
enerally
results
n
the
following:
n increase n
theprobabilityofwar; political expansion, unification, nd empirebuilding;a decrease
in
the number of states
in
the
system; and
shorter
duration and
lower
costs
of wars.
Superiority
fthe
defense,
n the other
hand,
results
n a
strengthening
f ocal areas
and
thus facilitates
evolts,
he
disintegration
f
empires,
nd
the
decentralization of
states;
an increase in
the number
of
states;
decrease
in the decisiveness of wars and their
importance forworld politics; strategies
f
protracted talemates and
mutual
attrition,
which result
n
wars of
onger
duration and
greater
destructiveness
Wright,
1965:
129,
292-93,
673, 797,
1520). Similarly,
Andreski
1968:75-76) argues
that
other
hings eingequal,
the
predominance
f the attackover
defence ends
o
diminishhenumber f
ndependent overnments
ithin
given
rea and
towiden
the reas under heir
ontrol, nd/or
acilitateshe tighteningfcontrol verthe
areasalreadyundertheir omination;while the superiorityf defence ends o
produce pposite esults.
One
can
find
similar
generalizations
in
Quester's
Offense
ndDefense n the nternational
System1977). He writes that: Offensesproduce war and/orempire; defenses upport
independence and peace' (p. 208). When the offense olds the
advantage 'both sides are
primed
to
reap advantages by pushing into each other's
territory,and)
war
may
be
extremely ikely
whenever
political
crisis
erupts' (1977: 7).
Offensive
superiority
s
conducive to
empire
and
a 'final
political
decision' while defensive
uperiority
eads
to
political independence
and
prolonged
wars
(1977:8,31,208).
Quester recognizes
the
complications
introduced
by
nuclear
technology,
nd
argues
that
the
capability
for
a
counterforce offensive
encourages
war
while
a
countervalue
offensive
capability
promotes peace (1977:69).
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JACK S. LEVY
221
Gilpin also devotes attentionto the relationshipbetween the offense nd the defense.
He argues that: 'Military
innovations
that tend to favor the offense ver the defense
stimulate
territorial
xpansion
and
the
political
consolidation of nternational
systems
by empires
or
great powers' (1981:61). Gilpin
also
argues
that the
offensive/defensive
balance affects he costs ofchangingthe status uo, nd that thehigher he coststhe fewer
incentives
for
war
(1981:60-62).
This is similar to Bean's
(1973:207) argument
that
defensive superiority
ncreases
the
costs of
conquest
and
consequently
reduces
the
number of conquests, thoughthose thatdo occur take longer.The strong mplication
s
that defensive
uperiority
educes the
likelihood of war.
Jervis provides the most systematic
effort o
trace
the
theoretical impact of
the
offensive/defensive
alance on the ikelihood of war.
Using
the
conceptual
device of the
security dilemma, Jervis (1978:188-190) identifies
a
number of related linkages
between
offensive
uperiority
nd
war. Most
importantly, ffensive uperiority
ncreases
the benefits rom
triking
irst
nd increases the
costs of allowing the adversary to
strike
first. his increases in turn the incentives to strikefirst nd therefore he likelihood of
war. Defensive superiority educes both the benefits o the attacker who initiates war
and the costs to the defenderwho waits and absorbs the first low, leaves neither ide
with
an
incentive to strike first, nd thus reduces the likelihood of war (Quester,
1977:211).
The
likelihood
of war
is also increased by the erroneous perception of
offensivedvantage.
Second, offensive uperiority ontributes o arms races, which are themselves ssumed
to
ead to war. The expectation that war will be frequent nd shortplaces a premiumon
high evels of existing rmaments and on a quick response to an adversary's ncreases n
armaments. When the defense is superior, however, inferior orces are sufficient or
deterrence.
Defensively uperior weapons may further rovide
a
dampening effect n
the
arms
race
because
in
such
a
situation securitydoes not require the matching of the
adversaryarm for arm. Third, Jervis argues that offensive uperiority ncreases the
incentive to seek alliances in advance (Osgood, 1967:81), which contributes to
polarization, tensions, nd
an
increased probability of
war.'
It
can
also be argued that
all
of
the destabilizing dimensions of the spiral model, including the psychological
dynamics
that
reinforce hem Jervis, 1978:67-66), work to the fullest xtentwhen the
offense
s
superior.
There are numerous historicalexamples which are said to illustrate he destabilizing
consequences
of
offensive uperiority.2 erhaps the most widely cited is World War I.
The perceived advantages of the offense (Hart, 1932:72; Farrar, 1973; Quester,
1977:103; Jervis, 1978:190-191) created enormous pressuresforearly mobilizations,
which
were
widely
believed
to make war inevitable
(Fay, 1928: II,
ch.
X; Levy, 1983b).
Israel's preemptivestrikeagainst Egypt in 1967 may have been encouraged by the
perceived advantages
of the
offense.
The
stability
of the nuclear balance
is
widely
believed
to derive from the absence of incentives to strike
first,
ncentives
which are
reduced by the existence of invulnerable retaliatory capabilities and
countervalue
potential.
While
many
of
the
hypothesesregarding
the
consequences
of
the
offensive/defensive
balance
are
inherently lausible,
there are critical
analytical problems
which must be
resolved before hey
an
be accepted
as
meaningful r valid. These problems
have to do
with the theoretical
ogic
of the
hypotheses,
the
definition
of
the
offensive/defensive
balance,
and the
empirical validity
of
the
hypotheses.
The hypothesis hat the likelihood of war is increased when the military echnology
favors the offense s theoretically plausible only on the basis of the rather strong
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222 The
Offensive/Defensive
alance fMilitary
echnologv
assumption that decisionmakers correctly
perceive the offensive/defensivealance.
However, it s perceptionsofone's psychologicalenvironment hat determinedecisions,
not the objective' operational environment
Sprout and Sprout, 1965). The assumption
of accurate perceptions is thereforeopen to question. The inherent difficulty f
determining heoffensive/defensivealance and thealleged tendencyofthemilitary o
prepare for the
last war
rather than
the next one may result in some profound
misperceptions. t is widely agreed, for example,
that in 1914 military technology
favored the defense Hart, 1932: 75; Fuller,
1961:
ch. 8-9; Montgomery, 1983:472) but
that most decisionmakers perceived that
it favored the offense. It was not the
offensive/defensive alance that intensifiedworst-case analysis and increased the
incentives for preemption, but decisionmakers' perceptions of that balance. If the
offensive/defensivealance is not defined
n terms f the perceptionsof decisionmakers
(and in most conceptualizations it is not so defined), then the hypothesis s technically
misspecified.Hypothesis regarding the consequences
of war, on the other hand, are
properlydefined n termsof the objective'
balance.
The second problem relates to the definition f the offensive/defensivealance. What
does it
mean to say that the offense
s
superior
to thedefense, r viceversa? his will be
treated at length
in
the following section,
but one point should be made here. An
hypothesisregarding the offensive/defensivealance has no explanatory power unless
that
concept
can
be nominally and operationally
defined independently of its
hypothesized effects. or example, Wright
1965:796-97)
states that
... it
s
difficultojudgethe elative ower
f he ffensivend defensivexcept y
a
historical
udit to
determine hethern thewhole,
n a
given
tate
f
military
technology, ilitary
iolence
ad or had
not
proved
usefulnstrumentf
political
change.... Duringperiodswhendissatisfiedowershave,
on the
whole,gained
their
ims
by
resort o
rms,
t
may
be
assumed,
n the evel f
rand trategy,
hat
thepower f he ffensiveas beengreater. uring heperiodswhen hey avenot
been ble todo
so,
t
may
be
assumed
hat he
power
f he
grand trategic
efensive
has been greater.
It would be tautological to use this conception
of the
offensive/defensive
alance to
predict to the military uccess
of the
aggressor,
hough
t
would be
legitimate
o
predict
to the
frequency
of
war.
Similarly,
it is
meaningless
to
hypothesize
that offensive
superiority
ncreases the incentive
to
strike
first
f
the
offensive/defensive
alance
is
defined
by
the incentive
to
strike
first.
he
separation
of
hypothesis
onstruction
rom
concept
definition
nd
the absence
of
rigorous
definition
has increased
the
dangers
of
tautological propositions.
The failure o subject thesehypotheses o
systematic mpirical testing
s another
major
problem. Most attempts to identify the
offensive/defensivedvantage
in
various
historical ras are not guided by an explicit
definition f
the
concept,3
nd
rarely
s there
a
demonstration hat
a
given balance had an effect
n the
frequency
fwars
occurring
r
on
the decisions for
particular
war. The apparent
a
priori lausibility
of
a
particular
hypothesismay derive more from ts
tautological
construction
han
from ts
correspon-
dence with
reality.
n
the absence
of
a
more
thorough analytic
treatment nd
a
more
systematic mpirical analysis the validity
of ny
ofthese
hypotheses
annot be
accepted.
Definitions of the Offensive/Defensive
Balance
Use
of the
concept
of
offensive/defensivealance to
refer o a
variety
of different
hings
has led to a great deal of confusion.Theoretical propositionswhich are meaningfulor
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JACK
S.
LEVY
223
interesting or
one use of the termmay not be very meaningful
or nother,and for his
reason the various usages of the concept
must be identified nd examined.
Concern here
is with the offensive/defensiveistinction
with respect to military
technology nd perhaps tactics4 ut
not with respectto policy. The question
ofwhether
national policy is offensive aggressive) or defensive is not unimportant, but is
analyticallydistinct nd not directly
elevant to the hypotheses urveyed
arlier.
These
propositions all
suggest that there
is something about military technology
tself hat
affects he ikelihoodor nature of
war, and that what is mportant
s whether echnology
gives an advantage to the offense
r defense. This relativeadvantage
may be one of
several
variables
affecting the likelihood of war
by affecting policy, but itself s
analytically distinctfrompolicy.
The offensive/defensive
alance of military echnology
has been defined
primarily n
terms f the ease of territorial onquest,
the characteristics f armaments,
the resources
needed by the offense
n order to overcome the defense,
nd the ncentive
to strike irst.
TerritorialConquest
The most common use of the concept
of the offensive/defensivealance
is based on
territorial onquest
and the defeatof enemy forces.
Quester (1977:15) states that the
territorial fixation then logically
establishes our distinction between
offense and
defense.'
Jervis
1978: 187) argues that an offensive
dvantage means that it is easier to
destroy
the other's army and take its territory
han it is to defend one's
own.' 'The
essence of defense,'
on
the other
hand, 'is keeping theother side out of your
territory.
purely defensiveweapon is one that
can do this without
being able to penetrate the
enemy's and' (1978:203).
A
defensive
dvantage means that it is easier
to protect
nd
hold than
it
is
to move
forward, destroy,
and take'
(Jervis,
1978:187). Wright
(1
965:
793)
includes these notions
of
defeat
of
enemy
forces
nd territorialeizure n
his
rathercomplex definition:
On
a
tactical
eveltheoffensiver
defensive
uality
f unit
may
be estimated
y
considering
ts
utility
n
an
attack pon
n
enemy
nit
ike
tself
r
n an
attack
pon
some
other oncrete
nemy bjective,
uch
as
territory,ommerce,
r morale.5
A
primary purpose
of
protectingterritory,
f course,
is the
protection
of
people
and
property.What is perhaps implicit
in the above definitions
s
made
explicit by
Tarr
(1983):
'Defense
refers o
techniques
and
actions,
both
active and
passive,
to
repel
attack,
to
protect
people
and
property,
o
hold
territory,
nd to minimizedamage bythe
attacker.'
This
linkage
of territorial
onquest
to
population
defense
creates
a
problem,
however. While territorialdefense
was sufficient or the protection
of
people
and
propertyn the pre-nuclear era (or at least in the era before trategicbombardment),
that s no
longer
true.
As
Schelling 1966:
ch.
1)
and others
have
noted,
the
uniqueness
of
the
nuclear
age
lies
in
the fact that
the
defeat
of the
adversary's
military
forces and
territorial
enetration
are no
longer necessary
for the destruction of his
population
centers.
The
destruction
f
population
and
the coercive
power
that t makes
possible
are
no
longer
contingentupon militaryvictory.
For
this reason
the
protection
of
territory
(from nvasion)
is analyticallydistinct
rom he
protection
of
population.
The inclusion
ofboth
n a
definition
fthe
offensive/defensive
istinction
nly
creates confusion
unless
the
use of hat
concept
s
explicitly
estricted
o the
pre-nuclear ra),
for he
hypothesized
effects
f
an
'offensive'
dvantage
are
precisely
the
opposite
forthe two
concepts.
The
likelihood of
war
presumably
ncreases
as
territorial onquest
becomes
easier,
because
theprobabilityofvictory ncreases while itsexpected costs decrease. But theabilityto
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224
The
Offensive/Defensive
alance
of
Military
Technologv
destroy nemypopulation and industrial
enters ontributes
o
deterrence
n the
nuclear
age, and therefore t
decreases
the likelihoodof war (or
at least
nuclear
war).
It is because of
the distinction etween
deterrence nd
defense Snyder,
1961: 14-16)
that the
meaning of
the offensive/defensive
alance
may differ
n
the nuclear and
pre-nuclear eras. Whereas in the pre-nuclear era both deterrence and defense were
based on the
capacity to defeat the armed forces of the
enemy,
that is
only
truefor
defense
in
the nuclear
age,
for
deterrence
is
ultimately
based
on countervalue
punishment.The
use of
military
orce or he
purpose
of
defeating
nemy
armed forces
s
analytically distinct from the use
of
force for coercion
(Schelling,
1966:
ch.
2).
Consequently,
traditional
hypotheses
Wright
and
others) regarding
the
effects
f
the
offensive/defensive
alance of
military
technology
are not
necessarily applicable
for
nuclear powers at the
strategic
level. Neither the
concepts
nor
the
hypotheses
are
interchangeable.6
Now let us return o the
territorial
onception
of
the
offensive/defensive
alance. Our
earlier discussion
leads
to the
question
of
what,
besides
the
numbers
of
troops
or
weapons,contributes o the defeatof nemyforces nd conquestof erritory.ne answer
is
provided
at
the
tactical
level,
based
on
movement towards the
armed
forces,
possessions, r
territory
fthe
enemy.
A
condition
ofrelative
passivity
nd
immobility
n
waiting
for
the
enemy
to attack defines the
strategic
and tactical
defensive
Wright,
1965:807).
Clausewitz
(as quoted
in
Boggs,
1941
68)
states:
What is defense n
conception? he
warding off a blow. What
is then its
characteristic
ign? he state f
xpectancyor ofwaiting or his
low).
.
by this
sign
lone
can the
defensive
e distinguishedrom he
offensivenwar....
Clausewitz
also
writes:
In
tactics
every
combat, great
or
small,
is
defensive
f
we leave
the nitiative o theenemy, nd waitforhisappearance on ourfront' as quoted inBoggs,
1941:68).
Both offensive
nd defensivemodes ofwar
on thetactical evel are
necessary, f
ourse,
for
the achievement
of either
offensive r
defensiveobjectives. The
pursuit
of
any
offensive
oal requires
a
supportingdefense,and the
defense alone can never
bring
victory
but
only
stalemate. Mahan
refers o 'the
fundamental
principle
of naval
war,
that
defense
s
insured
only
by offence' Boggs, 1941:
70). Clausewitz writes that an
absolute defense s
an
'absurdity'
which
completelycontradicts he dea
of
war'
(Boggs,
1941: 7
1).
At
some
point
it
is
necessary
to
seize the
tactical offensive n order to
avoid
defeat.7 Thus
the
familiar
maxim: the
best defense
s
a
good offense. t
is
necessary,
however, to
distinguish between the
strategic and tactical
levels.
A
general
fighting
offensivelyn strategic ermsneeds onlyto invade and thenhold territory o enable him
to
adopt
the tactical
defensive
Strachan, 1983).
It
may be
strategically dvantageous
to
maneuver the
enemy nto a
position
n
which he is
forced to take the
tactical offensive
under
unfavorable conditions.As the
elder Moltke
stated
n
1865,
our
strategymust be
offensive,
ur tacticsdefensive'
Dupuy,
1980:
200).
In
addition,
military acticsmay be
offensive
n
one
theater
and
defensive n
another.
The
Schlieffen
Plan,
for
example,
required
a
holding
action
against
Russia in
the east in
order to move
against France
in
the west.
Nevertheless,
with
certain
types
of
weapons
systems
more movement
and
tactical
mobility
is
possible
than with
others. It is
difficult o measure
movement
historically
while
controllingfor
non-technological
factors,8 owever.
This
leads us to
the
question
of
whether the
offensive/defensive
alance
can
be defined
by
the
characteristics fweapons systems hemselves.
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JACK
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225
Tule
CharacteristicsfArmaments
While
nearly
all
weapons
can
be used
for
itherthe strategic r tactical
offensive r the
strategicor tactical defensive,
he question is whether there are some
weapons systems
which contribute disproportionatelymore to one than to the other.As stated by the
Naval Commission of
the League of Nations Conference
for the Reduction and
Limitation of Armaments
1932-1936)
(Boggs, 1941:82).
Supposing
ne state ither ) adopts policy
f rmed
ggression
r
b)
undertakes
offensiveperations gainst
nother tate,
what re the
weapons
which, yreason
oftheir pecific haracter,
nd
without rejudice o their
efensiveurposes,re
most ikely o enable that
policyor those perations o be brought
apidly o a
successfulonclusion?
Hart (1932:73) argues that certain weapons 'alone make it possible
under modern
conditions to
make a
decisive
offensive gainst a neighboring country.' What are the
characteristics f such weapons?
Both Fuller and Hart identifymobility, triking ower, and protection s the essential
characteristics f
an
offensiveweapon (Wright, 1965:808). Striking
power (the impact
of
the blow)
is
not alone sufficient.
A
mobile
gun contributes
more to the tactical
offensive
han an
immobile one,
and its penetratingpower is further nhanced if t is
protected. But protection is
even more important for the defense. Mobility and
protection re inverselyrelated,
for t is easier to protect mmobileweapons and wait
passivelyfor he enemy to attack.The offensive alue of the medieval
knightultimately
was
negated by
the
heavy
armor which
protected
him
but restricted
is
mobility.
Thus
Dupuy and Eliot (1937:103) give particular emphasis
to
the
offensive dvantages of
mobility and striking power,
noting that they too may be in conflict. Boggs
(1941:84-85) argues
that 'the
defense disposes especially
of
striking power
and
protection, oa lesserdegreeofmobility,while the offense ossessesmobility nd striking
power,
and
protection
to
a
lesser
degree.'
He concludes that mobility
s the central
characteristic of
an
offensive
weapon and argues that
'armament which greatly
facilitates he forward movement of the attacker might be said
tentatively o possess
relatively greater offensivepower than weapons which contribute
primarily to the
stability
of the defender'
(Boggs,
1941
85).
Our later
survey
of
attempts by military
historians
o
identify he offensive/defensive
alance
in various historical ras
will show
that tactical
mobility
s
the
primary
criterion used
to
identify
n
advantage
to the
offense.
In terms
of the characteristics
f armaments, then, tactical mobilityand
movement
toward
enemy
forces nd
territory
re the
primary
determinants f he
offense,
t least
n
land warfare; protectionand holding power contributemore to the defense. Other
weapon
characteristics
uch as
strikingpower, rapidity
of
fire,
and the range
of
a
weapons system
do
not
contribute
disproportionately
to either the offense
or the
defense.9Much more work needs to be done here, however, because
of the lack of
precision
of some of these concepts.
The classification f weapons systemsby
theircontribution
o
mobility
nd tactical
movementtoward
enemy
forces nd territory
s much
less
useful
or
naval
warfare.
This
was
evident
from he
proceedings
ofthe
League
ofNations Conference
or he Reduction
and Limitation of
Armaments,
where
theproblems
and
disagreements onfronting
he
Naval Commission were even more serious
than those
confronting
he Land Commis-
sion
and
where technical
arguments
were even
more
likely
to follow
the
flag (Boggs,
1941: 50-60). The United States, among others, eclared that thequalitativedistinction
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226
The
Offensive/Defensive
alance
fMilitary
echnologv
could not be applied to navies. Hart, a proponent of the qualitative principle n general,
restricted t to the materials of and warfare Boggs, 1941: 50, 81). The main problem
with attempts to apply these principles of mobility and tactical movement to naval
warfare
s the
absence of
anythingcomparable
to the territorial tandard
occurring
n
land warfare.The command of he seas, the ultimateobjective ofnaval warfare Mahan,
1957),
can be
served by passive
as well as
aggressive ction,
for he neutralization of
the
enemy fleet by
a
blockade may serve the same function as its defeat. Moreover,
aggressive ction toward the enemy fleetdoes not always result n battle, for n inferior
navy can often void battle without sacrificingmajor territorial bjectives, unlike and
warfare.
Application of the territorially-based
riterion
f tactical mobility
o aerial
weapons
systems raises the question of whether the offensive
r
defensive character
of
these
weapons
is
determined ndependently
of
land
warfare or
by
their contributionto the
defeatof nemyground forces nd territorial onquest. Many aerial weapons systems o
contribute
to
the tactical offensive n the ground because of their strikingpower,
mobility, nd surprise for example, in theNazi blitzkrieg). et air power also has an
independent capability to destroythe enemy's war making industrial capabilities, and
hence contributes o deterrence n the nuclear age. This deterrent ffect f air power
takesplace independently f ts effect n thetacticaloffensive n the ground but cannot
easily
be
incorporated into
a
conception of the offensive/defensivealance based on
tactical mobility.
Some armaments
that
traditionally
have been considered as
defensive nd
therefore
assumed to be 'stabilizing' (in the sense that theydiscourage aggression and reduce the
likelihood
of
war)
are
often considered to be destabilizing
in the
nuclear age.
Air
defenses, nti-ballisticmissiledefenses, nd even civil defenses re considered under the
prevailing strategicdoctrine
to be
destabilizing because by protectingpopulations they
threaten to undermine deterrence.This reinforces ur earlierpoint that thehypothe-
sized consequences of military echnology avoring he offense or the defense) may not
be interchangeablebetween thenuclear and pre-nuclear eras.
The
definition
of the
offensive/defensivealance,
in
terms of the
characteristics
f
armaments,raises other questions
as
well.
One is whether t is
possible
to define the
offensive/defensive
haracter of
a
weapon by
its intrinsic
performance
haracteristics
alone, apart from the prevailing doctrine that determines its
use. For
example,
essentially
he same tank that
was used in much ofWorld War
I
as
protected
fire
upport
was used
in
World War
II
as the
organizing
element of
mobile
offensive
arfare
Fuller,
1945:
ch.
VI).
The
offensive
haracter of
Napoleonic
warfare
was
due
far
more to the
innovative tactics of Napoleon than to weapons systems themselves (Howard,
1976:75-76; Preston and Wise, 1979:189-191).1o It must be concluded that the
offensive r defensive
haracter
of
weapons system
must
be
defined
by
both ts
ntrinsic
characteristics nd the
tactical doctrine
which determines
ts
use.
What
is
important,
of
course,
s
not the characteristics
f
an
individual
weapon,
but
rather the
aggregate impact
of
all
weapons systems
n a
given
arsenal. How
is
a
given
mixtureof
armaments,designed
fordifferent
urposes
and
deployed
for
use
in
different
theaters n
land, sea,
and
air,
to be
aggregated
so
that
their
net
effect
n
the
offense nd
defense
can be classified?
This overall
impact
cannot be determined
apart
from
the
composition
of
an
enemy's weapons systems
nd
the
terrain
where
the
combat takes
plaoe.
The offensive alue of the
tank,
for
xample,
was reduced
by
the
development
of
new anti-tank technologies
in
the early 1970s. To complicate
matters
further,
most
hypotheses relating to the offensive/defensive alance treat that concept as a
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JACK
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227
systemic-level ttribute (the hypotheses that offensive uperiority ontributes to an
increased frequency fwar and to empire-building, or xample). They suggest hat at a
given time the offensive/defensivealance can be characterized by a single value
throughout the system. The balance must be aggregated not only over all weapons,
functional oles, nd theaters or given state, but also over all states n the system. his
is difficult iven differentialevels of ndustrialization nd militarypower, uneven rates
of
technologicaldiffusion,
nd
doctrinal differencesmong
various
states
n
the
ystem.
Some of these problems are minimized, however, f the focus s restricted o the eading
powers
in
the system, because they are often comparable
in
terms of power
and
technology.
RelativeResources xpended
Gilpin distinguishes
between the
offense and the defense
in
terms of
an
economic
cost-benefit
ramework. To speak of
a
shift
n
favor of the offensemeans that fewer
resources han beforemust be expended on the offense n order to overcome the defense'
(Gilpin, 1981: 62-63). Gilpin goes on to say that the defense s said to be superior fthe
resourcesrequired to capture territory re greater than the value of the territorytself;
the offense ssuperior
f
he cost ofconquest is ess than the value ofthe territory'p. 63).
Clearly the second definition oes not followfrom he first.Whereas the first ses the
relativecosts of overcoming the defense t two different imes nd independentlyof the
resulting enefits, he second definition ntroduces n entirelynew concept-the actual
value
of
the
territorial onquest itself. he value ofterritorial onquest is undoubtedly an
importantvariable leading to war but it s analyticallydistinct rommilitary echnology
and
ought to be treated separately. Under Gilpin's second definition he hypothesis
becomes
equivalent to
the
statement that
a
positive (expected) utility
of
territorial
conquest
increases
the ikelihood
of war. This
may
be true
Bueno
de
Mesquita, 1981),
but it is not the hypothesisunder consideration here. Moreover, the definition fthe
offensive/defensivealance by theutility
f
territorial onquest reduces to
a
tautology
the
hypothesis
hat offensive
uperiority
ncreases the
utility
f territorial
onquest.
One of the two
conceptualizations
of
the
offensive/defensive
alance
suggested by
Jervis
s more
consistent
with
Gilpin's first
ormulation.
Jervis (1978:188) poses
the
question
as
follows: Does
the
state
have to
spend
more or less
than one dollar
on
defensive orces o offset
ach dollar
spent by
the
other ide
on forces hat
could be used to
attack?' That
is,
what is
the
relative
marginal utility
f
devotingmilitary pending
to the
offense
rather
than
to the
defense?
This
approach
is
potentially valuable,
but
it is
incomplete. It defines
what it
means
to
say
that the offense
or
the
defense)
has an
advantage,
but
fails
to
provide any
criteria
for
pecifying
what
constitutes he offense
r
the defense n the first lace. The marginalutilities annot be compared untilthe offense
and
defense
re
first
efined,
nd until this
s done the
concept
is not
particularly
useful.
The
definition
f
the
offensive/defensive
alance
by
the relativeresources hatmust
be
expended
on the offense
n
order to overcome the defense can be
conceptualized
in
another
way
and related
to
the
conception
based on territorial
onquest.
This refers o
attack/defense atios rather
than
military spending.
What ratio
of
troops
does
an
attacker need
in
order to overcome an
enemy defending
fixed
positions?
This notion
s
mentioned but not
developed by Quester (1977:212):
'The
significant mpact
of
defensive
or
offensive
technology
shows
up
in
the
minimum
ratios
of numerical
superiority equired
for uch an offensive.'
t
follows
he same
logic
as
Foch's comment
regardingthe power
of the offensive
rior
to World War I:
'Formerlymany guns
were
necessary to produce an effect. Today a few suffice' (Montross, 1960: 686). The
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228
The
Offensive/Defensive
alance
fMilitary echnology
conventional wisdom s that the offense eeds at least a three-to-one dvantage, but the
point here
is
that this ratio varies as a function f existingmilitary echnology nd the
tactical doctrineguiding ts use. The offensive/defensivealance is thendefined
s
being
inversely roportional to the minimumratio offorcesneeded by the attacker n order to
overcomean adversarydefending ixedpositions.'2The greatertheminimumratio,the
greater the advantage of the defense.
It is important o note here that the minimumratio fforcesneeded by the attacker
n
a
particular
era is
analytically
distinct from the relative
numbers
f forces
actually
possessed by
two adversaries
in
a
particular
situation. The
probability
of
victory
s
a
function of both. To say that the balance of military technology (as
a
function
of
attack/defense atios) favors he offense oes notmean the attacker slikely o win. That
would be true
only
f
the attacker
actually possessed
the
requisite
number of
troops
n
a
particular situation.
The problem arises as to what ratio should be used
as a
baseline,
the
zero-point
indicating the transitionfrom a defensive advantage to an offensive dvantage. The
most obvious ratio is one to one, but that is widely regarded as favoring he defense.'3
While it
would not be technically ncorrect to say that the balance always favors the
defense because the attacker always requires numerical superiority,this is neither
interestingnor useful. If the offensive/defensivealance is defined as attack/defense
ratios, t s preferable o conceive ofthis n relativerather han absolute terms. t is useful
tospeak
of hifts
n
the balance and tocompare the balance at differentimes,but
not
to
speak
about the
absolute state
of
the balance. Thus the hypothesis hould technically
state that the higher the minimum ratio of forcesneeded by the attacker
in
order to
overcome
an
adversary defendingfixed positions, the
lower
the
likelihood
of
war.'
This conception of the offensive/defensivealance is more useful than the others
surveyed bove,
at least for and warfare.
The attack/defense atio
could be measured
n
one of two ways. It could be determined empirically froman analysis of a varietyof
battles
n
a
given era,
with
theforce atios nd results etermined or ach
and
some
kind
of
average computed.
The
problem,
of
course,
would be the need to control for
asymmetries
n
geography, roop quality, and doctrine.Alternatively, he ratio could be
conceived
in
perceptual
terms nd measured
by
the
perceptions
of
military
nd
political
elites
of
what
ratio
of forces is
necessary
for either
attack
or defense.
While this
informationsnot readily available it mightbe inferred rom n examinationof the war
plans
of
the leading states. The methodological problems involved
in
either
of
these
approaches are quite serious, however.
The
ncentiveo Strike irst
One of thequestionsasked byJervis 1978:188) of the offensive/defensivealance is the
following:
With
a
given nventory
f
forces, t
s
better o attack
or
to
defend? s there n
incentive to strike
first r
to
absorb the other's blow?' This conceptualization
is more
flexible han earlier criteriabased on tactical mobility nd characteristics f armaments
because
it
can
incorporate
considerations
of
deterrence
and be
applied
to
the nuclear
age. It creates some problems, however, which Jervismay recognizebut does notfully
develop.
For
one
thing,
the
hypothesis hat
a
military echnologyfavoring
the
offense
increases the incentive to strike first s reduced to a tautology and hence carries no
explanatory power. In focusing ttentionon the inkage between the ncentive to strike
first nd war,
4
it gnores the more basic question ofwhat conditionscreate an incentive
to
strikefirst. hese antecedent conditions
possess
the
greatest xplanatory power
and
operate throughtheintervening ariable of the incentiveto strikefirst. his leads to a
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JACK
S.
LEVY 229
related problem: there are numerous factorsbesides technology nd doctrine
affecting
the incentive
to
strike
first, ncluding geographic constraints and diplomatic and
domesticpolitical considerations, actorswhichalso have an independent effect n
war.
If the
offensive/defensivealance
is
defined
s
the ncentiveto strike irst, hen tbecomes
confounded with these other variables and it becomes impossible to distinguish heir
independent effects. he incentiveto strike irsts best conceptualized as an intervening
variable
leading to
war and as the
product
of several
distinctvariables, one ofwhichis
military echnology
nd doctrine. One
key
ssue is to
elaborate the aspects ofmilitary
technology
r doctrinewhich affect he ncentives
o
strike
irst, ut
this
annot be fully
analyzed here.
It
is
mportant
o
distinguish
he ncentiveto strike irst rom
therconcepts that have
also been used to define
the
offensive/defensivealance. The incentive to strike
first
should
not be confused
with
aggressive policy, which is influencedby a wide range of
variables. A state
may
have
revisionist mbitions but be constrained by a
military
technologyfavoring he
tactical
defense, s well as by other variables. Or, a state with
purelydefensiveambitionsmay rationally initiatewar ifit perceives that through a
preemptive trike t can minimize ts osses against an assumed aggressor.The distinction
between the incentive to strike first nd seizing territory s particularly ikely
to be
confused.'5 These are clearly distinct for naval and air warfare (particularlyin
the
nuclear
age) but
the difference
s
more
profound.One may simultaneouslyhave a policy
of
notstriking irst nd strategy f ctive defense nd territorial enetration nthe
event
that
war does
break out.
This was
Bismarck's policy
in
the 1870s and 1880s
(Langer,
1964)
and
perhaps
Israel's
in
1973. Germany'sSchlieffen
lan
called forpassivedefense
(holding ground)
in
the East and
rapid
territorial
penetration
in northern France
regardlessof
who
initiated
the
war.
The failure o recognize thesedistinctions nly creates confusion nd may result
n
the
incorrectuse of hypothesesdesigned for other purposes. Hypotheses appropriate for a
territorially-based
efinition
f the
offensive/defensive
alance
of
militarytechnology
may not be
valid for
definition ased on the ncentive to strike irst.While the
ease of
territorial
eizure
may
shortenwars and lower their osts
(Wright, 1965:673),
this
may
not
necessarily
e truefor he ncentive
to strike
irst. or is
an
incentiveto strike irst
n
the
nuclear
age likely
to have the same
consequences
as an
attack/defense
atio which
favors
the offense. urther, t is not clear that the incentive to strike
first
tself
has the
same causes or
consequences
in
the
pre-nuclear period
as it does
in
the
nuclear
age,
though
this
might
be an
interesting
rea forfutureresearch.
The same
types
f
problems arise with respectto the various otherconceptualizations
of the
offensive/defensive
alance
examined
above.
The concept
has been defined
n
terms fthe defeatof nemyarmedforces, erritorialonquest, protection fpopulation,
tactical
mobility,
the characteristics f
armaments, attack/defense atios,
the relative
resources
xpended
on the offense nd the
defense,
nd the ncentive o strike irst.
hese
separate
definitions
are
often not
interchangeable,
and
hypotheses
based on one
definition re often either
implausible
or
tautological
for another
definition.
This
is
particularly
rue for
pplications
of
theoffensive/defensive
alance to
the
nuclear
age.
Because
the
most advanced
weapons
of this
ra
are
used
primarily
or oercive
purposes
and
the
weapons
of earlier eras were used
primarily
o
engage enemy
armed
forces,
he
concept
of
the
offensive/defensive
alance
of
military technology may
mean
entirely
different
hings
n
the
two different ituations.
Certainly
one reason for the confusion
and
ambiguity among
these
hypotheses
s
the
fact that
they
are based on common
concepts such as 'offense', aggressor', and 'initiator'which have ordinary anguage
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230
The
Ofensive/Defensive
alance
fMilitaryechnology
meanings apart frommore precise
technical meanings.This is
all the
more
reason
why
any attempt to use such
a
concept must firstdefine
it
explicitly
and be very clear
regarding preciselywhich hypotheses
re relevant.
Classification of the Offensive/Defensive
Balance in History
The third ection of this rticle
surveys varietyof efforts
o classify he offensive/defen-
sive balance of
military
technology
n
the Western
internationalsystem
over
the
last
eightcenturies.
6
This
survey
will
be usefulbecause ofthe absence of ny previous
review
of this
body
of literature
and
because
of the
general
failure
of earlier studies to
acknowledge
or build
upon
each
other.
More
importantly,
t
may
reveal whether r not
theconcept has acquired
an informal
definition
n
its
empirical
application,
in
spite
of
the
conceptual ambiguity
demonstrated
above. While the
concept
of the
offensive/de-
fensivebalance ofmilitary echnologyhas taken
on a
variety
of
meanings,
the
question
arises as to how that
concept
has been used
in
attempts o classify he offensive/defensive
balance in past historical eras. If different uthorities have generally used the
offensive/defensive
alance to
mean
the same
thing even
in
the absence of any formal
nominalor operational definition), nd iftheyhave generally
greed on the state of the
balance
in
various historicaleras, then it can be concluded
that the ambiguity of the
concept
has not
precluded
its effective se
in
empirical analysis. Consistentusage
and
agreement by
various
authorities
on
the
state of
the balance
in
different istoricaleras
would permit intercoder
agreement' to be used as the basis for accurate historical
measurement provided thesemeasurements re independent).'7
Lack of agreementon
classification, owever,
would suggest hat the collectiveudgmentofauthorities annot
be used as
the
basis formeasurement. t would also
support
the earlier conclusion
that
the
offensive/defensive
oncept needs to be definedmuch more explicitly
nd
rigorously
before t can be used in historicalanalysis.
There is ittledissentfrom
he view that the ate Middle Ages
was characterized by the
ascendancy
ofthe defense ver the offense
n
war. The Crusades
had
stimulated
revival
in military rchitecture, nd advances
in
the art of fortification
utpaced increases in
destructive
power
and
improvements
n
siege
tactics
(Fuller,
1945:68; Montross,
1960: 161-163; Ropp, 1962:20;
Nef,
1963:185; Wright,
1965:795, 1525; Osgood,
1967: 43; Brodie
and
Brodie, 1973:31; Bean,
1973:
207;
Preston
and
Wise,
1979:
68-69,
78,
81; Gilpin, 1981:62;
Montgomery, 1983:166-171).
As
a
result, only
a small
percentage
of
sieges
were
successful
Montgomery,
1983:
169).
The
defensive
power
of
the new concentric stone castles was reinforced
by logistical
considerations. Armies
could not be maintained
in
the field for
ong periods
and
invading
armies could not
easily bypassthe feudal castles (Bean, 1973:218). In addition,thereplacementofchain
mail by plate armor to protect the knight greatly reduced
his mobility (Montross,
1960:163;
Preston and
Wise, 1979:85)
and
the
pike-phalanx
system
was
becoming
increasingly nvulnerable tocavalry charge (Bean, 1973: 206).
It has also be argued that
the
success
of the
English
with the longbow increased
the tactical
superiority
f the
defense
Dupuy, 1980:88), presumably
because its
range
made it more difficult
or he
offense o close. For these
reasons,
ll of
the above authorities ccept
Oman's
(1
953:
356)
argumentthat by 1300 the defensiveobtained
an
almost complete
masteryover the
offensive.
8
lJy he mid-15thcenturyfire
ower had moved from n auxiliaryrole to one where t
was
central and decisive (Howard, 1976:33). Developments
in heavy artillery ed to a
sharp resurgence of offensive superiority. This was symbolized by the seige of
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JACKS. LEVY
231
Constantinople
n
1453,
where the
greatest
of all medieval
fortifications
as reduced
by
the Turks
n
less than two months.Dupuy (1980: 107) argues
that
by
the end of the
15th
century artillery
had made medieval fortifications bsolete.
In
addition, greater
mobility, nd hence greater offensive apability,
of this
artillery
s evidenced
by
the use
of horse-drawn rtillery nd chains of wagon forts' s mobile fortificationsmploying
bombards (Montross, 1960:189; Brodie, 1973:51; Quester, 1977:47-48; Dupuy,
1980: 100).
Small firearms
lso
began
to
have
a
significant
ffect n battle at the end of
the 15thcentury, ominating
over the
pike
and
leaving
the armored
knight
vulnerable
and lessening
his local defensive effectiveness
Nef, 1963:29; Quester, 1977:48-49).
Thus a drastic change
in
the offensive/
efensivebalance is said to occur close to
1450
(Fuller, 1945:81-87; Montross, 1960:193-95; Nef, 1963:185-186; Wright, 1965:294;
Bean, 1973:207; Quester, 1977:47-49;
Preston and
Wise, 1979:91-92; Dupuy,
1980:99, 106-107; McNeill, 1982:83; Montgomery, 1983:224).
There
is much debate
regarding
how
long
this
period
of offensive
uperiority
asted.
Wright (1965:294-295, 795) argues
that it lasted for two centuries until
1648,
a
view
supported byNef (1963:185) and Quester (1977:49). Wright 1965:294-95) pointsto
the ncrease
in
mobility
f
nfantry enerated by
the
gradual
abandonment of medieval
armor;
the
disappearance
of
pikemen,halberdiers,
nd
heavy cavalry;
and
the
adoption
throughoutEurope
of
Turkish
Janissary tactics,
with armies
equipped
with cutlass and
longbow
and
supported by lightcavalry
and
artillery.Mobility
was
furtherncreased
n
the first
alf
of he 17th entury
fterGustavus
Adolphus reduced theweightofweapons,
introduced the light field gun
and
the concept of mobile massed artilleryfire, and
adopted
a
more
flexible
tactical
organization (Dupuy, 1980:137-38; McNeill,
1982:123).
These arguments re rejected by other authorities
who
instead argue that the science
of
fortificationoon overcame the new
developments
n
artillery, eading
to a shift
ack
to the defenseby 1525 or so (Hale, 1957:274; Montross, 1960:211, 250-54; Bean,
1973:208; Howard, 1976:35;
Prestonand
Wise, 1979:106; McNeill, 1982:90; Montgo-
mery, 1983:224). Dupuy
and
Dupuy (1977:455) argues:
'A
16th-century ortress,
f
provided with adequate stocks of food
and
ammunition, was
as
impregnable as the
13th-century astle
had been
in
its
day.'
Thus there s no consensus as
to whether the
balance of
military echnology hroughout
most of the 16th
century
nd the
first
alf
of
the 17th
century
favored the offense r the defense.
Authorities enerally gree
that for
nearly century
fter
1650
the balance of
military
technology ay
with the defense.'9
This was
largely
due to the
development
of a new
science
offortifications
y
Vauban and other
military ngineers
n
the ate
17th
century
(Guerlac, 1969).
These elaborate fortifications
ecame
increasingly
nvulnerable to
artillery, nd frontal ssault became nearly mpossible. This was the age ofgeometric
warfare,
f
position
and maneuver
ratherthan
pitched
battle.
Military operations
were
centered
around fixed fortifications
nd were restricted
y poor logistical systems
nd
short
upply lines,
and
guns
were deficient
n
range, accuracy,
and
penetratingpower
(Preston
and
Wise, 1979:142-44; Dupuy, 1980:144).
Vauban also
developed
the
science
of
siegecraft
with his
system
of
approaches by parallels,
but
such
systems
generally
remained one
step
behind
systems
f fortifications.
The balance did not turn
against
the defense until 1789
(Nef, 1963:185; Wright,
1965:295; Osgood, 1967:46; Howard, 1976:55; Quester, 1977:57;
Preston and
Wise,
1979:142-143).
This
view is
inconsistent, owever,
with the
general characterization
of
the warfare
f Frederick the Great as offensive
n
nature,
based on
Frederick's
emphasis
on the decisiveness fthebattle rather han staticmaneuver,hiswillingness o takerisks,
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232
The
Offensive/Defensive
alance
of
Military Technology
his use of the oblique order as a tactical device, and his emphasis on mobility Dupuy,
1980:148-154). Preston
and
Wise (1979:147-149)
recognize this and say simply that
Frederickdiffered rom he norm of 18th-century arfare.
The hesitancy o characterize
the military
balance
during
this
period
as offensive robablyderivesfrom he fact that
Frederick's nnovations were primarily actical and strategic atherthan technological,
and because most historiansdescribingthemilitarybalance focus on the latter rather
than the
former.
Still,
it
cannot be denied that Frederick
demonstrated
what was
possible given the technology of the time. The recognition
by many that Frederick
constitutes n exception to
the static
character
of
18th-century
arfare
uggests hat
the
characterization
of
the
entire
18th-centurymilitary
balance
as
defensive
s
open
to
question.
The
Napoleonic period presented
a
similar set of problems; Napoleonic warfarewas
characterized by mobility
nd the
tactical offensive
ut thishad little o do withmilitary
technology
tself
Howard, 1976: 76). Preston
and Wise (1979: 189) argue that n some
respects Napoleon was an 'arch-reactionary toward
new weapons and technological
progressn the material ofwar' and that his successescame through 'more efficient se
of well-known
weapons.'
The
offensive haracter
ofNapoleonic warfare derived from
the generalship of Napoleon
and
his changes
in military organization, strategy, nd
tactics, ncluding the democratization of war and mass mobilization. The divisional
formation,
he
employment
of
ight nfantry, he use of the column of attack instead of
the ine,
a
more flexibleuse
of
artillery n the battlefield
o gain a superiority f fire t a
given point, and the logistical advantages of living
offthe country were particularly
important
n
contributing o mobility (Fuller, 1961; ch. 3; Hart, 1964: ch. 8; Ropp,
1962:98-102; Howard, 1976; Quester, 1977:ch.
7; Preston and Wise, 1979:ch. 12;
Strachan, 1983:
ch.
4).
These
authorities often
refer to the offensive haracter of
Napoleonic
warfarebut do not trace it to
the balance
of
military echnology tself.
Fewjudgments aremade regardingtheoffensive/defensivealance for he first alfof
the 19th
century,perhaps
because of the relative absence of
European
war
during
that
period. By mid-century,
r
by
1870
at
the
atest,
the balance
had
shifted
n
favorof the
defense,
which continued
through
World War I. Reference
s
made to the
holding power
of
entrenchments,
arbed
wire,
the machine
gun,
thebreech-loading rifle, hedifficulty
of frontal assualt
and
closing
with the
enemy,
and
to
the
generally
static nature of
warfare
as demonstrated
in
the American Civil
War,
the Russo-Turkish
and
Russo-Japanese Wars,
and others. As summarized by Boggs (1941: 76-77), beginning
with
the American Civil War and
extendingthrough World
War
I
there
was
a
trend
'toward enormous increase
in
the
masses of men under arms,
and
in
the range,
casualty-producing capacity,
and
rapidity
of fire
of infantryweapons,
without
any
counteractinggrowth n the means ofadvancing of thisfire.'This conclusion, ncluding
the view
that the
objective'
balance favored the
defense
n
1914,
is
supported by
Hart
(1932:72, 75),
Millis
(1956:167),
Montross
(1960:633,
649),
Fuller
(1961:chs. 8-9),
Ropp (1962:162), Wright (1965:1525),
Brodie and Brodie (1973:131-56),
Howard
(1976:103, 105),
Preston and Wise
(1979:266), Dupuy (1980:195, 199), Gilpin
(1981:62),
and
Montgomery (1983:441, 458, 472).
Some of these authorities
oncede,
however,
that
the
railroad
and the
development
of
motorized transport
and then the tank all
contributed
to
mobility
and
helped
the
offense,
s demonstrated
by
the
wars ofBismarck
Wright,1949:186,
Brodie and
Brodie,
1973:
148-50). Quester (1977:ch. 8) suggests
hat for
this
reason there
was for time a
net advantage
to
the offense.
Montross
(1960:649) rejects
thisview
and
argues
that the
offensive revailedin 1870because 'intelligent efensive acticswere seldomemployed.'
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JACK S. LEVY
233
A more seriousproblem s
raised by the gap
between the objective' balance ofmilitary
technology asjudged retrospectively y historians) nd
the balance as perceived by the
military nd political leaders of the time. This gap
widened shortly fter he American
Civil
War, the defensive lessons of which were
resisted by professional soldiers
(Montross, 1960:633; Fuller, 1961 ch. VI; McNeill, 1982:242). By the turn of the
century
Foch
and the French school (Possony
and Mantoux, 1969) epitomized the
viewpoint prevailing at the
time that military echnologyfavored the
offense,
nd
this
belief
structured the
war
plans
and
influenced the behavior of
the great powers
(Montross, 1960:685-88; Hart, 1973:72;
Quester, 1977:80; Jervis,
1978:190-91;
Dupuy, 1980:216;
Montgomery, 1983:441; Strachan, 1983:105-6).
The
French
Army
Field
Regulations of 1913 stated that 'the French
Army.. .admits
no law but
the
offensive' Tuchman,
1962:151).
Most
authorities
urrently rgue
thatthe
objective'
balance favored the defense.Vyvyan (1968:165)
argues:
'Never has the
dogma
of the
offensive een
more
prevalent; never,
because of
the
lead of
firepower
over
tactical
mobility,has that dogma
been less applicable.' Because of thisgap between
perceptions
and reality nd because of theambiguityregardingtheroleofperceptions ndefinitions
of
theoffensive/defensive
alance, the period prior toWorld War I becomes
difficult o
classify
n
termsof
the
offensive/defensivealance.
The interwarperiod
presents similargap between the analysis of
militaryhistorians
and
the perceptions
of
statesmen. Most military
historians rgue that by 1930 or so the
military echnology avored
the offense Hart, 1932: 76; Millis, 1956:
252-53;
Montross,
1960:
774; Fuller, 1961: ch. 12; Wright, 1965:
300-301; Gilpin, 1981: 62)
20
The
speed,
mobility, nd striking owerof
the armored divisionwithtacticalairsupporthad a
great
advantage over fielddefenses nd minorfortifications.
he new warfare
was
character-
ized
by fluidity nd speed,
deep penetrations, nd broad encirclements. he
stalemate
of
World
War
I
had been
transformed
nto
the blitzkrieg
f
World War II. Most observers t
the time, however, perceived that the military technology favored the defense
(Montross, 1960:766-67;
Wright, 1965:795; Gibson, 1969; Alexandroff
and Rose-
crance, 1977; Quester, 1977:
ch. l11;Jervis,978:192-93). This view was
disputed by the
leading proponents of armored warfare (Fuller,
de Gaulle, Guderian, and Tukha-
chevski)
but
theirview
was of
the
minority.21
Thus the balance
of
military echnology
n
the interwar
period
becomes difficult o
classify.
It is seen
that militaryhistorians nd others have evaluated
the
offensive/defensive
balance
of
the
last eight centuries
of
the Western nternational
system
n
terms
of
the
contribution f
weapons systems o tactical mobility
nd
territorial
enetration.
This
is
in
spite of their ack of formal
definition f the concept and the variety
of
theoretical
perspectives
urveyed earlier. This implicit agreement
on
the
appropriate
criterion
no
longer exists, given the decline in the dominance of land warfare and the rise of
deterrence based on
nuclear
punishment.
Because
of
the
lack of consensus
on the
meaning
of
theoffensive/defensivealance
in
the nuclear
age,
it would
not be usefulto
survey attempts to classify he balance during this
period.
Let
us now summarize the
extent
of
intercoder
agreement' regarding
the
offensive/defensive
alance
of
military
technology
for the
previous
eight
centuries.
There
is
unanimous agreement among the references
ited that the
period
from
1200
to
1450
was
characterized
by
defensive
uperiority
nd that the
period
from
1450
to
1525
was
characterized
by offensiveuperiority.
he
authorities
re
split
on the
1525
to 1650
period. There is complete
agreement that
the defensewas
superior
from
1650
to 1740.
Some
argue
that
this
defensive superiority ontinues until 1789, though
Frederick's
emphasison thetacticaloffensiveeads sometoassert heoppositeand others o make no
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234
The
Offensive/Defensive
alance f
Military
echnology
specific
valuation. The 1789
to
1815
period
is
generally regarded
to favor theoffense
but because
of nnovations n tacticsratherthan armaments.
Little
attention s
given
to
the
1815-1850 period.
The next
hundred
years pose
a
problem
because
of the
gap
between
the
objective
and
perceived
balance and the uncertain
conceptual statusof the
latter.These authorities enerally gree thatfrom1850 to 1925or so thebalance favored
the defensebut
that
nearly
all
statesmen
perceived
that
t favored the offense
rom1870
to 1914.
Similarly,
rom
1930
to 1945 the balance favoredthe offense ut that the
actors
themselves
perceived
that it favored thedefense.
A rough calculation shows the followingdegree
of consensus
among
our
authorities.
Of the 450 years
from
1495-1945,22 only
two
periods totaling
55
years
claim a definite
consensus of offensive uperiority.
Two
periods totaling
at most
130
years
claim
a
consensus
ofdefensive
uperiority.
our
periods constituting
minimum
of
265
years
are
uncertain, either because ofdivergingviews,
or because
of
the diametric
opposition
of
the evaluations
of
actors
and
analysts
and
the
ambiguous
conceptual
status
of
perceptions
n
definitions
f
the
balance.23 The
inescapable
conclusion
sthatthere xists
considerable divergenceofopinion among leading authoritiesregardingtheoffensive/
defensivebalance duringthe
ast five enturiesof the modern
era,
and
that
a method
of
'intercoder agreement' cannot be used to provide a basis forclassification
during this
period.
This
analysis suggests that the concept
of
the offensive/defensive
alance of
military echnologyneeds more theoretical ttention nd operational
definition efore t
can be
applied to systematic mpirical analysis.
Conclusions
The
concept
of
the offensive/defensivealance of military echnology
has been defined
in the literature n terms of the defeat of enemy armed forces, he ease of territorial
conquest, protection
of
population, tactical mobility, he characteristics f armaments,
the
relative
resources
xpended
on the
offense
nd
the defense,
nd
the ncentive
o
strike
first. have suggested an alternative definition based on attack/defense atios: the
offensive/defensive
alance is
inversely roportional to the ratio
of troops needed by
an
attacker to overcome an enemy defendingfixed positions.
While
many
of
these
individual
concepts may
be
useful,
they mean fundamentally
differenthings nd are not nterchangeable.This is particularly ruefor he nuclear era,
where
the end
of
the predominance of and warfare and the emergence
of deterrence
based
on
nuclear
punishmenthas clouded the offensive/defensive
istinction. ince the
dominant weapons inthe pre-nuclear ra were used primarily or he defeatof dversary
armed forces,whereas the most advanced weapons in the nuclear era are used by the
leading powers primarily or oercion and bargaining, definitionsfthe offensive/defen-
sive
balance that mightbe useful n the nuclear age may not be useful
n the pre-nuclear
era,
and
vice-versa.he concept ofthe ncentive o strike irst, hich
s often
sed
to
define
an
offensive
dvantage today, s not the ame as tactical mobility,which s widely
used to
define
an
offensive dvantage in earlier times.
The inclusion of fundamentally different oncepts under
the umbrella of the
offensive/defensivealance has created considerable confusion n
the iterature.Because
these
different oncepts are not interchangeable, theoreticalpropositions egarding the
causes
or
consequences of an offensive r defensive advantage
may be useful for one
definition
ut implausible for
nother.,
Weapons characteristics hat are stabilizing i.e.,
reduce the likelihood of war) in one era may be destabilizing n another. Hypotheses
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JACK S. LEVY 235
designedtoexplain
the
consequences of
a
military echnology avoring
actical
mobility
are not necessarily pplicable to
a
militarytechnology which creates
an
incentive to
strikefirst.
The ambiguityof the concept ofthe offensive/defensivealance is not ust a
function
ofthe nuclear/pre-nuclear istinction.Even concepts restricted o land warfare n the
pre-nuclear era have differentmeanings and may have different heoretical
conse-
quences. Our survey of attempts
by military historians and others to identifythe
offensive/defensivealance
in
various historical eras is relevanthere. In spite of
the
common focus on land warfare, there is remarkably little consensus
among these
authoritiesregarding the state of
the offensive/defensivealance in mostperiods.This
suggests
that
far
more
conceptual
clarification and
rigorous operational definition
are
necessary
before the
offensive/defensive
istinction can be useful
in
historical
analysis.
To conclude, the concept
of
the offensive/defensivealance is too vague and
encompassing
to
be useful
n
theoretical
nalysis.24Many
of
the ndividual variables that
have been incorporated nto themore general idea may themselves e useful,however.
Few would doubt the utility or
deterrence heory fthe concept ofthe ncentive o strike
first, orexample, and the
concept
of
attack/defense atios suggested here deserves
further xploration. Much more
conceptualization is necessarybeforethese ndividual
variables
can be
effectively
sed
in
empirical analysis,however.
There
is already
a
body
of
theoryregarding
the
consequences
of
an
incentive
to strikefirst.What is needed are
comparable theories regarding
the
consequences
of
military technologies
which
contribute o tactical
mobility
r to
the ease
of
territorial
onquest,
or which
reduce the
ratio of forces needed by the attacker
to
overcome
an
adversary defending
fixed
positions.
nteraction effects etween these
separate
variables also need
to
be
explored.
Further heoreticaldevelopmentof
thiskind s necessary,because
in
its absence there
s
littlereason to believe that these ndividual conceptshave an important mpact on war,
and thereforeittle
reason to
use
these concepts
in
empirical analysis.
Notes
1. The theoreticaliteraturesdivided nthe uestion f
whetherlliances ontribute
owar
or
topeace.
The
empirical videncesalsomixedBuenode
Mesquita nd Singer, 973;Levy,1981).Norhave he inkages
between rmsraces nd warsbeen thoroughly
stablishedWallace, 1979).
2.
Here
destabilizing'
s used to mean an increase n the ikelihood r
frequency
f
war.
3. The most notable exceptionhere is Quester
(1977), thoughthe connection etweenhis nominal
definitionsnd historical lassificationss
notalways lear.
4. For this eason am not oncerned erewithBoggs' 1941:63-72) distinctionetween he ffensivend
defensiven thegrand trategicevel',whichhe sees s basedon a 'political' r Clausewitzian heory f
war.Boggs uggestshat
n
this evel he
ffensive/defensive
istinction
s
based
on
the
political bjectives
toward
which
militaryperations
re
conducted,
nd that he
concept
s
generally
efined his
way by
military heorists:The differenceetween
ffensivend defensives
a
differencen objectives, ot a
differencen themeans mployed o reach he
objective.' Boggs, 941:72). This conceptualization ot
only nvolves he analytical roblem
f
distinguishing
n
principle etween offensive'
nd
'defensive'
policies which ary
rom
heater o theater nd
during he ourse f war) and the normouslyifficult
methodologicalroblemsnvolved
n
determiningstate's bjectivesr ntentions.t
also
confoundshe
two
mportantoncepts
f
hemotivations
f
tatesmen
nd
the
ffensive/defensivealance,
nd
deprives
the atter
f
ny ndependentmeaning.
5. Several spects
f
Wright's efinitionre open to
question.
he offensiveharacter f
weapon ystem
cannotbe udged onlyby ts ffectivenessgainst
n
enemy
nit ike
tself,
s
examples
f
ubmarines
r
antitank eapons learly
ndicate.
Wright's ocus
n
commerce
s
the bject
fnaval
warfarep. 793)
can
be questioned
n
thegrounds hat he
primary
imof
eapower
s
thedefeat
f
he dversary'savalforces
(Mahan, 1957). Nor s thenotion f n attack nenemymorale ery seful.
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236 The Offensive/Defensivealance of MilitaryTechnology
6. Similarly, t is not
at
all clear that territorial onquest and defeat
of
enemy forces hould both be included
in a single definition, or they do not necessarily go hand
in
hand. One obvious problem concerns naval
and air warfare,where the defeat
of
enemy forcesmay be directed toward control
of
ea
lanes or control of
the air, but certainly
not
territorial onquest per
e. Even
in
land
warfare,however,
one can
conceive
of a
strategy f deep territorial enetration that aims to bypass enemy military orcesrather than defeat them
(see, for xample, Vigor, 1983), or
a
strategy imed to defeat enemy forceswithout seizing territory. he
latter
is
also relevant to the nuclear age,
for a
counterforce trategymay be aimed at destroying nemy
forces
for
ts
own
sake and independently
of
both territorial ontrol or even coercion.
7.
When Clausewitz
(1976:114) argues repeatedly that the defense
is
the stronger form of warfare, he
conceives of defense
not
n
static terms
s
the warding off f blows, but rather as a dynamic conception of a
holding action until conditions are ripe for a counter-offensive Boggs, 1941: 71; Howard,
1983:
54).
8.
One
objective
indicator
of such
movement
is
the relative rates
of
advance
of
armies
in
different
eriods.
Record (1973),
for
xample,
has
surveyed
historical rates of
armored advance
in
this
century.These
rates
are affected
as much
by
the
numbers
of
troops
on
each
side, geographical terrain,
and
political
considerations
as
they
are
by
the balance
of
military technology,
so that
its use
as an indicator of
the
offensive/defensive
alance
is
open
to
question.
9 Wright 1965: 808) notes that
Fuller also
includes holding power (the ability
to
hold captured territory)
s
an important element
of an
offensiveweapon.
If
newly acquired territory
annot
be held there
s
little net
gain forthe offense,yet by definition t is even more importantfor the defenseto hold territory.Wright
(1965: 808)
also
argues
that
rapidity
of
fire
s
another weapons characteristic
that
provides
an
advantage
to the defense,
but it is
not clear whether
this
generalization applies beyond the case of the machine gun
and the static warfare
of
the late 19th and
early 20th centuries.
In
addition, Wright (1965: 808) argues
that
the range
of a
weapon
contributes a net
advantage
to
the defense because it keeps the offense t
a
distance and restricts
ts
mobility.
But
long-range weapons may contribute equally to the penetrating
power ofthe offense y weakening defensivefortifications rom distance. Boggs (1941:86), for xample,
argues
that
while heavy
mobile
artillery ontributes o both the tactical offensive nd defensive, ts triking
power against enemy fortifications ominates, thereby favoring the offense. More generally, Fuller
(1945:9) argues
that
range
is
the dominant
characteristic of
an
offensiveweapon.
10.
A
more esoteric
example
of tactical
doctrine
precluding
the
optimal
use
of
available
military echnology
can be
found
in
McNeill
(1982:9-11).
The Asians' use of war chariots as
fighting latforms
s
well
as for
transport
ncreased their
mobility
nd
firepowerbeginning
n
the
18th
century C,
but
the
Europeans
lost
these offensive dvantages because of doctrinewhich led them todismountfrom he chariots and fight n
foot as
infantry.
11. Note that
the
greater
the extent to
which
the
offensive/defensive
alance
is
affected
by
doctrinal
considerations,
the
less
its
utility
s
a
systemic-level oncept.
12.
One obvious
problem
here
is
what is
meant
by 'overcoming
an
adversary'.
Here
I
mean the
minimum
ratio of
forcesnecessary
to
give the attacker
a
higher probability
of
winning
than
losing, recognizing
that
stalemate
is
also
a
possible
outcome.
Other
definitions re
possible,
of
course
(a 50%
chance
of
victory,
r
of
avoiding defeat,
for
xample), but the specificcriterion
s
less mportant
than its consistent
pplication.
It
is
recognized,
of
course, that we must make the ceteris aribus assumption
in
order to
control for
asymmetries
n
terrain, ogistics, morale, training, and leadership, which are also important.
13. The fact that
a one-to-one ratio
is
widely regarded to be insufficient or attack provides a basis
for
an
interpretation of the common argument that the advantage in war always lies with the defense
(Clausewitz, 1976:114, 128; Machiavelli, Discourses,
k
3,
ch.
XLV; Dupuy, 1980:326).
To
say
this does
not mean, however, that the extentofthe advantage to the defense s constant.
14. The
theoreticalconsequences
of an
incentive to strikefirst ave been thoroughlyexplored by deterrence
theorists
Ellsberg, 1960; Schelling, 1960; Wagner, 1983).
15.
This
point
was
emphasized
to me
by
Harrison
Wagner.
16. This
survey begins
n
the ate Middle
Ages
because
references
o the
offensive/defensive
alance
in
earlier
times are
few
and
scattered,
as are
references
o
non-Western
systems.
17.
This
assmes that
the authorities consulted reflect representative ample
of
viewpoints
and
they
make
independent
evaluations of the
offensive/defensive
alance over time.
Admittedly,
here
may
be
some bias
in
the authorities consulted
in
the
following urvey,
for ll
are
Anglophones
who deal
primarily
with and
warfare
and
basically ignore
naval
and
air
considerations. The
land focus is not
a
problem,
for most
theoretical
treatments
f
the
offensive/defensive
alance define
t in
these
terms.
Nor is
there
good
reason
to believe that continental
military
historians would
reach
fundamentally
different
conclusions,
particularly
since
they
also would
tend
to
ignore naval
and air considerations. More
serious, however,
is
the
question
of
independent
measurement.
Presumably,
there
is some
reciprocal
and cumulative
relationship between these authorities, o that their classificationsofthe offensive/defensivealance are
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JACK
S.
LEVY
237
not truly ndependent. This is particularly likely given the absence of rigorous nominal or operational
definitions uiding their nalyses. It is
n
this ense that
a
greater variety
of
ources might be valuable. The
relative absence
of
explicit references o others' work, however, and the nconsistency f theirconclusions,
suggests that thisproblem is not too serious.
18. Gilpin (1981: 62) argues that the 14thcenturymarked a resurgenceofoffensive apabilities
because
of
the
invention
of
gunpowder and artillery,but
most
would regard
his
view
as
premature by
a
century.
19.
One
exception
here
may
be
Montross (1960:327),
who
implies
that
by
1670 there
may
have
been
'advantages to be gained by strikingfirst'.
20.
One
exception
is
Quester (1977:
ch.
11-12),
who seems to
suggest
that the balance
may
have
favored the
defense.
21. There is considerable evidence
contradicting
the assertion that the entire
German General
Staff
recognized
the
superiority
f
the offensive
Howard, 1976:131-33; Quester,
1977:ch.
12).
22.
The
year
1495 marks
the
origins
of the modern
great power system Levy,
1983a: ch.
2).
The
period before
1495
is
excluded because the
basic
criterion
of a
European sovereign state system
s not
satisfied,
o that
earlier
warfare cannot
easily
be
compared
with
modern
war behavior.
23.
For this
analysis
the
period
1850-1890 is
liberally
creditedto the defense and 1790-1815
is
credited
to the
offense,rather
than
being labelled uncertain. The 1495-1525 period is classified as offensive, nd
the
1650-1740 period
is
classified
s
defensive.The periods 1525-1650, 1740-1850, and 1890-1945 have been
classified as uncertain.
24. More
technically,
the
offensive/defensive
alance is a multidimensional
concept, but theories should
be
based
on
unidimensional concepts if at all possible (Shively, 1974: ch. 3).
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