the nile basin in a global perspective

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The Nile Basin in a Global PerspectiveOlli Varis aa IWRA, Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo, FinlandPublished online: 22 Jan 2009.

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International Water Resources AssociationWater International, Volume 25, Number 4, Pages 624�637, December 2000

624

The Nile Basin in a Global PerspectiveNatural, Human, and Socioeconomic Resource Nexus

Olli Varis, Member IWRA, Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo, Finland

Abstract: The Nile brings virtually no water to the sea. The mighty basin with 1/10 of Africa�s landarea and 1/3 of its population, has only 1/16 of its water. The riparian countries use practically all of theNile�s water and they face increasing challenges in terms of environmental degradation, food security,and socioeconomic development. The geopolitical situation blocks the integrated development of waterresources in the basin scale, yet the political environment may be improving. The Nile basin is among themost critical regions of the world in terms of water resources development. In this article, the trends ofthe major driving forces within the basin countries�population, urbanization, climate, agriculture,economy, human resources, and governance�are scrutinized from the viewpoint of their impacts onwater resources and their management. A comparison is made to four other critical macroregions: China,South Asia, Southeast Asia, and West Africa.

Keywords: Food production, human development, Nile, socioeconomy, urbanization, water resources.

Introduction

The Nile is definitely one of the earth�s most criticalriver basins in several respects. This basin of magnifi-cent, ancient civilizations is facing enormous challengesin relation to the region�s capacity to tackle its own devel-opment (Elhance, 1999). Comparing the basin�s problemsto some other critical regions of the world will help tounderstand better their magnitude, urgency, and complex-ity.

The Nile Basin is one of the five critical regions, whichhave been chosen as focal regions in the analysis of inter-connections between water, food, poverty, and urbaniza-tion (Varis, 1998a, 2001; Vakkilainen and Varis, 1999;Varis and Vakkilainen, 2001). The other regions are China,South Asia, Southeast Asia, and West Africa. Of the worldtotal, these areas account for 59 percent of the total popu-lation, 80 percent of urban population, 60 percent of ur-banization, 7 percent of GNP, 34 percent of arable land,48 percent of cereal production, 57 percent of irrigatedland, and 45 percent of fertilizer use.

This paper will compare some crucial developmenttendencies of these regions, relating particularly the situ-ation of the Nile basin to the other regions, with a timeperspective of 1970�2025 (i.e., one generation in retro-spect and one generation to the future). A set of observa-tions is made on the water development framework of theNile basin on the basis of this comparative analysis.

The Nile and its Basin

Geography, Politics, and ManagementThe Nile basin of 3 million km2 covers about 10 per-

cent of the area of Africa and 2.3 percent of the world�sland surface area. Characteristic of its hydrology and cli-mate is that its water sources are in pluvial regions inEast Africa. Its mighty tributaries are united in the Sudanand flow through a virtually rainless desert a few thou-sand kilometers to the Mediterranean Sea (Figure 1).

In the basin there are ten states, among which Eritreaand the Democratic Republic of Congo lie only to a lesserextent in the basin. Therefore, they are excluded fromthis analysis. In the other eight countries (Burundi, Egypt,Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, the Sudan, Tanzania, andUganda) the population is currently about 255 millionand is expected to grow to 360 million by 2025. About70 percent of the inhibitants live in the Nile basin. Thetotal area of these countries is 5.1 million km2. The GNPper capita is US$340 per annum. Arable land makes up40 million hectares of the region (the eight countriesmentioned), of which 13 percent is irrigated arable land,divided between Egypt (57 percent) and the Sudan (36percent). Egypt has 25 percent of the region�s popula-tion, and its share of the GNP approaches 60 percent.

Due to climatic conditions, agriculture in the WhiteNile countries, except parts of Tanzania and Kenya, isbased on the use of natural rain, and there is no large-

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The Nile Basin in a Global Perspective:Natural, Human, and Socioeconomic Resource Nexus 625

IWRA, Water International, Volume 25, Number 4, December 2000

scale irrigation. In Egypt and the Sudan, irrigation is ofmajor importance. The most significant evidence for thisis the tradition of several millennia of irrigation systems,which have a unique cultural value.

Over the past hundred years, several significant damsand barrages have been built on the Nile in the Sudan andEgypt, the most massive of which is the Aswan High Dam,which was closed in 1964, and completed in 1968. Thisdam provides an enormous live storage of over 130 km3,which allows multi-year storage of the Nile water. It hasalso an indisputable significance to Egypt�s national iden-tity and political stability. With the help of the dam it ispossible to collect the Nile�s floodwaters of which, be-fore the construction of the dam, 32.5 km3 per annum werenot exploited (Shahin, 1985). At present, virtually no Nilewater is flowing into the Mediterranean. Solely 0.4 km3

are released annually to the sea through the Rosetta,Damietta, and other major branches, and more water ispumped up into the coastal lagoons and lakes which drainto the sea. The remaining 94 km3 per annum, which flowsto Lake Aswan evaporates either from arable land, LakeAswan (11 km3), or in the form of different losses. Egypt�s

share of the Nile water increased by 7 km3, and the Sudan�sby 14 km3 per year.

International treaties on the use of the Nile watershave existed for decades. The best known Nile WaterTreaty originates from 1920, and it has been strength-ened and amended several times. Its present form datesfrom November 4, 1959. It has proven to be functional,especially on the issue of dividing the river�s water be-tween Egypt and the Sudan. The treaty is under great pres-sure from the other riparian nations, particularly fromEthiopia, as they want to enhance irrigation and hydro-power production (Magloff, 1999). In addition, at leastsix other major agreements exist regarding the utilizationof the Nile�s waters in the past few decades. None hasincluded more than three nations (Smith, 1996; TDFF,2000; Ilomäki, 2000). Obviously, such a fractured ap-proach does not serve the goals of basinwide manage-ment strategy, nor does it serve to promote the interestsof all riparian nations in an equitable way.

A historical burden is due to the former colonial ap-proach of bilateral treaties: Between 1891 and 1952, atleast ten treaties or agreements were signed. In each ofthem, Britain was one of the two partners (TDFF, 2000).The other partners included Italy, Belgium, Congo, Ethio-pia, and Egypt. The present needs to integrated, basinwidemanagement would require a completely different ap-proach: all riparian nations should be involved, and shouldhave a feeling of ownership to a common resource.

As an economic and military power, Egypt is supe-rior to the other region�s nations. It objects projects, whichattempt to reduce the runoff in Aswan. Among the coun-tries of the region, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Burundi,and Rwanda have suffered from serious internal crises.Tanzania on the brink of famine, and Kenya in a continu-ally volatile state, are also politically unstable. Egypt hashad a more stable recent history: however, it has not beenfully free of conflicts and violence. Political instabilityand the uncertainties it brings along are noticeable in theregion.

The Blue Nile, Atbara, and SobatThe Blue Nile is by far the largest tributary in terms

of water flow. Its share of the water that reaches Aswanin Egypt is 64 percent. The other two main branches thatoriginate from Ethiopian Highlands, Atbara and Sobat,bring 21 percent of the water, whereas the contribution ofthe longest arm, the White Nile (upstream of Malakal,the Sudan), is only 15 percent (Hurst et al., 1959).

There are propositions that it would be more efficientto grow grain in Ethiopia than in Egypt, since this wouldsave huge amounts of water due to lower evaporationlosses (Woube, 1994). The losses that could, in theory,be controlled by hydraulic constructions, amount to 6 km3

(Allam et al., 1999). This option, evidently, faces strongopposition in Egypt. More modestly, the historic droitacquis of Egypt to the Nile�s waters has been questioned

Figure 1. Map of the Nile and the study regions.

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626 O. Varis


many times. Since �the time immemorial� Egypt has con-sidered itself as �a gift of the Nile� and sees that it has ahistorical �priority of appropriation� of the river�s watersthat all upstream nations must honor (Tadesse, 1998).Ethiopia clearly sees itself as the greatest provider of this�gift� to Egypt. This situation does not only draw fromthe ancient times, but also from the colonial history ofthe 19th and 20th centuries (El-Atawy, 1996), as well asfrom the complicated peace process in the Middle Eastthat has provided Egypt a special situation among the Nilebasin nations.

The Upper White NileThe White Nile loses 96 percent of its rainfall water

before the river reaches Khartoum. The huge evaporationlosses at Bahr El-Ghazal and other regions upstream ofMalakal in the southern Sudan could be reduced by bring-ing the construction of the Jonglei canal to an end. INBA(1996) and Allam et al. (1999) present a figure as high as51 km3 a year as the volume of evaporation losses thatcould be controlled in the White Nile. This figure sumsup the whole controllable potential in the regions of KiogaLake, Bahr El-Jebel, and the Sudd Area (including Jongleiand Bahr El-Gazal). Abu-Zeid (1993) presents a figure of18 km3 a year, which can realistically be added to theNile flow by such projects. According to Stoner (1990),only the Phase I of the Jonglei canal is expected to becompleted before 2025. This would add the water flow tothe High Aswan Dam by 2 km3 a year (Elarabawy et al.,1998).

Knowing the aversion of multilateral financing orga-nizations to fund these canal projects (given their vastenvironmental consequences) as well as political reali-ties, it is questionable whether the next decades will seemuch more intensive water use along the White Nile.

EgyptEgypt is likely to be an exception in many respects

including the efficiency issue. It is striving for efficiencyin its water use, Egypt is expected to make further progressin this field. Its current, already high, water use efficiencycan further be enhanced to a notable extent. Elarabawy etal. (1998) have calculated that Egypt�s present water useof 56 km3 a year could be elevated up 80 km3 by the year2030. This is required to facilitate the realization of theSouth Valley (Toshka canal) Project, which would allowthe reclamation of 2,100 km2 of desert to agricultural use,by abstracting five km3 a year from Lake Aswan. Theextensions required in the supply side (from 56 to 80 km3)can be sustained by increased water use efficiency plusgroundwater mining in the Egyptian territory. Irrigationimprovement would save five, reuse of drainage and sew-age water 10.4, catching rainfall and flash floods one, andgroundwater use 7.5 km3 per year till 2030. Most mean-ingful implications to agriculture will be the strong re-duction of the area of water-demanding crops, particularly

rice and sugar cane (Magloff, 1999).Egypt�s ambition for rural development through wa-

ter investments is not only for producing more food andother crops. It is obviously also for providing employ-ment for the rural population. Otherwise, the urban areas,the delta in particular, would be subjected to much higherimmigration pressure than at present.

Besides controlling quantitative water losses, thewater pollution control grows gradually in importancewithin the Nile basin. Although the Nile is not among theworld�s most polluted rivers (UNEP, 1995), it has severelocal pollution problems, which culminate in the delta�spoor water quality. Water pollution control has been ac-knowledged by the policy makers in Egypt, but the situa-tion in the whole basin scale is towards worse. Betterpollution control is a necessity in the coming years in thiswater stressed basin.

Water Development Drivers: Regional Outlook

PopulationPopulation growth sets a heavy burden on the devel-

opment possibilities of the Nile Basin countries. Whencomparing the growth rates among the five study regions,the first observation is that the African rates are higherthan elsewhere (Figure 2). Those of the Nile and the WestAfrica regions have varied around 2.6�2.8 percent overdecades, and according to the UN projections, they arenot expected to come down soon. The regions in Asia, onthe contrary, show remarkable decline in populationgrowth rate after 1970. According to UN (1994), this ten-dency is projected to continue.

The share of the world�s total population is steadilygrowing from the 55 percent of 1970, it is expected toreach 63 percent, by 2050. The Nile region�s share growsfrom 3.2 percent to 7 percent; the number of humans inthe region grows 5.9-fold in 80 years. The correspondingfigure for the West Africa region is 6.6-fold, for China 2,South Asia 3.4, and Southeast Asia 3-fold. Figure 2 showsthe projections for these regions.

UrbanizationUrbanization will perhaps be an even more problem-

atic and momentous issue than population growth (Fig-ure 3). Almost all population growth occurs in cities. It isan important issue and is considered a driving force forhumans and their environment: natural, social, or eco-nomic. Globally, rural and urban populations are nowequal size. By 2025, the rural population will not grow,yet the urban population will double.

In the Nile region, the urbanization rate was 20 per-cent in 1970, is now around 27 percent, and is expected togrow to 43 percent till 2025. In Egypt, the situation is andwill be close to the world average. The region�s urbanpopulation was 27 million in 1970, and is expected togrow 7.5-fold in 55 years, to 208 millions in 2025. In

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West Africa, the growth will be 10-fold, and in the Asianregions 5 to 5.5-fold.

Whereas urbanization is an enormous issue whichinduces far-reaching problems of many kind, these prob-lems are perhaps still smaller than those that would becreated if the rural population stayed in villages, wherethe population growth rate is much higher than in urbanareas, and opportunities for alternative employment arevery limited.

Water ResourcesA comparison of populations on each study region

with available runoff reveals, that the Nile region is byfar the most water scarce (Figure 4). 1,000 m3 of waterper capita per year is often used as a critical water quan-tity, below which a serious water shortage is faced. In thecase of the Nile Region, the population in the Nile basinis included (70 percent of total population).

Variations and Changes in ClimateThe study regions coincide well with the area called

the equatorial belt (Varis, 1998b). From that belt, onlythe northern part of South America, from mid-Brazil tonorthern Peru is excluded. The belt covers the range ofthe seasonal movement of the intertropical convergencezone, in which the trade winds from the both hemispheres

confront, causing rainfall. Its location varies seasonally,being in the extreme north during the northern hemispheresummer, and in extreme south in the southern hemispheresummer.

In the 20th century, the strongest climatic trends havebeen the temperature growth and precipitation decreasein West Africa (Hulme, 1992; IPCC, 1998). In East Af-rica, the trends have not been as evident, although theeastern Sahelian zone, particularly the Sudan, Eritrea,Ethiopia, and Somalia, have also become drier. The Sudanhas been subjected to a growing temperature trend.

The belt is subjected to highest uncertainties of anyclimatic zone in the climate change projections (IPCC,1996), and in the future, it will be affected more by otherglobal changes such as population growth, urbanization,industrialization, and political-economic transitions, thanother parts of the world. This makes the economies par-ticularly sensitive to climatic variations and changes.Table 1 shows some outlines of current climate projec-tions for the Nile basin (IPCC, 1996, 1998; Varis, 1998b).

There are some interesting and important connectionsof regional climates around the equator. The monsoon

Nile:

Population growth

per 25 years

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140% 160%

Burundi

Egypt

Ethiopia

Kenya

Rwanda

Sudan

Tanzania

Uganda

Regions:

Population growth

per 25 years

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140% 160%

All others

China

S Asia

SE Asia

Nile

W Africa

World

Figure 2. The population doubles in one generation in many countries, particularly in Africa. The rates are adjusted for 25 years for the periods1970�1995, 1995�2025, and 2025�2050 (from the top). Source: UN (1994).

Nile: Urban population

growth per 25 years

0% 100% 200% 300% 400% 500% 600%

Burundi

Egy pt

Et hiop ia

Kenya

Rwanda

Sudan

Tanz ania

Uganda

Figure 3. The urban population will continue to even quadruple inone generation. The rates are adjusted for 25 years for the periods1975�2000 and 2000�2025 (from the top). Source: UN (1994).

Runoff per capita

(1,000 m3 per year)

0.1

1

10

100

Eu

rop

e

As

ia

Afr

ica

N &

C A

me

ric

a

S A

me

ric

a

Au

str

ali

a,

Oc

ea

nia

Ch

ina

, 1

99

5

20

25

20

50

S A

sia

, 1

99

5

20

25

20

50

SE

As

ia,

19

95

20

25

20

50

Nil

e R

eg

ion

, 1

99

5

20

25

20

50

W A

fric

a,

199

5

20

25

20

50

1995

Figure 4. Runoff per capita in each continent in 1995, and in eachregion Forecasts to 2025 and 2050 are calculated using the opulationprojections of UN (1994) and Postel�s runoff estimates.Source:(Postel et al. (1996); SEI (1997).

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patterns and, consequently, the wetness of rainy seasonsare strongly interrelated within the intertropical zone. Forinstance, the rainfall anomalies in the source area of theNile�the Ethiopia-Sudan region�are very closely re-lated to the Indian summer monsoon, i.e., the rainy sea-son (Camberlin, 1997). The Asian summer monsoons indifferent regions have similar, high correlations (Kitoh etal., 1997; Ose et al., 1997).

EconomyIn the wealthiest study region, Southeast Asia, GNP

per capita has remained an order of magnitude below theaverage for the countries outside the regions during thelast 25 years, in spite of its fast growth. The African re-gions have had virtually no growth in the last decades.The regions� share of the world�s total GNP has fallen atthe same time from 11 to 7 percent although their propor-tion of the population has risen from 55 to 59 percent.The GNP share that the African regions of the world totalhas fallen from 1.4 percent to less than 0.6 percent in 1970-

95, even if the population has risen from 6.3 percent to8.1 percent (Figure 5).

The development of efficiency of the study regioneconomies is not on a good track. An indicator for this isthe amount of emissions produced for the earned unit ofmoney. While the share of the regions of the world�s eco-nomic activity has dropped sharply between 1970 and1992, their contribution to the global CO

2 emissions has

more than doubled (Figure 5).The Nile region has seen a redistribution of wealth in

the past decades: those better off have become richer,whereas the poorest have become poorer. Egypt�s sharehas grown rapidly from 40 percent to 65 percent of theregional GNP. Egypt has 25 percent of the region�s popu-lation. With its GNP per capita of US$1,200, it approachesthe upper limit of low-income economies. The rest of theregion has GNP per capita less than 20 percent of that ofEgypt. Egypt has been much more successful in attract-ing foreign aid than its greatest rivals for the Nile water,Ethiopia and the Sudan (Table 2). The Nile region�s shareof global gross private capital flows is minor, only 0.08

Table 1. Future Projections for Temperature, Preciptation, and River Runoff in the Nile Region

Area Temperature Preciptation Runoff

Uncertainty High Very high Extreme

Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi Modest increase, sensitivity Rainfall changes are to be Slight increasegrows towards inland small in comparison to present-

Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia day variation, yet slight increase Highly inconsistentis expected.

The Sudan, Egypt Projections are inconsistent Highly inconsistent,more prone to decrease

S h a r e o f w o r l d ' s

G N P

0 %

2 %

4 %

6 %

8 %

1 0 %

1 2 %

1 4 %

1 6 %

1 8 %

2 0 %

1 9 7 0 1 9 9 2

W A f r i c a

N i l e

S E A s i a

S A s i a

C h i n a

In d u s tr ia l C O 2 e m is s i o n s

o f w o r l d to t a l

0 %

2 %

4 %

6 %

8 %

1 0 %

1 2 %

1 4 %

1 6 %

1 8 %

2 0 %

1 9 7 0 1 9 9 2

W A f r ic a

N il e

S E A s ia

S A s ia

C h i n a

G N P : T h e N ile R e g io n

0 %

2 0 %

4 0 %

6 0 %

8 0 %

1 0 0 %

1 9 7 0 1 9 7 6 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 4

E t h i o p ia

E g y p t

B u r u n d i

K e n y aR w a n d a

S u d a n

T a n z a n i a

U g a n d a

Figure 5. Compared with the world total situation, the economic capacity of the regions (except Southeast Asia) has dropped to one halfwithin one generation, but the CO

2 emissions have more than doubled. Egypt�s share of the Nile region�s GNP has grown from 2/5 to 3/5 in

1970�1992 (data: World Bank, 1997a, 1999).

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percent, four-fifths of this being Egypt�s share. The studyregions account only for 2.8 percent of all private capitalflows in the world (World Bank, 1999).

Human DevelopmentWhen comparing levels of social indicators, many of

the same features exist as in economic development (Fig-ure 6). Southeast Asia has the lowest illiteracy rates forboth males and females, and the discrepancy betweenthose two are smaller than in the other regions. Chinascores second, but is approaching the rates of SoutheastAsia. South Asia is doing better, though than the Africanregions in terms of economy, although its illiteracy is wellbelow that of the Nile basin, and at the same level thanthat of West Africa. These regions suffer still from a widegender gap.

UNDP�s Human Development Index (HDI) rankingtakes into account wealth, education, and public health.Measured with this combined index, the Nile region coun-tries rank in the lower or middle category among the studyregion countries. It is interesting to note the clear relationbetween HDI and Gross Domestic Product per capita (Fig-ure 7). Egypt scores highest and Ethiopia lowest. Thecorrespondence between HDI and GNP is strong, yet notperfect. The economic performance of Tanzania, Kenya,and Rwanda is poor in comparison to their human devel-opment.

Food ProductionAgricultural Inputs and OutputsSouth Asia has a large amount of irrigated land per

person, and the fertilizer use is low; approximately one-fourth of the Chinese level (Figure 8). The fertilizer usein African regions is much below the South Asian level,and one order of magnitude smaller than in China. Theexception is Egypt, which is close to the Chinese level.

In the period 1970�1995, the study regions� share ofthe world�s arable land area has remained around one-third, whereas their share of grain production has increasedfrom 45 percent to 48 percent. Arable land area per capitahas fallen by about one-third except for West Africa wherethe fall has been only about 20 percent. The extent ofboth irrigation and fertilization has increased markedly.Yet the former, if calculated per capita, has decreased inmore cases than it has increased (Figure 8). The regions�share of the total irrigated arable land on the earth hasremained at 42 percent, the share of the use of fertilizersof the global use has risen from 13 percent to 45 percent.China�s share alone has risen from 6 to 24 percent. Incountries outside the regions, irrigation area has remainedunchanged whereas the use of fertilizers has decreased.

Table 2. Rwanda was the Biggest Receptor of Foreign Aid PerCapita, and the Sudan the Smallest in 1997. Egypt Receives 4.5

Times the Amount of the Sudan. For Comparisons, the US Aid toIsrael is 30 Times the Total Foreign Aid to the Sudan,

as Calculated Per Person

Aid GNP

Billion % of Per Capita Per Capita US$ GNP US$ US$

Rwanda 0.59 32 75 210Uganda 0.18 13 41 330Egypt 1.9 2.5 32 1,200Tanzania 0.96 13 31 210Burundi 0.12 12 19 140Kenya 0.46 4.6 16 340Ethiopia 0.64 10 11 110Sudan 0.19 2.1 7 290

Aid to Israel 1.2 1.2 204 16,180

Source: World Bank, 1999.

Adult illiteracy,

females 19 95 (% )

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

1 00

Ch

ina

S A

sia

SE

A

sia

Nil

e

W A

fric

a

Adult illite racy,

m ales 1 995 (% )

0

1 0

2 0

3 0

4 0

5 0

6 0

7 0

8 0

9 0

10 0

Ch

ina

S A

sia

SE

A

sia

Nil

e

W A

fric

a

Adult illiteracy , Nile

R egion (1 995)

0

1 0

2 0

3 0

4 0

5 0

6 0

7 0

8 0

9 0

10 0

Bu

ru

nd

i

Eg

yp

t

Eth

iop

ia

Ke

ny

a

Rw

an

da

Su

da

n

Ta

nz

an

ia

Ug

an

da

F em a le

M a le

Figure 6. The regions suffer from a wide gender gap, and the illit-eracy rates are high, particularly in S Asia and African regions.Source: World Bank, 1997b.

G DP vs HDI in 1997

100

1000

10000

100000

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

Human development index (HDI)

GD

P p

er

ca

pit

a (

US

$)

China

S Asia

SE Asia

Nile

W Africa

Egy pt

Kenya

Tanz an ia

Uganda

Rw anda

Et hiopia

S udan

Figure 7. The Nile region countries belong to the low and mid-cat-egories of all study region countries with respect to human develop-ment, as measured by UNDP�s Human Development Index (HDI).Data: UNDP (1999).

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This can be explained to a large extent by political changesover the last ten years in the states of the former USSR,and their effect on production structures.

Crop PotentialAfter FAO (Alexandratos, 1995), the region with least

potential for extending rainfed arable land is South Asiawith the maximal 20 percent growth of the present area.China is excluded from the assessment, but it has evenless potential than South Asia: its arable area is expectedto decrease by at least 10 percent by 2030 (Niu and Har-ris, 1996).

The Nile region has the largest potential: it exploitsless than 30 percent of its potential cropland. Here theconstraints are elsewhere: practically all the water of thebasin is already utilized. Therefore, most of the land po-tential is expected to remain uncultivated though the pres-sures for more extensive agricultural production aregrowing rapidly. Rainfed production would possibly havethe biggest potential in the south, particularly if the evapo-ration losses do not grow markedly from the present level.Small-scale irrigation could also be a plausible option(Vaishnav, 1994).

Food SecurityHow can the regions feed themselves in coming years,

given the heavy burdens of population growth and urban-ization? Today, approximately every sixth human beingsuffers from food insecurity. In sub-Saharan Africa, over40 percent of population is food insecure, and in SouthAsia, almost 60 percent of children are chronically un-dernourished. Global food security projections suggestbetter days to come, yet the optimism is largely based onthe assumption that low-income countries will increasetheir food imports (Figure 9). This means, that theireconomy should grow steadily, and food markets shouldbe stable.

The whole Nile region except Uganda belongs toFAO�s low-income food-deficit category. Each countryexcept Egypt has its daily calorie input per capita aroundor below FAO�s critical level 2,200. In Egypt, it was alsothere in the 1960s but has now reached the prevailing levelof industrial countries, 3,300. Each country has been in-cluded in FAO�s emergency programs in the recent past(FAO, 1998).

The present level of food production in the Nile re-gion is insufficient (Figure 10). All the study regions mustimport considerable amounts of food, but the Nile regionhas increased its imports more than the others, and leadsin food importation and food aid. The situation can beseen as a triangle of the following issues: import, malnu-trition, and growing production (Box 1). The region�s re-ality has been a melange of these three issues in the past;how can it manage with overcoming malnutrition and star-vation�will it be more feasible with growing imports orgrowing production? The global situation is somewhatdiscouraging: arable land does not grow, but populationdoes. Investments in agricultural inputs grew in the past,but this trend has ceased in the last two decades. Marketprices and food stocks have gone down as well, discour-aging the investments in food production (Alexandratos,1995; World Bank, 1997b).

There are two interesting dichotomies in food andagriculture of the Nile basin. First, Egypt has the highestper capita food supply, although it relies mostly on foodimports. Second, although food security is a major social

Production

(kg/person)

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19 70 1994

China

N ile

Egypt

O thers

W Africa

S As ia

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Inputs Outputs

Figure 8. Agricultural inputs and outputs by region. (Data: WorldBank, 1997b).

Net meat imports by

developing regions

(million tons)

-2

0

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4

6

8

10

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1993 2020

Lat in

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N Afric a

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(incl .

China)

Figure 9. Food insecurity is projected to grow in Sub-Saharan Africaand food imports to increase in Africa and Asia (IFPRI, 1997).

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problem in the basin, non-food products�such as fibercrops�give often more wealth to the farmer per used unitof water. Accordingly, the food security issue is increas-ingly a poverty-related social issue, as the trade barriersare brought down to allow opening markets.

Governance and Policy EnvironmentNational Institutions and Corruption PerceptionThere are severe shortcomings in national institutions

within the Nile region, which hamper water resourcesdevelopment. Perhaps the most cited indicator to describea country�s governance and government institutions is theCorruption Perception Index (CPI) by Transparency In-ternational.

The 1999 CPI is described as follows: �1999 CPIScore relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption asseen by business people, risk analysts, and the generalpublic, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highlycorrupt).� It has been defined by combining corruptioninformation from numerous sources (Lambsdorff, 1999).

Developing countries have not been well representedin these analyses, yet each year the coverage becomessomewhat better. Nineteen study region countries wereincluded in the 1999 update (Figure 12). A sad observa-tion is that almost all of the study region countries areperceived as very severely corrupted. The only exceptionsare Singapore and Hong Kong. Less coincidentally though,the CPI relates very clearly to GNP per capita, even bet-ter than GNP growth.

Informal SectorA formal institutional system that has malfunctions

allows the informal sector a good environment to flour-

ish. This sector, leaning largely on informal institutions,grows rapidly in developing and transitional countries,and already incorporates a majority of urban dwellers inthe world. The informal sector pays virtually no taxes, ispartly outside the legal system and receives only mar-ginal services from the government, etc. Officially, in mostcountries, its volume is strongly understated, even disre-garded, although a grand share of citizens, particularlythe poor, are fully dependent on that sector.

The informal sector is often of high economic impor-tance to the country. It runs with low administrationalcosts, it is rather self-contained, it recycles many materi-als, and it is in many respects very productive and inno-vative (i.e., economics). Authorities are often apathetictowards this sector (i.e., politics), as it provides potential,inexpensive labor and product supply to the formal sec-tor, as well as other assets. Attempts to control this sectorare not always as strong as they could be.

In Africa, the links between formal and informal sec-tors tend to be weak (Fidler and Webster, 1996). There-fore, most African countries lack a genuinely integratedeconomy. They have very distinctively two parallel econo-mies�the formal and informal one. After Coville (1996),informal areas occupy 24 percent of the area of greaterCairo, and house 46 percent of its people. The informalsector grows much faster than the formal sector almostthroughout Africa.

Missing property rights leads to extreme informaltransaction costs for water. In the outset, the rights arenot based on clear, formal property rights. Instead, theyare customary, embedded on local practices and traditions.Every individual needs a certain supply of water each day.Therefore, water is a lucrative good for making business,particularly in urban squatter settlements, where the tra-ditions and old customary rights to water have faded away.The term �hidden water economy� is often used in thiscontext. In Dar-Es-Salaam, the poor pay ten times as muchas the formal dwellers for water (UNCHS, 1996).

Informal water use is also a big issue in rural areas.FAO (1996) estimates, that informal irrigation coversbetween 35 percent and 50 percent of the total irrigatedland in Africa. This is primarily an illegal activity, whichtends to develop around formal irrigation schemes. De-spite being merely illegal, it has an extremely vital andimportant function in increasing food security and pro-viding nutrition locally to the rural poor, particularly dur-ing droughts. It is questionable whether official statisticsinclude this activity.

Whereas the current tendency with formal water in-stitutions is to target cost recovery, the costs of servicesare covered by user fees, the same logic is difficult to putin work in the informal sector. The extreme transactioncosts of water vendors never circulate back and translateto a better service, but marginally. The service is main-tained at the minimum level, and the profits go elsewhere.In irrigation management, the informal markets, however,

Nile

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120%

Egypt

Ethiopia

Kenya

Rwanda

Sudan

Tanzania

Uganda

Import

Aid?

1980-1984

1990-19940% 10% 20%

China

S Asia

SE Asia

Nile

W Africa

1980-84

1990-94

Cereal aid

(% of domestic production)

Figure 10. Cereal import and aid related to domestic grain produc-tion in the Nile region�s countries. It has relied much more on cerealaid than the other regions (data: World Bank, 1997b).

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Box 1. The Sudan�s Food Security Prospects

Take the situation of the Sudan as an example of the inter-play of a melange of constraints to food production and exploita-tion of water resources. The country has been mentioned to have alarge potential of becoming the food basket of East Africa manytimes over the years. After FAO, the Sudan�s potential grainlandis 540 percent of the 1995 level. The country�s renewable watersupply amounts to 154 km3 in a year. These figures suggest thatwith the structure and efficiency of Egypt�s agriculture in 1990the Sudan should be able to feed 80 million people (in 1990, Egyptfed its 52.4 million people with the self-sufficiency rate of 56 per-cent [Alexandratos, 1995] using 55.5 km3 of water). The Sudanhas at present 30 million people. Given the fact, that Egypt andmany other countries are constantly able to improve its water useefficiency, figures as high as 100 million have been proposed asthe population that the Sudan could feed. In addition, both coun-tries produce considerable amounts of cotton, which cannot easilybe converted to food production.

The situation in reality, however, is far from such simplicity.The food security situation of the Sudan has been chronically poorover decades, due to a complex situation of droughts, desertifica-tion, internal conflicts, and economic problems (Olsson, 1993;Nelan, 1998). According to SEI (1997), the Sudan�s water with-drawals were 17.8 km3 in 1995, and total consumptive use (theamount not returning to the river) was 9.19 km3 (IWMI, 1999).The Nile�s runoff that reaches Lake Aswan is 94 km3. The Sudan�sshare of that water, according to the Nile Water Treaty, is 18 km3

each year, which is close to the present level of water withdraw-als.

There are problems mobilizing the Sudan�s water resourcesin the upper White Nile. The huge evaporation losses should ei-

The S udan : H um an n utritio n vs.

g rain p ro du ctio n area in 2025

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100

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Ca lorie input pe r ca pita

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FA O's middle

nutr ition level

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(prevalent in

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Sudan in

1995

The S u dan : H um an nu tritio n vs.

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Sudan in

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Sudan's share

of Nile w ater

ther be eliminated by the construction of canals, or those re-gions should be turned to grain production. These options, how-ever, appear unrealistic within the time frame of 2025, exceptpossibly the elimination of evaporation losses of 2 km3

(Elarabawy et al., 1998).The Sudan�s grainland and water demands in 2025, using

IWMI�s (1999) Podium model should be calculated (Figure 11).The import and export levels, the share of animal feed grain,and the irrigation intensity were assumed to remain at the presentlevel. These results show, that given the population growth from28.1 to 58.4 in 1995-2025, even the maintenance of the presentlevel of nutrition (which is below the limit of chronic undernu-trition), would require 26 km3 of water, and almost tripling thegrainland area. The required water volume is well above theSudan�s share of the Nile�s water. Yet, this could be theoreti-cally managed if a part of the irrigated production were real-ized in southern regions, upstream of Malakal.

The water and land demands grow rapidly with improvinglevel of nutrition. Reaching the world�s 1995 average level of2,700 calories per person in a day, would require almost qua-drupling the present grainland area, and the consumption of 35km3 of water. Taking Egypt�s calorie consumption per person,3,300, as a reference, the grainland area should grow 470%,and 43 km3 of water would be needed each year. These figuresare unfortunately beyond any realistic optimism. They wouldrequire heavy and rapid investments to irrigated agriculture inregions such as the Sudd, Bahr El-Ghazal, and Bahr El-Jebel.Those regions have been suffering dramatically from militaryconflicts since the mid-1980s. Over 1.5 million people havebeen killed by hostilities and associated famines (Nelan, 1998).

Figure 11. The Sudan�s water constraint to food self-sufficiency. Water is not the only problem, however. Calculated using IWMI�s(1999) Podium model.

have in several cases yielded improved water use effi-ciency and distribution system improvements, and cantherefore be seen as a necessary evolution of the rigidformal system (FAO, 1996; Dick, 1997).

Owing to the importance and high volume of the in-formal sector in Africa, the official statistics are oftenvery inaccurate. No comparable statistics exist on the in-formal sector itself from East Africa. The empowermentof the government is the weaker larger corruption is andthe larger the coverage of the informal sector. Even if

water legislation and master plans exist, their implemen-tation is handicapped by the weak role of the government(Box 2).

Nile Region�s Key Challenges

Out of Vicious CirclesWhat happens when a river can no longer nourish the

population in its basin? Basically, there are three options:

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mass starvation, importation of food, or increase of basin�sfood production. In the case of the Nile region, all of thesebelong to today�s reality. Food security problems withboth famines and chronic malnutrition are widespread.The situation needs massive action in order to get better.Given the population growth of six to seven million peopleeach year, the task is not easy. This paper showed as anexample how great the challenges are for the Sudan. Thesecond option, importation of food, is inevitable in mostcountries. It, however, requires foreign exchange and capi-tal, which are short in most of the region�s countries. Alsothe political push must be there. For the third option, in-creasing food production in the basin, there is still muchpotential. During the last few decades, however, the foodproduction as calculated per capita has shown only minorincrease. The unit yields are well below the level of theAsian study regions.

In societies subjected to stresses from several direc-tions, global and regional changes tend to accelerate thecomplicated, mutually interconnected vicious circles thatfeed each other (Box 3). Societies suffering from the vi-cious circle malaise are vulnerable to even slight externalchanges, extremes in the climatic variability, in politicalstability, or in economical conditions. To break the circles,

a society must have capacity to take a control over itsdevelopment. Such capacity consists of human, techno-logical, institutional, and economic components. Oncethere is a capacity to allow conscious choices, those shouldbe made wisely, so that the living conditions of the peopledirectly in question, or others (those of the next genera-tions or those in other parts of the world) are not degraded.

The African regions, with the exception of Egypt, havefar less capacity than the Asian ones. However, theirstruggle out from the Malthusian era seems to have ad-vanced during recent years. Still, the headlines are richwith conflicts and disasters taking place in many Africanstudy countries. This keeps them weak, disabling themfrom making wise future choices.

Severe Constraints to Water DevelopmentThe 7th Nile 2002 Conference (TECCONILE, 1999)

included a series of workshops on the visions for the NileBasin development in the 21st Century. These workshopswere a part of the World Water Council�s Vision for the21st Century process, and produced the vision documentfor the Nile River Basin (World Water Forum, 2000). Along list of over 100 crucial aspects to water resourcesdevelopment was produced. The most important con-

Degree of corruption0 -> 10 (corrupted -> unc orrupted)

8 to 10 (3)

6 to 8 (2)

4 to 6 (2)

2 to 4 (13)

0 to 2 (6)

Data miss ing (22)

Degree of corruption

Un corrupte d

Corrup ted

Corruption

Corruption vs. GN P

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C orruption Perception Index x 10

GN

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W Africa

Corruption vs. G NP growth

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0 20 40 60 80 100

C orruption Perception Inde x x 10

GN

P g

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wth

min

us

fore

ign

aid

(%

of

GN

P)

Figure 12. Degree of corruption grows towards south, and correlates well with GNP per capita. The 1999 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).Sources: Transparency International (Lambsdorff, 1999) and World Bank (1999).

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World Bank (Sharma et al., 1996) performed a compre-hensive analysis on challenges and opportunities for sustain-able water resources development in Sub-Saharan Africa.Although such an analysis quickly becomes obsolate, this studyprovides important, comparative information of the develop-ment phase of water-related institutions in the African studycountries. The results concerning the four indicators analyzedare shown in Figure 13.

� Governance environment: Only one country, Burkina Faso,scores high in this respect. Among the Nile region coun-tries, Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania are ranked to theMedium category. All the other Nile countries are in theLow class.

� Capacity for resource management: None of the study re-gion countries ranked High in this respect. Kenya andEthiopia were classified Medium. The other countries werein the Low category, except Uganda with no data.

� Status of water legislation: Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanza-nia have the legislation.

� Status of water plan and water policy: East Africa is aheadof West Africa in this respect. Water plan/policy exists inEthiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, and exists par-tially in Senegal and Côte d�Ivoire.

Box 2. Water Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa After Sharma et al. (1996).

African study countriesby Gove rnance environm ent

High (1)

Medium (12)

Low (12)

No data (1)

Governance environment

African study countriesby Capacity for resourc e m anagemen t

Medium (6)

Low (12)

No data (8)

Capacity for resource managment

African study countriesby Status of water legislat ion

Ava ilable (10)

Pa rtia l (2)

No t available (4)

No data (10)

Status of water legislation

African s tudy countriesby Status of water plan/policy

Available (5)

Partial (2)

Not available (9)

No data (10)

Status of water plan/policy

Figure 13. Institutional indicators of African study regions. There are certain countries that perform better than the rest. They areEthiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania from East Africa, and Burkina Faso, Côte d�Ivoire, Senegal, Ghana, and Benin from West Africa.Unfortunately, plenty of data are missing. After all, the situation in the upper part of the Nile basin seems to be somewhat better thanelsewhere. Also the Volta, Gambia, and Senegal River basins, plus Côte d�Ivoire and Benin seem to be better institutionalized than therest of W Africa. Since the study was targeted to Sub-Saharan Africa, Egypt was excluded from the analysis

straints, with respect to the issues analyzed in this articleare the following:

� political instability,� mistrust and other shortcomings of mutual coopera-

tion among the riparian countries,� lack of transparency in dealing with issues of com-

mon interest,� lack of technical, financial, and economic capacity,

� lack of long-term visions and long-term planning,� inappropriate legal and institutional framework for

water management, and� various disparities within the region.

The urgency of the problems should press the coun-tries to overcome these problems. Exchange of knowl-edge and experts, open data sharing protocols, mutual andexternal helping, elaborating the existing initiatives, adop-

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tion of modern technology, and closer economic integra-tion were among the most stressed issues.

The Nile Basin Initiative is the most recent attemptto work towards better integration of water issues withinthe region. It builds on the late TECCONILE�s work, withthe aim: �To achieve sustainable socioeconomic devel-opment through the equitable utilization of, and benefitfrom, the common Nile Basin water resources� (NBIS,2000). The Initiative includes a series of action programswith extensive goals. Whereas such initiatives are ex-tremely welcome, their success depends entirely on thepolitical will of the governments to look for common goals,as well as their empowerment to implement policies.

Massive and Complicated Pressures:Direction Must Be Changed

The Nile region countries face colossal challengeswith their water resources development in the coming fewdecades. These challenges form a complex tissue of so-cial, economic, political, nature-related, and human driv-ers, which indeed call for holistic and integrated visionsand approaches as seems to be fashionable to talk aboutthese days. The water sector must meet these challengeson its part, contributing to the whole picture in a balancedway, rather than dealing with its sector expertise only.On the basis of this analysis, the key challenges to thewater resources development in the Nile region are:� Population growth is not under control. Together with

rapid urbanization, societies and the environment areunder excessive pressure. The tools to deal with theseissues require enhanced human and social develop-ment.

� Even the most basic physical needs, water and food,are chronically scarce. Particularly in terms of waterscarcity, this region is among the most problematicmacroregions of the world.

� The basin is already strongly polarized to the progres-sive Egypt and rest of the basin.

� In addition, social and economic disparities are verybig within each country. Most clear-cut phenomenonis the growth of the informal sector, which drains thegovernments� ability to govern the countries, as wellas causes a severe obstacle for developing water re-sources in long term, in an integrated and sustainableway. The role of informal institutions and the infor-mal sector are typically severely understated, althoughmost of the social water problems accumulate there.

� The region is dominated by monsoon climate, whichis known to vary seasonally and inter-annually morethan other climatic zones. Egypt is buffered againstthese variations socially and physically (through theHigh Aswan Dam), but particularly the Sudan andEthiopia are among the most vulnerable countries inthe world to climatic variations.

� Political and institutional confrontations and problemsare many within the region. There exists no basin-widetreaty or other strong institutions that could promotewin-win policies, although present attempts hopefullyyields positive development (NBIS, 2000).

� The historical burden is, however, heavy: the NileWater Treaty of 1959 plus the tradition of bilateral orat maximum three-party treatments with a colonialpower as a �supervisor� is a very different approachthan what is needed these days (Smith, 1996, Ilomäki,2000, TPFF, 2000). All the riparian nations should beinvolved genuinely in the process.

� Most of the international water confrontations culmi-nate in the in triangle of Egypt, the Sudan and Ethio-pia.

� Cooperation is necessary in the basin. Not only on apolitical arena, but also on institutional and economicalike.Water resources development in the Nile basin is very

much a nexus of natural, human, and socioeconomic de-velopment (including politics). Some of the planet�s mostancient civilizations have been flourishing along the Nileover millennia. However, the basin now faces greaterchallenges than most of the other parts of the planet.

Acknowledgments

The study is funded partly by the Academy of Fin-land, and partly by Helsinki University of Technology.The author is grateful to Pertti Vakkilainen, Aapo Pölhö,László Somlyódy, Jukka Ilomäki, Virpi Lahtela, OlliLeskinen, Tero Kärkkäinen, Andrew G. Warne, and Char-lotte de Fraiture for constructive discussions, materials,and comments to the manuscript.

About the Author

Olli Varis has a PhD in Water Resources Mangement.He works as a senior researcher at Helsinki University of

Box 3. Vicious Circles into Virtuous Ones(Varis, 1999).

Fragmented approaches to development tend to provideinsufficient tools for the comprehension of the multiple, often�turbulent�, interactions across the issues that belong to differ-ent scientific disciplines. The isolated, pure, and beautiful�laminar� or �linear�, discipline-specific approaches are toooften unable to see such complicated interconnections. Theseturbulences are typically self-sustaining (Union of InternationalAssociations, 1995); they feed themselves, several issues con-stantly reinforce one another. If their direction of influence isnegative, they are called vicious circles (or cycles). If the di-rection is positive, they are known as virtuous circles. Withrespect to policies targeting to sustainable development, thevicious, self-sustaining circles should be identified, be bro-ken, and be turned into self-sustaining virtuous circles (WorldBank, 1997a).

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Technology, Laboratory of WaterResources, Espoo, Finland, and hasbeen working with Asian Instituteof Technology, Bangkok, Thailand,International Institute for AppliedSystems Analysis, Laxenburg, andunited National University/WorldInstitute for Development Econom-ics Studies, Helsinki. Dr. Varis hasbroad experience on environmental

DC, USA: The International Food Policy Research Institute.Ilomäki, J. 2000. �Institutional Challenge of Developing

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INBA. 1996. �Water Scarcity in the Nile Basin.� InternationalNile Basin Association Bulletin 2, No. 1: 47�55.

IPCC. 1996. Climate Change 1995: The Science of ClimateChange. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

IPCC. 1998. The Regional Impacts of Climate Change: AnAssessment of Vulnerability. A Special Report of IPCCWorking Group II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

IWMI. 1999. PODIUM/Water for Food: Vision 2025 PolicyDialogue Model. Washington, DC, USA: International Wa-ter Management Institute, Colombo/International FoodPolicy Research Institute.

Kitoh, A., S. Yukimoto, A. Noda, and T. Motoi. 1997. �Simu-lated Changes in the Asian Summer Monsoon at the Timesof Increased Atmospheric CO

2.� Journal of the Meteoro-

logical Society of Japan 75: 1019�1031.Lambsdorff, J.G. 1999. The 1999 Transparency International

Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) � The FrameworkDocument. Göttingen: The Transparency International.

Magloff, L. 1999. �Turning Point on the Nile.� Egypt Today,November: 76�82.

Nelan, B.W. 1998. �Sudan: Why is This Happening Again? InUnholy Synergy, Drought and Human Folly are ProducingAnother Shocking Famine.� Time, July 27: 22�26.

NBIS. 2000. Nile Basin Initiative. The Nile Basin InitiativeSecretariat, Entebbe. http://www.nilebasin.org/index.html.

Niu, W-Y. and W.M. Harris. 1996. �China: The Forecast of itsEnvironmental Situation in the 21st Century.� Journal ofEnvironmental Management 47: 101�114.

Olsson, L. 1993. �On the Causes of Famine: Drought, Deserti-fication and Market Failure in the Sudan.� Ambio 22: 395�403.

Ose, T., Y. Song and A. Kitoh. 1997. �Sea Surface Tempera-ture in the South China Sea: An Index for the Asian Mon-soon and ENSO System.� Journal of the MeteorologicalSociety of Japan 75: 1091�1107.

Postel, S., G.C. Daily and P.R. Ehrlich. 1996. �HumanSppropriation of Renewable Freshwater.� Science 271: 785�788.

SEI. 1997. Comprehensive Assessment of the Freshwater Re-sources of the World - Water Futures: Assessment of Long-Range Patterns and Problems. Stockholm: StockholmEnvironment Institute.

Shahin, M. 1985. Hydrology of the Nile Basin. Amsterdam:Elsevier.

Sharma, N.P., T. Damhaug, E. Gilgan-Hunt, D. Grey, V. Okaru,and D. Rothberg, 1996. African Water Resources, Challengesand Opportunities for Sustainable Development. World BankTechnical Paper 331. Washington, DC, USA: World Bank

Smith, J.M. 1996. �Nine Nations, One Nile.� The University ofMichigan, School of Natural Resources and Environment.

modeling, and is the author of more than 160 scientificarticles. His current research is concentrated on the inter-connection of water, food, proverty, environment, andurbanization. Email: [email protected].

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