the new hungarian electoral system

7/30/2019 THE NEW HUNGARIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM

1/55

1

Introduction The Objective o This Paper 2

Previous vs. New Hungarian Electoral System

Minor Shit toward the Majority System 3

Emergence o the Hungarian Electoral System Ater

the Political Changes 3

The Hungarian Electoral System ater the Political Changes 6

The New Hungarian Electoral System 10

Impact o the New Electoral System 13

Proportionality o Constituencies Remedying Decade-long Shortcomings 16

Voting Rights or Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries

a European-conorm Solution 22

Parliamentary Representation o National Minorities Living

in Hungary Progress in the Protection o Minority Rights 28

The Right to Vote as a Fundamental Right

Closing the Gap in International Expectations 33

Full-time MPs End o Multiple Mandates 37

Transormation o the Candidacy System

Changes Aimed at Eradicating Abuse 39

Changing Campaign Rules A More Transparent System 42

The Electoral Management Bodies System

Stronger Organisational Autonomy 46

The Electoral Legal Redress Procedure

High Level Protection Remains in Place 50

Voting by Persons with Disabilities Enhanced Equal Opportunity 53

SZZADVG FOUNDATION

THE NEWHUNGARIANELECTORAL SYSTEM

Contents


2/55

2

SZ ZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System

Reducing the numbero MPs and the intro-duction o preerentialnaturalisation werethe main reasons orreorming the electoralsystem.

Besides eliminatingproblems experiencedearlier, the aim o thereorm is to create asimpler and more trans-parent system.

Introduction the Objective of this Paper

Voters having the right to decide about who exercises the supreme

power o state at set intervals and under appropriately regulated cir-cumstances is the undamental precondition underlying the operation

o every modern democratic state. Elections constitute an essential

tool or the unctioning o the democratic institutional system and are

also a undamental right. Consequently, the reorm o the electoral sys-

tem almost always generates political and legal debate.

The transormation o public law began ater the general election o

2010, which, ollowing the adoption o the Fundamental Law, also en-

gendered the amendment o regulations relating to exercising certain

undamental rights, as well as key institutions o public law. The reor-

mulation o substantive electoral law, ollowed by rules pertaining to the

election procedure was carried out within this ramework. Decreasing

the number o MPs, which the Fundamental Law dened as 199 in-

stead o 386 set the trajectory o the amendment o election rules.

Moreover, permanent residency in Hungary no longer constituted a

precondition or voting, as stipulated in the Fundamental Law, which

paved the way or Hungarian citizens living beyond the borders o the

country to vote in Hungarian elections. This created an entirely new

situation, and ensuring the right to vote or new voters living outside thecountry was also to be incorporated in the new electoral laws.

While the mixed system was retained, the most substantive overhaul to

the electoral system involved introducing a simple and more transpar-

ent dual ballot system (single-member constituencies and national par-

ty lists) replacing the ternary system (single-member constituencies,

regional party lists, national party lists). Moreover, electoral reorm also

provided the opportunity to incorporate the experiences o the six gen-

eral elections, six local government elections, two European Parliamentelections and numerous by-elections held over the past twenty years

in the electoral system, making it more ecient and more transparent.

However, the way in which issues that caused numerous anomalies

during previous elections could also be sorted out was an even more

relevant aspect o electoral reorm. These anomalies were threatening

the legitimacy, airness and cleanliness o elections, in which regard

both Hungarian and international orums solicited intervention. Ensur-

ing proportionality between constituencies or eliminating the anoma-

lies o the recommendation system are two prime examples or how

the new electoral system opened the opportunity to make amends or

problems that have been persisting or decades.


3/55

3


The aim o the present paper is to present the changes and key tra-

jectories o electoral reorm carried out within the ramework o the

transormation o public law. This paper does not ocus on presenting

election rules and the electoral system in ull detail. It simply wishes to

highlight certain points that have substantively changed in accordancewith the new laws and have in some cases also been under re.

Previous vs. New Hungarian Electoral

System Minor Shift toward

the Majority System

Emergence of the Hungarian Electoral System afterthe Political Changes

Ater the collapse o communism, existing models and alternatives de-

termined the architecture o electoral systems in Central and Eastern

Europe, with the perception o the political players shaping the targets

set and nally deals concluded between political groups determining

the outcome o negotiations. These three actors also determined the

orm o the electoral system adopted in Hungary during the period o

political transition. In Hungary, both MSZMP (the Hungarian SocialistWorkers Party) and the parties in opposition endeavoured to enorce

the principle o minimum risk when the National Round Table negotia-

tions began in 1989. During this particular period, the Hungarian elec-

toral system was not designed on the grounds o some sort o elaborate

and comprehensive plan wishing to satisy presumed or actual social

needs, but was codied by piecing together dierent elements. Both

the Opposition Round Table (EKA) and the party controlling the state

(MSZMP) attempted to establish a system through which they could

have maximised the parliamentary representation o their respectiveparties and enabled the new party elite1 to win seats.

1 Schiemann, J. W. 2000. The Electoral Law. In: Andrs Bozki edit.The Script o the Regime Change: The Minutes o the Hungarian Roundtable Negotiationsin 1989 Volume 7 Constitutional Revolution Papers, p. 540

MSZMP as well asthe parties in oppositionendeavoured toenorce the principleo minimum risk.


4/55

4


This is why setting up dierent electoral systems was in the interest

o political powers with dierent acilities; however, the electoral sys-

tem-related preerences o the parties also changed due to changes

in power relations and lack o inormation associated with the ormer.

During the negotiations, MSZMP initially proposed having 80% o the

seats decided in single-member constituencies with the remaining

20% allocated rom national party, compensation lists. Voters would

have only had a single ballot in this system. The proportional system

would have been more advantageous or the historical parties who

were more well-known to the people. At the same time, the Independ-

ent Smallholders Party backed the introduction o the mixed system,

leaving one-third o the seats or the single-member constituencies.

The Free Democratic Alliance, which party was less well-known, but

whose caucus included several well-known public gures, proposed

that 75% o representatives should be elected to parliament rom sin-gle-member constituencies. Based on internal compromise, the Op-

position Round Table ended up proposing a mixed system in which

hal o the seats could be won in single-member constituencies and

the other hal rom the national party lists. Contrary to the communists

proposal, EKA backed the dual ballot system.2

MSZMP accepted the proposal put orth by the opposition that voters

should have two ballots; however, was initially unwilling to make any

compromise in respect o the proportion o representatives elected othe national party list. Public opinion poll data revealing that MDF is

ar more popular than MSZMP convinced the top party leaders that a

more proportionate system would be more advantageous or MSZMP.

Ater this episode, the communists proposed that proportionality, ma-

jority representation and compensation should equally be incorporated

in the new electoral system. The opposition essentially accepted this;

however, disagreed with voters casting ballots on the national party list

and instead wanted 19 constituencies or the counties and one or Bu-

dapest, in which constituencies ballots could be cast or the party lists.In collaboration with the experts o the Ministry o Interior they eventu-

ally agreed on a system in which 70 seats are allocated rom the na-

tional party list on the grounds o ractional votes, 152 seats based on

proportionality and likewise 152 based on absolute majority. However,

the relatively low number o seats that could be won in single-member

constituencies prompted an outcry in the last undemocratically elected

parliament.

2 Schiemann, J. W. 2000. The Electoral Law. In: Andrs Bozki edit.The Script o the Regime Change: The Minutes o the Hungarian Roundtable Negotiations in1989 Volume 7 Constitutional Revolution Papers, p. 540

Party preerences alsochanged because ochanging powerrelations and the lacko inormation.


5/55

5


Finally, EKA came up with a compromise proposing to decrease the

number o seats that can be won rom the compensation list to 58

and increase the number o seats that can be won in single-member

constituencies to 176. Eventually, the National Assembly approved 386

seats and the proposal setting out the breakdown o 58-152-176. In

the midst o the round table discussions, the MSZMP Nmeth Gov-

ernment delineated the single-member constituencies within its own

scope o authority. In view o how during the course o negotiations

the emphasis was on other components o the electoral system, the

constituencies were nalised without any major opposition on behal o

the democratic powers in opposition based on the orders given by the

single party in power and without negotiating.

The designing o the Hungarian electoral system during the period o

political transition can be well-described with the help o models re-lating to prot maximising through political negotiation.3 Endeavours

relating to the enorcement o the interests o political parties eclipsed

theoretical issues, such as, the issue o political representation or mi-

norities, and orced these into the background. During the transitional

period, the electoral law was athomed through party deals, with the

perception the communists had about their very own interests having

a decisive impact. In the meantime, the political leaders o MSZMP

realised early enough, that their candidates running in single-member

constituencies are incapable o winning the majority o votes, which ishow the party managed to avoid the Croatian scenario. The Croatian

communists hoped that the majority system would be advantageous

or them, but in 1990 the opposition won a landslide election victo-

ry thanks to the majority electoral system. In Hungary, ater the rst

ree elections no single party or coalition won by such a majority that

would have made it possible to change the cardinal laws, which is

why the negotiatory transition branded the next two decades. At the

same time, two changes relevant rom a political perspective never-

theless did take place. The threshold or securing a seat in parliament

was raised rom 4% to 5% in 1994 and in 1997 the National Assembly

passed legislation stipulating that parties must each separately reach

the 5% threshold in the case o so-called joint lists.4

3 Birch, S. et al. 2002. Embodying Democracy.Electoral System Design in Post-Communist Europe, p. 654 Dezs, M. Tth, Z. 2002. Elections and the Voting Procedure. Rejtjel, p. 70

When the politicalsystem changed theelectoral lawmaterialised throughparty deals, and theperception that thecommunists had o theirown interestsdecisively impacted it.


6/55

6


The Hungarian Electoral System

after the Political Changes

The two-vote system incorporating the distribution o seats accordingto three various principles created during the period o political tran-

sition was one o the most complex electoral systems in Europe. Cit-

izens cast one vote or parties on regional party lists, on the basis o

which votes regional party list seats were distributed by applying the

Hagenbach-Bischo quota.5 A maximum o 152 seats was distribut-

ed through these regional party lists, with the remainder (20-25 seats)

going to the national party list. Votes that were not decisive in terms o

winning a seat o the regional party list were added to the ractional

votes, whilst in the event o the application o the two-thirds rule, the

dierence between the Hagenbach-Bischo quota and the number o

votes cast was deducted.

Signicant disproportionality was identied here too as the outcome o

the 20 regional party list electoral districts. This considerable margin

did not result in any deviation in respect o the number o seats won by

the parties due to the low district magnitudes. In practice, due to the

implicit threshold, small parties had no chance o winning seats be-

cause o the regional party lists, as a result o which the larger parties

were over-represented.6 Regional party lists are generally applied incountries that have exclusively adopted a proportional system in order

or regional representation to also appear in parliament. However, sin-

gle-member constituencies have already lled this unction in Hungary,

while voters are unaware o the regional dimension o party lists, which

is why several parties, civil society organisations and think tanks called

or this list to be replaced by a national party list.7

5 The quota was calculated by adding up the total number o votes cast in regional list con-stituencies, which was divided the number o distributable seats plus one. The number oseats distributable on the regional party list was equivalent to the ratio between the numbero votes cast or parties and the quota. The so-called two-thirds rule was applied i a seatcould not be distributed in a given constituency through the above means, i.e., the partythat reached two-thirds o the quota could also win a seat.6 Fbin Gy. 1999. A magyar vlasztsi rendszer kelet-kzp-eurpai sszehasonlts-ban (The Political Changes in Hungary in Central-Eastern Comparison). PolitikatudomnyiSzemle (Political Science Review), Issue 3, pp. 116-118; Krsnyi A. et al. 2003. A magyar

politikai rendszer. (The Hungarian Political System) Budapest, Osiris, pp. 244-2487 For example: Medin-HVG 2009 Proposal or Reorming the Electoral Systemhttp://www.median.hu/object.045a478-a27e-45a1-9b3-70de2733978.ivy

It was one o themost complex electoralsystems in Europe.

Several organisationsand think tanks backedreplacing regional partylists with national partylists.


7/55

7


Voters could cast their other vote or individual candidates. The dispro-

portionaility o the Hungarian electoral system does not lie in the unique

components o the proportional system o lists, but is to be sought in

its single-member constituency dimension.8 However, rom the very

beginning the objective o this was to ensure a clear majority or thewinner, hence acilitating governability.9

The majority electoral system was a two-round system. Voting conduc-

ted in 176 single-member constituencies also had to comply with vali-

dity and eciency criteria.10 In the 1990s, typically ater a valid, yet in-

decisive rst round, the ate o seats was decided in the second round.

As an outcome o the concentration o the party system, decisive rst

round voting became more and more common in the 2000s. Even can-

didates nishing in third place typically stood or election in the second

round in 1990 and 1994. However, in 1998, as a main rule candidates

ranked in third place withdrew in avour o one o the other candidates

as a result o the polarised party system. The Hungarian electoral sy-

stem was much criticised by those opposing that small parties could

potentially gain a disproportionate position o extortion. The withdrawal

o the candidates o smaller parties could considerably infuence the

outcome o the election in a tight race in a two-round voting system.

The objective o the national party list was to reduce disproportionality

ensuing rom the results o the regional party list and single-memberconstituencies. Votes cast or the national party list in which case a

seat was not won by any given party that ailed to reach the 5% thres-

hold at a national level were counted as ractional votes o the regional

party list and were transerred and counted as the compensation bal-

lots as well as negative ballots by applying the two-thirds rule.

8 Szoboszlai Gy. Kpviselet s arnyossg. A vlasztsi rendszer reorm-irnyai (Rep-resentation and Proportionality. Directions o the Reorm o the Electoral System). In: StumpI. (edit.): Kt vlaszts kztt (In Between Two Elections). Budapest, Szzadvg, 1997, p. 309 Tth Cs. 2002. A magyar vlasztsi rendszer mkdse (How the Hungarian ElectoralSystem Works).http://www.ajk.elte.hu/fle/TothCsaba-ValasztasiRedszer.pd10 I over 50% o eligible voters cast their votes in the rst round, i.e., the round was valid,and the winning candidate obtained over hal o the votes, this candidate won in the rstround and the second round was cancelled. I the rst round o voting was not valid, only25% o eligible voters had to turn out or the second round or this round to be valid andevery rst-round candidate could re-run in the second round. I the rst round was valid

without a obtaining a nal result, the rst three candidates, or any candidate that won atleast 15% o the votes was eligible to run in the second round. The candidate that receivedthe most votes won the second round.

The absolute majorityvote througha two-round systemwas also widelycriticised.


8/55

8


Ballots cast in single-member constituencies or candidates that did

not win were transerred to the national party list o the nominating par-

ty. In theory, a minimum o 58 seats could be distributed rom the com-

pensation list; however, in practice, additional seats were transerred

rom the regional party list. Seats were distributed based on ractionalvotes by applying the DHondt method.11

Altogether six elections were held in Hungary on the grounds o the

electoral system adopted in 1989. The adoption o the 1997 rules o

procedure was the biggest change to rules pertaining to voting rights

since the political changes took place. Aside rom technical problems,

in spite o how international election observers did not nd anything

that could have eectively infuenced the outcome o an election,

election raud was nevertheless suspected on numerous instances.

In addition, the electoral system had several neuralgic points that were

criticised time and again and which were not resolved over the past

two decades (e.g.: the anomalies o the recommendation system and

pre-election silence). Accordingly, the overhaul o the electoral system

was one o the components o the transormation o public law in 2010,

which was required or two undamental reasons, namely: remedying

two-decades long shortcomings by more accurately dening election

rules and meeting a social expectation relating to reducing the number

o the political elite in Hungary.

To satisy the latter, one o the very rst decisions passed by the Na-

tional Assembly in 2010 stipulated that, by amending the constitution,

the maximum number o MPs was dened as 200 instead o 386. This

measure was eectively implemented when the new electoral law that

was due was passed ollowing the adoption o the Fundamental Law.

According to the so-called cube root rule, the ideal number o MPs

in parliament can be calculated based on the adult population o the

country that can be mobilised.12 Taking the cube root o the literate

adult population is the method applied in respect o this rule. Taking apopulation o 8 million, this value is exactly 200 in Hungary.

11 This method is based on compiling a table in the rst row o which the number o votescast or individual party lists is registered, ater which columns are generated, the rst valueo which represents hal o the votes cast or the given list, with the third o the votes castrepresenting the next value, ollowed by the third and the ourth and so on. Seats are dis-tributed with the help o this table the lists with the highest value in the table win a seat.12 Taagepera, R. The Size o National Assemblies. Social Science Research, 1972.Vol. 1,Issue 4, pp. 385-401

Making amends ortwo-decades-longshortcomings, the needto accurately deneelection rules and theelection promise madeto reduce the number othe political elite madeit necessary to reormthe electoral system.

Instead o 386 MPs,capping the numbero MPs at 200 wasthe very rst decisionpassed by the NationalAssembly in 2010.


9/55

9


The ollowing diagrams present the number o MPs and

the number o citizens to one seat in international comparison.

Number of MPs(in the lower house in the case of two-chamber parliaments)

Number of citizens to one MP (in the lower house)(Thous. ind.)

Source: Szzadvg, Inter-Parliamentary Union, Eurostat

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700

02 0 40 60 80 100 120 140

Germany (2009-2013) 131.94

France 113.26

United Kingdom 97.2

Poland 83.7

Czech Republic 52.57

Hungary (2014-) 49.96

Hungary (1990-2014) 25.76

Germany (2009-2013) 600

France 577

United Kingdom 650

Poland 460

Czech Republic 200

Hungary (2014-) 199

Hungary (1990-2014) 386


10/55

10

SZZADVG FOUNDATION The New Hungarian Electoral System

The New Hungarian Electoral System

The National Assembly passed the new electoral law on 23 December

2011 by a vote o 256 in avour to 36 against. As mentioned earlier, in

accordance with the new law the number o MPs in the National As-sembly decreases rom 386 to 199, with the two-vote mixed system

remaining in place in Hungary. However, in the new electoral system

seats can only be won through two means instead o the current three.

93 MPs are elected through the proportional system in a way that the

ractional votes o single-member constituencies also count, whilst 106

MPs are elected in a single-round relative majority electoral system. As

a result, the proportion o MPs elected in single member constituenci-

es changes slightly rom 46% to 53%.

The electoral system also has a number o new components, such as

votes cannot be cast or parties on the regional party list, but must ins-tead be cast or the national party list in the proportional system, hence

eliminating one o the much criticised attributes o the previous system.

The new system ensures the opportunity to win parliamentary seats

under preerential terms or the thirteen national minorities in Hungary

through the proportional vote. Should a national minority ail to win

a seat on its national list it may send a spokesperson to parliament.

Ensuring the right to vote or citizens out o the country, which votes

are cast or national party lists is another new eature, which complies

with recommendations put orth by the Venice Commission. Seats are

distributed based on the number o votes cast or national party lists

and ractional votes by applying the DHondt matrix.

Source: Szzadvg

450

54%

210

46%

176

47%

93

53%106

400

350

300

150

200

250

50100

0

Two-vote mixed sys-tem remains in place

in Hungary. However,the proportion o MPselected by majorityincreases rom 46% to53%.

In the new system

votes are cast orparties on the nationallist instead o theregional party list inthe case o theproportional list.

Distribution o seats by proportional

representation (compensation)

Distribution o seats by single-member

constituency National Assembly

2009-13

National Assembly

2014-


11/55

11


In accordance with the new electoral law, requirements or nominating

candidates and orming national party lists have changed. An indivi-

dual candidate must be nominated in a minimum o 27 single-member

constituencies in at least 9 counties and Budapest and at least 500

recommendations rom individuals registered on the electoral roll o asingle-member constituency is needed in each constituency.13 Ther-

eore, the new rules make it easier to orm national party lists. The

most relevant change in the single-member constituency system is

that constituencies largely identical in size have been created and that

the absolute majority procedure (TRS) has been replaced by a relative

majority procedure (FPTP). Another key change is that there is no va-

lidity threshold or single-member constituencies in the new electoral

law and that every ractional vote not required or winning the given

seat will be added to the ballots cast or national party lists, hence also

the dierence between the number o ballots cast or the winning can-

didate and the number o ballots cast or the second place candidate

plus one vote.

The ollowing map presents changes to constituency boundaries.

It clearly shows that the new constituencies with a blue boundary orm

a coherent area in a way that their boundaries coincide with county

boundaries. There are no constituencies on the map that have an unu-

sual shape raising suspicion o gerrymandering. Constituencies with

strange boundaries, or example in Komrom-Esztergom County orSzabolcs-Szatmr-Bereg County, were more common in the previous

system.

13 Until recently, at least 750 recommendation slips had to be collected in single-mem-ber constituencies. Parties that were able to nominate candidates in at least 25% o the

single-member constituencies belonging to a given region, however, in no less than twodistricts were eligible to orm a regional party list. Parties that were able to orm at leastseven regional lists were entitled to orm national party lists.

As regards individualseats, the way in whichsimilar size single-member constituencieswere created and thatthe relative majorityprocedure replaced theabsolute majorityprocedure representthe two most relevantchanges.


12/55

12


Constituency Boundaries in Hungary until 2014

Source: Szzadvg, Geox Ltd.

New Constituency Boundaries in Hungary



13/55

13


Impact of the New Electoral System

Szzadvg examined the impact o the new electoral system on the

distribution o seats by applying estimation models. We added up the

votes cast during the 2006 and 2010 general elections according tothe new constituencies, ater which we analysed the potential impact

o the redrawn single-member constituencies and compensation rules

on the distribution o seats.

When making the model estimations, the impact o the new electoral

system on the strategies and behaviour o the parties also needs to

be taken into account. Taking the rst round o the previous election

as a basis would be highly misleading. Consequences drawn rom se-

cond-round withdrawals and coalition ormation must also be incorpo-

rated in the model. In 2006, SZDSZ and MSZP withdrew their respec-

tive candidate in every district in which a given candidate backed both

parties had a realistic chance o winning. SZDSZ withdrew 55 candi-

dates and MSZP withdrew 3 candidates. These two parties were in

government prior to the election and a let-wing government was once

again ormed in 2006. This implies that in their case, contrary to the ab-

solute majority system, the relative majority system would have orced

them to nominate a single joint candidate in the rst round. Accordingly,

when we made our model estimations we also assumed that MSZP

and SZDSZ would nominate joint candidates and stand or election ona joint national party list. Mass withdrawals did not take place in 2010,

which is why in this case we can take the rst-round results as a basis.

Until 2010, 176 seats could be won in single-member constituencies.

In 2006 MSZP won 102 seats, SZDSZ won 5 seats and FIDESZ-KDNP

won 68 o the seats. MSZP and SZDSZ candidates won 60.8% o the

single-member constituencies, with FIDESZ-KDNP candidates winning

38.6%. According to our model estimation, in the new electoral sys-

tem MSZP-SZDSZ would have won 69 o the 106 seats, with FIDESZwinning 37 seats. Consequently, let-wing candidates would have won

in 65.1% o the districts, while right-wing candidates would have won

in 34.9%. The right-wing won by a landslide victory in 2010 FIDESZ

won 98.3% or 173 seats in the 176 single-member constituencies.

MSZP won seats in two constituencies. By using the 2010 ballots as

input data in our model, FIDESZ would have won in 105 districts, while

MSZP would have won in 1 district (District 07 o Budapest).

Lessons learnedrom second roundwithdrawals and theormation o coalitionsalso need to beincororated in themodel.


14/55

14


Contrary to certain analysis14, in our opinion when we were building

the model we also had to take account o whether certain parties ran

popular candidates in a given constituency, which is why we take the

ballots cast in the ormer single-member constituencies as a basis du-

ring the course o modelling.

In the previous electoral system, altogether 120 seats were distributed

rom regional and national party lists based on the number o regional

party list votes cast and ractional votes. In the new system, 93 seats

are distributed based on the number o ballots cast or national party

lists and ractional votes. Changing the way ractional votes are coun-

ted avours the winning party - promoting governability. However, con-

currently the national party list system (in relation to the regional party

list system in place earlier) aects proportionality. The outcome is that

the internal ratio o seats distributed rom the list does not substantially

change i the result is tight. However, in the event o victory by a large

margin, the proportion o seats o the party receiving the highest num-

ber o votes urther increases due to changes to the mode o counting

ractional votes.

The ollowing table summarises the actual combined results o the

elections and model estimations. In this case, the potential impact o

the minority vote and votes cast by Hungarian citizens living in neigh-

bouring countries has been excluded rom the model and will be pre-sented in the ollowing.

14 E.g.: http://hazaeshaladas.blog.hu/2011/08/05/az_uj_valasztasi_rendszer_reszletes_modellje

I the new electoralsystem had beenapplied in 2006, out othe 106 seats, elected in

single-member constit-uencies, MSZP-SZDSZwould have won 69,while FIDESZ wouldonly have won 37.


15/55

15


According to the lessons learnt rom the public opinion poll conducted

by Szzadvg at the end o May 2013, Fidesz is on 47% and MSZP is

on 25% among denite voters, with Jobbik on 13% and LMP on 2%.

10% o voters would vote or Egytt 2014 and 1% would vote or the

Democratic Coalition. A total o 2% o denite voters would vote or

other parties.15 Based on the discrepancy o constituency results in the

2006 and 2010 general elections in relation to the national average,

we made an estimate o how seats would be distributed in the new

electoral system in the case o a voting ratio corresponding to the data

gathered in the latest public opinion poll.

Changes to Seat Distribution Based on the Resultsof the Elections held in 2006 and 2010

Number of Seats Estimated Based on the Public OpinionPoll Conducted in May 2013

First model

estimation

Second

model

estimation

Source: Szzadvg, National Election Ofce

Source: Szzadvg

15 Szzadvg conducted a telephone public opinion poll between 25 and 27 May 2013 poll-

ing 1,000 randomly selected adult respondents with the CATI method. Owing to the samplingprocedure, there is a maximum +/- 3.2% deviation in the data published in the analysis inrelation to the data that would have been generated by polling the entire adult population.

164

42,5%

210 (190+20)

54,4%

114

57,3%

Fidesz-KDNP

MSZP-SZDSZ

2006 2010

MDF

80

40,2%

11

2,8%

5

2,5%

263

68,1%

59

15,3%

23

11,6%

Fidesz-KDNP

MSZP Jobbik

152

76,4%

47

12,2%

18

9,0%

LMP

16

4,1%

6

3,0%

Fidesz-KDNP

MSZP-Egytt-PM-DK

Jobbik

47%

36%

13%

80

26

0

41

37

15

121

63

15

60,8%

31,7%

7,5%

Fidesz-KDNP

MSZP-Egytt-PM

Jobbik

47%

35%

13%

85

21

0

41

37

15

126

58

15

63,3%

29,1%

7,5%

Previous

Electoral system

New electoral

system

Number

Ratio

Number

Ratio

Seats

Vote ratio Ind. List Total Seat ratio

Seats

Vote ratio Ind. List Total Seat ratio


16/55

16


The above table presents the vote and seat ratio o parties that would

exceed the 5% threshold according to the latest polls. It is necessary

to note that in this case the model disregards the turnout o voters

that are currently still undecided voters, nor does it take account

o the minority ballot or votes cast in neighbouring countries. The

results in Table 1 present the scenario in which all let-wing parties

join orces, while the estimation in Table 2 is based on the assump-

tion that Ferenc Gyurcsnys party is let out o this coalition.

Proportionality of Constituencies

Remedying Decade-long Shortcomings

One o the most important attributes o the current overhaul o the

electoral system is that ewer constituencies are needed as a con-

sequence o the dramatic decrease in the number o MPs. Accor-

ding to Giovanni Sartori, proportionality o the electoral system is

not simply a mathematical ormula transposing votes to seats, but

equally represents proportionality between the size o constituencies

and the number o voters in relation to the number o distributable

seats.16 The principle o equality serves to ensure that every vote is

equal, or at least similar in weight. This is achieved i largely the same

number o votes is required in every constituency to win a seat. Inthis regard, delineating the boundaries o constituencies is a particu-

larly relevant issue, as is dening how many representatives can be

elected in a given district in countries in which several representa-

tives may be elected to parliament rom a single constituency.

International legal documents on elections also ocus on these is-

sues. Point 21 o the ocial comments made to Article 25 o the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on ensuring the

right to vote stipulates that signatory states must apply the principleo one person, one vote, i.e., every persons vote must more or

less be equal. Accordingly, in regard to drawing the constituency

boundaries, according to the comment it is necessary to ensure that

these are not disadvantageous or any given social group or mino-

rity.17

16 Sartori, G. 2003. Comparative Constitutional Engineering; An Inquiry into Structures,

Incentives and Outcomes, 1.4, p. 21, Akadmiai Publishing, Budapest17 General Comment No. 25: The right to participate in public aairs, voting rights andthe right o equal access to public service (Art. 25): 12/07/96., point 21.

The principle o equalopportunity is enorcedi by and large the samenumber o votes isneeded in every constit-uency to win a seat.


17/55

17


The electoral code o the Venice Commission also mentions that it

is important to distribute seats in equal proportion among constitu-

encies, at least in the case o the lower house and local and regional

representative bodies. The Commission deems that a 10% deviation

is acceptable in respect o the proportionaility o constituencies, al-lowing or a deviation o 15% only in particularly justied cases, or

example, to protect minorities. To continually ensure proportionate

constituencies the Venice Commission recommends the review o

constituency boundaries at set intervals, at least every 10 years, whi-

ch should preerably not take place during the election period or one

year prior to an election. I there are multi-member electoral districts

in a given country, instead o reviewing boundaries, the Commissi-

on in this case recommends the periodical review o the number o

seats that can be won in a given electoral district.18

Both the substantive legal review and the review o rules o procedu-

re o the electoral system have been carried out in the new public law

ramework. The review o substantive legal electoral rules could no

longer be put o because they were the products o deals conclu-

ded over twenty years ago during the period o political transition

between the political parties o the era and aligned to their respective

interests, which were not duly circumspect and dened rules perta-

ining to the election o parliamentary MPs, as well as constituency

boundaries in line with the interests o the political players o the era.19In addition, election rules have become so outdated over the past

decade, among others, the boundaries o single-member constitu-

encies due to demographic shits, that they had come to eectively

threaten universal surage, the right to vote granted to all citizens.

During the course o the round table discussions, the MSZMP N-

meth Government delineated the single-member constituencies wit-

hin its own scope o authority and only ater they were drawn was

it presented to the Opposition Round Table. Since the oppositions

emphasis was on other components o the electoral system duringthe course o negotiations, the constituencies were nalised without

any major opposition on behal o the democratic powers.

18 CDL-AD(2002)023rev Code o Good Practice in electoral Matters19 Schiemann, J. W. 2000. The Electoral Law. In: Andrs Bozki ed. The Script o the RegimeChange: The Minutes o the Hungarian Roundtable Negotiations in 1989 Volume 7 Constitu-tional Revolution Papers, pp. 557-558

The boundaries osingle-member constit-uencies threatened theequality o surage as aconsequence o demo-graphic changes.

In terms o theproportionality oconstituencies, theVenice Commission

deems that a 10%deviation is acceptable,allowing or a deviationo 15% only in particu-larly justied cases.


18/55

18


Constituency boundaries were, thereore, determined pursuant to the

decree issued by the Council o Ministers in 199020, which has ne-

ver been reviewed over the past 20 years. Disproportionaility among

constituencies is clearly evident when considered that there was a two

and hal old dierence between the size o the largest and the smallestconstituency in 2010. While there were 27,073 eligible voters in District 6

o Veszprm, there were 67,092 in District 4 o Gdll in Pest County.21

Consequently, votes cast in electoral districts with a higher population

were worth less than those cast in smaller districts, as an outcome o

which the requirement o ensuring equal voting rights was breached.

The Constitutional Court examined this or the rst time in 2005 and

stipulated in its decision that i the dierence between the number o

voters on the electoral roll o constuencies reaches 200%, this is de-

nitely a breach o equal voting rights which the body cannot deem

constitutional in any case whatsoever. In addition, the Constitutional

Court dened areas the National Assembly must regulate in a cardinal

law, because these constitute substantive elements or ensuring voting

rights. Areas to be regulated within the scope o a cardinal law includes

criteria applied or determining constituency boundaries, the degree o

deviation between the size o constituencies, as well as rules o pro-

cedure, the extent o and the body carrying out the review. Although

delineating concrete constituency boundaries is an implementation

regulation in the context o these rules o guarantee, regulating this ina decree is, however, not sucient and needs to be dened in a law.22

The National Assembly ailed to comply with the requirements stipula-

ted by the Constitutional Court up to the set deadline o 30 June 2007,

hence a state o constitutional deault emerged. Changing the existing

constituency boundaries was not in the interest o the governing par-

ties. The lack o commitment on behal o the parties in power is well

demonstrated by how the National Assembly not only ailed to pass

amendments requiring a two-third majority o votes, but also ailed to

make constituencies proportionate, or which a simple majority wouldhave been sucient. Finally, recognising that the body is incapable o

coercing any change, in 2010 the Constitutional Court abolished the

decree issued by Council o Ministers determining the boundaries and

seats o constituencies, as well as provisions o the law on voting rights

and the election procedure which delegates the delineation o constitu-

ency boundaries to the scope o authority o the Government.23

20 Council o Ministers Decree 21/1990 (I.11.) on Determining the Single-Memberand Regional Constituencies in the National Assembly

21http://www.valasztas.hu/hu/parval2010/350/350_0_index.html22 Constitional Court Decision 22/2005 (VI. 17.)23 Constittional Court Decision 193/2010 (XII. 8.)

The ConstitutionalCourt abolished theCouncil o MinstersDecree determining theboundaries and seats oconstituencies in 2010.

There was a two andhal old dierencebetween the size o thelargest and smallest

constituency in 2010.


19/55

19


In the new electoral system lawmakers consequently decreased the

number o single-member constituencies rom 176 to 106 by reducing

the number o MPs, as an outcome o which there will be 76,000 voters

to an MP winning a seat in a single-member constituency. By decrea-

sing the number o constituencies, or example, the number o districtsin Budapest decreases to 18 rom 32, with the ewest constituencies

in Nogrd County where the county will be subdivided into 2 districts

instead o 4 as an outcome o the changes made.

The law on the election o MPs regulates the ormation o constituenci-

es at two levels. On the one hand, the law denes rules to be applied in

respect o the ormation o constituencies. As a basic rule, constituen-

cies need to orm a coherent area; cannot cross over county bounda-

ries or the municipal boundaries o Budapest and the number o voters

in districts should be largely identical. Districts o Budapest or a given

settlement may also be subdivided into several constituencies whereby

justied. To ensure equal voting rights, the law stipulates that the num-

ber o voters living in a given constituency should not deviate rom the

national average by a margin exceeding 15%, except i required due

to the county boundaries or the coherent area, or historical, national

minority, religious or other local specicities. I this deviation reaches

20% the National Assembly needs to modiy constituency boundaries

to restore proportionality. However, on the other hand, the annex to the

law precisely denes the boundaries and seats o each constituency.The unconstitutional state that has been persisting or years in respect

o constituency boundaries has thereore been rectied with the entry

into orce o the new law.

The ollowing map clearly demonstrates the extreme dierences in pla-

ce in respect o the population o certain constituencies prior to the

overhaul o the electoral system. In several places there was a devia-

tion o up to 60% in relation to the ideal population, especially in Pest

County. The dispersion o the population is much lower in the newconstituencies.

There are 76,000 voterson average to each MPin the uture.

Constituencies mustorm a coherent area;they cannot cross overthe boundaries ocounties or themunicipal Budapest andthe number o voters inthe districts should belargely identical.


20/55

20


Distribution of the Total Population in Single-Member Constituencies(176 single-member constituencies, 1990-2011)

Distribution of the Total Population in Single-member Constituencies(106 single-member constituencies from 2012)




21/55

21


Pursuant to the request o the Hungarian Government, alongside ot-

her cardinal laws the Venice Commission also examined the law on

the election o MPs. The Commission put orth several specic re-

commendations or Hungary in regard to orming constituencies in its

position issued on 18 June 201224

. Among others, the Commissionpoints out that precise rules are missing rom the law on the grounds

o which the National Assembly denes the boundaries o constitu-

encies. In addition, the Commission recommends adopting a 10%

deviation threshold, instead o the 15% dened in the law, in relation to

the national average or the number o voters in a given constituency

and reviewing district boundaries at set intervals, preerably every ten

years, to prevent a 20% deviation. In addition, the Venice Commission

also recommends that instead o dening constituency boundaries in

a law an independent body should be set up or this purpose. Howe-

ver, it is necessary to note that a qualied majority, i.e., a two-thirds

majority, is required in Hungary to modiy district boundaries, which,

on the one hand, is dicult to achieve with a lack o political con-

sensus, but at the same time serves as a guarantee to prevent the

suracing o the phenomenon o gerrymandering. Besides these re-

commendations, the Commission also deemed that several changes

introduced by the new law are explicitly positive, such as eliminating

disproportionaility among constituencies which has been persisting

or several years, as well as ensuring preerential seats or national

minority representatives.

24 CDL-AD(2012)012 Joint Opinion on the Act on the Elections o Memberso Parliament o Hungary

A two-third majority isrequired to changeconstituency bounda-ries, which is hard toachieve with a lack o

political consensus.


22/55

22


Voting Rights for Hungarians Living

in Neighbouring Countries

a European-conform Solution

The National Assembly passed the amendment o Act LV o 1993 on

Hungarian citizenship on 26 May 2011 by a large majority, which ena-

bled the preerential naturalisation o Hungarians living in neighbouring

countries. In accordance with this amendment, any individual o Hun-

garian descent or any individual that presumes this and certies lan-

guage prociency is eligible or Hungarian citizenship without having to

have a place o residence in Hungary. The aim o the National Assem-

bly, which passed this bill almost unanimously, was to enable the sig-

nicant number o Hungarians living beyond the countrys borders or

historical reasons to acquire citizenship preerentially anywhere around

the world. The National Assembly opted or legal solutions applied in

several Central-eastern European countries, which is how they man-

aged to avoid neighbouring countries protesting against preerential

naturalisation. Slovakia was the only exception, the parliament o which

country passed a law banning multiple citizenship in response to the

Hungarian legislative amendment. Criticism o the institution o preer-

ential naturalisation was not espoused by any infuential international

organisation. 350,000 individuals have received Hungarian citizenshipup to April 2013 since the law was adopted.

The new citizenship law and the new electoral law were adjustments to

the political system that also enabled Hungarians living in neighbouring

countries to become an integral part o the political community. Per-

manent residency in Hungary was not stipulated as a precondition or

voting rights by the Fundamental Law, hence also ensuring Hungarians

that do not live in Hungary the right to vote. The overhaul o the elector-

al system also had to respond to the appearance due to preerentialnaturalisation - o a mass o several hundreds o thousands o voters in

the electoral system whose data has never been registered on electoral

rolls and who must be ensured the opportunity to vote on Election Day

some way or other.

In accordance with the preamble o the law on general elections, the

National Assembly guarantees that Hungarian citizens living outside

our borders are a part o the political community. However, while vot-

ers with permanent residency in Hungary are entitled to vote or one

single-member constituency candidate and one national party list, vot-

ers that do not have residency in Hungary are only entitled to vote or

The National Assemblyopted or legal solutionsalso applied in severalCentral and EasternEuropean countries toensure voting rightsor Hungarians living inneighbouring countries.

Hungarians living inneighbouring countriesalso became memberso the politicalcommunity.


23/55

23


the national party list. Consequently, contrary to citizens with a place

o residence in Hungary entitled to cast two votes, citizens living in

another country only have the right to cast one vote, which may also

be interpreted as a hal-vote. This complies with Article XXI-II(4) o the

Fundamental Law stipulating that By a cardinal Act o Parliament, vot-ers may be required to reside in Hungary in order to exercise or ully

exercise their right to vote, or they may also be required to meet addi-

tional criteria to stand or election. However, lack o compliance with

international conventions may arise in the case o the provision o the

electoral law under scrutiny. According to Andrs Jakabs analysis, the

way in which individuals that do not have residency in Hungary are only

entitled to vote or the national party list may be in breach o Point b) o

Article 25 o the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and

Article 3 o Protocol 1 o the European Convention on Human Rights,

i.e., the principle o equal right to vote.25 On the contrary, in the opin-

ion o the Venice Commission26 the new rule can be considered good

practice, because it extends the right to vote to Hungarians citizens

living outside the country based on recommendations made by the ad-

visory body, and thereore adheres to universal surage. According to

the Venice Commission, technical circumstances explicitly justiy that

lawmakers have limited the right to vote ensured or Hungarian citizens

living in other countries to the national party list.

Although the parties in government have been widely criticised abouthow they want to cement their hold on power with the votes o Hun-

garians living outside the country, in reality, the impact o their votes

is more symbolic than decisive. In practice, o the 199 seats to be dis-

tributed in the National Assembly, these votes may only infuence 93

national party list seats, or rather, only 91-92 due to the preerential

national minority seat, and does not infuence the 106 single-member

constituency seats. However, not only votes cast or national party

lists, but the ractional votes o single-member constituencies also

infuence the distribution o these seats. Every vote cast which wasnot required or winning a seat in a single-member constituency and

was cast or the candidate o a party exceeding the 5% threshold on

the national party list will count as a ractional vote in 2014. Due to the

Hungarian three-party system, depending on the nal results, some

60-75% o the total number o votes cast in single-member constitu-

encies may count as ractional votes and added to the ballots cast or

25 Jakab, Andrs: A klldn l magyar llampolgrok vlasztjoga egyenlsgnek

krdse a vlasztsi trvny koncepcijban (The issue o equality in the right to vote orHungarian citizens living in oreign countries in the concept o the electoral law). Pzmny LawWorking Papers No. 2011/38.26 Opinion No. 662/2012, CDL-AD(2012)012, Strasbourg, 18 June 2012

Voters that do not havepermanent residencyin Hungary are onlyentitled to vote or thenational party list.


24/55

24


national party lists.27 Ater calculating this, MP seats are distributed by

applying the DHondt ormula.

Out-o-country votes may on the one hand be cast by Hungarian cit-

izens that emigrated earlier and their descendants holding Hungariancitizenship, as well as Hungarian citizens temporarily residing in a or-

eign country who do not have a place o residence in Hungary, and on

the other hand by citizens naturalised within the scope o the simplied

naturalisation procedure. There is no accurate register recording the

individuals classied in the rst category and their address, which is

why their registration on the electoral roll presumes an active interest,

gathering o inormation and registration on their behal without receiv-

ing any notication about this in a letter. This is highly unlikely in the vast

majority o cases. Primarily individuals naturalised within the ramework

o the simplied procedure need to be taken into account or estimating

the potential voting weight o out-o-country votes. 440,000 individuals

applied or Hungarian citizenship within the ramework o the simplied

procedure between January 2011 and April 2013 and nearly 350,000

were naturalised by the end o April 2013. Preerential naturalisation is

equally available or Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin and the Hun-

garian Diaspora. 98% o the total number o applications made to date

was received rom citizens living in neighbouring countries. 67% o the

total number o applications made was received rom Romanian citi-

zens, 18% rom Hungarians in Vojvodina and 12% rom Hungarians liv-ing in the Sub-Carpathian region.28 Thereore, it is primarily necessary

to ocus on the larger Hungarian communities in the Carpathian Basin,

with the exception o Upper Hungary where barely over 1,500 individ-

uals applied due to the restrictive measures adopted.

According to the 2011 census data, over 1,237,000 Hungarians live in

Romania, 458,000 Hungarians live in Slovakia and over 253,000 Hun-

garians live in Serbia. The census will only be taken in Ukraine in 2013,

which is why we rely on the data o the 2001 census to estimate thepopulation o the ourth largest Hungarian community in the Carpathian

Basin, which was 156,000 at the time. As regards neighbouring coun-

tries, approximately 25,000 ethnic Hungarians with Austrian citizenship

live in Austria, 15,000 ethnic Hungarians live in Croatia and 6,000 in

Slovenia. In April 2013, the ratio o applications or naturalisation in re-

lation to the Hungarian population was 30% in the case o Hungarians

27 It is necessary to note that the proportion o ractional votes is even higher in the event othe ragmentation o the party system or a similar landslide victory to that o 2010.

28http://allampolgarsag.gov.hu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=251:hirek1304042&catid=1:riss-hirek&Itemid=50

Nearly 350,000 individ-uals were naturalisedup to April 2013.


25/55

25


living in Vojvodina and the Sub-Carpathian region and 23% in the

case o Hungarians in Romania. We may assume that the number

o applications or citizenship made per month will not signicantly

change over the next year. The whole procedure, rom applying to

the ceremony, takes 5-7 months in most cases. According to ourestimates, a urther 200,000 individuals may be naturalised within

the ramework o the preerential procedure up to April 2014 taking

account o the assumed proportion o the voting-age population.

Consequently, approximately 440,000 individuals naturalised within

the ramework o the preerential procedure will have the opportunity

to register on electoral rolls.

Registration will presumably decrease turnout among Hungarians

living in neighbouring countries. Voters that do not have a place o

residence in Hungary will have to request their registration on the

electoral roll, which they can do 15 days prior to every election. This

constitutes a precondition or exercising voting rights in Hungary.

The individuals concerned may register on the electoral roll via mail

or the Internet. It is necessary to note that in the case o Hungarians

living in other countries the Constitutional Court ruled registration to

be constitutional, since Hungarian authorities do not have a certi-

ed register recording the addresses o these voters, without which

ensuring voting rights is unimaginable.29 The ratio o Hungarian citi-

zens living in other countries motivated to register prior to electionsbecause o interest in Hungarian politics, citizenship awareness or

political attitudes or values is presumably relatively low. In any case,

it is dicult to accurately estimate how many will apply or registra-

tion on the electoral roll and take part in the elections. In Croatia, o

the 400,000 out-o-country Croatians registered on the electoral roll

the ratio o participants varied between 5% and 22% in the past last

three general elections held.30 In relation to this, active registration

may have a negative impact, while voting by mail and the higher ra-

tio o Hungarian national minority communities in the neighbouringcountries in relation to the Diaspora may have a positive impact.31

29 Constitutional Court Decision1/2013 (I. 7.)30http://www.izbori.hr/2003Sabor/index.htm, http://www.izbori.hr/2007Sabor/rezul-tati/i_02_011_0000.html, http://www.izbori.hr/2011Sabor/rezultati/rezultati.html31 The legal regulation relating to registration was amended in December 2012 in Croatia andactive registration was introduced or Croatian living in oreign countries, implying that they

have to register beore every election.

Registration willpresumably havea considerablenegative impact onturnout amongHungarians living inother countries.


26/55

26


Assuming that 40% o individuals that acquired citizenship through the

preerential naturalisation procedure turn up to vote and that the ma-

jority o these 176,000 votes were cast or a single party, with a sim-

ilar turnout o 65% in Hungary to that o 2010, it is plausible to state

that out-o-country Hungarian votes infuence the distribution o 1 or2 seats. This is equally reinorced by the model estimations made by

Szzadvg on the grounds o the results o the general elections held

in 2006 and 2010. We grouped the electoral districts o these two gen-

eral elections according to the electoral districts o the new electoral

system and examined what the election outcome would have been i

votes were transposed to seats according to the current system, as

well as what infuence out-o-country votes would have had on the

outcome o the election. When making this model estimation, we took

the assumption presented in the table below as a point o departure or

the distribution o out-o-country votes, which is based on the results

o available surveys.32

When making the model estimation, we also assumed that MSZP and

SZDSZ orm a single national list and delegate joint candidates in 2006.

Results clearly demonstrate that the votes o Hungarians living in neigh-

bouring countries would have by no means infuenced the outcome othe general elections held in 2006 and 2010. According to our esti-

mates, one seat would have been won by the right-wing coalition with

the 200,000 out-o-country votes, which would have not infuenced the

result in 2010 whatsoever.

32 For example: Juhsz A. Lszl R. 2012. A klhoni magyar llampolgrok vlasztjoga(The Right to Vote or Hungarians Living in Other Countries). In: Political Capital: Flton avlasztsi reorm (Halway to electoral reorm), p. 20

Estimated Ratio of Out-of-Country Votes

Source: Szzadvg

2006 2010

Fidesz-KDNP

MSZP-SZDSZ

MDF

egyb

80%

10%

2%

8%

80%

10%

8%

2%

Fidesz-KDNP

MSZP

Jobbik

LMP

Ballots cast byHungarians living inother countries willbarely aect the

distribution o seats.

200,000 ballots castby Hungarians living inneighbouring countries

would have notinfuenced the outcomeo the 2010 electionwhatsoever.


27/55

27


It is necessary to note that a 40% turnout (176,000 votes) is also quite

an optimistic estimate. For example, generally ewer voters turn out in

the Romanian and Serbian general elections in relation to Hungary. In

other countries like Ukraine and Slovakia, laws banning dual citizen-

ship in accordance with which individuals that applied or Hungariancitizenship in Slovakia may even lose their Slovak citizenship may also

inhibit the turnout o voters. This demonstrates that contrary to ears

according to which out-o-country votes may determine the outcome

o the election, in reality, voters naturalised within the ramework o the

preerential procedure will most probably only decisively infuence the

distribution o a single seat. Due to a lack o research conducted on

Diaspora turnout within the European Union and abroad it is dicult

to provide estimates; however, due to diculties involved in receiving

notication about registration and the weaker ties o these individualsto Hungary, their turnout is expected to be very low. The weight o their

combined number o votes will surely be considerably lower than that

o Hungarian voters in the Carpathian Basin.

Model estimation: Impact of out-of-country voteson the distribution of seats

Source: Szzadvg

40% turnout,i.e. 176,000 votesseems a veryoptimistic estimate.

0

100 000

200 000

300 000

400 000

500 000

80

80

81

81

82

82

23

23

23

22

22

22

18

18

18

18

18

17

6

6

6

6

6

6

114

114

113

113

112

112

152

152

152

153

153

154

5

5

5

5

5

5

2006 2010

Fidesz-

KDNP

MSZP-

SZDSZMDF

Fidesz-

KDNPMSZP JobbikL MP

Number o valid

out-o-country

votes


28/55

28


Parliamentary Representation of National

Minorities Living in Hungary Progress

in the Protection of Minority Rights

Ensuring representation or national minorities living in Hungary in the

National Assembly has never been achieved under any government

over the more than two decades since transition to democracy. Con-

cepts promoting the parliamentary representation o minorities never-

theless did exist (such as, the proposal made by Juhsz in October

1989; the independent motion o MP Mezey o January 1990; Tabajdi

and Jakabs proposal; several proposals put orth by the Ministry o

Interior in 1992; the Vralvi model; positions issued by minority com-

missioners). However, eventually none o these became a law.33

The Constitutional Court declared that lawmakers induced an un-

constitutional situation by deault by ailing to ensure parliamentary

representation or minorities.34 Although the Constitutional Court did

acknowledge that parliamentary representation does not constitute a

precondition or enorcing minority rights, at the same time it is without

doubt that ensuring parliamentary representation is the most eective

means o legal protection in the minority rights system.35 The National

Assembly passed the national and ethnic minorities act in 1993, asa result o which national and ethnic minorities were entitled to set

up independent sel-governments. Clariying the situation o nation-

al and ethnic minorities was an exceptionally important issue during

the course o the transormation o Hungarian public law, which, aside

rom ensuring the existing level o legal protection or minorities, implied

moving beyond this ramework and urther developing the system.

Based on the new set o regulations adopted in connection with na-

tional and ethnic minorities, rights ensured or minorities are exemplary

even in international comparison and were also acknowledged by theVenice Commission.36

33 Pap A. L. 2007. Identits s reprezentci. Az etnikai hovatartozs meghatrozstl a poli-tikai kpviseletig (Identity and Representation. From Determining Ethnic Belonging to PoliticalRepresentation). Budapest, MTA Gondolat, pp. 21526634 Constitutional Court Decision 35/1992 (VI.10.)35 A debate in which quite a diverse range o opinions suraced was launched several timesin regard to whether the National Assembly complied with commitments relating to remedyingthe state o constitutional deault when the system o sel-government or national and ethnicminorities was devised. Without going into the legal positions posited in detail, what is certainis that there is no reerence to the decision issued by the Constitutional Court in regard to

ensuring representation or national and ethnic minorities on its ocial website.http://www.mkab.hu/kozerdeku-adatok/mulasztasok36http://www.venice.coe.int/weborms/documents/?pd=CDL-AD%282012%29011-e

Based on the newset o rules, rights en-sured or minorities areexemplary even in inter-national comparison.


29/55

29


In light o international documents, ensuring equal opportunity or mi-

norities can be realised through positive discrimination.37 In this re-

gard, this is ensured by co-opting preerential quotas reserved or

minorities and delegation in several countries.38 For example, in Ro-

mania 5% o votes required to elect an MP is sucient or gaining apreerential seat. In Croatia, gaining a minority seat in parliament is

also subject to obtaining a minimum number o votes, as an outcome

o which Albanians, Bosnians, Macedonians, Slovenians, as well as

Czechs and Slovaks may be jointly represented in parliament, in ad-

dition to ensuring independent representation or Serbs, Italians and

Hungarians. Representation o the Italian and Hungarian community

in Slovenia is ensured through auto-representation.39 The Italian and

Hungarian minority with Slovenian citizenship may vote or parties, as

well as minority representatives, which somewhat diers to the Hun-

garian procedure.

At the level o the Fundamental Law, the National Avowal section

proclaims that the nationalities living with us orm part o the Hun-

garian political community and are constituent parts o the State []

we commit to promoting and saeguarding [] the languages and

cultures o nationalities living in Hungary. Article XXIX o the chapter

Freedom and Responsibility recognises nationalities living in Hunga-

ry constituting an integral part o the state. Consequently, rights o

national minorities have been incorporated in the catalogue o unda-mental rights, concurrently to which the Fundamental Law continues

to maintain a unique minority status that moves beyond undamental

human and civil rights.40 Substantive legal regulations pertaining to

the parliamentary representation o national minorities is specied in

the act on the election o MPs. This legislation makes both active

and passive voting rights subject to registration on the electoral roll.

Thereore, only individuals that request registration on the electoral

roll are eligible to vote in local, regional and national local government

and general elections. Pursuant to this law, registration as a minorityvoter includes making a declaration about ethnic belonging, as well

as a declaration by the individual applying or registration on the elec-

37 See: U.N. Convention on the Protection o National Minorities; The Council o EuropeFramework Convention on the Protection o National Minorities; U.N Declaration on the Rightso Persons Belonging to a National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities; OECD Co-penhagen Document; Lung Declaration o 1999, etc.38 Pap A. L. 2007. Identits s reprezentci (Identity and Representation). Budapest, 2007,MTAKI-Gondolat, pp. 18619239 Article 64 o the Slovenian constitution stipulates special rights or indigenous Italian and

Hungarian national minorities.40 Gerencsr B. Sz. 2012. Gondolatok az j nemzetisgi trvnyrl (On the New NationalMinority Law). Pzmny Law Working Papers. Issue 2012/34.http://plwp.jak.ppke.hu/en/muhelytanulmanyok/2012/79-2012-34.html

Representation isensured or minoritiesin several countries byco-opting preerentialquotas reserved orminorities and

delegation.


30/55

30


toral roll that the given individual also wishes to vote in the general

election, in addition to ensuring the option o being removed rom the

electoral roll. A national minority list can be ormed during general

elections, the precondition or which is receiving recommendations

rom at least 1% o the voters registered on the national minority list,however, no more than 1,500. Any national minority voter registered

on the national minority list may stand or election and any voter on

the electoral roll that has the right to vote or MPs is entitled to rec-

ommend a national minority list.

Ensuring preerential seats or the top candidate o the given national

minority list is the positive dimension o the new national minority

law. The number o votes required or gaining a preerential national

minority seat, i.e., the preerential quota, is calculated in the ollowing

manner: ater aggregating the total number o votes cast or national

party lists and national minority lists, the result received is divided by

93, which is then divided again by 4. The quotient derived is round-

ed to receive the preerential quota. I a given national minority list

receives an identical number o votes or more than the preerential

quota, a preerential seat is gained o the given list. Only one preer-

ential seat may be gained o one national minority list. The number

o seats that can be won o the national party list must be decreased

ater every additional preerential seat, i.e., a total o 199 MPs may be

elected to parliament together with every preerential seat.

The recommendation

o at least 1% o na-tional minority voters,or a maximum 1,500recommendations isrequired to orm a list.

The law ensures theopportunity or onecandidate at the top othe national minoritylist to win a preerential

minority seat.


31/55

31


In accordance with the law, any national minority list that does not

gain a seat is entitled to delegate its leading candidate to the National

Assembly as a minority spokesperson. The smaller minorities (presum-

ably, the Bulgarian, Greek, Polish, Armenian, Serb, Slovenian, Ukrain-

ian and Ruthenian minorities cannot count on ull parliamentary rep-

resentation) will thereore be granted the right o consultation by having

the right to delegate a spokesperson. Non-voting spokespersons andrepresentatives with ull voting rights at plenary sessions will be entitled

to set up committees representing national minorities. This commit-

tee may unction as a parliamentary body with the right to put orth

initiatives, proposals and opinions and conduct control, in addition to

presenting their position on reports compiled by the government about

the status o national minorities and reports presented by the commis-

sioner or undamental rights. Owing to demographic characteristics,

ull voting representation and representation through a spokesperson

will ensure a dierent status or specic communities; however, the

spokesperson status is seen as a major step orward in relation to the

current situation.

n. a.

6 404

n. a.

13 895

n. a.

11 310

n. a.

8 874

n. a.

2 805

9 101

1 731

n. a.

54 120

n. a.

142 683

n. a.

13 570

n. a.

30 824

n. a.

10 740

n. a.

2 905

10 459

1 930

n. a.

226 728

1 358

189 984

2 509

15 597

2 962

62 105

620

7 995

1 098

3 816

17 693

3 025

5 070

313 832

3 556

308 957

3 916

23 561

5 730

131 951

3 293

26 345

3 323

7 210

29 647

2 385

5 633

555 507

3 500 - 10 000

400 000 - 600 000

4 000 - 4 500

80 000 - 90 000

3 000 - 3 500

200 000 - 220 000

6 000

25 000

2 000

5 000 - 10 000

100 000 - 110 000

5 000

10 000

835 000 - 1 083 995

1980 1990 2001 2011

Table 3: Changes in the number of individuals belonging to a national minority

Source:* Hungarian Central Statistical Ofce (KSH, 2011;

** Report J/1397 on the situation of national and ethnic minorities living in the territoryof the Republic of Hungary. 1999. This data was provided by national minorities.

Any national minoritylist that does not gaina seat may delegate itsleading candidate to theNational Assembly as aminority spokesperson.

Bulgarian

Gypsy

Greek

Croation

Polish

German

Armenian

Romanian

Ruthene

Serbian

Slovak

Slovenian

Ukrainian

Total

Census data by national minority*

National minority estimate**


32/55

32


Szzadvg Foundation prepared a preliminary estimate in connection with

the preerential quota. According to this estimate, taking the average o the

number o votes cast in the past two general elections (which was a total

o 5.3 million) and assuming that ractional votes represent 65% o the to-

tal number o votes cast or candidates in single-member constituenciesand that Hungarian citizens living in other countries cast 160,000 votes,

in accordance with the ormula set orth in the law the preerential quota

represents approximately 24,000 votes. I we compare this to the census

data, more specically, the demographic breakdown o the national minority

population, this means that there is mathematical probability or the Gypsy,

Romanian, Slovak and German communities to gain seats.41 However, oth-

er actors may also infuence attaining the preerential quota, such as, voter

turnout; the degree o activeness o the national minorities, more specically

the inclination o non-Hungarian citizens to vote; number o individuals be-

longing to a national minority applying or registration on the electoral roll or

the campaign strategies o minority sel-governments and parties.

Szzadvg Foundation conducted a telephone public research poll be-

tween 14 and 17 April 2013 to survey the backing o parliamentary rep-

resentation o national minorities.42 Based on this survey, 58.1% o respond-

ents agree with the parliamentary representation o national minorities. In

other words, one year beore the election it is plausible to state that there is

signicant backing o this. Party preerence did not play a major role in the

case o respondents since, with the exception o the voters o the radicalright-wing party in parliament, a similarly large proportion o voters sym-

pathising with the other parties (60-70%) backed minority representation.

This act, i.e., high level o support regardless o party preerence urther

legitimises the parliamentary representation o minorities.

41http://www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas/tablak_teruleti_00, 2.1.6.Table 1: Population by ethnicity,age group, highest level o education and gender42 Interviews were conducted with 1,027 randomly selected individuals in this research by

applying the CATI method. Owing to the sampling procedure, there is a maximum +/- 3.2%deviation in data published in the analysis in relation to the data that would have been gener-ated by polling the entire adult population.

Do you agree with the representation of minorities living in Hungary inthe national assembly? (%)

Source: Szzadvg

The majority o societybacks the parliamentaryrepresentation o na-tional minorities.

58.1 Yes

35.1 No

6.8 Dont know/no response


33/55

33


The Right to Vote as a Fundamental

Right Closing the Gap in International

Expectations

The electoral system is ar more than a actor determining the party

structure. Elections orm the undamental components, conditions un-

derpinning the unctioning o democratic rule o law, and the right to

vote is above-all a undamental right. Thereore, elections have a two-

old character. On the one hand the election represents the means or

exercising democratic power based on the principle o establishing and

renewing representational bodies, the sovereignty o the people and the

popular vote. The outcome o the election determines which political

parties will have their hands on the legislative and executive power, and

also serves to ensure the legitimacy o these. However, on the other

hand, participating in elections and the right to vote is a undamental

right o all citizens, which oers an opportunity or voters to decide who

to delegate to representational bodies active voting rights and or

voting citizens to assume positions in these representational bodies.43

In Hungary, it is plausible to state that constitutional-level regulations in

regard to elections are structured in a similar way in the Fundamental Law

to the previous constitution. The right to vote is a undamental politicalright which cannot be considered an absolute right, i.e., exercising this

right can be made subject to conditions. At present, the combination o

two preliminary requirements needs to be met or an individual to have the

right to vote. Belonging to the given political community is one o these, i.e.,

holding Hungarian citizenship,44 whilst the other is being o legal voting age

and the ability to cast the ballot. In addition, the way in which a given citizen

has not been disenranchised within the scope o the relevant procedure

is a negative precondition or voting. The latter provides legitimate grounds

or exclusion rom voting. Aside the act that the Fundamental Law con-tinues to stipulate that there will be general, direct, ree, equal and secret

elections, the way in which voters need to be ensured the opportunity to

reely express their will has also been declared. The denition or ree elec-

tions has been incorporated in the Fundamental Law as a word-or-word

translation o Article 25 o the International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights (hereinater ICCPR). The European Convention on Human Rights

and, based on the ormer, the practice ollowed by the European Court o

Human Rights (hereinater ECHR) have also been incorporated in the law.

The right tovote is above-alla undamental right.

Two preliminaryrequirements need

to be met or a givenindividual to have theright to vote, namely:Hungarian citizenshipand reaching the legalvoting age.

43 Dezs M. 1995. A politikai jogok s a vlasztjog az Alkotmnyban (Political Rights andRight to Vote in the Constitution). Acta Humana 1995/18-19, p. 17244 Pursuant to the entry into orce o the Fundamental Law, permanent residency is no longera requirement in respect o ensuring the right to vote (Article XXIII o the Fundamental Law)


34/55

34


However, the Constitutional Court has not yet managed to issue any

guidelines in respect o how ree elections should be understood. There

are undamentally two ways to approach this issue. According to one o

the denitions, the principle o ree elections is, in practice, none other

than the synthesis o the other our undamental voting right principles,i.e., ree elections are established by enorcing these. According to the

other more sophisticated denition, the new principle introduced has a

separate meaning and it will be the task o the Constitutional Court to

dene it.45

Holding Hungarian citizenship is one o the requirements or voting. As

mentioned above, the right to vote is just as much a undamental right

as it directly relates to the structure and unctioning o the state. Dening

who enjoys this right essentially states who belongs to the given political

community. Prior to the adoption o the Fundamental Law, besides Hun-

garian citizenship, residence in Hungary constituted a urther require-

ment, which, however, was not incorporated in the Fundamental Law,

hence opening the opportunity or Hungarian citizens living outside the

country to enjoy the right to vote. With this solution, the model essentially

shited in the Hungarian electoral system re-positioning the country in

the mainstream, instead o being an exception, since in most countries

the political community is dened as the community o citizens irrespec-

tive o where they happen to live.46 The opinion issued by the Venice

Commission equally denes belonging to a given state as the legitimatemeans or eligibility to vote and also explicitly declares that citizens living

in oreign countries should also be given the right to vote.47 In their joint

opinion issued in respect o the electoral law, the Venice Commission

and OSCE posit that granting voting rights to Hungarian citizens tha

the new hungarian electoral system

Documents