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recognize “fish” as a class after seeing only a few examples despite the fact that they had almost certainly never seen an example of a fish before (Herrnstein, 1982). There even seems to be a propensity for the animals to overgeneralize slightly. These findings argue for an innate categorical ability of nervous systems, even in animals without language.

The ability to categorize appears to be general over many species. Given the richness of the environment and the fact that the nervous system itself must generate the categories, it appears that only a selective system could cope with the massive challenge involved in adaptive recognition. A selective theory, particularly when coupled with polymorphous rules for categorization, compels a view of memory as recategorization. Perception, memory and creativity then begin to merge in the workings of the degenerate repertoires of reentrantly linked neuronal groups.

Many of the ideas presented here arose in discussions with Dr. Gerald Edelman. Supported by a grant from International Business Machines Corporation.

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The Need for More Specificity

Commentary by Howard Gardner

First things first. F&L are to be congratulated for a heroic synthesis of diverse materials on creativity. As one who has searched for such an integrated account, I am impressed by the skill with which these authors have executed their project. Future synthetic accounts will stand on F&L’s shoulders.

Nor do I want merely to praise their heroism. A number of the specific points in their treatment are important and original. Their definitions of key terms are reasonable and useful. Their willingness to go beyond a purely computational account is to be applauded. Their hypothesis about the likelihood of creativity as a consequence of the geometries of specific semantic networks is intriguing and worth following up. It would be difficult to read this paper without learning something new and encountering ideas which are worth further exploration.

To be sure, any such ambitious effort merits (and will doubtless receive) critical comment -most especially from those with an inflexible scientific conscience and those with an aversion to sociobiological approaches. Since I do not fit into either category, I will leave these lines of criticism to others. My own reservations fall into three principal categories: (1) the nature of the evidence on which they base their claims; (2) their particular claims in the area of greatest

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familiarity to me; and (3) the issue of how to move from a highly general account of creativity to one which is applicable to, and which freshly illuminates, particular instances of creativity.

Evidence F&L survey a wide sweep of cognitive, neurological, and sociological sciences. Of course, they have to be highly selective in which authors they quote and what uses they make ofthe findings of these authorities. I am therefore concerned by the question of how do they decide upon which authorities to rely and how they then go about combining insights from various authorities in order to reach general conclusions.

Take, for example, the area of neuroscience. Certainly, neuroscience is relevant to any discussion of creativity and it is perfectly reasonable to cite the work of Edelman and to touch on Kandel in passing. But why not focus instead on cortical columns (Mountcastle, Hubel& Wiesel) or on evidence from neuropsychology (Geschwind, Sperry)? Analogously, in the area of cognitive psychology, it is perfectly reasonable to dwell on semantic networks but why not focus instead on prototype theory (Rosch) or accounts of similarity (Tversky, Ortony)? Or to mention another issue, F&L’s characterization of specific concepts often seems arbitrary. In Figure 1 “cultural learning” and “individual cognition” fall under cognitive phenotypes while “word categories of English” are placed under the sociocultural environment. Now there may well be motivated reasons for describing these concepts in a certain way and pigeon-holing them in a certain manner but the reader necessarily wonders how principled or ad hoc the decisions have been. Certainly the reasoning was not transparent to me.

It seems clear that the authors have made a decision to be quite catholic in their range of references and to include as much as practical in their synthesis. They are perhaps too open to “every factor influencing every other factor” and they often skirt the tautologous (it is hard to imagine how creativity could fail to be enhanced in environments which permit greater complexity). Given this permissiveness (which sometimes borders on the promiscuous), one naturally wonders: what has been left out and why? One has the feeling that almost any new line of evidence in any study could, if the authors so desired, be integrated into the emerging superstructure. But if a theory can incorporate any new line of study, how discriminating is it? Is it not loo powerful? And if materials are being excluded, on what basis is this decision made and what are the consequences of such a decision? To use the language of evolution, what are the criteria of selection?

Claims about Development and Modularity So far I have cited instances from areas where I am relatively ignorant. Naturally, I was pleased to see considerable emphasis on findings from developmental psychology, including generous citation of my own work. I would hope that these decisions could be justified! In truth, however, I know my own field well enough to concede that there is little consensus on the main issues.

Take, for example, the work of Piaget. An impressive array of witnesses could be cited on behalf of Piaget’s overall approach and his particular stage claims. But an equally large and probably growing cohort of witnesses is skeptical about Piaget’s specific claims. If these critics are right, what implications obtain for F&L’s theories? If the citation of Piaget is serious, then such a conclusion would invalidate parts of the theory. If, on the other hand, as I suspect, Piaget’s fate is immaterial to the present claims about creativity, then what is the point of quoting and incorporating him?

To put the point another way, it matters greatly in many fields of science just who one selects as a cicerone. I am pleased to have been so selected but keenly aware of the tentativeness of some of

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the claims (e.g. that development is U-shaped in certain domains), the issue of generalizability (are findings in artistic development necessarily relevant in other areas of development?) and the danger of mis-characterization (e.g. F&L quote me as saying that physically handicapped individuals can remain creative. I do not recognize this quotation. What I have shown is that some individuals who suffer brain damage can continue to make creative contributions in their chosen area - a somewhat different, and possibly a more dramatic claim). There is the equivalent danger of partial quotation. Thus F&L take note of my claim that there are broad stages (or “waves”) of syi,rbolic development, which cut across many domains; but they fail to note my concomitant claim that many aspects of symbolic development prove to be limited to a single domain (the so-called “streams” of symbolic development).

I am in broad sympathy with another theme of the paper: the recognition that different cognitive modules may exist, and the correlative interest in the distinctiveness and variety of symbol systems. With F&L I believe that any account of creativity would be enhanced by a consideration of this factor. My own reading suggests, however, that F&L do not pursue this assertion with the seriousness that it merits. For instance, while endorsing modularity, they continue to speak of processes like learning and memory, with the clear implication that these processes occur in the same way across different materials - a decidedly non-modular point of view. Moreover, they state quite explicitly that their account of creativity ought to be applicable in essentially its present form to all forms of creativity - once again, a direct challenge to modularity.

Future work My final problem with the present work is a nagging doubt about where it can ultimately lead. As a broad characterization of what makes creativity possible, it may well stand-and perhaps this is sufficient for F&L’s ambition. My guess is that F&L wish to go further, and certainly I feel that it is important and advisable to try to go further.

In my view, accounts of creativity must ultimately shed light on the particular contributions of particular individuals, groups, or cultures. Since creativity is by its nature a rare occurrence with its own idiosyncratic characteristics, any account needs to be attuned to the facts of a particular situation. F&L reveal their concern with this issue in their final figure, where they attempt to situate the contributions of Beethoven, Picasso, Einstein, etc. Like much of their essay, this account is suggestive but it simply whets one’s appetite for a more probing discussion - one which brings out the nature of the differences (and even the incommensuratenesses) as well as the similarities among instances of creative breakthroughs.

To arrive at such idiographic accounts, it will be necessary to pay specific attention to the details of creative products, creative processes, and creative lives. Needed are the kinds of accounts of individual creators (like Howard Gruber’s study of Charles Darwin or Frederick Holmes’ study of Antoine Lavoisier); of individual creations (like Picasso’s Guemicu or Stravinsky’s Les Notes); or of long term sketchbooks, such as those kept by Beethoven, Leonardo, or Dostoevsky. Relevant will be the kinds of goals put forth for large-scale projects, the networks of enterprises in which such individuals engage, the many steps and revisions entailed in the construction of any complex work, and other such considerations. Only by conducting numerous studies of this sort, and then comparing and contrasting the findings in such studies, will it be possible to determine which characteristics of creativity truly obtain across diverse individuals, which are limited to particular domains, and which are sui generis.

In sum, then, F&L have provided an impressive account of the multiple dimensions of creativity. No doubt one can quibble with the particular authorities that are cited and without question there are errors in specific citations. Still it is doubtful that any pair of experts could have

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made a superior selection at present. To my mind questions remain about the rationale which underlies particular citations as well as the methodology for combining these disparate lines of inquiry into a single coherent framework. F&L could allay my concerns here by spelling out their procedures and the consequences of particular selections which they have made. A final concern has to do with the extent to which this theory can actually illuminate specific instances of creativity. My own expectation is that the theory itself would be significantly altered and improved in the light of specific studies of particular instances of discovery and invention. If F&L are loathe to undertake such studies themselves, I hope that they will encourage students and associates to undertake specific case studies. If one area of science can ill afford to avoid a detailed analysis of specific examples, it is the study of human creativity.

Preparation of this manuscript was supported by grants from the Spencer Foundation and the John D. and Catherine T MacArthur Foundation.

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Dream-Work and the Creative Process

Commentary by Carol P. Harris

The authors have constructed a substantive basis for evolutionary studies of the creative process. However, in favoring cognitive science they give short shrift to a number of key issues in depth psychology, and this ultimately constricts the limits of their inquiry. F&L correctly point out several cognitive strategies for relinking (means-end inversion, stochastic jumps, “Janusian thinking”; Rothenberg, 1979a, etc.). In addition to these rather well characterized modes of information processing, extensive data from psychology and ethnography attest to the importance of reverie, daydreams, and dreaming in the creative process (Dodds, 1951; Freud, 1959; Koestler, 1964; O’Nell, 1976). None of these are examined or discussed in the target article. At first glance this omission may seem prudent, since the mention of dreaming invariably raises questions about subconscious events in the mind, as well as a host of other depth phenomena, which cognitive science either excludes (e.g. discussion in Simon, 1979) or with substantial awkwardness still barely incorporates (Foulkes, 1985). My purpose here is to show that the omission is in fact unnecessary.

The cognitive psychology of dreams is a new subject (review in Foulkes, 1985) and my remarks will necessarily be tentative. My starting point is a rather comprehensive looking map of human