the nature of intelligence - globalsecurity.org...—sun tzu, the art of war “for the whole...

Chapter 1

The Natureof

Intelligence

“And therefore I say: Know the enemy, know yourself; yourvictory will never be endangered. Know the ground, know theweather; your victory will then be total.”1

—Sun Tzu, The Art of War

“For the whole reason-for-being of all military intelligencepersonnel is to facilitate accomplishment of the mission, andto save lives. When they fail, all the wrong people are hurt.”2

—Stedman Chandler and Robert W. Robb, Front-Line Intelligence

o develop effective intelligence, we must first understandits fundamental nature—its purpose and characteristics

as well as its relationship to command and operations. This un-derstanding will become the basis for developing a theory andpractical philosophy for intelligence.

HOW IMPORTANT IS INTELLIGENCE?

Maneuver warfare requires a firm focus on the enemy. It aimsat taking action which avoids enemy strengths and exploits en-emy critical vulnerabilities. The identification of thesestrengths and vulnerabilities is crucial. Maneuver warfare re-quires acting in a manner to deceive and then striking at a timeand place which the enemy does not expect and for which he isnot prepared. Identification of an adversary’s expectations andpreparations is also important. Maneuver warfare requires de-cision and action based on situational awareness—a keen un-derstanding of the essential factors which make each conditionunique—rather than on preconceived schemes or techniques.How is this situational awareness gained?

Accurate and timely intelligence—knowledge of the enemyand the surrounding environment—is a prerequisite for successin war. Certainly, maneuver warfare places a heavy emphasison the judgment of leaders at all levels. Nonetheless, judgment,

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even genius, cannot substitute for good intelligence. Geniusmay make better sense of available information, and it mayprovide superior and faster use of the knowledge it gains fromthat information, but no commander—no matter how brillian-t—can operate effectively without good intelligence. A brilliantcommander, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, proclaimed that,“It is not that one general is more brilliant or experienced thanthe other; it is a question of which general has a better appre-ciation of the battlefield.”3

Intelligence, therefore, is at once inseparable from both com-mand and operations. Intelligence contributes to the exercise ofeffective command during military operations and helps ensurethe successful conduct of those operations. By identifying en-emy weaknesses susceptible to attack, intelligence also servesas an important element of combat power.

Effective intelligence in the hands of capable commandershas often provided decisive advantages of tactical, operational,and strategic importance. The Battle of Midway in June 1942was won by a vastly outgunned and outnumbered Americanfleet because its commanders had received, recognized, andacted upon detailed and accurate intelligence. In 1986, duringair strikes conducted in response to Libya’s terrorist activity,intelligence provided the detailed understanding of the Libyanair defense system that enabled Marine and Navy aviators toeffectively shut it down. Intelligence’s identification of criticalvulnerabilities in Iraqi air and ground defenses contributed to

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the rapid and thorough defeat of Iraqi forces during OperationDesert Storm.

THE OBJECTIVES OF INTELLIGENCE

Understanding the relationship between intelligence and com-mand and control is key to understanding the role of intelli-gence. Command and control is about making and executingdecisions. The main purpose of intelligence is to support thedecisionmaking process.

Intelligence strives to accomplish two objectives. First, itprovides accurate, timely, and relevant knowledge about theenemy (or potential enemy) and the surrounding environment.In other words, the primary objective of intelligence is to sup-port decisionmaking by reducing uncertainty about the hostilesituation to a reasonable level—recognizing, of course, that thefog of war renders anything close to absolute certaintyimpossible.

In achieving its primary objective, intelligence performs fourrelated tasks. First, it identifies and evaluates existing condi-tions and enemy capabilities. Second, based upon those exist-ing conditions and capabilities, it estimates possible enemycourses of action, providing insight into possible future actions.Third, it aids in identifying friendly vulnerabilities the enemy


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may exploit. Finally, intelligence assists in the development andevaluation of friendly courses of action based on the results ofthe first three tasks.

The second intelligence objective is that it assists in protect-ing friendly forces through counterintelligence. Coun-terintelligence includes both active and passive measuresintended to deny the enemy valuable information about thefriendly situation. Counterintelligence also includes activitiesrelated to countering hostile espionage, subversion, and terror-ism. Counterintelligence directly supports force protection op-erations by helping the commander deny intelligence to theenemy and plan appropriate security measures.

The two intelligence objectives demonstrate that intelligencepossesses both positive—or exploitative—and protective ele-ments. It uncovers conditions which can be exploited and si-multaneously provides warning of enemy actions. Intelligencethus provides the basis for our own actions, both offensive anddefensive.

INTELLIGENCE AS KNOWLEDGE

Although the objectives of intelligence have been discussed, theterm intelligence has not been defined. Very simply, intelli-gence is knowledge—knowledge about the enemy or the sur-

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rounding environment4 needed to support decisionmaking.Since people understand situations best as images—mental pic-tures—intelligence aims to create an accurate or meaningfulimage of the situation confronting a commander. Goodintelligence paints a picture—or more accurately, several pic-tures—of possible realities.5

Not all knowledge which goes into military decisionmakingqualifies as intelligence. Knowledge pertaining directly to thefriendly situation or to the status of an ally does not constituteintelligence. Knowledge not pertaining directly to the friendlycause generally falls under the category of intelligence.

What do we mean by knowledge? In describing intelligenceas knowledge, we are distinguishing intelligence from data orinformation.6 Intelligence is developed from information, but itis important to recognize that intelligence is not simply an-other term for information. Information is uneval- uated mate-rial of any kind—enemy prisoner of war interro- gationreports, radio intercepts, reconnaissance reports,photographs—and represents the raw material from which in-telligence is ultimately derived. Few pieces of informationspeak conclusively for themselves. They must be combined andcompared with other pieces of information, analyzed, evalu-ated, and, finally, given meaning. Good intelligence does notsimply repeat the information which a source reveals. Rather, itdevelops this raw material in order to tell us what that informa-tion means and identifies the implications for decisionmaking.


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In other words, intelligence is the analysis and synthesis of in-formation into knowledge. The end result is not more informa-tion, but knowledge that gives us a meaningful assessment ofthe situation.7

Since intelligence is derived from information, it sharesmany attributes of information. Information, and the intel-ligence which results from it, is perishable. Information will al-ways be incomplete, sometimes confusing, and often contradic-tory. Not all information will be important or even relevant,and much of it may be inaccurate or misleading. Too much in-formation can be as harmful as too little. With all information,we seek not a large amount, but to have the right informationavailable when needed and in a useful form, and so it is withintelligence.

Finally, we note that knowledge does not exist for its ownsake, but as the basis for action. We do not develop lengthy in-telligence studies just because we have the ability to do so orbecause a subject is of academic interest. Intelligence that isnot acted upon or that does not provide the potential for futureaction is useless.8

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INTELLIGENCE AS A PROCESS

Intelligence should be thought of as not just a prod-uct—knowledge—but also the process which produces thatknowledge. Intelligence is the process which identifies andevaluates existing conditions and capabilities, estimates possi-ble enemy courses of action based upon these conditions andcapabilities, and assists in the development and evaluation offriendly courses of action—all in support of the commander’sdecisionmaking.

Intelligence is thus a central component of the command andcontrol process, which can be described by a simple modelknown as the observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA)loop. Intelligence activities make up a significant portion of theobservation-orientation phases of the OODA loop with the pri-mary purpose of supporting the decision phase. Intelligencealso supports the action phase by identifying targets for attackand by assessing results, bringing the OODA loop full circle tothe next observation phase in support of a subsequent decision.


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Intelligence must not be construed as the exclusive provinceof intelligence specialists. Intelligence activities are driv- en bythe need to answer questions crucial to the planning and execu-tion of operations. Intelligence is inseparable from operations.Data collected during the course of operations is essential tothe development of a timely and accurate intelligence picture.Above all, intelligence shapes (some would say drives) the de-cisions made during the conduct of operations. All Marines in-volved in operations are involved in intelligence in one wayor another, and all Marines involved in intelligence are in-volved in operations.

WHY THE MYSTERY?

In the past, there has been a perception that intelligence is ahighly specialized field shrouded in secrecy and isolated fromother warfighting areas. Many misconceptions concerning in-telligence have arisen; some even view it as the modern equiva-lent of wizardry. Why has this aura of mystery developed?

First, intelligence is usually much less concrete than knowl-edge of the friendly situation, which Marines are likely to knowwith much more certainty and detail. It is commonly under-stood that effective intelligence is an important factor—oftenthe critical factor—in mission success or failure. Isolating or

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measuring the specific effects of intelligence on the mission’soutcome, however, is often difficult.

Second, intelligence employs specialized techniques to de-velop studies and products. Intelligence personnel receive cer-tain specialized training—but hardly more than specialists inother fields. In the normal course of performing their mission,Marine intelligence sections request and receive support fromspecialized, technical, and sometimes highly compartmentednational, theater, or service-level intelligence agencies. Whilethese activities provide access to resources necessary to de-velop tactical intelligence, the activities themselves may be oflimited interest to combat units. In addition, intelligence ofteninvolves highly specialized technology, especially in the collec-tion of information.

Finally, to protect the value of a piece of intelligence as wellthe sources used in developing it, many intelligence productsand methods are classified. Out of the legitimate concern forsecurity, a need to know is a basic requirement for access to in-telligence products. In order to protect the sensitive nature ofsome intelligence activities, elements of the intelligence sectionmay be physically separated from other staff sections, with ac-cess to these elements being controlled. Unfortunately, therightful concern over security contributes more to the mystifi-cation of intelligence than any other single factor.


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The result is a veil of mystery that often surrounds intelli-gence activities. However, intelligence is not an obscure activ-ity unrelated to other warfighting activities. In fact, intelligenceis a central component of command and control, a fundamentalresponsibility of command, and inseparable from operations.All personnel involved in the conduct and support of operation-s—commanders, operations officers, logisticians, communica-tors, etc.—must understand intelligence just as intelligencepersonnel must comprehend the conduct and support of opera-tions.

There is nothing mysterious about intelligence. While intelli-gence collection and production may involve the use of high-technology sensors and networks, good intelligence is primarilythe result of solid headwork and legwork, not the output ofsome secret process or compartmented database. Good intelli-gence begins with commanders clearly identifying their intelli-gence concerns and needs. It is developed through the focusedcollection of information, thorough study, and, most impor-tantly, effective analysis and synthesis. The result is an intelli-gence product that provides knowledge, reduces uncertainty,and supports effective decisionmaking.

WHAT MAKES INTELLIGENCE DIFFERENT?

We have noted that while intelligence uses specializedcapabilities and techniques, this alone does not distinguish

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intelligence from other command and control functions. Whatmakes intelligence unique? The one feature which distinguishesintelligence from the other command and control functions isthat intelligence deals directly with an independent, hostilewill personified by the enemy. As such, intelligence deals withmore unknowns and has less control over its environment thanany other aspect of command and control.

A commander may well face unknowns about the friendlysituation—uncertainty about the location, activity, or status offriendly forces. Presumably such uncertainty is not the result ofa conscious effort on the part of those forces to deny that infor-mation to the commander. If commanders have questions aboutthe friendly situation, they can usually obtain the answers di-rectly from the principals involved. In other words, for nearlyevery question about the friendly situation, there is a reliablesource ready to provide an answer.

This is not the case for questions concerning the enemy orthe area of operations. Such information by its very nature willbe significantly more difficult to obtain. The enemy will do hisutmost to deny us knowledge of his capabilities, dispositions,methods, and intentions through the use of security measuresand his own counterintelligence. He may intentionally presentus with erroneous or ambiguous information. When a foe sus-pects that we know something significant about his situation,he will likely undertake actions to change that situation.


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This is especially true at the tactical level of war. The closera unit is to contact with the enemy, the greater attention it paysto security, camouflage, dispersion, and deception. Moreover,once execution begins, the rapidity of changes in the tacticalsituation combines with the friction and fog of war to make itincreasingly difficult to develop a coherent image of the enemysituation. This is why it often seems that we have better intelli-gence about what is happening in the enemy’s rear echelon orcapital city than we have about what is occurring beyond thenext hill.

We have to work much harder to obtain information andknowledge about the enemy than we do concerning the friendlysituation. Despite our extensive specialized capabilities de-signed to collect information about the enemy, the informationwe collect will normally be less than what we would like tohave. Furthermore, collecting information does not by itselfprovide the needed intelligence. Even when friendly forces areobtaining information directly from the enemy—interceptingenemy signals, interrogating prisoners of war, translating cap-tured documents—we must still confirm, evaluate, interpret,and analyze that information. Follow-on collection, processing,and production activities are normally needed. Finally, itshould be emphasized that our need for intelligence usuallygreatly exceeds our ability to produce it; while questions aboutthe hostile situation are almost infinite, the intelligence re-sources available to answer those questions are limited.

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Once we have obtained the information necessary to build apicture of the enemy situation, we are confronted with otherchallenges. First, we must properly interpret the information.More important than the volume of information is the value ofthe information and the abilities of the people interpreting it.Any single item or any collection of information may be inter-preted in a number of ways. Many mistakes in intelligence arenot the result of a failure to collect the correct information, butrather a failure to discern the correct meaning from the infor-mation collected.

Second, even if we can develop a good understanding of thecurrent situation, we cannot know with certainty what will hap-pen in the future. While we can often assess the enemy’s capa-bilities, we can rarely be certain of his intentions. Capabilitiesare based ultimately on factual conditions, while intentions ex-ist only in the mind of the enemy—assuming the enemy evenknows clearly what he wants to do. Thus, any assessment ofenemy intentions is ultimately an estimate. While good intelli-gence can identify the possibilities and probabilities, there willalways be an element of uncertainty in these estimates.

Third, because we are dealing directly with a hostile will, wecan never be sure we are not being actively deceived. Even ifwe should gain some type of access to his actual plans, we can-not be certain that the enemy does not want us to see thoseplans as part of a deliberate deception effort.


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Finally, the problems facing intelligence are further compli-cated by the irony that good intelligence may actually in-validate itself. Consider the following instance. Intelligence es-timates that the enemy is preparing to launch an attack in acertain sector. Acting quickly on this intelligence, the com-mander strengthens that sector. The enemy, however, detectsour enhanced defensive preparations, which causes him to can-cel the attack. As a result, the intelligence estimate which pre-dicted the attack in the first place appears wrong—but onlybecause it was initially correct. Intelligence is thus a highly im-precise activity at best, and its effects are extremely difficult, ifnot impossible, to isolate.

For example, consider the U.S. response to a movement ofIraqi troops toward the Kuwaiti border in October 1994. Aftera period of increasing tension between Iraq and the United Na-tions over continuing sanctions against Iraq, U.S. intelligencedetected the deployment of almost 80,000 troops in the vicinityof the Kuwaiti border, including two elite Republican Guarddivisions.9 The situation appeared similar to the one in August1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait. Intelligence warned that an-other invasion was possible. The United States and other alliesresponded by immediately dispatching forces to the region. TheIraqi forces were withdrawn, and the threat subsided. Did Sad-dam Hussein intend to invade Kuwait again? We will probablynever know; intentions can seldom be determined with absolutecertainty. On the one hand, we could state that intelligencefailed because we could not as- certain Hussein’s exact inten-tions and thus were unable to detect the difference between a

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provocation and an actual invasion. A more reasonable expla-nation, however, is that intelligence stimulated appropriate ac-tion, action which prevented an invasion. The warningappeared to be incorrect, but only because it was right in thefirst place.

EXPECTATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE

We expect a great deal from intelligence. We ask intelligence todescribe in detail places we have never seen, to identify cus-toms and attitudes of societies fundamentally different fromour own, to assess the capabilities of unique and unfamiliarmilitary or paramilitary forces, and to forecast how these so-cieties and forces will act in the future. Most notably, we wantintelligence to enter the thought process of an enemy com-mander and predict, with certainty, what course of action he in-tends to pursue, possibly even before he knows himself what heis going to do. The standard against which we measure intelli-gence is also high. We desire a depth and degree of accuracy inour intelligence which approaches perfection. Even when a rea-sonable response has been provided to almost every intelligencerequirement, there is still one more question to be answered,one more detail to be fleshed out, one more estimate to be re-fined. This is as it should be. The price for failure in intelli-gence is high. Inadequacies in intelligence can lead directly to


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loss of life, destruction of equipment and facilities, failure of amission, or even defeat.

When properly focused and given adequate time and re-sources, our intelligence can come close to meeting these stan-dards. We can provide comprehensive depictions of phys- icalterrain and manmade structures or facilities. Our re-connaissance and surveillance systems can detect and track themovements of ships, aircraft, and ground formations, in certaininstances even providing real-time images of enemy activity.Our signals and human intelligence capabilities, coupled withexpert analysis, can provide insight into both enemy capabili-ties and intentions.

However, even in the best of circumstances, intelligence stilloperates in an environment characterized by uncertainty. Un-certainty is a fundamental attribute of war. As discussed in theprevious section, intelligence deals directly with the inde-pendent, hostile will of the enemy. This makes intelligencemore susceptible to uncertainty than any other command andcontrol function. In practical terms, this means that there arevery definite limits to what commanders can reasonably expectfrom intelligence. Not only will more gaps exist in what weknow about the enemy than in what we know about our ownsituation, but the reliability of everything we do know will besubject to greater scrutiny and doubt. Even if we obtain thecorrect information, there is no guarantee that we will interpretit correctly or that it will not change. We may be the victims ofdeception, whether it is by a deliberate enemy effort or by our

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own preconceptions. Intelligence produces estimates ratherthan certainties; it is important to remember that “estimating iswhat you do when you do not know.”10

Intelligence may be incorrect sometimes and incomplete atother times, and it often lacks the desired degree of detail andreliability. Some of the questions asked are simply beyondknowing—or are beyond knowing given the time and resourcesavailable. Gaps in our knowledge of the enemy sit-uation,sometimes sizable, are a natural and unavoidable characteristicof fighting an enemy having an independent, hostile will. Wemust continually remember that intelligence can reduce butnever eliminate the uncertainty that is an inherent feature ofwar.

INTELLIGENCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE

As a result of the ongoing information revolution, more peoplehave access to more information more quickly than ever before.Intelligence has benefited greatly from improvements in infor-mation gathering, processing, and dissemination. Sophisticatedsensors clandestinely collect vast quantities of data in all re-gions of the world. Integrated databases allow us to store andrapidly retrieve virtually unlimited numbers of reports, images,and studies. Information processors assist us in analyzing the


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data and developing tailored, graphic-enhanced products thatconvey intelligence in a more meaningful form. Communica-tions systems give us the ability to share databases, exchangeintelligence, and disseminate products almost instantaneouslyon a worldwide basis.

While it is alluring to believe that the information revolutionwill solve the problems of uncertainty in dealing with the en-emy, technology has its shortcomings as well. Systems em-ployed in intelligence can be expensive and complex. Many arecontrolled at the national or theater levels, where prioritiesmight not be consistent with those of the tactical commanders.Despite their sophistication, these systems are still subject tofailure as a result of weather conditions, breakdowns, or enemycountermeasures.

Further, these systems generally provide and manipulatedata and information rather than generate knowledge or under-standing. The information revolution has created the very realdanger of information overload—more available informationthan can be readily used or understood. Humans have a limitedcapacity to assimilate information. Even if we are able to col-lect vast amounts of information, information alone does notequate to knowledge or understanding, which are ultimatelythe product of human cognition and judgment. Since very fewpieces of information are decisive by themselves, they must beinterpreted and given meaning.

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Finally, the seemingly unlimited availability of informationdoes not necessarily help us in determining which informationwe should collect and develop into intelligence. In an unstableinternational environment, in which unanticipated crises prolif-erate, it is difficult to identify the next enemy or potential en-emy. This complicates commanders’ problems of identifyingtheir concerns and priorities; it may be harder than in the pastto focus the intelligence effort. As a result, it may not be possi-ble to develop adequate basic intelligence about potential ene-mies or regions well in advance.

We must continue to pursue advances offered by technologyto enhance our intelligence capabilities. At the same time, werecognize that technology by itself does not produce effectiveintelligence. Improvements in data collection, information proc-essing, and dissemination are tools which assist in the intelli-gence effort. These tools increase our capabilities only whenthey are applied by knowledgeable and skilled Marines focusedon producing timely, useful, and relevant intelligence.

A CASE STUDY: DESERT STORM 1990–1991

The development and use of intelligence in support of Marineoperations during Desert Storm illustrate the nature of intelli-gence and its core concepts and challenges. During this


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operation, intelligence provided an accurate picture of thesituation confronting Marine forces and identified the enemy’scritical vulnerabilities which Marine commanders exploited toachieve success.11

By mid-January 1991 the situation at the strategic and op-erational levels was well understood. Iraqi commanders pre-pared for the expected Coalition assault into Kuwait in amanner that reflected the success of their defensive strategyduring the Iran-Iraq War. They constructed two major defen-sive belts in addition to extensive obstacles and fortificationsalong the coast.

Intelligence identified three Iraqi centers of gravity at the op-erational level. The first was their command and control. Ifrendered unable to direct its military forces, Iraq would not beable to mount an effective defense at the operational level. Sec-ond was Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. Degrading thiscapability would reduce a major aspect of the Iraqi strategicthreat to other states in the region. The third center of gravitywas the Republican Guard. Destroying or severely degradingthe Republican Guard’s ability to fight would dramatically di-minish Iraq’s capability to conduct a coordinated defense or topose an offensive threat to the region later.

Intelligence likewise provided thorough understanding ofIraq’s critical vulnerabilities: a rigid, top-down command andcontrol system, the reluctance of Iraqi commanders to exerciseinitiative, an overly defensive approach to battle with limited

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ability to conduct deep offensive actions, vulnerability to air at-tack, an overextended logistics system, and extremely limitedintelligence capabilities.

This understanding was used to plan the campaign andguide the conduct of air operations during the first few weeksof Desert Storm. Coalition air attacks had devastating effectson the Iraqis, severely disrupting their command and control,eliminating their naval and air forces, and degrading their lo-gistics capabilities.

Nevertheless, the situation facing Marine commanders wasless clear. Much of the intelligence developed prior to the startof the operation was focused on strategic- and operational-level objectives and lacked the detailed, tailored intelligence es-sential for tactical planning. Further, ground force commanderswere not permitted to employ most of their organic collectionassets within Kuwait due to concerns about potential casual-ties, operational security, and initiation of engagements beforea decision on ground operations had been made. Marines re-quired support from national and theater intelligence agenciesto answer many of their critical intelligence requirements. Al-though these needs were generally recognized as valid by thehigher echelons which controlled these assets, Marine tacticalrequirements tended to fall too low on the priorities list to com-pete effectively with other requirements. When national sensorswere used to support Marine force requirements, the results of-ten did not provide sufficient detail to fully satisfy those re-quirements.


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Still, by January the Marine forces’ intelligence estimateprovided a fairly accurate assessment of the overall size anddisposition of the Iraqi units as well as the strategy and tacticsthey would employ. The estimate highlighted four potentialIraqi responses to Coalition air attacks: terrorist attacks insideand outside the area of operations, air and naval counterstrikes,surface-to-surface missile and multiple rocket launcher at-tacks against Marine positions in the forward area, and alimited-objective ground attack or raid. Like most estimates,this assessment proved to be only partially correct. Iraqi airand naval forces offered minimal opposition, and no major ter-rorist attacks were conducted. However, there were extensivemissile and multiple rocket launcher attacks, and a significantground attack was launched at the end of the month.

The main shortfall of the estimate was that it lacked detailsrequired for tactical planning. Determining the effectiveness ofIraqi forces was a critical requirement. The raw numbers indi-cated that large Iraqi forces remained within Kuwait. Air at-tacks were damaging the enemy’s forward echelon and hadseverely degraded both his sustainment and command and con-trol capabilities. There were indications that Iraqi front-line in-fantry troops were demoralized and would not put up much ofa fight. Intelligence clearly showed that the Iraqis had beenhurt, but in the absence of definitive information detailing howbadly they had been hurt, Marine planning continued to reflecta cautious approach.

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During a battle from 29 January to 1 February at Al-Khafji,an Iraqi division-sized ground attack was soundly defeated byCoalition forces. Iraqi actions during this battle providedMarine intelligence specialists critical information to fill in theintelligence picture. Analysis confirmed previous assessmentsof the deteriorating condition of enemy units and the Iraqis’limited capability to coordinate between tactical echelons.From reports by Marine participants, analysts concluded thatIraqi soldiers were unmotivated, poorly trained, and unable toconduct combined arms operations.

With this insight, previous perceptions of the enemy’sstrengths and ability to mount a formidable defense were calledinto question. Subsequent intelligence operations further clari-fied the threat picture. Interrogations of enemy troops lured tosurrender reinforced the view that the Iraqi will to fight was farweaker than anyone had anticipated. Artillery raids failed toelicit counterbattery fire, indicating that Iraqi artillery capabili-ties had been degraded. Unit boundaries along the defensivebelts were located, and gaps in the defenses were identified atthose points, confirming that coordination between tacticalechelons was poor.

From the new intelligence, a new estimate reflected the like-lihood that the Iraqis would be unable to conduct an effectivedefense of the forward positions. It noted that the Iraqis couldnot coordinate between units, employ supporting arms, or con-duct counterattacks with forces larger than a battalion. Finally,it indicated that Iraqi infantry and artillery troops would proba-bly surrender en masse once the first shot was fired.


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This intelligence was used to substantially revise the Marineoperation plan. Knowing that the Iraqis would be unable to as-sess what was happening on the battlefield or to respond effec-tively, Marine commanders adopted a more aggressive schemeof maneuver. The previous plan called for a sequential attackwith one division following the other through the defensivebelts using a single breech point. On February 6, the MarineForce commander approved a new plan in which two Marinedivisions would conduct a simultaneous, coordinated attackthrough the defensive belts at points 40 kilometers apart (seefigure 1). In addition, a significant force was now assigned todeal with the expected flood of surrendering Iraqi troops.

The intelligence assessment developed and refined duringOperation Desert Storm reduced uncertainty, enhanced situa-tional awareness, and aided Marine commanders in planningand decisionmaking. This assessment did not answer everyquestion, but it did identify the enemy’s critical vulnerabilitieswhich were exploited to achieve decisive results.

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Figure 1.O

CONCLUSION

Intelligence is a fundamental component of command and con-trol—inseparable from both command and operations. Accu-rate, timely, and relevant intelligence is critical to the planningand conduct of successful operations. Effective intelligence un-covers enemy weaknesses which can be exploited to provide adecisive advantage. Shortfalls in intelligence can lead to confu-sion, indecision, unnecessary loss of life, mission failure, oreven defeat.

Intelligence is knowledge of the enemy and the surroundingenvironment provided to support the commander’sdecisionmaking process. Intelligence is more than just informa-tion; it is the analysis and synthesis of information which pro-vides a meaningful assessment of the situation. Intelligenceevaluates existing conditions and enemy capabilities, estimatespossible future conditions and enemy courses of action, assistsin the development and evaluation of friendly courses of action,and aids in protecting friendly forces against the effects of en-emy action.

While intelligence uses specialized capabilities and tech-niques in developing a useful product, it is not an obscureprocess isolated from other warfighting functions. In fact,effective intelligence requires a firm focus on the needs of com-manders. This in turn, demands integration with all aspects ofoperational planning and execution. What separates intelli-

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gence from the other aspects of command and control, how-ever, is the fact that intelligence must deal directly with theindependent, hostile will of the enemy. Because intelligence at-tempts to look into the future despite significant unknowns, theresulting product will always be based on estimates, not cer-tainties. Users of intelligence must always remember that intel-ligence can reduce, but never eliminate the uncertainty that isan inherent characteristic of war, and act accordingly.


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