THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY ANNUAL February 4, 1961

The Naga National Council Origins of a Separatist Movement

Marcus F Franda

It is the purpose of this article to explore the factors which may account for the development of the Naga National Council as a separatist movement in the north eastern portions of Assam.

For a number of years after 1947. this movement engaged the Government of India in what at times took on the dimensions of a civil insurrection and which ultimately forced the Indian Government to create a separate State of Nagaland.

The new State, India's sixteenth, is its smallest with an area of only 6.0(>0 square miles and a popu­lation of 350,000 to 400,000 people.

The demand for an independent Nagaland was not supported by all the contiguous tribes residing in the hills of Assam, nor was it even supported by all Naga tribes. _

The western must Naga tribes supported the movement, while the eastern tribes - the Konyahs and Kalyo-Kengyus of the Tuensang Division of the North East Frontier Agency refused to sup/xnt the Naga National Council.

A comparison of the Nagas with other tribes in Assam, and a comparison of the eastern and the western Nagas may help us to understand the factors which entered into the creation of a separatist move­ment.

THE most obvious cont r ibu tory factor to the separatist move­

ment is the differences between the Nagas of the hil ls and the plains­men. The fact that the Nagas, vviih mongolian features, look different f rom the A r y a n plains­men, tended to separate them in social situations and other con­tacts. This was intensified by the association of the Naga, in the m i n d of the plainsman, w i t h a head-hunting. " p r i m i t i v e " t r ibe whose customs were rad ica l ly dif­ferent f rom those of other people.. I t is not insignif icant that the Council was made up of a number of youths who were unable to ad­jus t to the schools of Assam and the cities of Ind ia . Ethnographic differences were further accentuated by differences in language. By mid-twent ie th century, i t was necessary fo r educated Nagas to learn three or four of their own dialects or languages in order to matr iculate in Naga schools and this made i t difficult for them to learn the languages of others, i f fo r no other reason than the l imi t a t ions of t ime . Since few of the Assamese or Bengalis were able to speak even one Naga language, the l inguis t ic problem was intensified, w i t h the result that Nagas were denied op­por tuni t ies in the plains on the basis of thei r i nab i l i t y to speak the language. The extent of the problem can be seen by compar ing the num­ber of Nagas who could speak either Assamese, Bengal i , or H i n d i ,

with the speakers of the same three languages among the two other large Assamese tribes, the Garos and the khasis (see Table 1.,).

The reason why so few Nagas speak any of the languages of the plains is largely due to the linguis­tic differences w i t h i n the tribes themselves. The Khasis and Garos. each wi th a u n i f o r m t r i b a l langu­age, were able to devote much more time to the study of non-tr ibal languages before and after ventur­ing away f rom the hi l ls . The fact that the Nagas were not conquered unt i l 1890, a half-century after the

annexation of the Khasi and Garo Hi l l s also meant that they were late-comers in app ly ing themselves to the task of learning non-Naga languages.

Antipathy Reciprocal The differences between Nagas

and plainsmen can also be seen, in the area of religious beliefs. W h i l e the plains districts, l ike the rest of India , had t rad i t iona l lv been almost exclusively populated by Hindus and Muslims, the Naga Hi l l s came to include a Chr is t ian populat ion of 45 per cent. Moreover, few Nagas ever converted to Islam or to

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Hindu i sm, and when they d i d , i t was t inged w i t h t rad i t ional Naga an imism, The contrast presented by the (faros and khasis is again s t r ik ing (see Table 2 ) .

These differences can be pa r t i a l ly a t t r ibuted to the fact that the mis­sionary efforts among the Garos and Khasis were not as intense as those among the Nagas. Hut they are also due to the fact that H i n d u i s m and Islam were real competi tors in the Khasi and Garo Hi l l s . In the case of the Khasis. the presence of Shi l long. the capital of Assam, in the h i l l s meant that the t r ibals were more constantly in contact w i t h re­l ig ions of the plains. The Garos. the westernmost T r ibe in Assam, had been in contact w i th the plains even before the advent of the Br i t i sh and had been somewhat assimilated.

The feeling of ant ipathy was re­ciprocal in that the plainsmen also thought of the Nagas in separate terms. U n t i l independence, the Nagas were considered a " f ron t ie r t r i b e " and classified w i t h the unad ministered tribes on the border, in contrast to the Khasis and Garos who were considered to be an inte­gral part of the plains districts.

Exploited by Plainsmen

The Naga tribes were never in ­tegrated more closely w i t h the plains districts largely because the Naga Hi l l s were not as accessible to the pla ins people as were the Khasi and Garo H i l l s . Also, since the Khasi and Garo Hi l ls contained more natural and commercial resour­ces than the Naga Hi l l s , they offer­ed greater opportuni t ies to t rad ing plainsmen. The accessibility of the Khasi and Garo Hi l l s to plains­men also led to a greater degree of economic development among these two tribes than among the Nagas. Th i s can be seen when view­ing the progress of cul t ivat ion f r o m 1921 to 1951. Between these years, the average net area sown increas­ed by 1 8 % and 31% respectively among the Khasis and Garos, whi le the corresponding figure fo r the Nagas was only 4 . 2 % .

A more complete view of the ex­tent to which the Nagas were econo­mical ly neglected can be gained by a study of Table 3. re la t ing to the amount of money spent on public , ins t ruc t ion . I n this case the B r i ­t ish government spent more than six times as much in the Garo H i l l s and nearly eight times as much in the Khasi H i l l s as was spent on the

Nagas. This meant that the Khasis and Garos were being taught by more people f rom the plains and thus were more l ike ly to be instruct­ed by those who had a favourable view of plains people 'and culture. At the same t ime, the Nagas were gett ing their education f rom al ien American Baptist missionaries who d i d not know the plains people and d i d not approve of the ma jo r i ty of their customs.

British Offer of Crown Colony

The differences between Nagas and plainsmen and the instances of conflict between them, even taken together, could not have been solely responsible, however, for the sepa­ratist movement since such conflicts and differences existed also between non-Naga hillsmen ( i n c l u d i n g the Khasis and Garos) who eventually agreed to inclusion w i t h i n the I n d i a n U n i o n . Though the differ­ences produced a more pronounced feeling of separatism among the Nagas than among the Khasis and Garos, they were s t i l l differences on ly of degree and, taken alone, might not account fo r the indepen­dence demand. However, events d u r i n g and immediate ly f o l l o w i n g W o r l d W a r I I , pecul iar t o the Naga H i l l s and the western Naga tribes alone, shaped the extremist posi t ion of the Naga Nat ional Counci l , Not only was the war fought solely in the Naga H i l l areas of Assam, but also the Nagas alone were offered a separate c rown colony by the Br i t i sh government and were sub­ject to a great deal of freedom f r o m Ind i an admin is t ra t ion after inde­pendence.

Af te r the war, educated Naga leaders made extreme demands on government. W h e n the Governor-General-in-Council rewarded the Naga war effort w i t h the promise of a modern hospital at K o h i m a , a number of Nagas protested that i t was insufficient reward and asked for educational and economic deve-

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lopment schemes as wel l as some measure of self-government. B r i t i s h administrators, inc lud ing Professor Coupland, reacted by proposing the format ion of a Br i t i sh c rown colony compr i s ing the Naga H i l l Areas and the Naga areas of the N o r t h East Front ier Agency. The Brit ishers argued that these areas were not yet ready for independence and that the special conditions p reva i l ing in the h i l l s warranted their being severed f rom Ind i a . Naga leaders who were the o r ig ina l members of the Naga Nat iona l Counci l were called together for the purpose of discussing the crown colony idea. They were attracted by a proposal that sought to j o i n all of the Naga t r ibes ; pro­mised the eventual transfer of gov­ernment to Nagas; offered plans for educational and economic develop ment ; and w o u l d sever them f rom the adminis t ra t ion of the plainsmen Thus when the Br i t i sh abandoned the idea of a c rown colony and wi th ­drew f r o m Ind i a , they left the Counci l w i t h its expectations heigh­tened by the discussion of a crown colony, and face-to-face w i th the prospect of being incorporated into the regular adminis t ra t ion of Assam.

Distrust of Assam Government The events of the first four years

after independence contr ibuted to the Naga distrust of the Assam Govern­ment. First there was a misunder­standing about the nature of the H y d e r i Pact, an agreement reached in 1948 between the leaders of the Naga Nat iona l Counci l , the Governor of Assam, and the Cha i rman of India ' s Consti tutional Sub-committee on Assam Tr iba l s . The Counci l interpreted the pact as a ten-year treaty, after the exp i ra t ion of which the Nagas w o u l d decide whether or not to j o i n the Ind ian U n i o n . They were thus surprised to find that they were, included in the I n d i a n U n i o n when the Const i tut ion was p r o m u l ­gated. In addi t ion the Assam Gov­ernment discontinued the po l i cy of

THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY ANNUAL February 4, 1961

'Exclusion, ' maintained by the B r i t i s h u n t i l 1947. Under this pol icy , those areas designated as 'Excluded Areas" were administered by the Central Government th rough the Governor of the Province, but they were not integrated into the Pro­vince.

Though the Nagas wanted econo­mic development, they viewed w i t h a larm the end of 'Exclusion ' and their fears were borne out when the end of Exclus ion resulted in an i n ­flux of merchants and usurers f rom the plains in larger numbers than ever before, a si tuation made worse by the in t roduc t ion of cheap cloth w h i c h contr ibuted to the breakdown of cottage indust ry . Moreover, the Government proclaimed its in tent ion of ins t i tu t ing a policy of "de t r iba l i -za t ion" designed, in the words of one Governor of Assam, " to b r i n g the people of the hi l ls to the same level of the plains people w i t h i n as short a per iod as possible." It was re­ported that this policy meant, among other things, the teaching of Assa­mese in a l l t r i b a l schools F i n a l l y , the Nagas feared that a strong pro­v inc ia l adminis t ra t ion would mean enforcement of the Assam Reserve Forest Act and w o u l d p r o h i b i t many of the homeless Naga families f rom clearing forests to bu i ld new homes.

Administrative Vacuum The Counci l was able to gain

widespread support fo r its opposi­t ion to the Ind ian U n i o n because of the Naga fear of excessive Assamese adminis t ra t ion . Yet the Council w o u l d not have been able to organize as well as it d i d but for the lack of adminis t ra t ion that accompanied independence and pa r t i t i on , a situa­t ion that made it impossible to ad­minister p rope r ly the Naga H i l l s or to undertake development schemes. The fa i lure of the Assamese to ex­tend their adminis t ra t ion in to the Naga H i l l s gave the Council an oppor tun i ty to administer the area itself and to establish at least a semblance of a unif ied Naga Gov­ernment. In this endeavour it was aided by the Assamese Government which recognized Angami Zanu Phizo. the N N C president, as the representative spokesman of all Naga tribes and even referred to the N N C on some occasions as a legit imate Government.

Once again the contrast to the Garos and Khasis is s t r ik ing . W h i l e the Naga areas were always Excluded Areas, ' the Khasi and

Garo Hi l l s became " P a r t i a l l y Ex­cluded Areas" in 1935. This meant that the Khasis and Garos were a l lowed to elect two representatives to the Assam legislature and were placed under the adminis t ra t ion of a special M i n i s t r y in the Assam cabinet. Moreover, local councils were elected in some villages on an experimental basis. "Pa r t i a l Exclu­s ion" served to draw the Khasis and Garos closer to the people of the pla ins . They were in constant con­tact w i t h the Prov inc ia l Assembly, and they grew accustomed to pre­senting their demands to Govern­ment to this body. In sharp contrast was the case of the Nagas where the adminis t ra t ive arrangements and the per iod of war had caused the Assam Government to lose contact w i t h the tr ibals and thus help to strengthen the Naga Nat ional Counci l . Since the war d i d not spread to the Khasi and Garo H i l l s , regular administra­t ion , d rawing the t r iba ls closer to the Government of Assam, was carr ied on u n t i l 1951 when the S ix th Schedule of the Ind i an Consti­tu t ion replaced the exist ing arrange­ments. But wh i l e the Khasis and Garos accepted the Consti tution of 1951 and were organizing to contest elections, the Nagas were rejecting these same arrangements, having already organized to demand inde­pendence.

Why Eastern Nagas Kept Out

The Naga demand for separation can thus be a t t r ibuted to his tor ical differences between Nagas and plains-men. coupled w i t h instances of con­flict w i t h the peoples of the plains and the lack of adminis t ra t ion f o l l o w i n g independence. But what then accounts for the fa i lu re of the eastern Nagas to support the organi­zation? W h y d i d the western Nagas f o r m an organizat ion designed to achieve separation while the eastern Nagas d i d not j o i n the movement? The remainder of this study is an attempt to answer this question and to conclude w i th some observations about organizat ional creation among the Nagas.

The po l icy of both the missionaries and of government served to change t rad i t iona l Naga society among the western tribes. One of the first effects of the in t rus ion of the B r i ­tish was the increased interaction among the various tribes and villages. Due to the expansion of communicat ions — roads, rai lways

and even bridlepaths —- previously isolated units came into contact w i th one another more frequently. ln-deed. because of the need for por­ters, cooks and houseboys, the Br i t i sh administrators aided in increasing the interaction of the various tribes even further. Educational work carr ied on by missionaries and Gov­ernment schools, made possible by the abol i t ion of i n t e r t r i ba l head­hunt ing , was a further con t r ibu t ing factor.

Village Political Organizations

But while tribes were tending to­ward uni ty , the t rad i t iona l vi l lage pol i t ica l organizations were being torn apart. The abol i t ion of head­hunt ing , for instance, undermined the control of the chiefs and elders whose p r imary funct ion had been to determine the t ime for a ra id or an expedi t ion against a ne ighbour ing vi l lage. The power of the vil lage leaders was further undermined when their j u d i c i a l powers were usurped by Br i t i sh po l i t i ca l officers. The work of the missionaries served to weaken the force of the taboos and the t radi t ional system of social con­t ro l . Probably the most serious instance of this was the tendency for boys to refuse to serve at the mo rung ( bachelor's house). The missionaries forbade Chris t ian youths to enter the rnorung because of the excessive amounts of rice-beer consumed there. But this created a serious gap in the social and pol i t i ca l organiza­tions in that there was no discipl i ­nary agencies to take the place of the morung. nor any other means of recrui t ing future rulers .

Whi le Br i t i sh pol icy and missio­nary ac t iv i ty destroyed and weakened the t rad i t iona l t r i ba l organizations, it also served to introduce to the Nagas new forms of organizat ion. The increased interact ion of villages and the unif icat ion of diverse dialects made possible mul t i -v i l lage organiza­tions. These were for thcoming in the fo rm of "workers associations'* and "Chr i s t i an societies," instigated by the missionaries to combat Naga "laziness" and "sabbath-breaking.*" Naga women's clubs and Naga student groups were also formed in an effort to provide a more f ami l i a r social environment in which the missionaries could operate. By W o r l d W a r I I , these new social groupings were common to the western Naga Hil ls-

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Educated Elite Replace Tribal Rulers

W i t h the breakdown of the t radi ­tional po l i t i ca l systems, t r iba l chiefs, ciders and council lors lost their author i ty , though they were able to mainta in their positions un t i l inde­pendence because of the presence of Br i t i sh administrators. When the Br i t i sh left and Assamese were un­able to replace the adminis t ra t ion, the t r iba l rulers gave way to a new set of rulers; an educated elite, cap­able of p rov id ing the skills and knowledge necessary to form a uni­fied Naga Government that could promise some hope of achieving the new expectations. The result was a new form of poli t ical organization. The voluntary associations that had come into being pr io r to World War lb were combined wi th other newly formed organizations into one bureaucratic structure, the Naga Nat ional Counci l . This new associa­tion attempted to be a Naga central (Government. In a sense it replaced Br i t i sh admin i s t r a t ion : i t collected taxes, provided a jud ic i a ry and be­gan p lann ing the development of the Naga H i l l s . Moreover, it pro­vided a vehicle which the new elite could use to exercise its new-found author i ty and which t r iba l rulers could use to replace that aura of Iegi-timacy that had been lost wi th the wi thdrawal of the Br i t i sh . This accounts for the Counci l s success. It controlled the populace of I he Naga H i l l s to such an extent that it was able to carry out a boycott of both the 1051 and 1957 elections, was able to battle 12.000 Ind ian troops to a five-year stalemate, and even­tua l ly to force the central govern­ment to grant Naga statehood-

That the conditions of war played a large part in shaping Naga con­cepts of organization can be seen f rom the fact that the structure of the organization was almost identical to that of the Azad Hind Fauj (the rebel I N A of Suhhas Bose). to which many Naga leaders had be­longed. In addi t ion , the mi l i t a ry wing of the Naga National Counci l , the Home Guard. derived its name and structure from the local A l l i e d A r m y Units that had been set up in 1943

No Cultural Absorption The reason for the fai lure of the

Council organization to .spread to the Konvaks, and Kalyo-Kengyus was that these two Naga tribes had avoided the process of change that

had taken place among the western Nagas. The missionaries had t r ied to evangelize the Konyaks in 1838 but had abandoned the attempt after two years. By 1931, the Assam cen­sus listed only two Christ ians among the Konyaks and none among the Kalyo-Kengyus. The Bri t i sh had classified eastern Naga te r r i to ry as an "unadmiuis lered area" and only one visit had been made to the t r i ­bes by an adminis t ra tor d u r i n g the entire per iod of Br i t i sh rule. The first attempt at adminis ter ing the eastern Nagas, therefore, came in 1951 when the Ind ian Government attempted to place them in a single adminis t ra t ive unit , t i e Tuensang divis ion of NFT A. But in this case the administrators were forbidden to interfere in t r iba l matters, to encroach in any way on t r iba l lands, or even to collect taxes.

The Government of India was able to mainta in f r iendly relations w i t h the eastern Nagas by fo l lowing t r iba l customs. In 1956, when the Naga Nat ional Council began its campaign of violence. Lieutenant-General K S Th imayya toured the entire Tuensang divis ion and con­cluded a peace w i t h each powerful chief (Ang). The Ang d id not feel that he was re l inquishing any of his author i ty , however, since he viewed the ceremonies merely as a mutual pledge of peace on the part of the Ind ian Government as well as his own vil lage. Al though the eastern Nagas were in theory thus constitu­t i ona l ly incorporated into the Indian Union , in fact the Aug s t i l l ruled his village and the t r i b a l po l i t i ca l system remained intact- Thus, r i gh t up unt i l the present day, the eastern Naga area can stil l be termed " v i r ­gin jung le in the midst of head­hunt ing c o u n t r y / ' I Anupan i Dhar Ten Years' Progress in NEFA. Calcut ta : Sree Saraswaty Press. 1957 p. 25.) They have managed to main ta in their t rad i t iona l system of pol i t ical and social organizat ion, their self-sufficient village, economies, their customs and religious beliefs-There is l i t t l e or no trade, no inter-village or in ter t r iba l communicat ion and no common language. Not even the war affected the eastern Naga. tribes, for the Japanese invaded to the south of their te r r i tory where roads and paths made travel possible.

The complete isolation of Tuen­sang Nagas accounts for their fa i lure to organize or to be recruited into the Naga National Counci l . The

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eastern Nagas had no fear of cul­tural absorpt ion; neither the Br i t i sh nor Ind ian governments had t r ied to impose direct rule over them. The only threat of absorption came f rom the Council , and to this they reacted by f o r m i n g t radi t ional v i l ­lage alliances. The eastern Nagas lacked the skills necessary to run a large-scale bureaucratic structure-None was capable of conversing in several village dialects, none was experienced in organizational af­fairs, and none possessed the m i l i ­tary ski l l s necessary to main ta in order over a large geographic area.

Breakdown of Traditional Authority

In contrast, a number of factors can be put f o rwa rd to account for the organized separatist movement among the western Nagas. To begin wi th , the breakdown of t radi t ional author i ty due to the in t rus ion of Chris t iani ty and Bri t i sh administra­tion caused an organizational gap among the western Nagas. This gap was par t ia l ly filled by the introduc­t ion of in terv i l lage and in te r t r iba l associations --which eventually cu lmi­nated in an all-western Naga organi­zation, the Naga National Counc i l . The lack of a commensurate increase in the authori ty of the Br i t i sh or Indian adminis t ra t ion after W o r l d War II and the fa i lu re of the alien riders to incorporate Naga villages into a larger po l i t i ca l f ramework gave the Council an oppor tun i ty to spread its organization over the en­tire western Naga H i l l s .

Geographical factors were also crucial to the emergence of an orga­nized secessionist movement. The rugged ter ra in and the difficulties in­volved in t ransport ing Ind ian troops hampered the Ind ian Government in its attempts to quash the move­ment by force whi l e the cont igui ty of Nagaland to foreign borders made it realistic for the Nagas to demand succession and also made it necessary for the Indian government to use caution in sending troops.

F ina l ly , the Naga war experience was an impor tan t factor in that it taught the Nagas m i l i t a r y strategy and the use of weapons, brought them into closer contact w i th other peoples and thus heightened their expectations of pol i t ica l and econo­mic development, and gave them experience in that f o r m of organi­zation which they used to press their demand for independence.

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