the multifactorial nature of theory of mind: a structural modelling study larry cashion rachel dryer...
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The multifactorial nature of theory of mind:A structural modelling study
Larry Cashion
Rachel Dryer
Michael Kiernan
School of Social Sciences & Liberal Studies
Charles Sturt University
Bathurst NSW Australia
Presented at the 14th Australasian Human Development Association Biennial Conference
Perth Western Australia
July 2005
Presentation Plan
Theory of Mind and Classification
Current research study method
Age, gender, and the multifactorial nature of theory of mind
Conclusions and implications
Theory of Mind
The ability to attribute mental states, such as thoughts, beliefs, intentions, desires, and feelings, to others and oneself
The ability to perform social and laboratory tasks requiring theory of mind has also been called mentalising and mindreading
Classification in Theory of Mind
First-order theory of mind
Second-order theory of mind
Higher-order or advanced theory of mind
First-Order Theory of Mind
Unexpected locations“Where will X look for the object?”
Unexpected contents“What does X think is in the box?”
Appearance-reality“What is this object really?”
Second-Order Theory of Mind
Ice-Cream Van“Where will X look for Y?”
Unexpected locations“Where does Y think X will look for the
object?”
Higher-Order Theory of Mind
Understanding mental states in motivating actions
“Does X mean what she says?”“Why did Y do that?”
Reading complex mental states“What is X thinking or feeling?”
Theory of Mind Modularity
Theory of Mind Module (ToMM)Leslie (1987; Leslie & Roth, 1993) ToMM neurologically separate from other cognitive
and brain systems
Minimalist modularityBaron-Cohen (1999)Sub-modules of eye direction detection,
intentionality detector, shared attention mechanism
False belief & Theory of Mind
False belief unrepresentative of theory of mind in general
Bloom & German (2000)
False belief as a highly complex cognitive function
Bloom & German (2000)
Competing Theory of Mind Models
3-factors1st-, 2nd- & higher-order ToMCommon use in literature
2-factorsFalse belief tasks & other tasksBloom & German
1-factorTheory of mind moduleLeslie
Method I
Participants216 school-aged childrenRecruited from State Schools in NSW & VictoriaYears 1, 3, and 5Screened using a modified version of the Social
Communication Profile (Coggins & Olswang, 2001)2 children eliminated from sample prior to testingNo adverse incidentsEthics approval from CSU, and NSW & Victorian
Departments of Education
Method II First-order tests
Sally-Anne Task (unexpected locations)Smarties Task (unexpected contents)
Second-order tests Ice-Cream Van TaskSecond-Order Sally-Anne Task
Higher-order testsStrange Stories TestFaux Pas TestEyes Test – Children’s Version
Methodological Issues
Memory promptsNo memory prompts or hints were
provided to participants
Justification questionsOften absent from previous first- and
second-order ToM researchMakes lower-order tasks more
consistent with higher-order tasksEnsures understanding, not just
recognition
Hypotheses
Significant group differencesOlder children will perform better than
younger children
Significant gender differencesFemales superior to males
3-factor model superiorBetter fit than 1- and 2-factor models
Data Analysis
Categorical dataChi-square (χ2)
Continuous dataANOVA + Tukey HSD
Structural ModellingMplus confirmatory factor
analysis
Results ITask Year 1 Year 3 Year 5
Sally-Anne
Interpretation 72.9 90.1 89.3
Justification 65.7 83.1 89.3
Smarties
Interpretation 87.1 94.4 100.0
Justification 71.4 87.3 98.7
Ice-Cream Van
Interpretation 27.9 42.3 52.0
Justification 17.6 38.0 50.7
Sally-Anne 2nd-Order
Interpretation 69.6 81.7 96.0
Justification 31.9 57.7 85.3
Results IITask Year 1 Year 3 Year 5
Strange Stories (/8)
Interpretation 4.70 5.25 6.05
Justification 2.29 3.25 4.09
Faux Pas (/10)
Total 5.55 7.11 8.29
Eyes Test (/28)
Total 15.02 16.90 18.77
Results III
No gender
differences for any task
Results IVModel χ2 p df CFI TLI WRMR
No correlated terms
3-factor 18.60 .069 11 0.975 0.951 .546
2-factor 23.42 .037 13 0.965 0.944 .634
1-factor 24.67 .038 14 0.946 0.946 .655
Sally-Anne Tasks correlated
3-factor 6.56 .766 10 1.000 1.024 .328
2-factor 20.60 .057 13 0.971 0.950 .593
1-factor 20.36 .087 13 0.975 0.960 .596
N = 216; all models use WLSM estimation & Santorra-Bentler scaled χ2
Smarties
Sally-Anne(1st-order)
Sally-Anne(2nd-order)
Ice-Cream Van
Strange Stories
Faux Pas
Eyes
1st Order ToM
2nd Order ToM
Higher Order ToM
.59
.88
.48
.83
.66
.65
.54
.37
.76
.81
.34
e1
e2
e3
e4
e5
e6
e7
.65
.32
.77
.56
.58
.71
.23
Summary of Results
Hypothesis 1 – age group differences supported
For all theory of mind tasks
Hypothesis 2 – gender differences not supported
For all theory of mind tasks
Hypothesis 3 – 3-factor model significant superiority supported
Implications ISupport for the multifactorial nature of
theory of mindFits with current theory and use of ToM
Challenge to ‘male brain’ theory of Baron-Cohen
No gender differences detectedNo interaction effectsPossible that gender effects were not evident because
of prepubescent sample – but still fails to fit theory
Implications II
Challenge to current orthodoxy in theory of mind research
Assumptions of age – ability development of theory of mind were not supported
Knowledge that ‘something’ is going on is different from understanding what that ‘something’ is
Instruction sets and ‘memory prompts’ affect the ecological validity of ToM tasks and artificially inflate passing rates
Where Now?Further examination of ‘memory
prompts’ and instruction setsFurther research into the
multifactorial nature of theory of mind using a larger array of tasks
Using the 3-factor model to examine the relationship with executive functioning
