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THE METAGOVERNANCE OF AUSTRALIANWATER POLICY: PRACTICES, RATIONALES

AND OUTCOMES

Rachel Eberhard Bachelor of Agricultural Science (1987)

Master of Natural Resources (2002) Master of Business (Philanthropy and Non-profit studies) (2012)

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Civil Engineering and Built Environment Science and Engineering Faculty

Queensland University of Technology

2018

The metagovernance of Australian water policy: practices, rationales and outcomes i

Personal acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge and thank the support and inspiration I have

received from my supervisors, friends and peers.

First, to my supervisors, Douglas Baker, Severine Mayere and Richard Margerum

for their encouragement and constructive guidance. Thanks also to my longstanding

peers of influence: Allan Dale, Cathy Robinson, Karen Vella and Bruce Taylor.

Thanks to all my interviewees for giving generously of their time, honesty and

rich reflections. Thanks to those have shown leadership in NRM – amongst many I

acknowledge Suzie Christensen, Claire Rogers, Allan Dale, Bob Speirs, Dan Galligan,

Ruth Wade and Jon Brodie.

Thanks to three women who have never been shy of asking ‘why not?’ – Therese

Engeler, Ruth Wallace and Fiona Pakoa. Finally, of course, to Richard Hurl, whose

patience has been remarkable. May the post-PhD adventures now begin!

The metagovernance of Australian water policy: practices, rationales and outcomes ii

Funding acknowledgements

This work was supported by the Australian Research Council (LP130100933)

project ‘the Impact of Governance on Regional Natural Resource Planning’ project. The

project was led by Queensland University of Technology, in collaboration with the

CSIRO, University of Queensland, James Cook University and the University of Oregon.

Industry partners included the Queensland Regional Groups Collective (now known as

NRM Regions Queensland), Terrain NRM, North Queensland Dry Tropics, Fitzroy Basin

Association, Condamine Alliance and the Queensland Murray-Darling Committee.

The metagovernance of Australian water policy: practices, rationales and outcomes iii

List of published works

The following works were published during the candidature period of this thesis

and are relevant to its content:

Dale, A., Vella, K., Pressey, R. L., Brodie, J., Gooch, M., Potts, R., & Eberhard, R. (2016). Risk analysis of the governance system affecting outcomes in the Great Barrier Reef. Global Environmental Change, 183(3), 712-721. doi: 10.1016/j.jenvman.2016.09.013

Dale, A., Vella, K., Pressey, R. L., Gooch, M., Potts, R., & Eberhard, R. (2016). Monitoring and adaptively reducing system-wide governance risks facing the GBR: Final report. Townsville, Australia: James Cook University.

Eberhard, R., Brodie, J., & Waterhouse, J. (2017). Managing water quality for the Great Barrier Reef. In B. Hart & J. Doolan (Eds.), Decision Making in Water Resources Policy and Management: An Australian Perspective. Collingwood, Australia: Elsevier.

Eberhard, R., Margerum, R. D., Vella, K., Mayere, S., & Taylor, B. (2017). The practice of water policy governance networks: an international comparative case study analysis. Society and Natural Resources 30(4), 453 - 470. doi: 10.1080/08941920.2016.1272728

Eberhard, R., Margerum, R. D., Vella, K., Mayere, S., & Taylor, B. (in press). The practice of water policy governance networks: an international comparative case study analysis. Water Crises and Governance. Reinventing Collaborative Institutions in an Era of Uncertainty (pp. 170): Routledge.

Eberhard, R., Thorburn, P., Rolfe, J., Taylor, B., Ronan, M., Weber, T., . . . McCosker, K. (2017). Scientific Consensus Statement 2017: A synthesis of the science of land-based water quality impacts on the Great Barrier Reef, Chapter 4: Management options and their effectiveness. Brisbane: State of Queensland.

Stockwell, B., Eberhard, R., Bycroft, P., & Coutts, J. (2016). Reef Plan Best Management Program Monitoring and Evaluation Review and Practice change monitoring, evaluation reporting and improvement framework. Brisbane, Australia: Watershed Australia

Waterhouse, J., Schaffelke, B., Bartley, R., Eberhard, R., Brodie, J., Star, M., . . . Kroon, F. (2017). 2017 Scientific Consensus Statement: Land use impacts on Great Barrier Reef water quality and ecosystem condition. Brisbane: Queensland Government.

The metagovernance of Australian water policy: practices, rationales and outcomes iv

Statement of contributions

Eberhard, R., Brodie, J., & Waterhouse, J. (2017). Managing water quality for the Great Barrier Reef. In B. Hart & J. Doolan (Eds.), Decision Making in Water Resources Policy and Management: An Australian Perspective. Collingwood, Australia: Elsevier.

Elements of this chapter have been adapted and incorporated within chapter 5

Brodie & Waterhouse contributed c. 20% of the text incorporated as section 5.2. Eberhard was responsible for the remainder of the work.

QUT Verified Signature

The metagovernance of Australian water policy: practices, rationales and outcomes vi

Keywords

governance, metagovernance, governmentality, collaborative governance, Great

Barrier Reef, Murray-Darling Basin, water policy

The metagovernance of Australian water policy: practices, rationales and outcomes vii

Abstract

Collaborative governance is widely promoted as a good practice for addressing

complex and intractable environmental policy problems. Compared to centralised

policy-making, collaborative governance engages stakeholder networks in policy

development and implementation. Research suggests that collaborative governance

can contribute to better policy design and delivery through identifying a wider set of

policy options, tailoring solutions to local context, negotiating roles, accessing

additional resources and capacity and improving policy acceptance. Yet in Australia

and internationally, implementation of collaborative governance is frequently partial,

and evidence of the ascribed benefits limited. There is a lack of critical thinking about

what enables or constrains the practice of collaborative governance and the outcomes

it can achieve.

The research developed and applied an analytical framework that links the

concepts and theories of governance networks, metagovernance and governmentality

through a critical realist perspective to enquire into collaborative governance as it is

practiced. The rationalities, or beliefs in ‘how things should be done’ reflect the policy

context and guide the practice of metagovernance through technologies of agency and

performance. Intermediate outcomes such as trust, knowledge and capacity, mediate

the contribution of governance networks to policy outcomes.

The Murray-Darling Basin and the Great Barrier Reef provide two longitudinal

post-hoc case studies of the rationalities and practice of metagovernance in major

conflicts in rural water management in Australia. Forty-eight interviews across multiple

organisations and extensive documentary analysis were used to understand the logic

of institutional decisions about the objectives and modes of engagement. Findings

highlight significant constraints to the adoption of collaborative governance as

envisaged in the normative literature. Conditions that enable and constrain effective

governance and the potential impact on governance outcomes are identified.

The metagovernance of Australian water policy: practices, rationales and outcomes viii

This works adds value to the growing field of governance research through applying

governmentality theory in a critical realist analysis of the metagovernance of

Australian water policy. The analysis of two related, meso-scale longitudinal case

studies has generated a substantial dataset of government and stakeholder

experience and perspectives of metagovernance and policy outcomes. Political and

policy drivers constrain the capacity of governments to realise the full benefits of

metagovernance in these case studies. Recommendations include further research

to understand the effectiveness of metagovernance instruments in different

contexts, and the potential of third-party organisations to broker network capacity

and buffer the frequent political disruptions and accountability concerns of

governments.

The metagovernance of Australian water policy: practices, rationales and outcomes ix

Table of Contents

Personal acknowledgements ..................................................................................... i

Funding acknowledgements ..................................................................................... ii

List of published works ............................................................................................ iii

Statement of contributions ..................................................................................... iv

Statement of originality ............................................................................................ v

Keywords ................................................................................................................ vi

Abstract ...................................................................................................................vii

Table of Contents .....................................................................................................ix

List of Figures .......................................................................................................... xii

List of Tables........................................................................................................... xiii

List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................... xiv

Chapter 1: Introduction .................................................................................... 1

1.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 1

1.2 Research context ............................................................................................. 2

1.3 Research problem ........................................................................................... 3

1.4 Research purpose, questions and objectives ................................................... 5

1.5 Introduction to research design ....................................................................... 6

1.6 Significance of the research ............................................................................. 8

1.7 Thesis outline ................................................................................................ 10

Chapter 2: The elusive promise of collaborative governance ......................... 13

2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 13

2.2 Water policy in Australia ............................................................................... 13

2.3 Policy context ................................................................................................ 27

2.4 Collaborative governance as a response to wicked problems ........................ 33

2.5 The research problem ................................................................................... 47

Chapter 3: Theoretical foundations ................................................................ 49

3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 49

3.2 Defining governance...................................................................................... 50

3.3 Government and society ............................................................................... 52

3.4 Pure forms of governance ............................................................................. 53

3.5 Multi-level governance .................................................................................. 62

3.6 Frameworks of policy change ........................................................................ 62

The metagovernance of Australian water policy: practices, rationales and outcomes x

3.7 Collaborative governance as network governance......................................... 70

3.8 Metagovernance ........................................................................................... 72

3.9 Analytical framework .................................................................................... 80

3.10 Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 82

Chapter 4: Methodology, research design and methods ................................ 85

4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 85

4.2 Research aims and approach ......................................................................... 85

4.3 Research Design ............................................................................................ 89

4.4 Data collection ............................................................................................ 103

4.5 Analysis ....................................................................................................... 113

4.6 Research challenges, limitations and ethical considerations ........................ 119

4.7 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 122

Chapter 5: Great Barrier Reef case study...................................................... 125

5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 125

5.2 Great Barrier Reef Water Quality................................................................. 126

5.3 Management authorities ............................................................................. 132

5.4 Stakeholders ............................................................................................... 138

5.5 GBR Governance history .............................................................................. 142

5.6 Key governance phases for analysis ............................................................. 149

5.7 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 150

Chapter 6: Great Barrier Reef case study results .......................................... 153

6.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 153

6.2 Phase 1: Reef Plan and the Reef Partnership (2003-2007) ........................... 153

6.3 Phase 2: Reef Rescue and regulation (2008-2013) ....................................... 159

6.4 Phase 3: Responding to UNESCO (2014-2016) ............................................. 164

6.5 Great Barrier Reef case study summarised .................................................. 171

Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 181

Chapter 7: Murray-Darling Basin case study................................................. 184

7.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 184

7.2 Murray-Darling Basin ................................................................................... 184

7.3 Management authorities ............................................................................. 191

7.4 Stakeholders ............................................................................................... 195

7.5 Governance history ..................................................................................... 198

7.6 Key governance phases for analysis ............................................................. 211

The metagovernance of Australian water policy: practices, rationales and outcomes xi

7.7 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 212

Chapter 8: Murray-Darling Basin case study results ..................................... 215

8.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 215

8.2 Phase 1: Murray-Darling Basin Initiative (2000-2007) .................................. 215

8.3 Phase 2: Commonwealth Water Act and the Basin Plan (2008 - 2016) ......... 224

8.4 Murray-Darling Basin case study summarised ............................................. 239

8.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 247

Chapter 9: Metagovernance of water policy ................................................ 249

9.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 249

9.2 Acknowledging case study differences ........................................................ 250

9.3 How and why do governments use collaborative governance?.................... 253

9.4 How do stakeholder organisations respond to collaborative governance? .. 264

9.5 What does collaborative governance achieve? ............................................ 269

9.6 The importance of Context for collaborative governance ............................ 274

9.7 The potential for effective metagovernance of Australian water policy ....... 277

9.8 Conclusion ................................................................................................... 279

Chapter 10: Conclusions ................................................................................. 283

10.1 Summary of the research problem .............................................................. 283

10.2 Summary of research aims and objectives ................................................... 284

10.3 Key research findings .................................................................................. 286

10.4 Significance of the research ......................................................................... 291

10.5 Research limitations .................................................................................... 298

10.6 Recommendations ...................................................................................... 298

10.7 Concluding remarks ..................................................................................... 300

Bibliography ......................................................................................................... 303

Appendices .......................................................................................................... 337

Appendix A Glossary ............................................................................................. 337

Appendix B Major grey literature for the Great Barrier Reef case study................ 339

Appendix C Major grey literature for the Murray-Darling Basin case study ........... 344

Appendix D Invitation to participate ..................................................................... 349

Appendix E Information and consent form ........................................................... 350

Appendix F Indicative interview questions ............................................................ 353

Appendix G Coding framework ............................................................................. 354

Appendix H Communication of results to practitioners ........................................ 357

The metagovernance of Australian water policy: practices, rationales and outcomes xii

List of Figures

Figure 1. Australian water use by sector, 2008-09 and 2014-15 (ABS, 2016b) ...................................... 15

Figure 2. Location of the Murray-Darling Basin and Great Barrier Reef. .............................................. 21

Figure 3. Five models of governance (from Pierre and Peters, 2005 ..................................................... 52

Figure 4. Multi-partner governance (from Agrawal & Lemos, 2007) .................................................... 58

Figure 5. The Australian policy cycle (Althaus et al. 2013) ................................................................... 63

Figure 6. The institutional analysis and development framework (from Ostrom, 2014) ........................ 65

Figure 7. Rules classified according to their impact on IAD action situations (from Ostrom, 2005) ....... 66

Figure 8. The advocacy coalition framework (from Sabatier, 2007) ..................................................... 69

Figure 9. Analytical framework encompassing the metagovernance of networks (author) ................... 82

Figure 10. Analytical framework for the metagovernance of networks (author) .................................. 89

Figure 11. The research process and methods used............................................................................. 92

Figure 12. Location of the two case studies: the Murray-Darling Basin and the Great Barrier Reef ....... 97

Figure 13. Case study design (after Yin, 2014) ..................................................................................... 98

Figure 14. Summary of research design ............................................................................................ 102

Figure 15. The number and type of documents collated for the Great Barrier Reef case study ........... 103

Figure 16. The number and type of documents collated for the Murray-Darling Basin case study ...... 104

Figure 17 The Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area and adjacent NRM regions ............................ 126

Figure 18. Management logic of GBR water quality programs (author) ............................................. 132

Figure 19. Major governance arrangements for reef water quality programs (2017) (author) ........... 137

Figure 20. Key findings for the first phase of GBR governance ........................................................... 174

Figure 21. Key findings for the second phase of GBR governance ...................................................... 176

Figure 22. Key findings for the third phase of GBR governance .......................................................... 178

Figure 23. Key findings for the GBR case study overall ...................................................................... 180

Figure 24. The location of the Murray-Darling Basin (MDBA, 2017c) ................................................. 185

Figure 25. The Queensland Murray-Darling Basin Water Resource Areas (MDBA, 2017c) .................. 186

Figure 26. Management logic of MDB water programs (author) ....................................................... 191

Figure 27. Major governance arrangements for MDB water (2017) (author) ..................................... 195

Figure 28. Key findings for the first phase of MDB governance .......................................................... 241

Figure 29. Key findings for the second phase of MDB governance ..................................................... 244

Figure 30. Key findings for the MDB case study overall ..................................................................... 246

The metagovernance of Australian water policy: practices, rationales and outcomes xiii

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Accountability perspectives in governance evaluation (from Hertting, 2012) ........................ 43

Table 2.2 Three orders of intermediate outcomes for collaborative planning (Innes and Booher, 1999). .......................................................................................................................................................... 45

Table 3.1 Characteristics of market, hierarchy and network modes of governance (Lowndes & Sketcher, 1998) ................................................................................................................................................. 55

Table 3.2 Hybrid governance modes. .................................................................................................. 57

Table 3.3 Four ideal-typical governance modes (from Arnouts et al. 2012). ......................................... 59

Table 3.4 Features of hybrid governance (from Arnouts et al. 2012).................................................... 60

Table 3.5 Governance modes from government to governance (from Hysing, 2009)............................ 61

Table 3.6 Theories of network governance and seminal authors (from Sørensen, 2007) ...................... 76

Table 4.1 Criteria for case study selection ........................................................................................... 96

Table 4.2 Summary of data sources and outputs for research objectives ........................................... 100

Table 4.3 Types of grey literature compiled for case studies .............................................................. 105

Table 4.4 Sources of grey literature compiled for case studies ........................................................... 106

Table 4.5 Interview coverage of Great Barrier Reef case study phases, organisations and levels ........ 109

Table 4.6 Interview coverage of Murray-Darling Basin case study phases, organisations and levels ... 110

Table 5.1 Principal government agencies engaged in managing Great Barrier Reef water quality and their current activities ...................................................................................................................... 135

Table 5.2 Stakeholder organisations in the Great Barrier Reef .......................................................... 139

Table 5.3 Timeline of GBR governance phases including major milestones and natural disasters ....... 143

Table 7.1 Agricultural land use in the MDB (from ABS, 2017). ........................................................... 187

Table 7.2 Principal government agencies engaged in managing Murray-Darling Basin water and related activities in Queensland. ...................................................................................................... 193

Table 7.3 Stakeholder organisations in the Murray-Darling Basin ..................................................... 196

Table 7.4 Timeline of MDB governance phases and activities, with political and physical events........ 199

Table 9.1 Comparison of case study characteristics........................................................................... 251

Table 9.2 Examples of metagovernance practices as technologies of agency and performance (after Rose and Miller, 1992) ..................................................................................................................... 256

Table 9.3 Metagovernance practices employed by the Reef Alliance (author, after Rose and Miller, 1992) ............................................................................................................................................... 268

Table 9.4 Contextual factors that enable collaborative governance................................................... 275

The metagovernance of Australian water policy: practices, rationales and outcomes xiv

List of Abbreviations

ABS Australian Bureau of Statistics

AMCS Australian Marine Conservation Society

ANZECC Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council

APSC Australian Public Service Commission

ARMCANZ Agriculture and Resource Management Council of Australia and New

Zealand

Aus Australia

Aus. Gov. Australian Government

ACCC Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

ACF Advocacy Coalition Framework

BoM Bureau of Meteorology

CAC Community Advisory Committee

CAMBA China-Australia Migratory Bird Agreement

CEWH Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder

CMA Catchment Management Authority

COAG Council of Australian Governments

CSIRO Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation

DAWR Department of Agriculture and Water Resources (Aus. Gov.)

DEE Department of Environment and Energy (Aus. Gov.)

DEHP Department of Environment and Heritage Protection (Qld. Gov.)

DEWHA Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts (Aus.

Gov.)

GBR Great Barrier Reef

The metagovernance of Australian water policy: practices, rationales and outcomes xv

GBRMPA Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (Aust. Gov.)

GBRWST Great Barrier Reef Water Science Taskforce

IAD Institutional Analysis and Development Framework

JAMBA Japan-Australia Migratory Bird Agreement

MDB Murray-Darling Basin

MDBA Murray-Darling Basin Authority (Aust. Gov.)

NHT Natural Heritage Trust

NWC National Water Commission

NWI National Water Initiative

NWQMS National Water Quality Management Strategy

QMDB Queensland Murray-Darling Basin

QMDC Queensland Murray-Darling Committee

QAO Queensland Audit Office

Qld. Queensland, Australia

Qld. Gov. Queensland Government

ROKAMBA Republic of Korea-Australia Migratory Bird Agreement

RWQPP Reef Water Quality Protection Plan

SDL Sustainable Diversion Limits (under the Murray-Darling Basin Plan)

SES Socio-Ecological Systems Framework

UNESCO United National Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

WHC World Heritage Committee

WQIP Water Quality Improvement Plan

WWF World Wildlife Fund for Nature

The metagovernance of Australian water policy: practices, rationales and outcomes i

Chapter 1: Introduction 1

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 INTRODUCTION

In Australia, water has been the subject of heated national debate and fierce

interstate rivalry since Federation in 1901 (Marshall et al., 2013). Australian water

resources are naturally scarce and highly variable (Kendall, 2013). It is widely

accepted water extraction has exceeded sustainable levels (McKay, 2005) and that

most Australian water resources are degraded (Crase, 2008). Climate change adds

further pressure to the challenge of restoring Australia’s water resources to

reasonable health (Horne, 2013; Skinner, 2017). Around the world, population

growth and land use intensification are increasing competition for water resources

and impacting on water-dependent ecosystems (Jager et al., 2016; Kissling-Näf &

Kuks, 2004; Margerum & Robinson, 2015; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2010; Scholz & Stiftel,

2010).

Water governance refers to the decision-making systems that make and enact

water management decisions, including legislation, regulation, markets, policies,

institutions, networks and behavioural norms (Chaffin et al., 2014). Water

governance is a challenge - to address complex and uncertain problems that are

highly contested, value-laden and constantly changing (Head, 2010). For these

reasons, water and other environmental policy areas have been characterised as

'wicked', reflecting their resistance to solution (Head & Alford, 2015; Rittel & Webber,

1973; Weber & Khademian, 2008).

Collaborative governance is a form of governance that is widely promoted as

good practice for addressing wicked policy problems. Compared to traditional,

centralised decision-making by governments, collaborative governance engages

networks of stakeholders and their organisations in policy development and

implementation (Ansell & Gash, 2008). The benefits of collaborative governance are

promoted as “better decisions that are more likely to be implemented” (Wondolleck


& Yaffee, 2000, p. 23). Collaborative governance sits alongside, and interacts with,

other forms of governance, including regulation and markets.

Yet the practice of collaborative governance has been shown to be costly, time-

consuming and highly-uncertain. Evidence of the benefits is inconclusive, and debate

about appropriate performance measures ongoing. This thesis explores the

discrepancy between collaborative governance as recommended good policy

practice, and its use in ongoing water policy conflicts in Australia. In so doing, this

research aspires to contribute to understanding how public policy decision-making

processes about water and other environmental resources can be improved.

This chapter introduces the research context (section 1.2), the research

problem (section 1.3) and the research question and objectives (section 1.4). The

research approach is briefly outlined (section 1.5) and the significance of the research

highlighted (section 1.6). Finally, this chapter presents an outline of the rest of the

thesis.

1.2 RESEARCH CONTEXT

Australian water resources are amongst the most variable in the world, with

low rates of rainfall and runoff (Letcher & Powell, 2011), and much of Australia’s

water resources are inaccessible or unsuitable for human use (McKay, 2005).

Australia uses a high (and growing) proportion of its water for irrigated agriculture

(Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), 2016a).

In the Australian federation, the states have primary responsibility for land and

water resource management. In recent decades, the federal government has become

more involved in brokering water reform and supporting community-based natural

resource management (Robins, 2007).

The early development of Australian water resources was closely tied to a

regional development ethic. The Murray-Darling Basin, that crosses four states and

one Territory, has been the catalyst for national water reform since federation. In

recent decades, sustainability concerns have driven efforts to reduce levels of water

extraction, improve water quality and the ecological health of waterways and

wetlands.


Water policy is influenced by broad policy trends including neoliberalism,

regionalisation and public participation. Neoliberalism emphasises market-based

economic reforms, free trade, strong property rights and personal freedom (Harvey,

2007). Embraced by both major parties in Australia (Pusey, 1991; Robins, 2007),

neoliberalism is evidenced in environmental policy by water markets, deregulation

and regionalisation. Regionalisation is the process of decentralising government to

the regional scale as more appropriate for implementation (Morrison, 2007; Taylor,

2009) and can be seen in Australia’s natural resource management system and

catchment-based water resource planning where certain functions are decentralised.

There are growing expectations that public policy involves public participation, for

pragmatic reasons such as local ownership and knowledge sharing, as well as

democratic principles.

Australia’s natural resource management system embodies some of these

principles. Regional natural resource management (NRM) organisations are

resourced by state and federal governments to develop regional NRM plans and

deliver voluntary programs for environmental benefits. With variations in each state

(statutory and non-statutory models), the national NRM program has undergone

several changes in program design over the last 15 years (Morrison et al., 2010;

Robins & Kanowski, 2011; Vella et al., 2015).

1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM

The term ‘wicked problems’ describes problems that are resistant to solution

because of their inherent complexity and conflicting stakeholder values (Churchman,

1967; Rittel & Webber, 1973). Water policy can be considered ‘wicked’ because water

systems are complex, unpredictable and multi-scalar, are adjusting to climate change,

stakeholders view the problem differently, the science is often contested and

outcomes impact people’s wellbeing and livelihoods. One-hundred and thirty years

of Murray-Darling Basin water reforms is evidence of the ‘insolvability’ of water policy

conflicts.

Effective governance of water resources is a critical challenge for current and

future generations in Australia and elsewhere. Both research and practice call for


more collaborative approaches to intractable environmental conflicts (Australian

Public Service, 2007; Duckett et al., 2016; Head & Xiang, 2016; Ison et al., 2007; Pahl-

Wostl et al., 2007). The term ‘collaborative governance’ refers to:

“A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly

engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is

formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or

implement public policy or manage public programs or assets” (Ansell &

Gash, 2008, p. 544).

Rather than authoritative or competitive strategies, collaborative strategies

seek ‘win-win’ solutions by bringing parties together to explore different ways of

framing the problem, understanding stakeholder value and interests, testing

solutions and negotiating trade-offs (Kwakkel et al., 2016) (Roberts, 2000). The

benefits of such an approach include sharing knowledge and understanding, building

trust, reaching agreement and commitment, cost efficiencies, shared resources, risks

and responsibilities (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Margerum, 2011).

The practice of collaborative governance has, however, been shown to be

costly, time-consuming, and unpredictable (Huxham et al., 2000). Many challenges

to implementing collaborative governance are documented (Huxham et al., 2000),

including power imbalances, participation and capacity (Head et al., 2016), lack of

trust and multiple and conflicting accountabilities (Frame et al., 2004; Wondolleck &

Yaffee, 2000) (Hertting & Vedung, 2012).

Assessing the performance of collaborative governance is problematic. The

most common approach is to assess intermediate and process outcomes such as

participation and trust (Carr et al., 2012; Leach & Sabatier, 2005a). Others have

looked at output measures, such as agreements or projects (Born & Genskow, 2000;

Conley & Moote, 2003). Outcomes of collaborative governance can be problematic

to measure and benchmark (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Koontz & Thomas, 2006). Few

studies have attempted to link collaborative governance to environmental outcomes

(but see Biddle & Koontz, 2014; Scott, 2015).

Whether collaborative governance can delivery improved environmental

outcomes remains unanswered. There is clearly a gap between “theoretical


expectations and effective practice” (Keast & Mandell, 2012, p. 11,). This research

seeks to explore collaborative governance as it is practiced in Australian water policy,

to better understand its potential contribution to better policy outcomes.

1.4 RESEARCH PURPOSE, QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES

The benefits ascribed to collaborative governance are substantial and it offers

promise in policy arenas that are characterised by chronic policy failure (Head, 2008).

Yet its implementation is challenging and evidence of performance limited.

The purpose of this research is to advance the critical understanding of the

practice of collaborative governance to inform choices about modes of governance

to address environmental issues. This will be achieved by exploring the disjunct

between theoretical and normative recommendations about collaborative

governance by examining the process and performance of collaborative governance

as it is practiced in Australian water policy.

The overarching research question is ‘How do the rationales and practices of

collaborative governance influence Australian water policy outcomes?’. To answer

this research question, the research objectives are:

Research Objective 1. How is collaborative governance practiced in Australian

water policy?

The evolution of governance arrangements for two major water policy issues

are examined to determine contemporary collaborative governance practice in

Australian water policy. The structures and processes to engage key stakeholders,

such as non-government stakeholder organisations, are studied, and how this

engagement influenced water policy decisions documented.

Research Objective 2. How do governments rationalise collaborative

governance practice?

The perspectives of key government decision-makers at times of policy and

governance change are examined to determine the rationale for the modes of

governance adopted. To address this research objective, the rationales of

government agencies at these key decision-points are summarised.


Research Objective 3. How does collaborative governance impact stakeholder

relations and policy outcomes?

The impact of collaborative governance efforts on stakeholder relations and

policy decisions is explored with government and non-government decision-makers.

The research documents the influence of collaborative governance on stakeholder

relations, and the impact of this on policy decisions and outcomes.

Research Objective 4. How is the performance of collaborative governance

influenced by context?

The context for each phase of governance and policy change is examined

through documentation and the perspectives of government and non-government

decision-makers. The research documents the contextual factors considered to have

influenced the performance of collaborative governance initiatives through the

period of the two case studies.

Research Objective 5. What does that tell us about the potential adoption and

performance of collaborative governance in Australian water resource policy?

Reflecting on the findings above, the research draws preliminary conclusions

about what constrains or enables the adoption of collaborative governance in its

conception, implementation and performance in Australian water policy.

Recommendations are made about the conditions under which collaborative

governance may be more effective, and the benefits that may be achieved by its

adoption.

1.5 INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH DESIGN

A post-positivist, critical realist research philosophy (Archer et al., 2013; Guba

& Lincoln, 1998) has steered the research design, which frames governance as an

emergent process in which people’s perspectives are important determinants of

outcomes that are also strongly influenced by context. The analytical framework

draws on metagovernance, that refers to the governance of networks (usually by the

state) (Meuleman, 2008a) (Jessop, 2011) and governmentality theory (Foucault,

1991a; Rose et al., 2006), that draws attention to the rationalities and practices of

(meta)governance and the role of power and knowledge in shaping outcomes.


Qualitative methods were chosen to explore the integration of these constructs

with intermediate levels of prior theory (Edmondson & McManus, 2007). A case study

approach was adopted to allow an in-depth exploration of the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of

governance practice. Multiple, longitudinal case studies were chosen to widen the

evidence base and capture the evolution of metagovernance practices and outcomes

over time. Two significant water policy cases met the criteria for selection: the

Murray-Darling Basin and the Great Barrier Reef.

Academic and grey literature were reviewed to develop case histories, which

were then used to identify governance phases and decision points that marked

changes in governance arrangements. Key government agencies and non-

government stakeholder organisations were catalogued for each case, and

individuals that engaged in governance decisions and practices in each phase

identified. Those individuals provided the target population for data collection. Semi-

structured interviews were conducted with more than 40 individuals who agreed to

participate in the research. Questions explored the logic of organisational responses,

considerations that influenced that decision and the experience of governance

arrangements.

Interviews were transcribed and analysed using a thematic content analysis and

an iterative process of review, reflection and inquiry. Findings provided the empirical

evidence for the discussion of the research questions.

Limitations

The research explores a meso-scale approach, looking at the evolution of two

cases over a 15-year period. This allows for a ‘wider perspective’ than the usual single

case studies, but also limits the capacity to explore individual events in detail. While

the generalisability and transferability of case study research is always limited (Willis,

2012) wider inferences can be drawn through comparison with cases that share some

similarities, particularly in the context of Australian water policy. The research

conclusions are thus considered instrumental rather than representational (Stake &

Savolainen, 1995).


1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH

1.6.1 Theoretical contributions

This research makes a novel contribution in applying governmentality theory to

Australian water policy. This research bridges the domains of political and policy

science (governmentality and metagovernance) with the concept of collaborative

governance, that has emerged from natural resource management studies.

The findings supported several key tenets of metagovernance and

governmentality theory, namely the active role of governance subjects in

metagoverning themselves, the wide range of metagovernance instruments

employed, the tension between the self-regulation and steering of networks by the

state and the dynamic and emergent nature of governance itself.

Research results also highlighted the complexities of metagovernance within a

federated political system, where metagovernance practice is strongly influenced by

bilateral and multilateral relations.

1.6.2 Methodological contribution

The methodological contribution of this research stems from its critical realist

philosophy and novel combination of governance networks, metagovernance and

governmentality theory in an analytical framework to explore two related, meso-

scale longitudinal water policy case studies. Adopting an open inquiry into the

rationales, practices and outcomes of metagovernance revealed a complex set of

relationships that responds to multiple drivers and instruments from within and

beyond the immediate policy arena.

1.6.3 Empirical contribution

The empirical contribution of this research is derived from the analysis of two

longitudinal, meso-scale case studies in closely related policy domains. Most

governance research uses single case, single point of time studies (Koontz & Thomas,

2006). Detailed case histories and timelines were developed from extensive

documentary research, and more than 40 interviews provided a rich dataset that will

support further inquiry.


The two case studies are significant because they document the engagement

of two governments with each other and with similar cohorts of stakeholder

organisations over related policy issues in the same period. Despite these

commonalities, the two histories provide very different narratives of collaborative

governance and its contribution to policy development and implementation.

The research contributes to the body of work that has examined the trajectory

of large-scale water policy conflicts and governance responses. The research provides

documentation of two additional longitudinal case studies that contribute to an

understanding of Australian water governance and counters the dominance of

American and European case studies in the international water governance

literature.

1.6.4 Contribution to practice

This research highlights several aspects of Australian water policy

metagovernance not widely recognised by policy makers and practitioners.

Metagovernance practice is wider than formal stakeholder engagement and uses a

range of formal and informal instruments. Related policy domains may have a

significant impact on metagovernance outcomes.

The willingness of stakeholder organisations to constructively engage in policy

dialogue once there is clear political commitment to policy objectives is perhaps more

than is generally recognised. While governments are highly constrained in policy

decisions and view collaborative governance in utilitarian terms - stakeholders can,

and do, block, delay or co-opt unpopular policy reforms.

Metagovernance offers multiple potential benefits to wicked policy issues, but

realising those benefits requires greater understanding of the multiple forces that

shape and enable collaborative potential. Sustained and coherent bilateral policy

enables constructive policy engagement by stakeholder organisations, and the

converse encourages stakeholder gaming and political advocacy. The brokerage role

that NRM organisations have (and could) play in building the social capital of

governance networks is not well recognised, evidenced by the reduced and

competitive funding arrangements of the national NRM program.


1.6.5 Impact

The research was strongly motivated by a desire to contribute to better

governance practice. Regional Natural Resource Management (NRM) organisations

were co-investors in the research via an Australian Research Council Linkage grant

(LP130100933) and provided key informants and practitioner reflections. Findings

have been disseminated via a periodic project newsletter, conference presentations

and ongoing formal and informal engagement with Queensland and Australian

Government officers and staff of NRM, conservation and peak agricultural industry

bodies. The research has contributed to a healthy debate about preferred

governance arrangements in this field.

Ultimately, this research aspires to contribute to the better design and

operation of purposeful governance structures to manage wicked problems in a

manner that demonstrates both social justice and environmental outcomes.

1.7 THESIS OUTLINE

This thesis is organised in nine chapters that describe and explain the research

problem and its context, the theoretical foundations, the methods adopted, the case

studies and interview results and analysis. Each chapter is briefly described below.

Chapter 2: The research problem

Chapter 2 outlines the research problem and its context. Australian water

resources are subject to increasing pressures and declining condition. Australian

water policy reform has been led by efforts to manage the over-allocation of water

in the Murray-Darling Basin and the ongoing negotiation of roles between federal

and state governments. Efforts are influenced by the wider policy trends of

neoliberalism, regionalisation and public participation.

The complexity of the natural, social and institutional dimensions of water

management provides a substantial policy challenge. Both research and practice

promote 'collaborative governance' as good practice in responding to complex

environmental issues. Yet the implementation of collaborative approaches is

challenging and performance evidence lacking. The research question is thus


identified as ‘How do the rationales and practices of collaborative governance

influence Australian water policy outcomes?

Chapter 3: Theoretical foundations

Chapter 3 introduces the concept of governance in its pure, hybrid, multilevel

and polycentric forms. Frameworks of policy change, including Ostrom’s (1971)

Institutional Analysis and Development Framework and Sabatier’s (1988) Advocacy

Coalition Framework are canvassed. Collaborative governance is introduced and

described and identified as network governance. Metagovernance is described as the

art of governing networks, and governmentality theory introduced as a lens to

examine the complex relations between governments and stakeholders that

influences policy outcomes. The analytical framework draws upon the concepts of

governance networks, metagovernance and governmentality theory to focus

attention on the rationalities and practices of metagovernance and the influence of

context in shaping multi-layered outcomes.

Chapter 4: Research design and methods

Chapter 4 describes the design and methods used to address the research

question and objectives. The adoption of a qualitative methods to examine two

longitudinal case studies is justified. Methods for case selection, sampling strategy,

interview technique and data analysis are described. Research quality is discussed,

and limitations of the study acknowledged.

Chapter 5: Great Barrier Reef case study

The Great Barrier Reef is introduced as the first case study. The downstream

impacts of water quality on the reef lagoon is described and key stakeholders

identified. Three phases of governance are characterised by their governance

structures, problem framing, policy levers employed, stakeholder engagement and

outcomes achieved. These three phases are used to frame the analysis and guide the

interviewee sampling strategy.

Chapter 6: Great Barrier Reef case study results

Chapter 6 presents the results of the thematic analysis of interview data for

each phase of the Great Barrier Reef case study. Government and stakeholder


perspectives are presented in historical sequence and illustrated with quotations.

Findings are summarised against the analytical framework for each phase, and for

the case study overall.

Chapter 7: Queensland Murray-Darling case study

The management of water quantity in the Queensland Murray-Darling Basin

(QMDB)s is introduced as the second case study. The environmental impacts of over-

extraction of water for irrigation is described and key stakeholders identified. Two

phases of governance are characterised by their governance structures, problem

framing, policy levers employed, stakeholder engagement and outcomes achieved.

These two phases are used to identify key decision points for the case study analysis

and sampling strategy for interviewees.

Chapter 8: Queensland Murray-Darling Case study results

Chapter 7 summarises the results of the Murray-Darling case study. Like

Chapter 6, findings from the thematic analysis are presented in historical sequence

before being summarised against the analytical framework, for each of the two

phases and then the case study overall.

Chapter 9: Metagovernance of water policy

Chapter 9 examines the findings reported in the results from chapters 6 and 8

and considers them in the broader context. Results are considered and discussed in

relation to the research objectives.

Chapter 10: Conclusion

Chapter 10 summarises the research problem, research questions and

objectives before reviewing the key findings and discussing their significance and

limitations. Recommendations for research and practice are made.

Note that a glossary of key terms is provided in Appendix A.

Chapter 2: The elusive promise of collaborative governance 13

Chapter 2: The elusive promise of collaborative governance

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes Australian water resources as a critical resource - scarce,

highly variable, in declining condition and under increasing pressure. The states have

primary responsibility for land and water management, but the Commonwealth is

also a key player. A short history of Australian water policy and key contemporary

elements are introduced (section 2.2) (and are further detailed in chapters 5 and 7).

The history of water policy shows how the ongoing negotiation of multilateral

arrangements for the Murray-Darling Basin have led water reform since federation,

and the use of different policy levers (incentives, markets, education and regulation)

to achieve equitable and sustainable water use policy objectives. Three broad trends

that influence contemporary Australian policy are described (section 2.3): neo-

liberalising governance reforms associated with the promotion of a market economy

and deregulation, the devolution of decision-making powers through regionalism,

and public participation in policy making.

Water policy is identified as a wicked problem, complex, evolving and

resistance to solution. The arguments for collaborative governance as a 'good policy

practice' response to wicked problems are presented (section 2.4). Questions about

the uptake, performance and effectiveness of collaborative governance, however,

indicate that collaborative governance is no panacea. The research problem is then

framed as an enquiry into the practice of collaborative governance in Australian

water policy (section 2.5).

2.2 WATER POLICY IN AUSTRALIA

2.2.1 Australian water resources

Australian water policy is driven by the need to manage competing uses and

impacts on water resources. The following section provides an overview of Australian

water resources, including availability, use, water quality and ecological health.


Scarcity and variability

Australian water resources reflect variation in landscape and climate - from the

massive tropical systems of northern Australia, to temperate coastal catchments in

the southern states and arid inland regions. Nonetheless, water resources in Australia

have distinctive characteristics that make their management of critical importance in

all states and nationally.

The defining characteristic of Australian water resources is variability in rainfall

and runoff. Australia has generally high rainfall variability and high evaporation rates,

which results in low rates of runoff, and low and highly variable river flows (Letcher

& Powell, 2011). Runoff is generally an order of magnitude less than any other

continent, and variability an order of magnitude greater (Kendall, 2013). In many

areas, evaporation potential approaches average annual rainfall, so river flows are

occasional and short-lived (ephemeral). Groundwater is an important resource,

particularly in drier inland areas.

As Dorothea Mackellar noted in her famous poem 'My country' Australia is

indeed the land “of droughts and flooding rains” (Curtis Brown, 2016, p. 1). Australia

frequently experiences widespread and prolonged drought conditions, and periodic

high rainfall events due to the El Nino-Southern Oscillation (during El Nino years

eastern Australia experiences below-average rainfall, while in La Nina years northern

and eastern Australia experiences above average rainfall) and other climate cycles

(Chiew et al., 1998). Most recently the 2010-11 floods came after a decade of very

low rainfall years across eastern Australia (State of the Environment Committee,

2011). Rainfall in southern Australia is declining due to climate change and is

expected to put water resources under additional stress (Bureau of Meteorology

(BoM), 2015).

Water use

Nationally, Australians use less than 20% of available surface and groundwater,

but this aggregate statistic is deceptive as many water resources are in remote

locations or of unsuitable quality (McKay, 2005). In Australia's Murray-Darling Basin,

over 50% of mean annual runoff is diverted for human uses (Letcher & Powell, 2011).

While other catchments divert proportionally less of their water resources, many of


the east coast catchments and groundwater areas are fully or over-developed in

terms of water extraction (National Land and Water Resources Audit, 2002).

During 2014-15, an estimated 76,140 GL of water was extracted from the

environment (ABS, 2016b). The bulk of this water (58,105 GL) is for hydroelectricity,

a non-consumptive use. The balance (17,375 GL) is consumed, predominantly by

agriculture (10,410 GL) and 1,852 GL is consumed by households (Figure 1). Relative

to other countries, Australia uses a higher proportion of its water supplies for

agriculture (Kendall, 2013) and this use (mostly for irrigation) is increasing. The

remaining water use is for mining, electricity production (excluding hydro-electricity),

stock and domestic use, plantation forestry and farm dams.

Figure 1. Australian water use by sector, 2008-09 and 2014-15 (ABS, 2016b)

South eastern Australia has many large dams to provide security of water

supply (Kendall, 2013). Over two-thirds of irrigation water is used in the Murray-

Darling Basin (Bureau of Meteorology (BoM), 2015) and the Murray-Darling Basin

Plan is committed to reducing consumption by 2,750 GL to return that water to the

environment. Nationally, water markets are now trading $1.5 - 2.5B (Aus) per annum

(Jackson et al., 2016).

Water quality

Water quality is also an important determinant of water use in Australia.

Salinity, defined as the presence of dissolved salts in soil and water and is a common


issue in many parts of the country. Salinity is a natural phenomenon, but in many

areas, has been exacerbated by changes in water balance through the removal of

native vegetation or application of irrigation water. Salinity is a major concern in

Western Australia, western Victoria and the Murray-Darling Basin (National Land and

Water Resources Audit, 2002). Many crops are intolerant of saline water. Soils can

become degraded through prolonged exposure to saline water. At high levels, saline

waters are unsuited to most human uses.

Sediments and nutrients are more significant water quality issues across

Queensland and coastal NSW (National Land and Water Resources Audit, 2002).

Nutrients can be derived from direct sources such as sewage treatment plants, or

diffuse sources such as agricultural landscapes, where nutrients in runoff can be both

dissolved and attached to eroding soil particles. Sediments and nutrients affect

instream and downstream ecological health, increase water treatment costs and are

indicate soil degradation.

Many water quality measures are closely related to flow, with higher flow

resulting in greater dilution of pollutants (less impact). However, major rainfall events

can transport large amounts of sediments and nutrients from agricultural landscapes

into rivers, wetlands and downstream environments such as the Great Barrier Reef.

Ecological health

There is now widespread acceptance that Australian water resources are

degraded (Crase, 2008). Many surface and groundwaters are close to or beyond

sustainable levels of extraction (McKay, 2005). Water quality issues are increasing

and widespread in every drainage division (State of the Environment Committee,

2011). Loss of wetlands and riparian vegetation, and other habitat modifications are

almost universal (State of the Environment Committee, 2011). Overall, inland waters

are highly impacted by climate change, water resource development, land use and

management (land clearing, agriculture, peri-urban and riparian management) and

weeds and pests (Jackson et al., 2016; State of the Environment Committee, 2011).

These pressures also directly and indirectly affect coastal and marine environments

including the Great Barrier Reef (Jackson et al., 2016; State of the Environment

Committee, 2011).


2.2.2 Australian federalism

Australia is a federation of 6 states and 2 territories, and Local Governments

provide a 3rd tie of government. The Commonwealth of Australia was formed on

January 1, 1901, when the six former British colonies united under the

Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900. The Constitution provides the

legal framework for governing Australia and can only be changed by referendum.

Each state also has a Constitution, and the two territories (Australian Capital Territory

and the Northern Territory) also have self-government acts. Local Government

models vary by state and there are over 546 small and generally poorly resourced

Local Government Areas in Australia, recently reduced in number by amalgamations

(Bellamy & Brown, 2009; Ryan et al., 2016). Brown (2007) argues that Australian

federalism is more centralised than most other federations (Canada, USA and

Germany, for example) reflecting the low capacity of local government, the large

and/or populous nature of most states, and historical dissatisfaction with state

bureaucracies.

State governments retain primary responsibility for land and water

management, but these are not exclusive, and both local and federal governments

have overlapping interests. In recent decades, the federal government has become

increasingly involved in matters of natural resource management, particularly water,

through water reform, coordination and community-based natural resource

management (Robins & Dovers, 2007b). The Federal government also holds specific

constitutional powers in relation to international agreements such as World Heritage,

and environmental matters of national and international significance (Ross & Dovers,

2008). The evolving relationship of state and federal governments is a key feature of

Australian water resource management.

2.2.3 History of Australian water policy

Australian water policy development has been driven by the need to allocate

scarce water resources amongst competing users and manage the environmental

impacts of water extraction and use. The characteristics of Australian water resources

and the nature of the Australian federation, described above, provide important

context for the history of water policy development outlined in this section.


Like other western countries Australian policy has shifted over time from

subsidised agricultural production and under-priced water to market-based

economic reforms for more efficient allocation and a managed approach to achieving

public good outcomes (Crase, 2008). Water quality and catchment management have

emerged as significant policy areas more recently, and management efforts have

mostly employed voluntary education, extension and grants programs (apart from

point-sources of pollution, which are regulated). Market-based instruments are a

relatively new policy mechanism that is now well established in water quantity, and,

in some areas, being trialled for water quality.

Indigenous water use

Prior to European colonisation, water resources were used and valued by

Australia's indigenous population. The importance of these resources was reflected

both in tribal boundaries and creation mythology (McKay, 2005). Indigenous water

rights were negated by the practice, and later the legal doctrine of terra nullius, that

declared Australia an ‘unowned land’ prior to British colonisation, thereby precluding

indigenous property rights (Banner, 2005). Terra Nullius was challenged and

successfully overturned in 1992 when the Australian High Court recognised the

existence of Native title under common law in the Mabo judgement (Poirier &

Schartmueller, 2012). The Native Title Act 1993 (Aust.) recognises the traditional

rights and interests to land and waters of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people.

In 1996 the Wik judgement found that Native title can co-exist with pastoral leases

and other tenures that do not extinguish Native title rights (Davies, 2017).

Despite international pressures, reforms to accommodate Aboriginal interests

in water have progressed very slowly since then (Poirier & Schartmueller, 2012).

Federation 1901

The Federation drought of 1895-1902 brought eight years of low rainfall and

had severe impacts on sheep and cattle numbers, particularly in Queensland (Kendall,

2013). As a result, water resource management was one of the most heated topics

debated at the constitutional conventions in the 1890's (Kildea & Williams, 2010).

South Australia was concerned about the maintenance of river flows to support river-

based trade, while Victoria and NSW were keen to further develop water resources


for agricultural and general economic development. These interests are reflected in

the text of s 98 and s 100 the Constitution (Constitution of the Commonwealth of

Australia). Section 98 provides:

"The power of the Parliament to make laws with respect to trade and

commerce extends to navigation and shipping, and to railways the property

of any State."

Section 98 confirms the authority of the Commonwealth's power over river

trade and railways, while Section 100 states:

"The Commonwealth shall not, by any law or regulation of trade or

commerce, abridge the right of a State or of the residents therein to the

reasonable use of the waters of rivers for conservation or irrigation."

Section 100 responds to the concerns of the upstream states and limits the

power of the Commonwealth to interfere with the rights of the states and their

residents from making 'reasonable use' of river waters for irrigation (and s 92

guarantees free trade between the states). Kendall (2013) notes that the meaning of

the word 'reasonable' has been debated ever since. Notably, both provisions are

confined to federal government legislation with regards to trade and commerce

(Twomey, 2007). Section 98 became effectively redundant with the demise of river

trade by 1914 (Kildea & Williams, 2010).

Primary responsibility for water resources thus rests with the states, subject to

any Constitutional interests or Federal legislation. The states also hold primary

responsibility for land use, agriculture, forestry, town planning and floodplains

(Twomey, 2007). However, Kildea and Williams (2010) argue that litigation is likely to

be ongoing feature of water resource management in Australia, as governments seek

to interpret the balance of powers enshrined in the Australian constitution.


Early water resource development

From colonisation in 1788, land was progressively cleared of vegetation for

grazing and cropping, and water access was based on the traditional riparian doctrine

that gave landholders access to adjacent waters, if they didn't impede the rights of

other users (Musgrave, 2008). The riparian doctrine was clearly unsuited to the low

and highly variable flows of Australian rivers, and, in time, was overturned by state

laws.

Technological advances enabled the progressive development of water

resources, particularly in the southern states. Water and land development was led

by governments and resourced from the public purse. Politically, water resource

development was strongly tied to the ethos of regional and rural economic

development (Crase, 2008). Water storages and diversions rapidly expanded.

The need for cooperation between the states was well recognised at the time

of federation and arrangements for the Murray-Darling Basin, whose catchment

crosses four states and one territory (Figure 2) has been a catalyst for national water

policy reform since that time.

The first formal intergovernmental agreement was the River Murray Waters

Agreement, signed by the Australian Government, New South Wales, Victoria and

South Australia in 1915. The agreement established the River Murray Commission to

regulate the main stream of the Murray and water sharing between the three states

through investment in infrastructure, such as locks, weirs and storages (Kendall,

2013).


Figure 2. Location of the Murray-Darling Basin and Great Barrier Reef.

Each state developed slightly different water laws to replace the traditional

riparian doctrine by vesting the bed and banks of watercourses in the crown, rather

than the landholder. There were also significant differences in how water resource

development proceeded across states with the more conservative water allocation

regimes (South Australia and Victoria) encouraging perennial irrigation enterprises

such as orchards and horticulture, while the more liberal water allocation systems in

NSW encouraged annual crops. Water resource development in Queensland

generally developed later, with the first major irrigation scheme established in the

Dawson Valley in 1922. This partly explains the greater appetite for further

contemporary water resource development in Queensland compared to the

southern states (Crase, 2008).

By the 1970's, there were growing concerns about land degradation, irrigation

and in-stream salinity (Kendall, 2013; McKay, 2005). In 1983, the mouth of the River

Murray closed for the first time, raising awareness of the importance of

environmental flows (water required to sustain the environment) (Bunn &


Arthington, 2002). The River Murray Waters Agreement was replaced with the

Murray-Darling Basin Agreement, signed by the Commonwealth and three states

(New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia) in 1987 (and revised in 1992).

Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory joined later (discussed further in

chapter 6).

Council of Australian Government 1994 water reforms

The Council of Australian Governments (COAG), comprising the Prime Minister,

state and territory First Ministers and the President of the Australian Local

Government Association, led national water policy reforms through a series of

reports and agreements in 1994-5. These reforms were driven by the experience of

the Murray-Darling Basin but established national principles for all water resource

development. The COAG reforms were incorporated into National Competition Policy

agreements and supported by the financial power of the Australian Government

(Crase, 2008). The reforms recognised the need to address land and water

degradation, introduced water pricing based on full cost-recovery, established a

system of water entitlements and trade across state boundaries and allocated water

to the environment (House of Representatives, 2011). In 1997, the MDB Ministerial

Council agreed to cap water extractions to 1993-94 levels.

National Water Initiative

The Millennium drought of 1996-2009 put further pressure on water resources,

with shortages across South-eastern Australia and Perth (Kendall, 2013). COAG

agreed to further reform through the establishment of the National Water Initiative

(NWI) in 2003. The NWI was charged with establishing:

a nationally-compatible, market, regulatory and planning based system of

managing surface and groundwater resources for rural and urban use that

optimises economic, social and environmental outcomes. (National Water

Initiative, 2004).

Under the NWI, governments committed to:

• prepare water plans with provision for the environment;

• deal with over-allocated or stressed water systems;


• introduce registers of water rights and standards or water accounting;

• expand the trade in water;

• improve pricing for water storage and delivery; and

• meet and manage urban water demands.

The National Water Commission was established by the National Water

Commission Act (2004) and the Intergovernmental Agreement for the NWI. All states

were required to lodge implementation plans for accreditation under the NWI.

However, the millennium drought intensified in 2006, particularly across the Murray-

Darling Basin and many state capital cities (Kendall, 2013).

National Plan for Water Security

In 2007, Prime Minister John Howard announced a National Plan for Water

Security, which included a commitment of $10 billion and a 10-point plan for

addressing a range of water issues, including irrigation inefficiencies and over

allocation.

Commonwealth Water Act 2007

The Commonwealth Water Act 2007 (Cth) established the Murray-Darling Basin

Authority as a Commonwealth Statutory Authority to provide:

Equitable and sustainable use of the Murray-Darling Basin by governments

and the community including through development and implementation of a

Basin Plan, operation of the River Murray system, shared natural resource

management programs, research, information and advice. (Murray-Darling

Basin Authority (MDBA), 2016a, p. 8)

The Act specifies the content of the Basin Plan, including surface and

groundwater limits, trading rules, and plans for environmental watering as well as

water quality and salinity management.

A Guide to the Basin Plan (Murray–Darling Basin Authority (MDBA), 2010) was

released in 2010, triggering strident outrage from the irrigation industry and a media

frenzy (Crase, 2011). In the fallout to the release of the Guide, the federal Minister

amended the commitment to water buybacks and changes to the leadership of the


Basin Authority ensued (Crase et al., 2011). The first Basin Plan was enacted in 2012,

and implementation of the full suite of Basin Plan steps is currently underway. Further

details are provided in Chapter 7 'Murray-Darling Basin case study'.

State-based water resource planning

The Australian states and territories maintain primary responsibility for water

planning and management. Different jurisdictions employ different planning

approaches, reflecting their distinct statutory foundations. Plans generally cover

catchment areas (singly or collectively) and/or groundwater management areas.

The National Water Initiative established a set of water planning guidelines, and

in 2013 undertook a baseline assessment of water planning (National Water

Commission, 2014). The Commission's report found:

• That most jurisdictions have water plans covering more than 80% of

water use;

• That gaps and inconsistencies remain in the coverage of water

interception activities under water plans, such as the exemptions for the

resources and energy sectors to extract groundwater;

• That more recent water plans have clearer provisions for environmental

water allocation; but

• That monitoring and evaluation arrangements were weak across all

jurisdictions.

In Queensland, for example, the key legislation is the Water Act 2000 (Qld)

which provides for the allocation and management of the state's water resources

through water resource plans and resource operations plans at the catchment level.

Under the Water Act 2000 (Qld) the taking of surface water from a river, lake or

spring, other than for stock and domestic use, requires a water entitlement. The

taking of groundwater or overland flow may also require an entitlement, depending

on the relevant water resource plan. Water resource plans set diversion limits,

facilitate water trading and the management of environmental water.


National Water Quality Management Strategy

The National Water Quality Management Strategy (NWQMS) (Australian and

New Zealand Environment & Conservation Council (ANZECC), 1994) commits to water

quality management based on national guidelines to be implemented at State,

regional and local levels. The Framework for Marine and Estuarine Water Quality

Protection (Australian Government (Aust. Govt.), 2002) extends this process to the

protection of coastal and marine waters from the impacts of land-based pollutants.

Water quality guidelines define desirable ranges and maximum levels for

certain parameters that can be allowed (based on scientific evidence and judgement)

for specific uses of waters or for protection of specific values. They are generally set

at a low level of contamination to offer long-term protection of environmental

values. However, guideline values also reflect the environmental values or beneficial

use determined by community consultation. Environmental values include

ecosystem protection, recreational use, raw drinking water, agricultural, and

industrial uses.

Implementation of the NWQMS is through state-based legislation. In

Queensland, for example, water quality guidelines acquire status through the

Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld). In recent years, the Australian

Government, through the national NRM program, has funded the development of

Water Quality Improvement Plans (WQIPs) for high priority areas, particularly in

urban and Great Barrier Reef catchments. WQIPs identify the main issues impacting

water quality, set water quality targets and prioritise management actions to address

risks, consistent with the NWQMS and the Framework for Marine and Estuarine

Water Quality Protection.

WQIPs may be accredited as Healthy Waters Management Plans under the

Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld). The water quality targets are then used

under the Environmental Protection Regulation 2008 (Qld) for Environmentally

Relevant Activities, such as industry, agriculture, aquaculture, mining, and waste

disposal (Eberhard et al., 2017a).

In Queensland, WQIPs have been developed by regional Natural Resource

Management groups (non-government). The following section explains the


Australian natural resource management system and how regional Natural Resource

Management groups contribute to water policy.

2.2.4 Australian natural resource management

Community-based NRM programs have been widely adopted around the globe

and generally employ a consistent set of principles:

• Seek to address environmental, social and economic dimensions of

decisions; that balance development and conservation objectives;

• Involve some degree of devolution of decision-making to local

communities, leveraging voluntary efforts;

• Commit to participatory decision-making and collaborative approaches;

• Use science and local knowledge;

• Use monitoring and adaptive management approaches to learn and

improve; and

• Link a range of concerns including conservation, social justice, local

economic development, community empowerment and Indigenous

rights (Armitage, 2005; Gruber, 2010).

The Australian approach has evolved through successive five-year funding

cycles (Robins & Kanowski, 2011) with bipartisan support for nearly 30 years. The

genesis of NRM was the Landcare program that engaged networks of local

landholders in cooperative on-ground actions from 1986. The Natural Heritage Trust

(NHT) program commenced in 1996, and in its second phase (2002-2008) 56 regional

NRM organisations (now 55) were established across the country in response to the

perceived need for strategic regional planning and coordination (Ewing, 2003).

Regional NRM groups are statutory in some states, and non-statutory in others

(Pannell et al., 2008). Regional NRM plans were developed that engaged the

community and used 'best available science' to establish regional NRM priorities. In

Queensland, regional NRM plans were endorsed by both state and federal

governments and supported by multi-year funding programs (Dale et al., 2013; Vella

et al., 2015). Despite significant challenges, the regional model had “overwhelming


support” (Keogh et al., 2006, p.6). Since 2008 the national NRM program (Caring for

our Country) has changed significantly, shifting to a competitive service delivery

model to address priorities identified nationally (Aust. Govt., 2012). The reduced

status of regional plans and loss of regional autonomy has been widely critiqued

(Morrison et al., 2010) (Robins & Kanowski, 2011) (Vella et al., 2015).

2.3 POLICY CONTEXT

The following sections outline broad policy trends that have influenced policy

practice in recent decades in Australia and internationally.

2.3.1 Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism has many definitions, but it broadly refers to a political theory of

economic practices that rely on market-based economies, personal freedom, strong

property rights and free trade (Harvey et al., 2014; Jones, 2014). Castree (2010)

describes neoliberalism as both a philosophy, a policy discourse and a set of practical

instruments. As a philosophy, the rights and liberty of the individual have primacy,

and market mechanisms are the best way to meet the needs of the people. As a policy

discourse or program, neoliberalism promotes strategies that establish new property

rights (through privatisation of public or communal assets), the promotion of a

market economy, a reduction in state intervention through deregulation and quasi-

commercialisation of state services, and the promotion of civil society, community

and individual responsibility over reliance on the state (Castree, 2010).

Neoliberalism is an evolving concept, which is always hybridised with the

history, culture and philosophy of the context in which it is deployed (McCarthy,

2006). In Australia, both labour and liberal parties at state and federal levels have

embraced neoliberalism (Pusey, 1991; Robins, 2007). Jessop (2002b) lists the general

economic policies associated with neoliberalism in Australia as:

1. A shift from hierarchical government to more horizontal, networked

arrangements;

2. The dominance of economic paradigms in social and environmental

policy;


3. A shift of policy power to other levels, including upwards to

international fora and downwards to regions, with the engagement of

non-profit organisations as service delivery agents; and

4. The adoption of international policy models, such as new regionalism

(e.g. Bellamy & Brown, 2007; Peterson et al., 2010).

These characteristics are evidenced in environmental and water policy by:

• The adoption of regional models of resource allocation by state

governments, including, for example, regional statutory planning

processes for water and vegetation management (McKay, 2005;

Peterson et al., 2007);

• The adoption of national models of regional NRM and Regional

Development Organisations delivered by regional non-profit

organisations/entities? (Beer et al., 2005; Curtis et al., 2014; Robins,

2007);

• The embrace of market models in water allocation and trading, and

market-based instruments to improve water quality (Bell & Quiggin,

2008; Crase et al., 2013); and

• Widespread environmental de-regulation ('red tape' and 'green tape'

reduction) at both state and federal levels (Middle et al., 2013; Ruming

& Gurran, 2014).

Neoliberalism is firmly anthropocentric and utilitarian, viewing the

environment as a 'resource' and a 'capital asset'. In Australia, the application of

neoliberal policies to Australia's environmental issues is partial and conditional

(Lockwood & Davidson, 2010). In his review of neoliberalism in environmental

management, Castree (2010) concluded that neoliberalism is no panacea for

environmental issues, that environmental markets need to be carefully adapted to

the specific natural resource issue and it's social, cultural, economic and political

context, markets require considerable state intervention and frequently

disadvantage the poor and powerless. The apparent conflict in using neoliberal logics


based on economic rationality to facilitate social and environmental sustainability has

been widely noted (Higgins & Lockie, 2002; Lockie & Higgins, 2007; Robins, 2007)

(Lockwood & Davidson, 2010; McCarthy, 2005).

The adoption of a regional approach to environmental decision-making and the

adoption of market models for some Australian environmental issues is consistent

with neoliberal policy discourses. However, the efficacy of neoliberal approaches to

environmental issues is uncertain and tensions between economic, social and

environmental outcomes are evident (Lockwood & Davidson, 2010) (Lockie & Higgins,

2007).

2.3.2 Regionalisation

Regionalisation refers to the process of decentralising government to the

regional scale as the best scale for implementation. However, several related terms

need to be clarified and the differences understood.

Regionalism refers to a 'bottom-up' or 'grass roots' process whereby regions

strengthen their capacity to manage their own issues (Morrison, 2007; Taylor, 2009).

Founded on political self-identification and / or cultural expression, regionalism may

(or may not) be supported by central government (Bellamy & Brown, 2007). For

example, Taylor has described Local Governments regionalism in WesternAustraliaas'resistance'tostateintervention(threatofamalgamations).

In contrast, regionalisation is a ‘top-down’ form of decentralisation, that takes

one of two forms:

• 'Democratic decentralisation' where power is transferred to regional

communities to make their own decisions, and

• 'Administrative decentralisation' or 'deconcentration' where power is

devolved to central government representatives at the regional level

(Lane et al., 2004b; Taylor, 2009).

Obviously, the values and assumptions underpinning these distinct approaches

are fundamentally different (Campbell, 1996).


Regionalisation has been widely adopted in more than 6o countries (Ribot et

al., 2006) including Australia, where examples include Regional Organisations of

Councils, Regional Forest Agreements, Regional Development Organisations and

Natural Resource Management (NRM) organisations (Lane et al., 2004b). Various

economic, political and organisation benefits are ascribed to regionalisation

(Overman, 2015), including harnessing and empowering the community and civil

society, enhancing democracy, overcoming conflicts and thus reducing the need for

regulation (Jennings & Moore, 2000; Lane et al., 2004b).

The performance of regionalisation strategies is generally mixed and case

specific (Overman, 2015) (Taylor, 2009). Lane (2004a, 2004b) and Berkes (2010)

document risks associated with decentralisation, including:

• Imbalances between regions including the social capital required to

facilitate coordination (Pretty & Ward, 2001);

• Insufficient transfer of power and resources to address new

responsibilities;

• Capture of regional decision-making by elites and marginalisation of

disadvantaged minorities;

• Democratic deficit or lack of democratic accountability;

• Increased complexity and fragmentation of effort; and

• Exacerbation of local conflicts and potential resource overuse.

The distinction between regionalisation and regionalism may be somewhat

academic, however, as regional strategies may, in practice, adopt features of both

models and be shaped to fit institutional setting and policy environment (Overman,

2015; Taylor, 2009).

Bellamy (2007) concludes that NRM organisations are a product of top-down

'regionalisation' rather than bottom-up 'regionalism', while Robins (2007) describes

NRM model as 'regionalism', with power and resources shifting from the state level

to both the federal and regional levels. In his analysis of NRM regionalisation across

3 Australian states, Taylor (2009) identified 3 inherent tensions in the model:


• Tailoring strategies to local conditions versus a central preference for

administrative consistency;

• Empowering local decision-making versus investing in national

priorities; and

• Cooperation within regions versus competition between regions, scales

and actors.

Lane (2004a) argues that the popular support for regional models of

environmental delivery is uncritical, and that regional NRM should not be a surrogate

for regulatory and policy capacity in state and federal governments. Lane (Lane et al.,

2004b) highlights the importance of the states, the risks of public participation

including dominance by local elites, and the lack of definitive performance data.

So, while regionalisation has been a key neoliberal policy strategy, there are

nuances within the spectrum of regionalism to regionalisation that represent

different logics. With NRM and other regional programs, the final form is likely to be

a hybrid of multiple objectives. Evidence of the performance of regionalised models

is mixed, and highly specific to individual contexts (Lane et al., 2004b) (Taylor, 2009).

2.3.3 Public participation in policy-making

Public participation in policy making involves “the direct or indirect

involvement of stakeholders in decision-making about policies, plans or programs in

which they have an interest” (Quick & Bryson, 2016, p. 158). Stakeholders are “any

group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the

organisation's objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p. 46) and, in water resource

management, are generally considered to be non-government actors (Pahl-Wostl et

al., 2007).

Wallis et al. (1999) were the first to suggest that public participation, or

community engagement, in policy and planning, is a response to the failure of

markets or government interventions to deliver solutions to complex policy issues.

Both normative and pragmatic claims are made for the benefits of participation

(Reed, 2008). Normative claims focus on the benefits to democratic society,

citizenship and equity, including:


• Inclusion of marginalised groups;

• Increased public trust in decisions;

• Empowered stakeholders;

• Decisions are perceived as legitimate; and

• Social learning is promoted.

In contrast, pragmatic claims focus on the quality and viability of the resulting

decisions. Pragmatic benefits ascribed to public participation include:

• Interventions can be tailored to local conditions;

• Decisions can be improved by access to new information;

• Local interests and concerns are addressed;

• Participants can move beyond conflict to find new ways of working

together;

• Decisions will be actively supported and implemented; and

• Implementation costs can be reduced (Reed, 2008).

However, public participation involves substantial time and costs (Crase et al.,

2005) and often fails to achieve these goals (Antunes et al., 2009) or even be

counterproductive (Innes & Booher, 2004). There is an extensive literature on

participatory methods and well-established frameworks to align practice with

objectives (see Arnstein, 1969; International Association of Public Participation

(IAP2), 2014; Shand & Arnberg, 1996) but there are many institutional barriers that

constrain the choice of participation and engagement approaches (Brown, 2012; King

et al., 1998; O'Faircheallaigh, 2010). Many researchers call for more authentic

dialogue, ongoing negotiation and deliberative process (Fischer, 2003; Innes &

Booher, 2004; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; King et al., 1998; Rongerude & Sandoval,

2016).

In Australia, participatory processes for environmental policy issues frequently

focus on nongovernment organisations as representatives of a larger constituency,

rather than direct engagement with large numbers of individuals (Head, 2007). These


networks of interest groups are well established, and engaging with representative

bodies enables lower transaction costs for government (Curtain, 2004).

The national Natural Resource Management program is founded on principles

of public participation, adult education and agricultural extension, as well as

neoliberal theories of small government (Curtis et al., 2014). The well documented

changes in national NRM programs over time (see Curtis et al., 2014; Robins &

Kanowski, 2011; Vella et al., 2015) have seen the original intent of empowering

communities shift to one of engaging communities to implement policy strategies

decided by government (Davidson & Lockwood, 2009; Lockwood & Davidson, 2010).

Head (2009 p.19) goes further, suggesting that, despite the rhetoric of devolution and

community empowerment, there is little evidence of trust or power-sharing in the

NRM model and "It is doubtful whether senior public servants have the capacity (or

the permission) to develop trust and to share power with non-government actors".

2.4 COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE AS A RESPONSE TO WICKED PROBLEMS

2.4.1 Water as a wicked problem

'Wicked problems' is a term coined to describe issues that are resistant to

solution because of their inherent complexity and conflicting stakeholder values

(Churchman, 1967; Rittel & Webber, 1973). Wicked problems have many

interdependencies that arise from their complexity and uncertainty, so interventions

may lead to unforeseen consequences. Social and institutional complexity are key

elements of wicked problems, which are often characterised by chronic policy failure

(Australian Public Service, 2007).

Duckett (2016) has condensed and updated Rittel and Weber's (1973) original

10 criteria for defining a wicked problem into six characteristics:

• Indefinable and non-generalisable. Each wicked problem is unique and

stakeholders disagree about how they are defined. This is the

fundamental criteria for wicked problems, from which the following

flow as consequences.

• Ambiguously bounded. Wicked problems are often considered a

symptom of another problem at another scale. Connections across


scales and issues makes it difficult to put boundaries around the

problem.

• Temporally exacting, also called the 'no stopping' rule. Wicked problems

evolve in unpredictable ways, as do the social and institutional systems

that try to address them.

• Repercussive. Attempts to resolve wicked problems are likely to create

other, undesirable side effects. Solutions are confounded by value

conflicts and cultural constraints. No discrete set of possible solutions

can be described.

• Doubly hermeneutic. People's behaviour changes so our interpretation

is always incomplete, and knowledge lags the evolving problem. System

behaviour is complex and unpredictable.

• Morally consequential. Wicked problems create moral dilemmas where

action is demanded, mistakes are unacceptable, and outcomes are likely

to be contested.

Water policy and planning have long been recognised as 'wicked' (Liebman,

1976) (Herman et al., 2015; Reed & Kasprzyk, 2009). The use of modelling and

participatory processes to address uncertainty and resolve stakeholder conflicts are

well established in the water domain (Kwakkel et al., 2016; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2010).

The wicked characteristics of water policy can be readily identified. While water is

commonly managed at the catchment scale, a range of other scales are important,

including individual enterprises and irrigation districts at more local scales,

agricultural industries and ecosystems that span catchments, and global markets and

climate systems. Climate change adds greater uncertainty to the understanding of

complex rainfall, hydrology and water management systems. Stakeholders view

water issues in different ways – for example, as an environmental impact, an

economic risk, cultural values, property rights or local development issue. The science

of human impacts on water and ecosystems is commonly contested. Water quantity

and quality issues involve many discrete elements, but are themselves only part of a

suite of issues affecting ecosystem health and the economic and social viability of


communities. Solutions to water issues frequently involve changing the behaviour of

water users such as farmers, yet farming enterprises have individual goals and many

other drivers that influence management decisions including productivity,

profitability, business, economic and social dimensions. Facilitating sufficient and

timely behaviour change is usually difficult. Major water issues are not commonly

resolved - the state of water resources continues to decline despite prolonged and

substantial policy commitment and public investment.

The need to address water sharing in Australia's Murray-Darling Basin was a

feature of the federation debates in the 1890's (Kildea & Williams, 2010). Yet nearly

130 years later the negotiation of interests between states and between different

water users continues against a backdrop of declining environmental condition.

Other international water case studies show similar long histories of evolving policy

objectives and periodic disruption by internal and external factors such as floods,

droughts, elections, litigation and stakeholder pressure (Eberhard et al., 2017b).

2.4.2 Collaborative governance as good practice for wicked policy problems

The core challenge of wicked problems is managing the complexity and

uncertainty that arises from a multi-scalar, evolving issue, and the intersection

between complex biophysical processes with social and institutional dimensions that

involve different perspectives and the need to negotiate trade-offs to work towards

solutions (Kwakkel et al., 2016). Roberts (2000) identifies three generic strategies

employed for coping with wicked policy problems, each with concomitant risks –

authoritative, competitive and collaborative strategies.

Authoritative strategies delegate the problem solving to a small number of

individuals. This is a problem 'taming' strategy by reducing the number of

stakeholders involved. For it to work, however, other stakeholders need to accept

the authority of those making decisions. Decisions may be perceived as more

objective or professional if delegated to experts. But narrowing the perspectives

brought to the problem may increase the likelihood of a poor understanding of the

problem, partial solutions and constrain opportunities to build learning and

commitment across the wider network of stakeholders.


Competitive strategies allow multiple authorities to develop solutions and

successful solutions are adopted more widely. Competition is embedded in market

economies and can drive technological innovation. One of the advantages of

competitive strategies is that they do not require consensus to proceed, and results

can challenge existing power bases. The disadvantages of competitive strategies are

that competition can consume resources, and if no clear winners emerge issues can

stagnate or erupt in frustration. Examples of long-running water disputes in Florida

and California illustrate the gridlock that can occur when stakeholders have enough

power to block action but not sufficient power to drive change (Dengler, 2007;

Dutterer & Margerum, 2014; Heikkila & Gerlak, 2014; Innes et al., 2010). Competitive

strategies also assume that successful strategies can be assessed in a timely manner

- an ongoing challenge for environmental management.

Collaborative strategies bring parties together to understand problems and

develop solutions. Rather than a 'win-lose' strategy, collaboration seeks 'win-win'

outcomes. The advantages of collaborative strategies include sharing the costs and

benefits, harnessing greater resources and capacity and reducing redundancy and

inefficiency. Disadvantages include the time, transaction costs and skills required to

bring diverse parties into an effective collaboration. Collaborative strategies can, of

course, be unproductive, with stakeholder differences evolving into protracted

conflict or gridlock.

When the problem itself is difficult to define, decision-making processes need

to explore different ways of framing the problem, learning about stakeholder

preferences, testing solutions and negotiating trade-offs (Kwakkel et al., 2016). For

this reason, collaboration is widely promoted in both the academic and practitioner

literature as the most appropriate response to wicked problems (see Agranoff, 2012;

Australian Public Service, 2007; European Commission, 2003; United States

Government Accountability Office, 2014). Margerum (2011) emphasises that the very

nature of environmental policy issues has driven the growing interest in collaboration

- to facilitate the integrated management of complex human and natural systems

that are under increasing pressure.


The following section introduces the concept of governance in its ‘pure’ forms,

before explaining and situating collaborative governance within this broader field.

Pure forms of governance

Governance is defined as “a process of--more or less institutionalized--

interaction between public and/or private entities ultimately aiming at the realization

of collective goals” (Lange et al., 2013, p. 406). More specifically, environmental

governance encapsulates “the system of institutions, including rules, laws,

regulations, policies, and social norms, and organizations involved in governing

environmental resource use and/or protection” (Chaffin et al., 2014, p. 56). So,

governance can be thought of as how the affairs of the state are conducted, how

decisions are made and implemented. The three strategies outlined above represent

three 'pure' forms of governance: hierarchy, markets and networks (Powell, 1990)

that are traditionally associated with the public sector, the private sector and civil

society respectively.

Hierarchies are generally associated with government and bureaucracies.

Formal rules determine behaviour. Structures are vertical. Power is rested in a single

authority but can be delegated downwards or to other actors (van Zeijl-Rozema et

al., 2008). In democracies, accountability rests with government, as elected through

democratic process. The strength of hierarchies lies in the capacity for authoritative

action (Agrawal & Lemos, 2007) and replicating established procedures, but are also

relatively inflexible (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998). In Roberts' (2000) explanation

above, authoritative strategies would typically be associated with hierarchical

governance, that is, traditional, centralised decision-making by government.

In contrast, competitive strategies would typically be associated with market

governance, whose key feature is independent actors making decisions in response

to economic signals (e.g. prices). Markets are considered highly flexible and adaptive

systems (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998) and are often promoted as efficient and

economically rational. At least seven types of market failure are documented (Dollery

& Wallis, 1997) and many of these, including the provision of public goods, the

presence of externalities and incomplete information, are relevant to the supply of

environmental goods and services.


Collaborative strategies are associated with networks that involve both public

and private institutions and members of the community. Networks are driven by the

resource dependencies amongst network members. Structures are horizontal, and

decisions are negotiated on more informal rules, based on trust and relationships

(Kronsell & Bäckstrand, 2010).

In practice, governance in any one policy arena is likely to involve these 'pure'

forms in some combination or hybrid forms (see Agrawal & Lemos, 2007; Arnouts et

al., 2012; Driessen et al., 2012; Hysing, 2009). The adoption of collaborative strategies

by government is known as 'collaborative governance' and is part of a general trend

in the Western democracies to a more decentralised way of governing (Rhodes, 2007)

(discussed further in Chapter 3).

Defining collaborative governance

Collaborative governance in the environmental sphere is a term that has

evolved from three distinct strands of scholarship: ecosystem management,

community-based natural resource management and collaborative public

management (Koontz, 2016). While ecosystem management emphasised a scientific

and experimental approach to complex environmental issues, community-based

NRM included the social dimensions and the importance of stakeholder engagement

and learning (Conley & Moote, 2003; Leach & Pelkey, 2001; Wondolleck & Yaffee,

2000). More recently, collaborative public management brought in a policy

perspective and the use of collaboration between government organisations to solve

policy problems for public goals (Milward & Provan, 2000).

From these origins, collaborative governance has emerged as a concept that is

widely promoted but poorly defined and weakly theorised (O'Leary & Vij, 2012). Early

definitions emphasised organisations working together for mutual benefit (see Gray,

1989; Huxham & Vangen, 2005). Ansell (2008, p. 544) defined collaborative

governance as:

“a governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly



implement public policy or manage public programs or assets”.


Similarly, Emerson (2012, p. 2) defines collaborative governance as

“the processes and structures of public policy decision making and

management that engage people constructive across the boundaries of

public agencies, levels of government and/or the public, private and civic

spheres to carry out a public purpose that could not otherwise be

accomplished”.

Importantly these definitions incorporate the role of government agencies as

initiators, the inclusion of non-government actors, shared decision-making (not just

consultation), formal structures and processes, deliberation and consensus-seeking

for the public policy purpose (Emerson et al., 2012).

Clarifying network terminology

The governance literature has evolved across many different fields and

countries, each with their own evolving linguistic traditions, creating a confusing

array of terminology and conflicting definitions (Blanco et al., 2011; Marsh & Smith,

2000; O'Leary & Vij, 2012). Networks are:

“groups of three or more legally autonomous organizations that work

together to achieve not only their own goals but also a collective goal. Such

networks may be self-initiated, by network members themselves, or may be

mandated or contracted, as is often the case in the public sector” (Provan &

Kenis, 2008, p. 231).

Network governance is thus the set of institutionalised rules, norms etc. that

are applied to a network as a whole, in pursuit of its stated goals.

Policy networks are the more or less stable networks of actors that exist around

a policy area and which interact around that issue (Enroth & Bevir, 2011; Klijn &

Koppenjan, 2000; Klijn et al., 1995). Similarly, governance networks have been

explained by as the “formulation and implementation of public policy increasingly

takes place in and through interactive forms of governance involving a plurality of

public, semi-public and private actors” (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007a, p. 3). Klijn (2008)

argues that the terms governance and governance networks are basically equivalent

in contemporary literature. Blanco et al. (2011) point out that while the terms policy

network and governance network are often used interchangeably, they are derived


from distinct research traditions and have different characteristics. According to

these authors, governance networks have a more optimistic view of networks as a

new policy paradigm that sees a formal shift from hierarchy towards more plural

modes of governing. In contrast, policy networks see networks as a long-standing

feature of governance where informal networks of elite actors seek to influence

policy decisions. Recognising this distinction, for the purposes of this research,

collaborative governance is viewed as aligning with the concept of governance

networks, as it considers the formal processes initiated by government to seek

innovative solutions to intractable policy problems.

Benefits of collaborative governance

Wondolleck and Yaffee (2000, p. 23) summarise the benefits of collaborative

governance as “better decisions that are more likely to be implemented and, at the

same time, better prepare agencies and communities for future challenges”. They go

on to describe the following benefits in more detail:

• Building understanding: Information sharing, learning from the public,

educating the public and managing uncertainty through joint research

and fact finding;

• Making wise decisions and building support for them: solving common

problems, resolving disputes, building concurrence and support;

• Getting work done: coordinating efforts, sharing management

responsibility, mobilising resources; and

• Developing agencies, organisations and communities: building staff

capabilities, developing communities.

Emerson (2012) describes the benefits of collaboration as arising through the

dynamic interaction of principled engagement, shared motivation and capacity for

joint action, which together lead to collaborative actions and impacts (both of which

will depend on the context, but seek to achieve some change to the prior conditions).

This emphasis on intermediate outcomes that occur through the process of

collaboration is common in the collaborative governance literature. Principled

engagement involves open and inclusive participation that brings diverse


perspectives and knowledge (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Innes & Booher, 1999a; Innes &

Booher, 2004) (Leach, 2006) in deliberative processes that share information and

determine the course of action. The benefits of principled engagement include

enhanced trust, conflict management and perceived legitimacy of the decisions

(Agranoff & McGuire, 2004; Bryson et al., 2006; Fung & Wright, 2001). Consensus is

promoted as a decision-making principle (Innes & Booher, 1999a; Innes & Booher,

1999b) and deliberation is valued for its contribution to social capital and trust-

building.

Through principled engagement, participants develop a shared sense of

purpose (Emerson et al., 2012) and commitment to process (Ansell & Gash, 2008).

Emerson (2012, p. 13) describes this as 'a virtuous cycle' where engagement,

motivation and capacity grow in mutually reinforcing ways. Ansell and Gash (2008)

paints a similar picture, with good faith dialogue building trust that leads to

commitment to process and shared understanding that enables intermediate

outcomes and improved dialogue, and so forth. Trust is well recognised as a critical

factor in determining the success of collaborations (Berardo et al., 2014; Klijn et al.,

2016; Leach & Sabatier, 2005a; Selsky & Parker, 2005; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Social

capital built through collaboration can increase acceptance of policy change, reduce

compliance costs and conflict (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Gerlak & Heikkila, 2011)

Principled engagement and a shared sense of purpose enable capacity for joint

action, defined by Emerson (2012) as institutional arrangements, leadership,

knowledge and resources. Institutional arrangements involve both formal and

informal rules and practices (van Popering-Verkerk & van Buuren, 2015). Like trust,

leadership has been widely recognised as an essential element of successful

collaboration (Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Keast et al., 2004; Mandell & Keast, 2009;

McGuire, 2006) and collaboration requires new forms of leadership to work across

organisational boundaries (see Ansell & Gash, 2012). While governments are often

perceived to hold the greatest power (Brisbois & de Loë, 2015), collaborations can

facilitate access to additional knowledge, resources and relationships (Huxham,

2003).


The challenges of implementing collaborative governance

While the reputed benefits of collaborative governance are many, the practice

has proven to be costly, time-consuming and highly uncertain (Huxham et al., 2000;

Margerum, 2011). Huxham (2003) contrasts the potential benefits of 'collaborative

advantage' with the often disappointing reality of 'collaborative inertia', citing five

themes commonly raised by practitioners as significant hurdles to productive

collaboration:

• It is difficult to agree on common aims, negotiating the goals of

individuals, organisations and the collaboration itself.

• Power is often perceived to be a major constraint (Head et al., 2016),

although power may be more dispersed than participants realise, and

centres of power may change over time.

• Trust is important. Collaborators often start from positions of low trust,

but may build sufficient trust to overcome the risks of collaboration.

• Membership structures are frequently ambiguous (about membership,

representation and roles), complex and highly dynamic.

• Leadership structures and processes may be determined by investors,

governments or prior history (rather than purpose) and leadership may

be employed in constructive or obstructive ways.

That many of the features of collaborative governance cited in the previous

section prove to be significant challenges in practice highlights the tensions inherent

in the collaborative model. Provan and Kenis (2008) identify three tensions inherent

in thinking about collaborative governance:

1. Inclusivity versus efficiency - larger groups bring more diverse

knowledge and resources but take more time to build trust and a shared

purpose, while smaller groups may be more efficient but compromise

effectiveness.


2. Internal versus external legitimacy - there may be conflicts between

meeting the needs of participating organisations versus the needs of the

collaborative itself.

3. Flexibility versus stability - one advantage of collaborative governance

is the flexibility of the network, yet organisations require some degree

of stability to sustain engagement.

Unclear or conflicted accountability is frequently raised as an issue with

collaborative governance or governance networks (Folke et al., 2005; Frame et al.,

2004; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000). Hertting (2012) provides

a useful clarification of the multiple accountability perspectives within governance

networks (Table 2.1). Individual participants hold accountability to their own

organisational interests, mutual accountability with other members of the network,

a network accountability to external stakeholders and potentially also an

accountability to the leader or sponsor of the collaboration.

Table 2.1 Accountability perspectives in governance evaluation (from Hertting, 2012)

Network accountability

Internal External

Horizontal Mutual accountability of network members

Accountability to external stakeholders

Vertical Accountability of agents to own organisations

Accountability to external governor

Multiple and potentially conflicting accountabilities are relevant to the

consideration of performance outcomes, which must be prefaced with the question,

'outcomes for who?' (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Given that individuals and organisations

participating in collaborative governance will have their own aims and objectives, as

well as collective aims and objectives, it is not surprising that the assessment of

performance outcomes is a challenge.

Evidence of the performance outcomes of collaborative governance

As Koontz and Thomas (2006) point out, there is considerable confusion about

how to measure the outcomes of collaborative governance and many authors have

called for more effective performance assessment approaches (Ansell & Gash, 2008;


Margerum, 2011; McGuire & Agranoff, 2011; Newig & Fritsch, 2009; Rauschmayer et

al., 2009).

Attempts to evaluate collaborative governance efforts can be grouped

according to those that focus on process, outputs and outcomes. Evaluations that use

process measures such as participation and intermediate outcomes such as trust-

building and social capital are by far the most common approach (Carr et al., 2012;

Koontz & Thomas, 2006; Leach & Sabatier, 2005b; Lubell et al., 2005). Typically, these

are employed in single case studies (Newig & Fritsch, 2009) and many defer to generic

good governance criteria (Rauschmayer et al., 2009) such as 'openness, participation,

accountability, effectiveness and coherence' (European Commission, 2001, p. 8) with

the assumption that these normative principles are indicators of effectiveness.

Carr (2012) and others call for a greater use of intermediate outcomes. With a

focus on collaborative planning, Innes and Booher (1999a) further explore

intermediate outcomes as first, second and third order effects of consensus building

processes (Table 2.2).


Table 2.2 Three orders of intermediate outcomes for collaborative planning (Innes and Booher, 1999).

First order effects Second order effects Third order effects

• Social capital: trust, relationships

• Intellectual capital: mutual understanding, shared problem frames, agreed upon data

• Political capital: ability to work together for agreed ends

• High quality agreements

• Innovative strategies

• New partnerships

• Coordination and joint action

• Joint learning extends into the community

• Implementation of agreements

• Changes in practices

• Changes in perceptions

• New collaborations

• More coevolution, less destructive conflict

• Results on the ground: adaptation of cities, regions, resources, services

• New institutions

• New norms and heuristics

• New discourses

Others have looked at measures of outputs, such as agreements reached,

projects completed, changes to land management practices that are likely to be much

easier to measure (Born & Genskow, 2000; Conley & Moote, 2003; Koontz & Thomas,

2006) (Carr et al., 2012). There is a need to understand more about how process and

policy outputs such as these relate to environmental outcomes (Koontz & Thomas,

2006; Newig & Fritsch, 2009; Rauschmayer et al., 2009).

Very few studies have attempted to link collaborative governance to outcomes

or impacts (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Koontz, 2006 #773}. Emerson (2009, p. 222) defines

outcomes broadly as “beneficial environmental, economic, community/social and

institutional outcomes... (that) contribute to more effective problem solving, conflict

management and governance.” The outcomes sought will vary with the purpose of

the network (McGuire & Agranoff, 2011) and this is one of the factors that confounds

the assessment of generic performance measures. There are many challenges to

evaluating outcomes of collaborative governance, including data availability, the long

time frame required to measure lagged responses, many confounding variables and

the fact that many collaborations seek to influence environmental outcomes only

indirectly e.g. through policy changes (Koontz & Thomas, 2006). Uncertainty and


complexity make it difficult to establish the links between outputs and impacts

(Rauschmayer et al., 2009).

Some studies have attempted to look across large numbers of cases to provide

empirical evidence of the contribution of collaborative governance to environmental

outcomes, including Beierle & Cayford (2002), Chess and Purcell (1999) and Newig

and Fritsch (2009). These studies have yielded associations between process factors

and outputs but have failed to demonstrate other linkages. For example, in their

meta-analysis of 47 North American and European case studies, Newig and Fritsch

(2009) found that the environmental preferences of participants were strong

determinants of outputs and outcomes, and that face to face communication and

highly polycentric systems (many agencies at many levels) were associated with high

performance. Scott (2015) has explored the statistical relationship between

collaborative governance and water quality across 357 US catchments and found that

watershed partnerships were associated with better water quality and in-stream

habitat. Biddle and Koontz (2014) managed to demonstrate links from process

(sustained participation, information sharing and collective documentation) to

outputs (practice change and pollutant reduction goals) and outcomes (goal

achievement) through logic modelling of 26 watershed partnerships.

In summary, whether collaborative governance leads to better environmental

outcomes remains largely unanswered. While there are significant methodological

challenges to achieving this, and many intermediate indicators that offer insights into

collaboration workings, demonstrating performance outcomes is sadly lacking. There

is an argument that the evaluation lens needs to move beyond the specific purpose

of the relevant policy arena to encompass broader measures of public value (Moore,

1995). Rogers and Weber (2010) for example, propose additional governance

outcomes (enhancing agency resources, developing and transferring technology, and

going beyond compliance) as appropriate to the special features of collaborative

versus other governance strategies. Nonetheless, the proponents of collaborative

governance need to be able to demonstrate how collaborative strategies compare

with alternative processes such as authoritative or market-based strategies, and in

which contexts these are most suited (Koontz & Thomas, 2006; Margerum, 2011).


2.5 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Environmental degradation and resource over-allocation are pressing issues

globally. Water resources, fundamental to the health of both natural systems and

human society are at the forefront of efforts to find new ways of negotiating solutions

to critical environmental issues. Complexity and uncertainty in natural and human

systems contribute to evolving policy problems that are characterised by chronic

policy failure, earning their label as 'wicked' problems.

Australia and other western democracies have adopted collaborative strategies

to address uncertainty and engage stakeholders in negotiating solutions.

Collaborative governance describes a suite of practices employed by governments to

engage stakeholders in formal consensus-oriented policy dialogue. Collaborative

governance sits within the suite of policy practices promoted by a neoliberal

philosophy that embraces small government, marketisation, regionalisation, public

participation and engagement (Bevir, 2011; Curtis et al., 2014; Higgins et al., 2012;

Lockwood & Davidson, 2010). Collaborative governance is recommended as good

policy practice for wicked problems (Australian Public Service, 2007; Head et al.,

2016; Kwakkel et al., 2016) and its embrace by environmental policy has been hailed

as a paradigm shift in environmental management (Benson et al., 2013; Bevir, 2008;

Margerum, 2008).

The benefits ascribed to collaborative governance include sharing knowledge

and understanding, building trust, reaching agreement and commitment, cost

efficiencies, shared resources, risks and responsibilities (Ansell & Gash, 2008;

Margerum, 2011). Many challenges to implementing collaborative governance are

documented (Huxham et al., 2000), including power imbalances, participation and

capacity (Head et al., 2016) and accountability issues (Frame et al., 2004; Wondolleck

& Yaffee, 2000). Performance is mostly frequently judged against normative criteria

compiled for single case studies (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Koontz & Thomas, 2006;

Margerum, 2011). Acknowledging the unique characteristics and objectives of

individual cases, evidence that collaborative governance is effective at achieving

environmental outcomes, or how it compares to authoritative or market-based

strategies, is clearly lacking.


There is clearly a gap between “theoretical expectations and effective practice”

(Keast & Mandell, 2012, p. 11,). Yet, cross-sectoral collaboration continues to

proliferate in public policy because organisations are trying to achieve something

they cannot achieve in isolation (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Collaborative governance is

a complex phenomenon, and whether it can deliver improved environmental

outcomes remains unanswered. As a complex phenomenon, collaborative

governance requires a systems perspective to understand the dynamic interaction

between its many facets (Bryson et al., 2015). This research aims to bring a

theoretically informed perspective to the practice of collaborative governance in

Australian water policy to better understand the potential contribution of

collaborative governance to water policy outcomes and the factors that constrain or

enable collaborative governance performance.

Chapter 3: Theoretical foundations 49

Chapter 3: Theoretical foundations

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Chapter 2 introduced collaborative governance as an approach to engage

stakeholders in policy decision-making for 'wicked' problems characterised by

chronic policy failure. While scholars and practitioners espouse the benefits of this

approach, a lack of evidence of performance outcomes highlights the challenges that

lie between intent and implementation. In this chapter, the theoretical foundations

of collaborative governance are explored, starting with understanding governance as

the relationship between government and society, with the market, state and

hierarchy as pure, idealised forms of governance (Powell, 1990). In practice,

governance is more complicated than this, in a variety of hybrid forms, and cross-

scale dimensions are described as multi-level and polycentric (Bache et al., 2016, p.

487; Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Hooghe & Marks, 2001).

Governance is a dynamic process, facilitating policy change in response to

changing contexts and emerging issues. The policy cycle is introduced and the major

frameworks for policy change (particularly Ostrom's (1971) Institutional Analysis and

Development Framework and Sabatier's (1988) Advocacy Coalition Framework are

briefly outlined (section 3.6). The utility of, and relevance of these theoretical and

analytical frameworks are challenged on three grounds. First, governance in practice

is never a pure form, so the hybridised model is problematic from an analytical

viewpoint. Second, the analytical frameworks are siloed in nature, fitting the scales,

objectives and research traditions in which they were derived. Thirdly, the dynamics

of governance practice - multi-level, evolving over time and frequently disrupted,

challenge analysis at any single scale or point in time. For these reasons, theoretical

concepts that explore the complex relationships of government and non-government

actors in more detail are examined.


Amongst the confusing terminology arising from the parallel evolution of

different governance research traditions, collaborative governance is identified as

network governance (section 3.7). Networks are groups of self-regulating,

interdependent actors that work towards a collective goal, with governance referring

to the set of rules, norms and practices that steer that process (Provan et al., 2007,

p. 231). Governance networks are used by governments to facilitate network

contributions to public policy (Blanco et al., 2011), consistent with the earlier

definitions of collaborative governance.

The long-standing academic debate about the impact of a shift from

hierarchical to networked governance on the authority of the state is acknowledged

(e.g. Rhodes, 1994). Yet evidence suggests that governments remain a central actor

in governance network arrangements (Kooiman, 2003b). Metagovernance (Jessop,

1997a) refers to the “governance of governance” (Meuleman, 2008a, p. 66) and

describes how governments seek to manage the multiple forms of governance that

they both employ and participate within (section 3.8). Governmentality theory

(Foucault, 1991b) views governance as an emergent process arising from the

interaction of the rationales and practices of government and stakeholders, with

power and knowledge being critical dimensions. Governmentality theory provides a

focus on the how and why governments and stakeholder organisations engage in

collaborative governance.

The chapter concludes with the theoretical framework articulated for this

research - using governmentality theory to examine the rationales and practices of

governments in the metagovernance of water policy networks in Australia (section

3.9).

3.2 DEFINING GOVERNANCE

The term governance covers a wide range of meanings and applications

(Colebatch, 2014). Broadly, it refers to how the affairs of the state are conducted -

how decisions are made and implemented. A point of confusion arises because, in

some cases, the term governance is used to describe all modes of governing, while in

other contexts it is used to describe a mode of governing, in which the authority of


the sovereign state is diminished (Colebatch, 2014). The former is associated with

international development, corporate oversight and political systems, whereas the

latter is applied in public administration, policy studies and political science (Kjaer,

2004). In the latter tradition, the key feature is that governance represents a style of

governing associated with networks of non-government actors that contribute to

policy making decisions and implementation. In his seminal work 'Understanding

governance' Rhodes (1997, p. 53) defines governance as governing through networks

that involve:

1. Interdependence between state and non-state organisations (public,

private and civil society);

2. Continuing interactions between network members involving exchange

of resources and negotiation of purpose;

3. Game-like interactions, involving trust and rules of behaviour; and

4. Self-organising, that is, a degree of autonomy from the state.

Kooiman (2003b) takes this concept further, recognising that governance is the

net result of a range of governing actions taken by various actors (public and private),

at different levels, in different modes and orders.

In these definitions, governance is seen as a new form of governing, that is

more decentralised (Rhodes, 2007) and reflexive (Beck, 1992) in response to changing

risks and neoliberalisation trends. This perceived trend is often referred to as a shift

from government to governance. Others (e.g. Colebatch, 2014) argue that it is not the

engagement of non-state actors in the policy process that is new, rather, it is the

recognition and account of that in the governing process, that is new. Whether the

shift from 'government to governance' diminishes the power of the state has been

an ongoing academic debate (Kooiman, 2003b; Pierre & Peters, 2005; Rhodes, 2007)

that will be canvassed in following sections.

In summary, governance, as applied here, refers to the interactions of public

and private actors at various scales or levels that collectively steer society. The

following section describes a spectrum of governance models that illustrates, at a


broad level, the way governments (as the formalisation of the 'the state') relate to

society.

3.3 GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY

Pierre and Peters (2005) describe five typologies of governance that represent

a spectrum of state authority and capacity, and an (inverse) spectrum of relationship

to society and information base (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Five models of governance (from Pierre and Peters, 2005

At one end of the spectrum is the 'E'tatiste' (statist) model. The state manages

a large bureaucracy, and is the major social and economic actor. The state largely

implements its own policies and does not engage others. The state is strong and

capable, but may be blind to information feedback. Dominated by the political elite,

this model is typified by Singapore, Taiwan and France.

The next stage of the spectrum is 'liberal-democratic' where the state is the

principal actor and others compete to influence the state (the state chooses who to

engage with). There is a strong commitment to representative democracy. Some

interests may be very influential. Policy coherence may be challenged by the diverse

influences of external actors. Delivery is largely through third parties and regulatory

instruments. The state is better connected to society, but feedback may be biased as

it is received through limited channels and accountability may be unclear.

In the 'state-centric' model the state is central but institutionalises its

relationships with other actors. It appears more democratic, but still has the capacity

to manipulate access to policy fora. Organised interests build policy skills and trade

off autonomy for inclusion and influence. Decision-making processes may be slow


due to stakeholder engagement, but delivery is often efficient as disagreements are

resolved at the policy development stage. Accountability is unclear. Scandinavian

countries and Japan typify this model.

The 'Dutch governance' school is typified by Dutch politics. Engagement with

policy networks and public-private partnerships are a feature. The state may be the

most powerful actor, but 'steers at a distance' and involves a wide network in both

policy development and implementation. The model is highly flexible, but networks

can be conservative if dominated by particular interests. Effective management

requires a high degree of organisational capacity. Information feedback may be

problematic because the extensive networks make information diffuse.

The final model in the spectrum is 'governance without government' where

governance occurs through self-governing networks of private actors. The role of

government is relatively unimportant. Governance of individual sectors can be strong

if the network is coherent (albeit self-interested). Political accountability is confused.

This typology of forms of governance is a useful starting point for considering

the diversity of governance arrangements. Rather than speculate where Australia

might sit on this spectrum, it is perhaps more useful to recognise the diversity of

practice that is likely to exist for any one government, and the variations that occur

when major changes of government occur. Pierre and Peters' (2005) typology

highlights the implications that flow from different styles of social engagement in

policy-making and delivery: the authority and capacity of the state; the speed and

coherence of policy decisions; the influence of stakeholders; access to information

and public accountability.

3.4 PURE FORMS OF GOVERNANCE

Efforts to differentiate different modes of governing start with the 'pure' forms of governance: markets, hierarchies and networks, traditionally associated with the private sector, public sector and civil society respectively (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998; Thompson et al., 1991; Williamson, 1985).


Table 3.1 below summarises the key differences between the pure forms of

governance.

The key feature of market-based governance is independent self-organisation.

In response to economic signals (e.g. prices), actors make independent decisions.

Markets are considered highly flexible and adaptive systems (Lowndes & Skelcher,

1998) and are often promoted as efficient and economically rational. Cooperation

between actors may be limited by the competitive environment, and any

collaboration is generally driven by self-interest. Disputes may be settled by the

courts.

Hierarchies are generally associated with government and bureaucracies.

Formal rules determine behaviour. Structures are vertical. Power is rested in a single

authority but can be delegated downwards or to other actors (van Zeijl-Rozema et

al., 2008). In democracies, accountability rests with government, as elected through

democratic process. Hierarchies are good for replicating established procedures, but

are also relatively inflexible (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998). The strength of hierarchies

lies in the capacity for authoritative action (Agrawal & Lemos, 2007).

Networks are based on interdependencies between actors and can involve both

public and private institutions and members of the community. Trust, loyalty and

reciprocity enable collaboration (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998). Structures are

horizontal, and decisions are negotiated through informal rules, with reputational

risks being an important factor (Kronsell & Bäckstrand, 2010). Networks can be

unstable, relying on behavioural norms to guide behaviour.


Table 3.1 Characteristics of market, hierarchy and network modes of governance (Lowndes &

Sketcher, 1998)

Characteristics Market Hierarchy Network

Normative basis Contract – Property rights

Employment relationship

Complementary strengths

Means of communication

Prices Routines Relational

Methods of conflict resolution

Haggling – Resort to courts

Administrative fiat – supervision

Norm of reciprocity – reputational concerns

Degree of flexibility High Low Medium Level of commitment among parties

Low Medium High

Tone or climate Precision and / or suspicion

Formal, bureaucratic Open-ended, mutual benefits

Actor preferences or choices

Independent Dependent Interdependent

Broadly, governance, as defined by Rhodes (2007) and Kooiman (2003a), is

likely to involve all of these 'pure' forms in some combination. As the name suggests,

hybrid forms of governance sit on the boundary between two or more of the pure

forms described above.

Several authors have categorised hybrid forms of governance that bridge these three modes (


Table 3.2). While the categories identified appear similar, the classifications

reflect different rationales, so are not directly equivalent. While the following

examples are drawn from the environmental governance literature, these

characteristics are not exclusive to this domain (Bello et al., 1997; Makadok & Coff,

2009; Oliver & Anderson, 1995).


Table 3.2 Hybrid governance modes.

Author (date) Context Hybrid modes of governance identified

Agrawal & Lemos (2007)

Global environ-mental trends

Co-manage-ment

Public-private partnership

Public-social partnership

Multi-party governance

Arnouts et al. (2012)

Shifts in Dutch nature policy

Hierarchical

Closed co-governance

Open co-governance

Self-governance

Driessen et al. (2007)

Sustainability policies in the Netherlands

Centralised De-centralised

Public-private governance

Interactive governance

Self-governance

Hysing (2009)

Swedish forestry & transport

Hierarchical

Public-private relations

Facilitated networks

Multi-level governance

Self-governance

Agrawal and Lemos (2007) rationalise hybrid forms of environmental

governance as the combining the benefits of two or more forms of governance

(Figure 4). Government partners with communities (co-governance) to bring local

knowledge and community values to the decision-making process. Social-private

partnerships leverage financial and other resources from businesses and offer social

legitimisation from non-government organisations and/or communities. Public-

private partnerships blend the authority of state agencies with the market

efficiencies of businesses. Finally, multi-party governance, common in natural

resources, incorporates all three sectors, with the state providing critical authority

(Agrawal & Lemos, 2007).


Figure 4. Multi-partner governance (from Agrawal & Lemos, 2007)

Arnouts (2012) expands the governance modes described by Kooiman

(2003b) by splitting co-governance into closed and open forms, depending on the

number of non-government stakeholders involved and the ease of access to policy

fora. The four typologies are characterised by the actors (government and non-

governmental), relational power distribution and rules of access and responsibility

(Table 3.3).


Table 3.3 Four ideal-typical governance modes (from Arnouts et al. 2012).

Hierarchical Closed co-governance

Open co-governance Self-governance

Actors Mainly governmental actors

Selected mixed group of actors

Large mixed group of actors

Mainly non-governmental

Power With government Pooled Diffused With non-government

Rules Governmental coercion

Restricted cooperation

Flexible cooperation

Non-governmental forerunning

The resulting spectrum bears some resemblance to that of Pierre and Peters

(2005) outlined earlier. Hierarchical and closed co-governance would fit old styles of

governance, while open co-governance and self-governance would fit within new

styles of governance (Osborne, 2006; Rhodes, 1996). Engagement shifts across the

spectrum from an internal focus within government, to a widening sphere of non-

government actors. At the same time, power is increasingly shared, and delivery

facilitated through non-government agents. Rules are increasingly negotiable and

devolved.

Arnouts et al. (2012) developed the framework to understand changes to

governance modes in a longitudinal study of Dutch nature policy. They identify three

external change factors (shock events, socio-political trends and adjacent policy

arrangements) and one internal change factor (policy entrepreneurs) that triggered

governance changes. Interestingly, when this framework was tested on Dutch nature

policy, a shift from 'new' to 'old' governance modes was revealed.

Similarly, Driessen et al. (2012) identified five ideal-typical governance modes

to assist with analysing shifts in Dutch environmental governance. Centralised and

decentralised governance both involve the public sector as the sole or main

protagonist. Decentralised governance involves delegation of authority to lower

levels or scales. In both cases, the market and civil society are the recipients of

government policy. Public-private governance is when government gives the private

sector a privileged role. Interactive governance involves a wider and more equitable

engagement with market and civil society stakeholders, although boundaries are still


set by government. Finally, self-governance refers to private actors facilitating

change, albeit against a background of government regulation.

While this version of hybrid governance modes appears like those cited earlier

- the paper provides additional detail by characterising each mode according to

eleven features (Table 3.4).

This provides a more nuanced understanding of how these governance

archetypes perform. This approach provides a more explicit recognition of the policy

function - identifying the policy level engaged and the policy instruments applicable.

The framework also characterises the power base of the different governance models

(coercion, authority, legitimacy, competition, contractual, autonomy).

Table 3.4 Features of hybrid governance (from Arnouts et al. 2012)

Class of features Characteristics

Actor features Initiating actors Position of other stakeholders Predominant policy level

Institutional features

Formal and/or informal basis of power Model of representation Rules of exchange and interaction Mechanisms of social interaction

Policy content features

Goals Policy instruments Type of knowledge Degree of policy integration

Hysing (2009) articulated five governance modes based on governing

instruments and styles, the relationship between public and private actors and policy

levels (Table 3.5). Governing instruments and styles cover a spectrum from traditional

'hard' instruments such as regulation, through incentive-based instruments such as

taxes and grants to information and new environmental instruments such as eco-

labelling. In common with the earlier frameworks, the shift to governance is

characterised by a blurring of roles as network approaches based on resource

interdependency and trust replace monocentric, hierarchical political institutions.

The frameworks outlined above (Agrawal & Lemos, 2007; Arnouts et al., 2012;

Driessen et al., 2012) describe the ways that a state that may choose or allow

collaborative or self-governance. In contrast, Hysing (2009) identifies several ways


that state policy intentions can be actively undermined by networks at either the

subnational or international level. Actors in multi-level governance arrangements

may act independently and be able to circumvent the national policy level (Hooghe

& Marks, 2001). Global rules and standards may also bypass state authority (Kjaer,

2004).

Table 3.5 Governance modes from government to governance (from Hysing, 2009)

Dimensions State Intervention <--------------------------------------> Societal autonomy

Governing instruments and styles

Command and control

(legal sanctions)

Incentive-based instruments (taxes and

grants)

Delegated public functions

Information instruments

Voluntary instruments (agreements

and labelling)

Public-private

relationships

Hierarchic relationship

Institutional- ised public-

private relations (state

domination)

Facilitation and enabling of networks

Mutual dependency of

networks between

private and public actors

Private self-governing

Policy levels National

state governing

Delegation of authority and

responsibility to other levels

Gatekeeping (governing in

implementation)

Multilevel governance

(circumventing the national

level)

Governing by a global civil society

Hysing (2009) tested the governance modes in an analysis of Swedish forestry

and transport policy. Like other authors (Agrawal & Lemos, 2007; Arnouts et al., 2012;

Arts & Leroy, 2006; Driessen et al., 2012; Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998), he found that

the narrative of progression from government to governance, or from old to new

forms of governance did not stand up to scrutiny. These studies found that

governance shifts occurred in both directions, or that some elements shifted

independently of others. A common report is that multiple forms of governance

operate simultaneously in the same policy space. Environmental governance is

particularly prone to multiple concurrent governance modes because of its

complexity of actors, instruments and policy discourses (van Tatenhove et al., 2000).

While these frameworks are useful in understanding different modes of governance

and the implications in terms of roles, power, and knowledge, they should not be

taken to represent a discrete style of operating. In practice, governments will tend to


select a range of approaches that fit within a spectrum, and multiple forms are likely

to co-exist. Governance is a dynamic and evolving process.

3.5 MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE

The complexity of contemporary western governance is further highlighted by

the concepts of multi-level and polycentric governance. Multi-level governance was

originally developed to describe EU policy arrangements, and refers, more generally,

to both vertical interactions between governments operating at different levels (up

to supranational and down to regional and sub-regional levels), and greater

horizontal interactions between governments and non-government actors (Bache et

al., 2016). Hooghe and Marks (2001) further distinguished type 1 multi-level

governance systems where authority is dispersed to 'a limited number of clearly

defined, non-overlapping jurisdictions at a limited number of territorial levels' (Bache

et al., 2016, p. 487). Type I is typified by federalism, where authority is shared by

governments operating at different levels, or scales (Hooghe & Marks, 2001). In

contrast, type 2 multi-level governance systems involve many more specialised

jurisdictions with overlapping responsibilities operating in a more flexible, non-tiered

system. Frey and Eichenberger (1996) describe these units as “functional,

overlapping and competing jurisdictions”, while Ostrom et al. (1961; 2010a) use the

term 'polycentricity' or 'polycentric governance' to describe many formally

independent, public and private centres of decision-making that collectively result in

governance decisions.

3.6 FRAMEWORKS OF POLICY CHANGE

Governance is a dynamic process, facilitating policy change in response

responding to changing contexts and emerging issues. The complexity of policy

process is often explained as a series of stages (Lester & Goggin, 1998) or phases,

typically:

• Agenda setting: recognition and prioritisation of the issue;

• Policy formulation: canvassing options and selecting strategies;

• Policy implementation: policy administration and delivery; and


• Monitoring and evaluation.

This model has been roundly criticised for its gross simplification (Nakamura,

1987; Sabatier, 2007). In reality, policy processes are far from hierarchical, linear and

single issue. The policy cycle (Figure 5) described by Althaus at al. (2013) emphasises

that policy making is an iterative process whereby a complex problem is

desegregated into a set of related steps. Both policy models seek to illustrate how

the practice of policy occurs, as an instrument of governance (and governmentality,

explored further in section 3.8.2).

Figure 5. The Australian policy cycle (Althaus et al. 2013)

Frameworks of policy change seek to move beyond these simplistic

representations of policy process to represent the policy process as a one of dynamic

negotiation. The major frameworks described here are the advocacy coalition

framework, punctuated equilibrium, multiple streams framework and the

institutional analysis and development framework. These four frameworks vary in

their treatment of boundaries and scope, model of the individual, collective action,

institutions and policy change (Schlager, 2007).

All four frameworks apply bounded rationality to explain the behaviour of

individuals that contribute to the patterns of policy change that arise from collective

behaviour (Ostrom et al., 2014; Schlager, 2007). Bounded rationality is a behavioural


theory developed by Simon (1957), that describes how people can only devote their

conscious attention to one thing at a time - so decisions are made only within the

bounds of the problem under consideration. Institutions, on the other hand, can

handle multiple issues by either processing them in parallel (through discrete policy

sub-systems) or in series. Each sub-system involves a community of experts ('iron

triangles' of established stakeholders including policy makers, administrators,

interest groups, scientists etc.), and proceeds with incremental decisions based on

bargaining amongst interests (True et al., 2007). Each of the policy change

frameworks described in the following section are grounded in bounded rationality,

with different emphases.

3.6.1 The Institutional Analysis and Development framework (IAD)

The IAD framework has supported important theoretical contributions to the

study of common-pool resources since it was first developed by Vincent and Elinor

Ostrom in the 1980’s (Ostrom, 2011). The framework describes how individuals

behave in collective action settings and how institutions influence that behaviour.

Institutions are here defined as a set of shared concepts (tacit knowledge) that guide

people in systematic interactions. Institutions can thus refer to both organisations

and sets of rules, such as markets, companies, clubs, families and governments

(Ostrom, 2007).

At the core of the IAD is the action arena (Figure 6), which is a social space in

which individuals interact. An action arena contains both an action situation and

actors. The variables used to describe and predict actions and results are the set of

participants, their positions, allowable actions, potential outcomes, the level of

control over choice and the information available to individual actors and the costs

and benefits of actions and outcomes (Ostrom et al., 2014).


Figure 6. The institutional analysis and development framework (from Ostrom, 2014)

Theories of behaviour are then used to explain the choices actors make.

Economic theories apply when knowledge is freely available, and actors maximise

utility, but in many natural resource contexts this is not the case, and bounded

rationality is more appropriate. Empirical studies have demonstrated the predictive

capacity of the IAD in open-access, common-pool resources, but more complex

responses emerge in more constrained contexts (Ostrom et al., 2014). Outcomes can

be evaluated against criteria including economic efficiency, measures of equity,

accountability, morality and adaptability. Trade-offs must be made among these

criteria, such as between efficiency and redistribution equity (individuals capacity to

pay).

Action situations are themselves constrained by another set of variables that

include the physical and material nature of the resource, community attributes and

the operating rules (institutions). Rules can be both formal and tacit, and achieve

order and predictability by creating roles that are then required, permitted or

forbidden to take certain actions in relation to various states (Ostrom, 2007). The

IAD framework classifies rules according to their impacts on the elements of an action

situation (Figure 7).


Figure 7. Rules classified according to their impact on IAD action situations (from Ostrom, 2005)

Entry and exit rules determine who participates, and how they can enter and

leave the action arena. Position rules establish roles. Authority rules assign sets of

actions that actors may or may not take. Scope rules define acceptable outcomes and

therefore actions. Aggregation rules determine the level of control an actor may

exercise in acting. Information rules link knowledge to action. Payoff rules distribute

benefits and costs, and therefore incentives or deterrents for action. Rules are

interdependent, and are not necessarily written or explicit.

Physical and material conditions include attributes of the resource that affect

the incentives of actors and how rules are enacted. Characteristics such as mobility,

storage, access, consumption and time lags can all be key determinants of system

behaviour. Important community attributes include norms of behaviour, levels of

understanding, homogeneity of preferences, resource distribution and other cultural

dimensions.

A key feature of the IAD is its recognition that action arenas are typically

multiple and can be nested, and that multiple, interacting levels of rules exist. A

hierarchy of rules and 'meta-rules' starts with operational rules that determine day-

to-day decision-making of actors, collective-choice rules that affect operational rules

and constitutional-choice rules that affect collective-choice rules.


The Socio-Ecological Systems Framework (SES) is an extension of the IAD with

similar content but a stronger emphasis on the biophysical and governance aspects

(Ostrom et al., 2014). The SES approach is less developed than IAD (Ostrom et al.,

2014). with ambiguity and lack of clear guidance limiting comparability of results

(compared to the IAD which is better established). Nonetheless, with further

development SES should be able to support more rigorous comparison and

integration of learnings from natural resource governance (Ostrom et al., 2014;

Poteete & Ostrom, 2008).

While the IAD and SES provide high-level frameworks to describe and diagnose

collective action systems, the next two frameworks conceptualise and explain some

of the dynamics of policy making, with longer periods of stasis interrupted by bursts

of bursts of policy change.

3.6.2 Multiple-streams framework

The multiple streams framework (Kingdon & Thurber, 1984) was built on an

application of the garbage can model of public decision-making (Koppenjan & Klijn,

2004a). The garbage can model (Cohen et al., 1972) explains seemingly irrational

decision-making by disconnecting problems, solutions and decision-makers.

Decisions arise from a fortuitous alignment of decision-makers, problems and

solutions (what happens to be 'in the garbage can' that day). The multiple streams

framework adapts this to the policy environment by describing the progression of

distinct policy streams - problems, solutions and political events. 'Policy windows' or

opportunities for policy decisions occur when streams are linked. Policy

entrepreneurs can facilitate this. Couplings are temporary, and partial couplings

(coupling of two of the three streams) may create partial solutions. The multiple

streams framework emphasises the parallel development and ongoing shifts in policy

development. It explains why delaying tactics may be effective at blocking policy

change (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004b).

3.6.3 Punctuated-equilibrium framework

The punctuated equilibrium framework (Baumgartner & Jones, 2010) was

originally developed to explain changes in U.S. legislation but has been applied more


generally to policy change (Sabatier, 2007). The framework describes patterns of

politics and policy that are typified by long periods of incremental change interrupted

by short periods of significant change (and was previously used to describe similar

patterns in evolutionary biology [Jay Gould & Eldredge, 1993]). This pattern is

explained by the interaction between multi-level political institutions and decision-

making behaviour. Bounded rationality explains policy stasis that persists until

political conflict shifts the debate out of the established policy subsystem to other

venues. This shift is associated with the engagement of new political actors and

governmental institutions and reframing of the issue, and potential rearrangement

of rules and balances of power (Baumgartner & Jones, 2010).

3.6.4 The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF)

The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993)

focuses on long-term (>10 year) policy change within a policy subsystem

characterised by value disagreements and technical debates. Change is explained by

the interaction of advocacy coalitions and external shocks (Figure 8). Advocacy

coalitions are groups of policy actors that share a set of beliefs. Beliefs are generally

stable and difficult to change (particularly in mature policy subsystems with

established coalitions). Policy learning happens as knowledge is negotiated.

Coalitions interpret information differently, and technical information is often

politicised.

Subsystems are complicated by overlapping and nested subsystems. Most

policy making occurs within subsystems through negotiation amongst specialists.

Policy designs are interpreted as coalition beliefs (Weible et al., 2009).

Coalition behaviour can be affected by two sets of external variables. Relatively

stable parameters include the basic attributes of the issue, the socio-cultural and

constitutional context. They provide the resources and constraints of the policy

subsystem, and rarely change. Dynamic external factors include changes to socio-

economic conditions, political shifts and impacts from other policy subsystems.

Changes in these external factors provide a necessary (but not sufficient) impetus for

major policy change (Sabatier & Weible, 2007).


Figure 8. The advocacy coalition framework (from Sabatier, 2007)

The framework identifies four paths to major policy change: policy-oriented

learning, external shocks, internal shocks and a hurting stalemate (an intolerable

stalemate) (Sabatier, 2007). The framework explores policy subsystems and belief

systems in detail. The ACF is considered one of the more useful public policy

frameworks, and has been subject to substantial theoretical development and

empirical testing (Schlager & Blomquist, 1996). Emerging areas of advocacy coalition

scholarship include further theory testing within the framework (e.g. coalition

structure and stability), comparative public policy research, revisiting policy learning

and coalition resources (Weible et al., 2011).

The four analytical frameworks presented above have been developed to fit the

scales, objectives and research traditions in which they were derived. The IAD

framework, for example, focusses on citizen self-governance of common-pool

resources - the individual is clearly the focus (Schlager, 2007). The ACF (which itself


draws on punctuated equilibrium and multiple streams frameworks) focusses on

coalitions of like-minded actors that can facilitate long-term policy change. So, while

the policy change frameworks provide useful background to the understanding of

collaborative governance processes, they are not a good 'fit' to the research

questions of this thesis, that seek to explore the details and performance of

collaborative governance practice.

3.7 COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE AS NETWORK GOVERNANCE

Collaborative governance was introduced in Chapter 2 as 'the processes and

structures of public policy decision making and management that engage people

constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels of government and/or

the public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a public purpose that could

not otherwise be accomplished' (Emerson et al., 2012, p. 2). Ansell and Gash (2008,

p. 544) are more specific, defining collaborative governance as:

“A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly



implement public policy or manage public programs or assets.”

The previous sections have introduced the foundational concepts for

governance theory, starting with the broad concept of governance referring to

governments and society collectively navigating decisions towards some agreed

goals. While there is debate about the 'newness' of non-state actors having a

significant role, and the degree to which engagement with society diminishes the

power of the state, there is broad agreement that there is a spectrum of governance

styles that differ in the degree of centralisation of decision-making within the state,

and engagement of societal actors. The pure forms of hierarchy, market and network

governance are recognised as insufficient to describe the reality that encompasses

multiple, hybrid forms of governance operating and interacting at different scales.

The governance literature has evolved across many different fields and

countries, each with their own linguistic traditions, creating a confusing array of

terminology and conflicting definitions (Blanco et al., 2011; Marsh & Smith, 2000;


O'Leary & Vij, 2012). Collaborative governance is a popular normative concept widely

employed in environmental governance worldwide (Scott, 2015). In comparison,

network governance is an academic term, arguably equivalent to collaborative

governance. Networks are:

“groups of three or more legally autonomous organizations that work

together to achieve not only their own goals but also a collective goal. Such

networks may be self-initiated, by network members themselves, or may be

mandated or contracted, as is often the case in the public sector” (Provan et

al., 2007, p. 231).

Network governance is thus the set of institutionalised rules, norms etc. that

are applied to a network as a whole, in pursuit of its stated goals.

The terminology of governance and policy networks can be confusing, with

some authors arguing for their equivalence while others disagree. Policy networks

are the more or less stable networks of actors that exist around a policy area and

which interact around that issue (Enroth & Bevir, 2011; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Klijn

et al., 1995). Similarly, governance networks have been defined as the “a plurality of

public, semi-public and private actor” that formulate and implement public policy

through interactive governance (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007a, p. 3). Klijn (2008) argues

that the terms governance and governance networks are basically equivalent in

contemporary literature. Blanco et al. (2011) point out that while the terms policy

network and governance network are often used interchangeably, they are derived

from distinct research traditions and have different characteristics. According to

these authors, governance networks have a more optimistic view of networks as a

new policy paradigm that sees a formal shift from hierarchy towards more plural

modes of governing. In contrast, policy networks see networks as a long-standing

feature of governance where informal networks of elite actors seek to influence

policy decisions. Recognising this distinction, for the purposes of this research,

collaborative governance is viewed as aligning with the concept of governance

networks, as it considers the formal processes initiated by government to seek

innovative solutions to intractable policy problems.


For this research, governance networks are defined as relatively stable groups

of interdependent but autonomous actors; that interact through negotiations within

an institutionalised framework within limits set by external agencies for public

purpose (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007a). Actors are independent but related, and share

a stake in policy issues. Interdependence does not infer equality of power or

resources, however (Mayntz, 1993). Within the network, interactions include

dialogue and deliberation but also bargaining and negotiation. Agreement is often a

rough consensus within which elements of disagreement persist (Sørensen & Torfing,

2007a). The network operates within a framework that includes formal rules and

procedures, but also normative, cognitive and imaginary aspects such as values,

codes, identities and hopes (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007a). Self-regulation of network

behaviour is negotiated among members, but within a political and institutional

context that shapes and constrains this behaviour (Scharpf, 1994; Sørensen & Torfing,

2007a).

3.8 METAGOVERNANCE

The previous section related collaborative governance to network governance,

where the central argument is that policy is the result of governing processes 'that

are no longer fully controlled by the government, but subject to negotiations

between a wide range of public, semi-public and private actors, whose interactions

give rise to a relatively stable pattern of policy making that constitutes a specific form

of regulation, or mode of coordination' (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007a, pp. 3-4).

Networks can provide access to knowledge and information, facilitate acceptance of

policy direction, engage a diversity of interests and values and overall improve policy

decision-making (Kickert et al., 1997). Networks have been critiqued as unstable,

diffuse and opaque (Sørensen & Torfing, 2009), as well as ineffective, inefficient and

illegitimate (Kickert et al., 1997), where privileged elites can dominate the process

and subvert public good objectives for private interests (Bell & Hindmoor, 2009b). In

addition, Kickert et al. (1997) list the risks that government may neglect 'public good'

policy objectives, innovation may be blocked by established interests, policy

processes may not be transparent and there is insufficient democratic legitimacy.


Recognising that the state is no longer the sovereign authority (with unlimited

power) and that the boundaries between the role of the state and civil society are

increasingly blurred, metagovernance has emerged as a response that places the

state as a unique actor in a position to exert macro-level control of governance

networks (Rhodes, 2012). Metagovernance refers to "the role of the state in securing

coordination in governance and its use of negotiation, diplomacy and more informal

modes of steering” (Rhodes, 2012, p. 37). Consistent with neoliberal policies of

'steering not rowing', metagovernance considers the role of the state in governing

the organisations that govern civil society, that is, the “governance of governance”

(Meuleman, 2008a, p. 67) of “bringing the state back in” to the conceptualisation of

governance (Jessop, 2001, p. 152).

Yet the term metagovernance is itself employed in two different ways - as the

governance of different forms of governance such as markets, hierarchies and

networks (see Jessop, 2002a; Meuleman, 2008b; Whitehead, 2003), or as the

governance of networks (see Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004a; Sørensen & Torfing, 2009).

The difference can be explained by the evolution of the metagovernance concept

across different research traditions, as it emerged from the understanding of

governance failure of markets and hierarchies and the decline in social cohesion in

the 1980's and 1990's (Jessop, 2011). Kooiman (2003b) describes governance as

occurring at three levels:

• By direct problem-solving (1st order governance);

• By modifying the institutional conditions of problem-solving (2nd order

governance); and

• By changing how governance occurs by modifying the broad, normative

framework within which governance occurs (3rd order governance).

Jessop (2011) equates Kooiman's (2003b) 2nd order governance as first order

metagovernance, and 3rd order governance as 2nd order metagovernance, with the

former concerned with the coordination of one mode of governance, and the latter

with the coordination of multiple modes of governance. Thus, the redesign of

markets, or the management of networks would be 1st order metagovernance, while


the changing of the balance between markets and networks by privileging one or the

other, would be 2nd order metagovernance. For the purpose of this thesis, the term

metagovernance will refer to the governance of networks, consistent with Jessop's

(2011) first order metagovernance, and Kooiman's (2003b) 2nd order

metagovernance.

Metagovernance is usually the preserve of the state, but can be undertaken by

other parties with sufficient resources and influence (Kickert et al., 1997; Sørensen &

Torfing, 2009) or by a network itself (Torfing, 2016). Metagovernors need to be a

central actor with many ties to other actors, to be respected by other actors, access

to sufficient resources and capacity to monitor and manage the performance of the

network (Bell & Hindmoor, 2009a; Torfing, 2016). For these reasons, governments

are the most common metagovernor, although other forms such as lead

organisation, or an organisation to administer the network, are also commonly

employed (Provan & Kenis, 2008). The unique position of governments representing

the public interest and the 'primacy of politics' also limits their capacity to exercise

metagovernance as other actors might:

• Governments are not able to choose their network partners;

• Governments are not able to 'goal bargain';

• Governments must adhere to strict codes of behaviour (inclusivity,

democracy, probity etc.);

• Their behaviour is scrutinised by the public and the media; and

• Government decisions must be legitimised by politicians and the

community more broadly (Kickert et al., 1997).

Given that the key feature of networks is their interdependence and self-

regulation, the metagovernance of networks involves a fundamental challenge in

steering the network to productive ends whilst allowing the network to realise the

benefits of its characteristics which are by nature dynamic and emergent (De Bruijn

& ten Heuvelhof, 1997; Sørensen & Torfing, 2009; Torfing, 2016). Torfing (2016)

elaborates further, describing these as a set of metagovernance dilemmas: balancing

choices about the inclusion or exclusion of actors, defining the scope, balancing


stability and flexibility, avoiding excessive or insufficient metagovernance, employing

hands-off or hands-on metagovernance and pursuing instrumental or normative

objectives. The following section explores how metagovernance is enacted.

3.8.1 Metagovernance instruments

The instruments of metagovernance can be grouped into three broad families;

legal instruments such as regulations or prohibitions, economic instruments such as

financial incentives, and communicative instruments which involve the transfer of

information (De Bruijn & ten Heuvelhof, 1997; Jessop, 2001). The instruments of

metagovernance need to fit the subject of governance, and the characteristics of

networks constrain the effectiveness of traditional 'first generation' instruments that

tend to be compulsory, universal and generic in effect. In contrast, second generation

instruments have been adapted to network contexts by indirect rather than direct

use, fine-tuned to specific contexts, open to serendipitous opportunities and agreed

by network members (De Bruijn & ten Heuvelhof, 1997).

De Bruin and ten Heuvelhof (1997) highlight the diversity of instruments that

can be applied to individual network actors or the relations between actors within a

network. Regulatory instruments can influence the number and arrangement of

network actors, directly by adding new actors (institutions), or indirectly, by dictating

which actors can participate or not, and privileging some actors over others. Relations

between network actors can be regulated by instruments which dictate statutory

processes such as consultation or rights of review or veto. Financial instruments,

often used in conjunction with regulatory instruments, include the creation of

markets, or financial incentives which could be tied to network functions.

Communicative instruments indirectly affect behaviour through changing the

perception of actors or the framing of issues.

The metagovernance of networks is challenged by the dynamic and

unpredictable nature of networks themselves. The danger of an instrumental view

that judges the performance of a network against the predetermined goal is that this

view neglects other values that the network may achieve, including opportunities to

redefine the goal, or respond to emerging or alternative goals (De Bruijn & ten

Heuvelhof, 1997; Kickert et al., 1997). Balancing the need for metagovernance to be


both effective and democratic, Sorensen and Torfing (2009) describe a set of

metagovernance tools at a more operational level:

1. Network design that determines the scope, objectives, membership and

operation of the network.

2. Network framing that shapes and communicates the network

conditions and performance requirements.

3. Network management that addresses resource needs, participation of

minorities, transparency, flexibility, arbitration etc.

4. Network participation that leads network processes through direct

facilitation, active process management and modelling desired

behaviours.

3.8.2 Metagovernance theories

Four theories offer insights to metagovernance (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007c),

with different perspectives on the defining characteristics of network behaviour and

the drivers of social action (Table 3.6).

Table 3.6 Theories of network governance and seminal authors (from Sørensen, 2007)

Network theories and key authors

Rules driving social action Calculation Culture

Defining network characteristics Conflict

Interdependency theory (Jessop, 1998, 2002b; Kickert et al., 1997; Rhodes, 1997)

Governmentality theory (Dean, 1999; Foucault, 1991b; Rose, 2008)

Coordination

Governability theory (Kooiman, 1993; Marin & Mayntz, 1991; Mayntz, 1993; Scharpf, 1993, 1994)

Integration theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991; March & Olsen, 1995)

Interdependency theory (Jessop, 1998, 2002b; Kickert et al., 1997; Rhodes,

1997) is rooted in historic institutionalism and defines governance networks as a

space for the negotiation of interdependent but conflicting actors, each of whom has

a rule and resource base of their own. Networks are built from the bottom up as

actors negotiate power relations but remain linked by resource interdependencies.


The focus of metagovernance in this context is on network management strategies

to overcome conflict between self-interested actors and enable network functioning

(Torfing, 2016).

Governability theory (Kooiman, 1993; Marin & Mayntz, 1991; Mayntz, 1993;

Scharpf, 1993, 1994) draws on rational choice institutionalism and defines

governance networks as the horizontal co-ordination of independent actors that

interact through negotiation games in response to institutional complexity,

fragmentation and dynamics. Participants in network games are driven by mutual

trust and rules, as well as the anticipated benefits. Metagovernance in this context is

focussed on structuring and incentivising collaboration (Torfing, 2016), which may

include exercising the threat of regulation ['the shadow of hierarchy’ (Scharpf, 1997)].

Integration theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991; March & Olsen, 1995)

draws on sociological organisation theory and sees networks as forming from the

ground up, driven by institutional logics that recognise interdependencies, and

networks build shared identities and common cultures. Metagovernance in this

context involves developing the identities and capacities of actors and the

development of network rules, norms, values and rituals (Torfing, 2016).

Governmentality theory (Dean, 1999; Foucault, 1991b; Rose, 2008), which also

draws on institutionalism, sees networks as the product of the state seeking to

facilitate the actions of free agents. Networks are self-regulating, but within an

institutional framework that define norms, standards and practices consistent with

policy objectives. Metagovernance uses 'technologies of agency' to engage and

support actors, while also using 'technologies of performance' to steer and judge

their behaviour (Triantafillou, 2007). Torfing (2016) identifies this as 'new

governmentality' that seeks to mobilise the resources and capacities of actors to

deliver governmental tasks in response to the perceived failure of neoliberal

marketisation strategies. For this reason, I explore governmentality theory further in

the following section.

Governmentality

Michel Foucault first coined the term governmentality in a series of lectures in

France in 1978 (Foucault, 2007). The term is a contraction of 'government' and


'mentality' or 'rationality' and refers to the art of conducting the ways in which others

conduct themselves, aka the 'conduct of conduct' (Foucault, 2007, pp. 220-221).

Governance becomes a form of power that assumes that the subjects of governance

have the liberty to conduct themselves. Foucault's original conception varied both

between lectures and subsequent books and has since been further developed and

re-interpreted by multiple authors (see Barry & Osborne, 1996; Dean, 1999; Foucault,

1991a; Miller & Rose, 2008). While it's original conception arose from a historical

analysis of changes in the western European governance systems, it is now frequently

employed to understand new forms of contemporary governance, particularly

neoliberalism (Triantafillou, 2016).

Governmentality draws attention to the often-overlooked dimensions of

power, and how it is rationalised and exercised through governance (Triantafillou,

2016). Governmentality sees policy as a social and cultural artefact, developed over

time and arising from power and knowledge (McKee, 2009). Governmentality is not

just about the state, it considers the agency of individuals and groups, with

governance arising from the duality of the relationship between the state and society.

Power is not necessarily repressive; it can be productive, exercised through shaping

and mobilising particular rationalities. Thus, through institutionalised practices and

meanings, governance is enacted by the state and civil society collectively (Sørensen

& Torfing, 2007b).

Rose and Miller (1992) describe how government programs are the expression

of the political rationalities, interpreted by the intellectual machinery of government.

Political rationalities are espoused through language and discourse, are generally

moral in nature, and articulate the power and duties of authorities and how tasks and

actions should be employed. Policies are then given effect through the strategies,

techniques and procedures employed by the bureaucracy (the technologies of

practice) (Rose & Miller, 1992). The technologies of practice seek to induce, manage,

coerce, educate or motivate civil society to behave in the desired manner. In this way,

a governmentality perspective draws attention to the rationalities and the

technologies employed by governors, that is, the espoused meanings and employed

practices (Bevir, 2011).


Applied to networks, governmentality theory articulates a technology of self-

regulation, through a balance of technologies of agency (resources, capacity and

other incentives) and technologies of performance (standards and codes of conduct)

(Sørensen & Torfing, 2007b). While networks are typically defined by their autonomy

and self-organisation, networks can be mobilised by legal, financial, social and

institutional norms, some of which may be orchestrated by the state, but others are

pervasive in society (such as participation, transparency, responsibility) (Triantafillou,

2007). Dryzek (2013) has explored the use of governmentality in the discourse of

environmental politics. In Australia's natural resource management system, for

example, we see the framing of natural resource management issues and the

financial resources to encourage regional organisations and programs to achieve

policy objectives, against which performance standards and outcomes targets seek

to shape network performance.

Neoliberalism can be seen as a specific form of rationality that is sceptical of

the capacity of the state to govern, employing practices to enable governing ‘at a

distance' while supporting the freedom of civil society subjects (Rose & Miller, 1992).

Bevir (2011) defines two waves of neoliberalism; the first wave involved the shift

from bureaucratic states to marketisation and new public management, while the

second wave of neoliberal reforms post 1980's saw a greater emphasis on

institutional arrangements (networks and partnerships) and community values.

From an analytical perspective, governmentality “examines the conditions

under which regimes of (institutional) practices, come into being, are maintained and

are transformed” (Dean, 1999, p. 21). Regimes of practices constitute a fairly stable

set of ways of thinking about and doing things, which may have an institutional

'centre' but also a network of related actors, that overlaps and interacts with, related

regimes of practice. Dean (1999, p. 21) articulates this focus as a set of questions

about how governance is practiced within a policy regime:

1. Characteristic ways of seeing and perceiving, issue framing

(problematisation);

2. Ways of thinking and questioning, vocabulary of knowledge

(rationalities);


3. Ways of acting, directing using characteristic instruments and

techniques (practices); and

4. Ways of forming subjects, agents or actors (identities).

Governmentality draws attention to the often overlooked 'soft' dimensions of

power exercised in network governance (Triantafillou, 2016), recognising that state

power in the metagovernance of networks is not necessarily reduced, but

transformed and exercised in new ways (Pierre & Peters, 2005). Power has been

identified as a significant and under-researched area of contemporary water

governance (Brisbois & de Loë, 2015) and will be an important dimension of relations

between actors within a governance network as well as between the state and

network actors.

3.9 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The preceding sections of this chapter have argued that collaborative

governance, a term that has emerged within environmental policy, can be described

as governance networks (acknowledging the confusing terminology and multiple

strands of governance theory and research). Scholars recognise governance networks

as an established feature of contemporary policy making in western democracies. In

response to the increasing complexity of policy issues and fragmentation of

government capacity (at least partly attributable to the failure of neoliberal

marketisation), networks have emerged as a promising 'third way' to facilitate policy

design and implementation. Scholars debate the impact of the shift to more

networked approaches on the authority of government. Government remains a key

player, with special authorities and responsibilities. Metagovernance 'brings the state

back in' (Jessop, 2001) by recognising the role that the state (or other influential

actors) can play in facilitating and steering governance networks.

Governmentality theory frames metagovernance as the strategies and actions

employed by government to harness the knowledge and capacity of other actors to

deliver policy outcomes (Dean, 1999; Foucault, 1991b; Rose & Miller, 1992). Policy is

the product of governance, which is itself an emergent process as a result of the

agency of both government and other actors as they wield power and knowledge.


Governmentality draws attention to the meanings and practices espoused by

metagovernors (Bevir, 2011). The rationalities of government (and other actors) will

reflect the context, both of the specific policy regime and the broader societal

conditions.

The analytical framework for this research (Figure 9) draws upon these

concepts and theories of governance networks, metagovernance and

governmentality, framing their connections from a critical realist perspective that

highlights the relationship between context, mechanisms and outcomes. In any policy

regime, both governments and stakeholder organisations have rationalities or beliefs

about 'how things should be done' in the development and implementation of policy.

Context is a strong determinant of rationalities, at the broad socio-economic and

cultural level, but also the nature of the policy issue and the prior relationships

between governments and stakeholders. Amongst a suite of potential governance

models, governments may choose to engage stakeholders in the policy process

through governance networks. The metagovernance of policy network is likely to

include technologies of agency (to encourage stakeholder engagement) and

technologies of performance (to steer network activities). Initial measures of

governance performance include social and institutional outcomes such as mutual

trust, understanding of values, shared knowledge capacity and resources.

Governance networks can influence all aspects of the policy cycle, including agenda

setting, policy formulation, implementation and evaluation. Both the governance

performance and policy outcomes can change context, in turn triggering changed

rationalities and practices. Major political or economic changes, legislative changes,

litigation, community pressure and physical events such as floods and droughts can

also change the context and trigger changes to governance practice.


Figure 9. Analytical framework encompassing the metagovernance of networks (author)

3.10 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, the theoretical foundations of collaborative governance have

been explored, starting with understanding governance as the relationship between

government and society, with the market, state and hierarchy as pure, idealised

forms of governance (Powell, 1990). In practice, governance is more complicated

than this, in a variety of hybrid forms, and cross-scale dimensions are described as

multi-level and polycentric (Bache et al., 2016, p. 487; Bradach & Eccles, 1989;

Hooghe & Marks, 2001).

Governance is a dynamic process, facilitating policy change in response to

changing contexts and emerging issues. Major frameworks for policy change

(Ostrom, 1971; Sabatier, 1988) have been described and critiqued for their ability to

represent the complex, hybridised and dynamic nature of governance practice.

Collaborative governance was identified as a form of network governance

(section 3.7), where groups of self-regulating, interdependent actors work towards a

collective goal (Provan et al., 2007, p. 231) and are used by governments to facilitate

network contributions to public policy (Blanco et al., 2011). The pre-eminence of the

role of government in governance is asserted (Kooiman, 2003b), and

metagovernance (Jessop, 19 97a; Meuleman, 2008a, p. 66) describes how

governments seek to manage the multiple forms of governance employed (section

3.8). Governmentality theory (Foucault, 1991b) was used as a lens to focus on the

how and why governments and stakeholder organisations engage in collaborative


governance. Finally, the analytical framework draws the concepts and theories of

governance networks, metagovernance and governmentality together to structure

an inquiry into collaborative governance as it is practiced.

Chapter 4: Methodology, research design and methods 85

Chapter 4: Methodology, research design and methods

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter outlines the research design and methods, organised in six

sections. First, the research aims and approach are summarised (section 4.2) drawing

on the material from the preceding chapters. The research design is then outlined

(section 4.3) by explaining the research paradigms adopted and justifying the use of

qualitative research, longitudinal case studies, the selection of case studies and how

data will be collected and analysed. Section 4.4 provides details of the data collection

process, including the collation of background information, sampling strategy,

soliciting and conducting interviews. Section 4.5 explains the analytical process,

including document analysis, coding of interview data, analysis and synthesis. Section

4.6 discusses research quality measures and demonstrate how these have been

considered and addressed. Finally, research challenges, limitations and ethical

considerations are canvassed in section 4.7.

4.2 RESEARCH AIMS AND APPROACH

4.2.1 Research problem summarised

Environmental degradation and resource over-allocation are global issues with

far-reaching consequences for people and the environment. Attempts to resolve

environmental issues are challenged by the complexity of human and environmental

systems, and chronic policy failure characterises these 'wicked' policy problems.

Given the significance of water resources for human wellbeing, economic

development and environmental health, it is no surprise that water policy is one of

the most important environmental issues of our time.

Contemporary democratic policy practice promotes 'collaborative governance'

approaches to complex policy issues (Duckett et al., 2016; Head et al., 2016; Weber


& Khademian, 2008) consistent with broader policy trends including neoliberalism,

regionalisation and public participation. The benefits ascribed to collaborative

governance include access to knowledge and understanding, shared risk and

responsibilities, greater implementation capacity and policy acceptance (Ansell &

Gash, 2008; Gash, 2016; Koontz, 2016). However, collaborative governance

challenges include appropriate participation, imbalances in power and capacity and

accountability (Head et al., 2016; Lubell, 2004; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000), as well

as time, resources and collaborative leadership skills (Ansell & Gash, 2012; Huxham

et al., 2000; Margerum & Robinson, 2015).

Most of the evidence about the performance collaborative governance comes

from single case studies assessed against normative criteria (Ansell & Gash, 2008;

Koontz & Thomas, 2006; Margerum, 2011). There are few studies that look across

large numbers of cases (see Biddle & Koontz, 2014; Lubell et al., 2005; Newig &

Fritsch, 2009) and results are inconclusive. Better understanding of the effectiveness

of governance practice and how benefits may (or may not) be realised in different

contexts would help explain the gap between the ascribed benefits of collaborative

governance and the limited evidence of performance outcomes.

4.2.2 Research purpose, question and objectives

The overarching research question is 'How do the rationales and practices of

collaborative governance influence Australian water policy outcomes?'. The

following research objectives contribute to answering that question:


water policy?

The evolution of governance arrangements for two major water policy issues in

Australia is examined to determine contemporary collaborative governance practice

in Australian water policy. The structures and processes to engage key stakeholders,

such as non-government stakeholder organisations, were examined, and how this

engagement influenced water policy decisions. The research describes the

collaborative governance practices used in major Australian water policy cases.





governance change in the two case studies was examined to determine the rationale

for the modes of governance adopted. To address this research objective, the

rationales of government agencies at these key decision-points are documented.



To address this objective, the research investigated the impact of collaborative

governance efforts on stakeholder relations and policy decisions as perceived by

government and non-government decision-makers in the two case studies. As a

result, the research documents the influence of collaborative governance on

stakeholder relations, and the impact of this on policy decisions and outcomes.



The context for each phase of governance and policy change was examined

through documentation and the perspectives of government and non-government

decision-makers to understand how context influenced governance decisions and

performance. The research documents the important contextual factors considered

to have influenced the performance of collaborative governance initiatives of the two

case studies.



Reflecting on the findings above, the research draws preliminary findings about

what constrains or enables the adoption of collaborative governance in its




adoption.


4.2.3 Analytical framework summarised

In Chapter 3, the practice of collaborative governance was situated within the

research domain of governance networks, as a form of 'pure governance'

characterised by horizontal structures where interdependent actors negotiate

decisions based on trust, loyalty and reciprocity (Kronsell & Bäckstrand, 2010;

Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998). In practice, governance is more complex, involving hybrid

forms, multi-level and polycentric systems (Agrawal & Lemos, 2007; Hooghe & Marks,

2001; Kooiman, 2003a; Ostrom, 2010b).

The governance network literature emphasises the independence and self-

organising characteristics of networks (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2012; Sørensen & Torfing,

2007a). The tension between these characteristics and the traditional, hierarchical

governance systems led by the state has led to a long-standing debate about the

impact of governance networks on the role and authority of the state (Kooiman,

2003a; Lange et al., 2013; Pierre & Peters, 2005; Rhodes, 2007). The concept of

metagovernance describes how the state attempts to steer networks towards public

good policy objectives (Jessop, 2011; Kickert et al., 1997; Sørensen & Torfing, 2007b).

Governmentality theory (Dean, 1999; Foucault, 1991b; Rose & Miller, 1992) frames

policy as emerging from the negotiation of metagovernors (the state) and

governance networks. Governmentality theory draws attention to the rationalities of

government and other actors, and the actual practices of governance.

The analytical framework for this research (Figure 10) draws on the concepts

and theories of governance networks, metagovernance and governmentality to

enquire into collaborative governance as it is practiced. The rationalities, or beliefs in

'how things should be done' reflect the policy context and guide the practice of

metagovernance. The practice of metagovernance includes technologies of agency

that encourage stakeholder participation in collaborative processes (governance

networks) and technologies of performance to steer network activities. Intermediate

outcomes such as trust, knowledge and capacity, mediate the contribution of

governance networks to policy, in iterative cycles of development and

implementation that may be disrupted by internal and external shocks.


Figure 10. Analytical framework for the metagovernance of networks (author)

4.3 RESEARCH DESIGN

4.3.1 Ontology and epistemology

Research paradigms reflect how the researcher views the world (ontology) and

the way they experience and understand it (epistemology), which frames the

research approach (methodology) (Crotty, 1998). Traditionally, physical sciences

have searched for confirming or disconfirming proof of hypotheses (discoverable

truths) that can usually be expressed or tested mathematically. This 'positivist' view

of the world assumes that there is a reality, that it can be discovered and described

as truth. A number of critiques to this view have emerged in the social sciences. Guba

and Lincoln (1998) list implicit critiques of the positivist world view (the importance

of context, meaning and purpose, relevance to individual cases and the lived

experience and the reliance on a priori hypotheses) as well as external critiques (the

interdependence of theory and facts, and of values and facts, the impacts of

theoretical framing and the neutrality of the researcher). A number of paradigms

have emerged in response to these criticisms, with varying degrees of modified world

views. Constructivism, for example, challenges the view that an independent reality

exists, and understands reality as the flexible mental constructs held by individuals

or groups. A less radical paradigm is post-positivism, adopted by this research, which

takes a critical realist ontology. Critical realism assumes that reality exists, but can

only be imperfectly understood, due to the limits of human intellect and the

complexity of the natural world. If truth can only ever be partially known (or probably

true), objectivity remains an ideal, and research traditions and communities


employed to strengthen findings (Guba & Lincoln, 1998). Stepping back from testing

a priori hypotheses (deductive reasoning) allows the possibility of discovering theory

from observation (inductive reasoning). This is the case with grounded theory (Glaser

& Strauss, 1967).

While research paradigms are general guides only (Willis, 2012), and ontology

in organisational studies is often ambiguous (Fleetwood, 2005), a clear paradigmatic

stance enables a logical framing of research topics, questions, and contributions

(Edmondson & McManus, 2007). In particular, a critical realist approach validates the

search for contextual understanding instead of universal laws, and emergent

research designs (iterative cycles of deductive/inductive reasoning) (Willis, 2012) on

the basis that all interpretations of reality (including social realities such as rules or

collaboration) are mediated by our own understanding and must therefore be

tentative.

Critical realism is philosophically aligned to the theoretical perspective of

governance (outlined in the previous chapter) as an interactive and emergent social

process that sits between the constructivist view of institutional structures and the

interpretive perspective of grass-roots agency and the power of individuals (Fawcett

& Daugbjerg, 2012). Critical realism embraces the duality and inter-relatedness of

both structure and agency in governance studies. The methodological implications of

a post-positivist, critical realist philosophical perspective include situating research in

more natural settings and soliciting insider perspectives to understand the purpose

and meanings behind people's actions, and using triangulation of methods and

sources and testing counterfactuals to strengthen the evidence base.

Edmondson and McManus (2007) articulate the importance of 'methodological

fit' between the state of prior research, the research question and design and

potential contribution to knowledge. In this case, the state of prior research on the

rationales and practices of collaborative governance can be considered nascent.

Nascent theory provides only tentative answers to possible connections between

phenomena, unlike mature theory which provides an established understanding of

relationships, supported by a body of empirical and theoretical evidence (Edmondson

& McManus, 2007). Chapter 3 has outlined governmentality and other


metagovernance theories, but these clearly provide a frame of research inquiry into

the dynamic and emergent processes of collaborative governance, rather than robust

and predictable relationships. As a result, the research inquiry is an open-ended and

iterative approach to developing and testing the research questions posed here. The

following section outlines the research process adopted.

4.3.2 Outline of research process

The overall research process and methods used are summarised in Figure 11.

The research problem was defined in chapter 2 as the gap between the theoretical

and normative expectations of collaborative governance and metagovernance

practice and outcomes. The literature review (Chapter 3) located collaborative

governance as a form of governance networks, and metagovernance as efforts by the

state to harness the benefits of governance networks to achieve policy goals.

Governmentality theory was then used to develop the analytical framework, which

focusses the research question 'How do the rationales and practices of collaborative

governance influence Australian water policy outcomes?' as an inquiry into how the

rationalities and technologies of metagovernance influence governance

performance.

Figure 11 presents the research process as a linear progression of steps through

the selection of case studies, collation and analysis of documents, interviews, data

analysis and synthesis. As expected for an open-ended research inquiry, the process

was much more iterative than this figure suggests. Each step informed a revision of

prior steps, as well as laying a foundation for the following steps. In this way, the

research questions and analytical framework were progressively refined, and the

research focus narrowed.


Figure 11. The research process and methods used

The following sections detail the rationale for the adoption of a qualitative

approach using case studies and data collected through document and interview

analysis. Further detail is then provided in the data collection and data analysis

sections (4.4 and 4.5) before issues of research quality are discussed (section 4.6).

4.3.3 Qualitative research

Traditional 'physical science' research adopts a deductive approach to building

knowledge - by proposing hypotheses of cause and effect relationships and using

quantitative (numeric) measures to test and evaluate findings. In contrast, the

theoretical foundations of this research are immature, the inquiry is exploratory and

open to revising or refining tentative theories, even building preliminary theory from

empirical findings (inductive reasoning). Qualitative research involves collecting and

interpreting a range of information about actions, objects and reasoning to

accumulate evidence that informs theory and contributes to its further development.


The purpose of qualitative research is to understand a situated or contextual

understanding, rather than establishing 'truth' (Willis, 2012). With a critical realist

epistemology, this research seeks to approach truth that is comprised of both

physical reality and interpreted reality. Meanings matters, so the experience and

perspectives of individuals are a source of insight. Multiple perspectives are sought

to develop a richer picture of how reality is interpreted by subjects. Researcher

participation is frequently emphasised in qualitative research, and there exists a

spectrum of participatory styles in qualitative research - from neutral observer to

participant observation and participatory action research. Social dimensions are

embedded in social contexts, so qualitative research is typically pursued in natural

contexts and seeks to understand how context frames the subject of inquiry. A variety

of qualitative research traditions exist, including:

• Phenomenological research, that examines the meaning of lived

experiences;

• Ethnographic research, that explores the attitudes, beliefs and values of

social or cultural groups;

• Grounded-theory that seeks theoretical explanation of observed

phenomena;

• Narrative or biographical studies that explore individual experiences;

and

• Case studies that involve intensive examination of discrete subjects

(Creswell & Poth, 2017).

These traditions have distinct methodological foundations that rely on iterative

processes of data collection and analysis. Findings are emergent, rather than deduced

from formal statistical inference (Willis, 2012 #4025}. Multiple sources of data

strengthen the evidence base by triangulation. The research process is less linear and

more circular, as an iterative process of data collection and research inquiry.

Qualitative research is a reflective process, and the researcher is the primary tool for

data collection and analysis. Schön (1984) describes reflection in action, and reflection

on action, as the recursive framing of the research problem and improvisation of


research inquiry. Research involves analogical reasoning, abduction and family

resemblances, as well as induction (going from the specific to the general) and

deduction (from the general to the specific) (Willis, 2012). If the research topics are

individual and unique, then analogical thinking that draws attention to the partial

similarities of related phenomena (such as single case studies) allows some

inferences to be drawn.

The central role of the researcher in data collection and analysis highlights the

potential for researcher bias. Acknowledging and addressing the risk of bias is an

important part of qualitative research, and distinct research quality criteria have

been developed for qualitative research, drawing on validity and reliability,

triangulation and other approaches (Willis, 2012) (refer section 4.6).

4.3.4 Case studies and case selection

A case study approach was selected for this research because the research

questions focus on the 'how’ and the 'why' of social phenomena (institutional

decision making). The research requires an extensive and in-depth exploration of the

rationales and practices of metagovernors. It does not require control of events, but

it does examine contemporary events, but acknowledges the importance of

contextual factors in determining current and recent decision-making. Yin (2014, pp.

16-17) provides a definition of a case study that reflects both its scope and its

features:

A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary

phenomenon (the "case") in depth and within its real-world context,

especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not

be clearly evident. A case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive

situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data

points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data

needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result, benefits

from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data

collection and analysis.

The selection of the case study approach is therefore consistent with the

research questions (exploring how and why a social phenomenon occurs), the


research paradigm (post-positivist, critical realist) and the field of inquiry (complex

water policy issues where governance is an emergent property).

Longitudinal case studies allow the examination of how certain conditions and

processes change over time. Context is generally accepted to be a strong determinant

of rationales of metagovernance practice. Any single policy regime experiences

periods of stability as well as periodic disruption by internal or external triggers

(Eberhard et al., 2017b). Disruption allows the renegotiation of governance purpose

and governance arrangements, including revised metagovernance strategies

(rationales and practices). Thus, moments of policy change are of particular interest

to this research, as the rationales and practices of metagovernance will be more

visible at these times. A longitudinal case study approach also enables the application

of rich contextual understanding necessary for analysis to be applied at multiple

'events' or sub-units of analysis. For this reason, a longitudinal case study approach

has been adopted.

A potential vulnerability of the single-case study approach is that a case may

misrepresent the phenomena of interest (Yin, 2014), and governance research is

dominated by single case studies (Poteete et al., 2010). A multiple case study

approach reduces the risk of misrepresentation by widening the evidence base

beyond one policy regime and therefore strengthening the conclusions drawn.

Although a multiple case study approach has implications for time, resources and

capacity to undertake detailed inquiry, the benefits of this approach were considered

worthwhile given the importance of context and expectations of strong path

dependency in governance arrangements.

Criteria used to select the case studies for this research included scale,

significance, history of metagovernance, documentation, currency and location

(Table 4.1). Using these criteria, the selection of case studies was straightforward.


Table 4.1 Criteria for case study selection

Criteria Requirement Rationale

Scale and significance

Cases need to have attracted strong interest and informed broader policy development

Demonstrates policy impact

Metagovernance history

Cases needed to be demonstrate a history of metagovernance and the influence of governance networks on policy outcomes

Relevance to research questions

Documentation Cases needed to be well documented in both practitioner and academic literature, providing a rich source of documentary evidence

Evidence base for analysis

Contemporary Cases need to be recent and ongoing Access to interview subjects and quality of recollections

Australian Cases needed to be within Australia Practical and logistical reasons

The Murray-Darling Basin (Figure 12) has been the defining water policy case

that has led the development and revision of national water policy since federation

in 1901 (Kendall, 2013; Kildea & Williams, 2010). The Great Barrier Reef (Figure 12)

provides the second case study, a case that has led the development of water quality

approaches at regional and cross-regional scales in Australia. Both cases (and no

other cases) met all criteria listed above.


Figure 12. Location of the two case studies: the Murray-Darling Basin and the Great Barrier Reef

The temporal bounds of the two case studies was set as 2000 – 2016, based on

the declining quality of evidence with time before the present. There is little

academic literature that discusses the governance of the two case studies before

2005 (refer section 4.4.1), and identifying and accessing key decision makers is

progressively more difficult over time (refer section 4.4.3).

The Great Barrier Reef case study has had three distinct periods of policy and

metagovernance in that time, with phase changes associated with the review of

bilateral Reef Water Quality Protection Plan and changes to government programs

(chapter 5). The Murray-Darling Basin case study has two distinct phases delineated

by the Water Act 2007 (Cth) and the replacement the Murray-Darling Basin

Commission with the Murray-Darling Basin Authority (Chapter 7). The case studies

chosen thus provides 5 units of analysis, comprising different phases of policy regime

within two longitudinal case studies (Figure 13 below).


Figure 13. Case study design (after Yin, 2014)

It is important to note, that while the two case studies provide a stronger

evidence base than a single case study approach, the cases were not explicitly

selected for their comparative value. In both cases the governance arrangements are

unique and reflect the evolution of governance arrangements within an ever-

changing context. They do not provide a literal replication but a theoretical

replication. While cross-case (and cross-phase) comparisons will inform research

conclusions, the unique circumstances of each case provide instrumental evidence

that, with analogical thinking that draws attention to partial similarities of related

phenomena (Willis, 2012), wider inferences can be drawn.

4.3.5 Data requirements

With the adoption of a qualitative, post-hoc, multiple case study approach, the

research design primarily rests on data collected through interviews with

government and non-government stakeholders (Table 4.2). Interviews are important

sources of case study evidence because they can describe and explain events, but

also offer insights into personal views, such as opinions, attitudes and meanings (Yin,

2014).

The initial collection of background information was to establish a deep

understanding of the governance histories of the two case studies. Documented as

case history narratives and timelines, the histories provide a foundation for the

subsequent research activities in several ways. First, the histories allow the


identification of periods of governance states and change, which then break up the

case studies into distinct phases, characterised by a period of change followed by

(relative) stability. In each phase, it was then possible to identify key decision-makers

operating across organisations (section 4.4.2), which then formed the pool of

potential interviewees. The timelines were also used as part of the interview process,

and helped to frame the analysis and subsequent reflection and synthesis process.

Case study interviews provided the primary information source, particularly in

exposing the rationales, practices and perception of outcomes during each case study

phase. This information was triangulated with grey literature and existing academic

literature relevant to the case studies (section 4.4.1). The authors lived experience

provided an additional source of evidence (section 4.4.5), particularly in relation to

the Great Barrier Reef case study. The following sections detail the process of data

collection and analysis.


Table 4.2 Summary of data sources and outputs for research objectives

Research objectives Data sources Outputs Reported as:

How is collaborative governance practiced in Australian water policy?

Case studies

• Meetings with key informants

• Grey literature (plans, policies, legislation and major reports)

• Academic literature relevant to the governance of the case studies

• Case history narratives and timelines.

• Governance phases, key decision points and actors identified.

Chapter 5 (Great Barrier Reef case study) Chapter 7 (Murray-Darling Basin case study)

How do governments rationalise collaborative governance practice?

Case studies


• Interviews with government actors

• Thematic content analysis

• Illustrative quotations

Chapters 6 and 8 (Case study results) and Chapter 9 (Discussion)

How does collaborative governance influence stakeholder relations and policy outcomes?

Case studies


• Interviews with non-government actors




How is the performance of collaborative governance influenced by context?

Case studies


• Interviews with government and non-government actors




What does that tell us about the potential adoption and performance of collaborative governance in Australian water resource policy?

• Case study thematic content analysis

• Observational and experiential knowledge

• Synthesis and interpretation, reflecting on theory, practice and methodology

Chapter 9 (Discussion)


4.3.6 Summary of research design

The research design (Figure 14) can be summarised as a post-positivist, critical

realist inquiry into the adoption and performance of collaborative governance in

Australian water policy. The overarching research question is ‘How do the rationales

and practices of collaborative governance influence Australian water policy

outcomes?’ To answer this question, the research objectives are:

1. How is collaborative governance practiced in Australian water policy?

2. How do governments rationalise collaborative governance practice?

3. How does collaborative governance impact stakeholder relations and

policy outcomes?


policy outcomes?

5. What does that tell us about the potential adoption and performance

of collaborative governance in Australian water resource policy?

The analytical framework draws on the concepts of metagovernance and

governmentality theory to focus on the rationalities and practices of metagovernance

and perceived outcomes. Two longitudinal, post-hoc case studies provide 5 phases of

governance to examine. The primary data source is interviews conducted with key

stakeholders in government and non-government organisations, supplemented by

academic and grey literature and the researchers lived experience.


Figure 14. Summary of research design


4.4 DATA COLLECTION

4.4.1 Background documents to case studies

Both grey literature, defined as “that which is produced on all levels of

government, academics, business and industry, in print and electronic formats, but

which is not controlled by commercial publishers” (Primary Health Care Research &

Information Service, 2017, p. 1), and academic literature were compiled for each case

study. The number of background documents from grey and academic literature by

are summarised by date and case study phase in Figure 15 and Figure 16 below.

Figure 15. The number and type of documents collated for the Great Barrier Reef case study


Figure 16. The number and type of documents collated for the Murray-Darling Basin case study

Grey literature relating to the case studies

Grey literature was judged as significant for this research if it met the following

criteria:

1. Documents that guide, influence or dictate water policy, governance or

program decision-making;

2. Widely referenced in grey and academic literature; and

3. Validated as significant by interviewees.

Generally, these comprised legislation, policy, plans, proposals and reports

(Table 4.3). In addition, a wealth of other informal documentation was collected,

including smaller reports, program documents, records of meetings and so forth.

Grey literature was sourced from key informants, interviewees, websites and media

(conventional and social media) as well as the author's own professional records

(Table 4.4). Significant grey literature documents were classified by their source their

i.e. Queensland or Australian Governments, bilateral initiatives or non-government

organisations and were mapped to each case study phase (Appendices B and C).


Table 4.3 Types of grey literature compiled for case studies

Type of document Explanation Examples

Legislation Australian or Queensland legislation and associated regulations

Queensland Government regulations introduced to reduce the water quality impact of agricultural operations in GBR catchments

Policy

Formal policy documents developed by Queensland or Australian Governments (bilateral or unilateral),

Murray-Darling Basin Intergovernmental agreements

Plans

Statutory or non-statutory plans, developed by Queensland or Australian Governments (bilateral or unilateral), or Regional NRM groups

Bilateral Reef Water Quality Protection plan, Regional Water Quality Improvement Plans

Proposal Program proposals developed by Regional NRM groups, industry groups or local stakeholder groups

Proposal for 'Reef Rescue' program developed by Regional NRM bodies, agricultural industry bodies and the conservation sector

Report Scientific, technical, audit, review or consultancy reports

Queensland Auditors Report into reef programs, Scientific Consensus Statements on water quality impacts on the Great Barrier Reef


Table 4.4 Sources of grey literature compiled for case studies

Source Explanation Examples

Key informants and interviewees

Documents provided by key informants or interviewees post-interview

Stakeholder proposals and position statements, including draft material and material not generally in the public domain

Author's professional records

Documents retained from professional involvement in case studies

Material not in the public domain such as meeting minutes, proposals, project reports etc.

Government websites

Formal legislation, policy and planning documents developed or commissioned by Queensland or Australian Governments

Murray-Darling Basin Authority website (http://mdba.gov.au) Queensland Environment and Heritage Protection website (http://www.ehp.qld.gov.au)

Stakeholder organisation websites

Non-statutory plans, policy documents, scientific and technical reports from Regional NRM groups, agricultural industry groups, conservation groups and local community groups

Terrain NRM (http://terrain.org.au) World Wildlife Fund for Nature (http://www.wwf.org.au) Canegrowers (http://www.canegrowers.com.au) Border Rivers Food and Fibre (http://www.brff.com.au)

Media

Conventional media, social media, editorials, newsletters

The Australian newspaper (http://www.theaustralian.com.au) Facebook campaigns, The Conversation (http://www.qff.org.au/blog/reef-alliance-winter-edition-2017-e-news/) , Reef Alliance newsletter (http://www.qff.org.au/blog/reef-alliance-winter-edition-2017-e-news/)

Unpublished scientific reports

Scientific, technical, audit, review or consultancy reports

Unpublished scientific reports prepared for National Environmental Science Programme (http://www.nespnorthern.edu.au/nesp/ )

Academic literature relating to the case studies

Academic literature relating to the case studies was sourced from conventional

academic databases and search engines (Google scholar, Scopus, Web of Life, Trove),

by searching on case study name ('Murray-Darling Basin', 'Great Barrier Reef') and

governance or collaboration-related terms ('governance', 'plan', 'decision*',

'engagement', 'partnership', 'community'). Additional material was sourced by


tracking citations forward and backward, reviewing publication lists of key authors,

and maintaining alerts and notifications on authors and search terms in journal and

database systems.

4.4.2 Sampling strategy for interviews

A purposeful sampling strategy was adapted to identify individuals in decision-

making roles for key government agencies and stakeholder organisations and

networks for each case study phase. Key government agencies and stakeholder

organisations and networks were identified through the development of a historical

narrative for each case study. Stakeholder groups that had high levels of involvement

in water governance during any phase of the case studies were included as key

organisations (refer Table 5.2 and Table 7.). Individuals in decision-making roles (at a

number of levels) were identified for each organisation over the life of the case

studies. Agencies that had 'lead' roles were prioritised over other agencies e.g.

Department of Natural Resources over the Environmental Protection Agency for

water resource planning in the Queensland Murray-Darling Basin. Noting, of course,

that agencies are periodically restructured, and responsibilities redistributed. For

example, the Department of Premier and Cabinet led Great Barrier Reef water quality

in the Queensland Government from 2003, but were shifted to the Office of the Great

Barrier Reef within the Queensland Environmental Protection Agency in 2015.

Individuals were identified from background documentation, the author's own

knowledge, discussions with key informants, and further refined through the

interview processes. Key informants were individuals from within regional NRM

organisations who were industry partners in the ARC project that supported this

research (described in Appendix E). Thus, for each organisation several potential

interview candidates were identified. A spreadsheet of those individuals was then

developed, and contact and biographical information for everyone compiled (from

publicly available material such as background documentation, web searches and

online (e.g. LinkedIn) profiles, supplemented by information provided by key

informants and interviewees, as outlined above. Some individuals moved between

organisations, including shifts between the two case studies, so that individuals could


not be clearly related to a single case study or phase. From this list of individuals with

significant experience of key governance decision-making processes, individuals were

prioritised based on their potential to:

• Provide an additional institutional perspective (to those already

interviewed);

• Provide an additional individual perspective (e.g. individual role,

likelihood of new insights/alternative perspectives); and

• Time and logistics.

For example, individuals were identified in relevant Queensland Government

agencies at the level of Ministers, Directors General and senior bureaucrats (Directors

or Executive Directors or similar) for each phase of each case study. Individuals which

were perceived to have greater experience and influence of governance decisions

were prioritised, based on bibliographic information (such as extended tenure and

high profile). The sampling strategy sought to maximise the coverage of interviews

across:

a) Each phase of each case study;

b) Ministers, Department heads and senior bureaucrats for the lead

agencies in Queensland and Australian Government agencies; and

c) Senior staff from key stakeholder organisations; as well as

d) Any other strong advocates identified e.g. community group leaders or

science advocates.

4.4.3 Interview coverage

If individuals declined an interview, or were not contactable, then the next

priority individual was approached. Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 below summarise the

interview coverage achieved for the two case studies. Interview coverage across

phases, institutions and roles was successful except for Ministers and Departmental

heads (only 1 Minister and no departmental heads granted interviews). Contact

details for x-Ministers and x-Departmental heads was often problematic to access if


they had retired from public life. A total of 21 interviews were conducted for the GBR

case study (with 9 individuals declining to be interviewed). A total of 27 interviews

were conducted for the MDB case study (with 13 individuals declining to be

interviewed). Overall, this represented a 68% acceptance rate (48/70). Refusals

predominantly came from current and previous Ministers and departmental heads.

Table 4.5 Interview coverage of Great Barrier Reef case study phases, organisations and levels

Organisation and level of interviewees by organisational type

Phase 1: 2003-2007

Phase 2: 2008-2013

Phase 3: 2014-

current

Aust. Govt. (Environment, Water, GBRMPA)

Ministers

Bureaucrats

Qld. Govt. (Premiers’, Environment, Natural Resources)

Ministers

Bureaucrats

NRM organisations Terrain NRM, Reef Catchments, Queensland Regional Groups Collective

Conservation World Wildlife Fund for Nature

Agricultural peak bodies

Qld. Farmers’ Federation

Canegrowers

Agforce

Science science advocates

Note: shaded areas indicate that representatives of these organisations and roles from this

phase of the case study were interviewed.


Table 4.6 Interview coverage of Murray-Darling Basin case study phases, organisations and levels

Organisation and level of interviewees by organisational type

Phase 1: 2000-2006

Phase 2: 2007 - 2016

Aust. Govt. (Water, Environment)

Ministers

Bureaucrats

MDB Commission / Authority

Board

CEO

Bureaucrats

Qld. Govt. (Natural Resources, Water, Environment)

Ministers

Bureaucrats

NRM organisations Qld. Murray-Darling Committee

Conservation World Wildlife Fund for Nature

Agricultural peak bodies

Qld. Farmers’ Federation

Local irrigator & catchment groups

Agforce

Science science advocates

Note: shaded areas indicate that representatives of these organisations and roles from this

phase of the case study were interviewed.

4.4.4 Soliciting and conducting interviews

Individuals were initially approached by email (Appendix D), inviting them to

participate in a voluntary, confidential interview as part the research. If individuals

did not respond to the email invitation, a second invitation was sent a fortnight later.

If individuals said they were not willing to participate, they were thanked and not

engaged further. If they were willing to be interviewed, a convenient time and

location were arranged. A participant information and consent form (Appendix E) and

indicative interview questions (Appendix F) were sent to the participant in advance

(and had previously been approved by the QUT Research Ethics Committee [Research

Ethics Approval Number 1500000074]).


Most interviews were conducted face-to-face in Brisbane, Canberra or regional

centres. Some were conducted by telephone or internet-based audio or video calls

(e.g. via Skype). Further email correspondence was often required to schedule

interviews, and sometimes participants wanted further clarification about the

interview process.

Semi-structured interview process

The interviews were conducted as semi-structured interviews or guided

interviews (Quinn, 2002) based on the set of indicative interview questions sent to

participants beforehand. Semi-structured interviews allow for topics to emerge and

be explored in a more natural way than standardised interview questions. Indeed,

this reflects an important assumption in qualitative research - that the participants’

perspective should be framed in their terms (the emic perspective) rather than that

framed by the researcher (the etic perspective) (Marshall & Rossman, 2011).

Conducting interviews

Case study timelines were provided and used in interviews to clarify the timing

of events recounted by subjects. At the start of the interview subjects were asked to

recount their relevant work histories. This allowed questions to be tailored to the

times, events and perspectives that fit the individuals' experience. The guiding

interview questions (Appendix F) were loosely followed, tailored in this manner.

Broadly, interview questions covered:

• What were the major policy changes and what was the rationale for

those changes during that period?

• What role did that persons' organisation play in those changes?

• How were stakeholders engaged in that process, and the rationale for

that approach?

• What were the outcomes of that process?

• Additional questions supported deeper exploration and explanation of

relevant areas as they arose from the interview conversation.


Interview data

All participants consented to being recorded, and recordings were later

transcribed. The researcher also took rough handwritten notes during the interview,

and recorded reflections immediately following the interview. In this way, each

interview was documented in three ways: transcripts, notes and reflections.

4.4.5 Researcher's experience

The researcher has had extensive experience working in the Great Barrier Reef

case study and (to a lesser extent) in the Queensland Murray-Darling Basin, since c.

1998. This experience provides valuable, particularly for the Great Barrier Reef case

study. This experience is not formally used as a data source, but inevitably provides

an additional source of evidence that can be used to triangulate formal research

evidence from interviews and documents. A number of research and evaluation

reports are of direct relevance to this research (see Eberhard, 2010, 2011; Robinson

et al., 2010; Stockwell et al., 2016); these four projects between 2010 and 2016

involved interviews with key GBR stakeholders about the performance of GBR

programs.

Validating people's recollections

The researcher's experience and professional records thus provide a valuable,

additional source of evidence. In Interviews, recollection of events 10 years ago or

more seemed to commonly reflect 'accepted history' rather than personal

experience, and on occasion contradicted the researcher's own experience or prior

research.

Better access but potential bias

The researcher's lived experience of both case studies appeared to facilitate

good access to interview subjects, and allow an easy rapport to be quickly established

in the interview process. The trade-off, however, is that this experience and prior

relationships is that it introduces a risk of bias, in two ways. First, the researcher

brings a strong preconception of the history of actions and reasoning to the research.

Second, knowing the researcher's history may bias interviewee accounts of events

and experiences. Management of these risks is discussed in the sections 4.6 and 4.7.


4.5 ANALYSIS

4.5.1 Document analysis

All academic literature and the significant grey literature were compiled and

managed in Endnote software. An annotated bibliography was developed for each

case study. A timeline and historical narrative of major events was developed from

the bibliography and individual documents. Timelines were used as key reference

material in the interviews, and in some cases, was corrected or refined by

interviewees with an intimate knowledge of individual events. The historical

narratives and timelines for each case study are reported in Chapters 5 and 7.

4.5.2 Thematic content analysis

Content analysis is defined as “a research method for the subjective

interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification

process of coding and identifying themes and patterns” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p.

1278). Schreier (2014) describes content analysis as a systematic, flexible process to

reduce data, achieved through an 8-step process:

1. Determining the research question;

2. Selecting research material;

3. Building a coding framework which defines and structures codes that

describe the text;

4. Segmenting material into units based on formal criteria (e.g. word

length, paragraph) or thematic criteria (e.g. change of topic);

5. Trial coding to pilot and test the coding framework;

6. Evaluating and modifying the coding framework;

7. Main analysis through iterative grouping and interrogation of coded

material; and

8. Presenting and interpreting the findings.

Codes and the coding framework are at the heart of thematic content analysis.

Saldaña (2015, p. 3) describes codes as a “summative, salient, essence-capturing,


and/or evocative attribute for [...] language-based or visual data”. Codes can be

generated in two broad ways - derived from the data, or developed from a

preconceived structure based on existing theory or research and then applied to the

data (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). The former approach (conventional content analysis)

is more appropriate when existing theory or research constructs are limited

(Kondracki et al., 2002), and is the approach adopted in this study. Codes need to be

unidimensional (refer to one matter only), mutually exclusive and exhaustive

(comprehensive coverage of the research topic) (Schreier, 2014).

Conventional content analysis starts with coding derived from the data. The

researcher needs to be fully immersed in the data to identify codes in this inductive

process (Kondracki et al., 2002; Miles & Huberman, 1994). The process is usually an

iterative one, where codes are progressively identified and described, compared with

existing codes, subsumed in or split off from other codes, tested and refined in an

ongoing process. Codes can refer to manifest concepts - visible at the surface of the

text, and often literally the words used in the text. Alternatively, codes may refer to

latent concepts - deeper meanings implied within the text (Morse & Field, 1995).

Coding is commonly a two-step process involving two full rounds of coding

(Tracy, 2012). The first, or primary cycle of coding focusses on the 'what' of the data

(manifest concepts). The second cycle of coding builds upon the first set of codes and

beings to organise them into categories that attempt to explain, theorise or

synthesise the data (Tracy, 2012). Again, categories can be driven from the data or

from preconceived concepts. Ideally, the two rounds of coding result in 10-15 clusters

of categories that have some meaning in relation to the research question (Morse &

Field, 1995).

As an inductive process, thematic content analysis requires the data to be

interpreted, carrying the risk of researcher error. Proponents of content analysis

argue that the process goes beyond a systematic sorting, coding and categorisation

of data - that the process generates a deep and complex understanding of the data

through the high level of researcher engagement required (Chowdhury, 2014). Willig

(2013) and others argue for the importance of researchers being explicit about their

frame of reference and methodological choices as part of good research practice.


The consistency and reliability of the coding process can be tested by checking

the consistency of coding when applied by other individuals, or by repeat coding by

the same individual at different times (Morse & Field, 1995; Schreier, 2014). The

validity of the coding framework can also be tested by examining the structure and

coverage of the codes developed - lots of 'residual' i.e. uncategorised codes suggest

low validity (Schreier, 2014). Broader questions about the credibility and validity of

the findings will be discussed later in the section on research quality (section 4.6).

4.5.3 Coding process

The analytical framework for this research examines the rationalities and

practices of metagovernance, governance outcomes and contextual factors.

However, given the state of metagovernance theory, a conventional coding process

that allowed key concepts to emerge from the data was adopted.

Interview transcripts were coded using NVivo qualitative analysis software

(Hoover & Koerber, 2011), following the general two-step process described above

by Schreiber (2014). Interviewees and their histories did not neatly fit into individual

case or case phases, as individuals moved between jobs, organisations (e.g.

Government to NRM organisation, or from state to federal government) and

sometimes between case studies. A set of contextual codes were developed to

identify which case, case x phase, and the sector and role of the interviewee were

developed to identify the context of different sections of the interview data. Three

interviews were used to develop the initial coding framework (with subsequent

minor revisions) that was applied in the first round of coding. The initial coding

framework focussed on the what, but also identified concepts that were clearly

relevant to the research question. Tentative categories at this stage included:

• Contextual codes (case, case x phase, sector and role of interviewee);

• Case-specific events or features (e.g. Basin Plan, Water Act, Reef Trust,

reef regulations);

• Generic activities or features (e.g. community engagement, markets,

media);


• Factors (e.g. knowledge, power, leadership);

• Collaboration (between and within sectors and/or governments);

• Institutional logics or rationales (how decisions were justified); and

• Outcomes (environmental, social, economic, governance).

Coding commenced with an initial read through of the interview to be coded,

from beginning to end. Any transcription queries were checked against the audio

recordings and handwritten notes, and, if appropriate, the transcript was edited. The

first step in coding was to code the whole interview according to the contextual codes

(case x period, sector, role). Then, carefully reading the transcript in detail, sections

of the transcript were coded to the non-contextual codes. At the completion of

coding, a short memo was recorded that commented on the features of this

interview, noting, for example, events or perspectives that were covered in detail.

The second round of coding built upon this framework, developing a more

refined understanding of the data through aggregating codes up into broader

categories and/or splitting codes down into more nuanced variations. This process

involved greater engagement with the data and reflecting how this related to the

analytical framework articulated earlier. The coding framework explicitly

incorporated elements of the analytical framework, including coding for evidence of

collaboration between different parties, the rationales of different groups or

organisations and evidence of environmental, economic, social or governance

outcomes. The final coding framework is provided in Appendix G.


4.5.4 Analysis and synthesis

A three-step process was used for the analysis and synthesis of the coding

results. At each step, the analytical framework developed in Chapter 3 was used to

frame the inquiry. The analytical framework focussed the inquiry on the rationalities

and practices of metagovernance, governance outcomes and the importance of

contextual factors. Participants provided evidence from a diverse set of perspectives,

and the analysis sought to identify both convergent and divergent accounts and

perspectives. Results are illustrated with quotations from interviews.

At the first step, coding results were summarised for each phase of each case

study (a total of 5 governance regimes). The results of the documentary analysis were

used to clarify, corroborate or fill gaps in the interview data (but are reported

separately to distinguish the source of evidence). Results report evidence (as

perceptions and accounts) of the rationalities and practice of metagovernance,

governance outcomes and important contextual factors. The key features of each

phase are summarised, and then summarised again (graphically) against the

elements of the analytical framework. In this way, both the coding and analysis stages

were guided by the analytical framework.

The second step summarised the findings for each of the two cases. Phases

within a case have common characteristics, and an evolutionary relationship. Again,

the documentary analysis provides an additional source of evidence to triangulate

with interview data. Again, the analytical framework was used to structure the overall

findings for each case.

The third step was to step back and look at what the interview data suggests in

terms of generalities, discussed in relation to the research objectives, but noting the

key similarities and differences between the two case studies. An iterative process

drew on the first and second steps above, to generate and test summative

statements. Results for the phase and case analyses are reported in Chapters 6 (GBR)

and 8 (MDB). The findings in relation to the research are discussed in Chapter 9.

Reflections on the implications and significance of the findings for theory,

methodology, research and practice are presented in Chapter 10.


4.5.5 Credibility

Credibility can be summarised as congruence between study findings and

reality. Approaches to ensure credibility are focused on ensuring that measurement

and interpretation reflect the views of the participants and the research question,

and are not derived from methodological or researcher bias (Shenton, 2004).

The researchers' extensive engagement as both a researcher and practitioner

in the field (detailed in section 4.4.4) strengthens the credibility of the research by

providing prolonged engagement and deep familiarity with the organisational

cultures of the subject matter (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Of course, this familiarity also

brings the risk of researcher bias through pre-conceived ideas, and could also

influence interviewees with prior relationships. The researcher's developing

impressions was recorded in a journal, in a process that encouraged reflection.

Documentary evidence also provides some methodological triangulation, as does

checking against the researcher's own lived experience and impressions. Rich

description is used in both case studies (Chapters 5 and 7), and results are discussed

in relation to previous theoretical and empirical research in relation to these case

studies and more broadly (Chapter 9). Finally, the interview participants and

practitioners have been afforded the opportunity to provide member checks and

feedback via a 'plain English' summary of findings, and presentations given at several

practitioner forums.

4.5.6 Transferability

Transferability is generally considered to be equivalent to generalisability, but

naturalistic inquiry is often so specific to environments and individuals that

generalisability is not realistically achievable (Shenton, 2004). Rather, transferability

proposes that the researcher provide sufficient rich data for readers to judge the

relevance of the study to other contexts. The research needs to build a thick

description to provide a clear 'line of sight' from participant contributions to

researcher findings, and provide 'ecological validity' through sufficient contextual

information to enable conclusions to be reached about the transferability of the

research conceptualisations. The detailed descriptions provided in Chapters 5 and 7,


reporting of detailed results and the lists of key documentary resources (Appendix B

and C) provide rich data to assist readers in judging transferability of findings.

4.5.7 Dependability

While dependability is equivalent to external validity in a positivist paradigm, a

qualitative study is unlikely to be repeatable because of its context dependency

(Shenton, 2004). However, if the sampling and analytical methods are described in

sufficient detail the method is repeatable. This study commits to detailed description

of the design and implementation of the study, operational details and

documentation of reflexive appraisals.

4.5.8 Confirmability

Confirmability relates to the objectivity of the researcher and the research

process – the results must reflect the insights of the participants, not researcher bias.

By using both document review and interviews, this study attempts to triangulate

methods and thus strengthen confirmability. The researcher's reflexive diary and

engagement with both research and practitioner networks through formal and

informal processes should be used to constrain the potential for researcher bias in

data collection and analysis. Thorough documentation of design, implementation,

analysis and progressive interpretation will also improve transparency of the

research process (this chapter).

4.6 RESEARCH CHALLENGES, LIMITATIONS AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

4.6.1 Research challenges and limitations

Several challenges have been noted earlier in this chapter. The first challenge

relates to the size and complexity of the two case studies, each of which provides a

long and complex history of governance decisions at multiple scales, concerning

complex social, institutional and environmental policy issues.

The primary concerns with bias in the research have been discussed in previous

sections of this chapter, and they are summarised as follows:


• Lack of access to current or previous Ministers and heads of

departments (section 4.4.3);

• Researcher bias due to work history (particularly in the GBR case study)

(sections 4.4.5 and 4.5.5);

• Poor interview data coverage (difficulty in accessing interviewees) and

data quality (poor or unreliable recollections) for periods more than ten

years ago (section 4.4.3);

• The potential for prior relationships between the researcher and

interviewees to influence interviewee's responses (section 4.4.5).

Processes to minimise the risks of these impacting on research quality have

been outlined in section 4.5. Nonetheless, this research has several limitations. First,

the analytical framework adopted a theoretical lens of metagovernance and

governmentality theory. Many alternative theoretical lenses are possible in the

governance literature, and the benefits or limitations may not be immediately

apparent. Research experience may be the best antidote to this limitation.

Secondly, the methodological limitations have been outlined above and

detailed throughout this chapter. The triangulation of interview data with

documentary analysis and researcher experience could be stronger if other methods

of data collection were used (e.g. participant observation). A logical next step would

be to consider the generalisability and transferability of these findings through an

expert panel type process (e.g. Delphi process). This may be taken up in future

research.

Thirdly, the generalisability and transferability of case study research is always

limited, although wider inferences can be drawn through comparison with cases that

share some similarities (Willis, 2012). Governance research examines a phenomenon

that is, by its very nature, unique to its' specific context and continually evolving.

Thus, the direct relevance of findings to a wider audience will always have some

limitations. Steps to improve the transferability of findings are documented in section

4.5.6.


4.6.2 Ethical considerations

This research was deemed low risk research and approved by the QUT Research

Ethics Committee (Research Ethics Approval Number 1500000074). The ethical

standards of the Queensland University of Technologies Manual of Policies and

Procedures (see http://www.mopp.qut.edu.au) was adhered to always. The project

was not expected to involve any significant risks beyond the potential for minor

inconvenience and anxiety about participating in the voluntary interview processes.

The risks of inconvenience were managed by taking advice from research

partner contacts about the best engagement approaches for particular groups and

individuals, and offering efficient and flexible opportunities to participate in

interviews, e.g. giving sufficient notice, giving options for time and location,

canvassing convenience before scheduling activities, coordinating with other

activities and so forth. The risks of minor anxiety were managed by ensuring that

research participants and research partner contacts were well briefed about the

research objectives, process (including confidentiality etc.) and outputs. For

interviewees, an information sheet, the consent form and indicative questions were

provided as prior to interview (Appendix E and F). Research partners from NRM

organisations requested a project newsletter which was distributed to partners and

other interested parties approximately quarterly. Research findings were also

presented to several forums attended by policy-makers and practitioners.

Consent to participate was formally addressed at the start of every interview

process (in writing for interviews conducted face-to-face, and verbally for those by

phone or internet). All interviewees consented to have the interview recorded. All

audio data and transcripts in potentially re-identifiable format were securely stored

(in a locked filing cabinet and/or secure server) and will be destroyed at the

completion of the thesis. Analytical processing was conducted on de-identified data.

De-identified data may be used for future research, as per the agreement of

participants (Appendix E).


4.7 CONCLUSION

The trustworthiness of qualitative research has been long critiqued (Shenton,

2004). This chapter has detailed and justified the research design to satisfy

established and appropriate research quality criteria. Section 4.2 summarised the

research problem, research questions and objectives and the analytical framework

adopted. The major components of the research design were then described and

defended (section 4.3). The post-positivist, critical realist research philosophy is

appropriate for an inquiry into the emergent process of governance where human

perspectives are important contributors to outcomes that are also strongly

influenced by context. The nascent state of metagovernance theory and the lack of

investigative metrics guided the research to adopt qualitative methods to explore the

tentative relationships between context, metagovernance rationalities and practices,

and outcomes. A case study approach was chosen for its examination of governance

within a detailed contextual understanding, and longitudinal cases for their ability to

capture the dynamics of governance change. Two Australian case studies were

chosen for their scale, significance, relevance to the research question and

longitudinal evidence base: the Murray-Darling Basin and the Great Barrier Reef. The

selection of two longitudinal case studies, each with a number of governance phases,

enabled the further division into a total of 5 case x phase combinations (two phases

of the Murray-Darling Basin case study and three phases of the Great Barrier Reef

case study).

Data collection processes are described in some detail, including the collation

and prioritisation of grey and academic literature. The analysis of case study

documentation allowed the development of case study timelines and historical

narratives, which were then used to identify potential candidates for interview. A

purposeful sampling strategy was employed, targeting influential decision-makers

across Australian and Queensland Governments, stakeholder organisations and other

advocates for each phase of each case study. A diversity of individual and institutional

perspectives was sought. Coverage against the stated criteria was good except for

Ministers and Heads of Departments. The researcher's extensive work experience in


this field is acknowledged, and the benefits in terms of research credibility and access

to interviewees noted, as well as the potential bias this introduced to the study.

Data analysis included the development of annotated case study

bibliographies, timelines and historical narratives. The use of thematic analysis to

interpret interview data is described and justified. The final coding framework is

documented. Analysis and synthesis was undertaken at three levels: at the individual

phase, at the level of each case study and across the two cases. Finally, questions of

research quality are considered and discussed. Limitations and ethical considerations

are described.

Chapter 5: Great Barrier Reef case study 125

Chapter 5: Great Barrier Reef case study

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Great Barrier Reef (GBR) water quality is the first of the two case studies presented. This

chapter introduces and explains the GBR water quality issue and provides a narrative account

of the case history, drawing on academic and grey literature. The case history and timeline

are then used to identify three phases of governance for further examination through the

accounts and perceptions of interviewees (reported in Chapter 6).

Section 5.1 introduces GBR water quality as a policy issue, describing how the water

quality runoff from catchments adjacent to the reef lagoon bring elevated sediments,

nutrients and pesticides that contribute to the degradation of inshore coral reefs. Water

quality exacerbates the impact of climate change and threatens the health of reef ecosystems

and dependent tourism and fishing industries. The management strategy is to reduce the

impact of agricultural through the adoption of better agricultural practices (section 5.2). The

key stakeholder groups and their interests are identified, including government agencies,

agricultural industries, conservation and natural resource management organisations and

communities (section 5.4). Section 5.5 presents a timeline of GBR policy events and describes

the governance history through three distinct policy phases characterised by their

governance arrangements, policy decisions and outcomes achieved. Finally, the key

governance phases for further analysis are summarised (section 5.6).


5.2 GREAT BARRIER REEF WATER QUALITY

5.2.1 The values of the Great Barrier Reef

The GBR stretches 2,300 km from the Torres Strait in the far north-eastern tip of

Australia, down the coast to Bundaberg and Hervey Bay. In the north, the reefs are found

close to the coast (within 100 km), while the outer reefs are found further offshore (up to 200

km) in the south (Figure 17).

Figure 17 The Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area and adjacent NRM regions

The GBR World Heritage Area supports 2,900 coral reefs, 1,050 islands and 46,000 km2

of seagrass beds within its 348,000 km2 area (Kroon et al., 2016). The diversity of ecosystems


found along the length, depth and across the shelf of the GBR makes it arguably the most

significant marine protected area on the planet (Day & Dobbs, 2013). Iconic species include

whales, dolphins, turtles, sharks and dugong as well as the coral reefs themselves.

In 1975, the GBR was protected under the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975,

when, following public outcry, the federal government used its territorial powers to establish

the protection of the reef as a national concern (Morrison, 2017). World Heritage listing was

afforded in 1981 based on the GBR's 'Outstanding Universal Value', specifically:

Having superlative natural phenomena and areas of exceptional natural beauty; it

being an outstanding example of major stages in the Earth's evolutionary history; it is

representing significant ongoing ecological and biological processes and Traditional

Owners' interaction with the natural environment; and ... containing the most

important and significant natural habitats for in situ conservation of biological

diversity. (Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA), 2014a, p. 7).

O’Mahoney et al. (2017) estimated that the GBR has an economic, social and icon asset

value of $56 billion, supporting 64,000 jobs and contributing $6.4 billion per annum to the

Australian economy. Over 90% of this value is generated within the tourism sector, and the

balance from recreation, commercial fishing, science and research. More recently, Stoeckl et

al. (2014) have estimated the value of ecosystem services provided by the GBR as between

$15 and $20 billion per annum. Alluvium Consulting (2016) estimated the costs to achieve

water quality targets at $8.2B, while Jacobs (2016) recommended that an annual investment

of $830M based on the asset value the GBR.

As well as economic benefits, the GBR supports significant well-being and cultural

values including aesthetic quality, heritage opportunities, lifestyle, seafood and biodiversity

for residents (including tourism operators and commercial fishers) and the wider Australian

community (Marshall et al., 2016). Several studies have found that non-economic values are

highly rated, even by commercial users (Bohnet & Kinjun, 2009; Dutra et al., 2016; Marshall

et al., 2016). Indigenous communes have strong historical, cultural and economic ties to the

GBR (Smyth, 1995), with at least 47 Traditional Owner groups having rights and interests GBR

land and sea country (Dale et al., 2016a).

Thirty-five major basins (424,000 km2) in 6 NRM regions drain into the GBR lagoon

(Figure 17). The landscapes and communities of the GBR are diverse. Two very large


catchments (the Fitzroy and Burdekin) account for most of the GBR catchment area (70% of

the area but only 28% of the flow) (Waterhouse et al., 2016). Rangeland grazing in these very

large, flat, semi-arid catchments (rainfall < 1,500 mm/y) delivers high sediment loads to the

GBR receiving waters in high flow events. In contrast, the small, steep and humid tropical

catchments of the Wet Tropics and Mackay-Whitsunday regions are dominated by intensive

agriculture, including sugarcane, bananas and tropical tree crops. These small regions with

high rainfall and runoff (e.g. the Wet Tropics has only 5% of the GBR catchment area but 33%

of the average annual flow) contribute high levels of dissolved nutrients and pesticides to the

GBR (Waters et al., 2014).

5.2.2 Current condition of the Great Barrier Reef

The GBR is facing the cumulative pressures of climate change, over-fishing, catchment

runoff, coastal development, mines and energy developments (Hughes et al., 2015). The

combined effects of historical and contemporary impacts have resulted in significant

deterioration in a wide range of GBR species and habitats.

Across the midshelf and offshore areas of the GBR it is estimated that coral cover has

declined 51% (1985-2012) (De'ath et al., 2012). There are many causes of coral decline,

including:

• Smothering and reduced light availability on inner-shelf reefs caused by fine

sediment in catchment runoff (Fabricius et al., 2014; Fabricius et al., 2016);

• Predation by crown of thorns starfish outbreaks triggered by nutrient enriched

catchment runoff (Brodie et al., 2005; Fabricius et al., 2010);

• Competition with algae (De'ath & Fabricius, 2010; Fabricius et al., 2005);

• Coral bleaching and other climate change impacts (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2007;

Hughes et al., 2015; Wooldridge, 2009);

• Coral disease (Haapkylä et al., 2011); and

• Direct and indirect impacts of cyclones (De'ath et al., 2012).

Seagrass has experienced similar, though less well documented, declines in extent and

abundance from storms, floods and the impacts of coastal and catchment agriculture, urban

and port land uses (McKenzie et al., 2015). Many of the GBR's iconic species have seriously


declined, including some species of marine mammals, turtles, sharks and seabirds. For

example, dugong populations have declined from an estimated 72,000 in the 1960's to about

4,200 in the 1990's (Marsh et al., 2005). The Australian Government's 2015 report to UNESCO

concluded that:

The overall outlook for the Reef is poor, has worsened since 2009, and is expected to

further deteriorate in the future; and that greater reductions of all threats at all levels-

-Reef-wide, regional and local--are required” (Aust. Govt., 2015c, p. 2).

The impacts of growing human pressures are exacerbated by the impacts of climate

change. Coral reefs are threatened globally, with climate change predictions suggesting that

conditions in the next 50 years will exceed anything experienced by corals in the last half a

million years (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2007; Hughes et al., 2003). Extreme sea surface

temperatures in 2016 resulted in an unprecedented global coral bleaching event (Normile,

2016). Effects were severe, with preliminary results suggesting an average 22% coral mortality

across the GBR. Mortality was most severe (average 50% mortality) in the northern section

(Cairns to Cape York; Figure 17) (GBRMPA, 2016), which was generally considered to be in

relatively pristine prior to that event (Brodie et al., 2012; Brodie & Pearson, 2016; De'ath et

al., 2012).

Researchers continue to call for renewed efforts to manage water quality to improve

the resilience of GBR to multiple stressors while global climate agreements are enacted and

implemented (Brodie et al., 2017; Brodie & Waterhouse, 2012; Dale et al., 2016b; Kroon et

al., 2016; Waterhouse et al., 2017). The declining health of the GBR requires urgent action to

maintain its resilience in the medium term, since any mitigation of climate change will take

time.

5.2.3 Water quality impacts

Land derived pollutants disperse offshore during wet season high flow events (e.g.

Devlin et al., 2012) and pose a range of threats to valuable GBR ecosystems, including coral

reefs, seagrass meadows, and associated species such as dugongs and turtles (Schaffelke et

al., 2013). Excess nutrient discharges are associated with increased outbreaks of Crown of

Thorns populations which are a major predator of corals (Fabricius et al., 2010). Elevated

nutrients can also lead to excessive algal growth at the expense of coral diversity (De'ath &


Fabricius, 2010) and can increase the susceptibility of corals to bleaching (Brodie et al., 2017;

Wooldridge, 2009) and disease (Haapkylä et al., 2011). Fine sediment can reduce the growth

of seagrass and corals by making the water turbid and reducing light penetration (Collier et

al., 2012; Fabricius et al., 2014; Fabricius et al., 2016). Pesticides are used for the control of

weeds (herbicides) and insects (insecticides) but may not discriminate between pest and non-

pest species. When released into waterways they can pose a risk to freshwater and some

inshore and coastal habitats (Di Bella et al., 2016; Lewis et al., 2014a) such as seagrass,

mangroves and corals.

Increased runoff of sediment, nutrients and pesticides from agricultural and urban land

uses may also be impacting freshwater and estuarine ecosystems, but there is less evidence

of these effects than in the more-studied marine ecosystems (Brodie & Waterhouse, 2016;

Davis et al., 2016; Waterhouse et al., 2016).

5.2.4 Water quality pressures

In the period since 'European' agricultural practices were introduced into the GBR

catchments (since approximately 1830 in the south and later in the northern areas), loads of

sediment, nitrogen, phosphorus and pesticides transported by rivers have increased greatly.

For example, for the whole of GBR, modelled estimates of total annual average suspended

sediment, total phosphorus and total nitrogen exported loads have increased by 2-3 times

from pre-development loads (Waters et al., 2014). These changes can be detected using

historic data such as coral coring (e.g. Lewis et al., 2007), sediment coring (Clark et al., 2016;

Reymond et al., 2013; Roff et al., 2012) and geochemical records (Lewis et al., 2014b; Waters

et al., 2014).

The mean annual total suspended sediment load is estimated to be 8.5 million t/y. The

major sources of sediment are from the large dry tropics grazing-dominated Burdekin and

Fitzroy Basins, contributing over 70% of the modelled load. Erosion from hillslopes,

streambanks and gullies contribute to the sediment losses, with major variations in the

relative contributions between individual catchments (Bartley et al., 2014; Wilkinson et al.,

2013). While erosion from cropping areas and urban development on steep lands are much

smaller in area, they may be pose a threat to local coastal reefs and seagrass areas.


The estimated mean annual nitrogen load is estimated to be 10,500 t/y. By far the

largest increases since European settlement have occurred in the dissolved nitrogen from

fertiliser use and particulate nitrogen (bound to soil particles) associated with increased

erosion (Waterhouse et al., 2012). The largest increase in phosphorous is also due to

increased erosion. The largest sources of nitrogen and phosphorus are from the Wet Tropics

and Burdekin regions (Waters et al., 2014).

On average, at least 16 t/y of herbicides (for which reliable monitoring information

exists) are discharged to the GBR every year (Waters et al., 2014). Unlike nutrients and

sediments, there is no 'natural' level of herbicides. Herbicides mostly originate from the

sugarcane industry (Waterhouse et al., 2012), with smaller amounts sourced from the grains

and grazing industries (Waters et al., 2014).

Practices to reduce erosion in grazing lands rely on maintaining ground cover and

biomass of pastures, especially during the dry season and droughts (Thorburn et al., 2013).

Increasing ground cover levels will help reduce runoff and prevent or reduce further hillslope

and channel erosion. More recently, it has become clear that gully networks caused by

livestock grazing are much more important sources of sediment that previously thought (e.g.

Olley et al., 2013). Improved grazing practices alone may not be adequate to reduce gully

erosion and specific interventions to stabilise and revegetate gullies may be necessary

(Bartley et al., 2014).

Substantial amounts of nitrogen fertiliser are applied to high value crops such as

sugarcane in the GBR catchments with large losses of nitrogen to both runoff and

groundwater (Thorburn et al., 2013). Large reductions in the amounts of applied nitrogen per

hectare will be required to reach the pollutant load reduction targets set in current

government policies (Brodie et al., 2017).

Practices to effectively reduce the levels of nitrogenous fertilisers applied, while

maintaining profitability, are not well understood in the sugarcane industry. New 'solutions'

are being tested, such as slow release fertilisers (Di Bella et al., 2013), but such practices have

not been proven to reduce nitrogen losses and maintain profitability yet. In comparison,

management practices to reduce pesticide losses are well understood, particularly in

sugarcane (Devlin et al., 2015).


5.2.5 Management objectives

Climate change, water quality, coastal development and some fisheries are the major

threats to the Great Barrier Reef (Brodie & Pearson, 2016). Of these, the greatest threat to

the values of the Great Barrier Reef in the long-term is climate change (GBRMPA, 2014a).

However, catchment water quality is an immediate, system-wide threat that also impacts

ecosystem resilience to climate change (Aust. Govt., 2015b). The research reported here only

concerns management efforts to address water quality on the GBR.

The dominant source of water quality issues in the GBR is from agricultural land uses:

sediments predominantly from rangeland grazing and nutrients and pesticides predominantly

from sugar cane (Waterhouse et al., 2014). While there has been substantial Queensland and

Australian government investment in positive incentives (education, extension, grants and

market-mechanisms) to improve agricultural practices over the last 15 years, it is now

apparent that improvements are neither sufficient nor rapid enough to meet water quality

targets (Great Barrier Reef Water Science Taskforce (GBRWST), 2016).

The major bilateral initiatives to improve water quality for the Great Barrier Reef (the

Reef Water Quality Protection Plan and associated programs) are designed to accelerate the

adoption of agricultural practices that will improve water quality (reduced water quality risk)

to improve the health and resilience the GBR for multiple benefits (Figure 18).

Figure 18. Management logic of GBR water quality programs (author)

Noting, however, the urgency of action on climate change and the slow progress of

water quality improvement, there is ongoing pressure to widen the scope of policy objectives.

This will be discussed further in the section on GBR governance history (section 5.5).

5.3 MANAGEMENT AUTHORITIES

The GBR was listed as a World Heritage site in 1981 (proposed by the Australian

Government) following state government zoning most of the area for oil and gas exploration


(McCalman, 2016). The World Heritage Convention imposes binding obligations on Australia

(Wulf, 2004) and these obligations and constitutional responsibilities relating to

environmental matters of national significance are supported through the Environment

Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) and the Great Barrier Reef Marine

Park Act 1975 (Cth). The Queensland Government holds primary responsibility for land and

water management and administers this through the Environment Protection Act 1994 (Qld),

the Water Act 2000 (Qld), the Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld), the Planning Act 2016

(Qld) and other legislation. In recent decades, the federal government has become

increasingly involved in water reform and community-based natural resource management

(Robins & Dovers, 2007b).

Legislative boundaries between the Queensland and Australian governments overlap in

the tidal and inshore areas (Hockings et al. 2014) and the day-to-day operations of the marine

park are jointly managed. There are some 26 different legislative instruments that relate to

the GBR World Heritage Area, administered by 12 different departments and agencies and 8

different ministers (Jacobs, 2014). In addition, 42 Local Governments play a significant role in

planning, sewage treatment, local environmental restoration, and community engagement

activities.

The main policy initiatives employed by governments to specifically manage water

quality impacts on the GBR include:

• The bilateral Reef Water Quality Protection Plan (established in 2003, revised in

2009 and 2013) focusses on actions to improve water quality, and the 2015 Reef

2050 Long-Term Sustainability Plan which has a broader remit to coordinate

actions to maintain the health of the reef.

• Regional Water Quality Improvement Plans developed by Regional Natural

Resource Management (NRM) groups across the 6 NRM regions (c. 2008 and

revised c. 2016) funded by the Australian Government

• Property planning and management systems including industry-led voluntary

Best Management Practice (BMP) programs such as Smartcane and Grazing

BMP, currently supported by Queensland Government funding and used in the


implementation of water quality incentives programs funded by both

Queensland and Australian Governments.

• Specific property requirements under land and water management regulations,

including the Great Barrier Reef Protection Amendment Act 2009 (Qld.)

The Australian and Queensland governments have made substantial investments in

positive incentives (education, extension, grants and market-mechanisms) for improved

agricultural practices, largely delivered through natural resource management and

agricultural industry organisations. The government agencies responsible for these initiatives

are summarised in Table 5.1 below.


Table 5.1 Principal government agencies engaged in managing Great Barrier Reef water quality and their current activities

Government Agency Reef-related interests Current reef-related activities

Australian Government

Department of Environment and Energy

policies and programs to protect and conserve the environment, water… and promote climate action.

World Heritage reporting, bilateral Reef Plan, Reef 2050 Plan, Reef Trust projects, national Natural Resource Management (NRM) programs

Department of Agriculture and Water Resources

policies and services to improve the productivity, competitiveness and sustainability of agriculture

Landcare projects, research and development, national water policy

Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority

protect and restore the Reef's biodiversity, protect the Reef's heritage values and ensure sustainable use of the Marine Park

community engagement, marine monitoring

Queensland Government

Department of Environment and Heritage Protection

environment and heritage protection including the Great Barrier Reef

bilateral Reef Plan, Reef 2050 Plan, Office of the Great Barrier Reef, water quality, environmental regulations

Department of Natural Resources and Mines

responsible and sustainable use of our state's natural resources - water, land, minerals and energy

State NRM programs, water planning

Department of Agriculture and Fisheries

sustainable and innovative agriculture, fisheries and forestry sector

Agricultural industry best management practice programs, agricultural regulation

Note: the departmental responsibilities and activities are current as at March 2017


Coordination arrangements between Queensland and Australian Government are an

important component of reef governance. Figure 19 below illustrates the formal

intergovernmental structures for reef water quality management and the key organisations

involved in implementing reef water quality programs. An Intergovernmental Agreement

(Australian and Queensland Governments (Aust. & Qld. Gov.), 2009) commits the Australian

and Queensland Governments to work together to protect the reef. The Great Barrier Reef

Ministerial Forum, comprised of two ministers from each government, is charged with

implementing the Intergovernmental Agreement. The Ministerial Forum is supported by an

officials’ committee (the Intergovernmental Operational Committee), which administers the

two bilateral plans - the Reef Water Quality Protection Plan and the 2015 Reef 2050 Long-

Term Sustainability Plan. Both plans are supported by advisory science panels and stakeholder

committees. The plans provide policy guidance, coordination and reporting mechanisms.

Both Governments implement reef related programs, and the degree of active coordination

varies over time (Eberhard et al., 2017a).


Figure 19. Major governance arrangements for reef water quality programs (2017) (author)


Implementation of reef programs is primarily undertaken at the regional scale. Both

governments invest in incentive programs to improve agricultural practices, and the

Queensland Government administers additional 'on-ground' programs that relate to

agricultural extension and regulation. The primary delivery agents for reef water quality

programs are NRM organisations, of which there are 6 across the GBR catchments (Figure 17).

NRM organisations are responsible for developing water quality improvement plans to guide

regional investments in water quality improvement (although implementation of these plans

is not directly funded) (Eberhard et al., 2017a). NRM organisations partner with local industry

groups to deliver programs, and across the GBR a formal Reef Alliance between NRM,

agricultural industry peak bodies and the conservation sector has been influential in policy

advocacy and program delivery (Eberhard, 2011).

While these formal reef-related initiatives form the 'core' of reef water quality actions

by government, many policy areas influence water quality outcomes in the GBR. Dale et al.

(2016b) identified some 40 decision-making systems (or governance domains) that influence

the reef from local to international scales. The overall GBR governance system thus involves

a wide range of policy areas that collectively contribute to the health of the GBR catchments

and reef lagoon. The history and evolution of GBR governance and policy is detailed further

in section 5.5.

5.4 STAKEHOLDERS

The key stakeholder groups for reef water quality and their representative

organisations are listed in Table 5.2 below. Organisations with high levels of engagement in

GBR water quality policy making (at any time) have been included in this research. The three

phases of reef governance relate to the three phases described in the following section

(section 5.5) that details the history of reef governance.


Table 5.2 Stakeholder organisations in the Great Barrier Reef

Note: Engagement in reef governance refers to the level of engagement in Reef Plan policy-level decision-making. High = active and influential in policy-level decisions. Low = some level of engagement in policy- level decisions. None = no level of engagement in policy-level decisions evident.

Engagement in reef governance

Sector Organisations Relevant interests Relevant activities 2003-2007 2008-2013 2014-2016

Local governments 42 local governments

environmental management and

sustainability

local land use planning and management none low none

Natural Resource Management

(NRM) organisations

Cape York Sustainable Futures; Terrain NRM; Dry Tropics NRM; Reef Catchments; Fitzroy Basin

Association; Burnett Mary Regional Body for NRM, Queensland Regional Groups Collective

strategic regional NRM

community engagement, regional water quality

planning, policy advocacy and program delivery

low high high

Agricultural industry bodies

Queensland Farmers Federation; Canegrowers; Growcom, AgForce,

Queensland Dairyfarmers Organisation, Australian Banana

Growers Council

profitable and sustainable agricultural industries

member engagement and representation, program

delivery none low high

Conservation organisations World Wildlife Fund for Nature

environmental outcomes

policy advocacy, philanthropic investment none low high

Indigenous groups

Cape York Land Council; Balkanu; Girringun; FBEC and other

organisations

Indigenous livelihoods and environmental management

Traditional Owners and indigenous engagement

and representation, policy advocacy

none none none

Tourism peak body

Association of Marine Park Tourism Operators

profitable and sustainable tourism

industry

member engagement and representation, policy

advocacy low none none


5.4.1 Local Governments

Local governments have been described here as stakeholders rather than management

authorities because they have played a minor role in the delivery of reef water quality

programs and have had no formal engagement in reef water quality policy under the bilateral

arrangements described in the previous section (section 5.3). There are 42 local governments

across GBR catchments and they vary widely in scale, revenue base and capacity. They play

an important role in local planning and development decisions but do not deliver reef water

quality programs. The Queensland Department of Infrastructure, Local Government and

Planning provide state government oversight of planning, regional development and

infrastructure, while the Local Government Association of Queensland is the peak body for

Queensland Local Governments.

5.4.2 Agricultural industries

GBR water quality programs are currently focussed almost exclusively on accelerating

the adoption of agricultural practices that have reduced water quality risk. As detailed in the

previous section (5.2.4), the priority industries are sugarcane and grazing.

Canegrowers is the peak body for Australian sugarcane growers and provides

representation, advocacy and services to growers. Queensland accounts for 95% of Australia's

raw sugar production, with cane grown on coastal floodplains from Grafton in NSW up to the

Daintree in far north Queensland. About 4,000 farms (approximately 4,000 km2) supply cane

to 24 mills and 80% of the crush is exported. Sugarcane is the dominant source of dissolved

nutrients and pesticides in the GBR (Brodie et al., 2013). Canegrowers run Smartcane BMP, a

voluntary program that encourages growers to benchmark their practices against industry

standards and commit to addressing risks identified (Canegrowers, 2016; Kealley & Quirk,

2016).

Rangeland grazing is the dominant source of sediments exported to the GBR lagoon

(Brodie et al., 2013). Grazing dominates the large, flat, low rainfall catchments of the Burdekin

and Fitzroy regions (Figure 17). Agforce Queensland is the peak industry body representing

broad-acre agricultural industries in Queensland, including cattle, grain, sheep and wool


enterprises. Agforce is primarily a membership-based advocacy organisation, but supports

Grazing BMP, developed and implemented by regional NRM organisations.

Other agricultural industries engaged in GBR water quality programs include

horticulture (970 growers managing 86,000 ha), bananas, grains and dairy (Aus. & Qld. Gov.,

2016a). Queensland Farmers Federation (QFF) is the peak body for the intensive agricultural

industries in Queensland, while Agforce represents the broad-acre industries. QFF has played

a significant leadership role in Reef water quality advocacy, partnerships, program

development and coordination. The growing role of peak agricultural bodies in delivering reef

water quality programs has challenged traditional models of agricultural industry advocacy

and raised issues of representational legitimacy (who speaks for who) (Taylor & Lawrence,

2012; Taylor et al., 2010).

5.4.3 Natural Resource Management organisations

Australia's natural resource management system was described in section 2.2.4. In

Queensland, NRM organisations are non-statutory organisations, and there are six regional

organisations in the Great Barrier Reef catchment (Table 5.2). NRM organisations have been

central to GBR water quality policy advocacy and delivery since their formation in 2001-2.

NRM groups developed and subsequently revised Water Quality Improvement Plans (WQIPs)

in GBR catchments. WQIPs have helped to identify regional priorities (industries, areas,

practices) including the initial development of the Reef Water Quality Risk Framework (Aus.

& Qld. Gov., 2013b) subsequently adopted by governments. The mandate of these

organisations, funding levels and investment priorities have changed over time (Vella & Sipe,

2014; Vella et al., 2015), but in general they broker the delivery of voluntary resource

management programs on behalf of the Queensland and Australian governments. The

Queensland Regional Groups Collective is the peak body for the Queensland NRM

organisations.

5.4.4 Conservation sector

The conservation sector is an important stakeholder in reef water quality. The World

Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF) leads the sectors’ engagement in reef water quality policy

advocacy and has also been an active project partner, helping to bring philanthropic


investment into reef programs. WWF has been an extremely influential policy advocate at

both levels and sides of government.

5.4.5 Indigenous groups

At least 42 Traditional Owner groups have rights and interests to GBR land or sea

country (Dale et al., 2016a). Engagement of traditional owners in water quality planning and

programs has been inconsistent, however, and has lacked the supporting capacity building

and engagement frameworks (Dale et al., 2016a).

5.4.6 Tourism sector

The Australian Marine Park Tourism Organisation has been a relatively minor player in

GBR water quality policy but has supported proposals for additional investment in water

quality programs and research.

5.5 GBR GOVERNANCE HISTORY

5.5.1 Timeline

The timeline presented in Table 7.3 summarises the key milestones in reef policy across

the three phases of governance described and characterised in the following sections.

Milestones include legislation, plans, major reports and investment programs, categorised

according to whether they relate to Queensland or Australian Government or bilateral roles,

or those led by non-government stakeholders (mostly NRM organisations and agricultural

industry peak bodies). Each of these milestones are described and explained in the following

sections. Table 5.3 also shows the political context at state and federal levels, including

election dates which have, on some occasions, been important triggers for key reef policy

decisions. Significant physical events such as cyclones, coral bleaching and the 2011

Queensland floods are also show. Again, these events have been influential in subsequent

policy decisions.


Table 5.3 Timeline of GBR governance phases including major milestones and natural disasters


5.5.2 Science advocacy to consensus for action (1980-2002)

The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park was proclaimed under the Great Barrier Reef Marine

Park Act 1975 (Cth), in conjunction with establishment of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park

Authority (GBRMPA). Intergovernmental coordination between the Queensland and

Australian Governments for the management of the GBR was formalised under the 'Emerald

Agreement' which established the GBR Ministerial Council in 1979 (GBRMPA, 2005).

Scientific evidence of the water quality impacts and risks to the GBR built through the

1980s to 2000's (Haynes & Michalek-Wagner, 2000), but it was through the GBR Ministerial

Council (precursor to the current Ministerial Forum) that scientific argument finally attracted

policy attention in 2000. Following a Ministerial Council meeting, the first set of catchment-

based pollutant load reduction targets was developed by the GBRMPA (Brodie et al., 2001b)

and this was quickly followed by two key reports commissioned to support the development

of a bilateral Reef Water Quality Protection Plan. The Baker Report (2003) confirmed the

impacts and risks of declining water quality and agricultural industries as the primary source,

and the Productivity Commission Report (2003) evaluated a number of policy options to

address water quality issues.

At the same time, the national NRM program was undergoing a significant shift, from

the first phase of the Natural Heritage Trust (NHT) that resourced farmers and community

groups directly, to the second phase (NHT2) that established regional organisations to

oversee NRM programs under a national framework and bilateral arrangements (Robins &

Dovers, 2007a; Vella et al., 2015). Regional NRM organisations were charged with developing

and implementing NRM plans based on 'best-available' science and strong community

engagement.

In this phase, the need for actions to address water quality risks to the GBR was strongly

advocated by marine scientists and GBMRPA. While new catchment modelling capacity was

employed to develop targets (Brodie et al., 2001a), monitoring and other evidence of

outcomes was drawn almost exclusively from the coastal and marine environment. No formal

stakeholder engagement mechanisms were established under bilateral arrangements for GBR

water quality policy at this stage, but regional NRM organisations and national NRM funding

programs were anticipated to be the vehicle for delivery of 'on-ground' policy actions. The

Queensland Government, with responsibility for land management in the GBR catchments,


was a relatively passive partner in these early developments, with no major new investments

in reef programs.

5.5.3 Phase 1: Reef Plan and the Reef Partnership (2003-2007)

The first Reef Water Quality Protection Plan (Reef Plan) was launched in 2003 with the

goal of “halting and reversing the decline in water quality entering the Reef within 10 years”

(Queensland and Australian Governments (Qld. & Aust. Govt.), 2003, p. 6). Activities within

the Plan were largely existing government initiatives, and there were no formal stakeholder

engagement structures (Aus. & Qld. Gov., 2005).

The key additional activity initiated at this stage was the development of regional WQIPs

by regional NRM organisations, funded by the Australian Government under the National

Water Quality Management Strategy. The WQIPs involved a substantial investment in

science, particularly in water quality modelling and investigation of water quality impacts of

agriculture at various scales, and engaged local and regional industry representatives, as well

as government officers (Taylor & Lawrence, 2012; Taylor et al., 2010).

The first generation of regional WQIPs developed a framework for the water quality

benefits of different (improved) agricultural practices in the major agricultural industries

(sugar, horticulture and grazing). This framework developed into the 'ABCD' management

practices framework, with variations for different industries and regions (Vella & Dale, 2014).

Another key development was the establishment of the Reef Water Quality Partnership.

This emerged from a coordination arrangement across regional WQIPs, supported by regional

NRM staff and contractors. The Reef Water Quality Partnership was adopted within the

formal Reef Plan governance arrangements for two years (2006-2008), where it facilitated

policy dialogue between regional NRM organisations and Queensland and Australian

governments, supported by scientific and technical advisory groups.

The WQIPs made a compelling case for investment in improved agricultural practices.

Pilot NRM programs demonstrated the use of the ABCD framework as a metric to guide the

prioritisation of program grants to farmers for the adoption of improved practices with

demonstrated water quality benefit. The regional WQIPs had built regional expectations for

action amongst stakeholders including industry groups.


The Reef Water Quality Partnership facilitated the drafting of a 'Scientific Consensus

Statement' and the design of an integrated monitoring and monitoring program that included

property, catchment and marine components. A major conclusion of the Scientific Consensus

Statement was that “current management interventions were not effectively solving the

problem” (Brodie et al., 2008, p. 1).

A policy window was created by growing stakeholder frustration with the Reef Plan, the

lack of investment in WQIP implementation, and the looming Federal election and expected

change in government (2006-07). Actively encouraged by Australian government officers,

regional NRM and agricultural industry organisations jointly prepared a business case for

$300M (Aus) investment that was advocated to both the government and the opposition. The

business case was promoted by an unusual alliance of NRM groups, agricultural industries,

the conservation sector and leading scientists.

5.5.4 Phase 2: Reef Rescue and regulation (2008-2013)

Following the federal election in 2007, the Australian government announced a new

plan - 'Reef Rescue' – which was a $200 million grants program to accelerate the adoption of

improved agricultural practices. Reef Rescue was based on the proposal put forward by

regional NRM and agricultural industry organisations, who then became the delivery agents,

and formalised their collaboration as the 'Reef Alliance'.

The national NRM program underwent significant reform in 2008, moving from the

Natural Heritage Trust program, which funded regional NRM priorities, to a competitive

funding model to deliver national NRM priorities 'Caring for our Country' (Robins & Kanowski,

2011).

At the same time, the Queensland government regulated agricultural practices in high

priority GBR catchments under the Great Barrier Reef Protection Amendment Act 2009 (Qld).

Reef Plan itself was revised in 2009, with the additional long-term goal that “by 2020 the

quality of water entering the Reef from adjacent catchments has no detrimental impact on

the health and resilience of the Great Barrier Reef” (The State of Queensland and

Commonwealth of Australia, 2009, p. 14). The revised Reef Plan committed to water quality

and land management practice targets, based on the WQIPs and the business case put


forward by NRM and agricultural industry organisations. A formal stakeholder advisory

committee replaced the Reef Water Quality Partnership.

A more substantial monitoring program was established, including catchment

monitoring and modelling, and the first GBR water quality Report Card was released in 2011

(Aus. & Qld. Gov., 2011).

About this time, the rapid expansion in coal and coal seam gas industries triggered

significant new and expanded port development proposals, with associated risks from

dredging and dredge spoil disposal, as well as longer-term risks from the associated

greenhouse gas emissions. At the same time, new governments in Queensland (2012) and

federally (2013) were winding back a wide range of environmental controls ('green tape

reduction'), including a 'non-enforcement' policy for the recently introduced agricultural

pollution regulations.

The proposed port developments received wide media coverage. A reactive monitoring

mission by UNESCO/IUCN was triggered when the Australian government approved a large

liquefied natural gas hub in central Queensland without notifying the World Heritage

Committee (McGrath, 2012). In response, the Australian and Queensland governments

prepared strategic assessments of development in the marine and catchment areas of the

GBR respectively, under section 146 of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity

Conservation Act 1999 (Cth). Ultimately, the World Heritage Committee chose not to list the

GBR as 'World Heritage in Danger' but maintains a close interest. The Australian Government

currently provides annual reports to the Committee on efforts to maintain the 'Outstanding

Universal Values' that defines the GBR's World Heritage status (Aus. & Qld. Gov., 2016b).

Early results of the new programs looked promising. In the first two years of the Reef

Rescue program, 34% of sugarcane farmers, 25% of horticulture farmers and 17% of graziers

adopted improved practices with a modelled reduction of 6% of nutrient, 7% of sediments

and 15% of pesticide loads (Aus. & Qld. Gov., 2013a).

This phase of GBR management was characterised first by an increased commitment by

both governments to drive change in agricultural practices, adopting many of the strategies

proposed by the Reef Alliance and supported by regional WQIPs. A mix of regulation and

incentives were used, and clear evidence that persuasive measures were supporting


accelerated uptake of improved management practices. But then changes in government at

both levels adjusted policy settings. The resources and energy boom put new pressures on

the GBR and triggered the engagement of the World Heritage Committee.

In 2013, an updated Scientific Consensus Statement was released, and Reef Water

Quality Protection Plan was revised (Aus. & Qld. Gov., 2013c; Brodie et al., 2013). Targets

were updated based on revised modelling of the adoption of best management practices in

agricultural industries.

5.5.5 Phase 3: Responding to UNESCO (2014-2016)

In 2015, the Queensland and Australian Governments developed the Reef 2050 Long-

Term Sustainability Plan (Aust. Govt., 2015b) with a broader remit to address all threats to

the reef including climate change, land use change and direct use impacts. The Reef Water

Quality Protection Plan remains the guiding document for addressing water quality issues.

The Reef 2050 Long-Term Sustainability Plan was presented to the World Heritage Committee

in 2015 (Aust. Govt., 2015c). The Australian Academy of Science issued a scathing critique,

claiming that “the draft plan is inadequate” and “fails to effectively address any of these

pressures” (Australian Academy of Science (AAS), 2014, p. 2).

In 2014, the Australian government established the 'Reef Trust' with a $140 million

commitment. The Reef Trust provides investment for the implementation of some aspects of

the Reef 2050 Plan. Rather than programmatic funding that had previously provided long-

term (5 year) investments, the Reef Trust has engaged with a variety of new projects,

including market-based instruments for agricultural practice change.

Another change of government in Queensland in 2015 saw renewed political

commitment to protecting the GBR. The first 'Minister for the GBR' was established, making

changes to ports policy (including a ban on sea dumping of capital dredge waste), additional

resource commitments ($100 million), and review and reinstatement of recent legislative

changes to the Water Act 2000 (Qld), Vegetation Management Act 1999 (Qld) and Coastal

Protection and Management Act 1995 (Qld). The Queensland government convened a high-

level GBR Water Science Taskforce to determine the best approach to achieving revised

pollutant load reduction targets (up to 80% nitrogen reduction and 50% sediment reduction

in key catchments by 2025). The Taskforce recommended a suite of measures, including


extension, education, incentives and regulation, and noted the need for substantial and

enduring investment and governance reform (Great Barrier Reef Water Science Taskforce

(GBRWST), 2016). The Queensland government accepted, in principle, all the Taskforce's

recommendations.

This period (Phase 3) has been characterised by a substantial re-engagement in GBR

policy by the new Queensland government, but changes in Australian government funding

arrangements have created competition and uncertainty for delivery agents (the NRM

organisations). The World Heritage Committee continues to scrutinise efforts to protect the

reef.

Currently (December 2016), the Scientific Consensus Statement, pollutant load

reduction targets and regional management priorities are being updated in anticipation of a

revision of the Reef 2050 Plan in 2017.

5.6 KEY GOVERNANCE PHASES FOR ANALYSIS

The preceding sections have described four distinct phases of GBR water quality

governance. Three of these are taken forward as key decision points for analysis. The long

build of science advocacy that led to the initial establishment of the Reef Water Quality

Protection Plan is excluded from the analysis for two reasons. First, there were no major

policy commitments made during this phase, and secondly, access to decision-makers is likely

to be challenging and the recollections of those events (more than 15 years ago) are likely to

be unreliable. Three phases of GBR water quality governance are therefore relevant to the

research inquiry:

Phase 1: Reef Plan and the Reef Partnership (2003-2007). This phase was characterised

by the establishment of the bilateral Reef Water Quality Protection Plan, but little new activity

by government. Stakeholder engagement was weak. The development of Water Quality

Improvement Plans by NRM organisations (funded by the Australian Government) built a case

for action and expectations of investment. NRM organisations facilitated the Reef Water

Quality Partnership that influenced policy thinking but was not able to secure investment until

the 2007 election. Encouraged by Australian Government bureaucrats, NRM organisations

and peak agricultural industry groups developed and promoted an investment package to

political parties.


Phase 2: Reef Rescue and regulation (2008-2013). The proposal was successful and the

$200M Reef Rescue program was established with the new alliance of NRM and agricultural

industry organisations delivering it. Reef Water Quality Protection Plan was revised to reflect

new arrangements and committed to water quality and practice change targets based on the

regional Water Quality Improvement Plans. The Reef Water Quality Partnership was shut

down and replaced by a stakeholder advisory committee. Under pressure to match Australian

Government financial commitments, the Queensland Government announced new

regulations to enforce minimum agricultural practices for priority areas and industries. The

Reef Rescue program met and exceeded ambitious targets.

Phase 3: Responding to UNESCO (2014-2016). This phase has been characterised by the

mining boom and coal seam gas industry. Three new liquefied natural gas (LNG) plants were

established in central Queensland and 14 new ports were proposed along the Queensland

Coast. UNESCO's World Heritage Committee became involved when the Australian

Government failed to notify them of the LNG plants, considered as mining infrastructure and

incompatible with World Heritage values. A reactive monitoring mission was triggered, and

the Australian Government put on notice that the Great Barrier Reef would be considered for

listing as 'World Heritage in Danger.'

5.7 CONCLUSION

Australia's GBR is truly one of the world's natural wonders. Widely billed as the world's

largest, most spectacular and best-protected coral reef system, the GBR encompasses a wide

range of globally significant biodiversity and cultural values and directly supports fishing and

tourism industries. Protected as a national marine park and World Heritage Area, the GBR is

nonetheless threatened by climate change, overfishing and catchment runoff (Brodie &

Waterhouse 2012). This research focuses on efforts to manage the diffuse sources of water

quality pollutants from the catchment affecting the GBR.

In recent decades, the health of GBR ecosystems has declined, driven by poor water

quality largely due to catchment runoff, exacerbated by extreme climate events (cyclones,

coral bleaching) (Brodie et al. 2013a). Climate change is already affecting the GBR, and will

have “far-reaching consequences in the decades to come” (GBRMPA, 2014a, p. v).


Elevated levels of fine sediment, nutrients and pesticides are exported to the GBR

lagoon from agricultural landscapes during high rainfall events (Kroon 2012). Since 2003, the

Australian and Queensland governments have developed successive bilateral plans to

accelerate the adoption of improved agricultural practices. Significant but limited progress

against targets for the uptake of new practices and modelled water quality benefits have been

achieved primarily through voluntary mechanisms (Aust. Govt. & Qld Govt. 2016a).

This chapter introduces the GBR case study. The water quality issue, its sources and

implications for the health of the GBR and the environmental, social and economic values it

supports. The complex management arrangements between Australian and Queensland

Governments have been described and stakeholder groups identified and prioritised. The key

phases of reef water quality governance history have been described, and three of these

identified as key decision points for this research.

Chapter 6: Great Barrier Reef case study results 153

Chapter 6: Great Barrier Reef case study results

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the results of the GBR case study analysis. The results of the

thematic analysis of interview data are first presented for each phase of the case study

(sections 6.2 to 6.4) before being summarised for the case study overall. For each phase,

governments and stakeholder perspectives of key decisions are presented in historical

sequence and illustrated with quotations. Key features of each phase, such as plans,

investments, alliances, regulation and contextual changes are examined. In the analysis of

each theme, attention is thus drawn to the rationales and practices of metagovernance as

perceived by government or stakeholder actors.

The overall case study findings are summarised against the key dimensions of the

analytical framework presented in Chapter 3: context, rationalities, metagovernance,

governance performance, impact on policy and outcomes, first by phase, and overall for the

GBR case study. Two additional dimensions emerge from the findings and have been

incorporated in a modified framework: bilateral arrangements and stakeholder networks, and

these are explained further in section 6.5.

6.2 PHASE 1: REEF PLAN AND THE REEF PARTNERSHIP (2003-2007)

6.2.1 Reef Water Quality Protection Plan

The decision that signalled the start of the first phase of analysis in the GBR was the

drafting of the bilateral Reef Water Quality Protection Plan (RWQPP) by the Queensland and

Australian Governments. The decision to develop the RWQPP came in response to steady

pressure from advocates in the science community and conservation sector, supported by

media attention and looming elections.

There were a couple of big media events, if you like, that raised the profile. ... In some

ways, it was a lot more academic agitation in those days. The conservation sector

started to agitate much more seriously as well. (scientist 01)


Much of the science advocacy came from the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority

(GBRMPA), a federal government agency based in Townsville. The GBRMPA is perceived by

several interviewees to have had more independence then, compared to today.

A federal mob up in north Queensland. It's a long way from Canberra. If you had a

good idea you could get on and do it. (Aust. Govt. 35)

Although another informant highlighted the fact that the Authority was committed to

a very public and contentious rezoning of the marine park (with implications for commercial

and recreational fishers) at the time:

Don't forget, [XXX] was told by [xxx], not to do it. She said, "This is complicating. We

can't do a rezoning and this." She always did it under our radar, at the time. Everyone

was pleased to take all the credit later, but she was doing it under a bit of pressure, to

focus more on the other thing. (GBRMPA 30)

A feature of the GBR history in general, and this phase in particular, is the distributed

leadership of individuals who strongly influenced policy. Leadership from science (GBRMPA),

the conservation sector, and support from key individuals in the federal government drove

policy change in this instance.

The other thing is, sometimes different messages for powerful, influential turns of

event, I think in policy, come when different sources, apparently independent,

multiple sources of the same thing. If the public or politicians hear a story from

multiple sources and they all point one way, that's a powerful stimulus, I think, to

encourage political leadership, political will. That's what those guys created...

(GBRMPA 30)

While the momentum in this phase of the GBR seems to have been mostly driven by

federal agencies, the Queensland Government was an essential partner because of the state's

responsibility for land and water management (agricultural land use in catchments is the

primary source of water quality issues in the GBR):

I got the impression that the [Queensland] politicians were not aware until around the

time, and the DNRM [Department of Natural Resources and Mines], as it was, was the

principal water manager ... they didn't really want to know about it. (GBRMPA 30)


The RWQPP was formally led by the GBR Ministerial Forum and supporting committees.

The focus of the first RWQPP was clearly on mapping relevant government initiatives into a

framework for water quality management:

It was almost totally internally focussed. In those days, it driven very strongly by

Premier's [Department of Premier and Cabinet] so it was both internally focussed and

centrally focussed, and there was no sense of partnership at all. Very little

consultation. (Scientist 01)

So, I believe all 3 [Queensland Government agencies] would fall in the category of

supportive but compliant ... once you get them out of Premier's and into the three

agencies, they say 'how can I minimise my risks and maximise my outcomes. Yeah so

this is the what we're going to do. This will keep us out of trouble.' And remember,

there were no resources allocated to it either. So, it was a quite beautiful recipe for

lack of success. (Scientist 01)

The development of the RWQPP coincided with the second phase of the Natural

Heritage Trust (NHTII) and the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality. This phase

of the national NRM program saw a shift from local grants to multi-year bilateral investment

in the delivery of regional NRM plans by regional NRM organisations (Ewing, 2003). In the

period 2002-03, when RWQPP was being developed, the new regional NRM system was also

being established.

The RWQPP documents a consultation process that included “consultation with

stakeholders”, including regional meetings, providing drafts for comment by key stakeholder

groups and a formal, advertised public comment period which generated over 100

submissions (Queensland and Australian Governments (Qld. & Aust. Govt.s), 2003, p. 6).

The RWQPP compiled pre-existing government programs that contribute to water

quality, but clearly anticipated that delivery of large parts of the plan would be achieved

through the NRM programs, stating that “the Regional NRM bodies will be key users” [of the

plan] (Queensland and Australian Governments (Qld. & Aust. Govt.s), 2003, p. 8) and

“Substantial funding by the Australian and Queensland Governments will be sourced from

the Natural Heritage Trust (NHT) and the National Action Plan on Salinity and Water Quality

(NAP)” (Queensland and Australian Governments (Qld. & Aust. Govt.s), 2003, p. 5). So, while

there was some stakeholder consultation with the plan's development, and no formal


stakeholder role in the governance arrangements, there was clearly an expectation that the

plan would be supported through the NRM programs. The first RWQPP thus espouses a

rationality consistent with governmentality theory, of the practice of mobilising networks of

autonomous actors through technologies of agency (resources), even if this was internally

conflicted with traditional centralised decision-making. In the words of an NRM CEO at the

time:

I just think it was the standard mode of operating … the culture at the time was so

predominantly centralist and bureaucratic and a focus on collecting a range of

disparate actions, probably a good way to describe it, and believing that once that was

done, all would be ok. 'That'll do it.’ So yeah, the usual, do a bit of smoke and mirrors

and the problem will go away. (NRM org. 01)

6.2.2 Regional Water Quality Improvement Plans

While there was some effort to align NRM investments with RWQPP priorities,

stakeholders commented that this was not well done, and the governance arrangements for

RWQPP and NRM programs remained poorly integrated. One of the Australian Government

investments was in regional Water Quality Improvement Plans (WQIPs) under the Coastal

Catchments Initiative. The WQIPs involved a substantial investment in science and industry

engagement at the regional and local scale (Eberhard et al., 2017a). The resulting suite of

regional plans were very well received, although they remained somewhat separate from the

regional NRM planning process:

That wonderful Mackay WQIP plan which still to this day, I think is still a piece of work

and it helped us enormously. It was not running away from the problem, but it was

saying that we could modify, and we could quantify the micro scale. It was so good. A

lot of the numbers were there, but the principles and the illustration and the way of

the message was great. (conservation 13)

Then the water quality improvement plan... kind of sat outside that. It was a separate

piece of work that was going on... in my view at the time, it was disconnected, I think,

from what we were doing in NHT, and it was disconnected from the NRM plan. (NRM

org. 32)


6.2.3 Reef Water Quality Partnership

In the process of coordinating the development of regional WQIPs, the NRM

organisations built a network of planners with strong connections to local industries

supported by individuals from Queensland and Australian Government agencies. The WQIPs

illustrated a more strategic approach to managing water quality, with feasibility

demonstrated by pilot NRM programs. There was a growing sense of momentum in reef

regions, but there were no resource commitments to deliver the WQIPs, although they were

clearly aligned with government priorities. The NRM network established the Reef Water

Quality Partnership to “coordinate target-setting, monitoring and reporting to support Reef

Plan implementation” with government (Robinson et al., 2010, p. 8). Initiated by the regions,

the Partnership formally reported to the RWQPP's Intergovernmental Operational

Committee, but was actually far more active:

It was unbelievable. It will never happen again. We were driving the policy agenda. So,

you know, really again, it's a mix between community drive and science drive... the

foundation of the reef alliance, the jump to the bureaucracy, to get the politicians to

act. (NRM org. 01)

I think it was a really good thing because it was vibrant. It was coming up with ideas.

The previous processes were getting a bit stale. Reef plan in itself was getting a bit

stale. (Qld. Govt. 03)

Despite being active participants in the regional WQIPs, the agricultural industries

bodies were not formally part of the Reef Water Quality Partnership, and this was perceived

as excluding them from the decision-making process (Robinson et al., 2010). A stakeholder

alliance (the Reef Alliance) came together, including NRM organisations, peak agricultural

bodies and the conservation sector:

There was enough capacity across the regions from a few regions, and enough

collectivism between the regions to say let’s do this and do this well in partnership.

And at the same time, I think the ag. sector, leadership wise, was saying 'we need to

get our shit together' they could see this thing coming... Maybe they were looking

after their arse, but they still provided leadership... it was stable enough, long enough,

just enough to get going. And I think actually founded on, fundamentally,

partnerships. (scientist 01)


What came out of that was a real sense of frustration from the Reef Alliance members

around the inability to really deliver an outcome which is fundamentally seeking

improvement. (NRM org. 28)

Both the Reef Water Quality Partnership and the Reef Alliance demonstrate the

emergence of collaborative governance in the GBR policy arena. The Reef Water Quality

Partnership was a mechanism for the regions to formally engage governments in policy

dialogue but struggled to achieve change through this process. However, it was very

influential informally, and the genesis of the Reef Alliance and the collaborative business case.

6.2.4 Advocating for investment

The Reef Water Quality Partnership was not delivering change through the formal policy

channels, so stakeholders took the opportunity of a looming federal election and expected

change of government to advocate for change. Actively encouraged by Australian

Government bureaucrats, the newly minted Reef Alliance developed and advocated for

investment in agricultural practice change incentives, as recommended by the WQIPs:

So that meeting was really a clarifying moment. We have a business case. This is what

we're about. We're sending this to the federal government. Bam! That's why we exist.

(Industry 11)

The development of the collaborative business case for reef investment across parties

that are not natural allies created a powerful message that was well received by the Australian

Government:

There were a few things that really stood out about that proposal. The main one, the

fact that it involved a true partnership between all the involved NRM regions, the

industry peak bodies, and, at that point, even WWF was part of the Reef Alliance. It

was a pretty powerful proposal, it was costed, it had targets which were ambitious,

fitted into the government’s policy framework under reef plan, it took advantage of

all the planning and groundwork that had been done including things like WQIPs ...The

funding was sensible. (Aust. Govt. 21)

And that's what really sold it to Minister Garrett - the collaborative model that they

worked from. If you've got all the people sitting around the table, in agreement. That's

a really powerful message for the federal government to send out. If we do have

collaborative working arrangements, we can pretty much achieve anything. When we


could appease the Minister that everyone was inside the tent, he really hit the go

button and said 'make it all happen. (Aust. Govt. 27)

The collaborative business case was presented to the government and opposition in

Canberra, and Queensland Government executives, using the political connections that

existed across the network. Both the government and the opposition supported the proposal.

The new Prime Minister Kevin Rudd announced the 'Reef Rescue' program in 2007, which

signalled the start of a new phase of Reef governance.

6.3 PHASE 2: REEF RESCUE AND REGULATION (2008-2013)

6.3.1 Reef Water Quality Protection Plan revised

Three key decisions were made because of the growing frustration with the RWQPP:

the Australian Government committed $200M (Aus) to the Reef Rescue program, the

Queensland Government committed to regulating agricultural practices in reef catchments,

and the RWQPP was revised and updated, including new governance arrangements. The Reef

Water Quality Partnership was shut down and replaced by a formal Partnership Committee

to provide advice on RWQPP implementation to the Intergovernmental Operational

Committee (The State of Queensland and Commonwealth of Australia, 2009). The Partnership

Committee was independently chaired and included agricultural, NRM and conservation

organisations. In the quotes below, one Australian Government representative reflects on the

changing influence of stakeholder committees, and how stakeholder groups are selective

about their level of engagement.

I attended a few partnership committee meetings under reef plan. Maybe to start

with, they weren't taken very seriously by the governments... But I think it’s fair to say

that the partnership committee is now taken very seriously and is influential in

informing policy development, program development and roll out, monitoring and

evaluation. (Aust. Govt. 21)

I think where committees are effective, stakeholders are happy to commit limited

resources to participating, but they have very limited capacity to engage and they'll

be selective around what they perceive is best value for money. (Aust. Govt. 21)


6.3.2 The Alliance delivers Reef Rescue

The Reef Rescue program was largely implemented as it had been proposed, albeit with

a lesser financial commitment ($200M of the proposed $300M). NRM organisations

appreciated the ability to tailor programs to regional circumstances:

Largely, we were able to roll it out how we wanted, set our own partnerships that

government didn't interfere with, not a standardised approach (has its positives and

negatives). Government just set targets. (NRM org. 10)

An independent evaluation of the Reef Rescue program found that collaboration was a

critical factor in the successful development, design and implementation of the program, and

that "devolving decision-making to lower scales enables greater tailoring of solutions to local

conditions (greater effectiveness), leverages local resources (greater efficiency) and local

ownership (greater legacy)" (Eberhard, 2011).

The newly formed Alliance needed to shift from advocacy to implementation modes,

and develop operational relationships at both the regional and GBR-wide scales. Resources

galvanised commitment from NRM and industry groups:

This organisation's involvement really actually started when we actually started to see

funding opportunities at the regional level come up through Reef Rescue One. That

was the start of our involvement in collaboration. (NRM org. 32)

It was a turning point... the cane industry shifted from denial to participation. So that

was the really positive thing that happened. The taking the money meant that they

had to do that. (scientist 08)

but it just got so confusing about who was doing what, even though' theoretically it

was so simple, and perhaps it was because there wasn't enough trust or agreed level

of engagement at the industry level (industry 11)

Government officers outlined some of the challenges faced by government in operating

in a more collaborative way. Sharing and devolving decision-making to other parties involves

a risk that the government is perceived to be pandering to particular interests. Ministers and

governments like to make claim to leadership and achievements, which is more difficult with

devolved and collaborative programs where leadership is distributed and the attribution of

benefits complex.


At the political level, it still looked like Reef Rescue, but at the implementation level

we were maximising and capitalising on existing programs. That takes a lot of

navigating. It takes a lot of effort to work through some of those political barriers.

(Aust. Govt. 27)

Very quickly those things can turn to pot with politicians and the agendas of non-

government organisations. There's a big risk for government. That was an extreme

decision of government to get support of NGOs [non-government organisations]

because, obviously, aligning themselves with NGOs has implications for other key

stakeholders. So, if it looks as though an agenda is being driven by an independent

authority, then the government potentially loses the kudos of developing some of

those programs... So, there was a lot of politicking and a lot of risk in doing that. (Aust.

Govt. 27)

Tensions emerged in the Alliance as it shifted into an operational network. Strong and

independent leadership in the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF) and agricultural

industry organisations (particularly Canegrowers) pursed individual advocacy and media

strategies that were, at times, in conflict with the objectives of the Alliance. The peak bodies

(Queensland Farmers Federation and the Queensland Regional Groups Collective) could

manage these tensions, although WWF was, for a time, expelled from the Alliance.

It's been hard to hold that together. Because various players, including both WWF and

agriculture have misbehaved, and done deals behind the scenes. (NRM org. 25)

There was always an undercurrent ... always difficult to deal with. Always an amount

of denial, and a tension between what the peak body in Queensland did and what the

farmers did in their regional groups. We appreciated the leadership that came out of

the peak body, because that was pushing it forward. (NRM org. 25)

The tension, the example of WWF, is kind of a 'user and participant' dynamic. We got

the business case up, they would say, and I would actually agree ... Then it’s kind of

like, 3 months later, well, we don't want you now. I think that's a real problem for the

relationships that exist between NRM bodies, all NGOs really, and industry, is a kind

of use and abuse mentality to collaboration, that is really difficult if it isn't

acknowledged. (industry 11)

On the other hand, they weren't helping us either because they were also, and some

industries do this, (including Canegrowers) were walking on both sides of the street –


saying this is the best approach, but also moving into their own phase, and which was

advocacy at a different level. (industry 11)

As the Alliance settled in to its new role, and members reflected on the eviction of WWF,

there were discussions about what standards of behaviour were required of members, and

how those commitments could be agreed. A suggestion to document an agreement was

dismissed by industry, however:

There's no way I could hamstring myself by saying, everything the Alliance does I'm

with, and if it’s not part of the Alliance it’s not part of my approach. In a corporate

sense, I couldn't do that. (industry 11)

A partnership evaluation of Reef Alliance found that, while there was strong recognition

of the need for and commitment to the partnership, there was less confidence that the

Alliance had a clear purpose, robust arrangements or sufficient trust, and arrangements to

assess the performance of the Alliance was identified as problematic (Eberhard, 2010). The

Queensland Government commitment to regulating agricultural practices for water quality

highlighted the different interests of the conservation, agriculture and NRM organisations in

the Alliance. While regulation was actively encouraged by WWF through advocacy and media

campaigns, it was strongly resisted by agricultural industry groups. Accountability to the

members and governors of individual organisations over-rode accountability to the Alliance.

6.3.3 Regulation of agricultural practices

The introduction of reef regulations in 2010 complicated delivery arrangements for Reef

Rescue. The regulations were announced by the Queensland Government at a 'Reefocus'

summit in 2008 (without prior consultation). Interviewees reported that the regulations had

two immediate impacts:

1. Agricultural peak bodies shifted back into advocacy mode, which impacted their

capacity to collaborate in the delivery of the Reef Rescue program; and

2. Farmer engagement was complicated by messaging from both voluntary

incentives and regulatory programs.

The Queensland Government announced that they were doing regulatory changes,

which was a bit of a knee-jerk reaction, I guess, to the election there, and the policy


stuff by WWF that was stitched up with the government in terms of election promises

and drivers. (Aust. Govt. 27)

So, in the lead up to the election where Bligh was elected, WWF worked very hard to

get that commitment to reef regulation. They were designed and rushed through very

quickly to meet the election timeframes. We really weren't consulted in the Australian

Government. It came as a huge surprise to us. It made life very difficult for us, trying

to implement Reef Rescue, as the delivery partners, particularly Canegrowers and

Agforce were totally consumed by the regs. [regulations] and pushing back against the

regs. (Aust. Govt. 21)

We were trying to get a genuine cross-government program. It was the year that the

state stopped talking to us. And off they went on their regulatory rant. (scientist 01)

6.3.4 Resources boom and the World Heritage Committee

The early results of the Reef Rescue program were very positive (Aus. & Qld. Gov.,

2013a; Eberhard et al., 2017a). However, booming coal and coal seam gas industries led to

proposals for new and expanded ports and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) plants at Curtis Island.

Government approval of the LNG plants without notifying UNESCO triggered the interest of

the World Heritage Committee, who perceived LNG plants as 'mining' and therefore

incompatible with World Heritage values (McGrath, 2012). The public also perceived dredging

for new port facilities as mining on the reef, as portrayed in social media campaigns by

conservation advocates.

Their reach [WWF] was very strong in that [UNESCO] process. It was strengthened by

the public fear for the reef, which was fuelled by an extremely successful social media

campaign by a number of groups. (GBRMPA 30)

6.3.5 Regulatory wind back

A shift to new, conservative governments in Queensland (2012) and federally (2013)

was associated with 'green tape reduction', that is, removing or reducing regulatory

environmental controls (Eberhard et al., 2017a). In Queensland, the new government publicly

announced that they were not going to enforce compliance with the reef regulations,

preferring to invest in industry-led, voluntary 'best practice' programs:

My intent on putting the reef regs. [regulations] on ice was to make it clear to farmers

that we wanted to work with them with the carrot approach, but that the stick was


there if it was needed. But I had no intent of using it while we were forming the carrot

approach. There was no way on this earth that I was going to remove the reef

regulations while UNESCO was keeping an eye on what was happening. (Qld. Govt.

04)

While the World Heritage Committee ultimately chose not to list the GBR as 'World

Heritage in danger' (McGrath, 2012), they did recommend that no new port developments

be approved, and expressed deep concern about the proposed developments and the

decision-making process:

the scale of coastal development currently being proposed and consented presents a

significant risk to the conservation of the Outstanding Universal Values and integrity

of the property, and that the scale and pace of development proposals appear beyond

the capacity for independent, quality and transparent decision making (Douvere &

Badman, 2012, p. 5).

The committee sent a reactive monitoring mission to the GBR in 2012 and this triggered

a new round of initiatives. Australian and Queensland Governments undertook strategic

assessments (under the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999

[Cth]) of the marine and coastal components of the GBR. The RWQPP was again revised in

2013, signalling the next phase of GBR governance.

Everything went quiet until UNESCO rocked up and said, 'we've got a problem here’.

(scientist 01)

6.4 PHASE 3: RESPONDING TO UNESCO (2014-2016)

6.4.1 Reef Water Quality Plan revised, Queensland Taskforce

The Reef Water Quality Protection Plan (RWQPP) was revised in 2013, maintaining the

same governance arrangements, with two committees (science and stakeholders) providing

advice to the Intergovernmental Operational Committee (Aus. & Qld. Gov., 2013c). In 2015,

a new Queensland Government renewed commitment to the GBR with the establishment of

the first Minister for the Great Barrier Reef. The Queensland Audit Office described

Queensland's reef investments as lacking rigor, urgency and purpose “characterised by

disparate projects with no central authority and no clear accountability” (Queensland Audit

Office (QAO), 2015, p. 2). The new Minister established a Taskforce to provide advice on

achieving the water quality targets in the revised RWQPP. Chaired by Queensland's Chief


Scientist, the Taskforce was science-based with government representatives. Stakeholders

were not directly represented, but there were substantial opportunities for formal and

informal input, including a review panel, surveys, individual briefings and a regional tour.

I think they could manage the journey better with stakeholders. And we're engaged

enough - we talk to people on the taskforce, we talk to people in the Ministers office

... We're engaged, not happy, but engaged. (conservation 33)

The Taskforce worked very closely with the new Office of the Great Barrier Reef (OGBR)

in preparing material and developing recommendations:

It has felt like we have had a genuine influence on what the outcomes are. It's been

a great opportunity really because not many people know very much ...whatever we

said, there's no one to oppose it. Because it's been through so much consultation, if

anything was completely wrong, it's been picked out by now. (scientist 20)

A Queensland Government officer reflected on the value of the Taskforce process,

recognising that the discussion was about investment priorities, which is an easier

conversation than one that is just about regulation:

the Taskforce process… So, it enables you to have these conversations where you say

'this idea has been put on the table, you group of people who we've brought together

have a whole range of experience in this area. Let’s talk about what it might look like'

and if you can have it in that sort of way, and it seems to be easier to be honest, when

you're going to spend money, as opposed to when you're developing regulation, is my

observation, because people are willing to have those conversations. They come at it

with an open mind. (Qld. Govt. 11)

As a result, the Taskforce recommended a mix of tools including incentives, extension,

regulation and market instruments. All 10 recommendations were agreed by government.

One contentious recommendation was to estimate the total cost of achieving the water

quality targets. After considerable debate and strong advocacy by WWF and NRM

organisations, a report was finally commissioned that assessed the cost of achieving the 2025

water quality targets as $8.2 billion. At the time, the Queensland Government's 5-year

commitment was $90M.


6.4.2 Regulations revived

Following the recommendations of the Taskforce, the Queensland Government

revisited the regulations that had been introduced in 2010 but not been enforced by the

previous government. When the regulations were first introduced, they were announced

without prior consultation:

It was political, particularly in the design of things. It was a big thing that the

government was doing. And it was controversial, so it was kept fairly close to the

chest... It just wasn't done in a way, it wasn't done collaboratively with the industry is

one of the issues. They didn't sit down and work out a way to roll it out. It was just

resisted and pushed back the whole time. Nobody really accepted it. (Qld. Govt. 14)

This time, the government worked closely with industry to develop the implementation

process and this improved industry acceptance.

So, it’s being done as sensitively as possible. There's also a very clear message that we

are targeting the worst performers. (Qld. Govt. 14)

Every media statement we make now that relates to regs will start with 'we don't

believe that a regulatory approach is the best thing to do', but, the second paragraph

will say 'but we're committed to working with the government through the issues...’

(industry 11)

Both government and industry representatives acknowledge that 'on-again, off-again'

regulation is undesirable. One industry representative commented:

"I think that's a really good example of how not to do it. Government comes in and

says, 'we're going to do that' so everyone goes hell for leather, and then another

government comes in and says, 'we're not going to do that' so everybody stops, does

nothing, they're crippled. It's a hideous way to run a state" (industry 31)

Inconsistent regulation policy has been a feature of reef agriculture (Eberhard et al.,

2017a) but also climate policy, coastal planning and vegetation management in Queensland

(Simons et al., 2018; Warnken & Mosadeghi, 2018).

6.4.3 Strategic assessments and the Reef 2050 Long Term Sustainability Plan

The World Heritage Committee continued to review progress in managing the threats

to the Great Barrier Reef, and recommended the establishment of a long-term plan to “ensure

the overall long-term conservation of the poetry and its Outstanding Universal Value” (World


Heritage Committee, 2014, p. 1). Following the completion of the two Strategic Assessments

(GBRMPA, 2014b; Queensland Government, 2014) and the Outlook report (GBRMPA, 2014),

the two governments developed the Reef 2050 Long-Term Sustainability Plan to protect the

values of the World Heritage Area (Aust. Govt., 2015a). Clearly, international pressure was

driving closer cooperation between Australian and Queensland Governments:

Under Reef 2050 we actually have a joint team set up across the DE, OGBR & GBRMPA

[Aust. Department of Environment, Qld. Office of the Great Barrier Reef and the Aust.

Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority] and our Directors and Managers meet

weekly to work out how we're coordinating Reef2050 and at the ED [Executive

Director] and GM [General Manager] level we meet fortnightly. All virtually, obviously.

To work out how we can try and implement these things and we all work on different

bits. So, different agencies are leading different bits. This is the first time anything like

this has happened. So, this is new. It’s going quite well. Obviously, it’s not perfect yet,

there's always tensions between the governments. Especially as we've got different

political hats at present, but even if we didn't it wouldn't matter. (Qld. Govt. 14)

A new stakeholder committee was established for the Reef 2050 Plan, with broader

representation including tourism, mining and fishing interests. The use of an independent

chair was well received by stakeholders:

She's there to represent stakeholders, not to manage them or do the bidding of

government. I feel quite confident that when she represents the RAC [Reef Advisory

Committee] to the Ministers she will take the hard messages. (NRM org. 10)

Whether the new Committee can achieve a productive relationship with government,

however, remains to be seen, with some stakeholders expressing concerns:

There is no partnerships framework, there's a consultative framework, and it's not a

very good one. (scientist 01)

I don't know if the numbers will be sustained. People have started sending lower level

proxies. But if representation drops off the effectiveness will fall. (NRM org. 10)

I don't think there's any better way to do it. It should, if done well, prevent any

negative reaction at the other end. Doesn't always mean you can land something that

everyone's happy with, but they can at least say they have been involved in the

development of it. (Qld. govt. 04)


6.4.4 Reef Trust

Meanwhile, the Australian Government established the Reef Trust in 2014 to

consolidate investments in reef programs with an initial federal investment of $140M (Aust.

Govt., 2013). The Trust has its own governance arrangements, including a joint steering

committee (Queensland and Australian Governments), supported by the Reef 2050 expert

panel and stakeholder advisory committee. The Trust assesses priorities and releases funds

in phases of investment. Unlike the Reef Rescue program, which provided continuity of

investment over an 8-year period, the Trust is a series of ever-changing projects:

With Reef Trust, every project is like developing a new program every time. So, in

addition to the projects we're rolling out, we're always seeking to develop the next

phase of investment. (Aust. Govt. 21)

This approach reduces the potential for building enduring capacity in NRM or

agricultural industry organisations, and it also increases competition between organisations.

We have 2 taskforces. They are picking winners. There is no protection. There is no

legacy through investment. (scientist 08)

And it's all competitive. The transaction costs will be massive. You're basically trying

to make a competitive system out of something that is not competitive. (scientist 01)

Inevitably though, it will go through that phase and it will get complicated for line

agencies to manage and they'll be looking for big projects that need to be coordinated

by someone. And it won't be done by Canberra because nothing has been coordinated

down to the regional level by Canberra. Practicalities will rule in the end, somehow or

other. (industry 11)

6.4.5 Declining NRM investment

Australian and Queensland investments in regional NRM programs have become more

competitive and the overall level of investment has declined significantly since changes to the

national program in 2008 (Campbell, 2016; Robins & Kanowski, 2011; Vella et al., 2015). Lack

of resources and uncertainty over funding puts additional stress on relationships within

industry groups (between local and state levels), between industry groups, between NRM

groups, and between industry, NRM and the conservation sector in the Reef Alliance. While

the leaders of agricultural industry groups express their commitment to working

collaboratively with NRMs, there are tensions evident:


There is genuine desire to ensure that there's a cohesive bid put to government that

allows all of the key players – the NRM groups, the environmental groups and the

industry groups – to get reasonable access to funding, so that they can continue to do

the work that they've been doing. (industry 31)

And one of the key players is fractured in terms of having an informed approach. They

have some very strong groups within their membership who tend to be, tend to not,

tend to be very focussed on their own patch and not nearly as collaborative across the

board. (industry 31)

it seems like everyone who runs a project has become a professional advocate in

Canberra for reef. Every scientist every industry person, every regional NRM CEO,

every CFO they're all in Canberra lobbying for money. So that kind of says everything

has gone a bit crazy. (industry 11)

That's the risk – my perception of the risk. There's decreasing resources and that is

always a bad place to make good long-term decisions. (industry 31)

While reef water quality is the dominant issue for NRM groups in the region, it is just

one of many issues faced by industry groups. In 2016, the regional NRM groups developed a

costing proposal for further investment for Reef water quality. Unlike the previous successful

proposals, this proposal was not supported by the agricultural industry groups. The two key

sticking points were the profile given to the regulation of farming practices and land use

change (moving high risk lands out of intensive agriculture):

All we have to do is wind it back a bit. I know you guys have thought that far ahead,

but nobody else has. And if the primary objective, the principle that we're all going to

stick together, and endorse something collectively. then is it really that difficult for

you to move back if we're not ignoring the issue, it’s just that we don't want you to

profile it as heavily as you are. (industry 11)

6.4.6 WWF advocacy and tensions in the Alliance

From the beginning of the Reef Alliance, there have been tensions between the

different sectors (agriculture, NRM and conservation) (Eberhard, 2010). While the groups

agree on the need for investment to support voluntary agricultural practice change, they

disagree about roles, resources and the best mix of approaches to reducing the water quality

impact of agriculture. Increasing pressure to achieve greater improvements (driven by the

declining health of the GBR) and increasingly competitive investments amplify these tensions.


One industry representative nicely summarised the different perspectives between

agricultural, NRM and conservation groups:

There are people in the ag. industries that are saying that the NRM groups are putting

in layers of management and doing their own thing. And that agriculture needs to take

a much stronger degree of control of what we need to be doing. (industry 31)

So, the issues for agriculture is that if we become part of an overall bid, do we lose

control of our own BMPs [industry best management practice programs] and things

like that? Is someone else driving that? Industry needs to be driving industry issues in

that space. (industry 31)

There's a perception that industry hasn't done enough, in terms of buy-in to BMPs, in

terms of auditing BMPs, they would say industry is too slow. (industry 31)

From a conservation perspective, it’s not far enough and fast enough. Some of the

programs don't have enough external overview and I understand that. (industry 31)

The World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF) re-joined the Alliance and has facilitated

philanthropic investment in developing innovative agricultural practices, delivered through a

regional NRM body. This provides a valuable complement to the generally risk-averse

investments of governments in accelerating the adoption of proven practices.

WWF is in the alliance again. We're back. There's still tensions. We have the occasional

biff with Canegrowers, with Agforce, sometimes publicly. (conservation 33)

WWF employs four main strategies: public campaigns to increase political pressure,

policy advocacy, on-ground support and influencing supply chains. These strategies may, at

times, be in conflict, and governments and other stakeholder groups mentioned the

challenges associated with WWF's constant campaigning:

If you're working with government, and then you start running a campaign, they have

less desire to work with you, surprise, surprise. And some governments understand

and still work with you. Some understand and say, 'we actually want you to do that it

helps us make the case for us to do things’. (conservation 33)

The expectation from WWF is that they have these great ideas and we take them on

board. What WWF don't really realise, that even to take one of those ideas, like the

Reef Trust, to develop it, implement it and really make it work properly – it's a whole

group of people for several years. So, there is a bit of a disconnect... I think they have


unrealistic expectations about what we can fund, what we can do and the timeframes.

(Aust. Govt. 21)

WWF was particularly visible in shadowing the Australian Government's reporting to

UNESCO's World Heritage Committee (WHC):

We did matching reports for every report the Australian government did, with our

own report to UNESCO – we got scientists involved in that, it carried a bit of weight.

For every claim the government made, we analysed it, a lot of the time they were

spinning it, and the WHC took both reports on board. (conservation 33)

While the WHC ultimately chose not to list the GBR as 'World Heritage in danger' it has

maintained a close interest. In 2016 and then again in 2017 the Great Barrier Reef suffered

severe coral bleaching over 1,500km of its length, with nearly 70% mortality in the worst

affected areas (ARC Centre of Excellence Coral Reef Studies, 2017). Policy responses to this

new crisis are still emerging.

6.5 GREAT BARRIER REEF CASE STUDY SUMMARISED

In this section, the results for each governance phase are summarised against the

analytical framework presented in Chapter 3. Looking across the evolution of the case study

through the three governance phases allows high level findings to be identified.

The analytical framework draws on concepts and theories of governance networks,

metagovernance and govermentality. This perspective draws attention to the rationalities

and practice of metagovernance, as employed by government. The benefits of collaborative

governance can be judged by three levels of outcomes - through governance performance,

impact on policy decisions and environmental, social and economic outcomes. Two additional

categories are highlighted in the summaries - bilateral relations and stakeholder networks.

Metagovernance is usually framed as a relationship between a governor, usually the state,

and a policy or governance network of stakeholder parties. In both case studies this

relationship was strongly influenced by two other behavioural dimensions: bilateral relations

and the behaviour of stakeholder networks.

In the GBR case study bilateral plans and arrangements are a significant feature. Key

plans and programs are in some case bilateral, e.g. the Reef Water Quality Protection Plan

and Reef Trust, and in other cases, e.g. Reef Rescue program, reef regulations, the programs


are unilateral, but contribute to bilateral policy agreements. The degree to which government

initiatives are aligned and complimentary appears to be a key determinant of outcomes.

Stakeholder networks are also more complex than metagovernance frameworks imply.

While stakeholders respond to metagovernance initiatives of government, they are also

engaging with governments and each other in a variety of formal and informal ways. The

relations within the stakeholder network are a determinant of outcomes, and respond to

metagovernance and other drivers.

6.5.1 Summary of Phase 1 (2003-2007)

The history of this phase of governance is described in Chapter 5. The perceptions and

reflections of actors revealed through interviews are reported in detail in the preceding

section (6.2). Figure 20 summarises these findings against the analytical framework presented

in Chapter 3, with modifications described above.

The profile of water quality was raised by science and conservation advocates and

championed by individuals across several organisations. The Reef Water Quality Protection

Plan (RWQPP) was developed in response, but largely documented existing government

initiatives, and assumed that resources from the new NRM programs would support delivery.

There was little stakeholder consultation in the development of the plan and no formal

stakeholder engagement mechanisms established in the governance arrangements.

Governance was centralised and administrative. In contrast, bilateral arrangements for the

new NRM programs were actively engaging regional stakeholders.

The Australian Government resourced regions to develop Water Quality Improvement

Plans, which were developed by regional NRM organisations. NRM organisations established

a formal partnership with governments (the Reef Water Quality Partnership) which was

adopted within the formal Reef Plan governance structures. Australian Government officers

encouraged the regions, while Queensland Government appeared to be relatively passive.

Resources for the implementation of WQIPs were not forthcoming, and industry groups felt

disenfranchised by their exclusion from the Partnership (although relations with NRM

organisations were growing).

Regional NRM organisations led the development of a collaborative proposal for

investment in WQIP implementation, supported by agricultural industry groups, the


conservation sector, leading scientists and some Australian Government officers. The

proposal was picked up by the incoming Rudd government as an election commitment. There

were little tangible outcomes from this phase GBR governance but the foundations for

collaboration between stakeholders were established at both the regional (through WQIPs)

and GBR scales (through the Reef Alliance proposal).


Figure 20. Key findings for the first phase of GBR governance


6.5.2 Summary of Phase 2 (2008-2013)

The second phase of GBR governance (Figure 21) was characterised by the revision of

the bilateral RWQPP, the Australian Government investment in the Reef Rescue program as

proposed by the Reef Alliance and the unexpected announcement of reef regulations for

agricultural practices by the Queensland Government. Regulation had been strongly

advocated by the conservation organisation WWF, and was announced without prior

consultation with the Australian Government or industry organisations.

The roll out of the Reef Rescue program meant that the Alliance had to shift from

advocacy to collaborative delivery, and worked well with the Australian Government to

establish the program. The announcement of reef regulation drove industry bodies to return

to political advocacy against the regulations, which impacted collaboration and on-ground

delivery. When the Queensland Government changed in 2012, a policy of not enforcing the

regulations was adopted and industry-led 'best management practice' (BMP) programs were

funded instead. When the RWQPP was revised the NRM-led Reef Water Quality Partnership

was replaced by a stakeholder advisory committee managed by government.

Overall, despite the impact of regulations and generally poor coordination between

Australian and Queensland Governments, the Reef Rescue program was successful in building

delivery capacity and facilitating agricultural practice change. There is no evidence of the

impact of regulation on practice change. Ministers across the two governments sought to

attribute changes to each program, but this proved impossible. At the conclusion of phase 2,

the booming coal and coal seam gas industries led to proposals for new ports and coastal

infrastructure that led to UNESCO's World Heritage Committee raising concerns.


Figure 21. Key findings for the second phase of GBR governance


6.5.3 Summary of Phase 3 (2014-2016)

The World Heritage Committee's critical review of Australia's management of the GBR

drove a major and ongoing policy response by both governments in the third phase of GBR

governance (Figure 22). A change in government in Queensland gave renewed commitment

to achieving water quality targets and working collaboratively with stakeholders and the

Australian Government. The RWQPP was revised and maintained its good working relations

with stakeholders. The new Reef 2050 Plan was developed in response to UNESCO's concerns,

with a broader remit. Close bilateral relations were established for reef, but are undermined

by a disconnect from the NRM policy arena where declining investment and bilateral

cooperation are impacting NRM organisational capacity.

Following the recommendations of the scientific Taskforce, the Queensland

Government recommitted to reef regulations but engaged industry closely to ensure the

effective implementation and greater acceptance by industry. While the Queensland

Government was investing in collaborative initiatives with stakeholders, the Australian

Government established the Reef Trust as the Reef Program concludes. The Trust invests in

phased rounds of new projects, rather than committing to ongoing programmatic investment

through the Reef Alliance.

Greater funding uncertainty has increased competition and advocacy within the

stakeholder networks. The Reef Alliance has matured as a formal collaboration, but tensions

are evident with resource pressures and different advocacy positions. In contrast to the

previous phase, stakeholders are working closely with the Queensland Government, while

Australian Government investments appear to be less committed to a collaborative model.

Sever coral bleaching impacted the GBR in 2016 and again in 2017, marking a step change in

the declining health of the GBR and highlighting the impact of climate change.


Figure 22. Key findings for the third phase of GBR governance


6.5.4 Overall findings for the GBR case study

Overall, bilateral relations between Queensland and Australian Governments for Reef

water quality have varied over time (Figure 23). At different times one government or the

other has shown greater impetus of reef policy. The NRM policy arena is closely related but

poorly connected to Reef policy. Changes in NRM programs at the federal and state levels

have undermined the capacity of regional NRM organisations to deliver on reef programs.

While bilateral relations in GBR policy are currently strong, the converse is true in NRM policy.

Stakeholder organisations were always conceived as the major delivery agents for the

RWQPP, and governments progressively built stronger relationships with stakeholders to

support reef policy. However, governments struggle to manage accountability, probity and

risk concerns with these relationships. Formal stakeholder advisory structures and close

working relationship are well established in reef water quality.

The Reef Alliance has emerged as an enduring and effective collaboration between

NRM, agricultural industry and conservation organisations. The Reef Alliance delivery of Reef

Rescue has been a highly successful collaboration that strongly influenced policy and

successfully delivered nearly a decade of major reef programs. The Alliance is, however,

challenged by different sector perspectives on resourcing, roles and policy tools, and these

tensions are exacerbated with funding and policy uncertainty. WWF has been an extremely

effective advocate for GBR policy initiatives, wielding national and international public media

campaigns to prompt policy support.

Overall, the reef case study is marked by a huge shift in the position of agricultural

industry bodies in supporting better agricultural practices for water quality. A long-standing

industry representative highlighted:

"I'm gobsmacked by what they're doing. It's the same generation that would have

hung me out to dry 20 years ago – are now actively engaged and becoming

champions." (industry 31)


Figure 23. Key findings for the GBR case study overall


The case study provides some evidence that suggests the collaboration with NRM

organisations has been foundational to this shift. Regional NRM groups built relationships

with industry through regional WQIPs, and then scaled this up to engage peak bodies in the

development and advocacy of the original Reef Rescue proposal. Changes in government

policy and other disrupters have challenged this relationship, but it has provided stability and

brokerage to the network over this time. The NRM system itself is currently under stress, with

poor bilateral relations, declining funding and competitive funding models.

UNESCO's interest in the GBR has galvanised renewed policy impetus, but sadly climate

change is driving rapid decline in the condition of the GBR, and is not currently addressed or

even acknowledged in GBR bilateral plans.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has presented detailed results of the thematic analysis of interview data

for each phase of the three phases of the GBR case study (sections 6.1 to 6.3). Government

and stakeholder perspectives of events have been presented in the order in which they

occurred and are illustrated by quotations. Each phase has been summarised according to the

categories of the analytical framework, which was modified to accommodate important detail

about bilateral relations and stakeholder networks.

The GBR case study presents a historical narrative about growing stakeholder capacity

and an influential and effective alliance built between NRM organisations, agricultural

industry groups and the conservation sector. Government commitment to bilateral policy

coordination and consistent stakeholder engagement has varied between governments and

over time. The policy clout and delivery capacity of the Reef Alliance appears to have buffered

the network against some of these changes. NRM organisations appear to have been critical

brokers in this narrative.

Government commitment to addressing pressures to the reef has slowly grown, and in

recent years has been invigorated by the international attention of the World Heritage

Committee. Coral bleaching has severely impacted the reef in 2016-17. Another recurring

theme of this case study is the importance of related, but not closely engaged policy arenas,

including coastal development associated with booming coal and gas industries, declining


NRM investments and network capacity and the failure to embed climate change adaptation

or mitigation policy responses.

Chapter 7: Murray-Darling Basin case study 184

Chapter 7: Murray-Darling Basin case study

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The management of water quantity in the Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) is the second of

two case studies examined. Section 7.2 introduces MDB water quantity as a policy issue,

describing how the over allocation of water has had critical impacts on in-stream and

floodplain ecosystems. Section 7.3 identifies the management authorities and governance

arrangements for MDB water quantity management. Key stakeholder groups and their

interests are identified, including government agencies, agricultural industries, conservation

and natural resource management organisations and communities (section 7.4). The different

phases of governance history are outlined, with governance arrangements, policy decisions

and outcomes described (section 7.5). Finally, the key governance phases for analysis are

summarised and a timeline of key decision points is presented (section 7.6).

7.2 MURRAY-DARLING BASIN

The Murray-Darling Basin covers 1,043,000 km2 (c. 14% of Australia) and straddles four

states (Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia) and the Australian

Capital Territory (Figure 24). The Basin contains a diverse array of landscapes and

communities from the sub-tropical north to the temperate and alpine southern regions

(although most of the Basin is semi-arid). Two major rivers systems drain the Basin - the

Murray and the Darling.


Figure 24. The location of the Murray-Darling Basin (MDBA, 2017c)

For the purposes of this research, the case study area is the Queensland Murray-Darling

Basin (QMDB) catchments. These include four Queensland water resource planning areas -

the Warrego-Paroo-Bullo-Nebine, the Condamine-Balonne, the Moonee and the Border

Rivers (Figure 25). The QMDB catchments form part (but not all) of the ‘northern Basin’

catchments (see Murray Darling Basin Authority (MDBA), 2016). Note also that the Border

Rivers catchment is bisected by the Queensland: New South Wales state border, so there are

water resource plans for both the Queensland and New South Wales Border Rivers.

For the balance of this document, the Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) refers to the whole

basin (Figure 24) while the Queensland Murray-Darling Basin (QMDB) refers to the

Queensland parts of the Basin outlined above and in Figure 25. The QMDB covers about 25%

of the total area of the MDB, or 25,951 km2 (Blakely, 2015).


Figure 25. The Queensland Murray-Darling Basin Water Resource Areas (MDBA, 2017c)

7.2.1 The value of the Murray-Darling Basin

The Basin includes over 77,000 km of waterways and more than 30,000 wetlands, of

which 16 are listed under the Ramsar International Convention of Wetlands of International

Importance (Marshall et al., 2013; MDBA, 2012; Pittock et al., 2010). Important floodplain

vegetation that relies on inundation during flood events includes the iconic river red gums

(Eucalyptus camaldulensis), black box (Eucalyptus largiflorens), coolibah (Eucalyptus

coolabah), extensive lignum swamps (Muehlenbeckia florulenta) and aquatic vegetation [e.g.

Ruppia tuberosa in the Coorong (MDBA, 2014). MDB wetlands support more than 60

freshwater fish species and 120 waterbird species, including a large number of threatened

plants and animals (MDBA, 2012, 2014). The Basin is considered one of the most important

areas in Australian for bird biodiversity, including migratory birds listed under international

agreements (the Japan-Australia Migratory Birds Agreement [JAMBA], the China-Australia

Migratory Birds Agreement [CAMBA] and Republic of Korea Migratory Birds Agreement

[ROKAMBA]).

Many of the Basin's waterways are ephemeral (flow only part of the time) and this is

particularly the case in the drier catchments of the northern Basin. Floodplains are extensive,

and evaporation rates are high. There are several terminal wetlands in this part of the Basin,

including the Ramsar-listed Narran Lakes (Figure 25). Major wetlands in the QMDB include


the Barwon-Macintyre floodplain, Moonie floodplain, Culgoa floodplain and Warrego River

Waterholes (Colloff et al., 2016).

The Basin is home to two million people (around 10% of Australia's population) and

supplies water to more than another million people in South Australia (ABS, 2012). The Basin

accounts for approximately 40% of Australia's gross agricultural and pastoral production

(Bohensky et al., 2009). Of the 35,000 agricultural enterprises in the MDB, about 9,200

irrigate, consuming 57% of Australia's water use in 2015-16 (ABS, 2017). Grazing dominates

the agricultural land area in the Basin (62,000,000 ha out of a total of 84,000,000 ha) (ABS,

2017). The balance is mostly cereals, hay and other broad acre crops (c. 11,000,000 ha), with

lesser amounts of cotton, fruit, nuts and berries, grapes, vegetables and rice (in order of area)

(ABS, 2017). The gross value of irrigated agricultural production in the Basin in 2014-15 was

almost $7B Aus. (ABS, 2016a).

Table 7.1 Agricultural land use in the MDB (from ABS, 2017).

Agricultural land use Area (ha)

Area (% of agricultural land)

Grazing 62,330,522 85.4% Cereal cropping 8,030,888 11.0% Other broadacre crops 2,110,270 2.9% Cotton 256,406 0.4% Grapes 84,872 0.1% Fruit & nut trees 81,335 0.1% Vegetables 28,329 0.0% Rice 24,647 0.0% Nurseries 3,374 0.0% Sugar cane 912 0.0% Total 72,951,555 100.0%

Other businesses that rely on the water resources of the Basin include food and fibre

processing, mining companies and other industries (MDBA, 2012). In 2011, DPI estimated that

430,000 people took recreational fish trips in the Basin (Ernst & Young, 2011). About 50

Indigenous groups use the water resources of the Basin, and the Basin’s waterways and

wetlands are culturally highly significant (MDBA, 2015).

7.2.2 Condition of the Murray-Darling Basin

The ecological health of 20 of the 23 MDB catchments was been classified as poor or

very poor in 2008 (Davies et al., 2010), due to over-allocation of water from the river (Grafton,


2011). The condition of water-dependent vegetation has been declining across the basin,

because of water extraction, land management practices and drought (MDBA, 2014),

particularly in the southern catchments. Impacts on River Red Gum forests, native fish, water

birds and the Coorong coastal lakes are well established (Hart et al., 2015).

Monitoring has shown a 72% decline in waterbird abundance over the last 40 years,

across all major waterbird groups (MDBA, 2014). Waterbird populations naturally respond to

the boom and bust cycles of ephemeral river systems, but water extraction has severely

reduced the extent and frequency of medium flows (MDBA, 2014). Certain wetlands in the

Basin are particularly significant for waterbirds, including the Paroo overflow lakes and

Condamine-Balonne wetlands in QMDB and the Narran Lakes in northern New South Wales,

as well as the better-known Coorong, Menindee Lakes and Macquarie Marshes (Kingsford,

2000; MDBA, 2014).

Many native fish species were once found across the Basin. The population of Silver

Perch, once common across the middle reaches, has declined by 95%, while Trout cod and

Macquarie Perch are now found only in isolated pockets. The Sustainable Rivers Audit

recorded fish communities in poor condition across most of the Basin (Davies et al., 2010).

Twenty-six of the 46 native species found in the Basin are listed as either rare or threatened

under state or federal environmental legislation (MDBA, 2012). The current distribution and

abundance of native fish is estimated to be about 10% of pre-European levels (Hart et al.,

2015) and pest fish species such as European carp frequently dominate (Lintermans, 2007).

The condition of the QMDB is not as poor as the southern catchments, where water

resource development occurred much earlier. The Sustainable Rivers Audit (Davies et al.,

2010) rated the health of only one catchment in the Basin as ‘good', the arid Paroo catchment

in QMDB. The Condamine and Border Rivers were rated as 'moderate health' while all other

catchments were rated as 'poor' or 'very poor' (Davies et al., 2010).

7.2.3 Water quantity pressures and impacts

The average annual rainfall in the Basin in about 531,000 GL a year, of which 94%

evaporates or is used by plants before the balance (only 6%) enters the Basin's waterways

(MDBA, 2011b). The long-term average natural flow in the Basin (prior to water resource

development) has been estimated at around 33,000 GL per annum (Commonwealth Scientific


and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), 2008; MDBA, 2011b). Flows are highly variable

(by international standards) (Finlayson & McMahon, 1988; Kirby et al., 2006) and records of

annual flows range from 6,740 GL to 117, 907 GL (MDBA, 2012). Climate change is expected

to decrease rainfall, increase evaporation and increase the intensity of droughts in the Basin

(Garnaut, 2008; Quiggin et al., 2010). The Basin also has substantial groundwater resources

(including the Great Artesian Basin) although water quality is often poor (MDBA, 2012).

Approximately 42% of in-stream flows are 'consumed' by natural ecological processes

(e.g. evaporation, connection to groundwater, transpiration by plants), 42% is extracted for

human use and 16% remains to flow out of the Murray mouth in South Australia (MDBA,

2012). Of the water diverted for human use, 96% is used for irrigated agriculture, and the

balance for industrial, urban and rural water supply (Connell 2011). The consumption of water

for irrigation predominantly occurs in four regions:

1. Flood irrigated pasture in the south-east;

2. Rice (flooded for 3 months) in the Murray and Murrumbidgee;

3. Drip irrigation of grapes and perennial horticulture in the lower Murray; and

4. Flood irrigation of cotton in the northern catchments, including QMDC (Kirby et

al., 2006).

The evolution of water resource development has been quite different between states.

The southern states developed their water resources much earlier than the northern basin,

and with substantial public investment in irrigation infrastructure (Crase, 2008). In contrast,

water resource development in QMDB occurred much later, and was largely resourced

privately (Crase, 2008).

Changes to the hydrology (flow regime) of rivers leads to changes in ecology, including

vegetation, fish and birds. Ecological responses are complex, reflecting critical flow

components such as no flow periods, low flows, small flow events (freshes), bank-full flows

and over-bank flows that inundate floodplains (Banks & Docker, 2014). The small to medium-

sized events have been most impacted by water resource development (MDBA, 2012).

The reinstatement of environmental flows (flows required to sustain environmental

health and human use) in the Basin Plan seeks to recover four dimensions of flow:


• restore the natural flow regimes as far as possible (including magnitude,

frequency, duration, timing, rate of change overall flow variability);

• reinstate lateral connectivity between rivers and their floodplains;

• improve longitudinal connectivity by building fishways around dams and weirs;

and

• maintain sufficient water quality (Hart et al., 2015).

7.2.4 Management objectives

The over-extraction of water from the Murray-Darling Basin has caused significant

environmental damage to native vegetation, birds and fish, as well as contributing to

salinisation of soil and water resources (Connell, 2007; Hart et al., 2015; MDBA, 2012). Early

water resource development was strongly tied to regional growth and development (Connell

& Grafton, 2011a; Marshall et al., 2013). Despite nearly a century of efforts to coordinate

water allocation and management between the four Basin states, efforts to curtail the growth

in extractions has failed. The spectacular 1,000 km algal bloom in the Darling River in 1991

(and subsequently in the Murray River in 2007, 2009 and 2010) and the closure of the Murray

mouth in 1981 and ongoing dredging since 2002 are testament to the severity of biophysical

and ecological impacts of water extraction (Kingsford et al., 2011; Quiggin, 2001).

A series of intergovernmental agreements culminated in the Water Act 2007 (Cth)

(Commonwealth Parliament, 2007) that legislated the development of the Basin Plan to

restore environmental flows to the Murray-Darling. The Water Act 2007 (Cth) and the Basin

Plan established targets (sustainable diversion limits) to restore environmental water to the

Basin through water pricing, markets and trade and the purchase and use of environmental

water. In combination, the Basin and state plans thus seek to reduce consumptive use of

water through market mechanisms and in so doing increase environmental flows. Restoring

a more natural flow regime should improve the ecological health of the Basin, including the

hydrology of rivers and floodplains, water quality and habitat for birds and fish. In turn, this

should contribute to a healthy, working Basin that supports a healthy environment, supplies

water for towns and communities, and sustainable industries (Figure 26).


Figure 26. Management logic of MDB water programs (author)

7.3 MANAGEMENT AUTHORITIES

The principal legislative instruments for managing the water of the Murray-Darling

Basin are the Water Acts of the national and state governments. Sixteen wetlands in the Basin

are listed under the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (United

Nations Educational, 1971) which represents a commitment to their protection and wise use.

Many of the waterbirds that use the Basin are listed under the international migratory bird

agreements JAMBA, CAMBA and ROKAMBA, which commit Australia to the protection and

conservation of those species and their habitats. World heritage, national heritage,

threatened and migratory species and communities are listed as matters of national

environmental significance under the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity

Conservation Act 1994 (Cth). Proposed actions that may impact matters of national

environmental significance will require approval by the federal Minister for the Environment,

and will require an environmental impact assessment. These instruments are currently

administered by the federal Department of Environment and Energy.

Water resource management has traditionally been in the same portfolio as

environment, but recently was moved into the agriculture portfolio (Table 7. below). The

development and implementation of the Basin Plan (through the independent statutory

Murray-Darling Basin Authority [MDBA]) and national water reform are currently managed

by the Department of Agriculture and Water Resources (DAWR). The Commonwealth

Environmental Water Holder (CEWH), with responsibility for the purchase and use of

Commonwealth environmental water, remains within the environmental portfolio. The

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has oversight of water markets,

rules and charges. The establishment of the MDBA and the CEWH, water markets and trading

with oversight by ACCC and water reporting by the Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) were

established under the 2007 Water Act (Cth.).


Table 7.2 Principal government agencies engaged in managing Murray-Darling Basin water and related

activities in Queensland.

MDB-related interests Current MDB-related activities


Department of Agriculture and Water Resources (DAWR)

The productivity, competitiveness and sustainability of agriculture and the sustainable use of rivers and water resources

water reform, including National Water Initiative, Commonwealth water purchasing, MDB water markets and programs,

Department of Environment and Energy (DEE)

To protect and conserve the environment, water… and promote climate action.

Office of Environmental Water Holder, national Landcare program, Ramsar wetlands

Murray-Darling Basin Authority (MDBA)

Independent statutory agency established under the Water Act 2007

preparing and implementing the Basin Plan, operating the Murray River

Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder (CEWH)

Manages water acquired by the Australian Government for the environment.

Holds, plans and uses Commonwealth environmental water in the Basin.

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC)

National competition regulator and consumer law advocate.

Regulates and provides advice to the Water Minister and the MDBA on water market rules and charges.


Department of Natural Resources and Mines (DNRM)

Responsible and sustainable use of the state's natural resources - water, land, minerals and energy

Water monitoring, water licences and permits, catchment and water resource planning, natural resource management programs

Department of Environment and Heritage Protection (DEHP)

Environment and heritage protection

Environmental monitoring standards and regulation of environmental impacts, species and ecosystem protection

Department of Agriculture and Fisheries (DAF)

Sustainable and innovative agriculture, fisheries and forestry

Agricultural industries research, development and extension

Note: the departmental responsibilities and activities are current as at March 2017.

At the state level, the Queensland Department of Natural Resources and Mines (DNRM)

has carriage of the Water Act 2000 (Qld). The Water Act broadly provides for sustainable use

of water resources through planning, allocation and use of water (Queensland Parliament,

2000). The development of catchment-scale Water Resource Plans and Resource Operation


Plans is required under the Act, and these have been prepared and revised for the Queensland

Murray-Darling catchments. Environmental protection and agricultural industries support are

also relevant to water resource use in the QMDC, administered by the Department of

Environment and Heritage Protection (DEHP) and Department of Agriculture and Fisheries

(DAF) respectively) (Table 7.).

When the Prime Minister, John Howard, announced the 'National Plan for Water

Security' in 2007 he committed $10B (Aus.) to water reforms, principally in the Murray-

Darling Basin (Connell & Grafton, 2011a). Since increased to $13B (about a third of which has

been spent), these funds are being used to purchase water in the market, and subsidise

infrastructure upgrades including on-farm water use efficiency measures (Wentworth group

of concerned scientists, 2017). The announcement heralded a major change in Murray-

Darling Basin governance and programs which will be detailed in the following sections. The

current governance arrangements are outlined in Figure 27 below.

The centre of water management at the Basin scale is the Murray-Darling Basin

Authority, within the federal Water Minister's portfolio. The Authority develops the Basin

Plan, and state water resource plans are required to be consistent with the Basin Plan.

Intergovernmental coordination is facilitated through the MDB Ministerial Council, with

Ministerial representation from each state and the Commonwealth (as chair) (MDBA, 2017d).

The Council is supported by a Basin Officials Committee that provides advice to the Council

and is responsible for implementing the Council's decisions (MDBA, 2017b). The MDBA may

participate in meetings of the Basin Officials Committee but does not have voting rights. The

Council is also supported by a Community Committee whose role is to provide a community

perspective of Basin water resources to the Council and the Authority (MDBA, 2017a). The

Committee is expertise-based and provides key community contacts for the Authority.

Queensland and other state governments retain primary responsibility for the

management of land and water resources, and the Basin Plan relies on state-based water

resource plans for implementation. The state-based plans set and operationalise the rules for

water extraction and use in each catchment. Within each catchment are irrigation districts

that have distinct water use patterns and interests. Formal community engagement occurs

through community advisory committees when plans are developed or revised. The

Ministerial council and the MDBA formally use a Community Committee, comprised of


individuals rather than institutional representatives. There are no formal, enduring

mechanisms that engage institutional representatives such as agricultural industry

associations. Local irrigation district or community groups are often active advocates in the

water policy arena. Further details of the current and historical governance arrangements are

provided in the governance history sections following (section 7.5).

Figure 27. Major governance arrangements for MDB water (2017) (author)

7.4 STAKEHOLDERS

Representative organisations for the major stakeholder groups in the QMDB are listed

in Table 7. below and their level of engagement in MDB policy-making during three periods

of MDB governance noted. The three phases of MDB governance relate to the phases

described in section 7.5 that details the history of MDB governance. Groups that have had

high levels of engagement with MDB policy during any of these phases have been considered

for interviews as part of this research.


Table 7.3 Stakeholder organisations in the Murray-Darling Basin

Engagement in MDB governance

Sector Organisations - MDB Organisations - QMDB Relevant interests and activities

pre-1987 Phase 1 Phase 2

Local governments

162 local governments 8 local governments wholly or largely within the QMD (Murweh, Paroo and Balonne Shire Councils, Roma, Dalby, Toowoomba, Goondiwindi and Southern Downs Regional Councils)

local land use planning and management, local economic development, town water supplies

none low low

Water infrastructure managers

Private and public irrigation companies e.g. Murray Irrigation, Goulbourn Murray Water, Sunwater

Sunwater is a Queensland Government owned corporation that manages bulk water infrastructure such as dams, pipelines and irrigation systems.

Develops, owns and manages water supply infrastructure including upper Condamine, Chinchilla Weir, Macintryre Brook, St George

n/a low low

NRM organisations

17 catchment authorities across the MDB,

3 Natural Resource Management groups: Queensland Murray-Darling Committee (QMDC), South West NRM and Condamine Alliance

community engagement, sustainable agriculture and biodiversity programs, regional water quality planning

none low low

Agricultural industry bodies

National Farmers Federation, National Irrigators Council, Cotton Australia etc.

Queensland Farmers Federation, Cotton Australia, Agforce

member engagement and representation, program delivery none high high

Conservation organisations

World Wildlife Fund for Nature, Australian Conservation Foundation

World Wildlife Fund for Nature policy advocacy, philanthropic investment none high high

Indigenous groups

approximately 50 Indigenous nations

17 Indigenous nations cultural heritage and cultural flows, Traditional Owners engagement

none low low

Local groups various local groups Lower Balonne Irrigators, Border Rivers Food and Fibre, Border Rivers Water Network

local water supply and local economic development none high high

Note: Engagement in MDB governance refers to the level of engagement in Basin Plan policy-level decision-making. High = active and influential in policy-level decisions. Low = some level of engagement in policy- level decisions. None = no level of engagement in policy-level decisions evident.


7.4.1 Local Governments

Local governments have played a relatively minor role in Basin policy. There are 162

Local Governments across the 4 Basin states and 8 Local Governments are wholly or largely

contained within the QMD. Local governments manage local water supplies and have a strong

interest in local economic development. Many basin communities have grown up around

irrigation districts, so the impacts of water buy-backs on local industries is a concern to those

Local Governments.

7.4.2 Water infrastructure managers

Water infrastructure is managed differently in each state, reflecting different

development histories and more recent privatisation. In the southern states, irrigation

infrastructure was largely funded by the government for regional economic development

objectives, compared to the more recent development of irrigation in the QMD which was

largely privately funded (Connell & Grafton, 2011a). In Queensland, Sunwater is a government

owned corporation that develops and manages bulk water infrastructure in the QMD.

7.4.3 Agricultural industries

The Basin supports a wide range of agricultural industries, but by far the largest are

grazing, cereals and other broad acre crops (ABS, 2017). There are significant regional

variations reflecting climate and water availability. Irrigation in the QMD is largely for cotton,

grains, fodder and some small crops (melons etc.). The main industry bodies representing

these industries have been involved in catchment and Basin level policy, particularly irrigators

groups, for obvious reasons.

7.4.4 Natural Resource Management (NRM) organisations

There are 17 NRM organisations (known as Catchment Management Authorities

[CMAs] in NSW and Victoria) across the Basin, and three in Queensland. The roles that these

organisations play in water policy and programs reflect the different state models. In Victoria,

for example, the CMAs are statutory bodies with regional waterway, floodplain, drainage and

environmental water reserve management powers under the Victorian Water Act 1989

(Victorian Water Industry Association, 2017). In Queensland, NRM organisations are non-


statutory and their engagement with water planning and management is subsequently less

direct.

7.4.5 Conservation sector

The key conservation organisations that have been active in MBD policy are the

Australian Conservation Foundation and the World Wildlife Fund for Nature. The latter is the

leading conservation organisation in Queensland.

7.4.6 Indigenous

About 50 Indigenous nations exist across the Basin, 17 of which are in the QMD (MDBA,

2015). Indigenous groups have formed two alliances to facilitate Indigenous engagement

around water policy in the MDB - the Murray Lower Darling Rivers Indigenous Nations and

the Northern Basin Aboriginal Nations.

7.4.7 Local irrigation and community groups

A number of local irrigators and community groups are also active stakeholder

advocates in MDB policy. In the QMD, this includes groups such as the Lower Balonne

Irrigators, Border Rivers Food and Fibre and the Border Rivers Water Network.

7.5 GOVERNANCE HISTORY

7.5.1 Timeline

The timeline presented in Table 7. summarises the key milestones in MDB policy across

the three phases of governance described and characterised in the following sections

(sections 7.5.2, 7.5.3 and 7.5.4). Milestones include legislation, plans, major reports and

investment programs, categorised according to whether they relate to Queensland or

Australian Government or bilateral roles. Each of these milestones are described and

explained in the following sections. Table 7. also shows the political context at state and

federal levels, including election dates. Natural disasters such as major droughts, floods and

algal blooms that have been influential in subsequent policy decisions are also noted.


Table 7.4 Timeline of MDB governance phases and activities, with political and physical events.

Note: IGA = Intergovernmental agreement, CSIRO = Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research

Organisation, WRP = Water Resource Plan, ROP = Resource Operations Plan


7.5.2 River Murray Waters Commission 1917-1987

The Federation drought of 1895-1902 brought Australia's reliance on water supplies,

and the potential for competition between the states, into sharp relief (Kendall, 2013).

Water was a topic of great debate in the constitutional conventions, with South Australia

concerned about sufficient flows to support river-based trade, while Victoria and New South

Wales were interested in irrigation and economic development (Kildea & Williams, 2010).

As a result, section 100 of the Australian Constitution limits the power of the Commonwealth

to interfere with the rights of the states to make 'reasonable use' of river water for irrigation

(Connell & Grafton, 2011b; Kendall, 2013).

The first phase of collaboration between the states was the 1915 River Murray Waters

Agreement, signed by the Australian Government, New South Wales, Victoria and South

Australia. The agreement established the 1917 River Murray Commission (after two years of

negotiation) to regulate the main stream of the Murray and water sharing between the

three states. The agreement provided for substantial investment in infrastructure, including

two major storages (Hume Dam and the Barrages to reduce saltwater intrusion in the lower

lakes and Murray mouth) and 35 locks and weirs on the Murray and Murrumbidgee Rivers

(Kendall, 2013). The agreement excluded the Darling River and therefore the northern basin,

and land management issues such as soil management or irrigation practices.

Water sharing rules were developed for surface water, while groundwater remained

the preserve of the states. After providing for a defined monthly flow to South Australia, the

two upstream states had equal shares on water downstream of Hume Dam (the major

storage on the upper Murray) and exclusive rights to water in the tributaries. The three

states agreed proportional shares for times of drought (Marshall et al., 2013).

In this era, technological advances enabled the progressive development of water

resources, particularly in the southern states. Water and land development was led by

governments and resourced from the public purse. Politically, water resource development

was strongly tied to the ethos of regional and rural economic development (Crase, 2008).

Storages and diversions rapidly expanded. The powers of the Commission were quite limited

- it was unable to address the management of tributaries to the river and didn't have powers

to monitor water quality until 1981 (House of Representatives, 2011).


Each state developed slightly different water laws to replace the traditional riparian

doctrine by vesting the bed and banks of watercourses in the crown, rather than the

landholder (Connell & Grafton, 2011b). There were significant differences in how water

resource development proceeded across states. NSW and Victoria both harvested water

from the Murray River (which defines the border between these two states) for irrigation

development. The more conservative water allocation regime in Victoria encouraged

perennial irrigation enterprises such as horticulture and dairy, while the more liberal water

allocation systems on the northern side of the river (in NSW) encouraged annual crops.

South Australia, the downstream state, had an even more conservative water allocation

system that encouraged permanent horticultural crops such as orchards. South Australia

also used the Murray River for transport and had ambitions to develop the Murray mouth

as a major trading port. Water resource development in Queensland generally developed

later, with the first major irrigation scheme established in the Dawson Valley in 1922. This

partly explains the greater appetite for further contemporary water resource development

in Queensland compared to the southern states (Crase, 2008). Most water taken in the

northern basin is captured off the floodplain before it reaches the river, and stored in private

dams (Connell & Grafton, 2011b). This has important implications for the regulation of water

extraction (Connell & Grafton, 2011b).

The River Murray Waters agreement operated for 70 years, with various amendments

and some conflict (Kendall, 2013). The scope of the Commission was expanded to address

water quality following rising concerns about salinity in the Murray valley from the late

1960's (Kendall, 2013). By the 1980's the Commission was unable to manage the Basin's

water resources and the increasing problems of land degradation including salinity

(Gutteridge, 1970; Kendall, 2013).

7.5.3 Phase 1: Murray-Darling Basin Initiative and catchment water plans (1987-2007)

Through the 70's and 80's increasing salinity (driven by upstream irrigation

development on the Murray) threatened both downstream irrigation and urban water

supplies (Marshall et al., 2013). Then, in 1983, the mouth of the River Murray closed for the

first time, raising awareness of the importance of environmental flows (Bunn & Arthington,

2002).


The 1987 Murray-Darling Basin Agreement, signed by the Commonwealth and three

states (New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia) formally replaced the River Murray

Waters Agreement and provided, for the first time, a mechanism for managing the whole of

Basin (Queensland and the ACT were initially observers) (Connell, 2007; Marshall et al.,

2013). The Murray-Darling Basin Initiative gave effect to the agreement, whose purpose was

to:

promote and coordinate effective planning and management of rate equitable,

efficient and sustainable use of the land, water and other environmental resources

of the Murray-Darling Basin (Kendall, 2013).

The agreement established a suite of mechanisms to coordinate water policy across

the Basin:

• The MDB Ministerial Council of relevant Ministers from the Commonwealth

and state governments;

• A Community Advisory Committee of non-government regional

representatives to advise the Council; and

• The MDB Commission led by the heads of relevant agencies from the

Commonwealth and state governments (Connell, 2007).

This agreement was replaced by a new Murray-Darling Basin Agreement in 1992.

Queensland joined the agreement in 1996, and the Australian Capital Territory in 1998. Each

state parliament passed legislation to ratify the agreement.

The new arrangements allowed for cooperation on any matter on which all the

jurisdictions agreed, but this effectively gave the power of veto to any jurisdiction that did

not support a decision. Politics, economics and logistical capacity also constrained

implementation, and most actions relied on the states for implementation (Marshall et al.,

2013). Nevertheless, the early years of the Commission saw considerable progress, such as

the Salinity and Drainage Strategy (1989) that improved water quality in the lower Murray

(Marshall et al., 2013) and the Natural Resources Management Strategy (1989) that

embraced collaborative and integrated catchment management (Marshall et al., 2013). In

2002, the Australian Government launched the Natural Heritage Trust (NHT) and the

National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality that invested in regional organisations to


develop and implement regional natural resource management plans. The Living Murray

program was the Commission's flagship program, that sought to restore environmental

flows to five priority areas of the Basin (Murray-Darling Basin Commission (MDBC), 2004).

However, an audit confirmed the ongoing growth of water diversions (Murray-Darling

Basin Ministerial Council (MDB MinCo), 1995) which was reducing the reliability of supplies

to existing licence holders and generating environmental impacts, particularly in times of

drought (Crase, 2012). The Ministerial Council agreed to an interim cap to limit water

diversions (to 1993/4 levels) in 1995, which became permanent in 1998, and committed to

six guiding principles:

1. No further change to flow regimes that would contribute to further

deterioration;

2. Exercising the precautionary principle with regard to any further water

allocations;

3. Allocate water to the highest value use;

4. Statutory and agreed property rights to be recognised;

5. Water management processes to be transparent and auditable; and

6. Administrative efficiency (Kendall, 2013).

While the cap was effective for some time, it didn't include groundwater, farm dams

or plantation forestry, all of which can impact river flows (Kendall, 2013).

In 1994, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) (comprising the Prime

Minister, Premiers, Chief Ministers and President of the Australian Local Government

Association) agreed a set of water reform principles. The Water Reform Framework

embraced pricing reforms including full cost-recovery, transparency and/or removal of

cross-subsidies. The framework also sought to clarify property rights, water allocation for

the environment, arrangements to allow the trading of water, institutional reform and

public consultation and participation (Council of Australian Governments (COAG), 2004).

The framework agreement was tied to National Competition Policy that allowed incentive

payments to the states to be based on compliance (Kendall, 2013).


The millennium drought caused severe hardship to ecosystems and the economy from

1996 until it ended with widespread flooding in 2010. Severe and sustained decreases in

water flows reduced the water available for irrigation and increased pressure for further

water reform. A major report by CSIRO (Van Dijk et al., 2006) predicted further reductions in

water inflows and availability for towns and agriculture because of agriculture, forestry, farm

dams and improved infrastructure efficiency. Importantly, these issues sat outside the

agreed mandate of the MDBI (Marshall et al., 2013).

In 2003, COAG agreed to develop the National Water Initiative (NWI) to progress water

reform through a national system of water markets, regulation and planning for surface and

groundwater across rural and urban areas (COAG, 2004). The NWI committed the states to

statutory water planning, the recovery of environmental water in over-allocated systems,

wider and deeper water markets and water use efficiency measures. The National Water

Commission was established to support implementation. Initially, most resources were

directed to infrastructure improvements (water use efficiency) and these were critiqued as

not delivering enough water to the environment and effectively subsidising the irrigation

industry (Crase, 2012).

The drought intensified in the Basin in 2006. In 2007, Prime Minister John Howard

announced the National Plan for Water Security and committed $10 B over 10 years for

water use efficiency and water buybacks and a 10-point plan for water reform in rural

Australian, including reform of MDB governance “The tyranny of incrementalism and the

lowest common denominator must end” (Howard, 2007, p. 1). This heralded the next phase

of MDB governance.

Queensland Murray-Darling Basin

Like Western Australia, Queensland's political and economic development last century

was driven by rich supplies of natural resources and a bipartisan commitment to tackling

'under-development' through close alliances with business interests (Grant & Papadakis,

2004). The defeat of the Queensland National Party after 30 years in power, and an

increasingly diversified economy, signalled a change in the development paradigm in 1989.

Nevertheless, water extraction doubled in the period from 1983 to 1997 (Grant & Papadakis,

2004). Queensland's Environmental Protection Agency was only formed in the late 1990's

following the Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld).


Queensland enacted the Water Act 2000 (Qld) to implement the 1994 COAG water

reforms (Boully et al., 2005), replacing the Water Resources Act 1989 (Qld). The main

purpose of the Water Act is to provide for the sustainable management of water resources

by establishing a system for the planning, allocation and use of water, as well as quarry

resources, water supply and the groundwater impacts of the resources sector (Queensland

Parliament, 2000). Legally, the Act recognised the need to provide entitlements and

allocations for human use in a marketed system, as well as provide water for the

environment. This is achieved through a two-step catchment water planning process:

• A Water Resource Plan (WRP) that specifies water sharing and environmental

flow outcomes for a ten-year period; and

• A Resource Operations Plan that provides the implementation details for the

WRP (Queensland Parliament, 2000).

Stakeholder engagement was embedded in the water planning process, although "the

Queensland Government, like others, has struggled to understand how to involve

stakeholders appropriately in the water reform decision-making processes" (Boully et al.,

2005, p. 3).

Conflict over surface water extraction in the QMDB began in the 1990's (Tan et al.,

2012) but played out differently in the three irrigation areas (Upper Condamine, Border

Rivers and the lower Balonne). In the lower Balonne, private irrigation development

boomed, with water harvested from rivers (and later floodplains) and stored in massive on-

farm dams known as 'ring tanks'. This was in response to highly ephemeral river flows, and

in accordance with licence requirements at the time (Boully et al., 2005). Anecdotally, many

irrigation licences were issued in the year prior to the 1989 state election (Tan, 2000).

Downstream floodplains and wetlands showed signs of degradation, and graziers and

environmentalists raised concerns (Baldwin et al., 2009). In the Border Rivers, management

efforts were complicated by the negotiation of cross-jurisdictional arrangements across the

border between Queensland (north of the River) and New South Wales. In the Border Rivers,

disillusioned stakeholders formed the Border Rivers Food & Fibre Association to represent

the interests of water users in water planning processes (Boully et al., 2005). In the lower

Balonne, conflict between irrigators and graziers was more acute, exacerbated by the


historical and cultural divide between these groups, more variable river flows and the

financial significance of water licences (Boully et al., 2005; Tan, 2000). In both cases, early

attempts at water planning were stymied by ongoing conflict and litigation over 20 years.

Tan (2000) details the complex legal developments. The 1989 Act was constrained to

controlling water in a defined watercourse, so floodplain flows were considered, by common

law, to belong to the owner of the land (Tan, 2000). An early attempt to designate a

floodplain area to control flood harvesting was found to be invalid by the courts. In 1991, a

moratorium was placed on the issuing of new licences, but this did not restrict water

harvesting under existing licences. Cubbie Station was responsible for 75% of the water

extraction in the Queensland lower Balonne, and was at the centre of a series of legal cases

testing the licensing arrangements. The Department established the lower Balonne Advisory

Committee in 1992 to avoid ongoing litigation, with irrigators (including Cubbie Station) and

downstream graziers. This group agreed to a set of principles for a draft floodplain

management plan. Queensland's agreement to the 1994 MDB cap on further extraction was

dependent on the completion of a draft Water Allocation and Management Plan, which was

released in 2000 to wide public criticism (Tan et al., 2012). Floodplain works and storages

continued to rapidly expand during this period.

With the passing of the new Water Act 2000 (Qld), the third attempt at water planning

commenced. Conflict in the lower Balonne peaked in 2002, after which an independent

scientific review (see Cullen et al., 2003) and a revised community engagement process

(Boully et al., 2005) were established. The Water Resource Plans for the Border Rivers and

the Condamine-Balonne were finalised in 2003 and 2004 (Tan et al., 2012). The Condamine-

Balonne Resource Operations Plan was finalised in 2008, except for the lower Balonne,

which was not finalised until 2010. The Border Rivers Resource Operations Plan was

completed in 2010, which required cross-border negotiations under the New South Wales-

Queensland Border Rivers Intergovernmental Agreement 2008. As Leith Boully (one of the

protagonists) reflects:

conflict in the Lower Balonne and Border Rivers water planning processes was

exacerbated by the heavy reliance government placed on a mix of 'adversarial' and

'expert' decision-making approaches (Boully et al., 2005, p. 7).


7.5.4 Phase 2: Commonwealth Water Act and the Basin Plan (2008 – 2016)

The National Plan for Water Security signalled the start of a greater role for the

Commonwealth Government in the Murray-Darling Basin. The ten-point plan committed to:

1. A nationwide investment in Australia's irrigation infrastructure to line and pipe

major delivery channels;

2. A nationwide programme to improve on-farm irrigation technology and

metering;

3. The sharing of water savings on a 50/50 basis between irrigators and the

Commonwealth, leading to greater water security and increased

environmental flows;

4. Addressing, once and for all, water over-allocation in the Murray-Darling Basin;

5. A new set of governance arrangements for the Basin;

6. A sustainable cap on surface and groundwater use in the Basin;

7. Major engineering works at key sites in the Murray-Darling Basin such as the

Barmah Choke and Menindee Lakes;

8. Expanding the role of the Bureau of Meteorology to provide the water data

necessary for good decision-making by governments and industry;

9. A Taskforce to explore future land and water development in Northern

Australia; and

10. Completion of the restoration of the Great Artesian Basin.

A major condition of the plan was the full referral of water management powers for

the Murray-Darling Basin to the Commonwealth. Not all states agreed (Victoria was strongly

opposed), so a more modest reform agenda (without referral of powers) was agreed, whilst

retaining the financial commitment (Kendall, 2013). Prime Minister Rudd later negotiated

with the Basin States for referral of relevant powers to the Commonwealth, and the Act was

amended on this basis in 2008. The change of government also saw a further commitment

of funds, increasing the total to $12.9 billion ($5.8 billion in infrastructure efficiency, and

$3.1 billion for the purchase of water entitlements).


The National Water Initiative, with a strong focus on MDB reform was allocated

$10 billion (later increased to $12.9B) to implement 10-year Water for the Future program

(Connell & Grafton, 2011b). Funds were allocated to water buybacks and infrastructure

upgrades to respond to climate change and provide water for the environment (Connell,

2011; Marshall et al., 2013). When reform proved slow due to complexity and opposition

from the irrigation community, the Commonwealth introduced the Water Act 2007 (Cth)

(Connell, 2011; Marshall et al., 2013). Financing infrastructure upgrades was key to achieving

the states’ acceptance of the Water Act reforms (Connell & Grafton, 2011b).

The Water Act established the Murray-Darling Basin Authority (MDBA) to replace the

Murray-Darling Basin Commission. Unlike the Commission, which was accountable to all

governments (Commonwealth, state and territory), the Authority is a Commonwealth

agency (Marshall et al., 2013). A key tenet of the Act is the belief that a centralisation of

authority is required to overcome the challenges of coordinated state control of water

(Crase, 2012). The Murray-Darling Basin Agreement is incorporated within the Water Act,

and is periodically amended by the MDB Ministerial Council. The key role of the MDBA is to

develop and implement a comprehensive Basin Plan, which then gives direction to statutory

water resource plans developed by the states at the catchment scale. The Basin Plan

includes 'Sustainable Diversion Limits' i.e. extraction limits that effectively define basin-wide

and catchment water recovery targets for environmental water. The Basin Plan also sets

basin-wide environmental objectives, including environmental assets, environmental

functions, water quality and salinity, requirements for state planning and measures to

improve water security (Commonwealth Parliament, 2007). Statutory water plans

developed by the states will need to be accredited by the Minister as consistent with the

Basin Plan, recognising the substantial differences between the four state-based water

planning systems (Connell & Grafton, 2011b).

The Water Act also established the Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder

(CEWH) (as part of the Department of Environment) to manage the Commonwealth's

environmental water through purchases (legal entitlements equivalent to irrigation licences)

and water savings through infrastructure improvements, and using these to achieve


environmental objectives through environmental watering. Additional roles were specified

for the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission in terms of water charges and

market rules, the Productivity Commission for periodic review of progress under the

National Water Initiative and effectiveness of the Basin Plan, and the Bureau of Meteorology

for water information. The Water Act also sets out a risk allocation framework that

determines a risk allocation for changes in water allocations from weather events and

climate change (borne by licence holders) and changes in knowledge and policy (major

changes shared by state and federal governments) (Commonwealth Parliament, 2007).

In 2010, the MDBA took the extraordinary decision to release a Guide to the Basin Plan

to provide an opportunity for public comment in advance of the release of the plan itself

(Crase, 2011). The Guide comprised a 223-page overview, a 464-page technical report and

19 regional fact sheets. The Guide was released for a 6-week consultation period. The Guide

emphasised a c. 30% reduction in water extraction, potential employment impacts in some

regions, and with little acknowledgement of existing water recovery programs (Crase, 2011).

The subsequent public outcry and media fallout resulted in a new chair and executive officer

for the Authority and a prolonged political debate about the legal interpretation of core

elements of the Act relating to social, economic and environmental trade-offs (Crase, 2012).

The drought broke, easing water security issues, in 2010-11. Sustainable Diversion Limits

(SDLs) were subsequently raised (recovery targets relaxed) from 3-4,000 GL in the Guide to

2,750GL in the Basin Plan, which was finalised in 2012. The capacity to amend the SDL's has

been the subject of several subsequent amendments to the Water Act, under pressure from

South Australia, the downstream state.

The implementation of the first Basin Plan is expected to be largely completed in 2019,

with initial water recovery achieved, the SDLs formally come into effect and 36 regional

water resource plans accredited by the Commonwealth Water Minister. The scale and cost

of the water reforms proposed under the Basin Plan are immense and greater than any

achieved elsewhere in the world (Hart et al., 2015). There are substantial challenges to

implementation, including complex politics and powerful interest groups across diverse

scales and systems (Daniell et al., 2014). The progression of parliamentary inquiries is

evidence of ongoing tensions in the development and establishment of the Basin Plan -


Windsor Parliamentary Inquiry 2011, Senate Standing Committee 2013, Senate Inquiry 2015

(and recent calls for a further Senate inquiry in 2017).

Horne (2014) identified important implementation challenges, including effectiveness,

efficiency, transparency and compliance and responding to climate change. The balance of

investments between water buy backs and infrastructure upgrades has been contentious.

Water buy backs are considered cost-effective, whereas infrastructure upgrades are

expensive, ineffective, inequitable and do not save water (Crase, 2012; Crase et al., 2013;

Hart, 2016). Infrastructure investments, however, remain the preferred mechanism of

irrigators and many regional communities (and are thus more politically palatable) (Crase,

2012).

Implementation is highly reliant on cooperation of the Basin states which have a long

history of poor cooperation in water (Connell, 2011; Marshall et al., 2013) and other policy

areas (Althaus & Morrison, 2015; Dovers & Wild River, 2003). Nonetheless, progress in water

recovery is significant, with the CEWH and other water recovered totalling 1,951 GL, or 71%

of the target (as at February 2015) (Hart, 2016). The first review of the Basin Plan is

scheduled for 2022.

The lack of knowledge and understanding about the northern basin landscapes and

ecosystems was the rationale for the Northern Basin Review to consider amendments to the

SDLs in northern New South Wales and Queensland in 2015-16. The review included a

greater recognition of the social and economic impacts of water recovery, and

recommended a reduction in the water recovery target for this area from 390 GL to 320GL.

The Review recommended a 'toolkit' of complementary approaches (such as targeted

watering, and actions to improve fish passage) proposed by the Northern Basin Advisory

Committee (NBAC) to lessen the reliance on water licence buybacks.

Queensland Murray-Darling Basin

The most significant changes to the QMDB in this period relate the new federal Water

Act 2007 (Cth) and the subsequent release of the Basin Plan in 2012. Since the completion

of the first round of water resource planning in the Queensland Murray-Darling, there have

been several amendments - to the Border Rivers WRP in 2007, and the Condamine-Balonne

WRP in 2014. A water management plan was prepared for the Condamine Alluvium in 2012

to make groundwater licence holders eligible for the MDBA water recovery program (to


meet recovery targets under the Basin Plan). Under the Water Reform and Other Legislation

Amendment Act 2014 (Qld), water resource plans and resource operation plans have been

replaced by new planning instruments designed to improve flexibility. Water Resource Plans

become water plans, implemented through a water management protocol rather than a

Resource Operation Plan. Four State water plans in the Queensland Murray–Darling Basin

twill be reviewed and updated by 2019 to be compliant with the Basin Plan (and any

amendments arising from the Northern Basin Review):

• The Condamine and Balonne water plan;

• The Moonie water plan;

• The Border Rivers water plan; and

• The Warrego, Paroo, Bulloo and Nebine water plan.

7.6 KEY GOVERNANCE PHASES FOR ANALYSIS

The preceding sections have described three distinct phases of MDB water

governance; two of these are taken forward as key decision points for analysis. Water

sharing was an issue raised at Federation, and the first formal governance arrangement to

facilitate this was the River Murray Waters Commission from 1917-1991. This phase is

excluded from the analysis because of the lack of access to decision-makers and limited

documentary evidence. Two phases of MDB water governance are therefore relevant to the

research inquiry:

Phase 1: Murray-Darling Basin Initiative and Queensland Water Resource Plans

(2000-2007)

The first Murray-Darling Basin Agreement was signed in 1987 (and revised in 1992).

The agreement established the Murray-Darling Basin Commission, Ministerial Council and

community Advisory Committee. Despite the initial progress in salinity, natural resource

management and the Living Murray program, the Commission was unable to stem the

growth in water extraction. The Ministerial Council imposed a cap in new licences in 1995

but this ultimately proved unsuccessful. The Water Reform Framework was linked to

payments under the National Competition Policy to incentivise state cooperation. The

millennium drought (1996-2009) created a crisis in water supply. The National Water


Initiative (2004) committed to statutory water planning, the recovery of water for the

environment and further development of water markets. When the drought intensified in

2006, John Howard announced the National Plan for Water Security with a 10-point plan

and $10B commitment.

In Queensland, the Water Act 2000 (Qld) introduced a statutory water planning

process. In the QMD the amount of water extraction and private water storage grew

enormously from the 1990's until the first Water Resource Plans were enacted (from 2003-

2006). Ongoing conflict and litigation was particularly acute in the Condamine-Balonne

catchment, where the third attempt at water planning was finally successful in 2004.

Phase 2: Commonwealth Water Act and the Basin Plan (2008-16)

The Water Act 2007 (Cth) represented a significant centralisation of authority, moving

from a governance model that relied on the agreement of the states, to one where a federal

authority, the Murray-Darling Basin Authority, develops a Basin-wide plan that provides the

objectives and performance requirements for state-based statutory water plans. The

initiation of the Water Act was a response to the millennium drought, which provided a

water supply crisis, and frustration with the slow rate of progress in reducing water

extraction levels. The federal government negotiated a referral of powers from the states,

and the MDBA set about developing the first Basin Plan, with objectives to “optimise social,

economic and environmental outcomes” (MDBA, 2012, p. 23).

The release of a Guide to the Basin Plan (MDBA, 2010) caused a public and media

outcry. The drought broke, easing water security issues, in 2010-11. When the Basin Plan

was finalised in 2012 (with reduced targets) the new era of MDB water management

commenced.

In the QMDB, the outstanding Resource Operation Plans were finalised. The Northern

Basin Review recommended a reduction in SDLs for the northern Basin, and a 'toolkit' of

complementary measures was proposed by the Northern Basin Advisory Committee.

Revised QMDB plans will need to be accredited as consistent with the Basin Plan by 2019.

7.7 CONCLUSION

The Murray-Darling Basin is Australia's food bowl, supporting 40% of Australia's

agricultural and pastoral production, and supplying water to more than 3 million people


(ABS, 2012; Bohensky et al., 2009). The Basin supports a wide range of ecologically

significant assets, including internationally significant wetlands, migratory waterbirds and

endemic fish. The condition of these assets has been widely documented as poor or very

poor and continuing to decline (Hart et al., 2015). The need to dredge the Murray mouth to

keep it open (2002-2010 and 2015-17) and thousand-kilometre-long toxic algal blooms

(1991-92, 2007, 2009, 2010 and 2016) provide spectacular evidence of the poor health of

the Basins’ rivers (Baldwin, 2016).

The health of the Basin is affected by many pressures, but over extraction of water is

the critical element, affecting water security to downstream users such as South Australia,

and the health of the riverine ecosystems. Climate change is likely to reduce the average

inflows to the Basin, and increase rainfall variability even further (CSIRO, 2008).

Primary responsibility for the management of the Basin's water resources rests with

four states. Water supply to South Australia, the downstream state, has been a contentious

issue since Federation. Increasing levels of extraction, coupled with strong evidence of

environmental impacts, have driven a series of governance arrangements between federal

and state governments. For seventy years (1917-1991) the River Murray Waters Commission

facilitated water sharing arrangements for the Murray River. The 1987 Murray-Darling Basin

Agreement sought to manage the Basin as a whole, relying on collaboration between the

states to implement the agreement. The millennium drought and the slow rate of progress

prompted a radical governance shift, with the Water Act 2007 (Cth) and the subsequent

development of the first Basin Plan, supported by statutory catchment water planning

processes at the state level.

This chapter introduces the MDB case study. The issue of environmental water, the

pressures and impacts on the health of the Basins' ecological assets and water security for

agriculture and drinking water. The complex management arrangements between

Australian and state Governments have been described and key stakeholder groups

identified. The key phases of MDB water governance history have been identified and two

phases taken forward for further examination as part of this research.

Chapter 8: Murray-Darling Basin case study results 215

Chapter 8: Murray-Darling Basin case study

results

8.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the results of the thematic analysis of the MDB case study

interview data. Results are first presented for each of the two case study phases (sections

8.2 and 8.3) before being summarised for the MDB case overall. For each phase, government

and stakeholder perspectives of key decisions are presented in historical sequence and

illustrated with quotations. Key features of each phase, such as plans, investments, alliances,

regulation and contextual changes are examined. In the analysis of each theme, attention is

thus drawn to the rationales and practices of metagovernance as perceived by government

or stakeholder actors.

The overall case study findings are summarised against the key dimensions of the

analytical framework presented in Chapter 3: context, rationalities, metagovernance,

governance performance, impact on policy and outcomes, first by phase, and then overall

for the MDB case study. Two additional dimensions emerge from the findings and have been

incorporated in a modified framework: bilateral arrangements and stakeholder networks (as

described previously in section 6.5).

8.2 PHASE 1: MURRAY-DARLING BASIN INITIATIVE (2000-2007)

The first attempts to manage the Murray-Darling Basin began with the 1987 Murray-

Darling Basin Agreement, which established the MDB Ministerial Council, the MDB

Commission and a Community Advisory Committee. While the analysis of this phase of the

case study is formally confined to the period after 2000, it is useful to understand the

dynamics of intergovernmental relations in the period prior to that. Key milestones in the

period leading up to 2000 include the following:

1987 MDB Agreement;

1992 MDB Agreement revised;

1994 COAG water reform framework;


1995 interim cap on further water extractions; and

1998 permanent cap on water extractions.

8.2.1 Queensland join the Murray-Darling Basin Commission

Queensland signed the agreement and joined the Murray-Darling Basin Commission

in 1996. The Commission comprised the heads of relevant Commonwealth and state

agencies. Queensland engaged cautiously in the Commission’s business, emphasising the

relatively small contribution that Queensland catchments make to the Murray-Darling flows,

the distinctive hydrology and relatively undeveloped nature of QMDB water resources.

Queensland was, we were, a bit player, when it gets down to it, in the whole process.

It became a popular thing that Queensland was not pulling its weight. Which used to

piss off commissioners and ministers. There were times when the agenda was, let's

say the commission or the council, there was clearly no role for Queensland, we’d

just leave them in the midst of the agenda. There's no point in us being there. We

were trying to make a statement, that this is only relevant to us in certain points.

(Qld. Govt. 09)

As one Australian Government officer recalls, this was perceived as recalcitrance by

other members of the Commission:

There was a long history of Queensland trying to sit outside, or looking in, but not

fully engaging, and then engaging in a somewhat limited way. (Aust. Govt. 22)

In general, the Commission was criticised for taking a long time to make decisions,

although one Commissioner argues that that criticism is, perhaps, unfair:

Show me an intergovernmental agreement anywhere in this country that hasn’t

taken years to negotiate. And the benefits of having taken the time, when they are

ready to commit, they will actually stick to it. It is a commitment… I thought it worked

reasonably well. And because we weren’t beholden to a single government, it was

up to all 6. We had all our own systems in place – auditing and financials etc. they

tended to be more efficient, simpler is probably a better word. More straightforward

than single government processes. Because it’s in everyone’s interests, it’s very

transparent. (Aust. Govt. 35)


The Commission engaged widely with community groups, and the Community

Advisory Committee was perceived to be an effective part of Commission arrangements:

Under the MDB Commission arrangements, the community advisory committee was

quite influential. Some of it comes down to the governance, some of it comes down

to the individuals involved… who were quite influential, quite articulate, and were

connected back to their own catchments. (Qld. Govt. 16)

8.2.2 Slow progress on cap implementation

The Ministerial Council agreed to an interim cap on further water extraction in 1995,

which was made permanent in 1997. Despite the slow pace of agreements, and final

consensus on the cap decision, the process appeared to have some weaknesses:

But it was always a bit vague, as to what did the cap cover. How much of that really

covered take just out of rivers, or overland flow. New South Wales had a different

approach to Queensland, which, on one reading of it, could allow a huge amount to

be taken from overland flow, that would cause the cap to be regularly breached.

(Qld. Govt. 16)

The cap had an independent audit process and public reporting, but had limited

mechanisms to address non-compliance. As a federal Commissioner recalls:

You’d go along sometimes and say, ‘you haven’t met your cap targets’ and they’d

say ‘and?’ They didn’t need to give a rats because the way the body was organised,

there was no comeback. (Aust. Govt. 19)

For Queensland, cap implementation was deferred while the new Water Act 2000

(Qld) and water resource planning process proceeded. Again, Queensland argued for

recognition that the water planning needed to account for differences in the northern Basin

systems:

It’s fair to say that the appreciation of the nature of Queensland’s catchments, the

largely unregulated flows that we’d been taking, or the nature of the hydrology, was

something that the southern states, particularly South Australia, had a lot of trouble

understanding. (Qld. Govt. 09)


While there were obvious challenges to cap implementation, the MDB Commission

was claiming success by 2000 “there can be no doubt that it [the cap] has halted the growth

in diversions” (MDBC, 2000, p. 5).

Despite the consensus-based decision-making of the Commission, deep mistrust

between the states emerged as a consistent theme from interviewee accounts. The National

Water Initiative was announced by COAG in 2004, with a raft of measures to recover water

from over-allocated systems (COAG, 2004). Unlike the MDB Commission, COAG engaged

central agency (the Prime Minister and Premiers’ departments) decision-makers, and this

was perceived as more effective than the Commission:

NWI [National Water Initiative] as an example. That was a forum that came out of

COAG [Council of Australian Governments], so it was driven by central rather than

line agencies. So, when there were meetings there were always the PM’s rep [Prime

Ministers’ representative], the Premiers rep, as well as the line agency reps. And that

was designed that way to get action. If you leave it with the environment

departments and the ag. [agriculture] departments, history showed us that it took a

long time for anything to happen. (Aust. Govt. 19)

Inter-state rivalries still played out, however, with one official nick-naming it the

“COAG Somme” (Aust. Govt. 19) alluding to intractable trench warfare.

Victoria basically wanted to do its own thing, thought it was the source of all

knowledge and everybody else didn’t understand. That’s still the case today. (Aust.

Govt. 19)

8.2.3 Queensland Water Act 2000

In Queensland, the Water Act 2000 (Qld) was developed to implement the 1994 COAG

reforms and the cap. The new Act was a major reform and involved substantial consultation

with stakeholder groups:

To do the new Qld Water Act was an extensive process of community and industry

consultation over several years. It involved not only institutional changes but also

major changes to the way that water allocations were made, decisions about how

take of water in catchments and aquifers were made. So that was a whole detailed

process to put that in place for the first time, getting a whole of catchment approach.

It was also the first time that the management of overland flow water was included


in the water that came under the jurisdiction of the crown, the state in Queensland.

(Qld. Govt. 16)

Chapter 7 details the growth in water extraction that occurred in the QMDB through

the 1980’s and 1990’s. The changes required to implement reforms to existing licence

arrangements in Queensland were very significant. An interviewee from the state

government (at that time) recounts:

In the early 1990’s, the question was asked ‘have we allocated too much?’ That really

challenged the departmental engineers that built the dams, issued the licences etc.

Well, they said ‘piss off’! Then they were asked ‘well, how much have you allocated?

Can you add it up?’ and the answer was ‘no’. Because the licences were height and

pump size licences, not volumetric. So, if you got your licence in the 1970’s when a

flood comes down, you put your pump on, you might have 4 x 20-inch pipes, you can

harvest as much as you can pump and store in that period. So how much is allocated?

Every licence got a different height, a different pump size. (Qld. Govt. 17)

Despite the 1991 moratorium on new licences, extraction continued to increase

because it was constrained by storage capacity not licensing, and until the Water Act 2000

(Qld), the harvesting of overland flows (by capturing floodwaters with levee banks before

they enter the river system) was not regulated.

8.2.4 Crisis in the Condamine-Balonne

In the QMDB, most water extraction is via private harvesting and storage, unlike

southern systems that collect and distribute water via public infrastructure including large

headwater dams, in-stream weirs and irrigation district systems. As water harvesting grew

in the 1990’s, conflict between irrigators and downstream graziers that rely on beneficial

floods to replenish floodplain moisture and nutrients, also grew. This was particularly acute

in the lower Balonne, where Cubbie Station and other major water harvesters were rapidly

expanding harvesting capacity upstream of floodplain graziers and the Ramsar-listed Narran

Lakes in New South Wales.

So, people like Cubbie station and others saw that water as a major resource that

could be captured and put into dams and used to irrigate cotton and anything else.

And there were no controls over the take of that water. Not only did that impact the

availability of water for beneficial flooding or for neighbours, it also impacted the


downstream environment like the Narran Lakes in the lower Balonne. Obviously,

that sort of set things up for quite a lot of tension between the floodplain graziers

and the irrigators. (Qld. Govt. 15)

Tan (2000) details the complex series of legal cases that occurred in the early 1990’s

and several failed attempts at water planning in that area. At the same time, community

views on joining the Murray-Darling Basin Initiative were canvassed and then dismissed:

A large process was run in 1992 to see whether Queensland should join the Murray-

Darling Initiative. The overwhelming outcome from consultation was not to – 11

community meetings run around the basin. It was all ‘we’ll lose state’s rights, we

don’t want to be a part of it’. But the minister of the day decided to sign up, ‘thanks

for your input’…this meant we were going to have catchment committees... What

that meant was that the irrigation community has been hostile to water quality

issues and catchment management for years and years and years afterwards

because they turned up to all these meetings and gave their views, and the minister

ignored it, and then imposed these catchment groups. (Qld. Govt. 17)

When the new Water Act 2000 (Qld) was passed, the third attempt at water planning

in the Condamine-Balonne commenced. On the back of more than a decade of conflict

between irrigators and graziers, failed attempts at water planning and serial litigation, the

introduction of a significant reform process was never going to be an easy task.

It was this whole engagement in the communications process, trying to explain it to

people who, in many ways didn’t want to know about it, because they didn’t want

lifestyle to be affected… (Qld. Govt. 09)

Graziers and conservationists lined up against irrigators:

I took a very environmental bent. And, in hindsight, and on reflection, it was a bit

dishonest. For most floodplain graziers it was about economics not the environment,

but we used the environment as a tool, because that was where we could get

traction at that particular time. (local rep. 23)

The narrative that they had was about the now, what we were trying to talk about

was the long term, but that is a hard thing to talk about. We’re not talking about

something we can see now, because we’re taking about the systems. (Qld. Govt. 09)

Relations went from poor to worse as the process went on. At once stage, the Premier,

Peter Beattie, offered to buy Cubbie Station, which was the largest water harvesting


enterprise at the time. Irrigators had contracted their own scientists to monitor and report

on the health of the system. Tensions finally came to a head at a heated public meeting in

Dirranbandi in the lower Balonne:

The relationship between irrigators and the department was rock bottom. The

irrigators (so Smart Rivers and Cubbie) collectively and separately, were briefing

QC’s. (local rep. 23)

I think it was primarily around ‘this is going to take water away from me. This is going

to hurt me.’ It wasn’t about theory or principles or policy. It was just around fear of

the unknown. And that then led to, that fear then fueled, other things – questioning

the science, questioning the need for it all, then also led to the equity of what was

being proposed ‘why me and not them’ and just no ownership of the proposal, none

at all. Absolutely none. �Even at the quiet meetings that was quite clear. Then the

more informed they got, the more that fear grew. The effectiveness of Dirranbandi,

they really whipped up a storm. ‘You’ve got to be worried about this. You might not

understand it. But it’s not going to be good’. So, by the end of Dirranbandi we had

to stop. (Qld. Govt. 34)

Public meetings I’ve found are about the most useless forums for having any viable

conversations. (Qld. Govt.09)

The Premier then appointed Dr Peter Cullen to lead an independent science review

and Leith Boully (a local grazier and irrigator) to lead a Ministerial Advisory Committee. Leith

and Peter, with close support from the Department ran a process of joint discovery, where:

Everything was considered to be science. And we ran that a bit like a citizen’s jury.

Peter and I worked very closely on designing it. All the submissions went in, and we

held this citizen’s jury-like event where scientists came and presented to the panel,

who were able to ask questions. Other people were able to ask questions, and some

of them were able to present in that process. So, the draft report was written,

presented to the Ministerial Advisory Committee. (local rep. 23)

We had an approach that was called ‘going on a journey of joint discovery’ for us as

an agency and with those we were working with. ...You always have to take some of

this stuff with a grain of salt, but... because our plans have a strong technical

underpinning with modeling and data. We made that fully available and as

transparent as we can. So, if people have better data bring it forward and we’ll

include it. That’s what we meant by joint discovery for want of other jargon…we laid


bare all the modeling assumptions. If people disagreed with the assumptions we’d

run that model and see what difference it made. And have a discussion about all of

that. (Qld. Govt. 34)

We actually used a process of “joint discovery”. No-one was more important than

anyone else. We had to figure out what people valued, what mattered to them. Then

work out what the questions were that we were trying to solve. We had working

groups, technical working groups where people went and sat with the modelers.

They went through the model and said, ‘that’s wrong, that’s right’ so they got real

confidence in the information, and that was a really key element to taking it forward.

So, within 6 months we had a draft WRP [Water Resource Plan] where 90% of the

stakeholders said ‘yep, that’s good’. It had irrigators giving up water for no

compensation. And a completely different relationship with the department. (local

rep.23)

At the start of the process, the Ministerial Advisory Group had agreed to abide by the

recommendations of the scientific review, which examined the modelling, the current and

likely future health of the river, to propose relevant river health targets and monitoring

approaches (Cullen et al., 2003). The department also had to let go their position of authority

in order to work with the community. An officer recalls:

I remember saying ‘we got it wrong. We’ll go again. We’ll start again’. Once they

saw that, they were fine. They kept reminding me. Whenever I slipped into the old

way of talking, even in my speech, they’d remind me. It wasn’t all roses. But it was a

definite shift. (Qld. Govt. 34)

The results provided the circuit breaker required for the finalisation of the Water

Resource Plan for the Condamine-Balonne in 2004 and left a legacy of knowledge, learnings

and respectful relationships which endures to this day, 15 years later.

So, we’ve ended up with this network of high trust. I’m not sure the Murray-Darling

Basin Authority is there yet.” (Qld. Govt. 34)

“My big learning has been that during... from 1995 up to about 2000, I knew all of

the technical stuff, and none of the social stuff. And I lost every battle I went into.

After that, I lost most of my capacity in the technical, but just did the people stuff.

(local rep. 23)


8.2.5 The millennium drought

The millennium drought started in 1996 and worsened in 2006. Slow progress on

implementation of the cap, and a new report (CSIRO, 2008) predicted further reductions in

flow regardless of the cap (from climate change, farm forestry, farm dams and infrastructure

efficiencies). The pressure for more significant water reform grew:

We’d had 20 years of reports that the health of the Basin was going south… A whole

bunch of reports saying, ‘we’ve got to do something about it’, ‘we’ve got to do

something about it’. Each time we were in a worse place, so the millennium drought

really said we really must to do something or its going to be too late. (Aust. Govt. 19)

In 2006, the drought worsened, and water supply became the critical imperative.

Contingency planning moved into crisis mode:

It was serious business. We looked at options like trucking water to Adelaide. We

were really in a serious situation. Very close to the line. The sort of level of discussion

was very detailed. It didn’t at that level, include detailed community level

discussions. It was crisis level. We made sure that NFF [National Farmers Federation]

the farmer groups and ACF [Australian Conservation Foundation] knew what was

going on. (Aust. Govt. 19)

Then John Howard’s Australia Day speech in 2007 announced the National Plan for

Water Security (Howard, 2007):

When the PM [Prime Minister] made that statement, nobody dreamt that

government would get into that space. The first dismal 500 GL effort had been

underway for, I guess, 3-4 years at that stage. And 2 buckets full of water had been

collected. And it looked like, another 10 years, we would have 4 buckets of water.

(Aust. Govt. 19)

The level of ambition in the new plan included a $10B commitment and a promise to

fundamentally change the approach to managing the Basin’s water.

For this plan to work there must be a clear recognition by all – especially by state

and territory governments – that the old way of managing the Murray-Darling Basin

has reached its use-by date. (Howard, 2007).


8.3 PHASE 2: COMMONWEALTH WATER ACT AND THE BASIN PLAN (2008 - 2016)

8.3.1 Negotiation of the Water Act 2007 (Cth)

The National Plan for Water Security (Howard, 2007) marked a significant shift in

Australian water policy. The proposed new Basin arrangements shifted from the

Commonwealth working with the states in a consensus-based process, to one where the

Commonwealth sought to take a leadership role in setting and achieving Basin-wide

outcomes. The rationale stemmed from frustration with the slow rate of progress through

existing governance arrangements, exacerbated by the Millennium Drought:

There was a view that if one jurisdiction was in charge they could make it more

efficient, more streamlined. In theory, it was just one decision to make, rather than

6 or 7. (Aust. Govt. 35)

John Howard asked the states for a referral of powers under s51(xxxvii) of the

Constitution (Kildea & Williams, 2011). While the other states agreed, Victoria resisted. After

some months of negotiation, the Commonwealth chose to legislate, drawing on a mix of

powers including international conventions on biodiversity, wetlands and waterbirds

(Twomey, 2007). Kevin Rudd later negotiated referral of a more limited set of powers from

the states (Kildea & Williams, 2011). In the interim, the financial clout of the Commonwealth

helped ease negotiations with the states:

A lot of the funding comes down to the Commonwealth. We just can’t get

agreements in time, we just can’t get the control that we want, so let’s make the

changes. Let’s apply the golden rule – whoever has the most gold, rules. And the

Commonwealth had more gold than the states. (Qld. Govt. 16)

The Water Act could pass because that’s a federal act, but the Basin Plan, which was

a child of the Water Act, I don’t believe there’s any way that would have been

accepted if there hadn’t been a huge amount of money on the table. (MDBA, 05)

There was substantial and ongoing negotiation with the states as the Water Act was

developed:

We had negotiation groups with the states going on continuously for that 6-month

period when the Water Act was being written and negotiated. The writing and

negotiation was going on almost simultaneously. (Aust. Govt. 19)


At the same time, peak industry and conservation bodies were also being engaged,

with access to emerging drafts and agency staff:

We had separate discussions and we had a draft, we wouldn’t let people take them

away drafts because they were subject to negotiation. But they knew what was in it.

The peak groups involved... worked to some basic agreements about how the

material is handled. You can come in, someone will sit with you for the day. You can

read it, you can access the people involved and they can explain their thinking behind

it. We went to a fair bit of effort. People say they haven’t been consulted – often

what they mean is, you haven’t taken on board the points we made, so we haven’t

been consulted. (Aust. Govt. 19)

At the end of the day, final negotiations with the states resulted in some changes to

the Act that stakeholder groups hadn’t been privy to. This was seen as an act of betrayal by

representatives of the irrigation industry who had been part of the engagement and

negotiation process.

People who were sitting around with Malcolm Turnbull negotiating the Water Act.

But it was changed at the last minute. So, it was an act of betrayal, for the irrigators

it was an act of betrayal. There were things in that Act that appeared in the Act that

wasn’t there at 1 minute to midnight when they were negotiating around the table.

The same thing in the basin plan, the addition of an extra 450 GL of water was a dirty

deal done at midnight when everyone had walked away from the table and the state

premiers sat there ... That’s the sort of stuff that just doesn’t bode well for long-term

cooperation. (industry 31)

Nonetheless, there was negotiability on elements of both the Water Act, and

ultimately the Basin Plan, although one federal government officer reflects that the degree

of negotiability varied with the different leadership of the Authority in the early years:

Yeah, there is [negotiability]. Issue by issue yes. Within the project, each individual

program, how things were going to be delivered, there is some give and take. You

have to meet this objective but... but you can talk about it, sensible people can work

through and find the best way to deliver it, without giving away the core of it. (Aust.

Govt. 19) �


8.3.2 The Border Rivers story

While the Water Act and early stages of the Basin Plan were being developed,

Queensland and New South Wales ran a water resource planning process for the Border

Rivers catchment. With the centre of the river defining the state borders (Figure 25), water

planning needs to accommodate two state systems as well as the emerging Basin Plan. In

contrast to the lower Balonne experience (which also had cross-border issues), the Border

Rivers had a long history of constructive stakeholder engagement:

It’s long been a challenge to balance up the two state planning processes. Obviously

then with the Commonwealth legislation we’ve basically got three water laws that

the planning framework needs to deal with. But, it’s a robust relationship with New

South Wales. (Qld. Govt. 24)

“Institutionally the Border Rivers was one of the more challenging, of course, for the

states. We had the irrigators from different states, with different rules between the

states. It was bloody difficult. We had a lot of community engagement; more

effective I think. There were some good debates, it was reasonably mature, good

community leaders, both from industry and the catchment groups. It’s also fair to

say our own Toowoomba office ... had a very good, long standing relationship with

these people. That also came from the Border Rivers Agreement, which went back

that many years. There’s a whole infrastructure of community engagement over

water in that part of the basin that had been there for many decades. They had a

foundation that worked well. (Qld. Govt. 09)

8.3.3 Early development of the Basin Plan

When the Authority was established, the task ahead was challenged by needing to

work with the states, but also directly with communities (a role that had previously been

managed by the states).

Because MDBA is caught in a vice, with at least 2 jaws. They are accountable to

government and to the Minister, in particular. But they’re also dealing with things

that are very, very sensitive in communities, and they’re sensitive with scientists.

There’s lots of different levels of interest in this everywhere. (local rep. 06)

The first few years, the Authority focused i on getting on with the complex technical

job of developing a Basin Plan internally.


The first two years, I think the Authority, myself included, were ... really went about

it in a very naïve way. There was the federal government ethos that the states were

pretty hopeless, and we were going to do the lot. I didn’t believe that, but that was

the current thinking. (MDBA, 05)

We just had to basically close the doors, and get in behind closed doors and do a lot

technical work and come out with some pretty solid pieces of work…Just leave us

alone, let us do our technical work. (MDBA 15)

When technical details were released to the community, they came as a Guide to the

Basin Plan (Murray–Darling Basin Authority (MDBA), 2010). The release of the Guide was ill-

conceived as a community engagement exercise, with a huge document (volume 1, the

overview, was over 200 pages), presented by technical experts in a public roadshow days

after its release (Crase, 2011). In the subsequent fallout, public disagreements between the

Minister, the Chair and the CEO of the Authority did little to reassure stakeholders.

Of course, it was a disaster from a PR [public relations] point of view, and I think that

very poor on behalf of Authority, in terms of interaction with stakeholders. There

were a huge number of things that were done wrong there, and we’ve come a long

way. (MDBA, 05)

For some in the Queensland Government, the scenes were reminiscent of experiences

in the lower Balonne:

There was a direct parallel. Absolutely. I watched that and thought ‘they’re learning

all the lessons I learnt 10 years ago’. We tried to offer to convey our learnings out of

our approaches, but it fell on deaf ears, they had to learn the hard way. (Qld. Govt.

34) �

8.3.4 Change in leadership and a new style of engagement

With the resignation of the chairman and a new CEO, a different style of engagement

commenced.

The new chairman and his approach marked a huge difference for the Authority and

how it worked with people. So, from my point of view, that change in the approach

to working with people and all the stakeholders and the states was a key change in

how the Authority developed the basin plan up to its release in 2011. (MDBA 29)


I set up a regular working group with the states that hadn’t existed before and got

in an independent chair. They met regularly and worked through infinitesimal detail.

We shared all of the detail with the states and worked on it with them…. very

detailed discussions and negotiations with the states on the final Basin Plan. (MDBA

29)

Engagement with the peak bodies recommenced. The rationale for that engagement

was:

an expectation that we’d end up with a better Basin Plan because we’d sought the

diversity of people’s experience and views in forming that. That’s primarily … you

expect that you’re going to get a better outcome in terms of the substance, and then

the implementation and delivery because there’s better ownership of the solutions.

(MDBA 22)

At one stage, key industry stakeholders were invited to spend a week at the MDBA to

ensure they fully understood what was in the draft Plan, and discuss their feedback with the

Authority. This meant that the Authority had the opportunity to change or respond to that

feedback, or, at least be aware of the feedback that the peak groups would provide when

the Plan went public:

In the middle of that mess, Craig Knowles, who was the chairman leading up to the

release of the plan, had a group of us go and spend a week embedded in the MDBA.

We worked through every page of the document. He did the same with the

environmental groups, not at the same time. We had unfettered access for the week.

And that was a really significant gesture. It actually meant we could flag ‘if you do

this, the consequences will be that’ so we had on the record a dialogue about what

we were going to be saying. MDBA and the department knew what we would be

saying if they did this or that (industry, 31)

That approach helped to build trust with the leadership of the peak bodies, if not their

membership. One industry representative spoke about the tension between her members,

who refused to accept the Basin Plan, and the industry leadership, who had a more

pragmatic view:

No organisation in the irrigation sector has ever signed off or agreed to the basin

plan. A number of us said ‘this is the least worst outcome, let’s get on and make it

work’. (Industry 31)


Political bipartisanship is seen as a critical success factor. While different parties and

their leadership had different approaches, there was never a suggestion of either party

walking away from the plan at the national level (although states have, at various times,

threatened to pull out (Australian Associated Press (AAP), 2012; Monaghan, 2017; Williams

& Jean, 2012).

I kept saying this was a liberal party Act, reconfirmed by the labour party. It’s not

going to go away. We have to learn to work with it. (Industry 31)

Now, I won’t make any political observation, but if you look at the sort of political

spectrum there, from Malcolm Turnbull, to Penny Wong, to Barnaby Joyce...That’s

been the real success of the Basin Plan really, that the process has been able to

endure and have strong political support. (Qld. Govt. 24)

8.3.5 Localism

During this phase (2011-2015), Craig Knowles was chair of the Authority. In an effort

to rebuild trust with stakeholders and regional communities, Craig Knowles started a

discussion about localism, defined by the Authority as:

Localism in water management is about governments partnering with local and

regional communities and organisations to manage water and other natural

resources in an integrated way. (MDBA, 2011a).

In essence, localism was about strengthening stakeholder participation, from

information provision and consultation to collaboration (Tan, 2012). This was endorsed by

the House of Representatives Inquiry into the Impact of the Guide to the Basin Plan (House

of Representatives, 2011). The concept was generally well received, although as a loosely

defined concept there were obviously different interpretations of what localism actually

meant. Some stakeholders and policy makers remained skeptical of whether it would be

anything more than talk, or whether it would achieve the Basin scale outcomes sought.

Others reflected that it failed to deliver, and wasn’t feasible in this high stakes context:

People loved the idea of it … this plan will be better if people who engage with this

stuff all the time are part of developing it and implementing it… it’s just about finding

ways of involving people at the right scale. (MDBA 22)

From our perspective, localism was about genuine engagement and consultation. I

guess the risk with federal departments and bodies is that their idea of consultation


is pausing for 5 minutes as they drive through in air-conditioned comfort to hear

what people say and then probably continue with what they're going to do anyway.

(Industry 12)

For example, there was a debate around the Commonwealth Environmental Water

Holder. Some folk… argued ‘why can’t that be in the hands of the community groups

around the basin’ and the answer to that, I said to Mike and others, is that ‘we’re

after some basin-wide outcomes, not local outcomes’. (Aust. Govt. 19)

They believed him, that he was going to give them a say! He was just a con. He lied

through his teeth. (Local rep. 23)

My personal view is that government should always hold the reins in water resource

management and be accountable for it. The rest of us are too conflicted to do

anything more than participate. So, localism was never going to work. And look at

NRMs [Natural Resource Management Groups] and CMAs [Catchment Management

Authorities] that’s localism. But the hard tradeoffs don’t work.” (Local rep. 23)

“Border Rivers Environmental Network, which is basically as close to localism that

occurred...And was sort of Greg Knowles favorite example. But, I got to say I’m not

too sure that you could … point to any examples of what they’ve done has actually

achieved.” (Local rep. 26)

“So, you have to take that helicopter view necessarily, but when it comes down to

the decisions about environmental watering or assessing impacts you do that at the

local level and more importantly you involve local knowledge. It’s so critical because

no-one knows it better than the people who live there, so while we need maps and

models to know how it all fits together, you also need the local knowledge. We spent

a lot of time when we were doing the constraints strategy working with groups,

looking at ‘what does it really mean if you change the water level’ reach by reach.

And it varies quite a lot. People put their own measuring sticks in, so they know what

it means for them. So, you almost need to do it landholder by landholder. (MDBA

29)

The downside of that is people think they can revisit decisions that have already been

made. That’s been one of the challenges. Once it’s gone through parliament and it

had to have the certainty – when the decision is made, what’s the amount, what’s

the basis. You need that element of certainty. Versus how much freedom of

movement you have. (MDBA 29)


8.3.6 Basin Plan Implementation

The Basin Plan was finalised in 2012, with staged implementation through to 2019. By

that time, all 36 water resource plans should have been revised and accredited as consistent

with the Basin Plan (MDBA, 2017e). Ultimately, the implementation of the Basin Plan is

reliant on the states, who operationalise the Basin Plan through catchment water resource

plans, working with the existing water planning system in each state.

It’s all about trying to do a little bit of that, trying to come up with a degree of

consistency, but it’s mainly about just trying to make sure that the outcomes we’re

trying to achieve come back into state planning processes. (MDBA 15)

For the states, it’s about adapting water plans meet the requirements of the Basin

Plan. ‘Fit for purpose’ is how one interviewee put it:

A big part of the effort quite frankly is probably not so much changing things on the

ground, it’s getting an understanding of the planning framework and understanding

the requirements from the Commonwealth. (Qld. Govt. 24)

The relations between the states and Commonwealth are complex. Each party needs

to understand and interpret the planning frameworks of the other, their active management

roles (such as the water buybacks and infrastructure investments of the MDBA) and

overlapping stakeholder engagement interests. States, of course, may be recalcitrant

parties:

Because it is all new, there’s still ... You’ve got the legislation, you’ve got the words,

but there’s still quite a variety of opinions and interpretations of the words, and what

it really means. You’ve got people on our side that are going ‘Got to get the states to

change, they’ve got to change this, they’ve got to change that’ then you’ve got the

people in the states saying, ‘We don’t have to worry too much about this, we’ll just

keep on doing what we’re doing, what we’ve always done’. (Aust. Govt. 15)

The familiar arguments about blame and responsibility between the states continue,

surfacing most recently with allegations about illegal water extraction and weak compliance

systems in New South Wales (Thompson, 2017). As the downstream state, South Australia

is frequently the protagonist in these disputes. A few interviewees commented that debate

between governments, and amongst informed community representatives, are about the

pathway of reform, rather than disputing the need for reform.


Quite often the conflicts that do arise are certainly not on political lines. The tensions

between Victoria and South Australia are often as pronounced as they are amongst

any other jurisdiction. By-and-large they’ve moved to, again, not about the outcome,

but where should the balance lie, and who’s doing their fair share of the lifting and

who’s not, to being much more about the how. (Qld. Govt. 24)

I guess in the Queensland Murray-Darling Basin you always have this overlay

between the community groups saying, ‘Why do we’ve got to put a whole plan in

development, when it’s already been done in the southern states? Why should we

pay for others?’ At a political level, Queensland government, both side’s politics,

held a similar view and still do, and that did cause tensions, not only between states,

but also between communities within, between states. (Qld. Govt. 09)

8.3.7 Community engagement around the Basin Plan

There is a widespread view that the centralisation of authority under the Water Act

and the Basin Plan has come at the cost of relationships with the community:

I think the down side of it was certainly a very substantial weakening of the

community involvement... under the new Basin Plan and Water Act arrangements

that connection and that influence has been severely weakened. (Qld. Govt. 16)

While the MDBA has attempted to restore community relations after the disastrous

release of the Guide to the Basin Plan, good intentions have met with variable results. The

Basin Community Committee (BCC) is a legislative requirement under the Act (which also

specifies that the Committee must include 8 water users, out of a maximum number of 16

members). Its functioning appears to be influenced by the individual members, relations

with the Authority and potentially also the stage of policy development or implementation.

A senior individual in the Authority recounts the different styles and roles of two BCCs:

When I was first in the Authority, I thought it was not a very effective committee. It

was very, it was unhappy most of the time... they wanted to have a role in policy

development and they weren’t given much role in policy development, under the

previous administration, they had no trust in them - in that they weren’t to be

trusted with confidential information, which was borne out, in fact. So, it was a

pretty unhappy situation. (MDBA 29)


The next Committee was appointed with individuals that were constructive and well-

connected to different regions, rather than representing irrigators or any other group. The

revised Committee was considered to work very effectively for the Authority:

In my view, they were incredibly effective. They worked 2 ways. They worked very

closely with us and we could share information well ahead of sharing it more broadly.

And they were totally trusted with confidential information. It wasn’t like it wasn’t

going to be released, but it was giving them advance warning and asking them for

their assistance for the areas where people were going to be affected. So, having a

discussion about this particular policy or the next step in the implementation. And

they gave excellent advice on how to do things – new approaches or whether we

should leave it ‘that’s not going to work right now, leave it 6 months’ so that was a

really effective committee in support of implementation. (MDBA 29)

When asked about examples of the influence of the BCC, the officer recounted that

the BCC had suggested the extended implementation period for the Basin Plan, and

proposed the SDL adjustment mechanisms, whereby better water management practices

could be used to adjust the amount of water taken from irrigation, and also the constraints

strategy, to remove or modify physical water management barriers on the river. The second

BCC clearly had a role in shaping policy implementation.

The BCC had a particular role and privileged access to MDBA decisions. It was not a

surrogate for wider engagement across the Basin, however, as recounted here: ��

The Basin is a huge place. As well as that, we had relationships with individuals,

particularly mayors of local government in affected areas. With representative

groups, we had regular meetings. Very in-depth discussions with irrigation interests

– both the national group and individual companies. With the conservation groups,

probably a bit less. They are quite a small force. Probably more with the people on

the ground. As well as that, there were more formal processes with individual

elements of the Plan such as the constraints management strategy and

environmental watering strategy. They had their own consultation process, as well

as the regular updates we had with the key representative groups. And then we had

science groups as well that were very keen to make sure it was all based on robust

science. (MDBA 29)


Some stakeholders were critical of the Authority’s approach, including the changing

engagement styles, responding to the ‘noisy voices’ and preferencing water users over other

community representatives:

What was up for negotiation at one point in time might not be the next time.

Something that was completely non-negotiable under some sort of leadership,

under a different leadership, became negotiable. (MDBA 22)

One of the mistakes that government makes over and over again is they give access

to those very small groups. They should first ask ‘who do you represent, who are

your members, how many?’ Because there was one group that continues to agitate

very loudly, that has 11 members, but they got the same access to ministers that we

got. (Industry 31)

The predominant view, even to today, is that the people what have invested all the

money in infrastructure, whose livelihoods depend on it, have all the say. Everyone

else is sort of secondary. Mabey that’s valid, maybe it isn’t. But the river, and the

health of the river, is a public asset. (NRM group 17)

“Industry groups in many ways prevailed over the catchment groups in the grand

politics of public debate.” (Qld. Govt. 09)

The conservation sector has been a relatively minor player in MDB politics. Both the

Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) and the World Wildlife Fund for Nature have

engaged in Basin advocacy at different times. Conservation organisations will generally

agree which organisation has the lead advocacy role, although this may change depending

on the availability of resources and competing priorities. While conservation advocacy

groups have played a constructive role in Basin advocacy and catchment-based planning,

finding local conservationists prepared to participate in water planning processes can be a

challenge. Some interviewees commented that this can be “a lonely place for them” (MDBA

22), and “Conservation in the lower Balonne, it was a foreign term” (Qld. Govt. 09).

Surprisingly, NRM groups in the QMDB have had relatively little direct engagement

with either the Basin Plan or catchment water resource planning processes. One of the

Queensland NRM groups commented that, while they provide some input on the science,

monitoring and community engagement processes, they focus on water quality, partly

because of expertise, but also because the Queensland department doesn’t see them as an

important stakeholder:


When the Department wants to consult with people they don’t come and consult

with us. They put together a technical panel or a community panel but we’re not at

the table, because they don’t see us as key stakeholder because we’re not a water

user. Because it’s about volume, even though the Basin Plan has environmental

objective to meet. We say all the time; we can help you with this. (NRM group 17)

8.3.8 Water recovery strategies

Under the Basin Plan, water recovery is achieved either through buy back of water

licences from willing sellers, or through upgrades to irrigation infrastructure that achieve

water savings (COAG, 2013). There are many stories about the perversity of the buyback

strategies in the southern Basin (see House of Representatives, 2011; Wheeler et al.,

2012;2014) including impacts on infrastructure providers and the influence of banks in

forcing famers to sell water:

In the Murray Valley, where 40% of their water has been sold, it was the worst

possible time at the end of a 4-year drought. The irrigation farmers weren’t making

those decisions, their banks were. So, there was money from the Commonwealth,

so the banks were saying ‘sorry guys, sell your water’ and that was what was so

disconcerting for communities. (industry 31)

Despite the rhetoric from the ‘noisy voices’ from the irrigation community, the

voluntary buy backs have been well received, and have been generally oversubscribed

(Wheeler et al., 2014).

But these... community processes in the Basin Plan, people would sidle up to you

and say, ‘I’ve got some water, how do I sell it?’ After the first few of those, we learnt,

and made sure we always had somebody there, sitting quietly outside. The peak

bodies that said no one wants to sell their water, well, sorry, that just isn’t the case.

(Aust. Govt. 19)

Early buy backs may have been less than effective, with farmers selling licences that

were not active, on paper returning water to the river, but, in reality, not changing flows at

all.

Water trading was really a super [superannuation] package to farmers versus saving

water. It was less effective than it could have been. Lots of sleeper and dozer licences

were sold, not real water. (scientist 08)


8.3.9 Socio-economic impacts

With a focus on returning water from water users, all the attention was directed at the

irrigation community. Water licences are only bought from willing sellers, at fair market

price. The irrigation industry is, however, the backbone of some (but not all) Basin

communities. Small communities with little economic diversification are particularly

vulnerable to the flow-on impacts of farmers selling water and changing their business - first,

the service industries such as agricultural advisers, contractors and labour, and second, if

the population declines, impacts on schools, medical and other community services. The

socio-economic impacts were raised as a major concern by communities when the Guide to

the Basin Plan was released. Since then, the Basin Authority has attempted to better

understand the socio-economic impacts of the water reform process, and results have

highlighted the differences between communities. The impacts of water reform, of course,

are realised in conjunction with multiple other economic, policy and climate changes.

I think the Water Act was flawed; flawed for this reason. Not because of the

irrigators. It was always going to be a buyback or infrastructure changes. The

irrigators, they were fine. They were looked after, if you like. In fact, some of them

made a bloody lot of money in the earlier days. However, the Water Act really didn't

... It focused on the irrigators, it focused on the environment and the irrigators as

being the losers. The trouble was that it didn't really recognize, and I don't know

why, it didn't recognize the knock-on effect, the community effects.” (MDBA 05)

“Most of the concern I hear now, is not about whether the plan outcomes are

appropriate, it’s whether I believe that pathway is appropriate. Whether I believe

that there are appropriate transitional arrangements for, particularly affected third

parties. We see that still, in parts of the Queensland Murray-Darling Basin where the

willing selling concept has been widely embraced. But, it probably doesn’t address

the social disadvantage by those that are reliant on irrigation for their livelihood

indirectly, that aren’t part of the willing seller contract. The providers of service

industries. (Qld. Govt. 24)

St George and Dirranbandi, in the lower Balonne, are examples of communities with

high dependence on the irrigation sector (Murray-Darling Basin Authority (MDBA), 2016b,

2016d).


You would say, on a macro scale, there was re-investment back in agriculture,

significant value adding, and probably, it is fair to say, some good employment

outcomes from that. But local social impacts were well and truly aired at the St

George hearing of the Senate Select Committee. That’s a bit of a real-world

manifestation of the current concerns. (Qld. Govt. 24)

I think the reality is that it’s not been about the outcome, it’s been about the

pathway. That is probably quite a legitimate point for public discussion and debate.

There’s various ways in which the outcome can be achieved. There will be divergent

views on that, there’s obviously financial implications, there’s time imperatives.

(Qld. Govt. 24)

The disconnection between somewhere like Queensland and Canberra in a federal

government department is astonishing. You might as well be on the other side of

Mars. As to localism, you get your plan, right? You get your money. You say we’re

going to do some structural adjustment. We go and buy back the water, okay, what

are the alternative industries that we can introduce to that area, and it’s like well,

why don’t you go and have a look? Why don’t you go to St George and see what they

do there, because at the moment, they’re growing cotton. (Industry 02)

The political response to community concerns about socio-economic impacts has been

to favour investment in upgrading irrigation infrastructure over buy backs of water licences.

There are legitimate concerns that upgrading infrastructure is not an effective strategy to

restore environmental flows, is not cost-effective and may, in fact, be subsidising

unsustainable practices (Crase, 2011). In Queensland, the issue is exacerbated by the

different systems of water harvesting and storage. Investment in irrigation infrastructure is

not a viable option for substantial water recovery in the Queensland catchments.

Investment in infrastructure and mechanisms other than direct buyback…It doesn’t

work in Queensland. There’s not the types of delivery infrastructure. We’ve got

mostly on-farm developments…. But, by and large, most of the heavy lifting, most of

the water for recovery, needs to be through direct buyback. The whole of basin

messages, while valid for the whole of basin, it is a desire to have a consistent story

portrayed for the basin, doesn’t resonate at the local level. That becomes really

frustrating, and quite frankly inadequate, in telling the story of Queensland. (Qld.

Govt. 24)


8.3.10 Northern Basin Review

The Northern Basin Review was undertaken in 2013-2016 to review the water

recovery targets for northern NSW and southern Queensland (MDBA, 2016). The review

ultimately proposed a reduction in the water recovery target from 390 GL to 320 GL. As part

of the review process the Authority established a Northern Basin Advisory Committee

(NBAC) to provide “independent advice on how an adaptive Basin Plan can be implemented

in the Northern Basin” (MDBA, 2016c). While the Committee engaged constructively with

its task in supporting the review process, there were high expectations that the Committee

would be able to effect significant change to the rollout of the Basin Plan:

It’s about providing briefings to the advisory committee about where the work is up

to, and then having a discussion and listening to their advice. It’s a feedback loop

that then goes back so that we adjust what we’re doing based on that advice, we try

and respond. (MDBA 15)

A lot of them you just open the door a little bit, it’s like, we’re not opening right up,

but they jammed their foot in, and wedge that door open as far as they want, and

they want to go right back and argue some of the settings that ... Some of the bases

that we’ve already ... We feel we’ve settled. (MDBA 15)

Committee members want action, and frequently fail to differentiate the

responsibilities of state and federal governments:

They never really want to distinguish between who’s responsible for what, they just

want to say, ‘This is the issue, and somebody needs to do something about it’. (MDBA

15)

There is a great community appetite to achieve river health objectives and mitigate

the impacts of water recovery processes. As well as recommending investment in

infrastructure be prioritised over buybacks, the final NBAC report recommended a ‘toolkit’

of complementary measures to improve environmental outcomes (Northern Basin Advisory

Committee, 2016). The Northern Basin Review report endorsed the toolkit

recommendations, but notes “The Authority acknowledges that these measures are not

within our remit and cannot be implemented without commitments from the Australian,

NSW and Queensland governments” (MDBA, 2016, p. 6). Although the community

aspirations were acknowledged and reported, there is no clear pathway for the achievement


of those ambitions. The Committee members and many others in the Basin expressed

frustration that the focus on achieving environmental flows through major water reform has

come at the cost of a more integrated approach to achieving the broader environmental

objectives:

The stresses that are really having an impact on river health, and water diversions is

1 of 10 stresses. We’ve got a 12-billion-dollar program focusing on 1, and what about

the other 9? What’s happening there? (MDBA 15)

8.4 MURRAY-DARLING BASIN CASE STUDY SUMMARISED

In this section, the results for each phase of MDB governance are summarised against

the analytical framework presented in Chapter 3. Looking across the evolution of the case

study through the two governance phases allows higher level findings to be identified.

The analytical framework draws on concepts and theories of governance networks,

metagovernance and governmentality. This perspective draws attention to the rationalities

and practice of metagovernance, as employed by government. The benefits of collaborative

governance can be judged by three levels of outcomes - through governance performance,

impact on policy decisions and environmental, social and economic outcomes. The GBR case

study highlighted the importance of bilateral relations and stakeholder networks.

Metagovernance is usually framed as a relationship between a governor, usually the state,

and a policy or governance network of stakeholder parties. In both case studies, this

relationship was strongly influenced by two other behavioural dimensions: bilateral

relations and the behaviour of stakeholder networks.

Like the GBR case study, intergovernmental relations have been an important aspect

of the governance of the MDB. In this case, however, management of the whole of the Basin

has been a multilateral effort between the Commonwealth, four states and one Territory,

with changes to those arrangements across the two phases.

Stakeholder relations were also important in the MDB phase, but in a very different

way to the GBR case study. No cross-sectoral alliance emerged, although within non-

governmental sectors, organisations within the same sector typically coordinated responses

to policy shifts. A feature of the MDB case study has been the conflict within the agricultural

sector, between the irrigation industry and floodplain graziers. Further detail is presented in


the following sections that summarise key features of the two phases of MDB governance

and then the MDB case study overall.

8.4.1 Summary of phase 1 (2000-2007)

The context for this phase of MDB governance was the growing recognition of the

over-allocation of MDB water resources and the slow rate of progress with multilateral

implementation of national water reforms agreed through the MDBC and COAG (Figure 28).

Despite a cap on new licences, water extraction grew significantly in the 90s, including in

Queensland, where water harvesting, and storage is primarily through private, on-farm

infrastructure that were not regulated at that time. There were two failed attempts at water

planning and ongoing litigation in the Condamine-Balonne before the new Water Act 2000

(Qld) was enacted. NRM activities such as riparian restoration, fishways and carp control

were supported by the MDBC and receive new impetus with changes to the national NRM

program.

Multi-lateral arrangements were negotiated through the MDBC, where each state

could veto decisions, and there were no effective compliance mechanisms for

implementation failure. Progress through the MDBC was slow, marked by deep mistrust

between the states. Queensland joined the MDBC, but remained cautious about their

commitment to Basin-wide processes. Water governance remained the preserve of the

states. In Queensland, the Water Act 2000 (Qld) formalised stakeholder engagement and

COAG water reforms, but the state water planning processes remained centralised and

technocratic. Irrigators and graziers were in conflict over water resources in the QMDB. As

a result, the 3rd attempt at water planning in the Condamine-Balonne reached a crisis point

that triggered political intervention and a renegotiated community engagement process.

Governance performance was initially marked by mistrust of government, science and

competing water users. The ‘journey of joint discovery’ successfully negotiated these

divisions to achieve a high-level water plan in the Condamine-Balonne (although operational

objectives were not agreed until later). The millennium drought exacerbated frustration

with the slow rate of progress in water reforms across the Basin, and triggered the new

Water Act 2007 (Cth) that heralded the next phase of MDB governance.


Figure 28. Key findings for the first phase of MDB governance


8.4.2 Summary of Phase 2 (2008-2016)

The context for the second phase of MDB governance was framed by the Australian

Government water reforms that were triggered by the Millennium Drought: the new Water

Act 2007 (Cth), the Basin Plan and $13B of investment (Figure 29). While there have been

shifts between the balance of water recovery strategies (licence buybacks versus

infrastructure upgrades), bipartisan support for the Basin Plan has been maintained through

several changes in federal government. The MDBA was established as a federal authority

under the Water Act 2007 (Cth), with the states agreeing to referral of limited powers to the

federal government. The MDBC was dissolved, but states worked closely with the federal

government on the design of the Act and the development of the Basin Plan. The

commitment of $13B was seen as critical to buying states’ acceptance of the Basin Plan.

States continue to mistrust each other, although relations between NSW and Queensland in

the Border Rivers water planning process has been functional.

While the new arrangements appear simpler by centralising Basin-wide decision-

making in the new Authority, governance now occurs more explicitly at two levels; by the

MDBA (in consultation with the states) at the Basin-scale, and by the states at the catchment

scale (through accredited water plans). Water recovery targets are set at the Basin scale, but

achieved through a mix of water buybacks (by the federal CEWH) and infrastructure

investments (funded federally, implemented by states). Water management is

operationalized through state water plans, and how the CEWH will participate in those as a

water licence holder is, as yet, unclear.

For stakeholders, the new arrangements have added a new layer of policy engagement

with the MDBA. Irrigators have dominated the politics of the Basin Plan and the MDBA have

focused on engaging that sector. As water buy backs have proceeded, the socio-economic

impacts in some communities have attracted significant, widespread community concern.

The release of the Guide to the Basin Plan was a disaster, and triggered a change in

leadership and a new approach to stakeholder engagement, mirroring the Queensland

experience in the Condamine-Balonne catchment. Following this crisis, the Authority has

sought to embrace cultural change, but remains fundamentally centralised and technocratic

in its approach, despite expressing support for a more collaborative approach, such as

localism and the toolkit proposed by stakeholders as part of the Northern Basin review.


Irrigators continue to publicly challenge the Basin Plan targets, and there is

widespread community mistrust of the MDBA and Plan implementation. At the present time

(2017), water recovery is through investment in infrastructure upgrades and water licence

buybacks are on hold. Community committees provide useful feedback to the MDBA and

appear to influence local implementation decisions in some cases. There is strong public

interest in pursuing allied NRM actions such as fishways, carp control and riparian

restoration to achieve river health (and proportionally reduce water recovery targets to

reduce socio-economic targets). Yet NRM actions and Queensland NRM organisations

remain disconnected from the water recovery and water planning processes.

Water recovery efforts have made significant progress towards Basin Plan targets.

Significant socio-economic impacts are emerging in vulnerable basin communities such as

Dirranbandi in the QMDB, and community disquiet with water recovery persists.

Infrastructure investments are not appropriate for water recovery in Queensland.

Queensland water resource plans will be progressively revised to meet Basin Plan

accreditation requirements.


Figure 29. Key findings for the second phase of MDB governance


8.4.3 Overall findings for the MDB case study

The context for the MDB case study is founded in the poor and declining condition of

the Basin’s rivers, and the looming threats to water security posed by over-extraction,

drought and climate change (Figure 30). The Australian constitution limits the federal

government’s capacity to interfere with state responsibilities to manage water. Frustration

with decades of slow progress in water reform prompted a major shift in governance with

the centralization of Basin-wide decision-making through the Basin Plan and associated

water reforms.

Mistrust between the states has been a feature of this history since federation.

Acceptance of the Basin Plan by the states was facilitated by a $13B commitment from the

federal government. Negotiations between governments are central to water management

in the Basin, and the primary roles in implementation of water reform still rest with the

states. Technocratic solutions to determining water recovery or environmental flow targets

through sophisticated modelling has backfired at both the Basin and QMDB catchment

water planning scales. In both cases, crises triggered changes to how governments

approached planning and engagement with stakeholders. In Queensland, the recovery of

trust and stakeholder agreement was successful. In the Basin, a new approach has enabled

the Basin Plan to be enacted but stakeholder concern and resistance to reform continues.

Irrigators and their representative bodies continue to publicly oppose the plan.

Stakeholder engagement has preferenced water licence holders as ‘legitimate’

stakeholders, but as socio-economic impacts of water buybacks emerge in vulnerable

communities, other stakeholders, such as Local Governments, are increasingly important.

There is a strong appetite to mitigate the impacts of water recovery by other, NRM-type

actions to restore river health. As yet, this desire has not been met, although it has been

endorsed by the MDBA (but it is not their role to deliver NRM programs or investments).

Water recovery is proceeding successfully. Progress is hampered by shifting recovery

strategies to infrastructure investments which are less effective than direct licence

buybacks. Community concern persists, and there is greater acknowledgement of the socio-

economic impacts emerging in vulnerable communities that rely on the irrigation industry.


Figure 30. Key findings for the MDB case study overall


8.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter has presented the results of the thematic analysis of MDB case study

interview data for each phase of the case study (sections 8.2 and 8.3). Government and

stakeholder perspectives of events have been presented in the order in which they occurred,

and illustrated by quotations. Each phase has been summarised according to the categories

of the analytical framework, which was modified to accommodate important detail about

bilateral relations and stakeholder networks.

The MDB case study presents a historical narrative about the negotiation of water

reform between state and federal governments. The millennium drought triggered a major

policy and governance shift with the centralisation of Basin-wide planning in a new federal

government agency, the MDBA. Despite this, implementation of water reforms to achieve

the Basin Plan objectives remains the preserve of the states. The federal agency that is

purchasing water licences (CEWH) is now the largest water ‘user’ in the Basin. As CEWH

shifts from purchasing to using its water licences to achieve environmental flows, a new set

of state-federal practices will emerge.

Stakeholder engagement has been secondary to the bi- and multilateral processes at

the Basin level. Technocratic approaches have alienated stakeholders and triggered crises at

both Basin and Queensland catchment water planning processes. While the Queensland

Government managed to reshape stakeholder relations in the Condamine-Balonne,

community acceptance of the Basin Plan remains partial. Bilateral support for the Basin Plan

has been essential to reach this stage, although shifts in recovery strategies influence the

pace and effectiveness of implementation. Strong community interest in a more integrated

approach to achieving river health is, as yet, an unmet need. NRM organisations and

programs remain disconnected from the water quantity policy arena.

Chapter 9: Metagovernance of water policy 249

Chapter 9: Metagovernance of water policy

9.1 INTRODUCTION

Chapters 6 and 8 summarised the results of the thematic analysis of interview

data from the GBR and MDB case studies. Results provide stakeholder perspectives

of the key governance phases and events described in the historical narratives

presented in Chapters 5 and 7. Results highlight the complex and emergent nature of

governance practice and outcomes – with stakeholder engagement occurring as

reforms are progressively developed and implemented, adapting to changing

circumstances and frequent disruptions.

In this chapter, the findings are examined from a broader perspective and

related to the research objectives identified in Chapter 4:

1. How is collaborative governance practiced in Australian water policy?

2. How do governments rationalise collaborative governance practice?


policy outcomes?

4. How is the performance of collaborative governance influenced by

context?

5. What does that tell us about the potential adoption and performance

of collaborative governance in Australian water resource policy?

The distinct characteristics of each case study are acknowledged (section 9.2)

before the following sections synthesise findings across both case studies. Section 9.3

summarises and integrates evidence of how Australian governments practice and

rationalise metagovernance in water policy (addressing research objectives 1 and 2).

This section also discusses the importance of bilateral relations which was identified

as a significant feature of both case studies.


Section 9.4 addresses the response of stakeholder organisations to

collaborative governance practice (contributing to research objective 3). The

importance of stakeholder networks is also explored, reflecting the significant policy

impact of stakeholder-led initiatives in the GBR case study, and reflecting on why this

is not evident in the MDB. Section 9.5 describes the outcomes of metagovernance,

on the knowledge and behaviour of participants (governance outcomes) and

subsequent impact on policy decisions and policy outcomes (also contributing to

research objective 3).

Section 9.6 considers the influence of context in shaping metagovernance

practice and outcomes (research objective 4). Finally, section 9.7 synthesises these

findings as tentative generalisations about the conditions for effective

metagovernance in Australian water policy, and potentially other environmental

fields (research objective 5).

9.2 ACKNOWLEDGING CASE STUDY DIFFERENCES

The two case studies were chosen because of their scale and significance in

contemporary Australian water policy (section 4.3.4). While the MDB and GBR cases

have many characteristics in common (by virtue of being contemporaneous

Australian water policy issues), there are also significant differences that may help

explain the practices and outcomes of metagovernance observed.

Table 9.1 summarises the key commonalities and differences according to three

categories (drawn from (Ostrom et al., 1994): the nature of the issue, stakeholder

communities and the governance system. The similarities and differences of the two

case studies offer some explanatory power in the following sections, which compare

and integrate findings across the two case studies.

Both case studies are about water use and management, where the impacts of

agricultural industries impact downstream ecological systems and other water users.


Table 9.1 Comparison of case study characteristics

Category Characteristics in common MDB-specific characteristics GBR specific characteristics

The policy issue

Water use and management Water quantity (environmental flows) Water quality (pollution)

Impacts on downstream ecosystems Rivers and wetland ecosystems Inshore coral reefs

Impacts on downstream industries Reduced water availability for irrigation, floodplain graziers, towns

Potential impacts on tourism and the fishing industry (recreational and commercial)

Policy objectives quantified as targets Water recovery targets (Sustainable Diversion Limits)

Water quality and agricultural practice change targets (% reduction, % adoption)

Stakeholder communities

Primary stakeholder organisations Irrigation industry, some Local Governments, conservation groups

Agricultural industries, NRM organisations and conservation groups

Stakeholder collaboration Some coordination between agricultural industry groups, conflict between irrigators and graziers

Collaboration between agricultural industries, conservation sector and NRM organisations

Governance system State and federal governments involved Multilateral relations (Australian, Queensland,

New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and ACT)

Bilateral relations (Australian and Queensland Governments)

Primary international agreements Ramsar, JAMBA, CAMBA, ROKAMBA World Heritage

Financial commitment $13B (Aus) federal investment from 2007 (ongoing)

$1.3B state and federal investment 2015-2020.

Primary strategy Buy-back of water licences or investment in

irrigation infrastructure upgrades Positive incentives (education, extension, grants, best management practices, market instruments) Regulation

Implementation pathway State-based water planning Stakeholder organisations deliver incentive

programs, state-based regulation and compliance


The MDB case is a water quantity issue, where over-extraction has severely

impacted riverine and wetland ecosystems, and compromised water availability for

floodplain graziers, town water supplies and downstream irrigators. In contrast, the

GBR case study is about water quality, with agricultural runoff impacting inshore coral

reefs and threatening (but not yet impacting) tourism and fishing industries. In both

cases, the ecological, economic and social impacts of the issues are exacerbated by

climate change. The policy objectives of both case studies are represented by clear

numerical targets (water recovery targets in the MDB, water quality targets in the

GBR).

Agricultural industries are primary stakeholders and industry organisations are

key policy advocates in both case studies. However, the GBR is characterised by an

enduring collaboration between agricultural industry groups, NRM organisations and

the conservation sector that has become the primary policy delivery agent and has

strongly influenced policy. The irrigation industry has dominated stakeholder

engagement in the MDB, until relatively recently, when greater recognition of the

socio-economic impacts of water recovery strategies have triggered greater

engagement of Local Governments. There has been conflict between agricultural

industries in the MDB, and relatively little cross-sector collaboration (with some local-

scale exceptions). NRM organisations are peripheral to MDB policy processes in

Queensland (but central to Reef policy).

While both cases are leading national water reform, the MDB is a larger, longer-

standing and more complex case. Water sharing in the MDB has been the subject of

evolving multilateral negotiations since federation, and while the Water Act 2007

(Cth) centralised Basin planning with the Australian government, implementation is

still reliant on the states and subject to extensive multilateral and bilateral

negotiations. Over $13B (Aus) has been committed by the Australian Government to

water reform in the MDB since 2007, for the voluntary purchase of water licences

and irrigation infrastructure upgrades. GBR water quality is a more recent issue,

attracting bilateral policy and planning since 2003. The level of investment in

voluntary incentives is much smaller in the GBR (currently c. $1.3B/5 years across

both governments) (Aust. & Qld. Govt., 2016). Non-government stakeholder


organisations are the primary delivery agents for incentive programs in the GBR, and

the state government manages regulation and compliance as well as science and

policy roles. While both case studies involve international biodiversity agreements,

the attention of the World Heritage Committee has been a very significant policy

driver in the GBR that has no equivalent in the MDB case study.

Given the size of both cases, it is not surprising that policy and planning occurs

at the two scales - the whole of MDB or GBR basin, with implementation primarily at

the regional or catchment scale. Prior to 2007, Basin scale policies were negotiated

multi-laterally, but under current arrangements state-based catchment water

resources are required to be accredited as consistent with the Basin Plan. In contrast,

non-statutory water quality improvement planning at the catchment and regional

scale in the GBR has proposed water quality targets and implementation strategies

that have been adopted by bilateral planning and programs at the whole-of GBR

scale. Noting, however, that implementation of regional water quality improvement

plans is not directly resourced by government.

The following sections summarise and synthesise the results of the the case

study histories and analysis of interview data reported in Chapters 5 and 6 for the

GBR case study, and Chapters 7 and 8 for the MDB case study. Results are

summarised against the research objectives articulated in Chapter 3 and

generalisations proposed and discussed.

9.3 HOW AND WHY DO GOVERNMENTS USE COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE?

9.3.1 How do governments practice metagovernance?

As noted above, metagovernance is practiced in different ways at both whole-

of-region and at catchment or regional scales in each case study. In the GBR, formal

bilateral metagovernance practice has been relatively consistent over the three

phases of the case study, albeit marked by variations in approaches by individual

governments. In contrast, the two phases of MDB governance show very different

metagovernance practices.

Bilateral planning efforts at the whole-of-GBR scale have been through the Reef

Water Quality Protection Plan (RWQPP) and its revisions since 2003. The first version


of the RWQPP (GBR Phase 1) had no formal stakeholder forum, but within 3 years

regional NRM groups had successfully established a forum (the Reef Water Quality

Partnership) that was supported by government and embedded within the formal

policy structures. When the RWQPP was revised (GBR Phase 2), the Partnership was

replaced with a formal stakeholder advisory committee. These arrangements have

persisted in Phase 3, with an additional stakeholder advisory committee for the Reef

2050 Long-Term Sustainability Plan. The RWQPP stakeholder advisory committee

comprises NRM, agricultural industry and conservation groups, while the Reef 2050

Committee has a larger and more diverse membership, fitting its wider scope. The

Committees generally meet quarterly and provide advice to policy makers on

relevant matters, and links to their constituent communities (Department of

Environment and Energy, 2015; Department of Environment and Heritage Protection

(DEHP), 2013).

Regional NRM groups and peak agricultural industry bodies receive substantial

funding through government reef programs and related NRM programs. Program

investments change over time, and in general there has been a shift to more

competitive funding models, increased funding uncertainty and declining policy

alignment between NRM and Reef policy arenas over the period examined. Less

secure funding appears to have impacted the capacity of stakeholder groups to

collaborate with governments (and each other) as well as deliver programs.

The degree to which governments are prepared to work closely with

stakeholder organisations in the delivery of reef programs has varied over time and

between governments. For example, in first two phases of GBR governance, the

Australian Government funded regional NRM groups to develop regional water

quality improvement plans, and then worked closely with the Reef Alliance in the

delivery of the resulting Australian Government Reef Rescue program. In the more

recent phase 3 of GBR governance, the Australian Government has reverted to a

competitive project funding model under the Reef Trust, resulting in less direct

engagement with the Reef Alliance. Similarly, the levels of Queensland Government

engagement with stakeholder networks have fluctuated over time, but increased in

the most recent phase. During the conservative Newman Government (2012-2014)


there was less engagement with NRM organisations but closer engagement with

agricultural industry groups.

In the MDB, Basin-scale planning has been dominated by multilateral

negotiations. In phase 1, regional water planning in Queensland shifted from public

information sessions to a more collaborative dialogue with stakeholders following

the crisis triggered by community rejection of water planning efforts. A key feature

of the revised process was knowledge sharing and transparency on a mutually agreed

path of ‘joint discovery’. Prior to the Basin-scale water reforms that started in 2007,

there was ongoing community engagement through NRM programs within the Basin.

Following the 2007 National Plan for Water Security, the new MDBA focused on

developing the Basin Plan. Stakeholder engagement included consultation with peak

industry bodies, primarily agriculture, irrigation and conservation sectors. Despite

this, the Guide to the Basin Plan triggered community outrage, like the Queensland

experience 8 years earlier. Despite subsequent changes to the Authority’s

engagement strategy (which now includes a number of advisory committees and

multi-layered engagement across more sectors), there remains deep community and

industry disquiet about the implementation of the Basin Plan.

Metagovernance practice in Australian water policy, as evidenced by these case

studies, would appear to adopt conventional approaches (see Head, 2007) to formal

stakeholder engagement in policy (advisory committees, consultation with

representative bodies, public consultation processes). In both cases, governments

have employed a mix of communicative (committees and consultation processes)

financial (resourcing of NRM planning and programs in the GBR, supporting technical

staff in stakeholder organisations in the MDB) and regulatory instruments

(embedding consultation processes in the Water Act 2000 (Qld) and the Water Act

2007 (Cth), for example).

Framing metagovernance practices according to the technologies of agency and

technologies of performance described by Rose and Miller (1992) highlights the effect

of policy actions which may not be directed specifically at network performance but

nevertheless strongly influences network behaviour (Table 9.2).


Table 9.2 Examples of metagovernance practices as technologies of agency and performance (after Rose and Miller, 1992)

Metagovernance practices

Case Technologies of agency Technologies of performance

GBR

• Funding of NRM programs, regional water quality plans, Industry best

management practice programs (service delivery roles)

• Stakeholder engagement through advisory committees, working groups

• Public consultation on regulation, reef plan

• Regulatory requirements for public consultation e.g. regulatory impact statement

• Water quality and practice change targets

and Reef report card

• Program and project monitoring, evaluation

and reporting

• Political and policy access and

responsiveness (informal)

MDB

• Funding of technical officers in key stakeholder groups (agriculture, conservation)

• Stakeholder engagement through Basin & catchment advisory committees

• Ongoing engagement with individual peak bodies. Access to draft documents and

officers (technical and policy)

• Public consultation on Basin Plan, catchment water plans

• Regulatory requirements for public consultation e.g. Water Act 2000 (Qld), Water

Act 2007 (Cth)

• Basin targets and catchment water plan

objectives

• Political and policy access and

responsiveness


Funding of NRM programs, for example, is to support program delivery, but also

enables participation in GBR governance networks at the policy level. When NRM

funding declines, it reduces the capacity of NRM organisations to engage in

governance networks.

There is also evidence across the case studies that governments privilege some

stakeholder groups over others, and this can change with politics and context. For

example, in 2002-2003 the Queensland Government privileged agricultural industry

organisations over NRM organisations in policy dialogue and investments. In the early

years of the MDBA, the irrigation industry was prioritised in stakeholder engagement

efforts, while NRM organisations were not seen as legitimate stakeholders because

they were not water licence holders or water users. Informal access to Ministers and

policy makers can be both a technology of agency and of performance, used to

encourage or discourage stakeholder participation and leadership.

The terms of reference of stakeholder advisory committees in both case studies

were limited to providing advice on the relevant plan and its implementation (or

related matters) and providing a communication pathway between policy makers

and stakeholder organisations’ members or constituency. The clearly bounded roles

articulated for the stakeholder advisory committees would represent something

between ‘consult’ and ‘involve’ in the IAPs spectrum of public participation

(International Association of Public Participation (IAP2), 2014). Such an assessment,

however, would be an oversimplification. The advisory committees are just one of a

suite of formal and informal network engagement mechanisms employed by

governments in Australian water policy. The advisory committees are also not

directly engaging members of the public, but are working with well-established

networks of interest groups (Curtain, 2004; Head, 2007). Stakeholder perspectives

reveal that, while the role of the formal advisory committees is highly constrained,

stakeholder organisations, individually and collectively, can, at times, be far more

influential than this.

Table 9.2 also highlights, that while there are formal processes to engage and

support stakeholder organisations participating in network processes to improve

policy, there is no evidence of formal monitoring or evaluation of the performance of


these processes. Interviewees reported on their perceptions of when advisory

committees, for example, were working successfully or not, but no evaluation

documents were identified or referred to by interviewees in this research. Rather,

when a committee was perceived to be ‘not performing’, membership was changed,

or the committee shut down or replaced.

9.3.2 How do governments rationalise their metagovernance practice?

Government officers articulated various benefits of formal stakeholder

engagement processes, including access to stakeholder knowledge, testing

assumptions and avoiding or minimising the potential for negative public reactions.

An officer of the MDBA articulated it simply as:

you expect that you’re going to get a better outcome in terms of the

substance, and then the implementation and delivery, because there’s better

ownership of the solutions (MDBA 22)

There was also an acknowledgement that stakeholder consultation is standard

good practice for policy reform agendas (and is also required under the relevant

legislation e.g. Water Act 2000 (Qld) and Water Act 2007 (Cth)). Where policy reform

will have significant socio-economic impacts, consultation was seen as a way to

navigate to the “least worse solution… with the least amount of pain” (industry 12).

Navigating stakeholder support is not the only consideration, however. Policy

makers emphasised the need for policy decisions to be seen to be successful. The

need for visible success is driven by accountability both within government and to

the public to justify the investment. In the GBR, international scrutiny from WHC has

driven renewed policy efforts at both state and federal levels. Performance

accountability can also have perverse outcomes. Wanting to be in control and

confident of outcomes explains the reluctance of governments to invest in innovative

approaches that have a higher risk of failure. Clear, measurable targets can provide

direction to complex programs, but can also constrain the pursuit of more holistic

strategies that stakeholders may advocate. In the GBR, this is a tension between

investing in social change and capacity building programs versus targeted

investments in farming practice change in catchment hot spots. In the MDB, strong


stakeholder support for ‘localism’ has not been realised in the push to achieve

ambitious water recovery targets.

There is a political dimension as well as a pragmatic one in wanting to pursue

strategies that will deliver clearly stated objectives. As one interviewee articulated it:

“They are picking winners so they report success” (scientist 08). Political changes

often drive the need for distinctive new approaches, and elections provide ‘policy

windows’ (Kingdon & Thurber, 1984) that enable new initiatives. The 2007 federal

election enabled political support for the stakeholder proposal that became the Reef

Rescue program, for example. The decision shortly after by the Queensland

Government to regulate agriculture was widely perceived by stakeholders to be a

political response, to be seen to be doing something that was different to the federal

initiative. One officer acknowledged that “There’s not too much backward looking

when new programs come into place” (Aust. Gov. 27).

Aligning policy to the views of any particular stakeholder group has implications

for other stakeholders, and that can have political ramifications. The preferential

political access and policy influence of conservation, agricultural or NRM

organisations under different Queensland Governments has been a feature of GBR

policy over time. Many GBR policy initiatives at both the state and federal level have

been originally proposed and advocated by the World Wildlife Fund for Nature. But

Ministers like to own their initiatives “so if it looks as though an agenda is being driven

by an independent authority then the government potentially loses the kudos of

developing some of those program” (Aust. Gov. 27).

The stakeholder proposal for the Reef Rescue program was compelling because

it was supported by conservation, agricultural and NRM organisations, leading

scientists and key policy makers. This suggests that, as well as accessing stakeholder

knowledge, network processes can help to mitigate some of the political risks of

adopting stakeholder proposals if cross-sectoral support can be built.

Governments have a limited capacity to take on board stakeholder proposals.

In explaining why the Reef Water Quality Partnership was disbanded, a Queensland

Government official explained “you have to be careful about holding out

expectations that more can happen than actually can” (Qld. Govt. 03). Once policy


changes have been decided, there is less opportunity or interest in making further

changes. A number of interviewees talked about minimising the negotiability, and

just getting on with delivery. WWF is particularly active in policy advocacy:

WWF and other external stakeholders expect government to be able to fund

everything and do everything everywhere instantaneously. I think they have

unrealistic expectations about what we can fund, what we can do and the

timeframes. (Aust. Gov. 21)

There are, of course, pragmatic constraints as well as political ones, to what

governments can take on board. Stakeholder consultation takes substantial time and

resources, both of which may be in limited supply. Government officers spoke about

the need to get on with making and implementing decisions in a timely manner. Time

frames driven by election commitments or other political imperatives can constrain

stakeholder engagement. In times of crisis, governments must act quickly, and may

not consult at all, such as when the millennium drought triggered crisis planning

about water supply for Adelaide and other towns.

Some interviewees described traditional, conservative views about the need to

minimise stakeholder engagement and concentrate on making policy decisions

internally, particularly in the early phases of both case studies. Others mentioned a

view that Ministers and agencies have a mandate to lead policy through the

democratic election process. A commonly held view was that difficult or controversial

policy decisions with potential socio-economic impacts will tend to be ‘kept close’ i.e.

developed within government with minimal consultation, until policies have been

further developed. The early years of developing the Basin Plan exemplify this

strategy.

In summary, governments recognise the conventional benefits and good policy

practice of stakeholder engagement in policy decisions. Governments also need to

be seen to be getting on with policy decisions and implementation. Governments

have a limited capacity to respond to stakeholder initiatives due to time, cost and

political constraints. A desire for control, wanting to demonstrate successful

outcomes and political kudos may limit responsiveness to stakeholders.


Accountability and risk are major concerns for government, and major policy

decisions always have a strong political overlay.

9.3.3 The impact of bilateral relations

Both case studies involved state and federal governments, although the MDB

is clearly multilateral, while the GBR is bilateral. The lack of policy coherence or the

challenge of working across governments was a feature of almost all interviews, and

this reflects a broader national traditional of complex and contested relations

between federal and state governments (Brown & Bellamy, 2007). Water policy

reforms are significant political decisions that must respond to political imperatives

(as described in the previous section) as well as good policy practice, evidence and

stakeholder advocacy. The timing of elections can be a major driver of policy change

and the timing of policy cycles of development and implementation.

GBR policy in the 2007-2010 period provides a classic example when the federal

opposition adopted a stakeholder proposal as an election commitment (the Reef

Rescue program) and then, after a subsequent Queensland election, the new

Queensland government adopted regulation. While these might superficially appear

to be complementary strategies to achieve agricultural practice change, in practice

they were seen as contradictory and confusing to farmers. There was subsequently a

protracted dispute about the attribution of practice change to the respective

programs, that was settled when Ministers agreed to share the benefits claimed

equally.

An experienced, senior Queensland Government officer explains it with this

analogy:

It’s like separated parents. If the kids are living with mum, mum has to feed

them and take them to school. Dad takes them on holidays, so dad gets all

these kudos for holidays. The state was stuck with managing reef water

quality and agriculture, and it put in a $50M Christmas present, and dad had

put in a $200M Christmas present and said, ‘It’s all about me, it’s all about

me’. And we were saying ‘Dude, not only have we put in $50M, but we want

credit for this other $135M’ so that’s how we felt about it. (Qld. Govt. 07)


Ministerial one-upmanship is just one aspect to the long-standing disrespect

between Australian federal and state governments. Queensland Government officers

report that the federal government doesn’t understand Queensland landscapes and

farming systems, and that the ‘feds’ are always trying to take over state

responsibilities (and states do hold primary responsibility for managing land and

water resources). The federal government, in contrast, is frequently dismissive of the

capacity of states to develop and implement policy reform “couldn’t organise a chook

raffle” (MDBA, 05). Mutual disrespect impacts the ability of governments to learn

from their policy experiences. One Queensland officer recounted how he tried,

unsuccessfully, to share Queensland’s learnings from the Condamine-Balonne with

the MDBA. An Australian Government officer noted the different learnings from

looking across states, but said “but that’s for the states to work out themselves”

(Aust. Govt. 29).

Bureaucrats can work together effectively across governments when there are

sufficient drivers and political support to do so. In the GBR, WHC’s interest has driven

political and policy engagement and collaboration across both levels of government.

In the MDB, the Millennium Drought and the drafting of the new Water Act 2007

(Cth) were periods of intense multilateral negotiation. Ministers can support or

impede this process, and relations between Ministers appears to be more about

personalities than political allegiances. Interviewees recounted anecdotes of both

good Ministerial working relations across the political parties, or poor relations

between Ministers of the same political persuasion.

Non-government stakeholders were generally more critical of poor bilateral

relations than government officers. Quite a few stakeholders were unable to

nominate examples of good bilateral coordination: “they believe that they’re working

basically with the state to progress all this stuff. Yet neither of them knows what each

other’s doing” (scientist 20). Stakeholders report that poor bilateral coordination has

multiple implications, including ineffective or contradictory policy, competitive

programs, inefficient stakeholder and community engagement, and make it more

difficult for stakeholders to work constructively with governments. There is a risk that


poor policy and/or program alignment can be counterproductive in engaging

landholders:

We work so hard to build, try and ... It feels like you’re kind of doing it inch

by inch, to build that relationship and engagement with the community, and

the trust of the community, and all it takes is one bad program and you just

set it back. (NRM org. 32)

In terms of policy advocacy, differences between government policies are

exploited by stakeholder organisations who then advocate for individual benefits,

undermining collaborative initiatives.

Because it seems like everyone who runs a project has become a professional

advocate in Canberra for reef. Every scientist, every industry person, every

regional NRM CEO, every CFO, they’re all in Canberra lobbying for money. So

that kind of says everything has gone a bit crazy. (industry org. 11)

In the MDB, multilateral negotiations are even more complex, and the

negotiation of agreements between federal and state governments dominate

governance arrangements. The new Basin Plan has created a need for more

stakeholder engagement at the Basin scale than previously. This has created

additional demands for stakeholder organisations to engage with both Basin and

catchment scale water planning, requiring greater time, resources and technical

proficiency. For community members, two layers of planning is confusing and the

balance of roles and responsibilities between governments poorly understood.

Bilateral relations are a significant and problematic area in water and other

policy areas. Poor policy alignment is driven by political and policy cycles, and a long

history of mutual disrespect between levels of government. Better policy

coordination occurs when there is an imperative to do so – driven by Ministerial

leadership, policy crisis or external scrutiny. Poor bilateral relations are keenly felt by

stakeholders with implications for policy delivery and impact, as well as stakeholder

collaboration.


9.4 HOW DO STAKEHOLDER ORGANISATIONS RESPOND TO COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE?

9.4.1 How do stakeholder groups respond to metagovernance?

In general, across the five phase of both case studies, stakeholder groups

actively engaged in all metagovernance initiatives. No major stakeholder group or

organisation declined opportunities to be involved in policy design and

implementation that were facilitated by government. Even when, for example,

groups were actively resisting policy proposals through media and political advocacy,

they would still engage with policy makers. As one industry representative explained

Its uncomfortable at the table, but if we aren’t there we’ll get nothing. (ag.

industry 31).

Responding effectively to metagovernance initiatives can be challenging for

stakeholder organisations – in terms of human capacity, financial resources and

technical understanding, particularly for small groups. In both case studies,

governments directly or indirectly resourced industry and NRM organisations to

enable their active participation. In the agricultural industries, the larger peak bodies,

such as QFF and Agforce, support and represent member organisations, local groups

and networks who may lack that capacity. NRM organisations in the reef catchments

have also accepted that they cannot all participate in all policy fora, and delegate

representatives. In the GBR, for example, there are two stakeholder advisory

committees for the Reef Water Quality Protection Plan and the Reef 2050 Long-Term

Sustainability Plan, but also stakeholder representatives on working groups for

sediments, nutrients, wetlands, social dimensions of practice change and regulation,

as well as participatory program delivery arrangements at both GBR and regional

scales. Despite government support, keeping up with complex and evolving science

and participating in a range of forums is full time work for at least one staff member

in the larger agricultural, conservation and NRM organisations in both cases.

One key difference between the two case studies is that in the MDB there is

more direct policy and planning engagement with local irrigation districts and

communities, either as a network of individuals or through local representative

groups. In the Border Rivers, for example, Border Rivers Food and Fibre represent 11


irrigation groups, while the Border Rivers Water Network represents 80 organisations

with an interest in water (including government agencies). In the GBR, the equivalent

community networks are represented by industry or NRM groups in policy design,

and are then engaged by industry or NRM groups in policy delivery roles at the local

level. This does not reflect a difference in community networks between the case

studies, per se, but rather that irrigation districts provide pre-existing networks

associated with water supply and management, whereas this is not the case for water

quality management, which is a ‘downstream’ issue of land and water management,

some of which is irrigated, some of which is not.

Different stakeholder organisations have different interests, of course, and

employ different strategies to influence policy. Agricultural industry groups are

representing the interests of their members, so they are typically reactive, either

promoting support packages or reforms, or more commonly fighting against

regulatory proposals. While agricultural industry groups may publicly (via media) and

politically fight regulation, at the same time their professional officers will usually

engage with policy makers around designing environmental regulation, so it has the

least impost on their members (if there is a clear commitment by government to

proceed with regulation).

Every media statement we make now that relates to regs. [regulations] will

start with ‘we don’t believe that a regulatory approach is the best thing to

do’, but, the second paragraph will say ‘but we’re committed to working with

the government through the issues’. (ag. industry 11)

Local scale irrigation networks have a less sophisticated approach to policy

engagement. Individuals are often driven by business interests, which may or may

not align with industry or community interests. In the Condamine-Balonne, for

example, farmers fought each other over water access as well as the government,

employing litigation, media campaigns, independent scientific advice, and

monitoring, as well as engaging in policy discussions. One leading farmer

acknowledged using conservation as a ‘faux’ rationale because it aligned with the

interests of floodplain graziers. Local networks are primarily interested in their own


enterprises, local industries and communities, with strong overtones of sense of

place and self-determination (Lockwood & Davidson, 2010).

Conservation organisations are seeking environmental outcomes, and are

typically opportunistic in how they pursue this. The World Wildlife Fund for Nature

(WWF), for example, employs four strategies to facilitate change. WWF will use public

campaigns to create political pressure for action, develop and promote preferred

policy options (often based on international research), on-ground partnerships to

demonstrate innovative approaches, and working with supply chains to change

market signals. Public campaigns are used to generate policy commitment, into which

policy proposals are fed. If implementation is slow, public campaigns may be

reinvigorated to stimulate greater action by government. Sometimes, however,

strategies may conflict, such as when public media campaigns in the GBR resulted in

the ejection of WWF from the Reef Alliance. Conservation organisations are highly

constrained by resources, so major donors can facilitate greater policy engagement

through philanthropic investment. Typically, the main conservation organisations will

agree who ‘has the running’ on specific policy issues.

NRM organisations have played critical brokerage roles in the GBR case, but

have been largely excluded from water policy in the MDB, with the tight focus on

water quantity and engagement with water licence holders. NRM organisations are

interested in regional sustainability, using best available science and community

engagement to facilitate voluntary change through the delivery of government-

funded programs (some NRM organisations attract or generate alternative revenue).

NRM organisations perceive themselves as neutral brokers, but are widely perceived

by others to have a strong self-interest in obtaining funding, exacerbated by a shift

to more competitive NRM funding arrangements in recent years. A Queensland

Government Minister commented:

There’s always a nervousness from some of those groups about ‘if we agree

to this does it have ramifications for our ongoing funding?’ or ‘is there a way

we can monopolise additional funding?’ (Qld. Govt. 04)

In both case studies, there are legitimate stakeholders that will be affected by

policy decisions but are not closely engaged in policy dialogue. In the GBR, the


tourism and fishing sectors are economically reliant on the health of the reef. In the

MDB, non-irrigation industries and communities are not well represented in policy

fora. Governments have not sought greater input from these groups through

metagovernance, choosing instead to focus on the immediate stakeholders whose

practices will be directly affected. As the impact of ongoing environmental declines

are felt more widely, however, it is expected that these stakeholders will seek a more

active role in water governance. This can be seen in the MDB where the impacts of

water buy backs on some communities have driven greater Local Government

engagement with water planning.

In summary, stakeholder organisations that are directly impacted by water

policy will always engage with metagovernance initiatives although they may employ

other tactics, including political advocacy, public media campaigns and litigation at

the same time. Policy engagement is demanding of the human, financial and

technical resources of stakeholder organisations, and often requires direct or indirect

government investment to provide that capacity. Different stakeholder organisations

have distinct interests which they pursue through metagovernance processes.

9.4.2 The impact of stakeholder networks

Stakeholder networks react collectively, as well as individually, to

metagovernance initiatives. Stakeholder organisations within a sector (such as

agricultural organisations, or NRM organisations) interact and typically collaborate or

at least coordinate policy responses. Sometimes, stakeholder organisations

collaborate across sectors as well. In the GBR case study, the Reef Alliance has been

a successful advocate as well as delivery network involving NRM, agricultural industry

and conservation organisations. There is no equivalent formal structure within the

MDB case study, but interviewees reported cross-sector dialogue at the peak body

level, and there are certainly cross-sector community-based groups active at the local

level (such as the Border Rivers Water Network described above). Stakeholder

networks are not mere sets of independent actors responding to metagovernance

initiatives from government, they can exercise metagovernance themselves.

Stakeholder organisations are not in a position to enact legislation or market

instruments, but they can employ network management strategies such as network


design, framing, management and participation (Sørensen & Torfing, 2009). Non-

state parties acting as metagovernors require other actors to accept that role and the

resources to exercise metagovernance (Bell & Hindmoor, 2009a; Torfing, 2016).

The Reef Alliance provides an example of how networks can metagovern

themselves. Table 9.3 illustrates the technologies of agencies and the technologies of

performance (Rose & Miller, 1992) employed by the Reef Alliance. The Alliance was

formed around a collaborative proposal for government investment in incentives for

voluntary agricultural practice change in reef catchments, and successfully

transitioned from an advocacy network to a program delivery network with agreed

roles in implementing reef programs. The Alliance contains many tensions that have

persisted unresolved through its 10-year existence. Alliance members hold different

positions in relation to the regulation of agricultural practices, land use change and

other reef policy mechanisms (current and proposed). Alliance members have agreed

to Alliance leadership being jointly shared by the Queensland Farmers Federation and

the Queensland Regional Groups Collective. When tensions surface, these two peak

bodies work with their sector and each other to facilitate agreement.

Table 9.3 Metagovernance practices employed by the Reef Alliance (author, after Rose and Miller,

1992)

Technologies of agency Technologies of performance • inviting membership of the Reef

Alliance

• Advocacy of agreed ‘common

interest’ positions

• Programmatic proposals including

agreed roles, budgets,

performance standards and

monitoring mechanisms.

• Sub-contracted program delivery

roles

• Negotiation by organisations with

agreed leadership roles

(Queensland Farmers Federation

for agricultural industry groups and

the Queensland Regional Groups

Collective for NRM organisations)

• Internal evaluation of partnership

arrangements

• External performance measures

(contractual reporting, modelling

and monitoring of outcomes)

• Expulsion from the Reef Alliance


When tensions have arisen within the Alliance (such as when WWF was ejected

in 2009 when the agricultural industry bodies objected to a public campaign that

blamed farmers for killing the reef), the Alliance has considered how it might

formalise codes of behaviour, but the suggestion was rejected by Alliance members:

There’s no way I could hamstring myself by saying, everything the alliance

does I’m with, and if it’s not part of the Alliance it’s not part of my approach.

In a corporate sense, I couldn’t do that. (Ag. industry 11)

The Reef Alliance, as a stakeholder coalition with an agreed common purpose

that represents the intersection of individual organisational interests, has clearly

driven policy reform and programmatic investments. Interviewees across both

governments commented on the power of a proposal that came from a network of

diverse interests, that clearly assured ministers that this was a political ‘win-win’

proposal with no electoral trade-offs.

If a cross-sectoral Alliance can be such a powerful agent in developing,

promoting and delivering policy solutions, what are the conditions that enable that,

and how can metagovernance facilitate those conditions? Secondly, in the GBR, NRM

organisations have been critical brokers of collaboration, first at the regional level,

and then at the whole-of-GBR scale. It seems clear that government investments in

practice change programs would not have occurred to the same level without NRM

organisations. Yet, the foundational capacity of NRM organisations is being

undermined by programmatic changes that have reduced overall funding and

adopted a competitive ‘service delivery’ model in recent years (Robins & Kanowski,

2011; Vella et al., 2015).

9.5 WHAT DOES COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE ACHIEVE?

9.5.1 Governance outcomes

The analytical framework presented in Chapter 3 identified the intangible

outcomes of collaborative governance as including trust, knowledge, understanding,

capacity and resources (governance performance). The results presented in this

thesis provide clear evidence that effective metagovernance can facilitate these

outcomes.


In the GBR case study, the development of the Reef Alliance and its constructive

relationships with scientists and both governments have provided the foundation of

GBR policy and programs. The Alliance brings together a set of organisations with

distinct roles and perspectives but a common interest in the support of voluntary

uptake of improved agricultural practices. Regional WQIPs have provided the

foundational knowledge, implementation strategies and water quality targets

adopted over successive bilateral Reef Water Quality Protection Plans.

There are ongoing tensions within the Alliance that have persisted since its

inception, and these are exacerbated by media or political advocacy around issues

about which members disagree, such as regulation, land use change, distribution of

program resources and so forth. Alliance members accept that agreement and

collaboration across the Alliance is not absolute, and that organisations retain their

independent interests. Greater trust has been shown through the allocation of funds

and roles in the latest Reef Alliance project – with industry groups leading practice

change investments and NRM groups leading monitoring and evaluation activities.

The combined delivery network creates greater reach and multiple pathways for

farmers to engage with practice change programs. WWF has brought additional

philanthropic resources to the table, investing in a program delivered through Reef

Alliance partners.

The greatest change seen over the life of the Reef Water Quality Protection

Plan has been the shift in how agricultural industry groups view their role in relation

to the water quality impacts of agriculture. In 2003, agricultural industry groups were

somewhat peripheral to Reef water quality policy and programs, policy advocacy was

coming from NRM organisations, supported by conservation and scientists. In 2017,

the Reef Alliance leadership is shared between NRM and industry groups. The

relationships have persisted despite changes in leadership in many of the

organisations involved. As a metagovernance outcome, industry leadership of

voluntary practice change (and constructive engagement with regulatory policy

development) is a significant achievement.

In contrast, the Basin has not seen the benefits of cross-sectoral collaboration

in the same way. At the catchment scale, there have been constructive stakeholder


networks involved in water planning in both the Condamine-Balonne and Border

Rivers (albeit that the Condamine-Balonne had more than a decade of conflict prior

to that). When stakeholder committees have been constructive in planning at the

Basin scale, they have contributed advice to government about community

perceptions, and about operationalising some aspects of the Basin Plan (e.g. the

constraints strategy).

The first phase of Basin governance was mostly concerned with negotiating

outcomes with the states. In the early years of the second phase, the Authority’s

strategy of getting on with the technical business of planning before community

consultation clearly backfired (as it had in the Condamine-Balonne before). Trust in

the MDBA remains low across much of the Basin community. The irrigation sector

dominated MDBA engagement efforts in the subsequent years, masking the

emerging social and economic impacts of water buy-backs in some vulnerable

communities.

While the concept of ‘localism’ was well received by stakeholders, it hasn’t

been realised in any tangible way. The Basin Plan and water recovery strategies

remain technocratic and unresponsive to stakeholder groups advocating for

alternative pathways that may achieve the same objectives with less socio-economic

impact. To some extent, this reflects the two levels of planning – ultimately delivery

in each catchment will be through state-led water planning processes. Meanwhile,

individual irrigators stand to make very substantial windfalls from either licence

buybacks or infrastructure upgrades.

Unlike the GBR, the scientific foundation of Basin planning has not been

accepted by stakeholders, there has not been an opportunity to incorporate local

knowledge, diverse interests are only recently being acknowledged, and trust in the

MDBA is generally very low. Irrigator interests have effectively monopolised policy

debates, media and political attention. Without a clear role in delivery, opportunities

to harness additional capacity and resources through stakeholder networks remains

mute. This may change in the future, however, as the Commonwealth Environmental

Water Holder (CEWH) starts to deploy its environmental water holdings for ecological

benefits. Some authors (see Marshall et al., 2013; Roberts et al., 2011) have


suggested that the CEWH could contract NRM organisations to broker the delivery of

environmental watering strategies. Such an arrangement could enable the

negotiation of catchment solutions in a more integrated and tailored way than is

currently possible. Another shortcoming in the MDB is the lack of sufficient

monitoring and evaluation to improve knowledge about system responses, judge the

outcomes of the Basin Plan and reassure stakeholders. While knowledge remains

contested and monitoring inadequate, there seems little hope of building

stakeholder trust and collaboration.

Several government officers commented on the potential for negative

outcomes of collaborative governance. In one phase of the GBR case study,

collaborative governance was seen to be unrealistically raising stakeholder

expectations for action and investment that were not matched by government

capacity. In the MDB case study, a few interviewees commented on the tension

between the time that stakeholders would like to debate policy issues, versus the

need for government to get on with leading change agendas. In some cases,

interviewees noted that stakeholders wanted to go back and revisit previous

decisions which were not negotiable.

9.5.2 Policy impact and outcomes

Collaborative governance can have positive or negative impacts on policy

processes. It is clear from the MDB histories at both Basin and catchment scale that

poorly managed stakeholder engagement can exacerbate underlying tensions to the

extent that policy reform processes are effectively blocked. Such crises create an

opportunity for a change in strategy, which may (or may not) achieve a degree of

community acceptance.

Collaborative governance appears to offer different potential benefits at

different stages of the policy cycle. At the issue identification stage, there may be less

opportunity for collaborative engagement because of the implications of policy

objectives for different stakeholder groups. Stakeholder organisations are more likely

to be advocating for positions that reflect their own or members’ interests. Once

policy objectives have been set, there is more potential for stakeholder networks to

contribute to policy design, sharing useful knowledge about how behaviour change


can be achieved. This occurred in both the MDB and GBR case studies. As policy

moves into implementation, stakeholder networks may be able to provide valuable

delivery capacity and aligned resources. In line with international neoliberal trends,

Australian governments have reduced their implementation capacity in many areas,

relying instead on third parties to provide service delivery roles. Monitoring and

evaluation is a critical for effective policy responses to complex problems, and

stakeholders must see performance measures as credible if they are to support policy

reform (Cash, 2001). This has been a tension in both the GBR and MDB case studies,

but has been partially addressed in the GBR through an extensive monitoring and

modelling system and annual, regional and GBR scale report cards.

Interviewees reported that stakeholder organisations and networks helped

improve policy outcomes by:

• Bringing additional knowledge to policy design that can improve

understanding of the issue and potentially inform alternative or

modified policy solutions;

• Sharing interests and perspectives can provide a richer picture of the

policy issue and greater understanding of stakeholder

interdependencies;

• Advising on and facilitating member, sector and community

engagement strategies that are more likely to be well received,

improving acceptance of policy reform;

• Negotiating delivery roles and acting as an agent in policy

implementation, increasing the capacity and effectiveness of policy

implementation networks; and

• Contributing or facilitating the contribution of local knowledge that

enables generic policy solutions to be tailored to local conditions

(landscapes, farming systems, communities).


9.6 THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT FOR COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE

The major policy change frameworks described in Chapter 3 (e.g. Institutional

Analysis and Development framework and the Advocacy Coalition Framework)

acknowledge the importance of context as a determinant of governance

performance. The results of this research clearly support that argument. In this

section, generalisations about the conditions that support governance networks to

make a constructive contribution to policy outcomes are considered. Broader

contextual factors (such as political, legal and environmental context) were described

in Chapter 2 and are not reiterated here.

Table 9.4 summarises the contextual factors identified in this research that

support effective collaborative governance. First, the policy issue needs to be of

sufficient political significance to warrant sufficient government attention for

metagovernance to occur. Political significance may be driven by public concern,

international pressure (e.g. WHC), and economic risks.


Table 9.4 Contextual factors that enable collaborative governance

Category Enabling conditions Explanation Nature of the issue

Issue is politically significant (public concern, international pressure, economic risks)

Political significance is required to attract sufficient government attention for metagovernance to occur

Issue has actionable solutions (win/win, affordable, politically tenable)

Feasible solutions are required for government engagement

Government Governments provide clear policy signals - bilateralism & bipartisanship

Sustained and unambiguous policy signals drive stakeholder acceptance of reform agendas and engagement in policy design and delivery. Inconsistent policy messaging encourages stakeholder inaction or political gaming.

Policy coherence Related policy arenas that are critical for effective policy delivery must be aligned e.g. NRM, climate adaptation

Government capacity Metagovernance requires resources, delivery capacity and technical expertise Stakeholder organisations

Empowered stakeholder organisations

Engaging in governance networks requires human, financial and knowledge resources.

Cross-sectoral representation Cross sectoral networks offer more diverse views and reduce risk of co-optation Leadership & brokerage

Distributed leadership and brokerage skills

Individuals that can lead and deliver collaborative solutions in government and stakeholder organisations

Process Knowledge-base agreed

If the knowledge is contested then major conflicts need to be resolved before solutions can be considered

Trust in process

All parties (government and stakeholder organisations) must trust the process. Trust can be improved by transparency and public accountability.


In the short term, elections provide policy windows for change. The policy issue also

needs to have actionable solutions that meet pragmatic criteria such as affordable,

achievable and politically tenable, in the current context. Water policy conflicts are

more likely to meet these criteria than other environmental issues, where economic

development paradigms are more likely to preclude or limit the prospect of

negotiated solutions.

Policy clarity, coherence, stability and capacity support effective network

governance. Clear and sustained policy signals drive stakeholder acceptance of

reform agendas that enable constructive engagement in policy design and

implementation. Bilateral and bipartisanship are clearly beneficial. The Basin Plan has

endured because of sustained, bipartisan support. Inconsistent policy signals, such as

Queensland’s on-again, off-again reef regulations, encourage stakeholder

organisations to employ delaying tactics rather than constructive engagement.

Inconsistent programmatic and funding strategies between state and

Commonwealth Governments encourages stakeholder gaming and advocacy,

undermining the potential for collaborative arrangements. Contrary to popular

conceptions, policy areas are not silos, and there are many interdependencies

between related policy areas. NRM policy and programs, for example, have been

critical for the delivery of reef policy, and current funding and programmatic

arrangements undermine that capacity. Leadership and collaborative capacity is

needed to support metagovernance initiatives, and without this collaborative can be

tokenistic and ineffective.

Stakeholder organisations also require human and financial resources and

technical expertise. Governments frequently resource stakeholder organisations,

directly or indirectly, to enable them to engage in governance networks.

Governments will focus on organisations whose members or constituents will be

directly affected, or can directly affect, policy outcomes. A narrow spectrum of

stakeholder organisations will be easier to work with – building trust and reaching

agreement faster than a more diverse group. A more diverse governance network

will be slower and more challenging to work with, but more likely to bring diverse

views, insights and perspectives that may allow new policy insights (Huxham &


Vangen, 2005). A more diverse group can also help to balance the views presented,

and reduce the risk of co-optation by any particular stakeholder group (O'Toole &

Meier, 2004).

Leadership is a consistent theme in the network governance literature (see

Ansell & Gash, 2012; Connelly, 2007; Mandell & Keast, 2009). Results here suggest

the proposition that effective collaborative governance requires distributed

leadership across government and stakeholder organisations. At each phase of each

case study, individuals provided critical leadership roles that enabled collaboration,

including Ministers, government officers and individuals from industry, NRM,

conservation, community and science organisations.

Finally, a number of process features seem important enablers of collaborative

governance. There needs to be sufficient trust in the process, and agreement on the

scientific and technical foundations to allow collaborative governance. Trust can be

built through transparency and accountability, but can be easily lost if decisions are

perceived as unjust, inconsistent or ineffective. Science is commonly highly contested

in water policy. Processes to share, test and co-produce knowledge (such as the

‘journey of joint discovery’ used in the Condamine-Balonne) can reduce conflict. For

this reason, monitoring of policy outcomes must be credible to stakeholders.

9.7 THE POTENTIAL FOR EFFECTIVE METAGOVERNANCE OF AUSTRALIAN WATER POLICY

Clearly there is potential for metagovernance to facilitate collaborative

approaches that can improve policy design and implementation. While the

contribution of the Reef Alliance to policy design and implementation in the GBR is

not replicated in the MDB, there are clear signals that stakeholders are willing to

contribute to improving policy implementation.

Policy clarity and coherence, as discussed in the preceding section, are

necessary for major policy reform. While this may sound a little utopian, both case

studies have achieved this to some degree. Any inconsistency between government

policy positions will discourage stakeholder collaboration and encourage political

advocacy and stakeholder gaming.


It is tempting to speculate, as some interviewees did, as to whether only ‘win-

win’ solutions are amenable to collaborative governance. The evidence presented

here suggests that when policy reforms have negative impacts on some stakeholder

groups, those groups will employ all avenues of policy influence to mitigate those

impacts. Once a policy objective is agreed, and if governments are clearly committed

to delivering that objective, then stakeholder organisations are more likely to engage

in collaborative dialogue that explores how that objective can be achieved most

efficiently and with least impost. The stage of the policy cycle frames the agenda for

collaborative governance.

Australian governments employ conventional formal stakeholder engagement

processes such as advisory committees and public consultation processes, but

metagovernance incorporates a wider range of practices that engage and steer

stakeholder networks for policy purposes. Less visible, but more importantly,

metagovernance involves close working relationships between government officers

and stakeholder organisations, with a close political overlay.

Governments need to be seen to get on with policy decision-making and

implementation, and time constraints can limit both the capacity to invest in

collaborative processes, and recognition of the potential benefits. The collaborative

capacity of any of the effective collaborations described here are built over years of

engagement. While a crisis like the Condamine-Balonne water plan might trigger a

change in approach, the strength of relationships that emerged have endured

decades. Similarly, the collaborative capacity of the NRM network, and the

relationship with agricultural industry bodies, has been built over 15 years of close

engagement. Such networks provide collaborative capacity that governments may

access for policy purposes, now and in the future, for water or related policy issues.

Government imperatives to show leadership, to manage risks and be

accountable to the public, constrain metagovernance practice. There is a tension

between the utilitarian approach to governance networks for short-term policy

purpose, versus the potential for such networks to identify and delivery innovative

alternatives through a less constrained process (Huxham & Vangen, 2005). Cross-


sectoral networks are more likely to deliver new insights than networks with less

diversity.

NRM organisations may be a critical enabler of the cross-sector dialogue and

relationship building that governments are unlikely to sustain on their own. Effective

NRM organisations work with a diverse network of interested parties within and

beyond their region. With a broad remit to facilitate voluntary solutions to

sustainability challenges, NRM organisations should be well placed to provide the

collaborative capacity that governments may harness as policy priorities dictate. Two

challenges test this hypothesis. First, metagovernance frequently involves a mix of

policy instruments, including regulatory and market-based instruments as well as

voluntary incentives. NRM organisations in Queensland have a weak mandate and no

defined role in relation to statutory instruments (Pannell et al., 2008). Secondly, the

NRM system has been significantly impacted by changes to funding and program

arrangements in recent years (Robins & Kanowski, 2011; Vella et al., 2015).

9.8 CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined and synthesized the research findings against the

research objectives articulated in Chapter 4. The commonalities and differences

between the two case studies have been identified and acknowledged. The practice

of metagovernance has been described (research objective 1). Australian

governments take conservative approaches to formal stakeholder engagement, but

exercise a wider suite of metagovernance instruments than is immediately obvious,

including resourcing from related policy arenas, informal policy relationships and

political access.

Governments recognise the potential benefits of good metagovernance

practice and rationalise metagovernance practice as ‘good practice’, often as a

legislative requirement, but generally about improving policy acceptance and

outcomes (research objective 2). Metagovernance practice is, however, constrained

by political and policy imperatives including the need progress reform agendas and

demonstrate outcomes, as well the more obvious time, cost and capacity constraints.

In practice, government have a limited capacity to respond to stakeholder initiatives.


Accountability and risk are major concerns, and there is always a clear political

overlay to policy reform decisions.

Bilateral relations are a significant and problematic area in water policy. Poor

policy alignment is driven by mismatched political and policy cycles and a long history

of mutual disrespect between levels of government. Better policy alignment can

occur when strong drivers exist. Poor bilateral relations are keenly felt by

stakeholders and clearly impact policy delivery and impact, as well as stakeholder

collaboration.

Stakeholder groups will always choose to engage with metagovernance

initiatives rather than be left with no policy influence. Participating in network

governance is demanding for stakeholder organisations and is often directly or

indirectly resourced by government. Stakeholders can also exercise metagovernance,

and NRM organisations have played a key role in this capacity.

Collaborative governance can clearly deliver improved knowledge,

understanding, trust, capacity and resources (research objective 3). Undesirable

impacts include the time and effort required, and the potential to build unrealistic

stakeholder expectations. Policies with socio-economic or political impacts are less

likely to be shared with stakeholders until policies are well developed. Lack of

stakeholder acceptance can effectively block policy reform processes. Collaborative

governance may be less effective in the early stages of policy development where

implications for different stakeholders may drive advocacy and gaming rather than

collaborative engagement. Nonetheless, collaborative governance appears to offer

tangible benefits in terms of better policy design and policy implementation,

particularly where stakeholder organisations are service delivery agents (research

objective 3).

Important contextual factors that enable or constrain the potential for effective

collaborative governance to contribute to policy outcomes are identified (research

objective 4). The potential for collaborative governance to contribute to Australian

water policy is generally found to be favourable (research objective 5), albeit

acknowledging the political and policy constraints mentioned above. The potential

role of NRM organisations as brokers of collaborative capacity is identified, but the


impacts of NRM program changes and the unclear role of these organisations in

relation to statutory instruments is noted.

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Chapter 10: Conclusions

10.1 SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Environmental degradation and resource over-allocation are challenging policy

issues that not only grapple with substantial complexity and uncertainty in

understanding the issue and its possible remedies, but also complex trade-offs in

negotiating support for policies in highly contested and politicised policy arenas.

Water policy conflicts increase and evolve with increasing population, intensification

of resource use and climate change confounding policy implementation. Intractable

policy problems such as these are known as ‘wicked’ problems for their characteristic

resistance to solution.

In line with international trends, Australian public policy has adopted (and

adapted) neoliberal strategies including small government, marketisation,

regionalisation, public participation and engagement (Bevir, 2011; Curtis et al., 2014;

Higgins et al., 2012; Lockwood & Davidson, 2010). Collaborative governance sits

within the suite of policy practices promoted by a neoliberal philosophy, and its

embrace by environmental policy has been hailed as a paradigm shift in

environmental management (Benson et al., 2013; Bevir, 2008; Margerum, 2008).

Collaborative governance is recommended as good policy practice for wicked

problems (Australian Public Service, 2007; Head et al., 2016; Kwakkel et al., 2016).

Rather than policy decisions being made by centralised government, governments

engage networks of stakeholders or their organisations in the development and

design of policy responses. The benefits of such an approach include sharing

knowledge and understanding, building trust, reaching agreement and commitment,

cost efficiencies, shared resources, risks and responsibilities (Ansell & Gash, 2008;

Margerum, 2011).

Much of the research literature on collaborative governance is drawn from

normative or descriptive case studies (Ansell & Gash, 2008). The literature

documents many challenges to the realisation of the benefits ascribed to

collaborative governance, including power imbalances, participation and capacity

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(Head et al., 2016; Huxham et al., 2000) and accountability issues (Frame et al., 2004;

Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000).

There is considerable confusion about how to assess the performance of

collaborative governance, and ongoing academic debate about the utility of process,

output or outcome performance measures (Carr et al., 2012; Koontz & Thomas,

2006). There are many intermediate measures that explore how collaboration works,

and there are methodological challenges to assessing the outcomes, and attributing

benefits to collaboration. Evidence of the performance of collaborative governance,

compared to alternative approaches such as authoritative or market-based

strategies, is limited. ``This research aims to bring a theoretically informed

perspective to the practice of collaborative governance in Australian water policy to

better understand the potential contribution of collaborative governance to water

policy outcomes and the factors that constrain or enable collaborative governance

performance.

10.2 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The benefits ascribed to collaborative governance are substantial and it offers

promise in policy arenas that are characterised by chronic policy failure (Head, 2008).

Yet, implementation of collaborative governance is challenging and evidence of

performance limited. The purpose of this research is to advance the critical

understanding of the practice of collaborative governance to inform choices about

modes of governance to address environmental issues. The overarching research

question is ‘How do the rationales and practices of collaborative governance

influence Australian water policy outcomes?’. To answer this research question, the

research objectives are:


water policy?

The evolution of governance arrangements for two major water policy issues in

Australia is examined to determine contemporary collaborative governance practice

in Australian water policy. The structures and processes to engage key stakeholders,

such as non-government stakeholder organisations, were studied, and how this

engagement influenced water policy decisions. The research describes the

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collaborative governance practices used over time in two major Australian water

policy cases.




governance change in the case studies was examined to determine the rationale for

the modes of governance adopted. To address this research objective, the rationales

of government agencies at these key decision-points are summarised.



The impact of collaborative governance efforts on stakeholder relations and

policy decisions was explored with government and non-government decision-

makers in the case studies. The research documents the influence of collaborative

governance on stakeholder relations, and the impact of this on policy decisions and

outcomes.



The context for each phase of governance and policy change in the case studies

was examined through documentation and the perspectives of government and non-

government decision-makers to understand how context shaped governance

decisions and outcomes. The research documents the contextual factors considered

to have influenced the performance of collaborative governance initiatives through

the period of the two case studies.



Reflecting on the findings above, the research draws preliminary conclusions

about what constrains or enables the adoption of collaborative governance in its



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adoption.

10.3 KEY RESEARCH FINDINGS

10.3.1 How is collaborative governance practiced in Australian water policy?

Australian governments adopt conventional approaches to collaborative

governance in water policy, employing formal stakeholder advisory committees,

public consultation periods on key documents and ongoing consultation with

representative bodies. The research revealed that metagovernance practice involves

a wider suite of metagovernance instruments than formal stakeholder engagement

processes imply. A mix of communicative, financial and regulatory instruments are

used by governments to engage, facilitate and steer governance networks towards

policy purpose. As well as the formal stakeholder engagement structures mentioned

above, governments directly and indirectly (e.g. through NRM programs) invest in

stakeholder organisations to support their engagement in collaborative governance

processes. Informal pathways of policy dialogue are also prevalent, such as through

stakeholder access to policy makers and politicians. Formal and informal pathways of

policy influence work closely together.

While governments seek to facilitate the contribution of stakeholder networks

to public policy, governments do not directly assess the effectiveness and outcomes

of their metagovernance practice. Rather, performance is judged by policy outcomes

(e.g. water targets) and programmatic reporting (e.g. contractual reporting of service

delivery arrangements with stakeholder organisations).

Over the period examined (2000-2016), there was a general trend for greater

engagement evident across both case studies, driven by statutory requirements for

stakeholder consultation in contemporary legislation and a growing recognition of

good consultation practice. In both case studies, there were also anecdotes

demonstrating how stakeholder opposition can stall or change reform processes

through the media and political advocacy.

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10.3.2 How do governments rationalise collaborative governance practice?

Australian governments recognise the benefits of good stakeholder

engagement to improve policy design and delivery. Governments are, however,

highly constrained in how they practice metagovernance, and how responsive they

can be to stakeholder demands. In working with stakeholders, governments also

need to be mindful of:

• the need to ‘get on’ with policy decision-making and implementation in

a timely manner;

• the need to be seen to be achieving successful policy outcomes;

• wanting to be in control of policy processes and confident of outcomes;

and

• generating political kudos for Ministers and governments.

If policy reforms are likely to have negative impacts on some stakeholders,

governments are likely to more fully develop policy prior to consulting with

stakeholder. The need to act quickly in times of crisis may also preclude time for

stakeholder engagement.

Once a policy agenda is set, unambiguous targets can drive implementation,

but also prevent governments considering alternative pathways to the same

objectives (or recognising interdependencies between related policy areas).

Accountability and risk are major concerns for government. There are political risks

in supporting stakeholder-led policy initiatives, but this risk can be mitigated if

proposals receive cross-sectoral support. Major policy decisions always have a strong

political overlay.

10.3.3 How does collaborative governance impact stakeholder relations and policy outcomes?

Stakeholder organisations see collaborative governance as an opportunity to

influence policy design and delivery. Even stakeholder organisations actively resisting

policy reforms will engage with policy makers, while at the same time advocating to

the public and politicians by media and direct advocacy. Collaborative governance

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relies on the capacity of stakeholder organisations, and governments will directly or

indirectly resource the participation of key stakeholder groups.

Different stakeholder groups have distinct interests which they will pursue

through collaborative governance processes. Stakeholder networks can react

collectively as well as individually, and typically peak bodies will coordinate efforts.

Cross-sectoral networks can emerge at the local level (place-based), but also at the

policy level, exercising metagovernance to increase policy impact. Stakeholder

metagovernance can only draw on suasive mechanisms, using network leadership

and brokerage skills to garner network authority.

In the GBR case study a cross-sectoral Alliance between conservation,

agricultural industries and NRM organisations has been a powerful force in policy

design and delivery. No equivalent network has formed in the MDB. NRM

organisations can be critical brokers of cross-sectoral collaboration at local, regional

and cross-regional scales, yet this capacity has been undermined by programmatic

changes to NRM programs in recent years.

Successful collaborative governance can support the sharing of knowledge and

interests, grow trust and mutual understanding, and contribute capacity and

resources to policy outcomes. Such changes are more likely where a diverse network

of stakeholders work together over time – whereas closely aligned stakeholders are

more likely to reinforce their existing conceptions and positions. Collaborative

governance can have negative outcomes, unrealistically raising stakeholder

expectations, slowing down policy reforms and re-opening debates for which

government has no appetite.

Collaborative governance offers different benefits and risks at different stages

of the policy cycle. At the issue identification stage, stakeholder groups are more

likely to be advocating for their groups’ interests, which may limit the potential for

constructive collaboration. One policy objectives are set, stakeholder groups are

more likely to work collaboratively to refine policy design. If stakeholder

organisations have a potential role in policy delivery, as service delivery agents, then

governance networks can harness additional capacity and resources to policy

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purpose. If stakeholder acceptance and support is necessary for policy reform,

credible and legitimate performance measures must be monitored and reported.

Metagovernance of stakeholder networks can facilitate a range of benefits to

policy processes, including:

• Bringing additional knowledge to policy design that can improve

understanding of the issue and potentially inform alternative or

modified policy solutions;

• Sharing interests and perspectives can provide a richer picture of the

policy issue and greater understanding of stakeholder

interdependencies;

• Advising on and facilitating member, sector and community

engagement strategies that are more likely to be well received,

improving acceptance of policy reform;

• Negotiating delivery roles and acting as an agent in policy

implementation, increasing the capacity and effectiveness of policy

implementation networks; and

• Contributing, or facilitating the contribution of, local knowledge that

enables generic policy solutions to be tailored to local conditions

(landscapes, farming systems, communities).

10.3.4 How is the performance of collaborative governance influenced by context?

Contextual factors are important determinants of collaborative governance

outcomes. Significant policy issues with actionable strategies (such as major water

policy reforms) are more likely to attract the political and policy commitment for

metagovernance initiatives. Policy clarity, coherence, stability and capacity are

needed for effective metagovernance. Clear and sustained policy signals (bilateral,

bipartisan) drive stakeholder acceptance of reform agendas and constructive policy

engagement.

This research has highlighted the significant and problematic impact of bilateral

relations on the practice and performance of water policy metagovernance. In

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Australian, most major water policy issues (quantity or quality) attract bilateral or

multilateral policy efforts. The engagement of multiple layers of government

complicates governance arrangements, and poorly coordinated policies can have a

major impact on performance outcomes. Poor policy alignment is driven by political

and policy cycles, and a long history of mutual disrespect between levels of

government. Better policy coordination occurs when there is an imperative – driven

by Ministerial leadership, policy crisis or external scrutiny. Poor bilateral relations are

keenly felt by stakeholders with implications for policy delivery and impact, as well

as stakeholder collaboration.

Cross-sectoral governance networks of stakeholder organisations are more

likely to contribute to good policy outcomes than more homogenous networks.

Leadership across stakeholder organisations, government agencies, scientists and

politicians is a critical factor to lead changes in network relationships and

performance. In terms of collaborative process, trust and an agreed knowledge base

appear to be important pre-cursors to constructive collaboration. Collaboration is

likely to show a strong path dependency on prior relationships – highlighting the need

for metagovernance efforts to be sustained over time to realise their potential.

10.3.5 What does that tell us about the potential adoption and performance of collaborative governance in Australian water resource policy?

Effective metagovernance can facilitate better policy design and

implementation in Australian water policy. Collaborative governance is founded on

institutional relationships that are built between individuals who share, to some

degree, a view of what a desirable policy outcome is. Cross-sectoral networks can

provide a powerful voice in policy reform, but are not built overnight.

Government decisions are driven by political and policy imperatives, and are

frequently constrained by time, cost and the need to deliver policy outcomes in a

timely and predictable manner. Complex, or wicked, policy problems, however, are

not amenable to solution in the election timeframes of governments. Wicked

problems require sustained commitment, negotiated solutions and ongoing testing

and evaluation of performance outcomes.

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Stakeholder organisations are keen to contribute to shaping policy, albeit

primarily driven by their own interests. Cross-sectoral networks offer greater

potential for better policy design and delivery. Once policy objectives are set,

stakeholder organisations are more likely to collaborate, even if they oppose the

proposed policy reforms. Building and sustaining the social capital of policy networks

requires mature relationships and sustained policy objectives.

The potential for collaborative advantage to be realised through

metagovernance processes is constrained by the political and policy imperatives

under which governments operate. Poor bilateral policy coordination and

inconsistent or incoherent policies encourage stakeholder advocacy and gaming over

collaboration. While governments recognise the potential benefits of collaborative

governance for priority policy issues, they generally adopt a narrow and utilitarian

view, and accountability and risk are major concerns.

The role of NRM organisations in brokering cross-sectoral collaboration at

catchment and whole-of-basin scales appears to offer strong potential to provide

foundational social capital for environmental governance networks. NRM

organisations have led the development of successful collaborative governance in the

GBR, and could offer a constructive role in brokering environmental watering

outcomes in the MDB. Yet changes to national and state NRM programs have reduced

the capacity of NRM organisations that undermines this potential.

10.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH

10.4.1 Theoretical significance

Governance theory stretches across multiple research domains and is beset by

confusing and overlapping terminology (Ansell & Torfing, 2016). The simplicity of the

`pure forms of governance’ (market, hierarchy and networks) (Powell, 1990) and the

argument that there is a general trend from government to governance (e.g. Rhodes,

1994), falls short of providing an effective analytical lens on the complex and dynamic

world of governance in practice. Government clearly remains a critical actor in policy

decisions in western democracies, and the use of metagovernance and

governmentality theory to frame this research drew a helpful focus on both the

central role of the state, but also the complex interactions between the state and

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citizens in the policy process. Metagovernance highlights the special role and

constraints of the state, and draws attention to the many instruments of

metagovernance employed by the state. Governmentality theory goes beyond the

duality of governor and governed, to understand the ways that subjects participate

in governance by governing themselves. Through metagovernance, governments

seek to harness the power and agency of individuals and groups to exercise self-

governance. In this way, governance itself is emergent, shaped by the rationalities

and practices of multiple actors and networks.

This research makes a novel contribution by developing an analytical

framework that links collaborative governance, metagovernance and

governmentality theory to understand governance performance. Governmentality

theory has mostly been used within the European political science research arena,

often linked to neoliberalism, and has not been widely used in Australian

environmental research (but see Lockie & Higgins, 2007; Lockwood & Davidson, 2010;

Stephens et al., 2015). The analytical framework enabled insights to the suite of

metagovernance practices exercised in the two case studies. The benefits of the

analytical framework are discussed further in the following section on

methodological significance (section 10.4.2).

The opportunities and constraints that governments face in metagoverning

arise from the special role of government and the ‘primacy of politics’. On the one

hand, the state has tremendous authority that can be brought to bear, and the onus

to apply this ‘in the public interest’ towards public policy goals. On the other hand,

the special role of government (standards of behaviour, public and media scrutiny,

political leadership etc.) constrain the capacity of the state to metagovern effectively

(Kickert et al., 1997). In this research, there was clearly a tension between the

instrumental, utilitarian perspective that government officers take to ‘stakeholder

engagement’ that is driven by political and accountability demands, and the potential

for greater benefits to emerge from a more open, fluid metagovernance process in

the right context. Stakeholder networks were responding to a wide range of policy

signals and metagovernance instruments employed across multiple policy domains.

In contrast, government officers viewed the operation and performance of networks

through a narrow lens, that inhibited their capacity to recognise, assess and

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(collectively) influence the performance of governance network. These findings are

consistent with discussions within the metagovernance literature that identify the

tension between the interdependence and self-regulation of networks and the

interest of the state in steering networks for policy outcomes (see De Bruijn & ten

Heuvelhof, 1997; Sørensen & Torfing, 2009; Torfing, 2016). Kickert et al. (1997) and

other authors acknowledge that networks can metagovern themselves, and this was

supported by evidence from one of the two case studies examined.

While metagovernance and governmentality theories helped to highlight the

wide range of metagovernance instruments at play in these case studies, the

complexity of metagovernance exercised by two levels of government was not

anticipated or adequately addressed by the theoretical literature, which tends to

frame metagovernance as an interplay between the state and societal networks,

rather than the state and the state, and societal networks (except for the European

literature which considers EU, state and society).

In summary, the findings of this research support several key tenets of

metagovernance and governmentality theory, namely the active role of governance

subjects in metagoverning themselves, the wide range of metagovernance

instruments employed, the tension between the self-regulation and steering of

networks by the state and the dynamic and emergent nature of governance itself.

Research results also highlighted the complexities of metagovernance within a

federated political system. As bilateral relations were a key constraint to effective

metagovernance, this area is worthy of further theoretical attention.

10.4.2 Methodological significance

This research adopted a critical realist philosophical position (Archer et al.,

2013; Guba & Lincoln, 1998) that frames governance, as the research subject, as a

complex social process operating within (and responding to) an open and dynamic

system. Methodologically, a critical realist position is aligned with exploring

governance as it is practiced, in natural settings, and eliciting insider perspectives to

provide insight to the purpose and meanings behind behaviour. Critical realism also

brought the framing of causal chains linking context, mechanism and outcomes, that

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is, outcomes are not mechanistic, but emerge through the interaction of mechanisms

that are enabled or disabled in different contexts. Critical realist inquiry provided a

useful way to think about the mid-range theory that arises from individual case

studies. Critical realism provided the structural foundation for the analytical

framework (Figure 9) which showed metagovernance as a mechanism leading to

governance and other performance outcomes in different contexts. Results

highlighted the impact of intergovernmental relations, and relations within

stakeholder networks – themselves the outcome of relations (mechanisms) that

respond to history and context. Critical realism provided an effective way to

understand the complex dynamics of institutional relationships. Governmentality

theory is consistent with this viewpoint, seeing governance as an emergent property

in an open and evolving system.

The analytical framework developed for this research (Figure 9) makes a novel

contribution by bridging the research domains of political and policy science

(governmentality and metagovernance) and the concept of collaborative governance

(from natural resource management studies) in a critical realist framing that

highlights the importance of context in enabling or disabling mechanisms that lead

to outcomes. Metagovernance contributed the perspective of the state as a unique

actor whose role brings both special authority and constraints in seeking to steer

governance networks to public policy goals. The metagovernance literature also

brought the concept of direct and indirect instruments of governance.

Governmentality theory highlighted the emergent properties of relations between

the state and society, and methodologically drew attention to the practices and

rationalities of metagovernance. In summary, the analytical framework combined

theories of metagovernance and governmentality in a critical realist perspective that

framed governance as a set of rationalities and practice that may (or may not) result

in governance and other outcomes depending on the context.

Taking a systems view of governance allowed an open and explorative

approach to the two case studies. For example, asking interviewees about the

rationalities for their behaviour was instrumental in revealing the wide range of

metagovernance instruments affecting network behaviour, from within and beyond

the water policy domain, as well important contextual factors. The distinction

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between technologies of agency (instruments to facilitate engagement) and

technologies of performance (instruments to judge and steer performance)

(Sørensen & Torfing, 2007b) was particularly useful, as results highlighted the lack of

technologies of performance as a systemic weakness in the metagovernance

practices examined in the two case studies.

The analytical approach focussed on the evolution of water policy governance

systems over time. While this lens was effective in drawing insights to address the

research questions posed, there are additional complexities that are not captured in

this view. The same actors (governments and stakeholder organisations) have other

relationships that may, at times, be significant drivers of metagovernance practice

and policy outcomes. Two practical examples will demonstrate this. First, stakeholder

organisations and their members advocate for political parties through democratic

processes (political advocacy) as well as issue-based policy advocacy. In these

longitudinal case studies, elections were triggers for policy change, and election

periods constrained metagovernance practice. Yet the framework does not capture

the potential influence of stakeholders in changing the government of the day, and

hence the context for future metagovernance. This was clearly the case in the GBR

case study where conservation of the Great Barrier Reef was a significant election

issue. Secondly, large conservation organisations advocate internationally at forums

like UNESCO, as well as locally. Again, this was observed in the GBR case study where

international scrutiny has been a major driver of policy change. The analytical

approach adopted viewed both change in government, and international scrutiny, as

important contextual factors, but they are also part of the broader governance

system and represent alternative, potentially highly impactful, pathways of influence

for stakeholder groups. Obviously, there are logistical and conceptual constraints to

any methodological approach.

This research examined two related, longitudinal, meso-scale case studies.

Governance research is dominated by single case studies (Koontz & Thomas, 2006;

Poteete et al., 2010) and while single case studies enable detailed understanding of

specific events, they also risk misrepresenting the phenomena of interest (Yin, 2014)

due to limited generalisability of single case results. The choice of two related

longitudinal case studies allowed for some efficiencies in the use of rich contextual

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understanding across both cases and over time. Longitudinal cases allow multiple

events to be examined, revealing patterns of behaviour and the cycles of stability and

change. This highlighted, for example, the frequent external disruptions to

governance processes arising from elections and changes in government. The

Queensland Government was a metagovernor in both cases (albeit led from different

departments) and the quite different metagovernance approaches used in each case

highlights the importance of context in influencing metagovernance rationales and

practices, as well as outcomes. Section 9.2 discusses key differences between the two

case studies.

In summary, the methodological significance of this research stems from its

critical realist philosophy and novel combination of governance networks,

metagovernance and governmentality theory in an analytical framework to explore

two related, meso-scale longitudinal water policy case studies. Adopting an open

inquiry into the rationales, practices and outcomes of metagovernance revealed a

complex set of relationships that responds to multiple drivers and instruments from

within and beyond the immediate policy arena. The disjunct between the narrow

conceptualisation of metagovernance within the water domain and the wide range

of instruments that are employed without critical evaluation of performance is a key

finding that stems from this methodology.

10.4.3 Empirical significance

The empirical contribution of this research is derived from the comparative

analysis of two longitudinal case studies in closely related policy domains. The two

case studies document the engagement of two governments with each other and

with similar cohorts of stakeholder organisations over related policy issues over the

same 15-year period. Despite these commonalities, the two histories provide very

different narratives of collaborative governance and its contribution to policy

development and implementation.

Detailed case histories and timelines were developed for each case study. The

documentary analysis for the case histories was based on 173 grey literature

documents and 78 relevant academic sources (section 4.4.1). Forty-eight interviews

were conducted, achieving a good coverage across organisations and roles (except

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for departmental heads and Ministers). The research has established a rich dataset

that will support further inquiry.

10.4.4 Practical significance

In a practical sense, this research highlights several aspects of Australian water

policy metagovernance not widely recognised by policy makers and practitioners.

Metagovernance practice is wider than formal stakeholder engagement and uses a

range of formal and informal instruments. Related policy domains may have a

significant impact on metagovernance outcomes – as can be seen with NRM and the

GBR case study.

The willingness of stakeholder organisations to constructively engage in policy

dialogue once there is clear political commitment to policy objectives is perhaps more

than generally recognised. While governments are highly constrained in policy

decisions and view collaborative governance in utilitarian terms - stakeholders can,

and do, block, delay or co-opt unpopular policy reforms.

Metagovernance offers multiple potential benefits to wicked policy issues, but

realising those benefits requires greater understanding of the multiple forces that

shape and enable collaborative potential. Sustained and coherent bilateral policy

enables constructive policy engagement by stakeholder organisations, and the

converse encourages stakeholder gaming and advocacy. The brokerage role that

NRM organisations have in building the social capital of governance networks is

widely underestimated, evidenced by the retreat to reduced and competitive funding

arrangements.

10.4.5 Research impact

During the life of this PhD research, this work has contributed to several reports

and processes that have enabled the sharing of preliminary findings with

practitioners and policy makers. As well as the presentations listed in Appendix H, the

author has contributed the following to GBR and NRM policy arenas:

• Lead author of the ‘Management implications’ chapter of the Scientific

Consensus Statement 2017: A synthesis of the science of land-based

298

water quality impacts on the Great Barrier Reef (Eberhard et al., 2017c)

commissioned by the Queensland Government.

• Contributing author to a report making recommendations for the

review of the Reef 2050 Long Term Sustainability Plan (Roth et al., 2017)

commissioned by the Australian and Queensland Governments.

• As part of a QUT team, worked with NRM organisations across

Queensland to consider and explore new models of cross-regional

collaboration (2016-17).

10.5 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS

This research has several limitations. First, the analytical framework adopted a

theoretical lens of metagovernance and governmentality theory. Many alternative

theoretical lens' are possible in the governance literature, and the benefits or

limitations of alternatives may not be immediately apparent. Research experience

may be the best antidote to this limitation.

Secondly, the research approach deliberately adopted a ‘wider perspective’ on

the performance of collaborative governance, seeking generalisations about a

phenomenon (governance) that by its very nature is context specific and continually

evolving. The consequent wide scope of the research design and the quantity of

evidence generated by the two longitudinal case studies created practical challenges.

As a result, the ability to explore events or perspectives in greater detail is less than

a tighter research focus would support. While the generalisability and transferability

of case study research is always limited (Willis, 2012), wider inferences can be drawn

through comparison with cases that share some similarities, particularly in the

context of Australian water policy.

10.6 RECOMMENDATIONS

10.6.1 Recommendations for policy and practice

Research findings highlight the potential benefits of collaborative governance,

but also the complexity of drivers and political and policy constraints within which

metagovernors must operate. Two recommendations are made for policy and

practice.

299

First, for the benefits of collaborative governance to be realised, governments

must acknowledge the full range of actions they take that influence governance

outcomes. At the simplest level, governments must recognise the negative impacts

of changing policy, of poor policy coherence across policy areas and government

agencies, and poor policy coordination between governments. Sustained and

consistent policy signals drive constructive stakeholder engagement in policy design

and implementation. Short-term political kudos, narrow definitions of success and

risk aversion limit the potential for stakeholders to contribute to policy solutions, and

are likely to further delay substantive action on wicked problems that are getting

worse with greater competition for resources and climate change impacts.

Secondly, acknowledging the practical constraints of the political system in

which we operate, there are clearly critical interdependencies between water policy,

climate policy (emissions reduction and adaptation responses) and NRM policy.

Neither are adequately acknowledged or managed in the water policy domains.

While action on climate change requires both global and national agreement, action

on NRM is more readily achievable. NRM organisations can provide value to

government as a broker of community, industry and environmental interests to

provide foundational social capital for governance networks that can inform a range

of environmental and development policy challenges. Australian governments should

revisit the role of the NRM system and consider the intangible benefits it can provide

to governments in facilitating network capacity. Policy objectives should remain the

preserve of government, informed by stakeholder perspectives and democratic

accountability, but policy design and delivery could be enhanced through a mandated

role for governance networks (brokered by NRM organisations) to contribute to the

design and delivery of environmental policy in some areas.

10.6.2 Recommendations for research

Effective performance measures for collaborative governance remain elusive.

This research has highlighted (as others have done before, see Innes and Booher

(1999a) and Margerum (2011), for example) the multi-layered outcomes that

collaborative governance can deliver. This research has shown that collaborative

processes can deliver intangibles like trust and knowledge, contribute to policy design

300

and implementation in ways that can increase effectiveness, acceptance and

capacity, ultimately improving policy outcomes (social, economic, environmental).

The challenge remains to better understand the influence of context and

multiple drivers in enabling or disabling these outcomes. The generalisability of these

findings could be extended through a science synthesis process such as a Delphi

process to test the validity of the conclusions drawn here against researcher and

practitioner knowledge. A framework that links metagovernance instruments to

different policy contexts could contribute to the integration of evidence from

multiple governance case studies, and ultimately the development of heuristics that

could support better metagovernance practice and evaluation, and metagovernance

theory.

The political overlay in these high-profile water policy case studies highlights

the close relationship between political and policy processes and the tension

between managing for policy outcomes and managing for political outcomes. Issues

of power and democratic accountability are central to this issue. At the pragmatic

level, research to understand how metagovernance practice and governance

networks can mitigate some of the constraints to good practice that arise from

political disruption, through stability and accountability. For example, cross-sectoral

networks seem to be better suited to generating collective insights to improve policy,

and are potentially politically more robust (less likely to be shut down because of

association with one political party or another). Is there evidence to test this

assertion?

10.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS

Communities and stakeholder groups clearly have an appetite to contribute to

the resolution of wicked policy problems. The objective of this research was to

understand the potential for collaborative governance to contribute to better water

policy outcomes. The research findings provide mixed messages – of greater

complexity than anticipated, of the willingness of stakeholder organisations to

participate, of the potential for significant contributions to policy design and

implementation, but constrained by political and policy imperatives, and frequently

hamstrung by incoherent or uncoordinated or inconsistent policy signals.

301

The role of NRM organisations provides a tantalising glimpse into what could

be delivered with sustained effort to build and steer governance networks. Not all

issues or contests will be amenable to metagovernance, but the current view of NRM

organisations as service delivery agents in community engagement and

environmental grants is underselling their performance. Other authors have

highlighted, and this research supports, the assertion that changes to NRM programs

have undermined their potential to delivery substantive policy outcomes. In a world

of decreasing trust in government, can organisations at arm’s length from

government broker better outcomes than government can alone?

Bibliography 302

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Appendices 337

Appendices

AppendixA

Glossary

Governance

Governance is the “process of--more or less institutionalized--interaction

between public and/or private entities ultimately aiming at the realization of

collective goals” (Lange et al., 2013, p. 406). Environmental governance thus involves

“the system of institutions, including rules, laws, regulations, policies, and social

norms, and organizations involved in governing environmental resource use and/or

protection” (Chaffin et al., 2014, p. 56).

Collaborative governance

Collaborative governance is “a governing arrangement where one or more

public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-

making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to

make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets” (Ansell &

Gash, 2008, p. 544).

Governance networks

Governance networks are defined as “a horizontal articulation of

interdependent, but operationally autonomous, actors from the public and/or

private sector who interact with one another through ongoing negotiations that take

place within a regulative, normative, cognitive and imaginary framework; facilitate

self-regulation in the shadow of hierarchy; and contribute to the production of public

regulation in the broad sense of the term” (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007b, p. 9).

Metagovernance

Jessop (1997b, p. 7) coined the term metagovernance as “a means by which to

produce some degree of coordinated governance, by designing and managing sound

combinations of hierarchical, market and network governance, to achieve the best

Appendices 338

possible outcomes from the viewpoint of those responsible for the performance of

public-sector organisations: public managers as 'metagovernors'”.

Stakeholders

Stakeholders are “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the

achievement of the organization's objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p. 46).

Appendices 339

AppendixB

MajorgreyliteraturefortheGreatBarrierReefcasestudy

Case study phase

Year Title Publisher Type of document

Prior to water quality issues

1975 Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975


Legislation

1979 Great Barrier Reef Intergovernmental Agreement (the ‘Emerald agreement’)

Australian and Queensland Governments

Policy

Science advocacy to consensus for action (1980-2002)

1999 Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999


Legislation

2000 Water quality in the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area: past perspectives, current issues and new research directions.


Report

2001 Great Barrier Reef Catchment Water Quality Action Plan.


Report

2002 Industries, land use and water quality in the Great Barrier Reef Catchment


Report

Phase 1: Reef Plan and the Reef Partnership (2003-2007)

2003 A report on the study of land-sourced pollutants and their impacts on water quality in and adjacent to the Great Barrier Reef (the ‘Baker report’)


Report

2003 Catchments and corals: terrestrial runoff to the Great Barrier Reef.


Report

Appendices 340

Case study phase


2003 Reef Water Quality Protection Plan: for catchments adjacent to the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage. 2003


Plan

2004 Marine Parks (Great Barrier Reef Coast) Zoning Plan 2004


Legislation

2004 Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Zoning Plan 2003


Legislation

2005 Implementation of the Reef Water Quality Protection Plan. Report to the Prime Minister and the Premier of Queensland 2005. Progress to date, challenges and future directions.


Report

2006-08

Regional water quality improvement plans for Douglas catchment, Tully catchment, Burdekin region, Mackay-Whitsunday region, Fitzroy Basin and Burnett-Mary region

Regional NRM groups (Burnett-Mary Regional Group, Fitzroy Basin Association, Mackay Whitsunday NRM, Wet Tropics NRM, NQ Dry Tropics)

Plan

2007 Joint Proposal for a Reef Water Quality Program for Agriculture

Regional NRM groups and Agricultural Industry groups

Proposal

Phase 2: Reef Rescue and regulation (2008-2013)

2008 Scientific consensus statement on water quality in the Great Barrier Reef.


Report

2008 Reef Water Quality Protection Plan audit report 2010

Lloyd Consulting Report

Appendices 341

Case study phase


2009 Great Barrier Reef Intergovernmental Agreement (Revised)


Policy

2009 Great Barrier Reef Outlook Report


Report

2009 Great Barrier Reef First Report Card 2009 Baseline.


Report

2009 Reef Water Quality Protection Plan: for the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage area and adjacent catchments.


Report

2010 Great Barrier Reef

Protection Amendment Act 2009


Legislation

2012 Mission report: Reactive Monitoring Mission to Great Barrier Reef (Australia) 6th to 14th March 2012

UNESCO and IUCN

Report

2012 Reef Rescue Extension the next level of sustainable land use in the Great Barrier Reef catchments: a business case for further investment

Regional NRM groups and Agricultural Industry groups

Proposal

2013 Coastal GBR strategic

assessment Queensland Government

Report

2013 Reef Water Quality Protection Plan 2013: Securing the health and resilience of the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area and adjacent catchments


Plan

Appendices 342

Case study phase


2013 2013 Scientific Consensus Statement: land use impacts on Great Barrier Reef Water quality and ecosystem condition


Report

Phase 3: Responding to UNESCO (2014-current)

2014 Great Barrier Reef Outlook Report 2014


Report

2014 Great Barrier Reef region strategic assessment. Strategic Assessment Report.


Report

2014 Great Barrier Reef Coastal Zone Strategic Assessment 2014


Report

2015 Managing water quality in Great Barrier Reef catchments, Report 20: 2014–15.


Report

2015 Reef 2050 Long-term Sustainability Plan


Plan

2015 State Party Report on the state of conservation of the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area (Australia) - 2015.


Report

2015 Great Barrier Reef Intergovernmental Agreement (revised)


Policy

2015-16

Regional water quality improvement plans for Cape York, Wet Tropics, Burdekin, Mackay Whitsunday, Fitzroy and Burnett Mary regions

Regional NRM groups

Plans

2015 Great Barrier Reef Long Term Sustainability Plan

Regional NRM groups

Proposal

Appendices 343

Case study phase


2050. Investment proposal water quality catchment and coastal repair

2016 Reef 2050 Plan investment framework


Policy

Appendices 344

AppendixC

MajorgreyliteraturefortheMurray-DarlingBasincasestudy

Case study phase


Pre-2000

1900 Australia Constitution Act

British Government Legislation

1915 River Murray Waters Agreement

Australian, New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia Governments

Agreement

1983 River Murray Waters Act

Australian, New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia Governments

Legislation

1987 Murray-Darling Basin Agreement

Australian, New South Wales, Victoria & South Australian Governments

Agreement

1988 Salinity & Drainage Strategy

MDBC Strategy

1989 NRM Strategy MDBC Strategy

1992 New Murray-Darling Basin Agreement

Australian, New South Wales, Victoria & South Australian Governments

Agreement

1994 Water reform framework agreement

Council of Australian Governments (COAG)

Agreement

1995 An audit of water use in the Murray-Darling Basin

Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council

Report

1997 Cap implementation Framework Agreement

Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council

Agreement

1998 Review of Cap Implementation 1997/98

Independent Audit Group

Report

1999 The Salinity Audit of the Murray-Darling Basin

MDBC Report

Appendices 345

Case study phase


2000 Water Act (Qld) Queensland Government Legislation

2000 Integrated Catchment Management policy statement

Murray–Darling Basin Ministerial Council

Statement

2001 Co-coordinating catchment management: report of the Inquiry into Catchment Management

House of Representatives. Standing Committee on Environment and Heritage

Inquiry

2003 Border Rivers Water Resource Plan

Queensland Government Statutory plan

2003 Moonie Water Resource Plan


2003 Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative.

COAG Agreement

2003 Warrego, Paroo, Bulloo, Nebine Water Resource Plan


2004 Getting Water Right(s) – The future of rural Australia. Inquiry into future water supplies for Australia’s rural industries and communities

House of Representatives�Standing Committee on Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry

Inquiry

2004 Condamine-Balonne Water Resource Plan


Appendices 346

Case study phase


2004 National Water Commission Act

Australian Government Report

2004 National Water Initiative

COAG Agreement

2004 Intergovernmental Agreement on the Living Murray

COAG

2006 water resource assessment

CSIRO

2006 Water policy initiatives

Senate Standing Committees on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport

Report

2006 Moonie Resource Operations Plan


2006 Warrego, Paroo, Bulloo, Nebine Resource Operations Plan


2007 National Plan for Water Security

Australian Government Plan

2007 Water Act (Cth) Australian Government Legislation

2008 Sustainable Rivers Audit A report on the ecological health of rivers in the Murray–Darling Basin 2004–2007

Independent Sustainable Rivers Audit Group for the Murray–Darling Commission

Report

2008 Condamine-Balonne Resource Operations Plan


2008 NSW Qld Border Rivers Intergovernmental Agreement

New South Wales and Queensland Governments

Agreement

2008 Water availability in the Murray–Darling Basin.

Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Organisation

Report

2009 Australian water reform 2009

National Water Commission Report

Appendices 347

Case study phase


2009 Market Mechanisms for Recovering Water in the Murray-Darling Basin

Productivity Commission Report

2010 Guide to the Basin Plan

MDBA Plan

2010 Implications for the long-term sustainability management of the Murray–Darling Basin System’

Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee Inquiry

Report

2011 Border Rivers Resource Operations Plan


2011 The National Water Initiative-securing Australia's water future

National Water Commission Report

2012 Basin Plan MDBA Statutory plan

2012 Of drought and flooding rains Inquiry into the impact of the Guide to the Murray-Darling Basin Plan

The House of Representatives

Standing Committee on

Regional Australia

Inquiry

2013 The management of the Murray-Darling Basin

Senate Standing Committees on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport

Inquiry

2013 Intergovernmental Agreement on Implementing Water Reform in the Murray-Darling Basin.

COAG Agreement

Appendices 348

Case study phase


2016 Refreshing the Plan

Senate Select Committee on the Murray-Darling Basin Plan

Report

2016 Warrego, Paroo, Bulloo, Nebine Water Plan and Resource Operations Plan


2016 The Northern Basin Review. Understanding the economic, social and environmental outcomes from water recovery in the northern basin

MDBA Report

Appendices 349

AppendixD

Invitationtoparticipate

Dear xxxx

My name is Rachel Eberhard and I am a PhD student at Queensland University of Technology (QUT). I am researching collaborative water governance in the Murray-Darling Basin and the Great Barrier Reef.

My focus is on the conditions that enable (or prevent) governments and non-government stakeholders from engaging in effective policy dialogue. Further details of my research can be found in the attached information sheet.

If you are willing to be contribute to this study I would like to interview you at a time and location that is convenient (I am prepared to travel, or a telephone interview is an option). The interview would take 45-60 minutes.

Participation is, of course, completely voluntary. Your contributions would be confidential and individuals will not be identified in results. I will circulate preliminary results to participants at the completion of this phase of research (mid-2016).

If you are willing to be interviewed, please respond by email. I will then forward an outline of the interview questions and arrange a suitable time and location for the interview. If you do not wish to contribute, please let me know and I will not contact you again.

Do not hesitate to contact me if you would like further information or wish to discuss this. My contact details (and my supervisor’s contact details) are below.

Please note that this study has been approved by the QUT Human Research Ethics Committee (approval number 1500000074).

I look forward to hearing from you.

Yours sincerely

Rachel Eberhard

PhD candidate

(+) 61 0432 683 598

[email protected]

Professor Douglas Baker

Supervisor

(+) 61 7 3138 2505

[email protected]

Civil Engineering and the Built Environment

Science and Engineering Faculty

Appendices 350

AppendixE

Informationandconsentform

Appendices 351

Appendices 352

Appendices 353

AppendixF

Indicativeinterviewquestions

Appendices 354

AppendixG

Codingframework

Category Codes case x phase GBR between 2003 and 2008 GBR between 2009 and 2012 GBR after 2013 GBR in general GBR before 2002 MDB in general MDB before 1991 Qld. MDB MDB since 2007 MDB between 1992 and 2006 sector working for the Australian Government working for a conservation group working for an industry group working as a local grower / grazier working for an NRM organisation working for the Queensland Government working in a science organisation role working as a bureaucrat working as an executive or board member working as a local catchment or industry representative working as a politician working as a scientist working as a technical or professional collaboration collaboration across sectors collaboration between governments collaboration govt. & NGOs collaboration in sector collaboration within govt. rationales rationale or logic of conservation organisations rationale or logic of farmers rationale or logic of government/s rationale or logic of agricultural industry groups rationale or logic of NRM organisations rationale or logic of scientists outcomes economic outcomes environmental outcomes governance outcomes social outcomes

Appendices 355

Category Codes factors implementation incentives innovation knowledge leadership legitimacy litigation markets media monitoring & evaluation NRM programs National Water Initiative refers to tailoring delivery to local contexts scale trust community engagement politics specifics Water Act 2007 (Cth) MDB Plan Council of Australian Governments consensus statement drought extension Public reports of GBR health Cap on water extractions in the MDB NRM organisations GBR Outlook Report ports and dredging Water Act 2000 (Qld) Queensland Water Resource Plans potential quotation Reef 2050 Long Term Sustainability Plan

alliance of NRM organisations and agricultural industry groups in the GBR

Bilateral Reef Water Quality Protection Plan Great Barrier Reef Protection Amendment Act 2009 (Qld.) Queensland Government Taskforce 2015-16 Australian Government Trust investing in actions for the GBR formal scientific advisory panels formal stakeholder engagement committees environmental targets or objectives United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation Regional Water Quality Improvement Plans

Appendices 356

Category Codes World Wildlife Fund for Nature (organisation)

Appendices 357

AppendixH

Communicationofresultstopractitioners

The following presentations were made to practitioner forums during the PhD

candidature:

Lunchtime seminar, Australasian Evaluation Society, Brisbane, Nov. 2014.

Presentation to the Queensland Landcare and Natural Resource Management

Conference, ‘Reef, range and red dust conference’ Caloundra, Aug 31st – Sep 2nd,

2015

Poster presentation to the 6th national Natural Resource Management

knowledge conference ‘People, planet and profits’, Coffs Harbour, 6-8th June, 2016

Invited keynote presenter, preconference workshop on collaboration,

Environmental Defenders Society national conference ‘Wild Places’, Auckland, New

Zealand, 10-12 August, 2016,

Presentation to the Natural Resource Management Forum 2017, Queensland

University of Technology, Brisbane, 7th June 2017

Invited briefing of Queensland and Australian Government Natural Resource

Management Joint Strategic Investment Panel, Brisbane, 27th July 2017.

Presentation to the Australasian Evaluation Society Conference, Canberra, 4-

6th Sept. 2017