the marketpulse volume 2, issue 8august 2013...refinance originations purchase originations 30-year...
TRANSCRIPT
© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
News Media ContactsReal estate and mortgage industry trades:
Bill Campbell [email protected] (212) 995.8057 (office)
Business and consumer:
Lori Guyton [email protected] (901) 277.6066
Inside News
Overview Article 1–2
Feature Article 3–5
Chart of the Month 6
In the News 6
National Statistics 7
CBSA Statistics 7
State Statistics 8
Graphs and Charts 9–11
Variable Descriptions 12
Housing Statistics (June 2013)
HPI® YOY Chg . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.9%
HPI YOY Chg XD . . . . . . . . . . 11.0%
NegEq Share (Q1 2013) . . . .19.8%
Shadow Inventory (04/2013) . . .2.0m
Distressed Discount. . . . . . . .39.7%
New Sales (ths, ann.) . . . . . . . . . 410
Existing Sales (ths, ann.) . . . . 4,680
Average Sales Price . . . . . . $253,892
HPI Peak-to-Current (PTC). . . -19.0%
Foreclosure Stock PTC . . . .-34.9%
Volume 2, Issue 8
August 15th, 2013
Data as of June 2013
ortgage interest rates are on the rise. Between May 2013 and August 2013, the 30-year fixed
rate mortgage rate rose by a little over 100 basis points to 4.39 percent1, the largest rise in the long-term rate since mid-2004 (Figure 1). The recent increases in interest rates have raised questions about what will happen to the mortgage market. Will the rate increases lead to a slowdown in home sales and refinancing? This article focuses on a historical review of mortgage origination trends, including the composition of purchase money and refinance mortgage volumes, as well as the drivers behind these two segments of the
market. It concludes by exploring market estimates for mortgage originations for the rest of 2013.
The Purchase Market Forges Forward
Mortgage originations are made up of two distinct parts: the home sales-driven purchase market, and the mortgage interest rate-driven refinance market. The dollar amount of purchase money originations is influenced by home sales, home prices and leverage (loan-to-value ratios and the share of home sales that use a mortgage). In the go-go days of the housing market, all of
Rising Rates Cooling Refinance ActivityBy Molly Boesel
IN THIS ARTICLe: ♦ Purchase money mortgage origination volumes have gradually improved over the past year.
♦ The recent increase in long-term mortgage rates cuts the share of outstanding mortgages with above-market rates by 25 percentage points.
♦ Outside forecasts estimate that roughly 70 percent of the expected dollar volume of refinance originations for 2013 have already occurred.
M
Cont...
FIguRe 1. THe MoRTgAge MARkeT SLowLy ReTuRNSMortgage originations ($B) Mortgage Rate
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Jan
-00
Jun
-00
No
v-0
0
Ap
r-0
1
Sep
-01
Feb
-02
Jul-
02
Dec
-02
May
-03
Oct
-03
Mar
-04
Aug
-04
Jan
-05
Jun
-05
No
v-0
5
Ap
r-0
6
Sep
-06
Feb
-07
Jul-
07
Dec
-07
May
-08
Oct
-08
Mar
-09
Aug
-09
Jan
-10
Jun
-10
No
v-10
Ap
r-11
Sep
-11
Feb
-12
Jul-
12
Dec
-12
May
-13
Refinance Originations Purchase Originations 30-Year Mortgage Rate - Right Axis
Article 1: fig 1
Source: CoreLogic May 2013 Note: originations through May 2013, Mortgage Rates through July 2013
Footnote
1 Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey August 1, 2013.
© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
2
The MarketPulse - Volume 2, Issue 8
these drivers were in high gear, producing record-high number of home sales, easy access to credit, and soaring home prices. During this time, the economy was growing solidly as interest rates hovered around 6 percent. As the market cooled, home sales slowed, prices began falling and mortgage credit tightened, leading to a five-year stretch of low purchase origination volumes.
Late 2012 brought the beginning of the recovery in home sales, and with that a 7 percent increase in purchase originations between Q4 2011 and Q4 2012. Continued modest increases in home sales, coupled with increases in home prices, led to further improvements in the purchase market, producing year-over-year purchase market growth of 19 percent in Q1 2013. Though mortgage interest rates have recently risen, CoreLogic does not expect any significant slowing in purchase origination volumes. Higher rates are a signal that the broader
economy is strengthening, which would have positive implications for the housing market. Further, as discussed in the July 2013 issue of The MarketPulse, the impact of the recent rise in interest rates on housing affordability is minimal. Purchase money mortgage originations for all of 2013 are estimated2 to improve from between 12 and 22 percent over 2012 originations as home prices continue growing and sales improve further.
Refinances, on the other Hand
The greatest impact of increasing interest rates on the mortgage originations market will be felt on
refinance volumes. CoreLogic estimates that refinance volumes represented about 70 percent of mortgage originations for the first half of 2013, but that share is certain to fall in the second half of the year. Figure 2 shows the distribution of outstanding mortgages as of May 2013. Prior to the rise in rates, approximately 80 percent
of outstanding mortgages had rates higher than the market rate, but after the recent interest rate increases, only 55 percent of outstanding mortgages had rates higher than the market rate. CoreLogic estimates that as of July 2013, 29 percent of borrowers are in the money to refinance, taking into consideration the current market rate, outstanding mortgage rates and savings to mortgage payments large enough to justify refinancing3.
It is clear that the recent rate increases are already having an impact on the refinance market. The July 26 Mortgage Bankers Association Weekly Applications Survey showed a decrease in refinance applications of 12 percent from the prior month and 59 percent from the prior year. Housing market forecasters are expecting that the recent rate rise will reduce refinance origination volume for the second half of 2013. Refinance originations forecasts range from $1 trillion to $1.1 trillion for 2013, with $700 to $800 billion already completed through the first half of the year. Adding in the improving purchase money market, total mortgage originations are estimated to come in between $1.6 trillion to $1.8 trillion for all of 2013, a drop as small as 10 percent or as large as 19 percent from 2012.
“CoreLogic estimates that refinance
volumes represented about
70 percent of mortgage originations
for the first half of 2013, but that
share is certain to fall in the second
half of the year.”
End.
Footnotes
2 Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, Mortgage Bankers Association3 Refer to “We’re in the Money” in the July 2012 issue of The MarketPulse for details on the in the money calculations.
FIguRe 2. FeweR ARe in the Money To ReFINANCeMin, Max, Current Since January 2000
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
0 -
2.0
0
2.0
0<
- 3
.00
3.0
0<
- 3
.50
3.50
< -
4.0
0
4.0
0<
- 4
.50
4.5
0<
- 5
.00
5.0
0<
- 5
.50
5.50
< -
6.0
0
6.0
0<
- 6
.50
6.5
0<
- 7
.00
7.0
0<
- 7
.50
7.50
< -
8.0
0
>8
%
Current Interest Rate on Active Mortgages
3.35% = Market Rate on May 2, 2013
4.39% = Market Rate on August 1, 2013
Article 1: fig 2
Source: CoreLogic May 2013
© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
3
The MarketPulse - Volume 2, Issue 8
The Nature of RiskBy katie Dobbyn and Mark Fleming
IN THIS ARTICLe:
♦ Mortgage portfolio exposure to natural disaster risk is traditionally not quantified.
♦ Mortgage default risk, after controlling for traditional credit characteristics, is influenced by natural hazard risk.
♦ The greatest exposure to mortgage default risk due to natural hazards is in Miami, Florida.
Cont...
here are many ways that mortgage risk can manifest itself: prepayment risk, credit
default risk, fraud risk and collateral risk to name just a few. The mortgage finance industry has a long history of expertise in measuring many of these risks. However, there is one risk that traditionally has not been directly managed, but rather insured against by the borrower—natural hazard risk. Flood insurance is required when a property resides in a flood zone and standard homeowner’s hazard insurance covering a variety of additional natural hazards is also typically required. Today, can we say with certainty what a portfolio’s natural hazard risk exposure is? That is to say the extent to which there could be defaults caused by a natural disaster? If another Sandy happened, what would the increased propensity of defaults be?
The truth is, we know very little systematically about the level to which mortgage portfolios are exposed to natural hazard risk. In this article, CoreLogic economists test the hypothesis that natural hazard risks, after controlling for traditional mortgage risk characteristics, increase the propensity of mortgage default, and then translate the level of risk of natural hazard default into loan-to-value (LTV) risk space. Utilizing an inherent
understanding of, all else equal, the different risk profiles of an 80 LTV loan versus a 95 LTV or 125 LTV loan, the propensity to default caused by natural hazards can be represented in terms of the amount one would need to adjust the LTV to account for this risk.
A Single universal Measure of Natural Hazard Risk
To understand the likelihood of default due to natural hazards requires a good
measure of natural hazards in the first place. CoreLogic developed a natural hazard single risk score, representing the total natural hazard risk at a particular geographic location from all potential natural hazards combined. These hazards include tornado, hurricane and straight-line winds, hail, wild fires, earthquakes, storm-surge flooding, inland flooding and sink holes. Each natural hazard risk is modeled individually based on the geospatial
T FIguRe 1. THe RISk oF LIVINg ALoNg THe CoASTS
OklahomaCity
KansasCity
StLouis
Minneapolis
Milwaukee
Chicago
Indianapolis
DetroitCleveland
PittsburghColumbus
Cincinnati
Bu�aloBoston
Providence
New York
Washington
Miami
NewOrleans
Houston
DallasEl Paso
AustinSan
Antonio
San Diego
San Francisco
Memphis
Birmingham
Denver
SaltLakeCity
Seattle
Portland
Sacramento
Fresno
Los Angeles
Las Vegas
Phoenix
Tuscon
CharlotteRaleigh
Richmond
Atlanta
Louisville
Nashville
Albany
SINGLE RISK SCORENational SRS
Risk Score Range0 100
Source: CoreLogic
© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
4
The MarketPulse - Volume 2, Issue 8
characteristics that are predictive of that risk. For example, storm surges are modeled as a function of atmospheric pressure, hurricane track, hurricane speed, tides, bathymetric shoaling, elevation, land-based barriers and historical and modeled storm tracks. The natural hazard single risk score is then created as a weighted combination of the individual natural hazard risks accounting for the severity-weighted likelihood of the individual natural hazards at the particular location (Figure 1). This single risk score provides us with a comprehensive and national view of where natural hazard risk resides and the extent of its severity.
The Risk to Mortgage Default Due to Natural Hazards
To test the hypothesis that, after controlling for traditional mortgage risk characteristics, the propensity for natural hazard risk at the property level increases mortgage default risk, CoreLogic economists constructed an illustrative model that predicts the probability of default as a function of traditional borrower, loan and property characteristics typically used in the
mortgage industry. Borrower credit worthiness, ability to pay, equity level and loan purpose are all included to predict the likelihood of serious delinquency, foreclosure or REO. If the property-level propensity for natural hazard risk doesn’t increase mortgage default, then the natural hazard single risk score should have no bearing on mortgage default risk. The borrower who experiences a natural disaster would rebuild or repair and continue to make the mortgage payments. Alternatively, if the natural hazard single risk score does help explain mortgage defaults, then some borrowers will default, all else equal, on the mortgage in the event of a natural disaster. In this model framework, the natural hazard single risk score is added to the model to test the hypothesis of natural hazard risk property level propensity to default. If the single risk score is found to be an insignificant characteristic in the model, then natural hazard risk doesn’t influence
mortgage default. If the single risk score is found to be significant, then it can be concluded that some borrowers do default because of natural hazard events instead of rebuilding or repairing.
The data used to estimate the model was a 1.5 million record
sample of first lien loans that were active between January 1995 and June 2013 randomly selected from a broader universe of prime, subprime and Alt-A loans with monthly payment history. The probability of default model was estimated on this data using a logistic regression technique.4
Defaulting Due To Natural Disasters
The probability of default model indicates that the natural hazard risk score is a statistically significant predictor of default. The influence of the natural hazard single risk score and LTV are both shown in Figure 2. The propensity to default because of natural disaster of a high natural disaster risk loan is almost double that of the propensity for a low risk loan. By comparison, the propensity to default because of lack of equity, as measured by origination LTV, of a high LTV loan is a little over double that of the propensity for a low risk loan.
Another way of articulating the default risk implied by the natural hazard single risk score is to translate the amount of increased default propensity that the natural hazard single risk score represents in the model into LTV default risk, a natural hazard adjusted LTV. In other words, how much would LTV have to be adjusted in order to account for the default risk caused by the natural hazard risk implied by the single risk
Cont...
FIguRe 2. To Be uNDeR oR NoN-INSuReDProbability of Default (Basis Points)
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73 76 79 82 85 88 91 94 97 100
Single Risk Score Response LTV Response
Article 2: fig 2
Source: CoreLogic
“The propensity to default because
of natural disaster of a high natural
disaster risk loan is almost double that
of the propensity for a low risk loan.”
Footnote
4 For more on logistic regression and discrete choice models more broadly see Maddala, G.S. (1986) Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
5
The MarketPulse - Volume 2, Issue 8
score? The higher the natural hazard
single risk score, the more the LTV
has to be adjusted to account for the
risk. In Figure 3, the natural hazard
risk adjusted LTV is mapped across
the United States. Conforming to the
highest natural hazard risk existing
along the coasts of the United States,
the risk adjusted LTV is highest in the western coastal markets and along the Gulf and southern Atlantic coasts.
Delving down to the market level, the highest natural hazard adjusted LTV markets are shown in Figure 4 for the top 20 markets. The amount of adjustment required to account for
FIguRe 3. THe HAzARDS oF LIVINg oN THe CoASTS
OklahomaCity
KansasCity
StLouis
Minneapolis
Milwaukee
Chicago
Indianapolis
DetroitCleveland
PittsburghColumbus
Cincinnati
Bu�aloBoston
Providence
New York
Washington
Miami
NewOrleans
Houston
DallasEl Paso
AustinSan
Antonio
San Diego
San Francisco
Memphis
Birmingham
Denver
SaltLakeCity
Seattle
Portland
Sacramento
Fresno
Los Angeles
Las Vegas
Phoenix
Tuscon
CharlotteRaleigh
Richmond
Atlanta
Louisville
Nashville
Albany
RISK ADJUSTED LTVAverage Zip Code LTV Adjusted by SRS
Adjustment Range-28 128
Source: CoreLogic
FIguRe 4. THe LeAST SuFFICIeNTLy INSuReD MARkeTSMarket Average LTV Adjustment Necessary to Protect Against Natural Hazard Default Risk
10
15
20
25
Mia
mi,
FL
Riv
ersi
de,
CA
Pal
m B
ay, F
L
Val
lejo
, CA
Cap
e C
ora
l, F
L
New
Orl
eans
, LA
Cha
rles
ton,
SC
Tam
pa-
St.
, FL
San
Jo
se, C
A
San
Fra
ncis
co, C
A
Orl
and
o, F
L
Del
tona
, FL
No
rth
Po
rt, F
L
San
ta R
osa
, CA
Lo
s A
ngel
es, C
A
Ren
o, N
V
Ho
ust
on,
TX
Oxn
ard
, CA
Jack
sonv
ille,
FL
Sto
ckto
n, C
A
Article 2: fig 4
Source: CoreLogic June 2013
End.
Businessweek, August 8
Serious US Mortgage Delinquencies Decline to Lowest Since 2008
The share of U.S. homeowners who owe more than their properties are worth fell to less than 20 percent in the first quarter as values surged in hard-hit markets, according to CoreLogic Inc.
Realtor Magazine, August 7
CoreLogic: Rapid Rise in Home Prices 'Remarkable'
During the first six months of this year, home prices jumped 10 percent, the fastest pace in 36 years, CoreLogic reports.
Reuters, August 6
Home prices jump in June as sector recovers: CoreLogic
Home prices jumped in June and are forecast to ramp up further in the latest signs of a housing market that is on the mend, data from CoreLogic showed on Tuesday.
USA TODAY, August 6
Home prices rise again, but at a slower pace
Market researcher CoreLogic says June home sales prices were up 11.9% year-over-year and up 1.9% from May. But that's a slower month-to-month rise than 2.6% in May from April and the almost 2.8% increase in April from March, revised figures show.
Inman.com, August 6
Home prices trending at fastest upward pace since 1977
In July, prices are expected to increase 1.8 percent from June, and 12.5 percent on an annual basis, according to the CoreLogic Pending Home Price Index, the data aggregator's forward-looking price index.
CBS News, August 6
Obama to pitch plan to help home buyers; new figures show housing market…
A survey by the property information firm CoreLogic finds home prices in June were nearly 12 percent higher compared to the same time last year.
In the News
Cont...
© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
6
The MarketPulse - Volume 2, Issue 8
onditional Prepayment Rates (CPR) are back, thanks in large part to the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP).
While CPR calculations do include defaults, the chart above illustrates the effectiveness of the much-needed government programs and their impact on providing some homeowners some payment relief. The HARP program, initiated in 2009 as part of the Making Home Affordable Program, has moved into its second iteration—HARP 2.0. It was this second version of HARP that allowed homeowners in the hardest-hit states to benefit from the refinances offered by the program. Arizona, California, Florida and Nevada have the largest share of homes underwater. HARP 2.0 enabled many homeowners in these distressed states to stay in their homes and benefit from lower monthly payments.
The first version of HARP allowed for borrowers who were not delinquent to take advantage of decreasing 30-year conventional interest rates. Prepayment speeds gained additional momentum as the Homebuyer Tax Credit provided incentives for qualified
homeowners to purchase a new primary residence. The combination of the two government programs resulted in a rise in prepayment speeds to a rate of 22 percent by April 2010. Homeowners took advantage of rates that hovered around 5 percent, yet the prepayment speeds of those in the hardest-hit states fell below the national average. When the government released the guidelines for HARP 2.0, the hardest-hit states saw prepayment speeds jump from 19 percent to the current post-housing
crisis peak of 33 percent, surpassing the prepayment speeds of the rest of the country.
With the recent rise in interest rates in June and July, the expectation is that prepayment rates will slow down. With a new head of the Federal Housing Finance Agency expected to be confirmed, perhaps another version of HARP will be unveiled, allowing a new opportunity to those homeowners who could not qualify under the first two versions of the government program.
In Need of a Pick-Me-up By gilberto Méndez
IN NeeD oF A PICk-Me-uP12 Month CPR Mortgage Rate
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Jan
-07
Mar
-07
May
-07
Jul-
07
Sep
-07
No
v-0
7
Jan
-08
Mar
-08
May
-08
Jul-
08
Sep
-08
No
v-0
8
Jan
-09
Mar
-09
May
-09
Jul-
09
Sep
-09
No
v-0
9
Jan
-10
Mar
-10
May
-10
Jul-
10
Sep
-10
No
v-10
Jan
-11
Mar
-11
May
-11
Jul-
11
Sep
-11
No
v-11
Jan
-12
Mar
-12
May
-12
Jul-
12
Sep
-12
No
v-12
Jan
-13
Mar
-13
May
-13
AZ, CA, FL & NV Rest of the Nation Freddie Mac 30 Conventional Yr Rate (Right Axis )
COTM
HARP
Homebuyer Tax Credit
HARP 2.0
Source: CoreLogic and Freddie Mac May 2013 Note: Conventional-Conforming 30-year First Liens
End.
the high amounts of natural hazard risk in these markets is shown. Miami is the riskiest, but almost all of the markets in the top 20 are in either Florida or California.
A Risk To Be Improved upon
Through the recent crisis in the housing and mortgage finance markets, the
industry has learned a lot about how to better manage and predict risk. The cost of not doing so is far too high. One risk that we have historically presumed is covered by requiring insurance is the risk of mortgage default due to natural disasters. Our research demonstrates that borrowers, after controlling for their propensity to default based on traditional mortgage credit characteristics, default
at a higher rate the higher the propensity of natural disaster is at the property level. This may be because they are either under or un-insured against the natural hazards to which the property is exposed. The nature of risk is that work needed to successfully manage it is never finished. Natural hazard risk is another new frontier of risk management requiring ongoing attention.
Cont. from page 5
End.
C
© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
7
The MarketPulse - Volume 2, Issue 8
NATIoNAL SuMMARy JuNe 2013
Jul 2012
Aug 2012
Sep 2012
oct 2012
Nov 2012
Dec 2012
Jan 2013
Feb 2013
Mar 2013
Apr 2013
May 2013
Jun 2013 2010 2011 2012
Total Sales* 4,750 5,078 4,170 4,561 4,247 4,159 3,391 3,689 4,605 5,118 5,707 6,087 4,177 4,046 4,385
— New Sales* 325 359 311 331 320 325 242 266 324 329 367 410 347 302 318
— existing Sales* 3,385 3,628 2,932 3,176 2,872 2,866 2,291 2,523 3,271 3,748 4,325 4,680 2,702 2,638 3,019
— Reo Sales* 610 628 512 582 622 537 522 538 586 582 526 483 803 762 632
— Short Sales* 399 426 384 438 399 402 311 337 394 431 462 488 275 304 381
Distressed Sales Share 21.2% 20.8% 21.5% 22.3% 24.0% 22.6% 24.6% 23.7% 21.3% 19.8% 17.3% 16.0% 25.8% 26.3% 23.1%
HPI MoM 1.2% 0.6% -0.1% -0.4% 0.1% 0.2% 0.0% 0.3% 2.1% 2.8% 2.6% 1.9% -0.3% -0.2% 0.7%
HPI yoy 4.2% 4.9% 5.5% 6.3% 7.5% 8.7% 9.4% 10.0% 10.9% 11.6% 11.9% 11.9% -0.4% -4.1% 3.8%
HPI MoM excluding Distressed 0.9% 0.4% -0.2% -0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.6% 0.6% 1.8% 2.1% 2.3% 1.8% -0.3% -0.3% 0.5%
HPI yoy excluding Distressed 2.2% 2.9% 3.4% 4.2% 5.4% 6.4% 7.5% 8.5% 9.6% 10.3% 10.8% 11.0% -1.6% -3.9% 1.6%
90 Days + DQ Pct 6.9% 6.8% 6.7% 6.5% 6.4% 6.4% 6.3% 6.2% 6.0% 5.8% 5.6% 5.5% 8.1% 7.4% 6.8%
Foreclosure Pct 3.4% 3.3% 3.2% 3.1% 3.0% 3.0% 2.9% 2.9% 2.8% 2.7% 2.6% 2.5% 3.2% 3.5% 3.3%
Reo Pct 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.6% 0.6% 0.4%
Pre-foreclosure Filings** 127 125 116 123 103 94 101 92 91 95 97 101 2,105 1,525 1,459
Completed Foreclosures** 65 72 83 67 63 50 55 47 46 46 53 55 1136 925 809
Negative equity Share N/A N/A 22.0% N/A N/A 21.7% N/A N/A 19.8% N/A N/A N/A 25.3% 24.9% 22.7%
Negative equity** N/A N/A 10,574 N/A N/A 10,515 N/A N/A 9,665 N/A N/A N/A 11,904 11,820 10,943
Months Supply Distressed Homes 7.22 6.64 8.00 7.10 7.53 7.60 9.19 8.14 6.30 5.44 4.75 4.31 10.24 9.57 7.96
* Thousands of units, Annualized **Thousands of units †June Data
LARgeST 25 CBSA SuMMARy JuNe 2013
Total Sales
12-month sum
Total Sales yoy
12-month sum
Distressed Sales Share (sales
12-month sum)
Distressed Sales Share
(sales 12-month
sum) A year Ago
SFC HPI yoy
SFCXD HPI yoy
HPI Percent Change
from Peak
90 Days + DQ Pct
Stock of 90+ Delinquencies
yoy Chg
Percent Change Stock of
Foreclosures from Peak
Negative equity
Share**
Months' Supply Distressed
Homes (total sales
12-month avg.)
Chicago-Joliet-Naperville, IL 99,021 29.6% 34.9% 35.5% 4.6% 8.4% -28.6% 8.6% -22.7% -34.6% 34.4% 12.3
Los Angeles-Long Beach-glendale, CA 92,550 8.7% 26.8% 40.1% 20.7% 18.9% -22.8% 4.0% -39.0% -65.3% 15.2% 5.9
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, gA 84,403 23.2% 29.5% 38.0% 16.1% 13.3% -16.1% 5.7% -31.8% -44.4% 33.0% 7.5
New york-white Plains-wayne, Ny-NJ 70,178 11.1% 9.5% 9.9% 7.2% 7.5% -9.2% 8.2% -9.5% -16.1% 10.7% 12.8
washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-wV
67,327 10.2% 18.7% 24.0% 9.4% 9.4% -16.0% 4.6% -20.5% -29.2% 21.5% 6.7
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX 112,955 13.3% 16.9% 18.8% 10.0% 10.8% 0.0% 3.5% -27.5% -41.5% 8.7% 2.8
Phoenix-Mesa-glendale, Az 107,554 -1.2% 28.3% 39.7% 17.1% 14.7% -34.8% 3.0% -52.2% -82.7% 31.4% 2.3
Riverside-San Bernardino-ontario, CA 73,920 -0.3% 35.2% 51.0% 19.7% 18.6% -41.2% 5.3% -42.8% -75.9% 30.1% 5.4
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX 84,339 13.9% 18.1% 19.5% 9.9% 10.9% 0.0% 3.6% -24.6% -30.5% 7.6% 3.1
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-wI 52,080 20.5% 18.6% 24.4% 9.1% 8.7% -19.5% 3.1% -32.0% -60.8% 18.6% 4.1
Philadelphia, PA N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.9% 4.9% -11.4% 5.4% -8.7% -19.3% 9.3% N/A
Seattle-Bellevue-everett, wA 44,155 25.1% 19.4% 26.5% 15.1% 14.7% -16.4% 4.8% -29.8% -23.2% 11.7% 6.2
Denver-Aurora-Broomfield, Co 59,626 24.1% 18.4% 27.7% 10.5% 9.9% 0.0% 2.5% -38.6% -62.9% 13.5% 2.3
Baltimore-Towson, MD 35,191 13.9% 18.4% 18.3% 4.8% 6.6% -19.4% 7.1% -11.6% -18.4% 16.7% 10.7
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA 45,448 15.1% 26.1% 39.8% 19.9% 17.1% -22.8% 3.2% -43.2% -70.9% 18.3% 3.6
Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine, CA 36,478 15.1% 20.7% 34.5% 21.7% 19.6% -20.0% 2.6% -47.2% -66.3% 10.0% 3.6
St. Louis, Mo-IL 49,162 12.5% 26.3% 26.9% 4.9% 5.4% -14.5% 3.8% -22.7% -42.1% 9.1% 3.9
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 66,865 19.6% 29.0% 28.7% 9.4% 12.4% -38.3% 13.4% -25.4% -32.2% 15.2% 10.2
Nassau-Suffolk, Ny 23,917 5.2% 7.4% 5.9% 4.0% 4.0% -21.8% 10.2% -7.2% -13.5% 40.1% 21.5
oakland-Fremont-Hayward, CA 37,900 5.0% 26.9% 43.8% 25.7% 19.8% -24.1% 3.1% -46.0% -71.9% 21.4% 4.1
warren-Troy-Farmington Hills, MI N/A N/A N/A N/A 12.9% 10.4% -28.0% 3.5% -35.5% -71.2% 33.5% N/A
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, oR-wA 36,597 20.5% 18.8% 27.1% 14.6% 12.6% -15.8% 4.6% -20.2% -19.0% 10.2% 5.6
Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, CA 40,995 6.1% 33.6% 52.3% 25.7% 23.9% -35.2% 3.6% -47.5% -74.1% 24.2% 3.8
edison-New Brunswick, NJ 27,555 13.5% 13.0% 11.9% -0.4% 0.3% -25.8% 9.0% -5.4% -20.5% 15.4% 13.8
orlando-kissimmee-Sanford, FL 49,675 11.9% 35.0% 38.8% 13.9% 13.1% -41.8% 13.1% -29.1% -39.7% 41.8% 10.8
NoTe: * Data may be light in some jurisdictions. †June Data ** Negative equity Data through Q1 2013
© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
8
The MarketPulse - Volume 2, Issue 8
STATe SuMMARy JuNe 2013
State
Total Sales 12-month
sum
Total Sales yoy
12-month sum
Distressed Sales Share
(sales 12-month sum)
Distressed Sales Share (sales
12-month sum) A year Ago
SFC HPI yoy
SFCXD HPI yoy
HPI Percent Change
from Peak90 Days +
DQ Pct
Stock of 90+ Delinquencies
yoy Chg
Percent Change Stock
of Foreclosures from Peak
Negative equity
Share**
Months' Supply Distressed
Homes (total sales
12-month avg.)
Alabama 43,922 18.8% 19.3% 14.9% 1.2% 4.3% -16.9% 4.9% -13.5% -33.8% 17.4% 7.1
Alaska 11,409 10.5% 12.2% 11.5% 5.2% 6.8% 0.0% 1.8% -21.7% -37.1% 6.2% 1.5
Arizona 148,039 1.1% 24.0% 38.7% 16.2% 14.1% -33.9% 3.1% -47.7% -78.7% 31.3% 2.5
Arkansas 42,348 -1.6% 9.2% 7.9% 2.2% 3.6% -1.0% 5.2% -6.2% -24.7% 10.2% 4.2
California 495,402 6.2% 28.6% 43.6% 21.4% 18.7% -25.1% 3.6% -43.1% -70.2% 21.3% 4.5
Colorado 113,816 18.6% 19.6% 26.8% 9.2% 8.6% 0.0% 2.5% -36.3% -61.2% 14.2% 2.3
Connecticut 39,318 15.0% 19.4% 19.1% 2.9% 4.2% -21.4% 6.9% -9.8% -12.0% 15.8% 9.8
Delaware 9,527 -8.6% 19.6% 20.9% -1.0% 2.0% -22.5% 6.3% -9.8% -25.7% 18.7% 12.1
District of Columbia 8,217 16.4% 8.1% 9.1% 10.9% 10.3% 0.0% 5.1% -10.9% -21.7% 9.7% 7.0
Florida 469,990 13.1% 28.2% 30.4% 11.0% 12.7% -38.6% 13.0% -27.1% -38.3% 38.1% 9.3
georgia 135,979 17.1% 26.0% 31.5% 14.3% 12.2% -15.3% 5.4% -28.4% -41.8% 30.6% 6.7
Hawaii 17,152 9.3% 12.1% 18.4% 13.0% 10.7% -8.2% 5.6% -18.2% -17.0% 7.5% 6.4
Idaho 38,295 13.8% 16.8% 26.2% 12.8% 12.6% -21.5% 3.7% -24.4% -39.2% 16.4% 2.7
Illinois 160,750 20.1% 30.1% 28.0% 3.2% 6.5% -26.4% 7.4% -22.1% -34.8% 29.3% 9.8
Indiana 125,453 17.3% 18.7% 18.9% 3.4% 4.4% -8.7% 5.1% -21.7% -38.1% 11.6% 4.1
Iowa 50,040 5.8% 9.1% 9.3% 2.6% 2.9% 0.0% 3.3% -18.5% -31.7% 9.9% 2.7
kansas 36,045 14.8% 16.6% 15.9% 4.5% 8.0% -4.4% 3.5% -20.5% -38.9% 9.1% 3.5
kentucky 46,149 2.2% 16.5% 13.6% 2.2% 4.1% -5.2% 4.6% -18.7% -37.3% 10.3% 5.0
Louisiana 53,726 -1.6% 14.8% 14.1% 4.0% 4.3% -0.8% 5.0% -14.7% -39.1% 15.9% 5.0
Maine 15,176 27.6% 9.4% 9.5% 7.1% 8.2% -10.4% 6.7% -9.5% -12.0% 9.2% 7.6
Maryland 76,109 12.2% 21.2% 22.8% 5.4% 7.1% -23.4% 7.2% -13.2% -21.0% 22.6% 11.3
Massachusetts 91,599 9.6% 7.4% 12.7% 8.7% 6.3% -12.2% 5.0% -12.3% -24.0% 15.0% 5.5
Michigan 167,926 6.0% 36.2% 34.6% 8.8% 9.0% -31.1% 4.1% -31.7% -65.8% 32.0% 3.8
Minnesota 75,036 7.8% 16.3% 20.0% 7.3% 7.1% -17.9% 2.9% -29.6% -58.9% 17.5% 3.9
Mississippi N/A N/A N/A N/A -2.1% 1.6% -13.0% 6.0% -17.9% -47.5% N/A N/A
Missouri 91,604 8.4% 24.1% 25.1% 3.7% 5.2% -15.1% 3.4% -23.7% -46.9% 15.3% 3.4
Montana 15,816 14.6% 14.0% 15.4% 13.0% 10.0% -7.6% 2.1% -23.8% -50.5% 5.6% 2.1
Nebraska 30,925 -3.2% 9.3% 9.7% 4.8% 4.3% 0.0% 2.3% -18.1% -40.0% 11.1% 1.9
Nevada 67,995 -8.1% 39.3% 53.4% 26.5% 23.5% -44.3% 9.0% -30.1% -59.4% 45.4% 6.9
New Hampshire 19,512 15.1% 22.2% 25.1% 5.4% 6.3% -17.2% 3.6% -19.9% -40.0% 21.4% 4.1
New Jersey 89,657 12.1% 14.9% 14.3% 3.0% 3.7% -24.6% 10.7% -6.3% -20.0% 19.0% 17.1
New Mexico 26,288 15.7% 17.8% 17.7% 1.3% 2.8% -18.9% 5.0% -15.4% -21.7% 13.3% 5.7
New york 159,356 4.0% 6.5% 6.0% 8.0% 7.9% -6.7% 7.9% -7.9% -13.1% 7.7% 10.7
North Carolina 134,605 16.6% 15.7% 15.0% 5.0% 6.9% -5.7% 4.4% -22.3% -40.4% 12.2% 5.2
North Dakota 14,158 -0.8% 3.9% 3.6% 10.8% 6.7% 0.0% 1.1% -23.8% -26.5% 5.9% 0.5
ohio 163,159 10.8% 23.7% 25.6% 3.3% 5.6% -13.6% 5.6% -20.9% -37.0% 26.3% 5.7
oklahoma 71,997 5.5% 10.7% 10.8% 2.8% 2.8% 0.0% 4.6% -13.9% -22.1% 7.8% 2.9
oregon 62,200 18.5% 19.0% 27.1% 14.1% 12.3% -17.0% 4.8% -17.1% -16.7% 14.8% 5.5
Pennsylvania 156,620 14.0% 13.3% 12.1% 3.1% 4.4% -8.9% 5.5% -8.3% -18.4% 10.3% 6.0
Rhode Island 12,322 2.6% 20.5% 24.3% 2.7% 4.8% -31.7% 6.6% -12.7% -36.7% 25.8% 8.3
South Carolina 74,328 16.6% 21.5% 22.1% 8.2% 7.7% -7.3% 5.1% -21.4% -31.8% 15.9% 5.1
South Dakota N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.5% 5.3% 0.0% 2.0% -20.4% -40.9% N/A N/A
Tennessee 118,519 10.8% 20.4% 20.4% 5.9% 6.7% -5.9% 4.7% -22.8% -50.4% 15.2% 3.4
Texas 469,796 12.2% 15.5% 16.3% 8.4% 9.7% 0.0% 3.4% -24.5% -33.8% 7.2% 2.5
utah 53,591 6.8% 15.6% 24.1% 13.5% 13.8% -15.2% 3.5% -25.8% -49.5% 13.9% 3.3
Vermont N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.5% 4.7% -3.2% 3.8% -8.7% -16.9% N/A N/A
Virginia 104,696 5.2% 19.3% 22.7% 7.9% 7.8% -14.6% 3.1% -21.1% -49.4% 17.0% 4.5
washington 102,313 18.8% 19.4% 24.9% 11.9% 12.3% -17.4% 5.3% -22.3% -16.2% 14.7% 6.9
west Virginia N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.2% 12.6% -22.8% 3.2% -19.0% -42.5% N/A N/A
wisconsin 82,870 10.4% 15.5% 15.9% 2.9% 3.4% -13.0% 3.4% -24.8% -47.5% 16.3% 3.6
wyoming 8,658 34.7% 12.0% 13.1% 16.7% 11.9% 0.0% 1.8% -20.9% -60.6% 7.4% 1.8
NoTe: * Data may be light in some jurisdictions. †June Data ** Negative equity Data through Q1 2013
© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
9
The MarketPulse - Volume 2, Issue 8
Home Prices ► Home prices nationwide, including distressed sales, increased on a year-over-year basis by 11.9 percent in June 2013 compared to June 2012. Including distressed sales, the five states with the highest home price appreciation were: Nevada (+26.5 percent), California (+21.4 percent), Wyoming (+16.7 percent), Arizona (+16.2 percent) and Georgia (+14.2 percent). In June 2013 only two states posted year-over-year home price depreciation: Mississippi (-2.1 percent) and Delaware (-1.1 percent).
► Including distressed transactions, the peak-to-current change in the national HPI (from April 2006 to June 2013) was -19 percent. Excluding distressed transactions, the peak-to-current change in the HPI for the same period was -14.0 percent. The five states with the largest peak-to-current declines, including distressed transactions, were Nevada (-44.3 percent), Florida (-38.6 percent), Arizona (-33.9 percent), Rhode Island (-31.7 percent) and Michigan (-31.1 percent). Including distressed home sales, nine states and the District of Columbia have reached new highs in home prices.
yoy HPI gRowTH FoR 25 HIgHeST RATe STATeS Min, Max, Current since Jan 1976
-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
NV
CA
WY
AZ
GA
OR
UT HI
MT ID
WA FL
DC
ND
CO MI
MA TX
SC
NY
VA
MN
ME
WV
TN
Current
2.58x3.65 5pt gothamPrices: yoy hpi growth for 25 lowest rate states jun 2013
Source: CoreLogic June 2013
HPI By PRICe SegMeNT Indexed to Jan 2011
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
Jan
-11
Feb
-11
Mar
-11
Ap
r-11
May
-11
Jun
-11
Jul-
11A
ug-1
1S
ep-1
1O
ct-1
1N
ov-
11D
ec-1
1Ja
n-1
2F
eb-1
2M
ar-1
2A
pr-
12M
ay-1
2Ju
n-1
2Ju
l-12
Aug
-12
Sep
-12
Oct
-12
No
v-12
Dec
-12
Jan
-13
Feb
-13
Mar
-13
Ap
r-13
May
-13
Jun
-13
Price 0-75% of Median Price 75-100% of MedianPrice 100-125% of Median Price > 125% of Median
2.64x3.27 5pt gothamPrices: hpi by price segment jun 2013
Source: CoreLogic June 2013
HoMe PRICe INDeXPct Change from year Ago Pct Change from Month Ago
-4%
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
Jan
-02
Jul-
02
Jan
-03
Jul-
03
Jan
-04
Jul-
04
Jan
-05
Jul-
05
Jan
-06
Jul-
06
Jan
-07
Jul-
07
Jan
-08
Jul-
08
Jan
-09
Jul-
09
Jan
-10
Jul-
10
Jan
-11
Jul-
11
Jan
-12
Jul-
12
Jan
-13
All Transactions Excluding Distressed All Transactions - Right Axis
2.77x3.66 5pt gotham bookPrices: home price index jun 2013
Source: CoreLogic June 2013
PRICe To INCoMe RATIo Indexed to Jan 1976
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
Jan
-76
Ap
r-77
Jul-
78
Oct
-79
Jan
-81
Ap
r-8
2
Jul-
83
Oct
-84
Jan
-86
Ap
r-8
7Ju
l-8
8
Oct
-89
Jan
-91
Ap
r-9
2
Jul-
93
Oct
-94
Jan
-96
Ap
r-9
7Ju
l-9
8
Oct
-99
Jan
-01
Ap
r-0
2
Jul-
03
Oct
-04
Jan
-06
Ap
r-0
7Ju
l-0
8
Oct
-09
Jan
-11
Ap
r-12
Price/Income Ratio
2.66x3.52Prices: price to income ratio jun 2013
Source: CoreLogic, BeA June 2013
DISTReSSeD SALeS DISCouNT
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Jan
-02
Jul-
02
Jan
-03
Jul-
03
Jan
-04
Jul-
04
Jan
-05
Jul-
05
Jan
-06
Jul-
06
Jan
-07
Jul-
07
Jan
-08
Jul-
08
Jan
-09
Jul-
09
Jan
-10
Jul-
10
Jan
-11
Jul-
11
Jan
-12
Jul-
12
Jan
-13
REO Price Discount Short Sale Price Discount - Right Axis
2.72x3.56Prices: distressed sales discount jun 2013
Source: CoreLogic June 2013
© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
10
The MarketPulse - Volume 2, Issue 8
Mortgage Performance ► Approximately 1 million homes in the U.S. were in some stage of foreclosure as of June 2013 compared to 1.4 million in June 2012, a decrease of 28 percent. This was the 20th consecutive month with a year-over-year decline. As of June 2013, the foreclosure inventory represented 2.5 percent of all homes with a mortgage compared to 3.4 percent in June 2012. The foreclosure inventory declined 2.9 percent from May 2013 to June 2013. The inventory of foreclosed homes has declined by at least 20 percent year-over-year for six consecutive months.
► At the end of June 2013, there were under 2.2 million mortgages, or 5.5 percent, in serious delinquency (SDQ, defined as 90 days or more past due, including those in foreclosure or REO). In the first six months of 2013, the stock of seriously delinquent loans decreased by 412,000. In June 2013, the nation experienced 55,000 completed foreclosures, a 20-percent year-over-year decline from 68,000 in June 2012. Completed foreclosures are an indication of the total number of homes actually lost to foreclosure.
CoNFoRMINg PRIMe SeRIouS DeLINQueNCy RATeBy origination year
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
3 m
on
ths
6 m
ont
hs
9 m
ont
hs
12 m
ont
hs
15 m
ont
hs
18 m
on
ths
21 m
ont
hs
24 m
ont
hs
27 m
ont
hs
30 m
ont
hs
33 m
on
ths
36 m
ont
hs
39 m
ont
hs
42
mo
nths
45
mo
nths
48
mo
nths
51 m
ont
hs
54 m
ont
hs
57 m
ont
hs
60
mo
nths
2012 Total 2011 Total 2010 Total
2009 Total 2008 Total 2007 Total
3.06x3.45Performance: conforming prime serious del rate apr 2013
Source: CoreLogic April 2013
2012 Total 2011 Total 2010 Total 2009 Total 2008 Total 2007 Total
JuMBo PRIMe SeRIouS DeLINQueNCy RATeBy origination year
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
3 m
on
ths
6 m
ont
hs
9 m
ont
hs
12 m
ont
hs
15 m
ont
hs
18 m
on
ths
21 m
ont
hs
24 m
ont
hs
27 m
ont
hs
30 m
ont
hs
33 m
on
ths
36 m
ont
hs
39 m
ont
hs
42
mo
nths
45
mo
nths
48
mo
nths
51 m
ont
hs
54 m
ont
hs
57 m
ont
hs
60
mo
nths
2012 Total 2011 Total 2010 Total
2009 Total 2008 Total 2007 Total
3.07x3.44Performance: jumbo prime serious del rate apr 2013
Source: CoreLogic April 2013
2012 Total 2011 Total 2010 Total 2009 Total 2008 Total 2007 Total
SeRIouS DeLINQueNCIeS FoR 25 HIgHeST RATe STATeSMin, Max, Current since Jan 2000
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%F
L
NJ
NV
NY IL
MD CT
ME RI
DE
MS
OH HI
PA
GA
WA
AR IN SC
DC
LA
NM
MA AL
OR
Current
2.5x3.57Performance: serious del for 25 highest rate states jun 2013
Source: CoreLogic June 2013
oVeRALL MoRTgAge PeRFoRMANCe
0.0%
0.1%
0.2%
0.3%
0.4%
0.5%
0.6%
0.7%
0.8%
0.9%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
Jan
-02
Jul-
02
Jan
-03
Jul-
03
Jan
-04
Jul-
04
Jan
-05
Jul-
05
Jan
-06
Jul-
06
Jan
-07
Jul-
07
Jan
-08
Jul-
08
Jan
-09
Jul-
09
Jan
-10
Jul-
10
Jan
-11
Jul-
11
Jan
-12
Jul-
12
Jan
-13
90+ Days DQ Pct Foreclosure Pct REO Pct - Right Axis
2.53x3.42Performance: overall mortgage performance jun 2013
Source: CoreLogic June 2013
PRe-FoReCLoSuRe FILINgS AND CoMPLeTeD FoReCLoSuReSIn Thousands (3mma) In Thousands
0
50
100
150
200
250
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Jan
-02
Jul-
02
Jan
-03
Jul-
03
Jan
-04
Jul-
04
Jan
-05
Jul-
05
Jan
-06
Jul-
06
Jan
-07
Jul-
07
Jan
-08
Jul-
08
Jan
-09
Jul-
09
Jan
-10
Jul-
10
Jan
-11
Jul-
11
Jan
-12
Jul-
12
Jan
-13
Completed Foreclosures Pre-Foreclosure Filings - Right Axis
2.69x3.45Performance: pre foreclosure filings and completed
foreclosures jun 2013
Source: CoreLogic June 2013
© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
11
The MarketPulse - Volume 2, Issue 8
Home Sales ► Total home sales increased by 20 percent year over year in June 2013. The share of new home sales to total home sales was 7 percent in June 2013. New home sales for the month of June improved 14 percent from the same time a year ago.
► Nationwide, the share of distressed sales accounted for 16 percent of all homes sales in June 2013, the lowest level since May 2008. REO sales accounted for about half of all distressed sales in June 2013 and illustrated a 27 percent year-over-year decrease from June 2012. The share of REO sales is at the lowest level since December 2007 and has decreased for six consecutive months, providing a strong indication of continued sustainable home sales figures during the summer buying season.
HoMe SALeS SHARe By PRICe TIeRAs a Percentage of Total Sales
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Jan
-00
Jul-
00
Jan
-01
Jul-
01
Jan
-02
Jul-
02
Jan
-03
Jul-
03
Jan
-04
Jul-
04
Jan
-05
Jul-
05
Jan
-06
Jul-
06
Jan
-07
Jul-
07
Jan
-08
Jul-
08
Jan
-09
Jul-
09
Jan
-10
Jul-
10
Jan
-11
Jul-
11
Jan
-12
Jul-
12
Jan
-13
0-100K 100K-200K 200K+
2.54x3.42Sales: home sales vol by price tier jun 2013
Source: CoreLogic June 2013
New HoMe SALeS TReNDSIn Thousands In Thousands
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
170
180
190
200
210
220
230
240
250
260
270
Jan
-02
Jun
-02
No
v-0
2
Ap
r-0
3
Sep
-03
Feb
-04
Jul-
04
Dec
-04
May
-05
Oct
-05
Mar
-06
Aug
-06
Jan
-07
Jun
-07
No
v-0
7
Ap
r-0
8
Sep
-08
Feb
-09
Jul-
09
Dec
-09
May
-10
Oct
-10
Mar
-11
Aug
-11
Jan
-12
Jun
-12
No
v-12
Ap
r-13
Median Price Volume - Right Axis
2.75x3.51Sales: new home sales trends jun 2013
Feb
-12
Source: CoreLogic June 2013
DISTReSSeD SALe SHARe FoR 25 HIgHeST RATe STATeSMin, Max, Current
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%M
I
FL IL DE
GA
OH
MS
CA
TN SC
MO
AZ
WA
NH
AL RI
MD CT
NM KY IN VA KS
CO
NC
Current
2.39x3.48Sales: distressed sale share for 25 highest rate states jun 2013
Source: CoreLogic June 2013
DISTReSSeD SALeS AS PeRCeNTAge oF ToTAL SALeS
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Jan
-06
May
-06
Sep
-06
Jan
-07
May
-07
Sep
-07
Jan
-08
May
-08
Sep
-08
Jan
-09
May
-09
Sep
-09
Jan
-10
May
-10
Sep
-10
Jan
-11
May
-11
Sep
-11
Jan
-12
May
-12
Sep
-12
Jan
-13
May
-13
Short Sales Share REO Sales Share
2.62x3.64Sales: distressed sales as % of total sales jun 2013
Source: CoreLogic June 2013
SALeS By SALe TyPeAnnualized In Millions
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Jan
-06
May
-06
Sep
-06
Jan
-07
May
-07
Sep
-07
Jan
-08
May
-08
Sep
-08
Jan
-09
May
-09
Sep
-09
Jan
-10
May
-10
Sep
-10
Jan
-11
May
-11
Sep
-11
Jan
-12
May
-12
Sep
-12
Jan
-13
May
-13
Existing Home New Home REO Short
2.65x3.51Sales: sales by sale type jun 2013
Source: CoreLogic June 2013
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17-MkTPLSe-0813-00
VARIABLe DeSCRIPTIoNS
Variable DefinitionTotal Sales The total number of all home-sale transactions during the month.
Total Sales 12-month sum The total number of all home-sale transactions for the last 12 months.
Total Sales yoy Change 12-month sum
Percentage increase or decrease in current 12 months of total sales over the prior 12 months of total sales
New Home Sales The total number of newly constructed residential housing units sold during the month.
New Home Sales Median Price The median price for newly constructed residential housing units during the month.
existing Home Sales The number of previously constucted homes that were sold to an unaffiliated third party. Does not include Reo and short sales.
Reo Sales Number of bank owned properties that were sold to an unaffiliated third party.
Reo Sales Share The number of Reo Sales in a given month divided by total sales.
Reo Price Discount The average price of a Reo divided by the average price of an existing-home sale.
Reo Pct The count of loans in Reo as a percentage of the overall count of loans for the reporting period.
Short Sales The number of short sales. A short sale is a sale of real estate in which the sale proceeds fall short of the balance owed on the property's loan.
Short Sales Share The number of Short Sales in a given month divided by total sales.
Short Sale Price Discount The average price of a Short Sale divided by the average price of an existing-home sale.
Short Sale Pct The count of loans in Short Sale as a percentage of the overall count of loans for the month.
Distressed Sales Share The percentage of the total sales that were a distressed sale (Reo or short sale).
Distressed Sales Share (sales 12-month sum)
The sum of the Reo Sales 12-month sum and the Short Sales 12-month sum divided by the total sales 12-month sum.
HPI MoM Percent increase or decrease in HPI single family combined series over a month ago.
HPI yoy Percent increase or decrease in HPI single family combined series over a year ago.
HPI MoM excluding Distressed Percent increase or decrease in HPI single family combined excluding distressed series over a month ago.
HPI yoy excluding Distressed Percent increase or decrease in HPI single family combined excluding distressed series over a year ago.
HPI Percent Change from Peak Percent increase or decrease in HPI single family combined series from the respective peak value in the index.
90 Days + DQ Pct The percentage of the overall loan count that are 90 or more days delinquent as of the reporting period. This percentage includes loans that are in foreclosure or Reo.
Stock of 90+ Delinquencies yoy Chg Percent change year-over-year of the number of 90+ day delinquencies in the current month.
Foreclosure Pct The percentage of the overall loan count that is currently in foreclosure as of the reporting period.
Percent Change Stock of Foreclosures from Peak
Percent increase or decrease in the number of foreclosures from the respective peak number of foreclosures.
Pre-foreclosure Filings The number of mortgages where the lender has initiated foreclosure proceedings and it has been made known through public notice (NoD).
Completed ForeclosuresA completed foreclosure occurs when a property is auctioned and results in either the purchase of the home at auction or the property is taken by the lender as part of their Real estate owned (Reo) inventory.
Negative equity ShareThe percentage of mortgages in negative equity. The denominator for the negative equity percent is based on the number of mortgages from the public record.
Negative equityThe number of mortgages in negative equity. Negative equity is calculated as the difference between the current value of the property and the origination value of the mortgage. If the mortgage debt is greater than the current value, the property is considered to be in a negative equity position. we estimate current uPB value, not origination value.
Months' Supply of Distressed Homes (total sales 12-month avg)
The months it would take to sell off all homes currently in distress of 90 days delinquency or greater based on the current sales pace.
Price/Income Ratio CoreLogic HPI™ divided by Nominal Personal Income provided by the Bureau of economic Analysis and indexed to January 1976.
Conforming Prime Serious Delinquency Rate
The rate serious delinquency mortgages which are within the legislated purchase limits of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The conforming limits are legislated by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).
Jumbo Prime Serious Delinquency Rate
The rate serious delinquency mortgages which are larger than the legislated purchase limits of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The conforming limits are legislated by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).
Source: CoreLogicThe data provided is for use only by the primary recipient or the primary recipient's publication or broadcast. This data may not be re-sold, republished or licensed to any other source, including publications and sources owned by the primary recipient's parent company without prior written permission from CoreLogic. Any CoreLogic data used for publication or broadcast, in whole or in part, must be sourced as coming from CoreLogic, a data and analytics company. For use with broadcast or web content, the citation must directly accompany first reference of the data. If the data is illustrated with maps, charts, graphs or other visual elements, the CoreLogic logo must be included on screen or website. For questions, analysis or interpretation of the data, contact CoreLogic at [email protected]. Data provided may not be modified without the prior written permission of CoreLogic. Do not use the data in any unlawful manner. This data is compiled from public records, contributory databases and proprietary analytics, and its accuracy is dependent upon these sources.
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