The Limits to Europeanization

Kevin Featherstone

LSE

The limits…

• Ontological and empirical;

• Problems with the independent variable;

• Problems with the dependent variable;

• Determining the intervening variables.

The independent variable?

• The source of the stimulus? What is ‘Europe’ ?

• We attribute diverse qualities to ‘Europe’ – without clear definition. Explanatory rigour v. popular discourse.

• ‘Europe’ has a meaning greater than specific EU obligations.

• Delineate ‘transnational’ European pressures:

– Multi-dimensional: socio-cultural; economic; political.

– Actors: perceptions, understandings, norms, and values.

– Is there a European ‘model’? What is there to import into the domestic system? Coherence and consistency.

Identifying the subject…

• Who are ‘we’?– No ‘European ‘demos’: with whom do we

identify? Frames direction, purpose.– Inclusion, exclusion: defining the boundaries of

‘Europe’ – historically, geographically, culturally, etc. (shifting conceptions, cross-cutting cleavages). Turkey?

– A changing ‘we’: multi-ethnic, multicultural.

The EU as the independent variable

• ‘EU-isation’: EU explains domestic change.• EU attributes: domestic opinion can ascribe to EU

qualities beyond matters of legal competence. Expectations, understandings, tactics: e.g. identity cards, privatisation.

• What is shared in the EU? – Shifting understandings of the EU’s mission.

– Post Cold War: EU lacks a shared ‘narrative’ (T G Ash). Affects domestic response & impacts.

Linking mechanisms vary:

• Form of stimulus: ‘hard law’ (regulations, directives etc.) versus ‘soft law’ (open method of coordination / Lisbon 2000 agenda). Differences of ‘commitment device’: e.g. EMU v. Lisbon.

• Direction of stimulus: not just ‘top-down’ – EU impact on domestic level – also ‘bottom-up’ – national inputs at EU level. Interactive linkages.

• 2 complex arenas: EU institutional setting & domestic institutional setting. Ontological distinctions between structure & agency ?

‘Causality’?

• Independent variable: common EU commitments, stimuli.

• Intervening variable: domestic ‘institutional’ conditions frame responses & explain divergent outcomes.

• Dependent variable: domestic adaptation, shifts. Comparison between member states.

The dependent variable: what is changing?

• Politics: ideas (beliefs), interests, strategies.

• Polity: administrative adjustments, change in processes and institutions.

• Policy: beliefs, agendas, content, implementation.

Effects: breadth/scope?; depth?; permanent? Asymmetrical empowerment.

Explaining divergent outcomes: intervening variables

• Role of ‘Agency’ - intentional/unintentional (Ioakimides). Discourse: legitimating adaptation to EU (Schmidt, 2002).

• Role of ‘Structure’: follow ‘new institutionalism’.– ‘misfit’ between EU & domestic (Knill & Lenschow,

1998). Adaptation most likely when EU does not challenge core structures & practices.

– ‘push-pull’ (Boerzel, 2000): adaptation depends on misfit & mobilisation of domestic actors in support.

– ‘Reform capacity’ (A. Heritier et al, 2001): a typology of domestic conditions producing high/low capacity for change.

Domestic Vetoes

• Hypotheses: – Distances between veto players & their number will

determine adaptation (Tsebelis, 2002).– the higher the number of veto points, the less likely is

adaptation (Heritier & Knill, 2000).

• Distinguish between:– Individual & collective veto players (Tsebelis, 2002)– Competitive (diffuse) / collective (consensual) veto

points (Birchfield & Crepaz, 1998)– Formal (de jure) / informal (de facto) veto points

(Heritier & Knill, 2000).

Path dependence of domestic system: resistence to change

• Corporatist model – interest mediation.– Greek exceptionalism: state corporatism’;‘disjointed’;

‘parentela pluralism’. Clientelism; rent-seeking.

• ‘Varieties of capitalism’ (Hall & Soskice, 2001).– Different institutional types shape economic

performance & responses to external pressures.

– Distinguish: liberal market economies (UK); coordinated market economies (Germany; Sweden).

Greek exceptionalism?

• ‘Mediterranean capitalism’ ?(Amable, 2003); high regulation, low competition.

• state capitalist ? (Schmidt, 2004); – State mediates inter-firm relations; centrality of state in

econ dev.; heavy regulation; adversarial labour relations.

• ‘mixed market economies’ (Molina & Rhodes, 2005). – Unions & employers: strong, but fragmented. Problems

in delivering collective goods, sustaining coordination.

Identifying the constraints…

• Crude paradox in Greece: general discourse v. opposition on distributional issues.

• Low state institutional capabilities (implementation).

• Conflicting political interests (electoral, clientelistic) undermines policy leadership.

• Disjointed, skewed union / employer representation. Absence of stable social dialogue.

• Weakness of technocratic policy legitimation.

The research challenge: ‘Europe’

• ‘Unpack’ conceptual frame:– Clear hypotheses: identifying the linking

mechanisms between EU stimuli and domestic response. Distinguish actors & structures. [Also assess depth & scope; permanence.]

– Causality – not coincidence, co-variance.– Distinguish EU from other external pressures.– ‘Europeanisation’: a predisposition to find

effects.

The research challenge: domestic ‘model’

• What ‘variety of capitalism’ in Greece? Hypothesis: structures interests, behaviour and produces domestic resistance. Show link with:– State-centric. Heavy market regulation.– Structure of firms: few big, many small.– Employment pattern: importance of agriculture & self-

employment; few part-time. Black economy. High labour costs.

– Clientelism, corruption.

• Stress here is on rational self interest, not values.

The limits to Europeanisation:• Avoid fuzzy, aggregate assumptions of EU links

& effects. Primacy of EU impact? Rigour of research design.

• Resilience to domestic change: rational interests drawn from current ‘model’. Greek exceptionalism explains membership behaviour?

• Changing identities, attributes of ‘Europe’. Divergent national perceptions, expectations of obligations, opportunities with direct/indirect links to EU competences.

• Issues here of governability & coordination.