THE LIMITATIONS OF MILITARY POWER

Also by John B. Hattendorf

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WRITINGS OF ALFRED THAYER MAHAN (compiled with Lynn C. Hattendorf) ENGLAND IN THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION MARITIME STRATEGY AND THE BALANCE OF POWER (edited with Robert S. Jordan) ON HIS MAJESTY'S SERVICE SAILORS AND SCHOLARS (with B. M. Simpson III and John R. Wadleigh) THE WRITINGS OF STEPHEN B. LUCE (edited with John D. Hayes)

Also by Malcolm H. Murfett

FOOL-PROOF RELATIONS: The Search for Anglo-American Naval Co­operation during the Chamberlain Years, 1937-1940

HOSTAGE ON THE YANGTSE: Britain, China and the Amethyst Crisis of 1949

The Limitations of Military Power Essays presented to Professor Norman Gibbs on his eightieth birthday

Edited by

John B. Hattendorf Ernest !. King Professor of Maritime History Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island

and

Malcolm H. Murfett Senior Lecturer in History National University of Singapore

Foreword by General Andrew Goodpaster, Piers Mackesy and Sir Michael Pike

Palgrave Macmillan

ISBN 978-1-349-21025-1 ISBN 978-1-349-21023-7 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-21023-7

©John B. Hattendorf and Malcolm H. Murfett, 1990

Foreword (separate pieces) © Andrew Goodpaster, Piers Mackesy and Sir Michael Pike, 1990 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1990 978-0-333-52410-7

All rights reserved. For information, write: Scholarly and Reference Division, St. Martin's Press, Inc., 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010

First published in the United States of America in 1990

Phototypset by Input Typesetting Ltd, London

ISBN 978-0-312-04514-2

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Limitations of military power: essays presented to Professor Norman Gibbs on his eightieth birthday I edited by John B. Hattendorf and Malcolm H. Murfett; foreword by Andrew Goodpaster, Piers Mackesy and Michael Pike. p. em. ISBN 978-0-312-04514-2 1. War. 2. World Politics-20th century. 3. Military history-20th century. 4. Great Britain-History Military-20th century. 5. Great Britain-Military policy. I. Hattendorf, John B. II. Murfett, Malcolm H. III. Gibbs, Norman Henry, 1910-­U21.2.L517 1990 355.02-dc20 89-70294

CIP

Contents

Professor Norman Gibbs frontispiece Foreword by General Andrew Goodpaster, Piers Mackesy vii and Sir Michael Pike

Preface

Acknowledgements

Notes on the Contributors

PART I WAR HISTORY AT OXFORD

1 The Study of War History at Oxford, 1862-1990 John B. Hattendorf

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xvii

3

PART II THEMES ON THE LIMITATIONS OF MILITARY POWER

2 Alliances and International Order Robert J. O'Neill

3 The Military and Counter-insurgency George K. Tanham

4 The Contribution of the British Civil Service and Cabinet Secretariat Tradition to International Prevention and Control of War Robert S. Jordan

5 Geography and Grand Strategy Colin S. Gray

PART III CASE STUDIES ON THE LIMITATIONS OF MILITARY POWER

65

82

95

111

6 'One Man Whom You Can Hang if Necessary': The 141 Discreet Charm of Nevil Macready Charles Townshend

7 Winston Churchill, Neville Chamberlain and the 160 Defence of Empire George C. Peden

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8 The Sea Lion That Did Not Roar: Operation Sea Lion 173 and its Limitations Jehuda L. Wallach

9 Old Habits Die Hard: The Return of British Warships 203 to Chinese Waters after the Second World War Malcolm H. Murfett

10 Military Power and Revolutionary War in Vietnam 218 William J. Duiker

Appendix: The Writings of Norman H. Gibbs 230

Index 235

Foreword

Professor Norman Gibbs was the Chichele professor of the history of war in the University of Oxford from 1953 to 1977. In his teaching career, he touched the lives of people in many walks of life. Here, a soldier, a diplomat and a fellow historian pay tribute to him and give complementary perspectives on his contributions.

I

A diplomat, Sir Michael Pike is now British High Commissioner in Singapore. He studied under Norman Gibbs as an undergraduate at Oxford. Later, he became ambassador to Vietnam and deputy UK permanent representative to NATO. Sir Michael Pike writes:

Singapore in the late 1980s is a long way from the Oxford of the 1950s. I recall a city of sadly dilapidated buildings, damp undergrad­uate rooms, and leather-patched elbows. Almost all those under­graduates who had served in the Second World War had by then gone down; the University, still a largely male preserve, was heavily populated by ex-National Servicemen, some fresh from the battle­fields of Korea. University politics were notorious for their bore­dom, only the Labour Club and the radical Conservative 'Blue Ribbon' Club showing much sign of life. Mr Michael Heseltine and the present Labour Party Shadow Foreign Secretary, Gerald Kaufman, were the most visible political figures in a generally dull cast. Poetry and the theatre flourished, in contrast. Maggie Smith was already a star, and the poetry of Anthony Thwaite, George MacBeth and Patrick Kavanagh filled the columns of the little magazines.

Academic life might best be described as inward-looking. This was particularly so in my own school, modern history, which was, of course, very far from 'modern', its central core consisting of a close study of British history before 1914 and of nineteenth-century European history. University teaching was dominated by medieval­ists. The English Historical Review revelled in the more arcane aspects of the Middle Ages, its densely-written articles trailed by clouds of footnotes. Little wonder that, in his inaugural lecture as

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Regius professor in 1957, Hugh Trevor-Roper led off by confessing that he was, he feared, 'a somewhat eccentric occupant of this chair. It is now 32 years since it was occupied by anyone whose Oxford education had not been at Balliol, and whose historical training had not been at Manchester.'

'Prelims'in the undergraduate first year bizarrely combined study of the works of the Venerable Bede with that of the doctrines of the logical positivists. Most amazing of all, no attention was paid at any point in the central history syllabus either to the world outside Europe or to events since 1914. There seemed, indeed, to be a deliberate, if unspoken, conspiracy to avoid anything approach­ing contemporary relevance and a clear reluctance to become involved in the great debates of the day. Such issues were left to the Oxford Union or to undergraduate political societies.

At my own college, Brasenose, Eric Collieu, an expert on Glad­stone, an admirer of Asquith, and a pre-war Liberal party candidate for Oxford, conducted his tutorials with exquisite courtesy and kindness. But they generally failed to inspire. Our tutor in medieval history, Stanley Cohn, a scholar of great originality who, as a don at Oriel before 1939, makes a brief appearance in A. J. P. Taylor's autobiography, was, by the 1950s, a declining force. After a dis­tinguished war record as an over-age RAF officer in Malta during the Second World War, he had been disappointed by post-war life, and while invariably considerate to his pupils, liked to play the public curmudgeon. His habit each Christmas was to seek refuge from the festivities in a locked room above a country pub. He evoked cautious affection but not much more.

To me, who, as a London schoolboy, had watched the Spitfires' vapour trails in the summer of 1940 and exchanged amiable abuse with men of the 21st Army Group's armoured divisions as they ground towards the south coast in the spring of 1944 - the tailgates of the British lorries often bearing the chalked legend 'Don't cheer us, we're British'- the war seemed to change everything. One did not need to be Correlli Barnett, even as a 14-year old schoolboy, to appreciate the degree to which British patterns of government, and British industry, were being altered by its pressures; or to understand the challenge an analysis of their impact would pose for future historians. As a young National Serviceman in Libya and the Suez Canal Zone between 1950 and 1952, I also found the British Army an intensely interesting subject for study. But there

Foreword ix

was little published comment available on its place as an important social group within British society as a whole. Its history was an affair of regimental eulogies or occasional epics.

By the time I reached Oxford in October 1952, I naturally longed for an opportunity to tackle these and other subjects. The Oxford history school provided little guidance and less stimulus. I can still therefore recall my intense pleasure when, looking through the list of special subjects for the final year study, I came upon the title 'Military History and the Theory of War'. My pleasure was enhanced, if that were possible, when I attended Norman Gibbs's first seminar in a capacious, panelled seminar room in All Souls. For the ten or so undergraduates who gathered there weekly in the gloomy afternoons of the autumn of 1954, Gibbs's seminars proved a revelation. He would talk softly, yet incisively, dissecting our essays with gentle care and ranging across the field in a style which initially seemed only discursive. But as the terms passed, we began to discern a great edifice: a comprehensive theory of war, grounded in a precise grasp, not only of the detail of post-Renaissance history and an exhaustive reading of the greatest thinkers, but, perhaps most unusual, a profound knowledge of the workings of the British Cabinet system in time of war. It was not difficult and always profitable, to lead Gibbs away from Clausewitz or Mahan toward an insider's account of events in the later stages of the Second World War. His memory was exact yet he always avoided entering classified areas.

The future shape of his achievement as Chichele professor was already becoming clear in only his second full year of tenure. Its later course is outlined by John Hattendorf in Chapter 1, 'The Study of War History at Oxford, 1862-1990'. As a serving diplomat since 1956, who has been lucky enough to see the British Army in action in Borneo during 'Confrontation' with Indonesia in the mid-1960s, and to work alongside members of all three services during more recent spells at the Royal College of Defence Studies and at NATO Headquarters, I have had some opportunity to assess how much Gibbs contributed to establishing links between officers and civilians. As John Hattendorf points out, the fact that these are now so close and strong owes a great deal to Gibbs's sustained work. His contribution to the creation of the best-educated officer corps in our history has also been enormous. Its existence has never been more necessary in an age of limited war and 'low intensity

X Foreword

conflict' where political issues are invariably at the heart of the matter and where Clausewitz, properly understood, is often still the best guide to conduct.

Gibbs was also one of those academics who was instrumental in converting the study of military history, little more than a lively cottage industry in both Britain and the United States in the early 1950s, into a major multinational enterprise, with branches world­wide. While it is perhaps for debate whether this was entirely a good thing, given the occasional lapses in quality which inevitably accompanied such rapid expansion, its long-term importance cannot be denied. This festschrift can only be a token acknowledgement of the degree to which, in twenty four busy years, Norman Gibbs made this achievement possible.

II

An historian, Piers Mackesy has been recognised for his distinguished contributions to military history by his election as a fellow of the British Academy. He joined Norman Gibbs, throughout his tenure of the Chichele chair, in teaching the special subject in military history at Oxford. Dr Mackesy remarks:

The appointment of Norman Gibbs in 1953 to the Chichele chair of the history of war marked a turning point in the study of war at Oxford, and his twenty-four years' tenure placed the chair in the forefront of the great resurgence of military studies in Britain. At that time the study of war as an academic subject was not only unfashionable but perhaps even morally questionable, as I sensed from reactions to my own choice of subject as a graduate student. It was thirty years since the chair had last been held by an academic scholar with an understanding of the University's structure and needs; its visible achievements had been few and as John Hatten­dorf reveals in these pages, there had been a feeling in the 1930s that the chair had not justified itself and ought to be abolished.

When Norman Gibbs retired a quarter of a century later, the standing of the subject and the chair had been transformed. He handed on to his successor an active band of graduate students, a subject of academic repute, and a widespread influence in the world outside the University.

The new and expanding subject of strategic studies had been

Foreword XI

linked in to Oxford. The original purpose of the chair, to foster the creation of an educated officer corps in the army, had been realised to an extent perhaps never envisaged by its founders; and there is little doubt that Gibbs's influence shepherded the armed forces in this direction.

John Hattendorf describes the immense amount of hard work which Gibbs expended around Britain and the world in pursuit of the objects which he had so clear-headedly defined in his inaugural lecture. At first there may have been members of the University who feared that he was devoting too much of his attention to other institutions and to non-academic purposes. But it became apparent that this was not so. One of the qualifications which had attracted the electoral committee when he was appointed had been his under­standing of the faculty and its business, and of the arcane structure of the University. He nobly fulfilled the electors' hopes, integrating the subject into the history syllabus and shouldering the administrat­ive burdens which fell to him in university and faculty committees and the duties of an examiner. He accepted heavy obligations as a fellow of All Souls in a period of reform in the College. To col­leagues and pupils his help was always available and generously given, and his judgement was wise and experienced.

How extensive were his labours inside and outside the University was perhaps not widely realised. As a colleague in the faculty one was struck by his wisdom, particularly in handling the problems of graduate students; and above all by his kindness. A colleague who had suffered a disappointment could turn to him for reassurance and consolation; a supervisor for wise advice on problems with a graduate student; the student himself for direction, which was always given with a light rein and a feel for the individual's needs.

Norman Gibbs's distinguished and fruitful tenure of the Chichele chair demands the memorial and congratulations which this volume from the hands of friends and former pupils provides. We all join in expressing our gratitude and affection for him.

III

A soldier, General Andrew Goodpaster was the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, from 1969 to 1974. He later served as superin­tendent of the US Military Academy, when Norman Gibbs taught there in 1977-8. General Goodpaster comments:

Xll Foreword

It is an honour to JOin with the many friends and admirers of Norman Gibbs to commemorate his eightieth birthday. His contri­butions as a distinguished historian broadened and deepened the understanding of the role and limitations of military power over many years.· It was my privilege to see at first hand the way in which the students at West Point responded to their association with him during the time he served as Distinguished Visiting Professor of History. I know from conversations with many of them in later years how much they gained from those contributions as a teacher at the Military Academy.

It is fitting indeed that he should be honoured with a festschrift of essays on the limitations of military power, which will themselves constitute the kind of contribution to learning and understanding to which he so successfully devoted his own life as a scholar.

Preface

Professor Norman Gibbs spent a good deal of his academic life teaching the history of warfare and illustrating, for the benefit of his many students, the severe limitations that have circumscribed the successful and effective application of military power to a wide variety of disputes in the past, regardless of whether that power has been wielded indiscriminately or in a calculated way. It was this theme of the limitations of military power, which Professor Gibbs had done so much to identify in his lectures, seminars and tutorials, that attracted both editors when they met in Newport a couple of years ago to begin planning this festschrift to mark the eightieth birthday of their former Oxford supervisor.

From those discussions in 1987 has emerged the present volume of essays written by a number of Professor Gibbs's close friends and former students. Apart from reflecting the wide catholicity of interests that Norman Gibbs encouraged, the essays demonstrate some of the drawbacks and pitfalls of using military power. While the editors do not claim that the essays in this festschrift provide an exhaustive treatment of the subject, they do believe that the articles indicate some of the very real limitations of military power.

In his teaching, Norman Gibbs took Carl von Clausewitz's On War as his special topic of interest. While others stressed the rational relationship of national policy and military strategy in Clau­sewitz's thought, Gibbs went on to emphasise that Clausewitz did not stop at that point in his thinking. He went further to remind his readers repeatedly that war is characterised by chance more so than other human activities. War, Gibbs wrote in summarising Clausewitz,

cannot be calculated to the last decimal point. It involves dynamic and reacting forces, the result of which is that anyone 'seeking and striving after laws like those which may be developed out of the dead material world could not but lead to constant errors'. Of all the factors in war which defy the making of laws, the most important are the moral or psychological ones. 1

Gibbs clearly reminded his students that, 'Far from being a mili­tant, Clausewitz had a clear understanding of the limits of war as an instrument of policy .... In his own more critical view of the

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value of war for political purposes, Clausewitz's appreciation of the importance of moral forces played a vital role.'2

In this volume, the contributors have elaborated on and extended this theme in a variety of ways. Part I traces the history of military studies at Oxford, showing Norman Gibbs's role in the broad con­text of its development, through the work of many individuals over the years, and the way in which Oxford came to link military studies with the broad academic approach appropriate for a university.

In Part II, four authors suggest additional themes, beyond the moral and psychological, that provide limitations on military power. Professor Robert O'Neill, in his inaugurallecutre as Chichele pro­fessor of war history, shows the role of alliances and international order in this respect. Dr George Tanham discusses the complex problems which the military face in trying to deal with an elusive enemy in unconventional warfare. Professor Robert Jordan, elabor­ating on Professor Gibbs's own interest in the machinery of govern­ment for the forces, shows how the extension of the British Cabinet system of government to international organisations established a restraint on military power. Concluding Part II, Dr Colin Gray draws many broad issues together as he suggests the limiting factors created by geography on grand strategy.

In Part III, five authors deal in depth with different case studies, illustrating a wide range of limiting factors. They echo many of the points raised in the themes of Part II, as well as highlighting some of the moral and psychological issues encountered by the armed forces in both peace and war. Professor Charles Townshend shows clearly the role of a commander's personality in dealing with the use of military power to preserve civil order. Dr George Peden discusses financial and industrial restraints on the military in the context of dealing with dissimilar political personalities. Professor Jehuda Wallach examines Hitler's attitude to Operation Sea Lion, and the ways in which he used military planning as a ruse while forces reacted to one another in the context of a major war. Dr Malcolm Murfett shows the restraints on a naval power employing force in the confined waters of a river, while also showing how military action can undermine other national interests. Finally, in considering the American experience in Vietnam, Professor William Duiker concludes that, above all, policy-makers must have a lucid understanding of the requirements of national security and how best to achieve them.

In 1962, Captain Robert Asprey USMC, the editor of the Marine

Preface XV

Corps Gazette, asked Norman Gibbs to suggest an area of study which would be most helpful for a young career officer to choose as his 'second field'. In his reply, Gibbs touched on three areas: military history; economics and politics of modern society; and foreign languages. Since he was addressing an American audience, he suggested foreign languages as his first choice, since they broad­ened the mind through establishing contact with a far wider range of people. Like economics, foreign language study demanded an exactness and attention to detail that he found missing in the Amer­ican educational system of that era.

At the same time, he revealed some other fundamental aspects of his teaching. 'Military history, unless closely allied to a broad study of general history, only leads a soldier further into the danger of in-breeding', Gibbs noted. ' ... An officer should broaden his outlook first with a knowledge of other things. '3 'I think the military profession more than most is inbred in its habits of thought. While soldiers, for example, constantly quote Clausewitz to the effect the "war is simply the continuation of politics by other means," they rarely accept the full implications of that view either for politics or war.'4

In this volume, the editors and contributors have tried to carry on their work in the spirit that Norman Gibbs taught.

NOTES

JoHN B. HATIENDORF

MALCOLM H. MURFETI

1. N. H. Gibbs, 'Clausewitz on the Moral Forces in War', Naval War College Review, vol. xxvii, no. 4 (January/February 1975) p. 21.

2. Ibid., p. 22. 3. 'The John A. Lejeune Forum: For the Career Marine: A Second

Field', Marine Corps Gazette, vo!. 46, no. 3 (March 1962) p. 23. 4. Ibid., p. 22.

Acknowledgements

In preparing this volume, the editors have had the encouragement and support of many friends, former students and colleagues of Norman Gibbs. A number of these are mentioned in the notes to chapter one. First among others, we must mention Mrs Kate Gibbs, who provided us with a selection of photographs, but whose illness and death on 1 May 1989 prevented her from knowing the results of her early encouragement. A number of former students wished to contribute an essay to this volume, but were unable to do so for a variety of reasons. Among them were Thor Whitehead, J. Kenneth MacDonald, N. A.M. Rodger and Christopher Dowling. Neverthe­less, we appreciate their interest and support for the project. In addition, Nicholas Rodger dredged through the papers of the Cabi­net Historical Office at the PRO in search of references to Norman Gibb's wartime work and Christopher Dowling at the Imperial War Museum took a great amount of his time to see that this book was properly placed in the hands of an appropriate publisher.

In compiling the appendix on the writings of Norman Gibbs, we are grateful for the information provided by Miss Norma Aubertin­Potter at the Codrington Library, Robert Asprey, Brian Bond, Robert O'Neill, Jtirgen Forster, Peter Quarrell, Lynne Hattendorf at the Library of the University of Illinois at Chicago, J. B. Burgess at the Merton College Library, Earle Coleman and Michael Montgomery at the Princeton University Archives and Library, the Rockefeller Library at Brown University, Caroline Cornish of the BBC Written Archives Centre, and the Reference Department of the Eccles Library at the Naval War College.

The views and opinions expressed in this volume are those of individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the current policies of any government or institution with which the authors are connected.

xvi

JoHN B. HATIENDORF

MALCOLM H. MURFETI

Notes on the Contributors William J, Duiker is Professor of East Asian History at the Pennsyl­vania State University. A former US foreign service officer, he has written widely on the Vietnam War and on topics connected with modern China and Vietnam. In 1983, he was a colleague of Norman Gibbs while serving as visiting professor at the National University of Singapore.

General Andrew Goodpaster is the Chairman of the Atlantic Council of the United States. A graduate of the US Military Academy at West Point in 1939, he studied civil engineering and political science at Princeton in 1947-50, earning an MSE, MA and PhD. Among his many assignments in a distinguished military career, he served as defence liaison officer and staff secretary to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954--()1; senior US Army member, Military Staff of the United Nations, 1967-8; commandant of the National War College, 1968-9; deputy commander, US Military Assistance Com­mand, Vietnam, 1968-9; commander-in-chief, US European Com­mand and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 1969-74. He was superintendent of the US Military Academy at West Point in 1977-81, including the year that Norman Gibbs was a visiting professor.

Colin S. Gray is President of the National Institute for Public Policy in Fairfax, Virginia. He was a student at Lincoln College, Oxford, and received his DPhil in 1970 for a thesis on 'The Defence Policy of the Eisenhower Administration, 1953-1961', supervised by Norman Gibbs. Gray's books include Seapower and Strategy (1989); The Geopolitics of Super Power (1988); Nuclear Strategy and National Style (1986); and Strategic Studies and Public Policy (1982).

John B. Hattendorf is the Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. A former naval officer and graduate of Kenyon College with a master's degree in history from Brown University, he completed his DPhil thesis, England in the War of the Spanish Succession (published 1987), at Pembroke College, Oxford, under the supervision of Norman Gibbs. He was visiting professor of military history at the

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National University of Singapore in 1981-3 and is a corresponding member of both the Royal Swedish Society for Naval Science and the Society for Nautical Research.

Robert S. Jordan is Research Professor of International Institutions and Professor of Political Science in the University of New Orleans. He holds a PhD from Princeton University and a DPhil from the University of Oxford, where he completed his thesis at St Antony's College on The NATO International Staff/Secretariat, 1952-1957 (published 1967) under the supervision of Norman Gibbs. His most recent book is Generals in International Politics: NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (1987) and, with John Hattendorf, he has co-edited Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power: Britain and America in the Twentieth Century (1989).

Piers Mackesy has been a fellow of Pembroke College, Oxford, since 1954, where for many years before his retirement in 1988 he was Senior Tutor and Lecturer in Modern History. Upon complet­ing his DPhil thesis at Christ Church, published under the title The War in the Mediterranean, 1803-1810 (1957), Mackesy joined Norman Gibbs, throughout his tenure of the Chichele chair, in teaching the special subject in military history at Oxford. His works include The War for America 1775-83 (1964), Statesmen at War: The Strategy of Overthrow, 1798-1799 (1974), War Without Victory: The Downfall of Pitt, 1799-1802 (1984), and The Coward of Minden (1979). His distinguished contributions to military history have been recognised by the award of a DLitt from the University of Oxford and by his election as a fellow of the British Academy.

Malcolm H. Murfett is Senior Lecturer in History at the National University of Singapore. At New College, Oxford, he was Norman Gibbs's last graduate student while completing his DPhil thesis, later published under the title Fool-Proof Relations: The Search for Anglo-American Naval Co-operation during the Chamberlain Years, 1937-1940 (1984). In 1982-4, when Norman Gibbs was visiting professor in Singapore, they worked together closely as colleagues. His most recent book is Hostage on the Yangtse: Britain, China and the Amethyst Crisis of 1949 (1990).

Robert J, O'Neill is the Chichele Professor of the History of War and a fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. He was the Director of

Notes on the Contributors XIX

the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 1982-7; head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University in Canberra, 1971-82; and Senior Lecturer in History, Royal Military College of Australia, 1968-9. He served as an officer of the Australian Regular Army, 1958--69, and as an infantry captain he was mentioned in despatches during service in Vietnam, 1966-7. He was appointed an officer of the Order of Australia in 1988. He is a fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia and a fellow of the Institute of Engineers, Australia. His publications include the DPhil thesis he completed under the supervision of Norman Gibbs, The German Army and the Nazi Party 1933-1939 (published 1966) as well as Vietnam Task (1968), General Giap: Politician and Strategist (1969) and Australia in the Korean War (2 volumes, 1981 and 1985).

George C. Peden is Reader in Economic History in the University of Bristol. His first book, British Rearmament and the Treasury, 1932-1939 (published 1979), was originally prepared as a DPhil thesis at Brasenose College, Oxford, under the supervision of Norman Gibbs. He is the author of British Economic and Social Policy: Lloyd George to Margaret Thatcher (1985) and The Treasury and British Economic Policy (1988). He was a visiting fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, in 1988-9.

Sir Michael Pike, KCVO, CMG, has been the British High Com­missioner in Singapore since 1987. As an undergraduate at Bra­senose College, Oxford, between 1952 and 1955 he studied 'Military History and the Theory of War' under Norman Gibbs. He joined the Foreign (now Diplomatic) Service in 1956 serving in Seoul, Warsaw, Washington and Tel Aviv. After a period at the Royal College of Defence Studies in 1982, he was Ambassador to Vietnam between 1982 and 1985, and Minister and Deputy UK Permanent Representative to NATO between 1985 and 1987.

George K. Tanham is a consultant to the Rand Corporation, where he has been a staff member since 1955 and was vice-president and trustee between 1970 and 1982. He served in the US Army during the Second World War, was educated at Princeton, and earned his PhD at Stanford in 1951. He became associate professor and Master of the Student Houses while at the California Institute of Tech­nology, 1947-55. In 1956 he worked closely with Norman Gibbs

XX Notes on the Contributors

while at All Souls College, Oxford. In 1964-5, he served in Vietnam with the Agency for International Development, and in 1968-70 was special assistant for counter-insurgency, with the personal rank of minister, at the US Embassy in Bangkok. His publications include Communist Revolutionary Warfare; The Vietminh in Indoch­ina (1961), War Without Guns: American Civilians in Vietnam (1966) and Trial in Thailand (1974). He is co-author, with Douglas Blaufarb, of Who Will Win: An Answer to the Puzzle of Revolution­ary War (1989). He is editor-in-chief of Conflict.

Charles Townshend is Professor of Modem History in the University of Keele. Born in Nottingham in 1945, he was educated at Oriel College, Oxford, in 1964-7. In 1969-73 Norman Gibbs supervised his DPhil thesis, The British Campaign in Ireland 1919-1921 (pub­lished 1975). He has also published Political Violence in Ireland; Government and Resistance since 1848 (1983) and Britain's Civil Wars: Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century (1986). He was a fellow of the National Humanities Center in North Carolina during 1987-8 and has been awarded a Leverhulme fellowship to complete his study of public order in modem Britain.

Jehuda L. Wallach is Professor of Military History at Tel-Aviv University and President of the Israel Society for Military History. Born in Germany in 1921, he emigrated to Palestine in 1936. During the Israeli war of independence, he served as the commanding officer of an infantry battalion. In 1965, he completed his doctorate at Oxford University under the supervision of Norman Gibbs. He has published about 100 articles in professional journals and numer­ous books in Hebrew, English, German and Turkish, including The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation: The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen and their Impact on the German Conduct of the Two World Wars.

Professor Norman Gibbs, M.A., D.Phil, F.R.Hist.S., died suddenly on 20 April 1990, only three days after celebrating his eightieth birthday at a dinner held in his honour at All Souls College, Oxford, and attended by some of his closest friends and relatives. A specially bound proof copy of the book was presented to him on this occasion.

All those who have contributed in various ways to the publication of this Festschrift hope that The Limitations of Military Power will be seen as a fitting memorial to his name.