the kiessling papers - university of toronto t-space · the kiessling papers are published...

The Kiessling PapersTrudeau Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies

University of Toronto

Editorial Board

Ashllie Claassen

Thomas Homer-Dixon

Greg Kiessling

Nancy Kokaz

David Welch

Jane Willms

The Kiessling Papers are published regularly by the Trudeau Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University College, 15 King’s College Circle, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M5S 3H9, with the sponsorship of Greg Kiessling and Pam Isaak. This series gives the Centre’s faculty, senior researchers, fellows and students, as well as members of the broader scholarly community, the opportunity to disseminate their work to scholars, specialists and policymakers worldwide. Manuscripts, comments and mailing list inquiries should be directed to the Centre Director at the address above. Statements of fact or opinion appearing in The Kiessling Papers are solely those of the authors and do not imply endorsement by the editors, publishers or sponsors.

BEYOND GDP:

ENABLING DEMOCRACY

WITH BETTER MEASURES OF

SOCIAL WELL-BEING

BEYOND GDP:

ENABLING DEMOCRACY

WITH BETTER MEASURES OF

SOCIAL WELL-BEING

Part I: Developing Criteria for the Evaluation of

Social Performance Indicators

Part II: Survey and Evaluation of

Social Performance Indicators

by Karen Frecker

University of Toronto

The Kiessling Papers

Series Editor: Jane Willms

Trudeau Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies

June 2005

Copyright © 2005 by the Trudeau Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies. All rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission of the publisher.

An electronic, full-text version of this paper is available at www.trudeaucentre.ca.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication

Frecker, Karen, 1978- Beyond GDP [electronic resource]: enabling democracy with better measures of social well-being/ by Karen Frecker

(The Kiessling papers, ISSN 1716-4141)Also available in print format.Includes bibliographical references.ISBN 0-7727-7901-5

1. Quality of life — Evaluation. 2. Social indicators — Methodology.

I. Trudeau Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies II. Title III. Series: Kiessling papers (Online)

HN25.F74 2005a 306C2005-903327-4

Introduction

How can we determine whether our societies are flourishing or failing? This question is more important than ever, but it is also harder to answer. It is more important because the widespread availability of powerful technologies of violence can horribly amplify the consequences of societal failure. It is harder to answer because the soaring connectivity of our world and the accelerated pace of social change make pathways between cause and effect tangled and indistinct. Seemingly small, isolated factors can have an enormous impact on a society’s evolution, so social scientists have difficulty identifying those factors that are key to success.

Policymakers, commentators and academics increasingly acknowledge that existing economic measures of social well-being — especially the most widely used indicator, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita — are critically inadequate. These measures may give us a rough impression of trendlines in personal material consumption, but they tend to miscount or even exclude aspects of our lives that we all know are vital to our well-being. At best, GDP only indirectly gauges the effect on personal and societal well-being of environmental degradation, wealth and income inequality, crime, corruption and chronic civil violence.

In this inaugural paper of the Trudeau Centre’s Kiessling Papers, Karen Frecker, a graduate of the Trudeau Centre and a specialist in energy policy, tackles the problem of developing meaningful, comprehensive and rigorous measures of social well-being. Frecker examines the endeavor’s theoretical, ethical and methodological challenges. She also discusses how measures of social well-being can be made accessible and appealing to a wide audience. Finally, in a pioneering meta-analysis of current work in the area, Frecker reviews and assesses in detail a large number of existing approaches to measuring social performance.

Current work in the field of social indicators is rich and nuanced. But Frecker contends that we need more open, participatory and inclusive approaches, if we are to develop better indicators. Not only should the process of measuring social performance be democratic, but also the act of measurement itself enriches democracy. Indeed, she argues that the development and use of good indicators are key elements of genuine democratic practice because they provide citizens with the information, and policymakers with the critical feedback, they need to adapt to our rapidly changing world. Thomas Homer-Dixon Director, Trudeau Centre June 20, 2005

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary xi

Table 1: Scores for 12 Projects that Produce SPIs xiii

Table 2: URLs and Altavista Links for 12 Projects xiv

PART I:

DEVELOPING CRITERIA FOR THE EVALUATION

OF SOCIAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

I. Introduction 3

II. The Relationship Between Social Performance Indicators and

Democracy 5

III. A Brief History of Social Performance Indicators 9

IV. The General Utility of Social Performance Indicators 11

1. Contending Paradigms 12

2. Heterogeneity and Hegemony 15

3. Influence 17

4. Potentially Pernicious Effects 19

viii

PART I ( continued):

DEVELOPING CRITERIA FOR THE EVALUATION

OF SOCIAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

V. The Role of Public Institutions in Social Performance 21

1. Responsibility for Social Performance 22

i. Governance 22

ii. Welfare 23

2. Extent of Government Influence on Social Performance 24

i. Governance Failure 24

ii. State Capacity 25

iii. Government and Civil Society 25

iv. Government and Markets 26

VI. Methodological Considerations 31

1. Scaling 31

2. Weighting 33

3. More Advanced Techniques 34

4. Data Quality and Availability 35

5. Objective and Subjective Measures 35

VII. The Evaluation of Social Performance Indicators 37

1. Evaluative Criteria in the Literature 37

2. Evaluative Criteria Used in this Survey 40

i. Theoretical Criteria for Evaluating SPIs 41

ii. Practical Criteria for Evaluating SPIs 41

iii. Methodological Criteria for Evaluating SPIs 42

VIII. Conclusion 43

ix

PART II:

SURVEY AND EVALUATION OF

SOCIAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

IX. Introduction 47

X. Evaluation 49

1. The Wellbeing Assessment 49

2. UNCSD Indicators of Sustainable Development 54

3. EuReporting 59

4. OECD Environmental Indicators 63

5. World Bank Governance Indicators 66

6. Millennium Development Goals 70

7. OECD Social Indicators 75

8. Freedom in the World 78

9. Human Development Index 81

10. Genuine Progress Indicator 84

11. Canadian Sustainable Development Indicators 88

12. Transparency International 91

Appendix A 95

Appendix B 97

Bibliography 123

Endnotes 129

xi

Executive Summary

A renewed global interest in social well-being and the monitoring of living conditions is reinvigorating the search for better measures of social performance. This two-part paper examines the nature of social performance indicators (SPIs) and the factors that affect their usefulness as tools for social analysis, social change and the evaluation of public institutions. It describes 12 projects producing SPIs, evaluates them according to a new set of 14 criteria, and concludes that the best SPIs foster greater democracy.

Part I of this paper analyzes the measurement of social performance and develops the framework of evaluative criteria used in Part II. It begins by arguing that the development of SPIs can enhance democracy through the provision of information to citizens and politicians and through participatory and inclusive practices.

Part I also provides a brief history of SPIs and an examination of four streams of debate on the utility of SPIs. It argues that the indicator approach to social analysis and the evaluation of public institutions is a highly useful one in spite of the risks associated with reductionist paradigms, ideological hegemony, the influence of SPIs, and the potential for harmful, unintended consequences arising from SPI use.

The paper goes on to explain why social performance is the responsibility of government and to what extent governments can and should influence social performance. It examines the potential for governance failure, the relationship between social performance and state capacity, and the reasons that civil society and markets cannot improve social performance without the help of public institutions. After discussing common methodological issues involved in SPI construction, Part I concludes by laying out a new framework for evaluating SPIs. This framework consists of 14 evaluative criteria, organized into 3 categories, including: (i) criteria used to assess the theoretical soundness of an indicator set; (ii) criteria used to assess the practical application of an indicator set; and (iii) criteria used to assess the methodology of an indicator set.

Part II of this paper surveys and evaluates 12 social reporting projects that produce SPIs. For each project, the survey includes three components: an overview, a description of its methodology, and an evaluation. Each evaluation includes: a table recording the scores assigned to the project on the basis of the 14 evaluative criteria set out in Part I; and an

xii

assessment of the project in terms of the theoretical, practical and methodological categories of evaluative criteria.

Provided below are: a table summarizing the scores assigned to all 12 projects (Table 1); and a table listing the relevant URL of each project and the number of Web sites that are linked to that URL (Table 2).

The top three social reporting projects according to this evaluation scheme are The Wellbeing Assessment, the UNCSD Indicators of Sustainable Development, and EuReporting. Of these three, only The Wellbeing Assessment has developed an aggregation procedure; the other two are still in the process of constructing composite measures. Of the projects that measure only governance as a limited aspect of social performance, the World Bank Governance Indicators project receives the best evaluation, followed by Freedom in the World and Transparency International.

A good deal of high quality work has been done in the field of social reporting, particularly in identifying appropriate social domains and representative measures of domain performance. However, many of the most promising approaches to comprehensive reporting on social performance have yet to tackle the difficult task of developing methods of aggregation. And there is a great need for the development of more participatory approaches to SPI construction. The area of strongest performance across all projects is that of “policy relevance and practicality of purpose.” The area of weakest performance across all projects is the “inclusiveness” of the process of indicator selection and construction.

xiii

Table 1: Scores for 12 Projects that Produce SPIs

Pro

ject

Coh

eren

ce

Trea

tmen

t of C

ompl

exity

Com

preh

ensi

vene

ss

Logi

c of

Fra

mew

ork

App

licab

ility

to S

cale

Com

preh

ensi

bilit

y an

d A

ppea

l

Incl

usiv

enes

s an

d P

artic

ipat

ion

Pol

icy-

Rel

evan

ce a

nd P

ract

ical

ity o

f Pur

pose

Tran

spar

ency

and

Acc

essi

bilit

y

Dat

a Q

ualit

y an

d Av

aila

bilit

y

App

ropr

iate

Use

of O

bjec

tive

and

Sub

ject

ive

Mea

sure

s

Inco

rpor

atio

n of

Per

form

ance

Sta

ndar

ds

App

ropr

iate

Met

hods

of S

calin

g an

d W

eigh

ting

Impl

icat

ion

of S

ubst

ituta

bilit

y

Tota

l Sco

re

Num

ber o

f Crit

eria

Ran

ked

Aver

age

(tota

l sco

re/(3

x #

crit

eria

rank

ed))

x 10

0

The Wellbeing Assessment

3 3 2.5 3 2.5 3 0.5 3 3 3 0.5 3 3 2.5 35.5 14 84.5

UNCSD Indicators of Sustainable Development

NA NA 2.5 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 0.5 3 NA NA 25 10 83.3

EuReporting NA NA 3 3 3 3 0 3 3 3 3 0 NA NA 24 10 80

OECD Environmental Indicators

NA 3 3 3 2 2 1.5 3 3 3 0 0 NA NA 22 11 71.2

World Bank Governance Indicators

2.5 2 3 3 1 1.5 0.5 3 2.5 2.5 2 2 1.5 2.5 29.5 14 70.2

Millennium Development Goals

2 1 0 2 1 3 2 3 3 3 0 3 NA NA 23 12 63.9

OECD Social Indicators

NA 3 2 1.5 2 3 0 3 3 3 0 0 NA NA 20.5 11 62.1

Freedom in the World

2 1.5 1.5 3 1 3 0.5 3 1 1.5 1 1.5 3 2 25.5 14 60.7

Human Development Index

3 0 0 2 1 3 0 2 3 3 0 3 2 0 22 14 52.4

Genuine Progress Indicator

3 1 1 1 1 3 0 3 2 1 0 0 1 0 17 14 40.5

Canadian Sustainable Development Indicators

1 0 0 1 2 2 2 3 3 0 0 0 NA NA 14 12 38.9

Transparency International

2 1 0 2 1 1 0 3 1 1 2 0 1 NA 15 13 38.5

xiv

Table 2: URLs and Altavista Links for 12 Projects1

Project URLA l t a v i s t a

links


http://web.idrc.ca/en/ev-9433-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html 0


http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/natlinfo/indicators/isd.htm 467

EuReporting http://www.gesis.org/en/social_monitoring/social_indicators/EU_Reporting/ 0


http://www.oecd.org/department/0,2688,en_2649_34441_1_1_1_1_1,00.html 551


http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters3.html 58


http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ 19,900


http://www.oecd.org/department/0,2688,en_2649_34637_1_1_1_1_1,00.html 396

Freedom in the World http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/index.htm 635


http://hdr.undp.org/ 9,620


http://www.rprogress.org/projects/gpi/ 2,670


http://www.nrtee-trnee.ca/eng/programs/Current_Programs/SDIndicators/ 8


http://www.transparency.org/surveys/ 424

PART I:

DEVELOPING CRITERIA

FOR THE EVALUATION OF

SOCIAL PERFORMANCE

INDICATORS

I. Introduction

The purpose of Part I of this paper is to outline some of the major normative and analytical issues that arise when considering the use of social performance indicators (SPIs). It is important to look closely at these issues for two main reasons: first, they inform the framework developed here for evaluating the SPIs surveyed in Part II of this paper; and second, they reflect value orientations that must be drawn out and examined before fruitful and responsible discussion can take place about the use of indicators in general or the use of particular indicator sets. The aim of indicator use is to change a particular form of institutional behavior; such change, in turn, affects the broader social environment and the lives of real people. It is assumed here that any discussion of social change, with its implications for human and non-human life, must involve an examination of the values that make such change desirable.

This paper opens with a discussion of the relationship between social performance indicators and democracy. A brief history of social performance indicators follows. The paper continues with a discussion of the general utility of social performance indicators; the role of public institutions in social performance; and methodological considerations. The normative and analytical issues raised in sections II through VI are relevant to all indicators and indicator sets surveyed in Part II; a comprehensive review here will provide background and reduce redundancy in Part II. Part I concludes with a summary of the criteria used in the evaluation of social performance indicators surveyed in Part II.

3

5

II. The Relationship Between Social Performance Indicators and Democracy

“There is a world to create, as well as accommodate, through a politics that has its own reshaping perpetually in mind.”2

“Democratic governments could take few more important steps than to initiate a process

by which the components of well-being would become a substantial part of political debate.”3

In certain ways, growing anxiety about the ability of our public institutions to cope with 21st century challenges represents a crisis of democracy. Many feel that the responsibilities with which we have charged government are not being adequately met, and that normal democratic processes are failing to deliver a remedy to this problem. One way in which the use of social performance indicators (SPIs) may contribute to better collective problem solving on the part of public institutions is through a reinvigoration of democracy. SPIs can contribute to such a reinvigoration on two levels. First, by providing meaningful feedback into national policy, SPIs can engender a form of political organization that is not only formally democratic, but also substantively democratic. Second, the construction of SPIs through an open, inclusive, participatory approach can contribute to the development of a more deeply democratic culture.

“The construction of SPIs through an open, inclusive, participatory approach can contribute to the development of a more deeply democratic culture.”

Formal versus substantive democracyWhile a government may be democratic in a formal sense, by virtue of having free and fair elections with constitutionally guaranteed rights of citizenship, for example, it may not be genuinely or substantively democratic. Unless substantive rights are equally conferred across all individuals and groups within a society, the theoretical equality of citizens is contradicted, and a political community cannot be considered genuinely democratic.4

Formal (“first generation”) rights, such as the rights to vote, to assemble, and to speak freely, are distinct from “second” and “third generation” rights, such as social and economic rights.5 Examples of “substantive” rights include: “minimum standards of nutrition, the right to shelter, the right to education, the right to health, the right to work…the right to a minimum income and basic social welfare rights,” and also, the rights of children and linguistic and cultural rights.6 Additionally, there has been an impetus in recent years to extend social welfare rights to include environmental rights.7 (For instance, the Ontario Environmental Bill of Rights enshrines the right of each citizen to a “healthful environment” and provides citizens with access to governmental decision-making and the courts.8)

Furthermore, in order for a society to be substantively democratic, there is a need for genuine alternatives in decision-making.9 For instance, if there is no meaningful difference between the platforms or strategies of political parties, the act of voting is essentially inconsequential. If extremely powerful actors within the media or market affect public policy in ways that are non-transparent or outside the realm of citizen legitimation, democracy is more formal than substantive.10

Finally, genuine democracy involves deliberation. John S. Dryzek explains that according to contemporary political theory, “the essence of democratic legitimacy is to be found, not in voting or representation of persons or interests, but rather in deliberation.”11 Cass R. Sunstein laments that though this ideal of deliberation was envisioned by the founders of American democracy, the goal has not been achieved, largely because people do not have access to adequate information about important social issues.12 Even if people do have access to adequate information, they often do not have sufficient time to meaningfully interpret such information.

SPIs provide informationYet, an informed electorate is an absolute prerequisite of democracy,13 and the provision of information on social issues, including information relating to the distribution and fulfillment

Part I6

7

of both formal and substantive rights, is an important goal of the SPI approach. SPIs help a society to publicly assess its situation, ascertain goals, and formulate ways of meeting these goals in concordance with its stated values.14 SPIs create a meaningful context for public debate that encourages both institutional accountability and transparency; and they funnel information into an area where political mechanisms can operate to effect social change.

A participatory approachFor the SPI approach to be democratic, the view of every citizen must be given equal weight.15 SPIs should therefore be accessible and transparent to the electorate. If SPIs employ techniques that are simultaneously normative, opaque and unresponsive to the citizenry, they can undermine the democratic process.16 Similarly, SPIs should be comprehensive and represent, to the greatest degree possible, important social issues. If indicators are too narrow or focused, public dialogue and policymaking are impoverished.17

In keeping with the democratic ideals described above, the process of indicator construction and selection should be participatory and inclusive. “Sustainable cities” initiatives often use such a process, which is quite different from the more expert-driven, top-down approaches that are often used at larger, territorial scales.18 Participatory approaches address not only what is measured, but also how it is measured, and by whom decisions concerning the relative importance of various indicators are made.19 Simple majoritarianism (for example, by polling) is not sufficient in this context, as the concerns of marginalized persons or groups may not be represented. The paradox in voting is that a majority vote signifies the alternative preferred by most voters, not the alternative that is most preferred.20 Processes of SPI construction should be founded on principles of dialogue and consensus building, rather than on decision-making by polling.

SPIs and Democracy

9

III. A Brief History of Social Performance Indicators

Various indicators have been used throughout history to assess aspects of social life, but their widespread use for social policy formulation began largely in the twentieth century. Measurement of the size and composition of national economies was one of the first and foremost attempts at social reporting, as Clifford Cobb et al. explain.21 National accounts were first estimated in England in 1665 by Thomas Petty, but were only formalized in a comprehensive and uniform system in the early 1930s by Simon Kuznets, whose early formulation became the basis of the gross national product (GNP). Wedded with Keynesian economic theory, the GNP evolved primarily as a measurement tool geared towards the mobilization of resources during the Second World War. Indeed, “the degree to which the GNP evolved as a war-planning tool is hard to exaggerate.”22 In the postwar period, the GNP became the basis of economic management because of its role in helping to win WWII, and because economists required tools that would help prevent another Great Depression. Over the course of the 20th century, the GNP rose to ascendancy as the prime metric of social reporting.

In response to the unquestioned primacy of economic measurement, a social indicators movement arose in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which sought to expand the aspects of human life under review.23 The year Raymond Bauer’s Social Indicators24 was published

“...the GNP became the basis of economic management because of its role in helping to win WWII...”

10

(1966) has been cited as the inaugural year of the movement,25 and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) soon followed suit with the 1970 launch of its Social Indicator Development Program.26 Other notable work of this period includes Richard J. Estes’ Index of Social Progress,27 and David Morris’ Physical Quality of Life Index.28 Much of this work was motivated by a concern for the persistence of poverty in the face of two decades of full employment and economic growth,29 and revolved around the concept of “basic needs.”30

By the 1980s, however, widespread opinion held the movement to be moribund, as many social indicator initiatives, such as that of the American National Science Foundation, were discontinued.31 The movement became unfashionable, for reasons ranging from the debt crisis in developing countries to the growth of monetarism in Western economies with its concomitant policy changes.32 These developments tended to stress the importance of economic solutions to questions of social well-being; because social indicator initiatives fell outside the sphere of economic analysis, the popularity of the indicator approach dwindled. As Sten Johansson notes, of the indicators developed during the heyday of the movement, the only one that remains in regular use in the U.S. is the official poverty statistic based on the poverty line concept.33

In more recent years, there has been somewhat of a revival of the indicator approach. European integration has reinvigorated the search for appropriate measures of social performance. The improvement of living conditions and quality of life amongst European Union (EU) members is a stated goal of the Maastricht treaty, and indicators are being developed to help monitor progress toward that end.34 The 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro called for indicators of sustainable development in the context of Agenda 21, while the United Nations Human Development Program (UNDP) has pioneered the Human Development Index (HDI) over the past decade.35 More generally, contemporary reconceptualizations of social identity and well-being—for instance, away from individualistic conceptions of welfare to considerations of social well-being36—have stimulated greater interest in SPIs to the extent that “social indicators are now back in

vogue.”37

Part I

11

IV. The General Utility of Social Performance Indicators

“…everything is an indicator of something but nothing is an indicator of everything.”38

There are four main areas of debate concerning the general utility of the indicator approach to social analysis and the evaluation of public institutions.

The first area of debate is often couched in terms of contending paradigms: a reductionist, mechanistic world view is contrasted with one that is holistic, organic and complex. Whether the indicator approach is lauded or criticized often depends on the paradigm under which it is believed to fall.

A second area of debate revolves around the inherent heterogeneity of societies and the danger of intellectual hegemony in indicator construction and advocacy.

A third debate relates to the influence of indicators on the media, citizens and public agencies. To the extent that an indicator set is intended to change social behavior or social outcomes, it must permeate the consciousness of the general public or of decision-makers. But the fact that an SPI is prevalent does not necessarily mean that it is appropriate or well designed.

A fourth debate has to do with the fact that the use of SPIs can have potentially pernicious effects, producing unintended and unwanted social consequences. For instance, it can be argued that one unintended effect of our obsession with the GDP is that the preeminent value in our society has become wealth maximization, giving rise to extreme individualism and the erosion of community. It is unlikely that the creators of the GDP intended these effects.

12

1. Contending Paradigms

Under the reductionist, mechanistic paradigm of the last millennium, the world has been seen as a set of clearly defined elements that are related to one another in comprehensible and predictable ways: the whole can be understood through an analysis of isolated parts. Implicit in the reductionist mind set is a belief that these elements and relations can ultimately be discovered, understood and potentially controlled by human reason.

But a paradigmatic shift has been going on that involves a new awareness of the intricate interrelatedness of the human and non-human world. In contrast to the mechanistic, reductionist world view, the new world view is holistic, organic and complex.

Thomas Homer-Dixon identifies six key features of complex systems: they are composed of a multiplicity of things; their component parts are connected to one another in a dense web of causal connections, resulting in causal feedbacks and potential tight coupling; their components are interdependent; they are open to influence from the environment in which they are situated; they tend to display synergy among their components; and they exhibit non-linear behavior.39 Additionally, complex systems display emergent properties. Emergence can be summarized by the aphorism, “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.” An example of emergence is life itself: life is an emergent property of the non-living, inorganic molecules that, when combined, make up the living world. Ecosystems, economic systems, and social systems—and the larger macro-system in which these systems interact—are complex, and consequently, very difficult to map and measure.

A serious charge made against proponents of the SPI approach is that SPIs are a relic of the reductionist world view and cannot appropriately describe a fundamentally complex reality. Simon Bell and Stephen Morse have called attempts to “tie down and measure sustainability…a futile exercise of measuring the immeasurable,” which is demonstrative of an “objective and reductionist mindset.”40 For example, indicator systems are often grounded in a Driving-force Pressure State Impact Response (DPSIR) framework, which identifies isolated causal chains upon which to base a given indicator (see Figure 1). Because of the “structural dependency” of complex systems, however, the DPSIR model is inadequate: cause and effect cannot be so clearly delineated.41

Part I

13

Figure 1: Driving-force Pressure State Impact Response42

The DPSIR framework “is based on a concept of causality” and links three stages in the causal pro-cess: pressures are exerted on the social or natural environment (state), to which society responds. For instance, in applying the DPSIR framework to environmental problems, pressures might arise from human activities related to energy, transport, industry, agriculture or forestry. These pressures change the state of the environment, in terms of land, air, water and natural resource quality. Society may respond to changes in the environment through government policy, and changes in household and business behavior. The response stage is a feedback into the state and pressure stages: response might include direct interventions in the environment, such as planting trees or cleaning up a river (response influences state), or changing tax incentives to promote renewable energy (response influ-ences pressure, pressure influences state).

While the DPSR framework can be helpful in sketching simple relationships amongst variables, it can cloud more complex relationships. Because the framework implies linear causality amongst components, emergence, coupling, feedbacks and non-linearity are inadequately represented.

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

General Utility of SPIs

14

Hartmut Bossel explains that for SPIs to be adequately sensitive to complexity, they must take into account the fact that the viability of a complex entity is predicated on the viability of all of its components: a failure in one subsystem can cascade through others, resulting in total system failure. Additionally, components produce emergent properties at the level of the whole that cannot be deduced from an investigation of reduced parts. At the same time, the environment in which a system is situated also affects the system itself. Because aggregated or composite SPIs merge indicators into a single measure, important information concerning subcomponent viability, emergent properties, and environmental effects is lost, reducing the utility of the approach.43

One reply to the charge of reductionism is that a social performance indicator is itself a much-needed feedback mechanism that can assist in the negotiation of complexity. SPIs provide information on relevant dynamics and reveal whether an action is constructive or destructive; behavior can then be continued or modified in the interest of system health (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: SPIs are Feedback Mechanisms

Carol Taylor Fitz-Gibbon argues that “the provision of feedback is perhaps the unassailably important role of indicator systems” in helping to navigate complexity.44 Social indicators are about “adding a whole new row of additional gauges to the societies’ ‘instrument panels’, so as to plug feedback into decision levels with more precision and timeliness.”45 Systems-theory conceptions of feedback have also been used in the context of quality of life and its effect on governance institutions.46 Even critics of reductionism, while warning that SPIs must take into account the complex nature of reality, recognize that indicators are an important social mechanism.47

HUMAN ACTION

SOCIALPERFORMANCE

INDICATORS

SYSTEMHEALTH

Part I

15

The risk of reductionism is an important, but not insurmountable, obstacle. It is a reason for thoughtfulness and caution, not an abandonment of the indicators approach. SPIs can be designed so that they are adequately sensitive to complexity, as Bossel has shown, and as will be shown in the following sections of this paper.

2. Heterogeneity and Hegemony

A second area of debate concerning the overall utility of the SPI approach relates to the inherent heterogeneity of societies, and the danger that any application of an SPI, with its particular values and methods of analysis, implies a sort of ideological hegemony. For instance, some commentators argue that Western-style democracy is dependent on a certain level of affluence, and that evaluating lower-income countries in terms of democratic ideals, as many SPIs do, is inappropriate until some level of global income equality has been achieved.48 The Human Freedom Index of the UNDP has similarly been criticized for being biased toward Western values,49 while the concept of sustainable development has been said to embody a “condescending and paternalistic” ideology.50 Additionally, the emphasis that high-income countries place on environmental and social standards is regarded by some as an attempt to further limit and constrain the development potential of the South,51 where perhaps “poverty is the greatest pollution problem.”52 In another vein, the diffusion of western technology throughout the non-western world is sometimes interpreted as an imposition of western conceptions of science and progress.53 To the degree that SPIs are considered a western technology, and to the extent that they embody western values of progress, they are open to the same sort of criticism.

Even within societies, agreement on appropriate indicators is by no means assured. In the United Kingdom, the choice of sustainable development indicators for Local Agenda 21 initiatives varies enormously among localities.54 There has been controversy in the Netherlands over the inclusion of car ownership in the national index of well-being, as such ownership increases personal mobility, but also harms the environment.55 Further, indicator approaches can result in the “hegemony of the technocrat,”56 as inaccessible methodology

“SPIs can be designed so that they are adequately sensitive to complexity...”


16

and non-transparent value orientations make it difficult for the average citizen to interpret expert-driven SPIs. When an SPI is widely institutionalized, creating and reinforcing certain types of social behavior, it can be seen as a form of technocratic rule that lacks the conscious consent of the public.

The hazards intrinsic to any attempt to formalize and replicate models that contain normative components can, however, be lessened. Participatory, inclusive, fair and open processes of indicator selection and construction can ward off a hegemonic tendency. The necessity for, and potential of, such processes is well recognized in the literature.57 Moreover, practitioners and scholars who have worked long in the field have identified human values that appear to be universal. Johansson identifies the following:58

To be cared for, nurtured and fostered as a child;To be trained or educated as a preparation for the adult roles;To find a job in the system of production;To find one’s own place to live and to form a family;To maintain health over the life cycle;To be protected against violence and crime;To find a societal identity in culture and as a citizen.

Theorists have also identified certain criteria that must be met for any social system to be viable: existence, effectiveness, freedom, security, adaptability and coexistence.59 Once these criteria have been minimally satisfied, the relative emphasis placed on each of them can vary according to preference.60

By building on areas where commonality exists through participatory approaches—while at the same time respecting and encouraging cultural diversity—it should be possible to construct SPIs that are cross-culturally relevant and appropriate, without injustice or coercion.

“...it should be possible to construct SPIs that are cross-culturally relevant and appropriate, without injustice or coercion.”

Part I

17

Participatory approaches can also help to bridge difference. While it is unlikely that there will ever be universal value consensus within and among societies (indeed, this would be broadly undesirable on many levels), functional societies are predicated on the existence of some shared norms. And as the challenges faced by human societies become increasingly and inherently global, the need to engender cross-cultural norms also increases. The flourishing of local cultures must be encouraged, and they will certainly have divergent value orientations in many respects. At the same time, some sort of normative congruency must be achieved on points where our collective destiny hangs—on issues of poverty, the environment, disease, and violent conflict. Any agreement must be reached through a form of social negotiation that is fair, open and participatory, not through economic, technocratic or political imposition. The first step in the process toward agreement is dialogue. So there is a need to start talking. And perhaps, more importantly, there is a need to start listening.

3. Influence

“For indicators to lead change, there needs to be emotional content: people need to care in their hearts as well as in their minds.”61

A third area of debate has to do with how SPIs might be made more influential, and whether, in the case of specific indicators, the influence they do have is justified. As mentioned above in the discussion of contending paradigms, SPIs are a feedback mechanism that can help society adapt to complexity. But the translation of system information into social change is not automatic or assured. If SPIs are to influence the media, the public and policymakers in ways that will effectively generate changes in social behavior, they must be constructed with the goal of social change in mind (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: The Influence of SPIs

SYSTEM HEALTH

HUMANACTION

PUBLIC OPINION,MEDIA,

POLICYMAKERS

SOCIALPERFORMANCE

INDICATORS


18

Presently, the main feedbacks to national policy are economic indicators.62 Unfortunately, more holistic63 measures of social performance do not yet substantially influence policy, in part because they do not yet fully cover human and environmental concerns, or distil them “into an index as powerful as the GDP.”64

In order to gain a stronger footing, SPIs need to be extensively publicized, and the media has a key role to play in this regard. By crystallizing the attention of the public and private sectors around social issues, the media produces incentives for government to respond to social ills and foster social well-being.65

How can SPIs be formulated to be appealing to the public and the media? In The Tipping Point,66 Malcolm Gladwell identifies three general principles relating to how products and ideas become popularized within a culture. The first principle, “The Law of the Few,” states that “a tiny percentage of the people do a majority of the work.” The second principle, “The Stickiness Factor,” recommends that rather than trying to increase the dissemination of an idea, it can be more important to ensure the message makes an impact, or “sticks in your head.” The third principle, “The Power of Context,” notes that human behavior is strongly influenced by the broader social environment, and that ideas can achieve rapid diffusion if they achieve a sufficiently good fit within this context. These three principles can shed light on the characteristics that might make an SPI publicly appealing.

In terms of the “Law of the Few,” many prominent SPIs have indeed been spearheaded and nurtured by well-known figures: Kuznets and Keynes in the case of the GDP; Amartya Sen and Mahbub ul Haq in the case of the HDI; and Mathis Wackernagel and William Rees in the case of the Ecological Footprint67 (an approach that has also been adopted by the makers of the Genuine Progress Indicator68). The “Stickiness Factor” also suggests that certain characteristics might make some SPIs more appealing than others. For one, data

“If SPIs are to influence the media, the public and policy-makers in ways that will effectively generate changes in social behavior, they must be constructed with the goal of social change in mind.”

Part I

19

must be pulled together into a coherent and comprehensive whole in order to be publicly appealing.69 Without some degree of aggregation or compression, social reporting can come across as simply a “basket of interesting facts.”70 The public and the media must also be able to understand the meaning and methodology of an SPI,71 making obscure or esoteric approaches likely to fail. In terms of “The Power of Context,” SPIs must be policy-relevant and serve a practical purpose.72 With respect to context, success may also increase if an SPI can be couched in terms that are politically salient in current public discourse. For instance, sustainable development indicators received a tremendous boost from the Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit. Similarly, after being defunct for over a decade, social indicators in Israel were reinstated due to growing public concern about privatization, economic polarization, and environmental issues.73 At the same time, context may serve as a brake on SPI dissemination if powerful vested interests see such an approach as threatening.74

Influence, however, though a necessary criterion, is by no means a sufficient criterion for the evaluation of SPIs. That an SPI has captured public attention does not mean it is guaranteed to have intrinsic worth.

For instance, it is sometimes argued that the concept of sustainability is so popular because it is so flexible. Because sustainability can mean anything to anyone, however, the concept is often misapplied and used simply to promote a particular agenda.75 Similarly, the release of the HDI is often accompanied by a great deal of fanfare;76 it has even been called “the quintessential ‘global brand’ of the 1990s.”77 Critics argue that its prominence is due to packaging and promotion efforts, rather than its intrinsic worth.78 These critics are responding to those who regard the underlying construct of the HDI to be less important than its influence (particularly, in providing a counter-weight to economic measures), and warn that most people do not actually understand what is going on beneath the aggregate numbers.79 An understanding of these subsurface dynamics is necessary, because, if not used with caution, SPIs can produce pernicious effects.

4. Potentially Pernicious Effects

A fourth area of debate has to do with the unintended and unwanted situations that may result from using SPIs. One of these situations can stem from the tension that arises between a management approach that attempts to enhance performance through support and


20

appreciation on the one hand, and, on the other hand, an approach that uses SPIs to evaluate performance in a way that can be interpreted as judgmental.80 If civil servants, for example, who are already dealing with “backbreaking and thankless workloads,”81 are made to feel like scapegoats by an SPI, their morale and social performance may be negatively affected. A second effect of using SPIs is that static indicators can lock institutions and organizations into behavior that may become outmoded, preventing adaptation and change.82 For example, in the former Soviet Union, production was measured by weight, producing the unintended consequence of Poland having the heaviest furniture in Europe!83

Third, and more seriously, the social and environmental conditions represented by many SPIs are often seen as a new type of demand that lower-income countries must meet in order to secure financial support from the World Bank and international donors.84 When an infusion of resources is needed to improve social and environmental performance, limiting lending on the basis of SPIs clearly backfires. The U.S. Government’s Millennium Challenge Account, for example, bases the aid-eligibility of a particular country on its governance performance; but because there are wide margins of error associated with the statistical techniques employed in indicator construction, there is a high probability that countries that have acceptable governance processes are misclassified and denied aid (and vice versa).85 Misclassification aside, denying the resources needed to improve social performance because performance standards are not currently being met seems both counterintuitive and counterproductive.

A final example of how indicators can produce unintended and unwanted results pertains to standardized academic testing in schools. Since the introduction of standardized testing in Ontario, many teachers have had to spend weeks teaching students how to succeed on these tests, and conducting extensive review. The curriculum is based on a ten-month delivery period, but because the tests are conducted in May, the curriculum must be delivered in seven-and-a-half to eight months. The compressed delivery period forces teachers to “teach to the test,” leaving little room for iteration, flexibility and exploration, ultimately decreasing overall educational quality and, in some cases, undermining a love of learning in young students.86

Because SPIs can produce these types of pernicious effects, a careful investigation of the normative and analytical foundation of any indicator set is absolutely essential.

Part I

21

V. The Role of Public Institutions in Social Performance

In advocating the use of SPIs to evaluate and change public institutions, it is necessary to show that social performance is the responsibility of government, and to explore the extent to which government can and should influence social performance.

The responsibility of public institutions for social performance can be illustrated through a discussion of contemporary understandings of governance and welfare (see below). But the changing global landscape has led some commentators to question whether public institutions are still the most appropriate agencies for improving social performance. Because states have not adapted to meet economic, technological, environmental and social developments, some argue that governance failure has occurred. Governance failure can be seen as an inability to adequately influence social performance in a positive direction. Ironically, the current ability of a state to improve social performance—which political scientists sometimes call state capacity—is often dependent on the state’s past improvement of social performance. Today’s governance failure may result from government neglect of social performance in the past. It stands to reason, therefore, that improving a government’s current ability to influence social performance may lessen the chances of governance failure tomorrow. In essence, the ability to influence social performance and the actual improvement of social performance are mutually reinforcing.

“...public institutions are required for the improvement of social performance.”

22

Nevertheless, observers argue that the traditional sphere of influence of public institutions working to improve social performance has been, or should be, eclipsed by the spheres of influence of other social sectors. Some argue that civil society is the best-suited or most effective social sector, while others argue that markets are the most appropriate sector for improving social performance. This paper examines the relationship between government and each of these sectors, and concludes that public institutions are required for the improvement of social performance.

1. Responsibility for Social Performance

i. Governance

In recent years, the concept of governance has emerged in discussions of the appropriate role of the state. While widely used, the meaning and subtleties of the concept vary. This point can be illustrated by a brief review of some definitions of governance found in the scholarly and non-scholarly literature. The World Bank has defined governance as “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development.”87 Governance embodies four main areas, according to the Bank, including: effective and efficient public sector management; accountability of the public sector; a well-functioning legal system; and availability of information and transparency.88 Daniel Kaufmann et al. define governance as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised,” including: “the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced”; “the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies”; and “the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.”89 The UK’s Overseas Development Administration identifies good governance as entailing government that is legitimate, accountable, competent, and that upholds human rights and the rule of law.90 James H. Weaver et al. identify the following “dimensions of effective governance”: “technical competence and expertise”; “organizational effectiveness”; “accountability”; “rule of law”; and “transparency and open information systems.”91

These types of definitions are sometimes criticized because they emphasize formal rather than substantive aspects of democracy, and because these formal aspects are seen to be invoked mainly as a means to promote economic efficiency and neo-liberal reform.92 Some additional components of governance may help to round out the discussion. In addition to

Part I

23

political and administrative aspects of governance, Adrian Leftwich identifies a systemic strand of governance that pertains to “the distribution of both internal and external political and economic power.”93 Additionally, when considering human rights and the rule of law, it is important to include second- and third-generation rights, and the equal distribution of these rights throughout society.94 Similarly, in terms of accountability, it must be determined for what things government is actually accountable; and this, in turn, depends on larger discussions of social and political values.95

A more expansive definition of governance, if somewhat more amorphous and difficult to operationalize, is presented by Kenneth Hanf and Alf-Inge Jansen:

The core of governance has to do with determining what ends and values should be chosen and the means by which those ends and values should be pursued…Governance includes activities such as efforts to influence the social construction of shared beliefs about reality; the creation of identities and institutions; the allocation and regulation of rights and obligations among interested parties; and the distribution of economic means and welfare services. Governance, in other words, is the shaping and sustaining of the arrangements of authority and power within which actors make decisions and frame policies that are binding on individual and collective actors…96

Such a definition can subsume more formal parameters of governance, while simultaneously acknowledging its more substantive aspects. These more substantive aspects are essentially elements of social performance, while more formal aspects, such as competence and organizational efficacy, can be seen as instrumental to the achievement of social performance.

Because government is the de jure (if not always de facto) locus of power and authority within society, public institutions play a pivotal role in the provision of governance, no matter which of the above definitions of governance is employed. Because governance is synonymous with social performance on several levels, public institutions must also play a key role in social performance. As such, measures of social performance can be seen as an appropriate evaluation tool for government and institutional performance.

ii. Welfare

Another way in which governments are responsible for social performance is through their direct responsibility for the provision of welfare. Almost all societies charge government with this responsibility, though some commentators believe the model of the “welfare state” to be dead.97 Even the Constitution of the United States of America (arguably one of the more individualistic societies) charges government to “promote the general welfare.”98 Johansson has noted that there is a degree of universality in human social concerns, and that all societies

Role of Public Institutions

24

face certain challenges that they must solve collectively. Differences arise related to the relative weighting of these concerns and “the form and degree of collective responsibility” for the provision of social well-being.99

A recent study of 13 OECD countries supports the “responsibility hypothesis” that citizens hold government responsible for the provision of quality of life and well-being. Researchers found that when quality of life deteriorated, incumbent parties were voted out of office.100 Similarly, the Index of Social Health (ISH) developed by Marc and Marque-Luisa Miringoff has demonstrated that social performance is an important issue during U.S. elections. Over the period 1970 to 1992, the ISH showed improvement in social performance on eight occasions. Five of these improvements corresponded with election years, while only once did the index decline during an election year (in 1980).101 It can be inferred from these results that voters and candidates considered social performance to be an important issue.

2. Extent of Government Influence on Social Performance

i. Governance Failure

While social performance is an important responsibility of public institutions, government may fail to meet this responsibility in many respects. Rischard explains that recent technological and economic revolutions have led to a “new world economy,” where economic and environmental dynamics increasingly operate outside the territorial jurisdiction of the nation-state.102 Combined with population growth, this new form of economic organization has led to a crisis of complexity, twinned with a crisis of governance.103 The crisis of governance arises from institutional rigidity amidst rapid change, and results in a “growing sense of malaise about traditional politicians and politics.”104 While the cultural and economic landscape is changing, political boundaries remain static and unchanging.105 The institutions that evolved to serve the needs of the industrial era are being eroded by these processes of change, while a parallel assignment of social responsibility has not yet been implemented or devised.106 The failure of government in this contemporary context raises questions about state capacity (the ability of public institutions to improve social performance), and about whether other social sectors, such as civil society and the markets, are more suited to the task of improving social performance.

Part I

25

ii. State Capacity

While governance and welfare can be seen as inputs to social performance, social performance itself can be seen as an input to state capacity. The relationship between state capacity and social performance is, in fact, a mutually reinforcing one, illustrated by the following example.

Environmental degradation, in the form of global warming, deforestation, decreases in water supply, and agricultural land degradation, can erode government capacity. Environmental degradation of this type can bring about a decrease in economic performance (for instance, via reduced agricultural productivity, increased infectious disease, and damaged infrastructure), which, in turn, would limit the tax revenue that government collects. A lack of fiscal resources constrains public institutions, reducing institutional performance. Additionally, if access to political, legal and economic resources is insufficient or differentially distributed across society, government may suffer an erosion of legitimacy. Such legitimacy is necessary for effective and efficient governance. Deprivation and social segmentation can also increase unrest, leading to increases in the demands made on government. If rising demands occur alongside reduced institutional capacity, government performance can be acutely and severely threatened. Consequently, social performance can be seen as an important input to government performance, in terms of both the stress placed on institutions, and the capacity of those institutions to respond.107 Because of this relationship, the chance of future governance failure may be increased by a failure to improve social performance today. Conversely, adequate improvement of social performance today may enhance the capacity of future government.

iii. Government and Civil Society

While civil society is an important ingredient in a healthy society, it cannot improve social performance on its own. The concept of social capital that has emerged in the political science and economics literature points to the fact that both government and social performance can be enhanced by the density of social networks in civic society. Social capital may be a critical ingredient to social performance for the following reasons: it facilitates the solving of collective problems; it facilitates community advancement; it increases awareness of interdependence; it facilitates the flow of information that helps people achieve their goals; and it improves individuals’ lives through psychological and biological processes.108 In societies with very little social capital, it may be difficult for government to improve social performance, despite the best intentions.


26

Some argue that given the constraints visited on the nation-state by processes of economic change, civil society may be more free to engage in political innovation than public institutions.109 Civil society is both powerful and able, and can often garner greater legitimacy than public institutions.110 Moreover, some commentators feel that the real progress of society will come by addressing moral, spiritual and social questions that, by their nature, should not be promoted by the state.111

These are important points that illustrate the complementarity of public institutions and civil society, but they do not indicate the pre-eminence of the latter. While important, civil society cannot marshal public resources (without the mediation of government), cannot legislate or enforce law, and is not formally accountable to, or representative of, the public. For these reasons, social performance delivery requires public institutions.

iv. Government and MarketsAnother much more contentious debate over the role of public institutions in influencing social performance relates to the relative importance of government and markets.

Efficiency: an end or a meansGovernments have sought to regulate markets since the time of the Sumerians,112 but in recent years, deregulated markets have been promoted as a panacea to a host of social problems, including the inadequate provision of public goods. The case for markets revolves around the proposition that markets are a paragon of efficiency. For instance, Joseph Heath argues that Canada enjoys the highest quality of life on the planet simply because it is an efficient society.113 He contends that improvements in our quality of life are solely a result of improvements in economic efficiency,114 and, even more radically, that efficiency is “the central value in Canadian society.”115

Janice Gross Stein exposes the flaw in this type of thinking. Efficiency depends on effectiveness, and any concept of effectiveness entails an interpretation of usefulness, which is necessarily informed by value judgments.116 In promoting efficiency as a value (efficiency for the sake of efficiency), this critical consideration of effectiveness is sidestepped. Efficiency is mistaken for an end, when in actuality, it is a means to the achievement of things we value.117

As an argument for delegating to markets the responsibility of ensuring social performance, the efficiency stance is both unconvincing and misleading. First, government is absolutely

Part I

27

necessary to establish the legislative framework (property rights, torts, contracts) that enables markets to function.118 Second, there is no systematic evidence to support the idea that social performance necessarily follows from economic development. Statistical tests of causality have shown that the causal direction between per capita real gross domestic product (PCRGDP) and social performance varies among income groups and across different human well-being indicators.119 For instance, while a higher PCRGDP leads to improved adult literacy rates in high-income countries, in low-income countries, a higher PCRGDP follows from an improvement in adult literacy rates.120 In the low-income group, a higher PCRGDP leads to a higher teacher-pupil ratio at the primary level, while a higher PCRGDP follows from a higher per capita calorie intake at the same level of income.121 Similar statistical tests show that previous social performance, but not previous economic performance, predicts later social performance. At the same time, both prior economic and prior social performance predict later economic performance.122 Additionally, others have shown statistically that, even though structural adjustment programs and loans have increased per capita GDP, this increased growth has not resulted in better social performance.123

In contrast, increasing levels of government intervention, to an optimum point, have been shown to improve human development. Increased levels of human well-being stem from the public provision of goods and services, such as infrastructure, investment in human capital (education and health), law and order, and income redistribution to provide a basic economic safety net.124 Because there is no systematic evidence to support the contention that improved economic performance necessarily leads to improved social performance, abandoning government in favour of market efficiency represents an ideological, rather than rational, approach.

“...even though structural adjustment programs and loans have increased per capita GDP, this increased growth has not resulted in better social performance. In contrast, in-creasing levels of government intervention, to an optimum point, have been shown to improve human development.”


28

The market allocation method has irrational outcomesMoreover, markets are not always efficient. Notwithstanding the fact that perfect competition, upon which efficiency arguments are based, rarely, if ever, exists in the real world, individual efficiency and rationality often lead to outcomes that are collectively irrational.125 Modern economic theory is based on the Smithian notion that regretful human behavior such as selfishness and greed can be mobilized to produce collective welfare.126 However, the market allocation method, in reality, produces many perverse outcomes. The market does not include the value of environmental costs and benefits or the value of unpaid labour in the informal sector. It is indifferent to issues of distributive justice, and it counts “bads” (like the costs of cleaning up an oil spill) as positive contributions to wealth and well-being.

The significance of the inclusion or exclusion of these areas in the market allocation mechanism is great. It has been estimated that fifty percent of productive work is unpaid, while eighty percent of the world’s capital formation is not monetarized.127 Regarding distributive justice, the principle of Pareto Optimality that underpins economic theory implies that efficiency is achieved when no one can be made better off without someone else being made worse off. This condition would hold, however, if all the wealth in the world were owned by one person, and everyone else had nothing—improving the lot of the many would mean reducing the lot of that one person. If the overall economy does not improve the lot of most people, however, especially that of the poorest, then “any claims of overall prosperity or of a kinder, gentler nation ring hollow.”128

Even if distributive justice could somehow be worked into the price mechanism, income equity is an insufficient measure of overall socioeconomic equity (because of racial, ethnic, or linguistic prejudice, for instance).129 And the inclusion of “bads” in our economic accounts is both absurd and perverse:

Day care counts but mum-and-dad care doesn’t. Driving a car counts but walking does not….the more medical bills you incur, the more junk food you eat, the longer you sit in traffic and the more your credit-card company rips you off with hidden charges, the better the economy is doing.130

This situation does not improve our collective well-being, and it does not even necessarily contribute to individual well-being. Despite ever-rising levels of material well-being, the overall happiness of the average person has not increased, likely because material needs have already been sated, and additional material gain contributes little to overall well-being.131 In fact, a decrease in happiness in modern market economies has been observed, arguably because social needs are subject to persistent institutional neglect.132

Part I

29

For all of these reasons, it is clear that social performance cannot be improved by means of the market mechanism alone, and that public institutions have a crucial role to play in the provision of welfare and well-being.

“...it is clear that social performance cannot be improved by means of the market mecha-nism alone, and that public institutions have a crucial role to play in the provision of welfare and well-being.”


31

VI. Methodological Considerations

The question of whether or not the use of a given social performance indicator (SPI) is methodologically sound often forms the heart of any controversy surrounding it. Because methodological critiques usually revolve around several issues that are broadly relevant to all indicator sets, these issues are presented here in an overview, rather than being sporadically addressed in the survey that follows in Part II. Two methodological issues that arise when measuring social performance, particularly when an aggregate or composite measure is used, are scaling and weighting. Other important concerns include data availability and quality, and the relative importance of objective and subjective measures.

1. Scaling

In order for two variables to be compared and combined, their units of measurement must first be converted to a common unit of measurement. There are several methods for doing this.

Method 1: Simple ScaleA simple method is to convert SPIs to a common scale that ranges between 0 and 1, where 1 represents best performance and 0 represents worst performance (see Appendix A). Countries can then be ranked according to their scaled scores. One problem with this approach is that the scale depends on the SPIs of the worst and best performers, which can change over time. Essentially this amounts to constantly “moving the goal posts”: a country could actually improve its performance, but end up with a lower scaled score because either the top or bottom performers had improved performance. It also implies that performance of

32

the highest achiever is “good,” which is true relatively, but may not be so in absolute terms. These problems can be addressed by establishing fixed minimum and maximum standards of performance for an SPI, rather than basing these standards implicitly on the observed data.

Method 2: MonetizationAnother method of converting measures to common units is to monetize them. But monetization is problematic because it is based on contingent valuation (i.e., something is assigned a price on the basis of how much it would cost to replace it, or how much people would be willing to pay for it), and it breaks down when there is no substitute, or when something is invaluable or priceless. For instance, we do not have the knowledge and technology to replace the global system of climate regulation, or the agricultural services provided by billions of soil microorganisms. These ecosystem services are non-substitutable and the cost of replacement is irrelevant, because there simply is no means of replacement that can be priced. Other intangibles, such as freedom, equality and justice, are also not amenable to monetization.

Method 3: Performance ScaleAnother way to compare different units is by using a performance scale, a technique that has been developed by Prescott-Allen.133 A performance scale assigns a score to a particular indicator from 0 to100, with 0 being the worst and 100 being the best. The 100- unit scale is divided into equal ranges, each of which is ascribed a qualitative measure from “good” to “bad”:

Band Range

Good 81-100

Fair 61-80

Medium 41-60

Poor 21-40

Bad 1-20

Part I

33

For each indicator, criteria are established that delineate each band. For instance, in the case of the prevalence of stunting in children, the bands are defined as follows:

Thus, a country with a 36–50% prevalence of stunting in children would be assigned a qualitative assessment of poor, and a quantitative performance score somewhere between 21 and 40. The advantage of this method is that it is based on constant performance standards and is easy to interpret.

2. Weighting

Once indicators have been scaled, they can be aggregated. In the case of the simple scale method (Scaling, Method 1, above), the scaled indicators can be added together, and then divided by the number of indicators that compose a country’s overall SPI (see Appendix A). But there are several problems that arise with this type of aggregation. By dividing by the number of indicators that compose the country’s overall SPI, each indicator is given an equal weight. In most cases, it is likely more appropriate to calculate a weighted average, where the weight is determined by the contribution each indicator makes to overall social performance. Calculating either a simple or weighted average implies, however, that component indicators are substitutable, in that an increase in one indicator can compensate for a decrease in another indicator. If, for instance, we aggregate two component indicators related to environment and economy, the implication is that increased economic growth can compensate for environmental degradation, and vice versa. A further difficulty arising from this type of weighting is that the absolute values used for Xmax j and Xmin j (see Appendix A) inadvertently affect the overall weighting in the aggregation process.134 The performance scale technique (Scaling, Method 3, above) avoids this unintended problem.

Band Prevalence of stunting in children (%)

Good 0-10

Fair 11-20

Medium 21-35

Poor 36-50

Bad 51-100

Methodological Considerations

34

Performance scales can be aggregated in various ways, including either a simple or weighted average of the scores. These types of averages again, however, imply substitutability among the component indicators. Substitutability can be avoided by taking a “basket minimum.”135 For instance, if there are three indicators, none of which can substitute for the other, the indicator showing the worst performance is the value assigned to the aggregate. Another approach is to weight indicators that are declining more heavily than indicators that are improving.136

3. More Advanced Techniques

Other more advanced statistical techniques, such as factor and principal component analysis,137 unobserved components modeling,138 and non-linear canonical correlation analysis139 can also be used to standardize and aggregate data. These techniques weight indicators according to the degree to which they explain the variance in the dependent variable (social performance in this case), or according to the reliability of the contribution of the indicator to the dependent variable. Sometimes, more advanced statistical techniques are invoked to analyze or correct the degree to which subcomponent indicators are correlated amongst themselves, a problem known as multicollinearity.

These techniques avoid some of the difficulties that arise when scaling and aggregating in more simple ways, but they are not necessarily ideal. Because these models apply weighting on the basis of data variability and correlation, they avoid the normative questions involved in determining appropriate weights. Ideally, appropriate weights should be determined through thought, discussion and consensus. The idea that equity or income growth would be assigned a weight based on its statistical contribution to the variance of the dependent variable seems arbitrary, at least from an ethical standpoint.

Moreover, these statistical models sometimes attempt to reduce indicators to an equation that can be used for predictive purposes. If the point of the SPI exercise were to develop a predictive model based on indicator changes, then these statistical techniques (and more advanced ones as well!) would indeed be necessary. But the purpose of social reporting in this case is to direct and catalyze social change through evaluation and feedback. SPIs are not meant to predict the future; nor do they aim to represent mathematically a social theory of everything. Furthermore, these more advanced statistical techniques are not comprehensible

Part I

35

to the layperson with little or no statistical training. As such, their opacity precludes the more participatory approach to indicator construction and development that has been advocated above.

4. Data Quality and Availability

There are problems that arise in the indicator approach related to the quality and availability of data upon which to base SPIs. SPIs cover a broad range of data from different sources, which may not be comparable, may be inaccurate, and may be taken from non-random samples.140 While macro data may be widely available, micro data (looking at the distribution of well-being across different socioeconomic groups, for example) may be less so.141 The issue of comparability becomes especially important when considering indicators across different societies. Reference conditions, such as the setting of the poverty line, may differ, and results must therefore be interpreted with care.142

These are all very important problems, but they need not be intractable. Often a wealth of statistical information exists, but may be stored in widely different locations or formats. In many cases, when the data needed are available, an appropriate mechanism for their systematic evaluation, synthesis and presentation has not been developed. Indeed, “sometimes the need for an idea seems greater than the need for data.”143

5. Objective and Subjective Measures

Whether to use objective or subjective data, or some combination of the two, is another question that arises in the evaluation of social well-being. There are two broad approaches in the social indicators literature: one uses objective and the other uses subjective measures. Both objective and subjective assessments have methodological difficulties, however, and there is no assurance that the two will be positively correlated.144

The Scandinavian approach uses measures of objective living conditions, implying that there are “basic needs” and that the satisfaction of these needs increases people’s well-being.145 One purpose of using only objective measures is that it avoids personal preferences and differences in the interpretation of concepts. A second purpose of the objective approach is to provide government with policy-relevant information, and subjective data can be difficult to

Methodological Considerations

36

interpret in this respect.146

The subjective approach to measuring well-being is associated with an American scholarly tradition that has grown out of social psychology.147 There are difficulties associated with the use of subjective measures as well, not the least of which is that they may lead to an acceptance of the “wantlessness of the poor and the acquiescence of the exploited.”148 Ruut Veenhoven, a proponent of the use of subjective indicators, summarizes the main criticisms of such measures and groups them into two types.149 The first type of objection is pragmatic and includes charges that: subjective indicators are unstable, as attitudinal phenomena can vary over time; they are incomparable, in that the meaning of “very happy” means different things to different people; and they are unintelligible, as people know how they feel, but often do not know why they feel that way. The second type of objection is essential and includes charges that: the correlation between objective and subjective indicators is very weak; and subjective interpretations of reality may be incorrect, as in the case of blue-collar workers who often identify as middle class (the idea of “false consciousness”).

After many years of debate, a consensus has emerged among researchers of social well-being that both objective and subjective measures are needed.150 The mainstream consensus is that subjectivity and objectivity are two sides of the same coin, and that they should both be measured. This type of integrative approach is particularly associated with German work being done in the field and, in particular, with the German Welfare Survey.151

Part I

37

VII. The Evaluation of Social Performance Indicators

The framework for the survey and evaluation of SPIs found in Part II of this paper has been built on a synthesis of the issues discussed above in Part I and some important evaluative criteria found in the literature.

1. Evaluative Criteria in the Literature

Hazel Henderson152 has identified three evaluative criteria for SPIs:

• SPIs require inclusion of all categories relevant to social well-being.

• An interdisciplinary group of statisticians must be employed in indicator selection and index construction.

• The indicators must be unbundled with separate data released to the public media.

Michael R. Hagerty et al.153 have also identified evaluative criteria, some of which are relevant to current study. SPIs should:

• serve a clear practical (public policy) purpose;

• help policymakers develop and assess programs at all territorial scales;

• be based on time series data to allow comparison over time;

• be grounded in well established theory (paths and mediating variables by which policy affects well-being must be known, and have been subjected to empirical test);

38

• have components that are reliable, valid and sensitive (i.e., components must respond to policy);

• be reported as a single number, but have the capacity to be broken down into components;

• have domains that, in aggregate, encompass the totality of life experience;

• have domains, each of which encompasses a substantial but discrete portion of quality of life;

• have domains, each of which has the potential to be measured in both subjective and objective dimensions;

• have domains, each of which must have relevance for most people.

Finally, the Bellagio Principles154 for sustainable development indicator selection and construction specify the following criteria:

• Guiding vision and goals. Assessment of progress toward sustainable development should:

o be guided by a clear vision of sustainable development and goals that define that vision.

• Holistic perspective. Assessment of progress toward sustainable development should:

o include review of the whole system as well as its parts;

o consider the well-being of social, ecological and economic subsystems and their state, as well as the direction and rate of change of their state, their component parts, and the interaction between parts;

o consider both positive and negative consequences of human activity in a way that reflects the costs and benefits for human and ecological systems, both in monetary and non-monetary terms.

• Essential elements. Assessment of progress toward sustainable development should:

o consider equity and disparity within the current population and between present and future generations, dealing with such concerns as resources use, over-consumption and poverty, human rights, and access to services, as appropriate;

o consider the ecological conditions on which life depends;

Part I

39

o consider economic development and other non-market activities that contribute to human and social well-being.

• Adequate scope. Assessment of progress toward sustainable development should:

o adopt a time horizon long enough to capture both human and ecosystem time scales, thus responding to current short-term decision-making needs as well as the needs of future generations;

o define the space of study large enough to include not only local but also long distance impacts on people and ecosystems, and build on historic and current conditions to anticipate future conditions (where we want to go, where we could go).

• Practical Focus:

o an explicit set of categories or an organizing framework that links vision and goals to indicators and assessment criteria;

o a limited number of key issues for analysis;

o a limited number of indicators or indicator combinations to provide a clearer signal of progress;

o measurement that is standardized wherever possible to permit comparison;

o a comparison of indicator values to targets, reference values, ranges, thresholds or direction of trends, as appropriate.

• Openness. Assessment of progress toward sustainable development should:

o make the methods and data that are used accessible to all;

o make explicit all judgments, assumptions and uncertainties in data and interpretations.

• Effective communication. Assessment of progress toward sustainable development should:

o be designed to address the needs of the audience and set of users;

o draw from indicators and other tools that are stimulating and serve to engage decision-makers;

o aim, from the outset, for simplicity in structure and use of clear and plain language.

Evaluation of SPIs

40

• Broad participation. Assessment of progress toward sustainable development should:

o obtain broad representation of key grassroots, professional, technical and social groups, including youth, women and indigenous people, to ensure recognition of diverse and changing values;

o ensure the participation of decision-makers to secure a firm link to adopted policies and resulting action.

• Ongoing assessment. Assessment of progress toward sustainable development should:

o develop a capacity for repeated measurement to determine trends;

o be iterative, adaptive and responsive to change and uncertainty because systems are complex and change frequently;

o adjust goals, frameworks and indicators as new insights are gained;

o promote development of collective learning and feedback to decision-making.

• Institutional capacity. Continuity of the assessment of progress toward sustainable development should be assured by:

o clearly assigning responsibility and providing ongoing support in the decision-making process;

o providing institutional capacity for data collection, maintenance and documentation;

o supporting development of local assessment capacity.

2. Evaluative Criteria Used in This Survey

A synthesis of the above criteria from the literature and the criteria suggested by the analytical discussion in sections II through VI of Part I forms the evaluative framework for the following survey in Part II. Each of the 14 criteria used to evaluate SPIs in the survey is categorized as theoretical, practical or methodological in nature.

Part I

41

i. Theoretical Criteria for Evaluating SPIs

Coherence. Data must be pulled together in a coherent and comprehensible whole that can be disaggregated into subcomponents. Each subcomponent must represent a substantial but discrete component of social performance.

Treatment of Complexity. The approach must adequately acknowledge and account for complexity. The whole system and its subcomponents must be considered, as well as the interactions among the parts and the system as a whole. The SPI should employ an approach that is iterative, adaptive and responsive to changing social, environmental and economic conditions. The approach should foster collective learning, decision-making and feedback to the policy process.

Comprehensiveness. The SPI must represent all aspects of social performance and should be based on a holistic conception of welfare and well-being that is clearly articulated with definitive goals. It must consider social, ecological and economic dimensions (both market and non-market activity), including their current state and processes of change. The concept of well-being must also take into account considerations of intra- and inter-generational equity. In the case of governance indicators, the SPI should represent substantive as well as formal democratic criteria. Both the process and outcome of governance should be embodied in the SPI.

Logic of Framework. The approach must employ a logical framework and draw on work and knowledge that has been done in the field. Indicators should be selected on the basis of this logical framework.

Applicability to Scale. The SPI should be relevant to analysis at all territorial scales, and take into account the interdependence of systems at different territorial scales. The SPI should adopt a time horizon that captures both human and ecosystem time scales. The SPI should allow comparison over time.

ii. Practical Criteria for Evaluating SPIs

Comprehensibility and Appeal. The average person must be able to comprehend the framework, meaning, and methodology of the SPI, and the subcomponent domains should be broadly relevant to most people.

Evaluation of SPIs

42

Inclusiveness and Participation. Processes of indicator selection and index construction must be open, fair, participatory, and inclusive in terms of what is measured, how it is measured, and by whom weightings are determined. The approach must engage an interdisciplinary team. The participation of decision-makers should be assured, as well as participation by representatives of a broad range of groups from civil society, business, and government. Youth, women, indigenous people, and representatives of different ethnic, linguistic and visible minority groups must be included. Consensus-oriented approaches are preferable to majoritarianism.

Policy-relevance and Practicality of Purpose. The SPI must be policy-relevant and have a practical purpose.

Transparency and Accessibility. The data and methodology must be transparent and accessible. Judgments, assumptions, interpretations and uncertainties should be made explicit.

iii. Methodological Criteria for Evaluating SPIs

Data quality and Availability. The data must be reliable and valid, centrally located and available to the public.

Appropriate Use of Objective and Subjective Measures. Both objective and subjective indicators should be used appropriately.

Incorporation of Performance Standards. The SPI must employ clear and constant performance standards.

Appropriate Methods of Scaling and Weighting. The SPI must use appropriate methods of scaling and weighting.

Implication of Substitutability. The method of aggregation cannot imply substitutability amongst non-substitutable components.

Part I

43

VIII. Conclusion

The above discussion broadly outlines some of the important analytical issues that arise when considering the use of social performance indicators (SPIs). The first of these, the relationship between SPIs and democracy, is perhaps most important. As a form of condensed and meaningful information, a thoughtfully designed indicator set can help inform the political decisions of busy citizens and politicians. And the actual process of constructing an SPI can in itself foster greater democracy, if that process is both participatory and inclusive.

While the social indicators movement became popular in the 1960s and 1970s, it became all but moribund by the 1980s. Recently, there has been a renewed interest in the SPI approach, sparked particularly by increasing environmental concerns and the challenge of human development. This renewed interest warrants a consideration of the general utility of the approach, as its quantitative and value-oriented nature can be a source of contention. Indicator sets that have come to influence private and public decision-making carry the risks of intellectual reductionism, ideological hegemony, and the creation of unintended, negative consequences. In some senses, influence is a double-edged sword. A successful SPI must be influential, as the indicator is intended to catalyze positive change and must therefore feed into public consciousness. At the same time, an influential, but poorly or narrowly designed, SPI has the potential to generate and reinforce negative social behavior and trends. A participatory, inclusive approach to SPI development—while potentially fostering greater democracy—can help to overcome these dangers.

44

In considering the approach, a question arises as to what the appropriate agency for improving social performance might be. Traditionally, the provision and enhancement of welfare has been the responsibility of public institutions. In recent decades, however, global and domestic developments have called into question the appropriate role of the state; some have argued that functions traditionally performed by government are better delivered by civil society or markets. It is argued here that governmental responsibility for social performance is still an aspect of contemporary understandings of governance and welfare. If social performance is the responsibility of government, a question still remains as to whether government is, in fact, able to influence social outcomes to a sufficient extent. It is argued here that the ability to influence social outcomes and the actual improvement of social performance are mutually reinforcing. Moreover, both civil society and markets are dependent upon well-functioning public institutions and are incapable of independently improving social performance.

In sum, Part I of this paper has shown the value of the SPI approach, despite important caveats. Further, it has demonstrated that social performance requires public institutions that are robust, able and influential.

Part I

PART II:

SURVEY AND EVALUATION OF

SOCIAL PERFORMANCE

INDICATORS

47

IX. Introduction

Part II of this report surveys 12 social reporting projects that produce SPIs: The Wellbeing Assessment; the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) Indicators of Sustainable Development; EuReporting; the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Environmental Indicators; the World Bank Governance Indicators; the Millennium Development Goals; the OECD Social Indicators; Freedom in the World; the Human Development Index (HDI); the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI); the Canadian Sustainable Development Indicators; and Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). (The list of initiatives from which these 12 were selected can be found on pages 119-122 in Appendix B.)

While there are certainly other projects worthy of analysis, the 12 projects surveyed here were chosen to illustrate a broad array of contemporary approaches to indicator construction and to illustrate the issues that arise from the use of specific methodologies. They represent social, political and environmental studies, as well as studies that are more cross-disciplinary in nature. Because the focus of this paper is on the development of comprehensive measures of social well-being, broadly conceived, some projects were selected because they incorporate many aspects of social, ecological and economic life.

The Wellbeing Assessment, the UNCSD Indicators of Sustainable Development, EuReporting, and the GPI all fall into the category of comprehensive, broad-based indicator sets. At the same time, each of these four projects employs a different methodology, illustrating the strengths and challenges of various approaches. The Canadian Sustainable Development Indicators project was chosen to provide a look at current initiatives in Canada, while the HDI and Millennium Development Goals projects illustrate some of the challenges faced by lower-income countries and the international community. Because the area of

48

governance and institutional performance is both difficult to measure and important, three projects measuring this aspect of social performance were examined in detail: Transparency International’s CPI, the World Bank Governance Indicators, and Freedom in the World. The OECD Social and Environmental Indicators projects were selected to provide a more detailed look at the social and environmental domains.

For each project, the survey includes three components: an overview, a description of its methodology, and an evaluation. (Additional details about some projects can be found in Appendix B.) Each evaluation includes: a table recording the scores assigned to the project on the basis of the 14 evaluative criteria set out in Part I; and an assessment of the project in terms of the theoretical, practical and methodological categories of evaluative criteria. The theoretical evaluation includes an assessment of the project’s coherence, treatment of complexity, comprehensiveness, the logic of the project framework, and its applicability to scale. The practical evaluation includes an assessment of the project’s comprehensibility and appeal, inclusiveness and participation, policy-relevance and practicality of purpose, and transparency and accessibility. The methodological evaluation includes an assessment of data quality and availability, appropriate use of objective and subjective measures, incorporation of performance standards, appropriate methods of scaling and weighting, and the implications of substitutability.

For every project, each of these 14 criteria has been ranked on a scale from 0 to 3 (0 = “inadequate,” 1 = “marginal,” 2 = “adequate,” 3 = “good”), except where the criterion is not applicable (N/A). An overall score for each project has been calculated by determining a total score and converting it to a score out of 100.

All 12 projects represent a wealth of high quality work in the field of social performance measurement, much of it cross-disciplinary and far-reaching. Lower numeric scores often stem from the fact that these projects were, of course, not designed to meet the particular evaluative criteria used in this paper. Regardless of score, each initiative makes a very important contribution to the ongoing development of meaningful measures of social well-being.

Part II

49

X. Evaluation

1. The Wellbeing Assessment

Overview

Robert Prescott-Allen pioneered the concept of well-being assessment in his 2001 book, The Wellbeing of Nations: A Country-by-Country Index of Quality of Life and the Environment.155 The Wellbeing Assessment is an attempt to provide a navigational aid toward the goal of sustainable development, and evaluates the well-being of people and the ecosystem, as well as human-ecosystem interactions. The well-being assessment approach consists of four indices: the Human Wellbeing Index (HWI); the Ecosystem Wellbeing Index (EWI); the Wellbeing Index (WI), which compares and contrasts human and ecosystem well-being; and Wellbeing/Stress Index (WSI), which relates the amount of national human well-being to the amount of environmental stress caused by a given country. People and the ecosystem are treated equally, and their interdependence is related through the metaphor of the “egg of well-being”: “just as an egg can be good only if both the yolk and white are good, so a society can be well and sustainable only if both people and the ecosystem are well.”156 The ecosystem condition is represented by the white of the egg, and the human condition is represented by the yolk. Prescott-Allen has carried out well-being assessments for 180 countries and has found that “no country is sustainable or even close.”157

The aim of the approach is to provide several essentials for the achievement of sustainable development: a clear statement of goals; a mechanism for measuring progress toward such goals; a tool for prioritizing action; and a process to “keep the goal constantly in mind”

50

and foster a learning process as to how it can be attained.158 However, Prescott-Allen acknowledges that any attempt to map the complex and interactive nature of human societies and the ecosystem will never be perfect, and will be influenced by conflicting values as to what is important. Consequently, he concedes that the well-being assessment is not definitive, but rather, “a framework for reflection and debate” that can help to further progress toward the achievement of sustainable development.159 Prescott-Allen offers an invitation to countries and those with different viewpoints to review and test the framework, and to expose and explore dynamics that occur within the state and that may be masked by national-level analysis. MethodologyThe common framework informing the construction of the four indices listed above is based on two subsystems (people and ecosystem), which are each divided into five dimensions. These dimensions are further divided into elements, for which a goal is identified. (See table below for subsystems, dimensions and elements, and Appendix B for stated objectives.) If an element is very broad, it may be divided into sub-elements. The element/sub-element is then assigned one or more indicators, for which performance criteria are chosen.

The indicators are standardized using performance criteria, as discussed in Part I of the report, and assigned a numeric value (ranging from a 0 base to a possible maximum of 100, representing best achievable performance as defined by the performance standard). The indicators are then aggregated into element indices (or sub-element indices, which are then aggregated into element indices). The method of aggregation varies: when appropriate, a simple average is taken of the indicators or sub-elements; in other cases, the indicator that yields the lowest value (i.e., the worst performance) is taken as the score for the element/sub-element index. For instance, the Household Wealth Index (which is an element of the Wealth dimension) is composed of a simple average of a Needs sub-element index and an Income sub-element index. The Needs sub-element index is composed of the lower score of a food sufficiency indicator and a basic service indicator. The food sufficiency indicator is represented by the lowest score of: the percentage of the population with insufficient food; the prevalence of stunted children; or the prevalence of underweight children. The Wealth dimension index is composed of a simple average (equal weighting) of the Household Wealth Index and the National Wealth Index.

Part II

51

People

Dimensions Elements

Health and PopulationHealth

Population

WealthHousehold Wealth

National Wealth

Knowledge and CultureKnowledge

Culture

CommunityFreedom and Governance

Peace and Order

EquityHousehold Equity

Gender Equity

Ecosystem

Dimensions Elements

LandLand Diversity

Land Quality

WaterInland Waters

Sea

AirGlobal Atmosphere

Local Air Quality

Species and GenesWild Diversity

Domesticated Diversity

Resource UseEnergy and Materials

Resource Sectors

An average of the indices of health and population, wealth, knowledge and culture, community, and equity or an average of the indices of health and population, wealth, knowledge and culture, and community — whichever is lower — comprises the HWI. The result is that equity is included in the index when it lowers the HWI of a country, and excluded when it raises the HWI. In the latter case, human development is low throughout the country, “so what is being shared is misery....equity is excluded to avoid making conditions look rosier than they are.”160 The EWI is composed of an average of the indices


52

of land, water, air, species and genes, and resource use, or an average of the indices of land, water, air, and species and genes — whichever is lower. Where resource use lowers the EWI, it is included in order to account for ecosystem impacts that may not turn up in national indicators. (For instance, the export of environmental damage to countries from which imports originate is important, but may not turn up in national indicators.) If national indicators do reflect resource consumption, the EWI would remain unchanged or improved. In the latter case, the EWI resource consumption dimension is excluded in order to avoid double counting.

The WSI is the ratio of human well-being to ecosystem stress. Ecosystem stress is conceived as the opposite of well-being, and is derived by subtracting the EWI from 100 to yield an Ecosystem Stress Index (ESI). The WSI is yielded by dividing the HWI by the ESI. The WI presents the HWI and EWI together in a visual “barometer of sustainability.” The Barometer is a two-dimensional graph with human well-being on the vertical axis and ecosystem well-being on the horizontal axis, which is divided into equidistant, color-coded qualitative performance bands (0-20 is “bad”; 81-100 is “good”). The WI is the point on the Barometer where the HWI and the EWI intersect. For instance, Canada receives an HWI of 78 and an EWI of 43, and the intersection of these two values yields a WI in the yellow, “medium” performance band. Prescott-Allen has also presented the “structure of well-being” for certain countries by plotting the values of the human and ecosystem dimensions on the Barometer. Because the HWI and EWI are averages of these dimensions, the dimension values form a cross with the HWI-EWI intersection in the centre (human dimensions are plotted vertically, ecosystem dimensions horizontally).

EvaluationThe well-being assessment approach receives a very positive review in terms of the evaluative criteria established in Part I of the report. A tremendous volume of data has been pulled together by Prescott-Allen in a very clear fashion, and all the disaggregated data are available in the Appendix of The Wellbeing of Nations. The complexity of human and ecological systems is well represented, particularly by the establishment of “critical” performance thresholds, the acknowledgement of systemic interdependence, and the basing of indices on the lowest performing indicator, where appropriate. Use of the lowest indicator implies that overall system performance cannot be considered satisfactory if certain subcomponents fare poorly. The framework is highly comprehensive, though the inclusion of more substantive aspects of governance and attention to the issue of social cohesion in the index would be beneficial. Similarly, indicators for the culture element of the knowledge and

Part II

53

culture dimension have yet to be developed, and their inclusion would be very valuable. The framework is logical and consistent, and the approach incorporates both short- and long-term time horizons. The territorial scales addressed most effectively by well-being assessments are the regional, national and international scales, while the approach is less relevant to the local scale (though not irrelevant).

In practical terms, the framework, meaning and methodology of the well-being assessment approach is both comprehensible and appealing. The Element Objectives and indicator performance criteria articulate clear goals that can be easily translated into a policy context. The data and methodology are transparent and accessible, and Prescott-Allen has acknowledged the role of values in constructing indices of social well-being. The process of designing the well-being assessment approach, however, has not been genuinely participatory. The Wellbeing of Nations was indeed written in cooperation with six NGOs and UN organizations,161 and Prescott-Allen has invited countries and individuals to test, explore, debate and reflect upon the approach. It is hoped that local and national exploration of the approach will be constructed in a participatory and inclusive manner, using his work as a point of reference and focus.

Methodologically, the data is centrally located and available to the public, though Prescott-Allen has noted that the well-being assessment project has been constrained by poor data reliability, particularly with respect to environmental information.162 No subjective indicators were used,163 and their inclusion would be beneficial—particularly with respect to the knowledge and culture, and community dimensions. The performance standard method of scaling is excellent, the use of the lowest indicator is often an appropriate method of weighting, and the decision to keep the HWI and EWI as separate numbers avoids the implication of a human-environment trade-off. However, the simple averaging of the dimensions to produce the HWI and EWI does imply substitutability amongst these components. Displaying the dimensions as sections of a circle, with the performance score indicated as distance from the centre of the circle, could help avoid this implication of substitutability. The circle could be colour-coded using Prescott-Allen’s system of performance bands, beginning with “bad” closest to the centre, and radiating outward in concentric bands to “good.” The plotted values of the performance scores could be connected with a line, yielding an image that might be called the “web of sustainability.”


54


2. UNCSD Indicators of Sustainable Development

Overview

The United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) was founded in 1992 in order to ensure effective follow-up on the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The Commission is serviced by the UN Division for Sustainable Development, under the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs. During the 1992 UNCED summit, assembled leaders adopted Agenda 21, a comprehensive plan for achieving sustainable development in the twenty-first century. Chapter 40 of Agenda 21 specifically calls for the construction of indicators of sustainable development

Evaluative Criteria ScoreCoherence 3

Treatment of Complexity 3

Comprehensiveness 2.5

Logic of Framework 3

Applicability to Scale 2.5

Comprehensibility and Appeal 3

Inclusiveness and Participation 0.5

Policy-relevance and Practicality of Purpose 3

Transparency and Accessibility 3

Data Quality and Availability 3

Appropriate Use of Objective and Subjective Measures 0.5

Incorporation of Performance Standards 3

Appropriate Methods of Scaling and Weighting 3

Implication of Substitutability 2.5

Total Score 35.5

Number of Criteria Ranked 14

Average (total score/3 x # of criteria ranked)) x 100 84.5

URL Altavista Linkshttp://web.idrc.ca/en/ev-9433-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html 0

Part II

55

that can inform policymaking and decision-making at all territorial scales. A comprehensive indicators project was initiated by UNCSD in 1995, and named the CSD Work Programme on Indicators of Sustainable Development.164 The key elements of the work program have been identified as follows: enhancement of information exchange and data accessibility; development of methodology sheets for indicators under consideration; training and capacity building at national and regional levels related to sustainable development indicators; testing and evaluation of indicators under consideration; analysis of the linkages among the social, economic, ecological and institutional aspects of sustainable development; and development of highly aggregated indicators.165

The work program has consisted of three main phases. The first phase (May 1995–1996) consisted of the development of indicator methodology sheets, based on a “cooperative, consultative and collaborative approach” involving UN agencies, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, and representatives of national agencies. Each methodology sheet is presented in a consistent format that includes: a basic description of the indicator; its policy-relevance and applicable international targets and conventions; a conceptual and methodological explanation of the indicator, as well as its limitations and alternative definitions; data availability; and a list of the agency(ies) involved in indicator construction, as well as contact points and further reading sources. The second phase of the program (May 1996–January 1998) focused on training and capacity building at regional and national levels, with particular priority placed on the identification of national priorities and their relevance to indicator utilization. This phase also consisted of a period of participatory, multi-stakeholder national testing, involving 22 countries from Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, the Americas and the Caribbean. The third phase of the program (January 1999–December 2000) has involved: evaluation of results from the testing period; development of a revised working list of indicators and a conceptual framework based on these results; and consideration of the linkages among, and aggregation of, sustainable development indicators.166

Methodology

While the original conceptual framework proposed by the CSD work program was based on a driving force-state-response approach related to the goals set out in the various chapters of Agenda 21, the framework has since evolved. It is now based on a theme/subtheme approach, in order to render it more explicitly policy-relevant, and in order that future risk, the relationships among themes, and performance goals and targets can be assessed.167 The overall framework

UNCSD Indicators

56

is based on four overarching domains: social; environmental; economic; and institutional (see below). Each of these domains is subdivided into themes, which are, in turn, subdivided into sub-themes. Each sub-theme is then assigned one or more indicators, for which a publicly accessible methodology sheet has been prepared. Data on these indicators are available for most countries via the CSD’s website.168 The four main domains and themes are listed below, and the relevant sub-themes and indicators can be found in Appendix B.

I. Social1) Equity2) Health3) Education4) Housing5) Security6) Population

II. Environmental1) Atmosphere2) Land3) Oceans, Seas and Coasts4) Fresh Water5) Biodiversity

III. Economic1) Economic Structure2) Consumption and Production Patterns

IV. Institutional1) Institutional Framework

2) Institutional Capacity

A method of aggregation is currently under development and has not yet been definitively articulated. A background report on the aggregation of sustainable development indicators, provided to the 9th Session of the UNCSD in April 2001, evaluated current methods of aggregation and related issues.169 The report acknowledges the difficulty of establishing an appropriate weighting scheme, both scientifically and politically, and also calls for complete transparency in the aggregation process. The report states that the most preferred method of determining weighting is the “distance-to-target” method, by which a target reference for an indicator can be developed from legal, international or political agreements or goals.170 The distance-to-target method entails ascribing higher weights to components that are further away from their stated performance standard, and then summing these weighted components.171 The aggregation process that has been suggested for the UNCSD indicators is to sum the weighted

Part II

57

indicators into a subtheme index, and then to weigh and sum the subthemes into theme indices. The theme indices would then have to be aggregated, which the UNCSD has recognized as the most complex aspect of the aggregation process.172 One promising approach that has been recommended is to present the index for each theme separately in a single visual chart. (For instance, each theme would be represented by an equal section of a circle and the value of the theme index would be represented as the distance from the center of the circle.)

Evaluation

The work of the UNCSD receives a positive evaluation in theoretical, practical, and methodological terms, though this evaluation is contingent on the aggregation method that is ultimately adopted by the program. Theoretically, the approach is coherent, in that the proposed aggregation method seeks to pull data into a cohesive whole, while data are still accessible at a disaggregated level. The approach has explicitly sought to represent the inherent complexity of social performance – particularly in terms of future risk and subcomponent interdependence – and has adopted an iterative and adaptive approach that fosters collective learning and policy feedback. It is quite comprehensive in its coverage, but the approach could benefit from the inclusion of indicators on social cohesion and an expanded conception of performance in the institutional domain. The framework is consistent and logical and builds on existing knowledge. It is relevant to both short- and long-term time horizons, though it is most applicable to the national and international territorial scale by design.

Practically, the framework and methodology are comprehensible and relevant, as each indicator is explained in plain language in a publicly accessible methodology sheet accessible via the Internet. Discussions of aggregation are similarly explained clearly and made available to the public for review. The process of indicator selection has been highly inclusive and participatory, though it could be made even more so by the explicit engagement of socially marginalized groups at the grassroots level. The work program has gone to great lengths to ensure that the framework and chosen indicators are policy-relevant and serve a practical purpose, and it has also emphasized that transparency and accessibility of both data and methodology are absolutely essential.

Methodologically, data quality has been addressed through an emphasis on common methodology, harmonized terminology and internationally compatible classification systems.173 Relevant data is accessible through the CSD’s Web site, but links often refer to outside data

UNCSD Indicators

58

sources such as the World Bank or other UN agencies. Compilation of data into one electronic source that could be sorted and queried would make the process of information retrieval and comparison less cumbersome from a user’s perspective. The CSD approach only uses objective indicators, and could benefit from the inclusion of some subjective ones. There are international performance standards for each subtheme listed in Annex I of the Guidelines and Methodologies,174 and the incorporation of such standards – perhaps by a distance-to-target aggregation scheme – would be very fruitful. The difficulties associated with scaling and weighting methods have been acknowledged by the UNCSD; it is hoped that an appropriate method of aggregation will be developed. The issue of subcomponent substitutability was not directly addressed in the reports reviewed, but the presentation of theme indices in a single visual chart (as described above) would avoid the implication of substitutability among component themes.


Evaluative Criteria ScoreCoherence NA

Treatment of Complexity NA



Applicability to Scale 2


Inclusiveness and Participation 2




Appropriate Use of Objective and Subjective Measures 0.5


Appropriate Methods of Scaling and Weighting NA

Implication of Substitutability NA

Total Score 25



URL Altavista Linkshttp://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/natlinfo/indicators/isd.htm 467

Part II

59

3. EuReporting OverviewEuReporting was established in 1998 by the European Commission (DG XII G) Targeted Socio-Economic Research (TSER) Programme, the objective of which is to create a science-based social reporting and welfare measurement system for the EU. The project is comprised of three subprojects: the European System of Social Indicators (EUSI) subproject is focused on the development of a European system of indicators; the Stocktaking of Comparative Databases in Survey Research subproject aims to create an accessible, unified database of cross-national, cross-sectional survey data with an emphasis on international comparability; and the Access to Comparative Official Microdata subproject assesses major official surveys in terms of content, comparability and availability.175

The process of European integration has provided the impetus behind the project, as the stated goals of the Maastricht treaty include the improvement of living conditions and quality of life in EU member states. An analysis of the values and political goals embodied in EU treaties (Rome, 1957; Maastricht, 1992; Amsterdam 1997) and in various official documents of the European Commission provides the political basis of the EuReporting Project. The political goals of the European Union have been categorized into three broad areas, including: the improvement of people’s social and economic living conditions and quality of life; the strengthening of social and economic cohesion; and sustainability. These three categories have been broken down further into specific policy areas and issues.176 The categorization of political goals, for example, corresponds to three theoretical conceptions of welfare: quality of life (in both objective and subjective terms); social cohesion (which subsumes the concepts of social exclusion and social capital); and sustainability (which is assessed using the World Bank’s Multiple Capital Approach).177

Methodology

As of Fall 2003, work on the EuReporting project had focused on the development of a conceptual framework for indicator selection and presentation, and the collection and compilation of indicators. The construction of composite indexes that compress the multitude of indicators will be considered at a later stage in the project.178 Though a particular methodology for composite index construction has yet to be identified, the underlying theoretical and conceptual framework is well developed and worthy of consideration. The architecture of the system encompasses thirteen “life domains”:179

EuReporting

60

1) Population, Household and Family 2) Housing 3) Transport 4) Leisure, Media and Culture 5) Social and Political Participation and Integration 6) Education and Vocational Training 7) Labor Market and Working Conditions 8) Income, Standard of Living, Consumption Patterns 9) Health10) Environment 11) Social Security12) Public Safety and Crime13) Total Life Situation

Each of these life domains is evaluated in terms of six “goal dimensions,” which correspond to the theoretical welfare conceptions of quality of life, social cohesion and sustainability. These six goal dimensions include: “improvement of objective living conditions; enhancement of subjective well-being; reduction of disparities, inequalities and social exclusion, and promotion of equal opportunities; strengthening of social connections and ties (social capital); preservation of human capital; and preservation of natural capital.”180 Because the project also seeks to chart changes in attitudes, values and social structure, two further goal dimensions are also included: demographic and socioeconomic structures; and values and attitudes.181

For each goal dimension, several “measurement dimensions” are identified, most of which are further broken down into “subdimensions.” From one to several indicators are then selected to measure a given subdimension. For example, the “improvement of objective living conditions” goal dimension of the “Labor Market and Working Conditions” life domain includes five measurement dimensions: labor market opportunities and risks; employment level and potential; working conditions; mobility; and unemployment and underemployment. Unemployment, for example, is broken down further into four subdimensions: level of unemployment; duration of unemployment; subsistence of unemployed persons; and level of underemployment. The subdimension of “duration of unemployment” is assessed with four indicators: short-term, mid-term, long-term and very long-term unemployment.182 The architecture of the system necessitates the collection and compilation of a huge body of indicators. Currently, indicators and data are available for seven out of thirteen life domains: population, households and families; housing; labor market and working conditions; education and vocational training; income, standard of living and consumption patterns; health; and total life situation.183

Part II

61

Evaluation

In theoretical terms, EuReporting meets many of the criteria outlined above, though a complete evaluation is contingent on the development of aggregation techniques. In its current state, EuReporting is coherent insofar as indicators are disaggregated in consistent categories that represent subcomponents of social performance that are both significant and discrete. Until a method of composite index construction is developed, however, the coherence of the approach remains somewhat inadequate. Though the hundreds of indicators that are being compiled under the project are consistently organized, it is quite difficult to gain an overall picture of social performance without any degree of aggregation. Similarly, an evaluation of the degree to which the approach acknowledges and accounts for complexity must await the development of a composite index. The approach may yield a promising outcome, as the volume and range of indicators under consideration offer the potential for an intricate and relational understanding of both the social whole and its components. The EuReporting project is extremely comprehensive, and employs a theoretically well grounded and highly logical framework. The approach can nominally be applied at all territorial scales, and offers potential for the analysis of the relationships among different scales. Through its focus on sustainability, it adopts an appropriate temporal scale, and the presentation of annual indicators since 1980 (where feasible) will allow for comparison over time.

The EuReporting approach fares well in practical terms, with the exception of the inclusive and participatory features of the approach. Though the conceptual framework is theoretically quite sophisticated, the life domains and goal dimensions are comprehensible and appealing. The focus of the project is explicitly related to the political aims and policy issues of European integration, and is therefore policy-relevant and practical. At the same time, the data and methodology are highly transparent and accessible. The scrutiny of the scientific community and of policymakers has been invited, and the reaction from these arenas will be taken into account to both validate and improve the EuReporting approach.184 Because a process of broad public consultation and deliberation has not been implemented, however, the process of indicator selection and construction is highly expert-driven. Therefore, the EuReporting approach does not currently meet the criteria for an inclusive and participatory approach to the evaluation of social performance.

Methodologically, data quality and availability are important goals of the project, and both objective and subjective indicators are used in a judicious and appropriate manner. An

EuReporting

62

evaluation of scaling and weighting techniques and substitutability among components cannot be made until a method of indicator aggregation has been identified for the project. While detailed trends of social performance will be monitored and reported under the scheme, there are currently no explicit tangible performance standards against which progress towards EU policy goals can be measured. The inclusion of such standards in a composite index would be beneficial.

EuReporting


Treatment of Complexity NA

Comprehensiveness 3








Appropriate Use of Objective and Subjective Measures 3




Total Score 24


Average (total score/3 x # of criteria ranked)) x 100 80

URL Altavista Linkshttp://www.gesis.org/en/social_monitoring/social_indicators/EU_Reporting/ 0

Part II

63

4. OECD Environmental Indicators

OverviewThe OECD has regularly published and systematically used environmental indicators since 1991.185 The purpose of the environmental indicators program is to track environmental progress, and to ensure that environmental concerns are incorporated into economic and sectoral policy.186 The work on indicators has been carried out in close cooperation between the OECD and its member countries, as well as with Russia and China, and is specifically geared to be policy-relevant. Collective learning is also fostered through close collaboration with the UN, the World Bank, and the European Union.187 The environmental indicators have been used by the OECD to carry out environmental performance analyses, which has created “a synergy in which regular feedback is provided on the indicators’ policy-relevance and analytical soundness.”188 The OECD also aims to further expand the indicators to include social-environmental dynamics, and integrate the environmental indicators into a broader set of sustainable development indicators.189 The OECD is attempting to promote integration through the publication of sectoral environmental indicators (those that pertain to the transportation industry, for example) and the development of environmental accounting methodologies.190 Indicators are selected on the basis of policy-relevance, analytical soundness and measurability, and the core set is structured according to 14 major issues, outlined below. State, pressure and response indicators have been identified for each major issue area.191

1) Climate change 2) Ozone layer depletion 3) Eutrophication 4) Acidification 5) Toxic contamination 6) Urban environmental quality 7) Biodiversity 8) Cultural landscapes 9) Waste10) Water resources11) Forest resources12) Fish resources13) Soil degradation (desertification, erosion)14) Socioeconomic, sectoral and general indicators


64

MethodologyThe OECD utilizes a PSR framework that has subsequently been adopted as a common harmonized framework by OECD members.192 The PSR framework is illustrated by the following figure, which is based on OECD Environmental Indicators 2001 (134):

Figure 4: PSR Framework

Sixteen environmental indicators are presented in OECD Environmental Indicators 2000, each of which follows this PSR framework. Eighteen socioeconomic indicators are also presented, and the links among these and the environmental indicators are identified. (A list of the environmental and socioeconomic indicators is presented in Appendix B.) Graphical representations of trends over time, and tables including data for each OECD country, are also included for each indicator. The relationships among the component indicators are also identified. The indicators have not been aggregated, though the OECD has presented a study

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

��

Part II

65

on aggregation procedures193 and intends to “produce aggregated indices when feasible and policy-relevant.”194 The OECD maintains that neither state and response indicators nor objective and subjective indicators should be aggregated together,195 which differs from the approach taken in this report.

Evaluation

In theoretical terms, the coherence of the OECD approach suffers because the data are disaggregated to such a degree. The PSR model has been criticized for not adequately accounting for complexity. However, the OECD’s careful mapping of subcomponent interactions, and the organization’s deliberate attempt to link its environmental indicators into broader measures of sustainable development, do acknowledge complexity. The indicators have been developed in an adaptive and iterative fashion, fostering collective learning and feedback to the policy process. While the framework is focused mainly on environmental concerns, the OECD does pay attention to social-economic-ecological linkages, with the ultimate aim of situating the environmental indicators in a broader sustainable development framework. The conceptual framework is theoretically well grounded, and the approach is used in a very consistent fashion. The approach is most relevant to the national, international, and global scales, and the long-term implications of environmental degradation are implicitly acknowledged.

From a practical perspective, the major issue areas are relatively intuitive, though the PSR framework and the numerous indicator linkages may be overwhelming. The ten key environmental indicators ameliorate this problem, but may evoke a “basket of interesting facts” syndrome. The process of indicator selection and construction has been fairly technocratic, though there has been direct involvement of member countries and intergovernmental organizations. The indicators are highly policy-relevant and practical, and the data and methodology are both transparent and accessible.

Methodologically, attention has been paid to issues of data quality, validity and comparability, and the indicator data are presented in OECD Environmental Indicators 2001. Neither subjective indicators nor performance standards have been used, while the issues of scaling, weighting and substitutability are not applicable, as no aggregation has been performed.


66


5. World Bank Governance Indicators

OverviewIn response to a recent “surge of interest in the consequences of governance and misgovernance for development”,196 the World Bank Institute initiated a project in 1998 aimed at developing comprehensive measures of governance. Several hundred indicators have been compiled and aggregated, and will continue to be updated in order to provide “valuable benchmarks for policymakers, donor agencies, civil society and development experts.”197 The indicators have been called “the most comprehensive and best-quality database available on governance indicators.”198 Governance is conceived as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised,” and includes aspects of democratic process, state capacity, and the respect given to institutions by both citizens



Comprehensiveness 3












Total Score 20.5



URL Altavista Linkshttp://www.oecd.org/department/0,2688,en_2649_34441_1_1_1_1_1,00.html 551

Part II

67

and the state.”199 Measures of governance have been broken down into six clusters: voice and accountability; political stability and absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and, control of corruption.200 Indicators for these clusters have been drawn from 25 different sources generated by 18 different organizations. The sources include both polls of experts, and surveys of citizens and business people (see Appendix B).201

MethodologyThe indicators are standardized by subtracting the minimum possible score from the indicator, and then dividing by the difference between the possible maximum and minimum scores (all indicators are thus standardized on a scale from 0 to 1).202 An index is then generated using an unobserved components model, which assumes that observed governance indicators can be written as a linear function of unobserved governance plus a random error term: Where: there are k = 1,…,K indicators for j = 1,…,J countries y(j,k) is the observed score of country j on indicator k g(j) is a linear function of unobserved governance ε(j,k) is a disturbance term and α(k) and β(k) are unknown parameters that relate g(j) to y(j,k)

The governance estimate for a given country is the mean of the distribution of unobserved governance, conditional on the observed scores for that country. The conditional mean is derived, using the following formula:

The weights are inversely proportional to the variance of the error term of source k, and are given by the equation:

The unknown parameters, α(k), β(k) and (k), are estimated using a standard application of the unobserved components model. Almost all scores fall on the interval -2.5 to 2.5, with better scores corresponding to better performance.203

k))(j,(g(j)(k)(k)k)y(j, ��

(k)(k)k)y(j,w(k)K(j))]y(j,y(j,1),...|E[g(j)

K(j)

1k ��

K(j)

1k

2�

2�

(k)�1

(k)�w(k)


��

68

EvaluationThe huge volume of data amassed by the Governance Indicators project has been pulled together coherently, and both composite and cluster indices have been made available. While the raw data underlying the indices are not made available, the authors do indicate the exact questions that have been included from the sources for each cluster.204 While relationships among the clusters are not addressed specifically, there is an implicit understanding that governance is one node of a complex social reality. For instance, the authors acknowledge that governance is an important ingredient for socioeconomic development, but also that socioeconomic development affects governance outcomes.205 The World Bank Indicators take a highly comprehensive and multidimensional view of governance, and include measures ranging from the animation of civil society, money laundering and inside trading to the prevalence of terrorism. Comprehensiveness might be improved by including ecological considerations in the regulatory quality cluster. Both substantive and formal aspects of democracy are measured, as are characteristics of both process and outcome. The definition of governance and the six clusters are logical and the indicators have been selected consistently, according to the framework used here. The indicators are only relevant at the national level, and comparisons over time and between countries are problematic due to the large margins of error associated with the aggregation process.206

In practical terms, the framework chosen by the authors is fairly straightforward. The interactive Web site also enables the user to view world maps colour-coded for governance performance, as well as bar and star charts of the percentile ranking of a given country.207 These tools make the results easy to interpret. But the methodology used to generate the composite and cluster indices is probably not accessible to those without advanced statistical training. The process of indicator selection and construction has been technocratic rather than participatory, though it is an improvement over Transparency International’s index, as the viewpoints of the general citizenry have been taken into account. The indicators are intended to be policy-relevant and practical, and have been utilized by NGOs and by the U.S. and other governments.208 Both the data and methodology are transparent and accessible (if not entirely comprehensible).

Methodologically, the authors have utilized the unobserved components model and method of weighting in order to diminish the impact of noisy data. The composite and cluster measures are centrally located and publicly available. Only subjective data are used because it is difficult to develop objective measures of governance. Performance standards are included implicitly in the scaling method, and also in the percentile ranking charts and

Part II

69

colour-coded maps. The method of scaling is appropriate, but the weighting procedure is problematic. The weight of each component is based on the variance of the error term for that component, though weighting is intrinsically normative and not necessarily amenable to such a mechanical procedure. Substitutability is implied by the method of aggregation, though it is not as extreme a problem as in other cases, as only one domain of social performance is under review. The interactive Web site also produces star charts based on the percentile ranking of each cluster index; these do not imply substitutability.


Evaluative Criteria ScoreCoherence 2.5


Comprehensiveness 3



Comprehensibility and Appeal 1.5



Transparency and Accessibility 2.5

Data Quality and Availability 2.5



Appropriate Methods of Scaling and Weighting 1.5

Implication of Substitutability 2.5

Total Score 29.5



URL Altavista Linkshttp://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters3.html

58


70

6. Millennium Development Goals

OverviewThe UN Millennium Declaration was adopted by the General Assembly at the September 2002 UN Millennium Summit. The Declaration is comprised of eight sections that outline general principles, values and specific resolutions and goals. The idea of “collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the global level” and an affirmation to uphold the purposes and principles of the UN Charter are enshrined in Section I. This section also affirms six fundamental values as essential to contemporary international relations: freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature, and shared responsibility. The following seven sections deal with thematic issues: peace, security, and disarmament; development and poverty eradication; protecting our common environment; human rights, democracy and good governance; protecting the vulnerable; meeting the special needs of Africa; and strengthening the United Nations.209 Fifty-six specific goals, concerning the implementation of the resolutions contained in the Millennium Declaration, are identified in the 2001 Report of the Secretary-General.210

At the Summit, all 191 UN Member States agreed that they would meet eight of these goals by the year 2015; these are the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs are intended to provide a unified framework to guide the activities of the entire UN system, and they are being incorporated into all aspects of country-level work. Country-level and global monitoring measures progress toward these goals, and involves national and UN agencies, the OECD, the World Bank and IMF, as well as the private sector and civil society. The UN and civil society have also undertaken an important advocacy role, launching country-based Millennium Campaigns in an effort to raise awareness and stimulate public opinion. Additionally, Kofi Annan has commissioned the Millennium Project, which is charged with recommending (by June 2005) the best strategies for implementing the MDGs. Headed by Jeffrey Sachs, the Project researches and evaluates practice, policy and financing options, drawing on current work in the field, a network of scholars, UN agencies, policy-makers, and public, nongovernmental, civil society and private institutions.211 During the 2002 International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, the issue of funding and economic reform in support of the MDGs was addressed. 212

MethodologyThe MDGs consist of eight prioritized goals from the Millennium Declaration, for which eighteen targets have been established and 48 indicators selected. To date, there has

Part II

71

apparently been no initiative to aggregate the indicators into a composite index. The goals and targets are listed below, and the associated indicators can be found in Appendix B. The data associated with the indicators are publicly available on the Web site of the UN Statistics Division.213 A handbook has been prepared, explaining each indicator and including metadata sheets that outline the following information: indicator definition; the goal and target addressed by the indicator; the rationale for the use of indicator; the method of computation; sources of data; references; periodicity of measurement; gender and disaggregation issues; limitations of the indicator; and national and international agencies involved in data collection, compilation or dissemination.

Goal 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

Target 1. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day.

Target 2. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.

Goal 2. Achieve universal primary education

Target 3. Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling.

Goal 3. Promote gender equality and empower women

Target 4. Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and to all levels of education no later than 2015.

Goal 4. Reduce child mortality

Target 5. Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate.

Goal 5. Improve maternal health

Target 6. Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio.

Goal 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases

Target 7 By 2015, halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS.


72

Target 8. By 2015, halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases.

Goal 7. Ensure environmental sustainability

Target 9. Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs and reverse the loss of environmental resources.

Target 10. Halve by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation.

Target 11. By 2020, achieve a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers.

Goal 8. Develop a global partnership for development

Target 12. Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system. Includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction - both nationally and internationally.

Target 13. Address the special needs of the least developed countries. Includes: tariff and quota-free access for least-developed countries’ exports; enhanced program of debt relief for HIPCs and cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous ODA for countries committed to poverty reduction.

Target 14. Address the special needs of landlocked countries and small island developing States (through the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the outcome of the twenty-second special session of the General Assembly).

Target 15. Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term.

Target 16. In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth.

Target 17. In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries.

Part II

73

Target 18. In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially in information and communications.

Evaluation While the MDGs and the Millennium Declaration are an extremely important and praiseworthy development in international affairs, their function is not to provide a comprehensive measure of social performance as conceived in this report. Moreover, because indicators have only been operationalized for eight out of the over fifty goals embodied in the declaration, the coverage of the MDGs is necessarily limited. The prioritization of these eight goals is entirely warranted given the crisis they are intended to ameliorate, but the eight goals taken together do not provide a comprehensive measure of social performance or adequately account for social-ecological-economic complexity. The expanded set of goals embodied in the declaration is much more comprehensive, and Kofi Annan has explicitly acknowledged the way in which the goals are intertwined and interactive, necessitating a highly coordinated approach. It is also worth noting that the expanded goal embodies substantive aspects of governance.

The framework of the MDGs follows directly from the structure and purpose of the Declaration, and is in this sense logical. The data are presented in a unified and consistent manner, but are comprehensible as a whole largely because the number of goals has been limited. If the goals (over 50 in number) were presented without any degree of aggregation, the coherence of the approach would suffer. Because achievement of the goals is planned for 2015, the short-term time horizon is best represented by the MDGs, though success will certainly confer long-term benefits. In terms of territorial applicability, the MDGs are most relevant to developing countries and the international level of analysis. The MDGs apply to higher-income countries only insofar as they reflect these countries’ contributions to the international system.

The MDGs receive a positive evaluation in terms of all practical criteria, though the subcomponent domains are not necessarily relevant to all. Grassroots participation might have made the development of the goals and indicators slightly more inclusive, though the process was quite inclusive and participatory on the whole. Methodologically, data quality and availability and the use of performance standards receive a positive evaluation. No subjective indicators are utilized, and issues of scaling and weighting and substitutability could not be evaluated, as no method of indicator aggregation has been put forth.


74

As a stand-alone approach, the MDGs and indicators are not an adequate measure of social performance. However, they are extremely important tools for evaluating the performance of the international system and of progress toward priority development goals. SPIs would greatly benefit from the inclusion of the MDG goals and measures. Particularly, the goals embodied in the Millennium Declaration could be very useful for assessing the degree to which a country contributes to, or is constrained by, the international system. The indicators and performance standards established by the Millennium approach could also be incorporated quite easily into several existing indicator sets, such as EuReporting, well-being assessments, and the CSD approach.




Comprehensiveness 0












Total Score 23



URL Altavista Linkshttp://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ 19,900

Part II

75

7. OECD Social Indicators

OverviewAfter a hiatus during the 1980s and 1990s when social indicators were unfashionable, the OECD resumed its program of social reporting in 2001. The “new” list of social indicators is intended to report on “whether our societies are getting more or less equal, healthy, dependent and cohesive.”214 The indicators serve two purposes, as stated by the OECD: to monitor trends in social developments in OECD countries; and to assess whether social policy is effectively altering social outcomes.215 The reporting model used in Society At a Glance is based on a hybrid of reporting tools used elsewhere by the OECD, and combines a context-input-output model and a PSR framework. The indicators are divided into three categories: social context, social status and societal response. Four social policy objectives are further used to classify social status and societal response: enhancing self-sufficiency (SS); improving equity (EQ); improving population health (HE); and increasing social cohesion (CO).216 The OECD explicitly acknowledges that the indicators are interdependent. For instance, a change in an indicator measuring drug use pertains to the social policy goals of both population health and social cohesion.217

MethodologyNo large-scale data collection effort was undertaken by the OECD to publish the 2002 edition of Society at a Glance, and all indicators were compiled from existing data sets. The context indicators are included to signal the constraints and opportunities faced by different countries as they work towards the achievement of self-sufficiency, equity, health and social cohesion.

The remaining indicators are organized by the four social policy objectives and broken into categories of social status and social response. The OECD recognizes that certain social policy objectives may overlap; for instance, unemployment is an indicator of self-sufficiency, but also pertains to equity. For a list of social status and societal response indicators,

Context Indicators: National income Age dependency ratio Foreigners and foreign-born population Fertility rates Divorce rates Refugees and asylum seekers Lone parent families


76

organized by social policy objectives, please see Appendix B. In Society At a Glance, trends in each indicator are described, and the ways in which a given indicator is dependent on other indicators is also highlighted. For instance, the social status indicator, “employment,” is linked to the status indicators of unemployment, working mothers, retirement ages, low paid employment, the gender wage gap, and strikes. It is also linked to the societal response indicators of replacement rates, activation policies, tax wedge, and minimum wages.

While a systems diagram has not been provided by the OECD, such a diagram could be developed, based on the way in which the organization has highlighted the interdependent nature of the indicators. By identifying the indicators that have the most links to other indicators, it might be possible to target specific policies that would cascade through the entire system. A method of aggregation has not been developed. A star chart of the indicators, organized by policy objective, might be used, though this would require the establishment of performance standards.

EvaluationTheoretically, the OECD approach is not particularly coherent, as the indicators have not been aggregated. The organization has, however, mapped the links among the indicators, and shown their contribution to social performance as a whole. Society at a Glance thus makes an important contribution to our understanding of the complexity of social reality. The project can also be seen as a social feedback mechanism, as the stated aim of the indicators is to provide information on the relative performance of social policy. Because the OECD does not take into account ecological dynamics and explicit aspects of governance, the approach is not sufficiently comprehensive. Its stress on literacy and education does point to a concern with intergenerational equity, and process and outcome measures are explicitly identified. The approach is logical, though it could be further developed: the OECD itself recognizes that the structure of the indicators “falls well short of being a full-scale framework”.218 While the social status indicators could theoretically be applied to any level of analysis, the societal response indicators are more suited to the national (and maybe subnational) level of analysis.

In practical terms, the approach is fairly easy to comprehend, and the indicators are broadly relevant: they have been chosen to be “easily and unambiguously interpreted – all countries would rather have low poverty rates than high ones.”219 The approach is expert-driven rather than inclusive, though the indicators are highly policy-relevant and serve a practical purpose. The data and methodology are both transparent and accessible, and numerous citations for further reading on particular indicators are provided throughout Society at a Glance.

Part II

77

The data are centrally located on the OECD Web site and are available to the public. No subjective indicators have been used, though subjective interpretations are particularly relevant to the areas assessed by the organization. Performance standards are not utilized, while the issues of scaling, weighting and substitutability are not relevant, as the indicators have not been aggregated.




Comprehensiveness 2

Logic of Framework 1.5











Total Score 20.5



URL Altavista Linkshttp://www.oecd.org/department/0,2688,en_2649_34637_1_ 396


78

8. Freedom In the World

OverviewFounded in 1941 by Eleanor Roosevelt and Wendell Willkie to oppose Naziism and Communism in Europe, Freedom House is the United State’s oldest human rights organization.220 It is led by a non-partisan Board of Trustees composed of politicians, scholars, writers, journalists, and business and labor leaders. With a mandate to promote democratic values, it has over the years supported the Marshall Plan and NATO, the U.S. civil rights movements, the Vietnam boat people, Poland’s Solidarity movement and the Filipino democratic opposition.221 Since 1978, the organization has annually published Freedom in the World,222 in which the political and civil liberties of 192 countries and 18 territories are comparatively assessed. The survey has been called “the definitive report on freedom around the globe,” and is “widely used by policymakers, journalists and scholars.”223 The survey includes a numerical index of political rights and civil liberties for each country (from 1 to 7, 1 being best and 7 worst), as well as a qualitative assessment of “free,” “partly free,” and “not free.” Political rights are defined as those rights that “enable people to participate freely in the political process,” while “civil liberties include the freedom to develop opinions, institutions, and personal autonomy without interference from the state.”224 Freedom in the World is based on the norms established by the Universal Declaration of Human rights.225

MethodologyThe research and ratings process is conducted by 30 analyst/writers and senior-level academic advisors, who base their analysis on: foreign and domestic media; NGO, think-tank and academic publications; individual professional contacts; and field research. The ratings are then reviewed on a comparative basis by the analysts and regional academic experts, and the methodology of the survey is further reviewed by a separate advisory committee. The research team analyzes each country in terms of a political rights checklist, composed of 10 questions in 3 subcategories, and a civil liberties checklist, composed of 15 questions in 4 subcategories (see Appendix B for checklist questions). Each checklist item is assigned a score from 0 to 4, where 4 represents the best performance, and the raw scores are tabulated for each of the political and civil lists. The maximum political rights score is 40, and the maximum civil liberties score is 60. The raw scores are then correlated to a 1 to 7 scale for each of political rights and civil liberties, with 1 being the “most free” and 7 the “least free”. The two scores are then averaged to produce the qualitative ranking, with 1 – 2.5 qualifying as “free,” 3 – 5.5 as “partly free,” and 5.5 – 7 as “not free.”

Part II

79

EvaluationFreedom in the World coherently compresses the analyses of the research team, but it is not possible to disaggregate the political rights and civil liberties indices. In terms of its treatment of complexity, Freedom in the World measures a limited domain of social reality, and does not take into account aspects of social performance outside of “freedom.” This is, however, a result of its specific mandate. Modifications to the survey have been made over time in response to changing conceptions of freedom and democracy and, in that sense, it can be seen to be adaptive. The conception of freedom is fairly comprehensive, including social and economic rights, and process and outcome measures of democracy. However, because the survey is based on expert analysis rather than citizen viewpoints, certain aspects of governance have been circumscribed. For instance, measures such as confidence in institutions, trust in government, and feelings of political efficacy are not included, though they are important measures of participation, access and legitimacy. The framework and choice of indicators is logical and consistent, and based in part on the academic work of Raymond Gastil.226 The indices allow for comparison over time, but are only relevant at the national level.

In terms of practicality, the framework and methodology are clearly articulated and can be understood by those who can perform basic arithmetic. The approach of indicator selection and construction, however, is neither participatory nor inclusive. While the team members and the sources consulted may be relatively representative, Freedom in the World is essentially based on expert opinion and analysis; no direct citizen survey data have been used. The political and civil indices are very policy-relevant and serve a practical purpose. While the general methodology is transparent, the underlying raw score data are not accessible. Further, because the analysis is based on expert knowledge, the reasoning process behind the assignment of raw scores is not necessarily apparent.

Freedom House is conscious of the need to maintain data quality and comparability, as evidenced by the report and methodology review process. The country reports and rankings are centrally located and available to the public online, but the indices cannot be disaggregated into the underlying raw scores. While the questions embodied in the checklist do have an air of objectivity, analysis is ultimately grounded in the informed (subjective) opinion of experts. Performance standards are implied by the 0-4 scoring procedure and the use of qualitative measures of freedom. However, it is not necessarily clear what constitutes a “0” or a “4” for a given checklist question, and whether the method for assigning scores is consistent (it may very well be, but this is not transparent). The scaling procedure is


80

adequate, while equal weighting of each checklist item is implied (it is a simple additive model). The composite freedom index assumes political and civil rights are substitutable, but this is not necessarily unreasonable, given that these rights are likely to move together, and that they are both measuring a fairly discrete aspect of social performance.



Treatment of Complexity 1.5








Data Quality and Availability 1.5


Incorporation of Performance Standards 1.5


Implication of Substitutability 2

Total Score 25.5



URL Altavista Linkshttp://www.freedomhouse.org/research/index.htm 635

Part II

81

9. Human Development Index

OverviewThe Human Development Index (HDI) was developed in 1990 as a response to the limited capacity of solely economic measures to assess quality of life. It is based on the work of Amartya Sen,227 who has proposed that assessment of development should be based “on the entitlements of people and the capabilities these entitlements generate,” rather than on aggregate economic measures.228 The HDI is based on three dimensions: a long and healthy life, measured by life expectancy at birth; education, measured by the adult literacy rate and the gross enrolment ratio (GER); and a decent standard of living, measured by GDP per capita.229 These dimensions are considered to be the essential requirements for enhancing human capabilities, as conceived by Sen.230 In addition to the HDI, the UNDP has also developed two human poverty indices (HPI 1 and 2), a gender-related development index (GDI), and a gender empowerment measure (GEM).231

MethodologyAn index for each of life expectancy, education and GDP are first derived, and these indices are then combined into the composite HDI. The education index is comprised of two sub-indices: the adult literacy index and the gross enrolment index. Each index is calculated by taking the difference between the actual indicator value for a country and the minimum value, and dividing this difference by the range between the maximum and minimum values. The maximum and minimum values are based on fixed “goalposts,” which are outlined in the table below:

Index Minimum MaximumLife expectancy 25 years 85 years

Adult literacy 0 (%) 100 (%)

Gross enrolment 0 (%) 100 (%)

GDP per capita 100 (PPP US$) 40,000 (PPP US$)

The education index is composed of a weighted sum of the adult literacy and gross enrolment indices, with the former receiving a weight of 2/3 and the latter a weight of 1/3. A logarithm of income is used to adjust income, “because achieving a respectable level of human development does not require unlimited income.”232 Essentially, this adjustment reflects diminishing marginal returns to income vis-à-vis development: an improvement of per capita


82

income from $100 to $1000 has a much more significant impact on development than does an improvement of $21,100 to $22,000. The GDP index is calculated using the following formula:

The composite HDI index is composed of a simple average of the life expectancy, education, and GDP indices (each is given equal weight).

EvaluationIn theoretical terms, the HDI is highly coherent, and the underlying data and subcomponent indices are presented together with the composite index. However, it is an inadequate representation of social complexity, and is not based on a comprehensive conception of welfare and well-being. It has been criticized for not taking into account ecological health or equity, intra- and intergenerationally, both between and within countries.233 Further, the HDI does not address whether improvements in human development are being derived from environmentally or economically unsustainable practices.234 It is based on the theoretical work of Sen, but it is arguable whether the dimensions and indicators reflect an adequate range of entitlements and responsibilities. The HDI can be mapped to all levels of analysis and allows for comparison over time, but it does not adopt a sufficiently long time horizon.

Practically, the framework, meaning and methodology of the HDI are clearly expressed, and more difficult concepts such as the logarithmic adjustment of income are presented in straightforward terms. The appeal of the index is also demonstrated by the widespread public attention it has captured, leading Castles to comment that it has attained the “dominant position in the global market for information on the social and economic world”.235 The development process of the HDI has not been inclusive or participatory, as the index has been constructed solely by the UNDP. While commentators have questioned the policy-relevance of the HDI,236 it is at least relevant to broad policy goals of increasing longevity, educational attainment and per capita economic growth. The data and methodology are both transparent and accessible.

The index has been criticized on methodological grounds. Data quality has been called into question, with one commentator pointing out that certain figures are simply wrong.237 However, the statistics are drawn from the UN system, which is generally considered a

cap)per GDPlog(min - cap)per GDP log(maxcap)per GDPlog(min - cap)per GDP log(actualindex GDP

Part II

83

credible source of statistical data. Additionally, all data are centrally located and available to the public. No subjective indicators are utilized, though clear and constant performance standards are clearly outlined. The scaling method, being based on constant performance standards, is good. The method of weighting is problematic because it implies complete substitutability among the component dimensions: for instance, higher income can compensate for a decrease in life expectancy. One possible remedy to this problem would be to adopt a multiplicative rather than additive model, so that poor (or exceptional) performance in one area would be reflected more accurately in the composite index.238 The method has also been criticized on the grounds that the dimensions are highly correlated among themselves,239 and that an adjustment for diminishing marginal returns should be applied to the longevity and education dimensions.240




Comprehensiveness 0












Total Score 22



URL Altavista Linkshttp://hdr.undp.org/ 9,620


84

10. Genuine Progress Indicator Overview

The Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) was developed in 1995 by the non-profit research and policy institute, Redefining Progress.241 The GPI was explicitly constructed to counter the dominance of the GDP as a measure of social performance among policymakers, the general public and the media. Redefining Progress views the GDP as a poor measure of economic health, as it makes no distinction between transactions that contribute to or detract from social well-being. The organization contends that, “much of what is now measured as economic growth consists of fixing social problems, borrowing environmental and other resources from the future, or shifting functions from the community and household realm to the monetized economy.” 242 An entirely economic and monetized measure, the GPI attempts to correct the shortfalls of the GDP by including over twenty aspects of economic activity that are excluded by the latter. For instance, the value of work done in the household and the voluntary sector is added to the personal consumption component of GDP, while the costs of combating crime and of resource depletion and degradation are subtracted.

The GPI is expressly political in that it is an attempt to instill “genuine accountability in Washington,”243 by revealing the negative social performance that often accompanies orthodox conceptions of economic growth. In policy terms, Redefining Progress has advocated environmental tax reform (e.g. eliminating income taxes and instituting taxes on environmentally-destructive activities) in order to incorporate environmental accounting directly into the price system.244 The organization has also argued that left-leaning environmentalists and social conservatives (concerned with the perceived erosion of family and community life) have increasingly found common cause when considering the ultimate ends of economic growth.245

Methodology

The methodology of the GPI is based on the standard macroeconomic model of aggregate income/expenditure that underpins the construction of the GDP. The model is extended by the inclusion of an adjustment for income inequality and 23 economic costs and benefits that are traditionally excluded in standard macroeconomics. These additional elements are listed below, while a description of the manner in which they are calculated is given in Appendix B. The starting point of the GPI is the personal consumption component of the GDP, while three

Part II

85

other standard components of the model—capital investment, government spending and net exports—are excluded.246 Since 2000, real dollars have been estimated using the chain-type price deflator with a base year of 1992. (The original GPI used the consumer price index and implicit GDP price deflator to estimate 1982 constant dollars.)247

Economic costs and benefits included in GPI: 1) Value of household work and parenting

2) Value of volunteer work

3) Services of household capital

4) Services of highways and streets

5) Cost of crime

6) Cost of family breakdown

7) Loss of leisure time

8) Cost of underemployment

9) Cost of consumer durables

10) Cost of commuting

11) Cost of household pollution abatement

12) Cost of automobile accidents

13) Cost of water pollution

14) Cost of air pollution

15) Cost of noise pollution

16) Loss of wetlands

17) Loss of farmland

18) Depletion of non-renewable resources

19) Long-term environmental damage

20) Cost of ozone depletion

21) Loss of old-growth forests

22) Net capital investment

23) Net foreign lending or borrowing

Personal consumption expenditure (PCE) is divided by an index of income inequality (derived from the Gini coefficient), which lowers the value of PCE as income inequality increases. The resulting component – personal consumption adjusted for income inequality – is then adjusted by the addition or subtraction of monetized costs and benefits. For example, the monetary value of household work and parenting is added to inequality-adjusted PCE,


86

while the cost of noise pollution and loss of wetlands is subtracted. The value that results after all positive and negative adjustments have been calculated is the GPI for a given year.

Evaluation

With respect to the theoretical criteria outlined above, the GPI receives a mixed evaluation. As the data are condensed into a single number and can be easily disaggregated into component parts that are relatively exclusive of one another, the GPI is quite coherent. However, because the GPI is based on a simple linear model, it does not adequately reflect complexity. Moreover, rates of change are often assumed to be constant or extrapolated linearly from historical trends, belying the complex dynamics of social, ecological and economic systems. Because the GPI only encompasses the economic domain, it is not sufficiently comprehensive. Only ecological and social processes that can be monetized are included in the index, while non-monetary forms of social exclusion and inequity are overlooked. The logic of the framework is also somewhat questionable: there does not seem to be any uniform set of principles for component selection or exclusion and some monetary values have been assigned arbitrarily. The GPI allows comparison over time, and attempts to take into account ecosystem time dimensions. In terms of territorial scale, the GPI is most relevant to the national level of analysis, but is not as applicable to subnational or local scales.

With respect to practical criteria, the GPI again receives a mixed evaluation. The GPI is both easy to comprehend and appealing: the meaning and methodology are quite straightforward, and the subcomponent domains are intuitively relevant. As the GPI was constructed solely by Redefining Progress, however, the process of indicator construction and selection was not genuinely inclusive. Moreover, the index does not address the exclusion of marginalized groups within society, except by reference to broad income inequality between the rich and poor. To its credit, Redefining Progress does have a community indicators project that encourages broad community-based participation and partnership;248 however, this participatory approach has not been utilized in the construction of the GPI. Because the express goal of the index is to influence policymaking, it is policy-relevant and serves a practical purpose. The data and methodology are available to the public, though more explicit argumentation around certain assumptions—for instance, the cost of divorce to a child, or the cost of non-renewable energy depletion—would improve the subtlety of the index.

Methodologically, the GPI has certain questionable attributes. The data are centrally located and available to the public, but of variable quality. Some statistics are drawn from reliable

Part II

87

sources published by the U.S. federal government, but other measures of scientifically contentious, ecological issues are extrapolated or interpolated from single, dated studies. The GPI does not utilize any subjective indicators or employ any performance standards. Methods of scaling (in this case, by monetization) are sometimes arbitrary, and all components are weighted equally, which is highly questionable. The method of aggregation implies complete substitutability among components, implying, for instance, that an improvement in the U.S. net international investment can offset or outweigh the cost of long-term environmental damage.




Comprehensiveness 1












Total Score 17



URL Altavista Linkshttp://www.rprogress.org/projects/gpi/ 2,670


88

11. Canadian Sustainable Development Indicators

OverviewIn his government’s 2000 spring budget, the Canadian Prime Minister stated that “the current means of measuring progress are inadequate,” and that the development of sustainable development indicators “could well have a greater impact on public policy than any other single measure we might produce.”249 In a move toward the development of such indicators, the PM announced the Environment and Sustainable Development Indicators (ESDI) Initiative, undertaken by the National Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy (NRTEE). The NRTEE has drawn three principle conclusions through its work on the ESDI Initiative: Statistics Canada should report annually on a small number of new, national, human capital and natural capital indicators; the Government of Canada should expand the System of National Accounts (SNA) to include measures of human, natural, and social capital; and Canadian national environmental systems should be improved. The NRTEE has identified six indicators (five related to natural capital and one related to human capital) that it hopes will be reported annually by Statistics Canada. The ESDI Initiative involved the assembly of a thirty-member Steering Committee that included representatives of non-governmental organizations, academia, government, and the business and finance communities. Additionally, two national conferences and workshops were held, during which the Steering Committee sought input from potential audiences of the indicators; the Committee made revisions based on this input.250

Underlying the ESDI Initiative is the belief that well-being is ultimately derived from a form of wealth that includes four types of capital: produced, human, social and natural. This expanded view of wealth has been pioneered by the World Bank, and is often referred to as the Multiple Capital Approach.251 Traditional economic measures, such as the GDP, are considered to be inadequate measures of wealth and progress because they only account for produced capital. While there was general consensus among the stakeholders that a capital model should be utilized in order to address issues of intergenerational equity, some participants advocated a stronger focus on intragenerational equity than was ultimately adopted by the ESDI Initiative. Most participants agreed that measures of social capital and of environmental thresholds are important, but that the insufficient state of current knowledge of these issues precludes their inclusion in recommended indicators.

The topic of aggregation was highly controversial in the group. Ultimately, the NRTEE did not recommend the use of an aggregated indicator, due to uncertainty as to how capital

Part II

89

should be monetized and the difficulty of developing a methodology that does not imply substitutability amongst the various forms of capital. There was also disagreement as to whether consumption/pressure indicators should be included, particularly with respect to environmental damage that Canada displaces to other countries; no indicators of this type were ultimately adopted by the Initiative.

MethodologyAs aggregation was not recommended by the NRTEE, methodological considerations relate solely to the six indicators selected. Natural capital is measured with five indicators: an air quality trend indicator; a freshwater quality indicator; a greenhouse gas emissions indicator; a forest cover indicator; and an extent of wetlands indicator. Air quality is indicated by a population-weighted measure of exposure to ozone (exposure being based on the annual mean ozone concentration). Freshwater quality is indicated by the percentage of cross-country water quality sampling stations that have “marginal” or “poor” water quality (as defined by the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment’s water quality index). Greenhouse gas emissions are indicated by the total annual emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride (measured in gigatonnes of CO2 equivalents). Forest cover is indicated by the area (in million hectares) of land with greater than 10% crown closure, as recorded by satellite. (This indicator has also been disaggregated into twelve ecozones.) Extent of wetlands is indicated by the percentage of Canadian land composed of wetland, based on satellite remote sensing data. Human capital is measured with one indicator: the percentage of the population between the ages of 25 and 64 with upper-secondary and tertiary-level educational qualifications.

EvaluationWhile the ESDI Initiative represents an important first step in tracking and reporting Canadian environmental dynamics and changes in educational attainment, it does not have sufficient scope to be considered a broad measure of social performance. Nonetheless, it represents a significant opening of political space in Canada for the development of measures of progress that fall outside the rubric of traditional economics. Because the indicators are limited in number, they can be comprehended simultaneously; but they have not been drawn together into a coherent whole. The indicators neither take adequate account of complexity nor embody a comprehensive conception of welfare and well-being. Even if further indicators were established to measure the various forms of capital, and were monetized and aggregated within the SNA, all aspects of social performance that defy monetization would continue to be excluded. While intergenerational equity is addressed by the capital


90

model, no measure of intragenerational equity has been included, and issues of governance have not been addressed. The Multiple Capital Approach is a logical framework based on particular assumptions, but the ESDI Initiative does not sufficiently flesh out each type of capital with representative indicators. The Initiative utilizes an appropriate time-scale, and is predominantly applicable to the regional or national level (though the air quality and greenhouse gas emission indicators are relevant at all territorial scales).

In practical terms, the approach is comprehensible, though the inclusion of more indicators relevant to other aspects of daily life might make it more appealing. Similarly, while critically necessary, the reform of the SNA and monetization of externalities may not attract broad public attention. The multi-stakeholder process is commendable, although broader public deliberation and an inclusion of marginalized groups would have increased the participatory potential of the exercise. The ESDI Initiative is quite policy-relevant, and the methodology is transparent and accessible. The NRTEE has also unambiguously identified areas of contention and debate, which is an important aspect of transparency. Data will be accessible once Statistics Canada has made it available, in accordance with the recommendations of the Initiative.

The NRTEE has noted that environmental data in Canada is of limited availability and questionable quality in certain cases, and has called for an improvement of this situation.252 Neither subjective indicators nor performance standards have been adopted by the approach, and the issues of scaling and weighting and substitutability cannot be assessed as the indicators have not been aggregated. To its credit, the Initiative has identified the methodological issue of substitutability as important.

Part II

91


12. Transparency International

OverviewFormally launched in 1993, Transparency International (TI) is a non-governmental organization focussed exclusively on combating corruption. In 1995, it launched the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which is a measure of corruption in countries as perceived by international and domestic business communities.253 For the purposes of the CPI, corruption is defined as “the abuse of public office for private gain.”254 TI’s Mission Statement regards corruption as “one of the greatest challenges of the contemporary world,”255 and the organization publicly acknowledges that it is rampant in both developed and developing countries.256 In response to the charge that the CPI reflects acceptance of bribes at the domestic level (most often in developing countries), but does not incorporate the origin of those bribes (often developed countries), TI created the Bribe Payers Index (BPI) in



Comprehensiveness 0












Total Score 14



URL Altavista Linkshttp://www.nrtee-trnee.ca/eng/programs/Current_Programs/ 8


92

1999. The BPI scores and ranks the 21 leading exporting countries in terms of the propensity of nationally-based companies to pay bribes to officials in emerging market economies.257 TI also produced its first Global Corruption Barometer in July 2003, which surveys the perception of corruption by the general public.258

The publications of TI assume a causal link between corruption and poverty (and other developmental crises). Corruption is seen as a “threat to human rights, the environment and sustainable development,”259 causing children to “suffer from lack of clean water and lack of medicines,” and attend “schools with no books.”260 TI argues that corrupt elites are “trapping whole nations in poverty,” and depriving the poor of “social, economic and political benefits…that are taken for granted in societies that have managed to shake off the yoke of corruption.” Moreover, TI says that increasing freshwater scarcity,261 the HIV/AIDS crisis in Africa262 and disillusionment with democracy263 are all linked to corruption. Citing a Harvard University study based on the CPI,264 TI argues that the CPI can be considered “a measure of lost development opportunities [because] an empirical link has now been established between the level of corruption and foreign direct investment.”265 The implication of these statements, taken together, is that corruption impedes international trade, specifically foreign direct investment, resulting in poverty and other developmental problems.

Methodology266

The CPI is based on surveys conducted by independent organizations that poll business people and country analysts (domestic residents and expatriates) about the degree of corruption in a given country, particularly in reference to the incidence of bribery. The 2003 CPI was based on seventeen surveys (some for multiple years) conducted by thirteen organizations. (Survey sources, types of respondents and question subjects are included in Appendix B). The questions are all subjective, and assess the degree of corruption perceived by respondents. The index is standardized, using a matched percentiles procedure based on a comparison of the rank (not the score) of each country in each survey with the percentile ranking of the previous year. The highest value of the CPI is assigned to the highest ranking country for a given survey source, the second highest value to the second highest ranking country, and so on. TI gives the following example:

Imagine that a new source ranks only four countries: UK is best, followed by Singapore, Venezuela and Argentina respectively. In the 2002 CPI these countries obtained the scores 8.7, 9.3, 2.5 and 2.8. Matching percentiles would now assign UK the best score of 9.3, Singapore 8.7, Venezuela 2.8 and Argentina 2.5.267

Part II

93

Because the matched percentiles approach is based only on rankings, it results in information loss. Nevertheless, TI uses the approach because it avoids assumptions about data distributions and standardizes the values within the range of zero to ten.

Because the matched percentile approach causes the index of each subsequent year to have a lower standard deviation than the previous year, a second standardization technique is applied. A simple mean and standard deviation technique could be utilized to maintain the diversity among scores, but this procedure would result in the scores being outside of the zero to ten range. Consequently, TI applies a monotonous beta-transformation, whereby each value (X) is transformed by the following function:

The index is aggregated using a simple average of the standardized components for a given country. Confidence ranges are also reported for each country (e.g. the lower- and upper-bound of the possible “true” value of the index, with a 90% degree of certainty), and are determined using a non-parametric bootstrapping methodology (of the bias-corrected-accelerated variety).

EvaluationTheoretically, the CPI does pull its underlying data into a coherent and comprehensible whole. However, it is not possible to disaggregate the index in order to investigate the underlying data. Even when considering complexity in terms of the limited domain of corruption, the approach is inadequate. For instance, corruption is assumed to be a cause of poverty, but the possibility of causality flowing in the other direction is not acknowledged. It is plausible that poverty results (in part) from exogenous structural forces and, in turn, creates a climate in which corruption flourishes. Similarly, the definition of corruption that TI utilizes is inadequate. Only corruption in the public sphere is addressed, and corruption that takes place in the private sphere is overlooked (such as white-collar crime that does not involve public institutions). The choice of survey data follows from TI’s definition of corruption, and is in that sense logical. The CPI is only applicable to the national level, and comparisons over time are problematic due to the standardization methodology (changes in relative performance can result in a different ranking, even if “absolute” levels of corruption have remained unchanged).

1

0

11 )10/1()10/(10 dXXX ��


94

In terms of practical evaluative criteria, the zero to ten scale is fairly straightforward to comprehend, but the underlying methodology involves an opaque percentile matching procedure, integral calculus, and non-parametric statistical techniques. Additionally, the index only accounts for the opinion of business people and experts, and is not representative of general public opinion. Indicator construction and selection was neither inclusive nor participatory, as the approach was developed solely by TI. The CPI is policy-relevant, and serves the practical purpose of building public awareness of corruption so that it can be ameliorated. The methodology is made available to the public, though the data that underlay the index are not accessible. In terms of judgments and assumptions, TI has stressed that the CPI is based on perceptions rather than an objective assessment of corruption, and that these are the perceptions of a limited social stratum. However, many of its publications imply a sufficient, unidirectional causal link between corruption and poverty, via the constraining effect corruption has on international trade.




Comprehensiveness 0












Total Score 15



URL Altavista Linkshttp://www.transparency.org/surveys/ 424

Part II

95

APPENDIX A

Scaling

Method 1: Simple ScaleSPIs can be converted to a common scale that ranges between 0 and 1 as follows:

Where: Xij = the actual value of the jth indicator of country iXijscaled = the scaled value of the jth indicator of country iXmin j = the lowest value obtained for the jth indicator of all the countries surveyedXmax j = the highest value obtained for the jth indicator of all the countries surveyed

A country that achieves the highest value of Xmax j will receive a score of 0, whereas a country that achieves the lowest value of Xmin j will receive a score of 1, and countries with values somewhere between Xmin j and Xmax j will receive a score somewhere between 0 and 1. These scaled values can then be subtracted from 1 to yield a score where 1 represents best performance and 0 represents worst performance. Countries can then be ranked according to their scaled scores.

Once indicators have been scaled, they can be aggregated by adding them together, and then dividing by the number of indicators that compose a country’s overall SPI.

SPIi = the Social Performance Index score for country iXij = the actual value of the jth indicator of country iXmin j = the minimum performance standard for the jth indicatorXmax j = the maximum performance standard for the jth indicatork = the number of indicators that compose the index

jj

ijjijscaled

XXXXX

minmax

max

kXXXX

SPI

k

j jj

ijj

i

1 minmax

max

97

APPENDIX B

The Wellbeing Assessment 99

UNSCD Indicators of Sustainable Development 101

OECD Environmental Indicators 103

World Bank Governance Indicators 105

Millennium Development Goals 106

OECD Social Indicators 110

Freedom in the World 112

Genuine Progress Indicator 114

Transparency International 117

Surveys and Indices (from which 12 were selected for this evaluation) 119

99


Source: The Wellbeing of Nations268

People

Dimensions Elements Element Objective

Health and Population

Health People enjoy long lives in good health

Populationwhile keeping their numbers within the bounds of human and natural

resources.

Wealth

Household WealthIndividuals and households have the material goods and income to secure

basic needs and decent livelihoods,

National Wealthand the community has the resources to support enterprise and maintain

prosperity.

Knowledge and CultureKnowledge

People have the knowledge to innovate and cope with change, live well and sustainably, and fulfill their potential,

Culturewith avenues for spiritual growth,

creativity, and self-expression.

Community

Freedom and Governance

Human rights are fully respected, and individuals are free to choose how decisions are made and who should make them. Decision-making bodies

are open, clean, and effective.

Peace and OrderCommunities coexist peacefully and protect their members from crime and

violence.

EquityHousehold Equity

Benefits and burdens are shared fairly among households and groups

Gender Equity and between males and females.

Ecosystem

Dimensions Elements Element Objective

Land

Land Diversity

All major land ecosystems are maintained or restored in large units with minimal loss of the habitats and

communities within them.

Land QualitySoil degradation on cultivated and modified lands is kept close to

degradation rates on natural lands.

Water

Inland Waters All major aquatic ecosystems, both

inland and marine,

Sea

are maintained or restored in large units with minimal loss of the communities and habitats within them and minimal stress from pollution and water uses.


100

AirGlobal Atmosphere

Pollutants that disrupt the chemical balance of the global atmosphere are

eliminated or substantially reduced.

Local Air QualityLocal air pollutants are below levels

that affect people or the ecosystem.

Species and Genes

Wild DiversityAll native wild species are maintained, and extinctions are reduced to

background rates.

Domesticated DiversityAs much as possible of the heritage of crop varieties and livestock breeds is

maintained.

Resource Use

Energy and MaterialsConsumption of energy and materials

and

Resource Sectorsextraction and production of resources are within the carrying capacity of the

ecosystem.

Appendix B

101

UNSCD Indicators of Sustainable Development

Source: CSD Theme Indicator Framework269

Social

Theme Subtheme Indicator

Equity

PovertyPercent of Population Living below Poverty Line

Gini Index of Income Inequality Unemployment Rate

Gender Equality Ratio of Average Female Wage to Male Wage

Health

Nutritional Status Nutritional Status of Children

MortalityMortality Rate Under 5 Years Old

Life Expectancy at Birth

Sanitation Percent of Population with Adequate Sewage Disposal

Facilities Drinking Water Population with Access to Safe Drinking Water

Health Care Delivery

Percent of Population with Access to Primary Health Care Facilities

Immunization Against Infectious Childhood Diseases Contraceptive Prevalence Rate

Education Education Level

Children Reaching Grade 5 of Primary Education Adult Secondary Education Achievement Level

Literacy Adult Literacy RateHousing Living Conditions Floor Area per Person Security Crime Number of Recorded Crimes per 100,000 Population

Population Population Change Population Growth Rate

Population of Urban Formal and Informal Settlements

Environmental


AtmosphereClimate Change Emissions of Greenhouse Gases

Ozone Layer Depletion Consumption of Ozone Depleting SubstancesAir Quality Ambient Concentration of Air Pollutants in Urban Areas

Land

AgricultureArable and Permanent Crop Land Area

Use of FertilizersUse of Agricultural Pesticides

ForestsForest Area as a Percent of Land Area

Wood Harvesting IntensityDesertification Land Affected by DesertificationUrbanization Area of Urban Formal and Informal Settlements

Oceans, Seas and Coasts

Coastal ZoneAlgae Concentration in Coastal Waters

Percent of Total Population Living in Coastal AreasFisheries Annual Catch by Major Species

Fresh WaterWater Quantity

Annual Withdrawal of Ground and Surface Water as Percent of Total Available Water

Water QualityBOD in Water Bodies

Concentration of Faecal Coliform in Freshwater

UNSCD Indicators

102

BiodiversityEcosystem

Area of Selected Key Ecosystems

Protected Area as a % of Total Area

Species Abundance of Selected Key Species

Economic


Economic Structure

Economic PerformanceGDP per Capita

Investment share in GDP

Trade Balance of Trade in Goods and Services

Financial StatusDebt to GNP Ratio

Total ODA Given or Received as a Percent of GNP

Consumption and Production Patterns

Material Consumption Intensity of Material Use

Energy UseAnnual Energy Consumption per Capita

Share of Consumption of Renewable Energy ResourcesIntensity of Energy Use

Waste Generation and Management

Generation of Industrial and Municipal Solid WasteGeneration of Hazardous Waste

Management of Radioactive WasteWaste Recycling and Reuse

Transportation Distance Traveled per Capita by Mode of Transport

InstitutionalTheme Subtheme Indicator

Institutional FrameworkStrategic Implementation of SD National Sustainable Development Strategy

International Cooperation Implementation of Ratified Global Agreements

Institutional Capacity

Information Access Number of Internet Subscribers per 1000 inhabitantsCommunication Infrastructure Main Telephone Lines per 1000 Inhabitants

Science and Technology Expenditure on Research and Development as a Percent of GDPDisaster Preparedness and

ResponseEconomic and Human Loss Due to Natural Disasters

Appendix B

103


Source: OECD Environmental Indicators 2001270

Environmental Indicators

Climate ChangeCO2 emission intensitiesgreenhouse gas concentrations

Ozone Layer Depletionozone depleting substancesstratospheric ozone

Air Qualityair emission intensitiesurban air quality

Wastewaste generation waste recycling

Water Qualityriver quality waste water treatment

Water Resourcesintensity of use of water resourcespublic water supply and price

Forest Resourcesintensity of use of forest resourcesforest and wooded land

Fish Resourcesfish catches and consumption: nationalfish catches and consumption: global and regional

Biodiversitythreatened speciesprotected areas


104

Socioeconomic Indicators

GDP and Populationgross domestic productpopulation growth and density

Consumption

private consumptiongovernment consumption

Energyenergy intensitiesenergy mixenergy prices

Transportroad traffic and vehicle intensitiesroad infrastructure densitiesroad fuel prices and taxes

Agriculture

intensity of use of nitrogen and phosphate fertilizers nitrogen balanceslivestock densitiesintensity of use of pesticides

Expenditurepollution abatement and control expenditure

official development assistance

Appendix B

105


Source: Governance Matters III271

Sources of indicators

Afrobarometer (AFR)

Business Environment & Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS)

Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BRI, QLM)

Country Policy & Institutional Assessment (CPIA)

State Failure Task Force State Capacity Survey (CUD)

Global Insight (DRI)

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBR)

The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)

Freedom House (FRH, FNT)

Gallup International (GAL, GMS)

World Economic Forum (GCS, GCSA)

Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal (HER)

Human Rights Database (HUM)

Latinobarometro (LOB)

Political Risk Services (PRS)

Reporters Without Borders (RSF)

Institute for Management Development (WCY)

World Markets Online (WMO)

PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC)

The World Business Environment Survey (WBS, WDR)


106


Source: Millennium Indicators Database272

Goal 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

Target 1. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day.

Indicators 1. Proportion of population below $1 (PPP) per day (World Bank)1a. Poverty headcount ration (percentage of population below national poverty line)2. Poverty gap ratio (incidence x depth of poverty) (World Bank)3. Share of poorest quintile in national consumption (World Bank)

Target 2. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.

Indicators 4. Prevalence of underweight children under five years of age (UNICEF - WHO)5. Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption (FAO)

Goal 2. Achieve universal primary education

Target 3. Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling.

Indicators 6. Net enrolment ratio in primary education (UNESCO)7. Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 5 (UNESCO)8. Literacy rate of 15-24-year-olds (UNESCO)

Goal 3. Promote gender equality and empower women

Target 4. Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and to all levels of education no later than 2015.

Indicators 9. Ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education (UNESCO)10. Ratio of literate women to men of 15- to 24-year-olds (UNESCO)11. Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector (ILO) 12. Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (IPU)

Appendix B

107

Goal 4. Reduce child mortality

Target 5. Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate.

Indicators 13. Under-five mortality rate (UNICEF - WHO)14. Infant mortality rate (UNICEF - WHO)15. Proportion of 1-year-old children immunized against measles (UNICEF - WHO)

Goal 5. Improve maternal health

Target 6. Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio.

Indicators 16. Maternal mortality ratio (UNICEF - WHO)

17. Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel (UNICEF - WHO)

Goal 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases

Target 7 By 2015, halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS.

Indicators 18. HIV prevalence among 15-to-24-year-old pregnant women (UNAIDS-WHO-UNICEF) 19. Condom use rate of the contraceptive prevalence rate (UNAIDS, UNICEF, UN Population Division, WHO)19a. Condom use at last high-risk sex19b. Percentage of population aged 15-24 with comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS19c. Contraception prevalence rate 20. Ratio of school attendance of orphans to school attendance of non-orphans aged 10-14 (UNICEF-UNAIDS)

Target 8. By 2015, halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases.

Indicators 21. Prevalence and death rates associated with malaria (WHO)22. Proportion of population in malaria risk areas using effective malaria prevention and treatment measures (UNICEF - WHO)23. Prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis (WHO)24. Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and cured under DOTS (internationally recommended TB control strategy) (WHO)


108

Goal 7. Ensure environmental sustainability

Target 9. Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources.

Indicators 25. Proportion of land area covered by forest (FAO) 26. Ratio of area protected to maintain biological diversity to surface area (UNEP-IUCN) 27. Energy use (kg oil equivalent) per $1 GDP (PPP) (IEA, World Bank) 28. Carbon dioxide emissions (per capita) (UNFCCC, UNSD) and consumption of ozone-depleting CFCs (ODP tons) (UNEP-Ozone Secretariat) 29. Proportion of population using solid fuels (WHO)

Target 10. Halve by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation.

Indicators 30. Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved water source, urban and rural (UNICEF - WHO) 31. Proportion of urban population with access to improved sanitation, urban and rural (UNICEF - WHO)

Target 11. By 2020, achieve a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers.

Indicators 32. Proportion of households with access to secure tenure (UN-HABITAT)

Goal 8. Develop a global partnership for development

Indicators for targets 12-15 are given below in a combined list.

Target 12. Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system. Includes a commitment to good governance, development, and poverty reduction - both nationally and internationally.

Target 13. Address the special needs of the least developed countries. Includes: tariff and quota-free access for least-developed countries’ exports; enhanced program of debt relief for HIPCs and cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous ODA for countries committed to poverty reduction

Target 14. Address the special needs of landlocked countries and small island developing States (through the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the outcome of the twenty-second special session of the General Assembly).

Target 15. Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term.

Appendix B

109

Some of the indicators listed below are monitored separately for the least developed countries (LDCs), Africa, landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) and small island developing States (SIDS).

Indicators

Official development assistance (ODA)

33. Net ODA, total and to LDCs, as percentage of OECD/Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors’ gross national income (GNI)(OECD)34. Proportion of total bilateral, sector-allocable ODA of OECD/DAC donors to basic social services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water and sanitation) (OECD)35. Proportion of bilateral ODA of OECD/DAC donors that is untied (OECD)36. ODA received in landlocked countries as proportion of their GNIs (OECD)37. ODA received in small island developing States as proportion of their GNIs (OECD)

Market access

38. Proportion of total developed country imports (by value and excluding arms) from developing countries and from LDCs, admitted free of duties (UNCTAD, WTO, WB)39. Average tariffs imposed by developed countries on agricultural products and textiles and clothing from developing countries (UNCTAD, WTO, WB)40. Agricultural support estimate for OECD countries as percentage of their GDP (OECD)41. Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacity (WTO, OECD)

Debt sustainability

42. Total number of countries that have reached their Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) decision points and number that have reached their HIPC completion points (cumulative) (IMF - World Bank) 43. Debt relief committed under HIPC initiative, US$ (IMF - World Bank)44. Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services (IMF - World Bank)

Target 16. In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth.

Indicators 45. Unemployment rate of 15- to 24-year-olds, each sex and total (ILO)

Target 17. In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries.

Indicators 46. Proportion of population with access to affordable essential drugs on a sustainable basis (WHO)

Target 18. In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications.

Indicators 47. Telephone lines and cellular subscribers per 100 population (ITU) 48. Personal computers in use per 100 population (ITU) and Internet users per 100 population (ITU)


110


Source: Society at a Glance 2002273

Four social policy objectives are further used to classify social status and societal response: enhancing self-sufficiency (SS); improving equity (EQ); improving population health (HE); and, increasing social cohesion (CO).274

The OECD recognizes that certain social policy objectives may overlap, for instance, unemployment is an indicator of self-sufficiency, but also pertains to equity. The table below lists the indicators by social policy objective, and the codes SS, EQ, HE, and CO are used to illustrate where there is overlap between indicators.

Self-sufficiency IndicatorsSocial Status Societal Responses

Employment SS Educational attainment SSUnemployment SS Student performance SSJobless households SS Replacement Rates SSWorking mothers SS Public social expenditure EQJobless youth SS Net social expenditure EQRetirement ages SS Activation policies SS

Spending on education SSEarly childhood education and care SSLiteracy SSTax wedge SS

Equity IndicatorsSocial Status Societal Responses

Old age income EQ Public social expenditure EQUnemployment SS Net social expenditure EQJobless households SS Benefit recipiency EQWorking mothers SS Educational attainment SSRelative poverty EQ Replacement rates SSIncome inequality EQ Minimum wages EQLow-paid employment EQ Private social expenditure EQGender wage gap EQ Activation policies SSJobless youth SS Spending on education SS

Early childhood education and care SSLiteracy SS

Health IndicatorsSocial Status Societal Responses

Potential years of life lost HE Health care expenditure HEHealth-adjusted life expectancy HE Responsibility for financing health care HEUnemployment SS Educational attainment SSLife expectancy HE Older people in institutions HEInfant mortality HE Health infrastructure HEDisability-free life expectancy HE Early childhood education and care SSAccidents HERelative poverty EQDrug use and related deaths CO

Appendix B

111

Social Cohesion IndicatorsSocial Status Societal Responses

Strikes CO Prisoners COSuicide CO Educational attainment SSCrime CO Public social expenditure EQUnemployment SS Health care expenditure HEDrug use and related deaths CO Activation policies SSGroup membership CO Early childhood education and care SSVoting CORelative poverty EQJobless youth SS


112


Source: Freedom in the World: Survey Methodology275

Political Rights and Civil Liberties Checklist

Political Rights Checklist

A. Electoral Process 1. Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through free and fair elections? 2. Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? 3. Are there fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling, and honest tabulation of ballots?

B. Political Pluralism and Participation 1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings? 2. Is there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections? 3. Are the people’s political choices free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group? 4. Do cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups have reasonable self-determination, self-government, autonomy, or participation through informal consensus in the decision-making process?

C. Functioning of Government 1. Do freely elected representatives determine the policies of the government? 2. Is the government free from pervasive corruption? 3. Is the government accountable to the electorate between elections, and does it operate with openness and transparency?

Additional Discretionary Political Rights Questions: A. For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the system provide for consultation with the people, encourage discussion of policy, and allow the right to petition the ruler? B. Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of another group?

(NOTE: For each political rights and civil liberties checklist question, 0 to 4 points are added, depending on the comparative rights and liberties present [0 represents the least, 4 represents the most]. However, for additional discretionary question B only, 1 to 4 points are subtracted, as necessary.)

Appendix B

113

Civil Liberties Checklist

A. Freedom of Expression and Belief 1. Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression? (Note: in cases where the media are state-controlled but offer pluralistic points of view, the survey gives the system credit.) 2. Are there free religious institutions, and is there free private and public religious expression? 3. Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free of extensive political indoctrination? 4. Is there open and free private discussion?

B. Associational and Organizational Rights 1. Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion? 2. Is there freedom of political or quasi-political organization? (Note: this includes political parties, civic organizations, ad hoc issue groups, etc.) 3. Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there effective collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other private organizations?

C. Rule of Law 1. Is there an independent judiciary? 2. Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Are police under direct civilian control? 3. Is there protection from police terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and insurgencies? 4. Is the population treated equally under the law?

D. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights 1. Is there personal autonomy? Does the state control travel, choice of residence, or choice of employment? Is there freedom from indoctrination and excessive dependency on the state? 2. Do citizens have the right to own property and establish private businesses? Is private business activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, or organized crime? 3. Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage partners, and size of family? 4. Is there equality of opportunity and the absence of economic exploitation?


114


Source: Mark Anielski and Jonathan Rowe, The Genuine Progress Indicator—1998 Update276

Column Variable Metric Contribution to GPI

A Personal ConsumptionPersonal consumption expenditures (PCE) from the National Income and Product

Accounts (NIPAs)Positive

B Income Distribution Index Gini index (%) multiplied by 100 Weight

CPersonal Consumption Ad jus ted fo r Income

Inequality

Personal consumption ÷ Income Distribution Index

Positive

DValue of Household Work and

Parenting

# annual hours spent on housework (based on time studies by Michigan Survey Research Centre) x amount that a household would have to pay to hire someone to do equivalent work (based on

the work of Robert Eisner)

Positive

E Value of Volunteer Work

Total # of hours volunteered each year (based on US Current Population Surveys) x average real non-farm wage rate from

1959-1997 ($11.20/hr in 1992 dollars)

Positive

FS e r v i c e s o f H o u s e h o l d

Capital

Assumed depreciation rate (15%) plus average interest rate (7.5%) = 22.5% of the value of the net stock of consumer

durables

Positive

GServices of Highways and

Streets

7.5% of the net stock of streets and highways (2.5% depreciation + 7.5% interest) x (75% [as 25% of services used for commuting, which is considered a

cost])

Positive

H Cost of Crime

Direct cost of crime (out-of-pocket expenditures or value of stolen property) as measured by the Bureau of Statistics’ National Crime Survey Data + household spending on crime prevention (expenditure on locks, burglar alarms, and safe deposit

boxes)

Negative

Appendix B

115


I Cost of Family Breakdown

a) [(Cost of divorce to adults ($7,269 per divorce for legal fees, moving, etc)) x # of divorces] + [(cost to children ($10,904 – an arbitrary approximation of lifetime damage

due to divorce)) x # children affected]

plus

b) social cost of television viewing ($0.44/hr) x daily hrs watching TV/household x 365 days x # US households x proportion

of households with children

Negative

J Loss of Leisure Time

ΔLeisure since 1969 = ([Discretionary hours (3,650 annually) - annual hrs spent working in 1969] - [Discretionary hours (3,650 annually) - annual hrs spent working currently]) x average real wage rate between 1950 and 1997 ($11.20/hr)

Negative

K Cost of Underemployment

Estimates of unprovided hours per worker (extrapolated from Leete-Guy and Schor trends over 1969-1989) x # constrained/unemployed workers x average real wage

rate ($11.20/hr)

Negative

L Cost of Consumer DurablesValue of private expenditures on consumer durables from NIPAs (this is an adjustment

to avoid double counting)Negative

M Cost of Commuting

Direct out-of-pocket expenses (percentage of expenditure on vehicles, public transport, used for commuting, less depreciation) + indirect costs (total # of people working x annual time spent commuting x $8.72/hr)

Negative

NCost of Household Pollution

AbatementExpenditure on air and water filters Negative

O Cost of Automobile Accidents Based on US Statistical Abstract Negative

P Cost of Water Pollution

a) Damage to water quality. Based on Freeman’s 1982 estimate of $12 billion for 1972, which equals $39.3 billion in 1992 dollars. Cost assumed to be constant from

1972 to 1997 ($39.3 billion annually).

b) Damage from siltation. $10.8 billion per year (1992 dollars) based on work of The Conservation Foundation (1985) and an assumption that siltation has remained

constant since 1972.

Negative

Q Cost of Air Pollution

[Myrick Freeman’s (1982) baseline cost of air pollution = $90 billion 1992 dollars for damage done in 1970] x [air pollution

index for current year ÷ index for 1970]

Negative


116


R Cost of Noise Pollution

Based on estimated cost of $12 billion 1992 dollars for 1972 (World Health Organization), with assumption of 3% deterioration in auditory environment from 1972-1994, and 1% deterioration from

1972 to the present

Negative

S Loss of WetlandsAnnual # of acres lost x value of ecological

services of wetlands [$19,543 for 1997]Negative

T Loss of Farmland

Value of an average acre of converted cropland ($329/acre/yr) x [acres lost to urbanization] + productivity losses from erosion (USDA) + cost of soil compaction

Negative

UDepletion of Non-renewable

Resources

Cost of replacing non-renewable energy production [based on an assumed $75 nominal replacement cost of oil in 1988 (calculated as the marginal cost of replacing of a barrel-equivalent of energy from biomass), and an assumption that the real replacement cost of energy has

increased at a rate of 3% per annum]

Negative

VLong-term Environmental

Damage

Barrel-equivalents of energy consumption x $1.45 per barrel “tax” (admittedly

arbitrary)Negative

W Cost of Ozone DepletionUS share of cumulative world production of CFC-11 and CFC-12 (1/3) x $45.78/kg

x cumulative world productionNegative

X Loss of Old-Growth Forests

Increasing value placed on ecological services as resource becomes more scarce (1 acre = $1,419 in 1950; 1 acre = $28,000 in 1994) x annual loss of old

growth forests

Negative

Y Net Capital Investment

Net capital growth = amount of new capital stock – capital requirement (amount of capital required to maintain the same level of capital per worker) [five year rolling

average utilized]

Positive

ZNet Foreign Lending or

Borrowing

US net international investment position (from the Bureau of Economic Analysis)

[five year rolling average utilized]Positive

Appendix B

117

Transparency InternationalSource: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2003277

Surveys used for 2003 Corruption Perceptions Index

Number 1 2 3

Source World Economic Forum

Name Global Competitiveness Report

Year 2001 2002 2003

Internet address www.weforum.org

Who was surveyed? Senior business leaders; domestic and international companies

Subject asked

Undocumented extra payments connected with import and export

permits, public utilities and contracts, business licenses, tax payments or loan applications are

common/not common

Questions on left plus payments connected to favorable regulations and judicial decisions

Number of replies 4,022 ca. 4,600 7,741

Coverage 59 countries 76 countries 102 countries

Number 4 5 6

Source Institute for Management Development, IMD, Switzerland

Name World Competitiveness Yearbook

Year 2001 2002 2003

Internet address www.imd.ch

Who was surveyed? Executives in top and middle management; domestic and international companies

Subject asked Bribery and corruption in the public sphere Bribery and corruption in the economy

Number of replies 3,678 3,532 >4,000


Number 7 8

Source Information International World Bank

Name Survey of Middle Eastern Businesspeople World Business Environment Survey

Year 2003 2001

Internet address www.information-international.com info.worldbank.org/governance/wbes/index1.html

Who wassurveyed?

Senior businesspeople from Bahrain, Lebanon, UAE Senior managers

Subject asked

How common are bribes, how costly are they are for doing business, and how frequently are public contracts awarded to friends and relatives in

neighboring countries?

“Frequency of bribing” and “corruption as a constraint to business”

Number of replies

382 assessments from 165 respon-dents 10,090

Coverage 31 countries 79 countries278


118

Number 9 10 11

Source Economist Intelligence Unit Freedom House World Markets Research Centre

Name Country Risk Service and Country Forecast Nations in Transit Risk Ratings

Year 2003 2003 2002

Internet address www.eiu.com www.freedomhouse.org www.wmrc.com

Who wassurveyed?

Expert staff assessment (expatriate)

Assessment by US academic experts/FH staff Assessment by staff

Subject asked

Assessment of pervasiveness of corruption (misuse of public office for private or political party gain) among public officials (politicians

and civil servants)

Perception of corruption in civil service, business interests of top policymakers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest,

and anti-corruption initiatives

Red tape and likelihood of encountering corrupt officials

(includes small-scale bribes, larger-scale kickbacks and

corporate fraud)

Number of replies Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable

Coverage 139 countries 27 transition economies 186 countries

Number 12 13 14

Source Columbia University (CU) Political and Economic Risk Consultancy PricewaterhouseCoopers

Name State Capacity Survey Asian Intelligence Issue Opacity Index

Year 2002 2001 2001

Internetaddress www.asiarisk.com www.opacityindex.com

Who wassurveyed?

US-resident country experts (policy analysts, academics, journalists) Expatriate business executives CFOs, equity analysts, bankers,

PwC staff

Subject asked Severity of corruption within the state

How do you rate corruption in terms of its quality or contribution

to the overall living/working environment?

Frequency of corruption in various contexts (e.g., obtaining

import/export permits or subsidies, avoiding taxes)

Number ofreplies 224 ca. 1,000 1,357


Number 15 16 17

Source A multilateral development bank Gallup International on behalf of Transparency International World Bank and the EBRD

Name Survey Corruption Survey Business Environment andEnterprise Performance Survey

Year 2002 2002 2002

Internetaddress

www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html#bpi

info.worldbank.org/governance/beeps2002

Who wassurveyed?

Experts within the bank were identified and multiple

questionnaires (each relating to a different country) sent out to them (roughly 40% of questionnaires

were returned)

Senior businesspeople from 15 emerging market economies Senior businesspeople

Subject asked

How widespread is the incidence of corruption? (widespread, somewhat

widespread, somewhat limited, limited, no judgment)

“How common are bribes to poli-ticians, senior civil servants, and judges?” and “How significant of

an obstacle are the costs associated with such payments for

doing business?”

Frequency of irregular “additional payments”; How [important] is corruption for the operation and

growth of your business?

No. of replies 398 835 6,500

Coverage 47 countries 21 countries 25 transition countries

Appendix B

119

Surveys and Indices (from which 12 were selected for this evaluation)

Africa Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum)

Afrobarometer Survey

Agenda 21 Indicators (UN, Individual Localities)

Alesina Index of Political Instability

American Demographics’ Index of Wellbeing

Bollen Index of Political Rights

Bureau of the Census various Reports on Minorities (US)

Business Enterprise Environment Survey (World Bank)

Business Risk Service (Business Environment Risk Intelligence)

Cairncross’ Costing the Earth

Canada’s Green Indicators

Canadian Social Trends


Central and Eastern Eurobarometer

Class Structures and Class Consciousness

Comparative Scandinavian Welfare SurveyCompendium of Sustainable Development Indicators (International Institute for Sustainable Development)Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (World Bank)

Country Risk Service (Economist Intelligence Unit)

Cummins’ Comprehensive Quality of Life Scale

Datenreport (Germany)

Development Indicators (Institute of Development Studies, Sussex)

Diener’s Basic and Advanced Quality of Life Indexes

Données socials (France)

Ecological Footprint (Wackernagel and Rees)

Economic Freedom Index (Heritage Foundation)

Ecosystem Approach to Human Health Program (IDRC, Canada)

Ecosystem Health Indicators (International Joint Commission, Canada)

Environmental Sustainability Index (World Economic Forum)

Estes’ Index of Social Progress

EU Local Sustainability Project

EuReporting (EU)

Eurobarometer

European Commission’s Policy Performance Index

Surveys and Indices

120

European Union Local Sustainability Indicators

Eurostat

Fedderke and Klitgaard’s Governance Indicators

Finnish Welfare Survey

Freedom in the World (Freedom House)

Gallop International 50th Anniversary Survey

Gallup Millennium Survey

Gastil Political and Civil Rights Indices

Gender Empowerment Index (UNDP)

Genuine Progress Indicator (Redefining Progress)

German System of Social Indicators

Gini Coefficient

Global Competitiveness Report (World Economic Forum)

Global Environment Outlook

Global Insight’s DRI McGraw-Hill Country Risk Review

Health USA

Health-Related Quality of Life (Centre for Disease Control)

Healthy Cities Project (World Health Organization)

Henderson’s Country Futures Indicators

Human Activity and the Environment (Statistics Canada)

Human Development Index (UNDP)

Human Freedom Index (UNDP)

Human Rights Reports (US State Department/Amnesty International)

Humana’s World Human Rights Guide

Index of Economic Well-Being (IEWB)

Index of Leading Cultural Indicators

Index of Leading Economic Indicators

Indicators of Housing and Neighborhood Quality (US)

International Crime (Victimization) Surveys

International Living Index

International Risk Guide (Political Risk Services)

International Social Justice Project

International Social Survey Programme

Israel Bureau of Statistics Social Indicators and Social Surveys

Jacksonville’s Quality of Life Initiative

Appendix B

121

Jasso’s Justice Indices

Johnston’s Quality of Life Index

Latino Barometro Surveys

Level of Living Index (Drewnowski and Scott)

Living Planet Report (World Wide Fund for Nature)

McGranahan et. al.’s Development Index

Michalos’ North American Social Report

Millennium Development Goals (UN)

Miringoffs’ Index of Social Health (ISH)

Money’s Best Places

Multiple Capital Model (World Bank)

National Cross-sectional surveys (Hudler and Richter)

Nations in Transition (Freedom House)

Netherlands Living Conditions Index

New Democracies Barometer

Nordic Living Conditions Surveys



Opacity Index (Price Waterhouse Coopers)

PAIN Index

Philippines Social Weather Reports

Physical Quality of Life Index

Pourgerami Democracy and Culture Indices

Qualitative Risk Measure on Foreign Lending (Business Environment Risk Intelligence)

Quality of Life Report (World Health Organization)

Reader’s Digest Eurodata 1990

Recent Social Trends in the United States (William F. Ogburn)

Reporters Without Borders

Scandinavian Level of Living Surveys

Seattle’s Sustainable Project (City of Seattle)

Social Consequences of Economic Transformation

Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989

Social Trends (Britain)

Social Trends in the United States: Blacks and Whites: Narrowing the Gap?

Social Trends in the United States: Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations

Surveys and Indices

122

State Capacity Project (Columbia University)State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) Indicators (People’s Republic of China)State of the Environment Reporting Program (Environment Canada)

State of the World’s Children (UNICEF)

Swedish Level of Living Survey

The Condition of Education (US)

The Economist’s Global Indicators and Data

The Misery Index

The Pulse of Europe

Toronto’s Healthy City Project

Transition Report (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development)

Transparency International’s Corruption Surveys and Indices


US Commission on Civil Rights Reports

US General Social Survey

Veenhoven’s Happy Life Expectancy Scale

Wellbeing Assessment (Prescott-Allen)


World Bank Environmental Performance Indicators

World Competitiveness Yearbook (Institute for Management and Development)

World Development Index (World Bank)

World Markets Online (World Markets Research Centre)

World Resources Report (World Resources Institute)

World Value Survey

Worldwatch Institute Database and Vital Signs

Appendix B

123

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Altvater, Elmar. “Restructuring the Space of Democracy: The Effects of Capitalist Globalization and the Ecological Crisis on The Form and Substance and Democracy.” In Global Ethics and Environment, edited by Nicholas Low, 283-309. New York: Routledge, 1999.

Anielski, Mark, and Jonathan Rowe. “The Genuine Progress Indicator: 1998 Update.” San Francisco, California: Redefining Progress, 1999.

Aturpane, Harsha, Paul Glewwe, and Paul Isenman. “Poverty, Human Development, and Growth: An Emerging Consensus?” The American Economic Review 84, no. 2 (1994): 244-49.

Bauer, Raymond. Social Indicators. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1966.Bell, Simon, and Stephen Morse. Sustainability Indicators: Measuring the Immeasurable. London: Earthscan,

1999.Benhabib, S. “Deliberative Rationality and Models of Democratic Legitimacy.” Constellations 1 (1994): 26-52.Bennett, Fran, and Chris Roche. “Developing Indicators: The Scope for Participatory Approaches.” New

Economy 7, no. 1 (2000): 24-28.Berger-Schmitt, Regina. “Dimensions, Indicators and Time Series in a European System of Social Indicators by

Example.” Mannheim: EuReporting, 2001.Berman, Yitzhak, and David Phillips. “Indicators of Social Quality and Social Exclusion at National and

Community Level.” Social Indicators Research 50, no. 3 (2000): 329-350.Boelhouwer, Jeroen. “Quality of Life and Living Conditions in the Netherlands.” Social Indicators Research 58

(2002): 113-138.———. “Social Indicators and Living Conditions in the Netherlands.” Social Indicators Research 60 (2002):

89-113.Bossel, Hartmut. Indicators for Sustainable Development: Theory, Method, Applications. Winnipeg:

International Institute for Sustainable Development, 1999.Cairns, J. Jr., P.V. McCormick, and B.R. Niederlehner. “A Proposed Framework for Developing Indicators of

Ecosystem Health.” Hydrobiologia, no. 263 (1993): 1-44.Castles, Ian. “The Mismeasure of Nations: A Review Essay on the Human Development Report 1998.”

Population and Development Review 24, no. 4 (1998): 831-44.Chafy, Randy. “Confronting the Culture of Progress in the 21st Century.” Futures 29, no. 7 (1997): 633-48.Cobb, Clifford, Mark Glickman, and Craig Cheslog. “The Genuine Progress Indicator 2000 Update.” Oakland,

California: Redefining Progress, 2001.Cobb, Clifford, Gary Sue Goodman, and Joanne C. May Kliejunas. “Blazing Sun Overhead and Clouds on the

Horizon: The Genuine Progress Report for 1999.” Oakland, California: Redefining Progress, 2000.Cobb, Clifford, Ted Halstead, and Jonathan Rowe. “If the GDP Is Up, Why Is America Down?” The Atlantic

Monthly 276, no. 4 (1995): 59-72.Cohen, J. “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy.” In The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State,

edited by A. Hamlin and P Pettit, 17-34. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989.

124

Delhey, Jan. “The Prospects of Catching up for New EU Members: Lessons for the Accession Countries to the European Union from Previous Enlargements.” Social Indicators Research 56, no. 2 (2001): 205(27).

Dhakal, Shobhakar, and Hidefumi Imura. “Policy-Based Indicator Systems: Emerging Debates and Lessons.” Local Environment 8, no. 1 (2003): 113-19.

Dryzek, John S. “Global Ecological Democracy.” In Global Ethics and Environment, edited by Nicholas Low, 264-82. New York: Routledge, 1999.

Eigen, Peter. “Corruption Is Unsustainable.” Berlin: Transparency International, 2002.———. “Corruption Perception Index 2001: The Powerful Are Corrupt as Ever.” Paris: Transparency

International, 2001.———. “Nine out of Ten Developing Countries Urgently Need Practical Support to Fight Corruption,

Highlights New Index.” London: Transparency International, 2003.Estes, Richard J. Trends in World Social Development : The Social Progress of Nations, 1970-1987. New York:

Praeger, 1988.Etzioni, Amitai. “The Good Society: Goals Beyond Money.” The Futurist 35, no. 4 (2001): 68.EuReporting. European System of Social Indicators [Web site]. EuReporting, 2003 [cited December 31 2003].

Available from http://www.gesis.org/en/social_monitoring/social_indicators/EU_Reporting/eusi.htm.Ferriss, Abbott L. “Telesis: The Uses of Indicators to Set Goals and Develop Programs to Change Conditions. “

Social Indicators Research 58 (2002): 229-265.———. “The Use of Social Indicators.” Social Forces 66, no. 3 (1988): 601-17.Fitz-Gibbon, Carol Taylor. “Evaluation in an Age of Indicators: Challenges for Public Sector Management.”

Evaluation 8, no. 1 (2002): 140-48.Fortune, J., and J. Hughes. “Modern Academic Myths.” In Systems for Sustainability: People, Organizations

and Environments, edited by F.A. Stowell, R.L. Ison, R. Armson, J. Hollowar, S. Jackson and S McRobb, 125-30. New York: Plenum Press, 1997.

Freedom House. About the Center for Religious Freedom [Web site]. Center for Religious Freedom, 2003 [cited November 5 2003]. Available from www.freedomhouse.org/religion/about/about.htm.

———. Freedom in the World 2003: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties [Web site]. Freedom House, 2003 [cited November 5 2003]. Available from www.freedomhouse.org/research/index.htm.

———. Freedom in the World: Survey Methodology [Website]. Freedom House, 2003 [cited November 5 2003]. Available from www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm.

———. Freedom of the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties. New York: Freedom House, 2003.

———. Mission Statement and History Freedom House, 2003 [cited November 5 2003]. Available from www.freedomhouse.org/aboutfh/index.htm.

Gladwell, Malcolm. The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2000.

Government of Ontario, Ministry of the Environment. The Environmental Bill of Rights: General Information [Web site]. 2004 [cited June 6 2004]. Available from http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/envision/env_reg/ebr/english/ebr_info/purpose.htm.

Habermas, J. Between Fact and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge: Polity, 1995.

Hagerty, Michael R. “Declining Quality of Life Costs Governments Elections: Review of 13 OECD Countries. “ Social Indicators Research 58 (2002): 383-402.

Hagerty, Michael R., Robert A. Cummins, Abbott L. Ferriss, Kenneth Land, Alex C. Michalos, Mark Peterson, Andrew Sharpe, Joseph Sirgy, and Joachim Vogel. “Quality of Life Indexes for National Policy: Review and Agenda for Research.” Social Indicators Research 55 (2001): 1-96.

Hanf, Kenneth, and Alf-Inge Jansen. “Environmental Policy: The Outcome of Strategic Action and Institutional Characteristics.” In Governance and Environment in Western Europe: Politics, Policy and Administration, edited by Kenneth Hanf and Alf-Inge Jansen. New York: Addison Wesley Longman Ltd., 1998.

Heath, Joseph. The Efficient Society: Why Canada Is as Close to Utopia as It Gets. Toronto: Viking, 2001.Henderson, Hazel. “Mutual Development: Towards New Criteria and Indicators.” Futures 21, no. 6 (1989):

571(14).

Bibliography

125

———. “Paths to Sustainable Development: The Role of Social Indicators.” Futures 26, no. 2 (1994): 125(13).Homer-Dixon, Thomas. Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999.———. The Ingenuity Gap. Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000.Hopkins, Michael. “Defining Indicators to Assess Socially Responsible Enterprises.” Futures 29, no. 7 (1997):

581(23).Johansson, Sten. “Conceptualizing and Measuring Quality of Life for National Policy: From the Swedish Level

of Living Survey to an Epistemology of the Democratic Process.” Social Indicators Research 58 (2002): 13-32.

Kamen, Charles S. “’Quality of Life’ Research at the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics: Social Indicators and Social Surveys.” Social Indicators Research 58 (2002): 139-160.

Kaufmann, Daniel. “Government Matters II:Governance Indicators for 1996-2002.” Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2003.

Kaufmann, Daniel, and Aart Krayy. “Governance and Growth: Causality Which Way?” Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2003.

Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Krayy, and Massimo Mastruzzi. “Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002.” Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2003.

Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Krayy, and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton. “Aggregating Governance Indicators.” Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1999.

———. “Governance Matters.” Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1999.Kelly, Rosemary (Toronto District School Board Teacher). August 25 2003.Kunte, Arundhati, Kirk Hamilton, John Dixon, and Michael Clemens. “Estimating National Wealth:

Methodology and Results.” Washington, DC: The World Bank: Environment Department, 1998.Lai, Dejian. “Principal Component Analysis on Human Development Indicators of China.” Social Indicators

Research 61, no. 3 (2003): 319(12).Lambsdorff, Johann Graf. “Background Paper to the 2003 Corruption Perceptions Index: Framework Document

2003.” Berlin: Transparency International and University of Passau, 2003.Lane, R. The Loss of Happiness in Market Democracies. USA: Yale University, 2000.Lane, R.E. The Market Experience. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1991.Lawrence, Gary. “Indicators for Sustainable Development.” In The Way Forward: Beyond Agenda 21, edited by

F. Dodds, 179-89. London: Earthscan, 1997.Leftwich, Adrian. “Governance, Democracy and Development in the Third World.” Third World Quarterly 14,

no. 3 (1993): 605-24.Mazumdar, Krishna. “An Analysis of Causal Flow between Social Development and Economic Growth: The

Social Development Index.” The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 55, no. 3 (1996): 361-383.

McGillivray, M. “The Human Development Index: Yet Another Redundant Composite Development Indicator?” World Development 19 (1991): 1461-68.

Michalos, Alex C. “Combining Social, Economic and Environmental Indicators to Measure Sustainable Human Well-Being.” Social Indicators Research 40, no. 1-2 (1997): 221-258.

Millennium Project. “Millennium Project Information Material.” New York: United Nations, 2003.Miringoff, Marc, and Marque-Luisa Miringoff. “America’s Social Health: The Nation’s Need to Know.”

Challenge 38, no. 5 (1995): 19-24.Morris, David. Measuring the Condition of the World’s Poor: The Physical Quality of Life Index, Pergamon

Policy Studies. New York: Published for the Overseas Development Council by Pergamon Press, 1979.National Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy. The State of the Debate on the Environment and

the Economy: Environment and Sustainable Development Indicators for Canada. Ottawa: Renouf Publishing Co. Ltd., 2003.

Newman, Barbara A., and Randall J. Thomson. “Economic Growth and Social Development: A Longitudinal Analysis of Causal Priority.” World Development 17, no. 4 (1989): 461-471.

Noll, Heinz-Herbert. “Towards a European System of Social Indicators: Theoretical Framework and System Architecture.” Social Indicators Research 58, no. 1 (2002): 47-87.

Noorbakhsh, F. “The Human Development Indices: Some Technical Issues and an Alternative Indices.” Journal of International Development 10 (1998b): 589-605.

———. “A Modified Human Development Index.” World Development 26 (1998a): 517-28.

Bibliography

126

Noorbakhsh, Farhad. “Standards of Living, Human Development Indices and Structural Adjustments in Developing Countries: An Empirical Investigation.” Journal of International Development 10 (1998): 751-75.

OECD Environment Directorate: Environment Policy Committee, Working Group on Environmental Information and Outlooks. “Aggregated Environmental Indices: Review of Aggregation Methodologies in Use.” Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2002.

Ogburn, William F. Recent Social Trends in the United States. 2 vols., Report to the President’s Research Committee on Social Trends: McGraw-Hill, 1933.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Environmental Indicators [Web site]. OECD: Environmental Directorate, 2003 [cited November 22 2003]. Available from http://www.oecd.org/about/0,2337,en_2649_34441_1_1_1_1_1,00.html.

———. “OECD Core Set of Indicators for Environmental Performance Reviews: A Synthesis Report by The Egroup on the State of the Environment.” Paris: OECD, 1993.

———. OECD Environmental Indicators 2001: Towards Sustainable Development. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2001.

———. Society at a Glance: OECD Social Indicators: 2002. Paris: OECD, 2003.Overseas Development Administration. “Good Government.” London: Overseas Development Administration,

1993.Pandey, M. D., and J. S. Nathwani. “Measurement of Socio-Economic Inequality Using the Life-Quality

Index.” Social Indicators Research 39, no. 2 (1996): 187-202.Prescott-Allen, Robert. The Wellbeing of Nations: A Country-by-Country Index of Quality of Life and the

Environment. Washington, DC: Island Press, 2001.Putnam, Robert D. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Touchstone,

2000.Ravallion, M. “Good and Bad Growth: The Human Development Reports.” World Development 25 (1997): 631-

38.Redefining Progress. Community Indicators Project [Web site]. Redefining Progress, 2003 [cited November 10

2003]. Available from http://www.redefiningprogress.org/projects/indicators/#indicators.———. Sustainability Program: Ecological Footprint Accounts [Website]. Redefining Progress, 2003 [cited

August 8 2003]. Available from http://www.rprogress.org/programs/sustainability/ef/.Rischard, J.F. High Noon: Twenty Global Problems, Twenty Years to Solve Them. New York: Basic Books,

2002.Rowe, Jonathan. “Grossly Distorting Perception.” The Ecologist 33, no. 1 (2003): 54-56.Sagar, A.D., and A. Najam. “The Human Development Index: A Critical Review.” Ecological Economics 25

(1998): 249-64.Schulze, Peter C., and Robert A. Frosch. “Overview: Measures of Environmental Performance and Ecosystem

Condition.” In Measures of Environmental Performance and Ecosystem Condition, edited by Peter C. Schulze, 1-12. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1999.

Sen, Amartya Kumar. “Freedoms and Needs: An Argument for the Primacy of Political Rights.” The New Republic 210, no. 2-3 (1994): 31-37.

———. Resources, Values and Development. Oxford: Blackwell, 1984.Seppälä, Jyri, and Raimo P. Hämäläinen. “On the Meaning of the Distance-to-Target Weighting Method and

Normalisation in Life Cycle Assessment.” International Journal of Life Cycle Assessment 6, no. 4 (2001): 211-18.

Srinivasan. “Human Development: A New Paradigm or Reinvention of the Wheel?” (Papers and Proceedings of the American Economic Association Annual Meeting) T.N. American Economic Review 84, no. 2 (1994): 238-245.

Steenkamp, Anton J. “The South African Constitution of 1993 and the Bill of Rights: An Evaluation in Light of International Human Rights Norms.” Human Rights Quarterly 17, no. 1 (1995): 101-26.

Stein, Janice Gross. The Cult of Efficiency, CBC Massey Lectures Series. Toronto: Anansi, 2001.Sun, Li-Teh. “Mean Value, Government and Human Development.” International Journal of Social Economics

24, no. 4 (1997): 383.Sunstein, Cass R. “Well-Being and the State.” Harvard Law Review 107, no. 6 (1994): 1303-27.The World Bank. Expanding the Measure of Wealth: Indicators of Environmentally Sustainable Development,

Bibliography

127

Environmentally Sustainable Development Studies and Monographs Series. Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1997.

———. “Governance and Development.” Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1992.———. “Indicators by World Bank Research Called “Best Measure” of Quality of Governance Worldwide.”

Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2003.Transparency International. Mission Statement [Web site]. Transparency International, 2003 [cited August 27

2003]. Available from www.transparency.org/about_ti/mission.html.———. TI History: Building the Coalition against Corruption -- a History of Transparency International

[Website]. Transparency International, 2003 [cited August 27 2003]. Available from www.transparency.org/about_ti/history.html.

———. “Transparency International Bribe Payers Index 2002: Explanatory Notes and Comparative Tables.” Berlin: Transparency International, 2002.

———. “Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2003.” Berlin, Germany: Transparency International, 2003.

———. “Transparency International Publishes 1997 Corruption Perceptions Index.” Berlin: Transparency International, 1997.

———. “Transparency International Releases First TI Global Corruption Barometer Survey, Developed with Gallup International.” Berlin: Transparency International, 2003.

———. “Transparency International Releases the Year 2000 Corruption Perceptions Index.” Berlin: Transparency International, 2000.

Turner, M., and D. Hulme. Governance, Administration and Development: Making the State Work. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1997.

United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development. CSD Theme Indicator Framework [Web site]. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Division for Sustainable Development, 2003 [cited Nov. 8 2003]. Available from http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/natlinfo/indicators/isdms2001/table_4.htm.

———. Indicators of Sustainable Development: Guidelines and Methodologies 2001 [PDF]. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Division for Sustainable Development, 2001 [cited Oct. 14, 2003]. Available from http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/natlinfo/indicators/indisd/indisd-mg2001.pdf.

———. National Sustainable Development Strategies [Web site]. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Division for Sustainable Development, 2003 [cited Nov. 8, 2003]. Available from http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/natlinfo/nsds/nsds.htm.

———. “Report on the Aggregation of Indicators of Sustainable Development: Background Paper for the Ninth Session of the Commission on Sustainable Development.” New York: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Division for Sustainable Development, 2001.

United Nations Department of Public Information. “Implementing the Millennium Declaration: The Millennium Development Goals and the United Nations Role.” New York: United Nations, 2002.

United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Report: Millennium Development Goals--a Compact among Nations to End Human Poverty. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

United Nations General Assembly. “United Nations Millennium Declaration.” New York: United Nations, 2000.United Nations Secretary General. “Road Map Towards the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium

Declaration.” New York: United Nations, 2001.United Nations Statistics Division. Millennium Indicators Database [Database]. UN Department of Economic

and Social Affairs, 2003 [cited November 11 2003]. Available from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_goals.asp.

Veenhoven, Ruut. “Why Social Policy Needs Subjective Indicators.” Social Indicators Research 58 (2002): 33-46.

Wackernagel, Mathis, William E. Rees, and Phil Testemale (Illustrator). Our Ecological Footprint: Reducing Human Impact on the Earth. Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers, 1996.

Weaver, James H., Michael T. Rock, and Kenneth Kusterer. Achieving Broad-Based Sustainable Development: Governance, Environment, and Growth with Equity. West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, Inc., 1997.

Wei, Shang-Jin. “How Taxing Is Corruption on International Investors?” Review of Economics and Statistics 82, No. 1 (2000): 1-11.

Bibliography

129

ENDNOTES

1 Links determined using Altavista’s Webmaster search function: http://www.altavista.com/web/webmaster.2 John S. Dryzek, “Global Ecological Democracy,” in Global Ethics and Environment, ed. Nicholas Low (New York: Routledge, 1999), 279.3 Cass R. Sunstein, “Well-Being and the State,” Harvard Law Review 107, no. 6 (1994): 1327.4 Yitzhak Berman and David Phillips, “Indicators of Social Quality and Social Exclusion at National and Community Level,” Social Indicators Research 50, no. 3 (2000): 343.5 Elmar Altvater, “Restructuring the Space of Democracy: The Effects of Capitalist Globalization and the Ecological Crisis on The Form and Substance and Democracy,” in Global Ethics and Environment, ed. Nicholas Low (New York: Routledge, 1999), 284.6 Anton J. Steenkamp, “The South African Constitution of 1993 and the Bill of Rights: An Evaluation in Light of International Human Rights Norms,” Human Rights Quarterly 17, no. 1 (1995): section V(A-E).7 Altvater, “Restructuring the Space of Democracy: The Effects of Capitalist Globalization and the Ecological Crisis on The Form and Substance and Democracy,” 285.8 Ministry of the Environment Government of Ontario, The Environmental Bill of Rights: General Information [Website] (2004 [cited June 6 2004]); available from http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/envision/env_reg/ebr/english/ebr_info/purpose.htm.9 Altvater, “Restructuring the Space of Democracy: The Effects of Capitalist Globalization and the Ecological Crisis on The Form and Substance and Democracy,” 287.10 Ibid., 286.11 Dryzek, “Global Ecological Democracy,” 276. cites S. Benhabib, “Deliberative Rationality and Models of Democratic Legitimacy,” Constellations 1 (1994), J. Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,” in The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State, ed. A. Hamlin and P Pettit (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), J. Habermas, Between Fact and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 1995).12 Sunstein, “Well-Being and the State,” 1303.13 Ferriss, Abbott L,”Telesis: The Uses of Indicators to Set Goals and Develop Programs to Change Conditions,” Social Indicators Research 58 (2002): 230.14 Berman and Phillips, “Indicators of Social Quality and Social Exclusion at National and Community Level,” 344.15 Sten Johansson, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Quality of Life for National Policy: From the Swedish Level of Living Survey to an Epistemology of the Democratic Process,” Social Indicators Research 58 (2002): 21, 28.16 Hazel Henderson, “Paths to Sustainable Development: The Role of Social Indicators,” Futures 26, no. 2 (1994): 131.17 Marc Miringoff and Marque-Luisa Miringoff, “America’s Social Health: The Nation’s Need to Know,” Challenge 38, no. 5 (1995): 19.18 Simon Bell and Stephen Morse, Sustainability Indicators: Measuring the Immeasurable (London: Earthscan,

130

1999), 64.19 Fran Bennett and Chris Roche, “Developing Indicators: The Scope for Participatory Approaches,” New Economy 7, no. 1 (2000): 26.20 Alex C. Michalos, “Combining Social, Economic and Environmental Indicators to Measure Sustainable Human Well-Being,” Social Indicators Research 40, no. 1-2 (1997): 227.21 Clifford Cobb, Ted Halstead, and Jonathan Rowe, “If the GDP Is Up, Why Is America Down?,” The Atlantic Monthly 276, no. 4 (1995): 61-63.22 Ibid.: 61.23 Henderson, “Paths to Sustainable Development: The Role of Social Indicators,” 125.24 Raymond Bauer, “Social Indicators,” (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1966).25 Jeroen Boelhouwer, “Social Indicators and Living Conditions in the Netherlands,” Social Indicators Research (2002): 91.26 Ibid.27 Richard J. Estes, Trends in World Social Development : The Social Progress of Nations, 1970-1987 (New York: Praeger, 1988).28 David Morris, Measuring the Condition of the World’s Poor: The Physical Quality of Life Index, Pergamon Policy Studies (New York: Published for the Overseas Development Council by Pergamon Press, 1979).29 Johansson, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Quality of Life for National Policy: From the Swedish Level of Living Survey to an Epistemology of the Democratic Process,” 14.30 F. Noorbakhsh, “A Modified Human Development Index,” World Development 26 (1998a): 517.31 Abbott L. Ferriss, “The Use of Social Indicators,” Social Forces 66, no. 3 (1988): 601.32 Noorbakhsh, “A Modified Human Development Index,” 517.33 Johansson, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Quality of Life for National Policy: From the Swedish Level of Living Survey to an Epistemology of the Democratic Process,” 14.34 Heinz-Herbert Noll, “Towards a European System of Social Indicators: Theoretical Framework and System Architecture,” Social Indicators Research 58, no. 1 (2002): 47-48.35 Henderson, “Paths to Sustainable Development: The Role of Social Indicators,” 126.36 Jan Delhey, “The Prospects of Catching up for New EU Members: Lessons for the Accession Countries to the European Union from Previous Enlargements,” Social Indicators Research 56, no. 2 (2001): 168.37 Berman and Phillips, “Indicators of Social Quality and Social Exclusion at National and Community Level,” 329-30.38 J. Jr. Cairns, P.V. McCormick, and B.R. Niederlehner, “A Proposed Framework for Developing Indicators of Ecosystem Health,” Hydrobiologia, no. 263 (1993): 6. quoted in Peter C. Schulze and Robert A. Frosch, “Overview: Measures of Environmental Performance and Ecosystem Condition,” in Measures of Environmental Performance and Ecosystem Condition, ed. Peter C. Schulze (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1999), 1.39 Thomas Homer-Dixon, The Ingenuity Gap (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 111-13.40 Bell and Morse, Sustainability Indicators: Measuring the Immeasurable, vii.41 Shobhakar Dhakal and Hidefumi Imura, “Policy-Based Indicator Systems: Emerging Debates and Lessons,” Local Environment 8, no. 1 (2003): 115.42 Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “OECD Core Set of Indicators for Environmental Performance Reviews: A Synthesis Report by The Egroup on the State of the Environment,” (Paris: OECD, 1993), 5-10.43 Hartmut Bossel, Indicators for Sustainable Development: Theory, Method, Applications (Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development, 1999), 6, 22-24.44 Carol Taylor Fitz-Gibbon, “Evaluation in an Age of Indicators: Challenges for Public Sector Management,” Evaluation 8, no. 1 (2002): 141.45 Hazel Henderson, “Mutual Development: Towards New Criteria and Indicators,” Futures 21, no. 6 (1989): 575.46 Hagerty, Michael R.,”Declining Quality of Life Costs Governments Elections: Review of 13 OECD Countries. “ Social Indicators Research 58 (2002): 385.47 Bossel, Indicators for Sustainable Development: Theory, Method, Applications. Bell and Morse, Sustainability Indicators: Measuring the Immeasurable.48 Altvater, “Restructuring the Space of Democracy: The Effects of Capitalist Globalization and the Ecological

Endnotes

131

Crisis on Thee Form and Substance and Democracy,” 292.49 Henderson, “Paths to Sustainable Development: The Role of Social Indicators,” 126.50 J. Fortune and J. Hughes, “Modern Academic Myths,” in Systems for Sustainability: People, Organizations and Environments, ed. F.A. Stowell, et al. (New York: Plenum Press, 1997). quoted in Bell and Morse, Sustainability Indicators: Measuring the Immeasurable, 1.51 Randy Chafy, “Confronting the Culture of Progress in the 21st Century,” Futures 29, no. 7 (1997).52 Henderson, “Paths to Sustainable Development: The Role of Social Indicators,” 135.53 Chafy, “Confronting the Culture of Progress in the 21st Century.”54 Bennett and Roche, “Developing Indicators: The Scope for Participatory Approaches,” 27.55 Boelhouwer, “Social Indicators and Living Conditions in the Netherlands,” 102.56 Bell and Morse, Sustainability Indicators: Measuring the Immeasurable, 8.57 Altvater, “Restructuring the Space of Democracy: The Effects of Capitalist Globalization and the Ecological Crisis on The Form and Substance and Democracy.” Bell and Morse, Sustainability Indicators: Measuring the Immeasurable. Bossel, Indicators for Sustainable Development: Theory, Method, Applications. Bennett and Roche, “Developing Indicators: The Scope for Participatory Approaches.” Henderson, “Mutual Development: Towards New Criteria and Indicators.”58 Johansson, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Quality of Life for National Policy: From the Swedish Level of Living Survey to an Epistemology of the Democratic Process,” 27.59 Bossel, Indicators for Sustainable Development: Theory, Method, Applications, 27.60 Ibid., 34.61 Gary Lawrence, “Indicators for Sustainable Development,” in The Way Forward: Beyond Agenda 21, ed. F. Dodds (London: Earthscan, 1997).62 Cobb, Halstead, and Rowe, “If the GDP Is Up, Why Is America Down?,” 60.63 A more thorough discussion of the limited utility of economic indicators follows in the section “Government and Markets.” However, in general, economic indicators are not holistic because they fail to take into account the value of goods and services that exist outside the market. For instance, the value of ecosystem services provided by the Amazonian rainforest and the value of childcare performed by a stay-at-home Mom do not find their way into the calculation of GDP.64 Robert Prescott-Allen, The Wellbeing of Nations: A Country-by-Country Index of Quality of Life and the Environment (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2001), 3.65 Amartya Kumar Sen, “Freedoms and Needs: An Argument for the Primacy of Political Rights,” The New Republic 210, no. 2-3 (1994), Amartya Kumar Sen, Resources, Values and Development (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), Sunstein, “Well-Being and the State,” 1324.66 Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2000), 19, 22, 25, 29.67 Mathis Wackernagel, William E. Rees, and Phil Testemale (Illustrator), Our Ecological Footprint: Reducing Human Impact on the Earth (Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers, 1996).68 Redefining Progress, Sustainability Program: Ecological Footprint Accounts [Website] (Redefining Progress, 2003 [cited August 8 2003]); available from http://www.rprogress.org/programs/sustainability/ef/.69 Miringoff and Miringoff, “America’s Social Health: The Nation’s Need to Know,” 19.70 Bennett and Roche, “Developing Indicators: The Scope for Participatory Approaches,” 25.71 Ibid.72 Hagerty, Michael R., “Declining Quality of Life Costs Governments Elections: Review of 13 OECD Countries”. Kamen, Charles S.,”’Quality of Life’ Research at the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics: Social Indicators and Social Surveys,” Social Indicators Research 58 (2002): 145.73 Kamen, Charles S. “’Quality of Life’ Research at the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics: Social Indicators and Social Surveys,” 145.74 Henderson, “Paths to Sustainable Development: The Role of Social Indicators,” 130.75 Bell and Morse, Sustainability Indicators: Measuring the Immeasurable.76 A.D. Sagar and A. Najam, “The Human Development Index: A Critical Review,” Ecological Economics 25 (1998): 249.77 Ian Castles, “The Mismeasure of Nations: A Review Essay on the Human Development Report 1998,” Population and Development Review 24, no. 4 (1998): 832.78 Ibid.

Endnotes

132

79 M. Ravallion, “Good and Bad Growth: The Human Development Reports,” World Development 25 (1997): 632.80 Fitz-Gibbon, “Evaluation in an Age of Indicators: Challenges for Public Sector Management,” 140.81 J.F. Rischard, High Noon: Twenty Global Problems, Twenty Years to Solve Them (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 203.82 Bennett and Roche, “Developing Indicators: The Scope for Participatory Approaches,” 26-27.83 Fitz-Gibbon, “Evaluation in an Age of Indicators: Challenges for Public Sector Management,” 142. In economic language, this type of behavior is referred to as “gaming.” Gaming may optimize the payoffs of an individual, firm, or organization, but often produces results that are socially sub-optimal.84 Henderson, “Paths to Sustainable Development: The Role of Social Indicators,” 126.85 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Krayy, and Massimo Mastruzzi, “Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002,” (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2003), 25.86 Rosemary Kelly (Toronto District School Board Teacher), August 25 2003. Personal correspondence. 87 The World Bank, “Governance and Development,” (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1992), 1.88 Ibid.89 Kaufmann, Krayy, and Mastruzzi, “Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002,” 2.90 Overseas Development Administration, “Good Government,” (London: Overseas Development Administration, 1993). summarized in M. Turner and D. Hulme, Governance, Administration and Development: Making the State Work (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1997), 231.91 James H. Weaver, Michael T. Rock, and Kenneth Kusterer, Achieving Broad-Based Sustainable Development: Governance, Environment, and Growth with Equity (West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, Inc., 1997), 93-96.92 Altvater, “Restructuring the Space of Democracy: The Effects of Capitalist Globalization and the Ecological Crisis on The Form and Substance and Democracy,” 290-91.93 Adrian Leftwich, “Governance, Democracy and Development in the Third World,” Third World Quarterly 14, no. 3 (1993): 610-11.94 Berman and Phillips, “Indicators of Social Quality and Social Exclusion at National and Community Level,” 344.95 Janice Gross Stein, The Cult of Efficiency, CBC Massey Lectures Series (Toronto: Anansi, 2001), 8.96 Kenneth Hanf and Alf-Inge Jansen, “Environmental Policy: The Outcome of Strategic Action and Institutional Characteristics,” in Governance and Environment in Western Europe: Politics, Policy and Administration, ed. Kenneth Hanf and Alf-Inge Jansen (New York: Addison Wesley Longman Ltd., 1998), 3.97 Altvater, “Restructuring the Space of Democracy: The Effects of Capitalist Globalization and the Ecological Crisis on Thee Form and Substance and Democracy,” 288.98 Weaver, Rock, and Kusterer, Achieving Broad-Based Sustainable Development: Governance, Environment, and Growth with Equity, 85.99 Johansson, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Quality of Life for National Policy: From the Swedish Level of Living Survey to an Epistemology of the Democratic Process,” 26.100 Hagerty, “Declining Quality of Life Costs Governments Elections: Review of 13 OECD Countries”.101 Miringoff and Miringoff, “America’s Social Health: The Nation’s Need to Know,” 22.102 Rischard, High Noon: Twenty Global Problems, Twenty Years to Solve Them, 3-37.103 Ibid., 56.104 Ibid., 56-57, 46.105 Stein, The Cult of Efficiency, 56.106 Michael Hopkins, “Defining Indicators to Assess Socially Responsible Enterprises,” Futures 29, no. 7 (1997): 583-84.107 This discussion is based on chapter five of Thomas Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), and on material presented in the University of Toronto undergraduate course “Social Adaptation to Complex Change,” instructed by Thomas Homer-Dixon, 2001-2002.108 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Touchstone, 2000), 288-89.109 Dryzek, “Global Ecological Democracy,” 277.110 Rischard, High Noon: Twenty Global Problems, Twenty Years to Solve Them, 48-49.

Endnotes

133

111 Amitai Etzioni, “The Good Society: Goals Beyond Money,” The Futurist 35, no. 4 (2001): 68.112 Hopkins, “Defining Indicators to Assess Socially Responsible Enterprises,” 587.113 Joseph Heath, The Efficient Society: Why Canada Is as Close to Utopia as It Gets (Toronto: Viking, 2001), xi.114 Ibid., 7.115 Ibid., xvii-xviii.116 Stein, The Cult of Efficiency, 20.117 Ibid., 10.118 Sunstein, “Well-Being and the State,” 1303.119 Krishna Mazumdar, “An Analysis of Causal Flow between Social Development and Economic Growth: The Social Development Index,” The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 55, no. 3 (1996): 381.120 Ibid.: 378.121 Ibid.: 375-79.122 Barbara A. Newman and Randall J. Thomson, “Economic Growth and Social Development: A Longitudinal Analysis of Causal Priority,” World Development 17, no. 4 (1989): 469.123 Farhad Noorbakhsh, “Standards of Living, Human Development Indices and Structural Adjustments in Developing Countries: An Empirical Investigation,” Journal of International Development 10 (1998): 768-69.124 Li-Teh Sun, “Mean Value, Government and Human Development,” International Journal of Social Economics 24, no. 4 (1997): 383-89.125 Stein, The Cult of Efficiency, 33-42.126 Henderson, “Paths to Sustainable Development: The Role of Social Indicators,” 126.127 Henderson, “Mutual Development: Towards New Criteria and Indicators,” 574.128 Noorbakhsh, “Standards of Living, Human Development Indices and Structural Adjustments in Developing Countries: An Empirical Investigation,” 58.129 M. D. Pandey and J. S. Nathwani, “Measurement of Socio-Economic Inequality Using the Life-Quality Index,” Social Indicators Research 39, no. 2 (1996).130 Jonathan Rowe, “Grossly Distorting Perception,” The Ecologist 33, no. 1 (2003): 55.131 Ruut Veenhoven, “Why Social Policy Needs Subjective Indicators,” Social Indicators Research 58 (2002): 41.132 R. Lane, The Loss of Happiness in Market Democracies (USA: Yale University, 2000). cited in Veenhoven, “Why Social Policy Needs Subjective Indicators,” 411.133 Prescott-Allen, The Wellbeing of Nations: A Country-by-Country Index of Quality of Life and the Environment.134 F. Noorbakhsh, “The Human Development Indices: Some Technical Issues and Alternative Indices,” Journal of International Development 10 (1998b).135 Bossel, Indicators for Sustainable Development: Theory, Method, Applications, 60.Jeroen Boelhouwer, “Quality of Life and Living Conditions in the Netherlands,” Social Indicators Research (2002): 101.136

137 Dejian Lai, “Principal Component Analysis on Human Development Indicators of China,” Social Indicators Research 61, no. 3 (2003), Noorbakhsh, “The Human Development Indices: Some Technical Issues and Alternative Indices.”138 Kaufmann, Krayy, and Mastruzzi, “Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002,” 7.139 Boelhouwer, “Quality of Life and Living Conditions in the Netherlands,” 101-02.140 Harsha Aturpane, Paul Glewwe, and Paul Isenman, “Poverty, Human Development, and Growth: An Emerging Consensus?,” The American Economic Review 84, no. 2 (1994): 245.141 Delhey, “The Prospects of Catching up for New EU Members: Lessons for the Accession Countries to the European Union from Previous Enlargements,” 167.142 The poverty line in India is based on the minimum necessary income to buy 2000 kilocalories a day, while in Canada, the poverty line for a single person living in a rural area is $13,000.143 William F. Ogburn, Recent Social Trends in the United States, 2 vols., Report to the President’s Research Committee on Social Trends (McGraw-Hill, 1933).Quoted in Ferriss, “The Use of Social Indicators,” 609.144 Berman and Phillips, “Indicators of Social Quality and Social Exclusion at National and Community Level,” 329-30.145 Delhey, “The Prospects of Catching up for New EU Members: Lessons for the Accession Countries to the

Endnotes

134

European Union from Previous Enlargements,” 168-69.146 Boelhouwer, “Social Indicators and Living Conditions in the Netherlands,” 99.147 Delhey, “The Prospects of Catching up for New EU Members: Lessons for the Accession Countries to the European Union from Previous Enlargements,” 168-69.148 R.E. Lane, The Market Experience (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 440.149 Veenhoven, “Why Social Policy Needs Subjective Indicators.”150 Michael R. Hagerty et al., “Quality of Life Indexes for National Policy: Review and Agenda for Research,” Social Indicators Research 55 (2001): 8.151 Delhey, “The Prospects of Catching up for New EU Members: Lessons for the Accession Countries to the European Union from Previous Enlargements,” 168-69.152 Henderson, “Paths to Sustainable Development: The Role of Social Indicators,” 136.153 Hagerty et al., “Quality of Life Indexes for National Policy: Review and Agenda for Research,” 2-11.154 Listed in Bossel, Indicators for Sustainable Development: Theory, Method, Applications, 15-16.155 Prescott-Allen, The Wellbeing of Nations: A Country-by-Country Index of Quality of Life and the Environment.156 Ibid., 4.157 Ibid., 2.158 Ibid.159 Ibid., 10.160 Ibid., 17.161 The International Development Research Centre; IUCN-The World Conservation Union; the International Institute for Environment and Development; the UN Food and Agriculture Organization; Map Maker Ltd.; and UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre. 162 Prescott-Allen, The Wellbeing of Nations: A Country-by-Country Index of Quality of Life and the Environment, 145.163 With the exception of those embodied in the Freedom and Governance element. This element is based on indices produced by Freedom House and Transparency International, which do include subjective indicators.164 United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development, Indicators of Sustainable Development: Guidelines and Methodologies 2001 [PDF] (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Division for Sustainable Development, 2001 [cited Oct. 14, 2003]); available from http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/natlinfo/indicators/indisd/indisd-mg2001.pdf.165 Ibid.166 Paragraph based on: Ibid.167 Ibid.168 United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development, National Sustainable Development Strategies [Web site] (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Division for Sustainable Development, 2003 [cited Nov. 8, 2003]); available from http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/natlinfo/nsds/nsds.htm.169 United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development, “Report on the Aggregation of Indicators of Sustainable Development: Background Paper for the Ninth Session of the Commission on Sustainable Development,” (New York: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Division for Sustainable Development, 2001), 21.170 Ibid., 22.171 Jyri Seppälä and Raimo P. Hämäläinen, “On the Meaning of the Distance-to-Target Weighting Method and Normalisation in Life Cycle Assessment,” International Journal of Life Cycle Assessment 6, no. 4 (2001): 211.172 United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development, “Report on the Aggregation of Indicators of Sustainable Development: Background Paper for the Ninth Session of the Commission on Sustainable Development,” 24.173 United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development, Indicators of Sustainable Development: Guidelines and Methodologies 2001.174 Ibid.175 EuReporting, European System of Social Indicators [Web site] (EuReporting, 2003 [cited December 31 2003]); available from http://www.gesis.org/en/social_monitoring/social_indicators/EU_Reporting/eusi.htm.176 Noll, “Towards a European System of Social Indicators: Theoretical Framework and System Architecture,” 63-65.

Endnotes

135

177 Regina Berger-Schmitt, “Dimensions, Indicators and Time Series in a European System of Social Indicators by Example,” (Mannheim: EuReporting, 2001), 4-5.178 Noll, “Towards a European System of Social Indicators: Theoretical Framework and System Architecture,” 77.179 EuReporting, European System of Social Indicators.180 Noll, “Towards a European System of Social Indicators: Theoretical Framework and System Architecture,” 73.181 Berger-Schmitt, “Dimensions, Indicators and Time Series in a European System of Social Indicators by Example,” 6.182 Noll, “Towards a European System of Social Indicators: Theoretical Framework and System Architecture,” 72-77.183 EuReporting, European System of Social Indicators.184 Noll, “Towards a European System of Social Indicators: Theoretical Framework and System Architecture,” 81.185 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Environmental Indicators [Website] (OECD: Environmental Directorate, 2003 [cited November 22 2003]); available from http://www.oecd.org/about/0,2337,en_2649_34441_1_1_1_1_1,00.html.186 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Environmental Indicators 2001: Towards Sustainable Development (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2001), 8.187 Ibid., 8-9.188 Ibid., 140.189 Ibid., 10.190 Ibid., 8.191 Ibid., 135.192 Ibid., 8.193 Working Group on Environmental Information and Outlooks OECD Environment Directorate: Environment Policy Committee, “Aggregated Environmental Indices: Review of Aggregation Methodologies in Use,” (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2002).194 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Environmental Indicators 2001: Towards Sustainable Development, 109.195 OECD Environment Directorate: Environment Policy Committee, “Aggregated Environmental Indices: Review of Aggregation Methodologies in Use.”196 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Krayy, and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, “Governance Matters,” (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1999), 3.197 The World Bank, “Indicators by World Bank Research Called “Best Measure” of Quality of Governance Worldwide,” (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2003), 1.198 Steven Radelet quoted in Ibid.199 Kaufmann, Krayy, and Mastruzzi, “Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002,” 2.200 Ibid., 2-4.201 Daniel Kaufmann, “Government Matters: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002,” (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2003), 4-6.202 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Krayy, and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, “Aggregating Governance Indicators,” (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1999), 7.203 This explanation is based on Kaufmann, Krayy, and Mastruzzi, “Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002,” 7-11.204 As such, it is at least possible to access the underlying data by going independently to the sources used by the World Bank. Ideally, it would be possible to access this data through the World Bank Web site; however, this may be problematic due to copyright. One source that was published by the World Bank (The World Business Environment Survey) is available via the Interactive Governance Indicators website: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/datainteractive.html.205 Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Krayy, “Governance and Growth: Causality Which Way?,” (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2003), 1-2.206 Kaufmann, Krayy, and Mastruzzi, “Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002,” 2-3.207 Kaufmann, “Government Matters II:Governance Indicators for 1996-2002.”

Endnotes

136

208 The World Bank, “Indicators by World Bank Research Called “Best Measure” of Quality of Governance Worldwide,” 1.209 United Nations General Assembly, “United Nations Millennium Declaration,” (New York: United Nations, 2000).210 United Nations Secretary General, “Road Map Towards the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration,” (New York: United Nations, 2001).211 Millennium Project, “Millennium Project Information Material,” (New York: United Nations, 2003), 1-2.212 United Nations Department of Public Information, “Implementing the Millennium Declaration: The Millennium Development Goals and the United Nations Role,” (New York: United Nations, 2002).213 United Nations Statistics Division, Millennium Indicators Database [Database] (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2003 [cited November 11 2003]); available from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_goals.asp.214 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Society at a Glance: OECD Social Indicators: 2002 (Paris: OECD, 2003), 3.215 Ibid.216 Ibid., 11.217 Ibid., 12.218 Ibid., 9. 219 Ibid., 10.220 Freedom House, About the Center for Religious Freedom [Web site] (Center for Religious Freedom, 2003 [cited November 5 2003]); available from www.freedomhouse.org/religion/about/about.htm.221 Freedom House, Mission Statement and History (Freedom House, 2003 [cited November 5 2003]); available from www.freedomhouse.org/aboutfh/index.htm.222 Freedom House, Freedom of the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties (New York: Freedom House, 2003).223 Freedom House, Mission Statement and History.224 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2003: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties [Website] (Freedom House, 2003 [cited November 5 2003]); available from www.freedomhouse.org/research/index.htm.225 Freedom House, Freedom in the World: Survey Methodology [Web site] (Freedom House, 2003 [cited November 5 2003]); available from www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm.226 Ibid.(cited).227 Noorbakhsh, “The Human Development Indices: Some Technical Issues and Alternative Indices,” 590.228 Sen, Resources, Values and Development, 496. quoted in Noorbakhsh, “The Human Development Indices: Some Technical Issues and Alternative Indices,” 590.229 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report: Millennium Development Goals--a Compact among Nations to End Human Poverty (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 340.230 Noorbakhsh, “The Human Development Indices: Some Technical Issues and Alternative Indices,” 590.231 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report: Millennium Development Goals--a Compact among Nations to End Human Poverty, 340.232 Ibid., 341.233 Sagar and Najam, “The Human Development Index: A Critical Review.”234 Ibid.235 Castles, “The Mismeasure of Nations: A Review Essay on the Human Development Report 1998,” 832.236 Ibid.; Srinivasan, “Human Development: A New Paradigm or Reinvention of the Wheel?” Papers and Proceedings of the American Economic Association Annual Meeting T.N. American Economic Review 84, no. 2 (1994).237 Castles, “The Mismeasure of Nations: A Review Essay on the Human Development Report 1998.”238 Sagar and Najam, “The Human Development Index: A Critical Review.”239 M. McGillivray, “The Human Development Index: Yet Another Redundant Composite Development Indicator?,” World Development 19 (1991).240 Noorbakhsh, “The Human Development Indices: Some Technical Issues and Alternative Indices.”241 Clifford Cobb, Gary Sue Goodman, and Joanne C. May Kliejunas, “Blazing Sun Overhead and Clouds on the Horizon: The Genuine Progress Report for 1999,” (Oakland, California: Redefining Progress, 2000), i.

Endnotes

137

242 Clifford Cobb, Mark Glickman, and Craig Cheslog, “The Genuine Progress Indicator 2000 Update,” (Oakland, California: Redefining Progress, 2001), 1.243Cobb, Halstead, and Rowe, “If the GDP Is up, Why Is America Down?,” 69.244 Ibid.: 71.245 Ibid.: 71-72.246 Cobb, Glickman, and Cheslog, “The Genuine Progress Indicator 2000 Update,” 2.247 Mark Anielski and Jonathan Rowe, “The Genuine Progress Indicator: 1998 Update,” (San Francisco, California: Redefining Progress, 1999), 1.248 Redefining Progress, Community Indicators Project [Web site] (Redefining Progress, 2003 [cited November 10 2003]); available from http://www.redefiningprogress.org/projects/indicators/#indicators.249 National Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy, The State of the Debate on the Environment and the Economy: Environment and Sustainable Development Indicators for Canada (Ottawa: Renouf Publishing Co. Ltd., 2003), xvii.250 Ibid., 4.251 Arundhati Kunte et al., “Estimating National Wealth: Methodology and Results,” (Washington, DC: The World Bank: Environment Department, 1998), The World Bank, Expanding the Measure of Wealth: Indicators of Environmentally Sustainable Development, Environmentally Sustainable Development Studies and Monographs Series (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1997).252 National Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy, The State of the Debate on the Environment and the Economy: Environment and Sustainable Development Indicators for Canada, xix.253 Transparency International, TI History: Building the Coalition against Corruption -- a History of Transparency International [Web site] (Transparency International, 2003 [cited August 27 2003]); available from www.transparency.org/about_ti/history.html.254 Transparency International, “Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2003,” (Berlin, Germany: Transparency International, 2003).255 Transparency International, Mission Statement [Web site] (Transparency International, 2003 [cited August 27 2003]); available from www.transparency.org/about_ti/mission.html.256 Peter Eigen, “Corruption Perception Index 2001: The Powerful Are Corrupt as Ever,” (Paris: Transparency International, 2001), Transparency International, TI History: Building the Coalition against Corruption -- a History of Transparency International.257 Transparency International, “Transparency International Bribe Payers Index 2002: Explanatory Notes and Comparative Tables,” (Berlin: Transparency International, 2002), 1.258 Transparency International, “Transparency International Releases First Ti Global Corruption Barometer Survey, Developed with Gallup International,” (Berlin: Transparency International, 2003).259 Transparency International, TI History: Building the Coalition against Corruption -- a History of Transparency International.260 Peter Eigen, “Nine out of Ten Developing Countries Urgently Need Practical Support to Fight Corruption, Highlights New Index,” (London: Transparency International, 2003), 2.261 Peter Eigen, “Corruption Is Unsustainable,” (Berlin: Transparency International, 2002).262 Eigen, “Corruption Perception Index 2001: The Powerful Are Corrupt as Ever.”263 Transparency International, “Transparency International Releases the Year 2000 Corruption Perceptions Index,” (Berlin: Transparency International, 2000), 2.264 Shang-Jin Wei, “How Taxing Is Corruption on International Investors?” Review of Economics and Statistics 82, No. 1 (2000): 1-11265 Transparency International, “Transparency International Publishes 1997 Corruption Perceptions Index,” (Berlin: Transparency International, 1997), 2.266 The following methodological discussion is based on: Johann Graf Lambsdorff, “Background Paper to the 2003 Corruption Perceptions Index: Framework Document 2003,” (Berlin: Transparency International and University of Passau, 2003).267 Ibid., 5.268 Prescott-Allen, The Wellbeing of Nations: A Country-by-Country Index of Quality of Life and the Environment, 13,60.269 United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development, CSD Theme Indicator Framework [Web site] (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Division for Sustainable Development, 2003 [cited Nov. 8, 2003]);

Endnotes

138

available from http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/natlinfo/indicators/isdms2001/table_4.htm.270 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Environmental Indicators 2001: Towards Sustainable Development.271 Kaufmann, Krayy, and Mastruzzi, “Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002,” appendix.272 United Nations Statistics Division, Millennium Indicators Database (cited).273 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Society at a Glance: OECD Social Indicators: 2002.274 Ibid., 11.275 Freedom House, Freedom in the World: Survey Methodology.276 This chart was summarized from the entire document: Anielski and Rowe, “The Genuine Progress Indicator: 1998 Update.”277 Transparency International, “Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2003.”

The Author

Karen Frecker graduated from the University of Toronto with

an Honours degree in Peace and Conflict Studies and a major

in Economics. She currently works in Ontario’s energy sector

and continues to pursue her interest in the politics and

economics of social and ecological sustainability.

Endnotes

The Trudeau Centre for Peace and Conflict Studiesis a world leader in peace and conflict research,

as well as one of the world’s best schools for young peacemakers.

• The Centre promotes research that focuses on the root causes of violence and on methods to reduce its prevalence.The Centre’s scholars work within and beyond the traditional purview of international affairs, studying interstate war as well as major conflict inside countries, including revolution, insurgency, ethnic strife, guerrilla war, terrorism and genocide. They seek to identify, especially, the underlying causes of this strife, from poverty, resource scarcity and weapons proliferation to competing claims for justice and failures of foreign policy decision-making.

• The Centre gives a select group of undergraduates – drawn from Canada and around the world – the practical knowledge they need to advance the cause of peace.By offering its students a wide range of programs for their intellectual and professional development as peacemakers, including unparalleled opportunities to undertake their own research, the Centre aims to produce graduates with the character, idealism and skills to change the world.

For further information, contact:

Trudeau Centre for Peace and Conflict StudiesUniversity College

15 King’s College CircleUniversity of Toronto

Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 3H9

General Phone: 416-978-2485 General Fax: 416-978-8416

General email: [email protected]

the kiessling papers - university of toronto t-space · the kiessling papers are published...

Documents