the journal of kashmir studies volume vi 2012, no.1 - institute of

THE JOURNAL

OF KASHMIR STUDIES

VOLUME VI 2012 NO.1

Editor

G.M. Khawaja

(alias)

Meem Hai Zaffar

Editorial Advisory Board

Prof. Noor Ahmad Baba

Prof. Ashok Aima

Prof. Gulshan Majeed

Prof. Nisar Ali

Prof. Fida Mohammad Hasnain

Editorial Staff

Samir Ahmad and Shabir Ahmad

UNESCO MADANJEET SINGH INSTITUTE OF KASHMIR STUDIES

University of Kashmir, Srinagar

The publishers are not responsible for the views expressed by the authors of the research paper appearing in this volume of the Journal.

All rights are reserved, no part of the contents of the Journal may be reproduced by photo print, micro film or any other means without the written permission from the publisher.

Price: Rs. 350.00

Publisher: UNESCO Madanjeet Singh Institute of Kashmir Studies, University of Kashmir Hazratbal, Srinagar-190006

ISSN: 0975-6612

©2011, UNESCO Madanjeet Singh Institute of Kashmir Studies, Printed at: Quaf Printers # 9419436635 Designed By: Mir Shabir

CONTENTS

EDITORIAL

Between Secular Pluralism and Religious Exclusivism Some Observations in the Context of Peace, Sustainability and the Religious Other

Muhammad Suheyl Umar

1-48

Imagery of Withdrawal, Violence and Destruction in the Kálīkrama

Aleksandra Wenta

49-64

Northeast and Kashmir: Problems in a Comparative Perspective

Noor Ahmad Baba

65-79

Lal-Ded: The Mystic Poet of Kashmir M.H. Zaffar

80-86

Contextualizing Musharraf’s Four-Point Formula

Samir Ahmad

87-105

The Fourth Buddhist Council The World’s Best Kept Secret

Mohammad Ajmal Shah

107-115

The 2010 Assertion in Kashmir and The Indian Democracy

Bilal Ahmad Ganai

116-126

Book Review Children at Work Depriving Future Generations of Intellectual Capital

Nazir Ahmad Gilkar

128-134

EDITORIAL

Kashmir has a tradition of speculative Philosophy that

goes back to Buddhist times. As a matter of fact Kashmiri

Scholars have contributed substantially, not only towards the

development of metaphysical trends in Buddhism but also to

the development of Indian logic. It is worth mentioning here,

that Naya Manjri of Jaint Bhat is considered one of the

classical texts of Indian logic. Buddhist metaphysics and logic

has heavily informed Kashmir Saivism, which is practiced by

Sections of Kashmiri population as a spiritual discipline, even

today. Although the texts belonging to these traditions are

called Buddhist or Saivite, but most of these are not at all

religious texts, no religious practices are prescribed in these

texts. Kashmiri Scholars mostly practiced what we may call

descriptive metaphysics. Their aim was to unravel and

articulate the universal experience of man; so the goal was to

indicate and if possible to describe the universal truth. And

these scholars attempt to achieve their purpose by describing

the psychological experiences that are universal in nature. It is

this universality of experience that makes these texts speak to

us even today, and impress us by their freshness, truth and

relevance. Thus the texts produced by the spiritual masters of

Kashmir posses universal appeal, but the hurdle to appreciate

this appeal is the language and the style of these texts. All the

texts produced during the Buddhist and Saivite period in

Kashmir, are in Sanskrit language, and our script for writing

this language used to be ‘Sharda’. Unfortunately in the present

day Kashmir, we do not have many scholars, who know either

Sanskrit or even the Sharda script. So this tradition of

knowledge has been almost inaccessible to us for quite some

time now. Later on the Muslim scholars and Sufis also

continued this tradition of speculative Philosophy, by

composing many treatises on the human condition. These texts

are a valuable addition to the already existing tradition. Most

of these treaties are in Persian, the knowledge of which is fast

decreasing. It is very unfortunate that the traditional

speculative and logical approach towards the comprehension

of the human situation is disappearing from our society.

In the present volume there are three articles that remind

us of this great speculative and logical tradition of Kashmir.

One article is by a Pakistani scholar and Sufi Mr. Suheyl

Umar. The article is entitled Between Secular Pluralism and

Religious Exclusivism some Observations in the Context of

Peace, Sustainability and the Religious Other and the second

one is by a Polish scholar of Kashmiri Saivism, Ms. Alexander

Wenta. The article is entitled Imagery of Withdrawal, Violence

and Destruction in the KālĪkrama. The third article is by

M. H. Zaffar. The article is entitled Lal-Ded: The Mystic: Poet

of Kashmir. There are some valuable empirical studies also,

for which our contributors have worked very hard and tried

their best to provide a value neutral analysis of the issues of

contemporary relevance. We hope our readers will critically

evaluate this effort on our part and guide us with their valuable

comments.

I am thankful to Mr. Samir Ahmad Research Scholar, in

the Institute of Kashmir Studies for checking the proof of the

articles included in the Journal.

Editor

1

BETWEEN SECULAR PLURALISM AND RELIGIOUS

EXCLUSIVISM

SOME OBSERVATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF PEACE,

SUSTAINABILITY AND THE RELIGIOUS OTHER

Mr. Muhammad Suheyl Umar

The present day world is a strange mixture of the vestiges and

outposts of secular late/high modernity, postmodern mindset and

“beyond the postmodern” frontier thinking with its divergent trends of

engaging with the Sacred, its ideas about the human condition and

dealing with the question of Reality. Cultures and their worldviews are

ruled by their mandarins, the intellectuals, and they, as well as their

institutions that shape the minds that ruled the modern world– and

continue to hold sway in the postmodern (and beyond the postmodern)

milieu– are unreservedly secular. One, therefore, often encounters the

argument, and at times it turns into an objection, that a misleading

picture is being presented by bringing in religion and spirituality as a

stake holder in discussions on “building democratic structures”, contours

of “a South Asian sensibility”, as well as the questions of “human

functioning and social responsibility” and “new relationship between

humans, nature and production to sustain life”; the themes that are being

addressed in our discussions. Both within and without the Islamic faith,

many would make such an observation and the secular mindset is,

obviously, averse to it. But if the ground realities are taken into

consideration, these alert us to another situation.

We live for the first time in history in an age of multiculturalism and

it is utterly important and central that we think in plural terms about

Director, Iqbal Academy Lahore, Pakistan

Journal of Kashmir Studies 2

faith. The most towering problem facing people in the 19th

century was

nationalism and in the 20th century it had been ideology as, for most of

the century, the nations were located on the opposite sides of the

ideological divide and the cold war conflict. But now when the war is

gone and the ideological conflict is over, the greatest problem that faces

the 21st century is the ethnic conflict and because those conflicts are

powered, in part, by multiple faiths clashing with one another it is

important that we turn over attention to that danger and do our best to

annihilate whatever problems in our human collectivities that we face

now or that may come down the road.

I would offer a few observations in relation to the ground realities of

the situation. Since everyone comes to the discussion with one’s own

specific tool kit and training I would exclude all practical considerations

and try to say something philosophically or theologically as, like the

medieval Muslims, Christians and traditional Hindus, I too consider

philosophy to be the long arm of theology and see religious arguments at

work behind attitudes and actions and societal behaviours that apparently

seem to have nothing in common with religion, even in mundane matters

like the way Muslim, Hindu and Christian males treat their females!

Moreover I do not agree with the way mostly common responses are

made to the misplaced religious arguments and bad logic used by the

present day extremist Hindus, Muslims and Christians. Most often the

response is made by dissociating oneself from the monstrosities by

saying that this is not true Islam or this is not true Hinduism or

Christianity. But that amounts to side stepping the question and turning a

blind eye to the fact that the groups in question from among all the faith

communities are putting forward religious arguments to validate their

actions and the conceptual framework and basic assumptions through

which these operate are claimed to be supported by their basic religious

texts. In this case one cannot absolve oneself of one’s responsibility by

simply disowning the group or groups in question. One must place the

sin at the doorsteps of a definite group, school of thought or mode of

interpretation in one’s community and try to hold a mirror to their

thinking.1

Until quite recently, most of the writers tended to keep religion out of

their scenarios of the future. Today, projections of a simply secular

future seem less persuasive. The shift in perception could have diverse

reasons but one might argue that this perception is just catching up with

the reality obscured by the expansion of Communism earlier in the

3 Between Secular Pluralism and Religious Exclusivism

twentieth century and by the influence, especially in the media and

education, of a largely secularized Western-educated elite throughout

that period. Probably between 4 and 5 billion of the world’s more than 6

billion people are directly involved with a religion today, and this picture

seems unlikely to change a great deal during the rest of the twenty-first

century. So during the lifetimes of all of us now alive we would do well

to reckon seriously with religions as shapers of our world, for worse or

for better especially when there is no widespread confidence that ‘the

secular project’ can adequately resource any society in areas such as

personal and family life, ethics and politics, health and environment,

civic and international responsibilities. Karen Armstrong was right when

she remarked that, “in the middle of the 20th century it was generally

taken for granted that secularism was the coming ideology and that never

again would religion play a major role in public life. Well, we certainly

got that wrong.”2 This does not mean that we have a purely religious

world to deal with; rather it is simultaneously both religious and secular

in complex ways. There are important issues between the religions; but

there are also further, overlapping issues between each of the religions

and the various secular understandings and forces.

Here it would be wise to take account of the ways such relationships

have been handled in the recent past, by referring to the three major

“settlements” made in this regard, namely, the British, the French and the

American. Referring to these “settlements” I would allow Dr. David

Ford of Cambridge Divinity School to make the point. “In one of the

sessions of the Clinton Global Initiative in the section on ‘Religious and

Ethnic Conflict’ [there was] a panel with an Englishman, a Frenchman

and an American. As they spoke about religion and politics the

Frenchman resisted any suggestion that religions should be taken

seriously as religions within the political sphere: problems were traced

mainly to economic causes, and he was confident that if poverty were

dealt with effectively the unrest in French cities would disappear. The

American (who was also a Muslim) insisted that the religions needed to

contribute to public discourse but that the American separation of

Church and state was a healthy thing. The Englishman, John Battle MP

(the Prime Minister Tony Blair’s special adviser on the religions), told

stories of his own involvement with religious communities in his Leeds

constituency, and evoked a complex settlement in which religious bodies

were seen as stakeholders in society with whom the government and

other public bodies were in constant communication and negotiation and

whose identities could be affirmed by such means as state-supported


faith schools. It was as if each was representing his own nation’s

settlement, developed over centuries. Making judgments on such

complex achievements, each worked out in special circumstances, is

dangerous, but I will risk it in summary form.”3

I think that in the current world situation the French secularist

solution is the least satisfactory4 for its practical exclusion of religions

from the public sphere (including state schools and universities) is in

effect the establishment of a state ideology that is not neutral in relation

to religion but is suspicious, critical and often hostile. It envisages a

secular public sphere. It is not well suited to a world that is religious and

secular at the same time.

The American separation of church and state is far more benign with

regard to the religions, and in fact religion plays a major role in

American politics. But there has been a tendency to try to use the

separation to create a neutral public space, where it is illegitimate to

draw explicitly on religious sources. This ‘lowest common denominator’

public square5 is increasingly being criticized, even by secular thinkers

such as Jeffrey Stout6 of Princeton University, who see it as an

impoverishment of public life. Both religious and secular traditions

should be able to contribute in their distinctive ways to public debate

rather than reducing all discourse to a secularized lowest common

denominator.

That at its best is what happens in Britain also. Its particular history

has kept religion involved in its public life, sometimes controversially

usually resisting pressures from those quarters who have more sympathy

with secularist, often atheist, ideologies and would favour a French-style

settlement. Britain also comes out rather poorly from comparative

studies of the relative alienation of the religious and ethnic minorities

from the rest of society. In global terms, Britain has the conditions for

pioneering work in shaping a religious and secular society that draws on

the resources within each of the traditions for peaceful living and

working together. They have an extraordinary range of religious

communities in a society that has also experienced intense secularization.

The British settlement works within what one might call a minimal

secular and religious framework that enables mutual public space. This

has been shaped over many centuries and is constantly open to

renegotiation. The framework is minimal in that it refuses to impose

either a particular religious solution or a particular secular solution and

so lives by ongoing negotiation rather than by appeal to a fixed


constitution or principles. It therefore helps to create a mutual public

space with possibilities for shared discussion, dialogue, education,

deliberation, and collaboration– in contrast to the French tendency

towards strictly secular public space and the American tendency towards

neutral public space. But for all practical purposes this constant, ongoing

negotiation leaves the British settlement little better than the others,

oscillating between secular pluralism and religious exclusivism.

The point that I am driving at by alluding to the just mentioned

“settlements” is that there is no widespread confidence that ‘the secular

project’ can adequately resource any society in areas such as personal

and family life, ethics and politics, health and environment, civic and

international responsibilities. So where is wisdom to be found that we

need in the South Asian context for the shaping of our society in the

twenty-first century? South Asian situation is rather different. Speaking

of Pakistan we can see that it draws on the Islamic tradition as its

reservoir of wisdom and religious bodies are seen as the major

stakeholders in its society but the “settlement” it has reached or is trying

to reach is in no way free of the struggle between secular pluralism and

religious exclusivism. A flippant remark is often heard in this regard but

it has, perhaps, a ring of truth when it is said that Pakistan already has

more of religion than it can handle! If the French, the Americans and the

British, respectively, have a secular, neutral and mutual public space,

Pakistan seems to have moved toward a public space that is invaded by

religion. Not only that, it is constantly being renegotiated with all sorts of

hostilities. There was a time, not long ago, when the “ultras” were few,

forming only a tiny wart on the face of the worldwide attempt to revivify

Islam. Sadly, we can no longer enjoy the luxury of ignoring them. The

extreme has broadened, and the middle ground, giving way, is

everywhere dislocated and confused. And this enfeeblement of the

middle ground, of the moderation enjoined by the Prophetic example, is

in turn accelerated by the opprobrium which the extremists bring not

simply upon themselves, but upon committed Muslims everywhere.

Islamic spirituality, which exercised the most pervasive influence over

the social, cultural and intellectual life of the Islamic community

throughout the centuries and had traditionally been a stronghold against

worldliness and literalism, has also seen the corrosive effect of

extremism. We shall return to the question later but before that let me

state the upshot of the issue. And the upshot is this.


It is the theological position that you take on the question of the

religious and cultural other that determines everything else that follows,

attitudes, behaviour, dealings, agendas, relationships etc. Moreover, it is

not only an inter-faith issue; it has far reaching implications for intra-

faith dialogue and relations and would in the end back fire on one’s own

community as we have seen in Pakistan in the case of Islam and, if I go

by the data shared by my Christian and Hindu friends, also undermined

the internal coherence of the Pakistani Christian community and the

Hindu sensibility. A person who does not maintain a deep seated respect

for that “divinely ordained diversity” and has no place or tolerance for

the religious and cultural Other in his or her perspective would,

naturally, be expected to react in a similar manner when it comes to the

dissident voices, difference of interpretation or diversity of opinions in

one’s own community.

The challenge is big; how to tread a third way between secular

pluralism and religious exclusivism and how to articulate an appropriate

theological/conceptual approach to the Other; to do so without

undermining the integrity of our own religious self-definition; and to do

so in a manner that strengthens and complements all existing attempts to

establish openness, tolerance, mutual respect and fruitful dialogue

between believers in a world of religious plurality.

According to my lights, it is the perspective nurtured by Islamic

spirituality that enables us to uphold the normativity of Islam without

detriment to our universalism; and it is only true universalism that can

generate “a transcendently ordained tolerance” which carries with it

some divinely revealed sanction. A tolerance that is not the outcome of a

sentimental desire for peaceful relations between the members of

different religions, or perspectives within one given religion, but one

which is deeply rooted in a recognition of, and respect for, the holiness

that lies at the core of all faith and wisdom traditions, all revealed

religions. According to our lights, a universalism that does not include

particularism is itself particularist and exclusivist– it excludes

exclusivism. A Universalist perspective based on Sufi hermeneutics

provides a third way between secular pluralism and religious

exclusivism.

It is, however, sadly the case, and it applies to most of our dialogue

forums, that so many of those engaged in dialogue on behalf of Muslims,

Hindus and Christians are not seen as representatives of mainstream

Hindu, Muslim and Christian opinion. Those who are in dialogue are, in


a sense, those who do not need to be, as they already possess a respectful

attitude to the religious other; and those who stay away from dialogue,

out of suspicion or ignorance, are those who most need to open up to,

and respect, the other. The main drawback of the many well-intentioned

efforts to present a Qur’anic ‘approach’ to, or ‘perspective’ on, religious

dialogue is that they fail to connect sufficiently with those who most

need to be convinced of the argument, those for whom the normativity of

Islam, Hinduism or Christianity is threatened or undermined by the kind

of pluralism or universalism propounded.

Each of the three Abrahamic traditions and the non-Semitic

civilizations have their own, distinct yet related, ways of giving priority

to God, honouring God, blessing or hallowing the name of God,

respecting the mystery of God’s active, holy presence among us. These

texts are most liberating when they are read for the sake of God and

God’s purposes, even though we differ on just how God is to be

identified.

This is immensely important for public life. Each of these wisdom

traditions or faiths identifies idolatry as the most radical distortion and

corruption of human life. To give ultimate status, honour and priority to

whatever is not God– whether a race, a nation, a leader, an ideal, a

gender, an ideology, a science, an economic system or even the whole of

creation– harnesses immense religious energies often to devastating

effect. The most insidious forms of idolatry are explicitly religious,

distorted ways of identifying God or trying to harness God to one’s own

cause. The only reliable way of countering such idolatries is continually

to seek the God beyond our constructions, to be open to correction,

challenge and critique, and to sustain those practices of prayer, common

life, study and debate that allow the truth to be recognized. What could

be healthier for each of these wisdom traditions than to contribute to this

by the shared study of scriptures? What could be healthier for our public

life than for citizens within these faiths to be able to share their wisdom

and together to work out ways of faithful, non-idolatrous service of the

common good?

Iqbal, the sage and poet-philosopher, sang in his magnum opus, the

Javid Nama (Pilgrimage of Eternity): 7

کافر و مومن ہمہ خلق خداست

باخبر شو از مقام آدمی

می شود بر کافر و مومن شفیق

حرف بد برلب آوردن خطا است

آدمیت احترام آدمی

بندۂ عشق از خدا گیرد طریق


Soiling one’s tongue with ill-speech is a sin

The disbeliever and the believer are alike creatures of God.

Humanity, human respect for human reality:

Be conscious of the station of humanity.

…

The slave of love who takes his path from God

Becomes a loving friend of both disbeliever and believer.8

What prevents us from becoming a loving friend of both disbeliever

and believer has its roots in the presiding paradigm or worldview that

our age has come to espouse and that warrants a quick overview of the

march of our intellectual history with reference to the question of the

Religious Other. The attitude manifested itself in a different mode after

the advent of Modernity when the Western cultural imagination turned

away after its encounter with the stunning variety of cultural worlds that

appeared for the first time in the Age of Discovery. This inward turn

sparked the appearance of all sorts of imaginary realities and was

responsible for the withdrawal of the Western thinkers of Enlightenment

from the whirling world of cultural values into an utterly imaginary

world of ‘objective’ forms of knowledge.9 It was specifically a Modern

phenomenon as, during the Middle Ages, despite the outwards conflicts

and even protracted wars, intellectual exchange had continued at a

deeper and more meaningful level.

Since the 18th century, many of the secularists, rationalistic, and

especially agnostic and atheistic philosophers of Europe have taken

recourse to the argument that if religion were to be true, why are there

then Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and other

religions with different messages? According to them, the multiplicity of

religions is therefore proof that all religions must be false. “The

multiplicity of sacred forms has been used as an excuse to reject all

sacred forms.” This line of reasoning is accepted by Karl Marx, and is

one of his arguments for the rejection of religion. The fallacy of this

argument lies in that these people identified the expression of the Sacred

within a particular religious universe with the Absolute itself, and since

there have been other expressions of the Absolute in other religious

universes, they were led to the denial of the Absolute itself, and to the

claim that everything is relative and, therefore, there is no Sacred as

such. The truth of the matter, on the contrary, is that the very multiplicity

of sacred forms in different religions, far from negating the sacredness of


things, only confirms the richness of the Source of all that is sacred, the

infinite creativity of the Divine Origin of all sacred forms.

In this context the remarks of the twentieth century metaphysician

Frithjof Schuon immediately come to mind. Faced with the fact that

there are diverse religions which apparently exclude each other most of

the people tend to think that one religion is right and that all the others

are false; others conclude that all are false. “It is as if,” Schuon

remarked, “faced with the discovery of other solar systems, some

maintained that there is only one sun, ours, while others, seeing that our

sun is not unique, denied that it is a sun, and concluded that there is no

sun….”10

The Asian sensibility goes for a third possibility– that all

religions are right, not in their dogmatic exclusivism, but their

unanimous inner meaning, which coincides with pure metaphysics,

signifying “the totality of the primordial and universal truths– and

therefore of the metaphysical axioms– whose formulation does not

belong to any particular system.” Likewise one could speak of the religio

perennis, “designating by this term the essence of every religion, that is,

the essence of every form of worship, every form of prayer and every

system of morality just as the Sophia perennis is the essence of all

dogmas and all expressions of wisdom.” With regard to religio perennis,

the Shaykh al-Akbar Ibn ‘Arabi writes:

All the revealed religions [sharāʾiʿ] are lights. Among these religions,

the revealed religion of Muhammad is like the light of the sun among

the lights of the stars. When the sun appears, the lights of the stars are

hidden, and their lights are included in the light of the sun. Their being hidden is like the abrogation of the other revealed religions that takes

place through Muhammad’s revealed religion. Nevertheless, they do in

fact exist, just as the existence of the light of the stars is actualized. This explains why we have been required in our all-inclusive religion

to have faith in the truth of all the messengers and all the revealed

religions. They are not rendered null [bāṭil] by abrogation– that is the opinion of the ignorant.

11

This whole doctrine can be clearly illustrated further by reflecting on

by the following example: the sun is unique in our solar system, but it is

not so in space; we can see other suns, since they are situated in space

like ours, but we do not see them as suns. The uniqueness of our sun is

belied by the multiplicity of the fixed stars, without thereby ceasing to be

valid within the system which is ours under Providence; the niceties is

then manifested in the part, not in the totality, although this part is an

image of the totality and represents it for us; it then ‘is’, by the divine


Will, the totality, but only for us, and only in so far as our mind, whose

scope is likewise willed by God, does not go beyond forms; but even in

this case, the part ‘is’ totality so far as its spiritual efficacy is

concerned.12

However, while propounding a belief in a universal Truth, we do not

want to commit the error of drawing the conclusion that one can ignore

or strip away the outward differences in the religions, so as to focus

solely on their inner similarities. We reject this notion and instead

demonstrate that the outward distinctness in the forms is necessary and

providential. “[T]he divergence between religions is due not only to the

incomprehension of men, it is also in the Revelations, thus in the Divine

Will, and that is why there is a difference between exoterism and

esoterism; the diverse dogmas contradict each other, not only in the

minds of theologians, but also– and a priori– in the Sacred Scriptures;

yet God, in giving these Scriptures, gives at the same time the keys for

understanding their underlying unity. If all men were metaphysicians and

contemplatives, a single Revelation might suffice; but since that is not

the way things are, the Absolute must reveal Itself in different ways, and

the metaphysical viewpoints from which these Revelations derive–

according to different causal explanations and different spiritual

temperaments– cannot but contradict one another on the plane of forms,

somewhat like geometrical figures contradict each other so long as one

has not grasped their spatial and symbolic homogeneity.”13

Every religion is a manifestation of the One Supreme Reality. Most of

us have, however, heard it said more than once over the years: “How is it

possible to believe in religion since the different religions contradict each

other?” The motive behind such remarks can never be profound, but it

may vary between a would-be self-justification for not practicing

religion and the desire to be thought intelligent or up to date.14

Every

religion is completely dependent upon the Divine Word, which may

manifest Itself either as Book or Man. In Christianity the Word is Christ,

and the New Testament is not Revelation but an inspired sacred history

of the life and teaching of the Word made Flesh, whereas Judaism and

Islam are based on the Word made Book. The basis of Judaism is the

Pentateuch the first five books of the Old Testament which were

revealed to Moses, together with the Psalms which were revealed to

David, and the basis of Islam is the Qur’an which was revealed to

Muhammad. In the ancient religions, of which Hinduism appears to be

the sole fully surviving example, there was room for both these Divine


Manifestations: the Vedas are the Word made Book, and the Avatāras of

Vishnu are the Word made Flesh. It must however be clearly understood

that in the religions which are based on the Word made Book, the

Messenger to whom the Book is revealed is thereby to be ranked at the

highest degree of sanctity, which means that some of his utterances are

bound to proceed from the level of the Divine Word, even if the structure

of the religion does not allow him to be worshipped. It is therefore

possible for every Divine Messenger to make a statement which amounts

to the same as the words of Christ, “None cometh to the Father but

through me”; and there is in Islam a saying attributed to the Prophet

Muhammad to the effect that there can be no meeting with God which is

not pre-ceded by a meeting with himself.15 We are thus enabled to speak

symbolically of the Word as a precious stone of many facets. This brings

us back to the claims to absoluteness and universality that seem to be the

foundation of the extended analogy of the “suns and stars” that we had

alluded to earlier and this allows us to make the following observation.

One of the recent publications16

on the issue of the religious other

displays a sub-title; Towards a Muslim Theology of Other Religions in a

Post-Prophetic Age which is evocative as it underscores the importance

of another basic insight that informs the perspective we are considering

here. We are conscious of the fact that a religion’s claim to unique

efficacy must be allowed the status of half-truth because there is, in fact,

in the vast majority of cases, no alternative choice. “In the past it would

have been as pointless for a religion to dwell on the validity and efficacy

of other religions as it would be for an announcement to be made from

an all-capacious lifeboat to those struggling in the waters about it that

five miles away there was an equally good lifeboat.”17

According to their

lights, in the “Post-Prophetic Age” the conditions are different. “For

those who come face to face with the founder of a new religion, the lack

of alternative choice becomes as it were absolute in virtue of the

correspondingly absolute greatness of the Divine Messenger himself. It

is moreover at its outset, that is, during its brief moment of

‘absoluteness’, that the claims of a religion are for the most part

formulated. But with the passage of time there is inevitably a certain

levelling out between the new and the less new, the more so in that the

less new may have special claims on certain people.” This is not the

place to address the implications– conceptual, theological, as well as

practical and legal– of this “levelling out” but we felt that the point

needed registration here for its importance.


If we look at the two major houses of faith that share the mutual

public space in Pakistan, that is, Islam and Christianity, and try to find

the fault line that hampers the path of Peaceful Coexistence with

reference to the two communities it could be described, in theological

terms, as follows. In the case of Islam it is Misplaced Absolutes18

and

Supersessionism and in the case of Christianity it is a monopolizing

claim on the Divine Mercy through the notion of the One and Only,

Unique Saviour. Both lead to religious exclusivism. Islamic

Supersessionism, taking its point of departure in an apparently “benign

Inclusivism” ends up in exclusivism by interpreting the inclusivist verses

of the Qur’an in an exclusivist manner. The monopolizing claim of

Christianity arrives at the same end as it classes Hinduism/Buddhism as

“paganism”, Judaism as a superseded religion and Islam as a pseudo

religion.

For thousands of years already, humanity has been divided into

several fundamentally different branches, which constitute so many

complete humanities, more or less closed in on themselves; the existence

of spiritual receptacles so different and so original demands

differentiated refractions of the one Truth. The exclusivist claim thus

seems contrary to the nature of things. The following observation, again

from Frithjof Schuon, remarkably sums up the point: 19

...the ethnic diversity of humanity and the geographical extent of the

earth suffice to make highly unlikely the axiom of one unique religion

for all men, and on the contrary highly likely– to say the least– the

need for a plurality of religions; in other words, the idea of a single religion does not escape contradiction if one takes account of its

claims to absoluteness and universality on the one hand, and the

psychological and physical impossibility of their realisation on the other.

If God had sent only one religion to a world of widely differing

affinities and aptitudes, it would not have been a fair test for all. He has

therefore sent different religions, especially suited to the needs and

characteristics of the different sectors of humanity. In this regard the

same author has observed:

.....that God could have allowed a religion that was merely the invention of a man to conquer a part of humanity and to maintain itself

for more than a thousand years in a quarter of the inhabited world,

thus betraying the love, faith, and hope of a multitude of sincere and fervent souls― this is contrary to the Laws of the Divine Mercy, or in

other words, to those of Universal Possibility ....If Christ had been the


only manifestation of the Word, supposing such a uniqueness of

manifestation to be possible, the effect of His birth would have been the instantaneous reduction of the universe to ashes.

20

This is a problem of a particularly specific nature in the west,

especially in America where there is a large presence of Christians21

that

hold that there in only one true faith and only they have it but, mutatis

mutandis, the same thing is true of other faith traditions, especially of

those parts of their exoteric aspect that has been moulded and influence

by modernity. That makes it difficult as we work for harmony among the

world’s faiths. I would like to work my point by focusing on the Islamic

perspective here.

In the Islamic perspective, the “divinely ordained diversity” lies in the

following verse, which many consider among the last Revelations

received by the Prophet and belongs to the period which marks the close

of his mission. As such it coincides with a cyclic moment of extreme

significance– the last ‘opportunity’22

for a direct message to be sent

from Heaven to earth during what remains of this cycle of time. Many of

the last Qur’anic revelations are concerned with completing and

perfecting the new religion. But this verse is a final and lasting message

for mankind as a whole. The Qur’an expressly addresses the adherents of

all the different orthodoxies on earth; and no message could be more

relevant to the age in which we live and, in particular, to the mental

predicament of man in these later days.

For each of you We have appointed a law and a way. And if God23

had

willed He would have made you one people. But (He hath willed it otherwise) that He may put you to the test in what He has given you.

24

So vie with one another in good works. Unto God will ye be brought

back, and He will inform you about that wherein ye differed.25

But while considering the limitations of Muslim exoterism, it must be

remembered that from its stronghold of finality as the last religion of this

cycle of time, Islam, unlike Judaism and Christianity, can afford to be

generous to other religions. Moreover its position in the cycle confers on

it something of the function of a summer-up, which obliges it to mention

with justice what has preceded it, or at the least to leave an open door for

what it does not specifically mention.

Verily We have sent messengers before thee26

About some of them have

We told thee, and about some have We not told thee.27

We may quote also:


Verily the Faithful28

and the Jews and the Sabians29

and the Christians

whoso believeth in God and the Last Day and doeth deeds of piety– no fear shall come upon them neither shall they grieve.

30

There is a place for other religions within the Islamic civilization, and

Muslims are obliged to protect the temples, synagogues and churches

and other religious sanctuaries. It has to be admitted, however, that the

authorities of Islam have been no less ready than their counterparts in

other religions to fall a prey to religious exclusivism. Muslims have been

encouraged to believe, and the majority have been only too eager to

believe, that Islam has superseded all other religions and that it is

therefore the sole valid religion on earth. But however absolute the

claims of Muslim theologians and jurisprudents may be, they are shown

in fact to be relative by the tolerance which Islam makes obligatory

towards the religious Other.

The intrinsic nature of the Muslim polity is derived from the

Prophet’s embodiment of the Qur’anic revelation. His acts of

statesmanship should not be seen in isolation as a series of historical

events, but as a series of symbolic acts which, more powerfully than

words, uphold the inviolability of the religious rights of the Other and

the necessity of exercising a generous tolerance in regard to the Other.

The seminal and most graphic expression of this sacred vision inspiring

the kind of tolerance witnessed throughout Muslim history is given to us

in the following well-attested episode in the life of the Prophet. In the

ninth year after the Hijra (631), a prominent Christian delegation from

Najrān, an important centre of Christianity in the Yemen, came to

engage the Prophet in theological debate in Medina. The main point of

contention was the nature of Christ: was he one of the messengers of

God or the unique Son of God? What is important for our purposes is not

the disagreements voiced, nor the means by which the debate was

resolved, but the fact that when these Christians requested to leave the

city to perform their liturgy, the Prophet invited them to accomplish their

rites in his own mosque. The Christians in question performed the

Byzantine Christian rites.31

This means that they were enacting some

form of the rites which incorporated the fully-developed Trinitarian

theology of the Orthodox councils, emphasising the definitive creed of

the divine “sonship” of Christ– doctrines explicitly criticised in the

Qur’an. Nonetheless, the Prophet allowed the Christians to accomplish

their rites in his own mosque. Disagreement on the plane of dogma is

one thing, tolerance– indeed encouragement– of the enactment of that

dogma is another.


One should also mention in this context the tolerance that is inscribed

into the first Muslim constitution, that of Medina. In this historic

document a pluralistic polity is configured. The right to freedom of

worship was assumed, given the unprejudiced recognition of all three

religious groups who were party to the agreement: Muslims, Jews and

polytheists– the latter indeed comprising the majority at the time the

constitution was drawn up. Each group enjoyed unfettered religious and

legal autonomy, and the Jews, it should be noted, were not required at

this stage to pay any kind of poll-tax. The Muslims were indeed

recognised as forming a distinct group within the polity, but this did not

compromise the principle of mutual defence which was at the root of the

agreement: Each must help the other against anyone who attacks the

people of this document. They must seek mutual advice and consultation,

and loyalty is a protection against treachery.’32

Let us also take an example from the Indian subcontinent where Islam

met the Hindu and Buddhist wisdom traditions– the oldest among the

revealed religions according to our lights– for the first time. Throughout

Islamic history, Hindus and Buddhists– together with Zoroastrians, not

to mention other religious groups–were regarded by Muslims not as

pagans, polytheists, or atheists, but as followers of an authentic religion,

and thus to be granted official dhimmī status, that is, they were to be

granted official protection by the state authorities: any violation of their

religious, social or legal rights was subject to the ‘censure’ (dhimma) of

the Muslim authorities, who were charged with the protection of these

rights.

It is instructive to glance at the roots of this Muslim appraisal of the

religio-juridical status of Hinduism and Buddhism. One of the earliest

and most decisive encounters between Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism

on the Indian soil took place during the short but successful campaign of

the young Umayyad general, Muhammad b. Qāsim in Sind, launched in

711. During the conquest of this predominantly Buddhist province, he

received petitions from the indigenous Buddhists and Hindus in the

important city of Brahmanabad regarding the restoration of their temples

and the upholding of their religious rights generally. He consulted his

superior, the governor of Kufa, Hajjāj b. Yūsuf, who in turn consulted

his religious scholars. The result of these deliberations was the

formulation of an official position which was to set a decisive precedent

of religious tolerance for the ensuing centuries of Muslim rule in India.

Hajjāj wrote to Muhammad b. Qāsim a letter which was translated into


what became known as the ‘Brahmanabad settlement’: 33

The request of the chiefs of Brahmanabad about the building of Budh

and other temples, and toleration in religious matters, is just and

reasonable. I do not see what further rights we can have over them

beyond the usual tax. They have paid homage to us and have

undertaken to pay the fixed tribute [jizya] to the Caliph. Because they

have become dhimmīs we have no right whatsoever to interfere in their

lives and property. Do permit them to follow their own religion. No one should prevent them.

The Arab historian, Al-Balādhurī, quotes Muhammad b. Qāsim’s

famous statement made at Alor,34

a city besieged for a week, and then

taken without force, according to strict terms: there was to be no

bloodshed, and the local faith would not be opposed. Muhammad b.

Qāsim was reported to have said: 35

The temples [lit. al-Budd, but referring to the temples of the Buddhists

and the Hindus, as well as the Jains] shall be treated by us as if they

were the churches of the Christians, the synagogues of the Jews, and the fire temples of the Magians.

36

Although subsequent Muslim rulers varied in their degree of fidelity

to this precedent establishing the principle of religious tolerance in

India,37

the point being made here is more theological than political.

What is to be stressed is that Hindus and Buddhists were, in principle, to

be granted the same religious and legal recognition as fellow

monotheists, the Jews and the Christians, or the ‘People of the Book’.

The implication of this act of recognition is clear: the religion these

Hindus and Buddhists followed was not analogous to the pagan

polytheistic religions, whose adherents were not granted such privileges.

Rather, as a community akin to the ‘People of the Book’, they were

regarded, implicitly if not explicitly, as recipients of an authentic divine

revelation.

It may be argued, however, that granting Hindus and Buddhists legal

recognition was in fact more political than theological; that the

instinctive response of Hajjāj and his general stemmed more from hard-

headed pragmatism than subtle theological reflection. While such

pragmatism no doubt played a role in this historic decision, the point to

be made is this: that the scholars of Islam did not (and still do not) regard

this ‘pragmatic’ policy as violating or compromising any fundamental

theological principle of Islam. Pragmatism and principle went hand in

hand. The implication of granting Hindus and Buddhists legal


recognition, political protection and religious tolerance is that the

spiritual path and moral code of the Hindu and Buddhist faith derive

from an authentic revelation of God. If this be disputed by Muslims, then

the historical practice of granting Hindus and Buddhists dhimmī status

will be seen to be nothing more than ‘Realpolitik’, at best, or a betrayal

of certain theological principles, at worst: one would be guilty of

according religious legitimacy to a false religion. We would argue, on

the contrary, that the Hindus and Buddhists were recognized– in an as it

were existential, intuitive, largely unarticulated manner– by Muslims as

followers of an authentic faith, even if this faith appeared to contradict

Islam in certain major respects; that the early Muslims in their

encounters with Hinduism and Buddhism observed sufficient ‘family

resemblances’ between Hinduism and Buddhism and the ‘People of the

Book’ for them to feel justified in extending to Hindus and Buddhists the

same legal and religious rights granted to the ‘People of the Book’; that

the ‘pragmatic’ decision of the politicians and generals was actually in

harmony with the Islamic revelation, despite the reservations, refutations

or denunciations stemming from popular Muslim prejudice, and despite

the paucity of scholarly works by Muslims making doctrinally explicit

what was implied in the granting of dhimmī status to Hindus and

Buddhists.

It would be useful to explore further the implications of this early

Muslim response to Hinduism and Buddhism, and to provide a more

explicit theological– or spiritual– justification for this response, which

formed the basis of the official policy of tolerance of Hinduism and

Buddhism by Muslims world-wide. But that is a subject of a separate

study that we cannot compress here. The conclusion is, however, self-

evident. If Hindus and Buddhists are recognized as akin to the ‘People of

the Book’, then they are implicitly to be included in the spectrum of

‘saved’ communities, as expressed in the following verse, one of the

most universal verses of the Qur’ān: Truly those who believe and those

who are Jews, and the Christians and the Sabeans– whoever believes in

God and the Last Day and performs virtuous acts– for such, their reward

is with their Lord, no fear or suffering will befall them (2:62; repeated

almost verbatim at 5:69).

To sum, the record of tolerance in Muslim history must surely be seen

as the fruit of the prophetic paradigm, which in turn derives from and is a

commentary upon, the vision revealed by the Qur’an, to which we

should now turn. Notwithstanding the many verses critical of earlier


religious traditions, the fundamental message of the Qur’an as regards all

previous revelations is one of inclusion not exclusion, protection and not

destruction. Arguably the most important verse, as mentioned earlier, in

this regard is:

We have revealed unto you the Scripture with the Truth, to confirm and

protect the Scripture which came before it ... For each of you We have appointed a law and a way. And if God had willed He would have

made you one people. But (He hath willed it otherwise) that He may

put you to the test in what He has given you. So vie with one another in

good works. Unto God will ye be brought back, and He will inform you about that wherein ye differed (5:48).

This verse, supplemented by a multitude of other proof texts (given in

the endnotes), establishes four crucial principles that enshrine the

Qur’anic Vision which both fashion and substantiate an open-minded

approach to all religions and their adherents and inculcates the attitude

that if God is the ultimate source of the different rites of the religions, no

one set of rites can be legitimately excluded from the purview of

authentic religion:

the Qur’an confirms and protects all divine revelations;38

the very plurality of these revelations is the result of a divine will

for diversity on the plane of human communities;39

this diversity of revelations and plurality of communities is

intended to stimulate a healthy ‘competition’ or mutual

enrichment in the domain of ‘good works’;40

difference of opinion are inevitable consequences of the very

plurality of meanings embodied in diverse revelations; these

differences are to be tolerated on the human plane, and will be

finally resolved in the Hereafter.41

Dr. Martin Lings has elucidated the issue with great perspicacity and

insightfulness in his masterly study “With all Thy Mind”,42

but I would

refer here to Arvind Sharma who has closely followed the four crucial

principles mentioned above in his “Can Muslims Talk to Hindus?”43

After working his thesis through the enunciated categories, Sharma

concluded as follows:

I would now like to discuss a third option provided by Verse 13 of Sūrah 49, (…“Oh mankind! Lo! We have created you male and female,

and we have made you nations and tribes that ye may know one


another. Lo! The noblest of you in the sight of Allah, is the best

conduct Lo! Allah is Knower, Aware.44

This verse seems to offer the clearest mandate for the Muslim to talk

to the Hindu. A Medina verse, is addressed specifically to humanity, not

just Muslims and in this verse the diversity not just of peoples but of

sexes is clearly alluded to. Note that no revelations have been sent in

terms of the division of humanity by sex, but rather to the peoples. Not

only is diversity of the peoples alluded to, there are no qualifications

attached to it, such as that they be Jews or Christians or Sabaens.

Moreover, the purpose of this diversity is also identified. It is to provide

an occasion for the people to know each other– or to put in the modern

idiom– engage in dialogue, so that it might bring out the best in them.

Hence Muslims and Hindus can talk to each other not (only) because

revelation is universal but because diversity is universal–a pervasive

feature of the human condition. In other words, the diversity being

celebrated here is “radical,” in its etymological sense of pertaining to the

roots, and as providing a root metaphor of the human condition. I would

therefore propose that it is possible for the Muslims to talk to the Hindus,

without this possibility having to be mediated through the category of ahl

al-kitāb; which is to say that Muslims can talk directly to the Hindus just

because they constitute two different communities and that this

difference is meant to enable them to come to know each other. The

Qur’an provides what we might call an anthropological basis here, as

distinguished from a revelatory basis, for the Muslims to talk to the

Hindus.45

The conclusion is that for the survival of humanity it is necessary for

man to respect his fellow-men; in the same way it is necessary for him to

learn to respect religions other than his own. It is only through the

adoption of this moral and spiritual approach that, borrowing Iqbal’s

phrase, “man may rise to a fresh vision of his future.” And this brings us

to the opening point of our discourse, “Be conscious of the station of

humanity” which is intimately related to the question of the “Other”–

religious, cultural, political– which, in turn, subsumes the issue of

“tolerance” that we wish to address now not only in the context of “a

South Asian sensibility” but with reference to Western-dominated global

reality since the problems of social integration that we face today are not

confined to our local situations any more but impact all persons who

around the world live out different degrees of accommodation with the

local and global reality. This calls for a few remarks about the situation


of the modern world, the “global reality” that engulfs us, shapes our

worlds and determines our predicament.

In this late stage of secular modernity and its hangover in

postmodernism, melancholy has become a collective mood. Melancholy

used to afflict individuals who felt rejected and exiled from the

significance of the cosmos. By our day it has turned into a cultural

malady deriving from a world that has been drained of all meaning and

which had come to cast doubt on all traditional sources– theological,

metaphysical, and historical. The dominant mood of our time is “a

desperate search for a pattern.” The search is desperate because it

seemed futile to look for a pattern in reality. In terms of its mindset or

worldview the modern world is living in what has been called the Age of

Anxiety, and if one tries to look beyond symptoms to find the prime

cause one comes to realize that there is something wrong with the

presiding paradigm or worldview that our age had come to espouse.

Something has gone wrong with the world and the Time is again out of

joint? East and West both seem to face a predicament! As Iqbal has

observed:

نیندیشم دگر چلیپا و ہلال از من

است ایاّم در ضمیر دگری فتنۂ کہ

I am no longer concerned about the crescent and the cross, For the womb of time carries an ordeal of a different kind.

46

The crisis that the world found itself in as it swung on the hinge of

the 20th

century was located in something deeper than particular ways of

organizing political systems and economies. In different ways, the East

and the West were going through a single common crisis whose cause

was the spiritual condition of the modern world.47

That condition was

characterized by loss– the loss of religious certainties and of

transcendence with its larger horizons. The nature of that loss is strange

but ultimately quite logical. When, with the inauguration of the scientific

worldview, human beings started considering themselves the bearers of

the highest meaning in the world and the measure of everything,

meaning began to ebb and the stature of humanity to diminish. The

world lost its human dimension, and we began to lose control of it. In the

words of F. Schuon: 48

The world is miserable because men live beneath themselves; the error

of modern man is that he wants to reform the world without having

either the will or the power to reform man, and this flagrant contradiction, this attempt to make a better world on the basis of a


worsened humanity, can only end in the very abolition of what is

human, and consequently in the abolition of happiness too. Reforming man means binding him again to Heaven, re-establishing the broken

link; it means tearing him away from the reign of the passions, from

the cult of matter, quantity and cunning, and reintegrating him into the

world of the spirit and serenity, we would even say: into the world of sufficient reason.

If anything characterizes the modern era, it is a loss of faith in

transcendence, in God as an objective reality. It is the age of eclipse of

transcendence. No socio-cultural environment in the pre-Modern times

had turned its back on Transcendence in the systematic way that

characterized Modernity. The eclipse of transcendence impacts our way

of looking at the world, in the formation of a world view, in a far-

reaching manner. According to our perspective, Transcendence means

that there is another reality that is more real, more powerful, and better

than this mundane order. The eclipse of transcendence impacted our way

of looking at the world, that is, forming a worldview? It is an issue of the

greatest magnitude. Whatever transpires in other domains of life–

politics, living standards, environmental conditions, interpersonal

relationships, the arts– is ultimately dependent on our presiding world

view. Modern Westerners, forsaking clear thinking, allowed themselves

to become so obsessed with life’s material underpinnings that they had

written science a blank cheque; a blank cheque for science’s claims

concerning what constituted Reality, knowledge and justified belief. This

is the cause of our spiritual crisis. It joined other crises as we entered the

new century– the environmental crisis, the population explosion, the

widening gulf between the rich and the poor, and the list goes on. But

that is the subject for another day.49

Suffice to say here that the

enlightenment project and modernity’s worldview had brought in the

human thought, the damage that it had done to the academia, and the

contemporary discourse created by it is marked by incredulity. The

incredulity takes many forms and the discourse grew increasingly shrill.

Minimally, it contented itself with pointing out that “we have no maps

and don’t know how to make them.” Hardliners added, “and never again

we will have a consensual worldview.” In short, our contemporary

discourse is filled with voices critiquing the truncated worldview of the

Enlightenment, but from that reasonable beginning it plunges on to argue

unreasonably that world-views (or grand narratives) are misguided in

principle. Wouldn’t we be better off if we extricate ourselves from the

worldview we had unwittingly slipped into and replace it with a more


generous and accurate one that shows us deeply connected to the final

nature of things?50

A world ends when its metaphor dies, and

modernity’s metaphor– endless progress through science-powered

technology– is dead. It is only cultural lag– the backward pull of the

outgrown good– that keeps us running on it.

In this regard it is useful to investigate how the West engaged with the

idea and practice of tolerance as it had manifested in other religions and

cultures and how does it relate to the historical trajectory through which

it became established in the West.

Tolerance– Religious and Secular

Tolerance is a multi-faceted concept comprising moral, psychological,

social, legal, political and religious dimensions. The dimension of

tolerance addressed by this essay is specifically religious tolerance, such

as this principle finds expression within the Islamic tradition, and how it

came to be enshrined in the Western thought after the Enlightenment.

Further to that we would try to look at the shared legacy of the idea that

suffered a diverse destiny in the West. Religious tolerance can be defined

in terms of a positive spiritual predisposition towards the religious Other,

a predisposition fashioned by a vision of the divinely-willed diversity of

religious communities. If the diversity of religions is seen to be an

expression of the will of God,51

then the inevitable differences between

the religions will be not only tolerated but also celebrated: tolerated on

the outward, legal and formal plane, celebrated on the inward, cultural

and spiritual plane. As is the case with secular tolerance, here also one

will encounter a positive and open-minded attitude, one capable of

stimulating policies and laws of a tolerant nature towards the religious

Other, but the root of this attitude derives from a principle going beyond

the secular domain: the tolerant attitude emerges as the consequence of a

kaleidoscopic vision of unfolding divine revelations, a vision which

elicits profound respect for the religions of the Other, rather than

reluctantly, begrudgingly or condescendingly granting mere toleration.

And this brings us back to the “anthropological basis” of Dr. Arvind

Sharma referred earlier. The rest of our paper closely follows the

argument presented by him in response to the apparently intelligible

demand voiced by the late Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn that the

Muslims– and that holds, mutatis mutandis, for other faiths encountering

modernity– must pass through an Enlightenment. He wrote that

“Christianity and Judaism have gone through the laundromat of

humanism and enlightenment, but that is not the case with Islam.”52


Tolerance born of a divinely ordained imperative cannot but

engender respect for the religious Other. But the converse does not hold:

one can be tolerant in a secular sense outwardly and legally, without this

being accompanied by sincere respect for the religion of the Other.

Moreover, the purely secular approach to tolerance carries with it the risk

of falling into a corrosive relativism of the ‘anything goes’ variety. It can

lead to the normativity and particularity of one’s own faith being diluted,

if not sacrificed, for the sake of an abstracted and artificial social

construct.53

The Islamic tradition, in principle as well as in practice, provides

compelling answers to many questions pertaining to the relationship

between religious tolerance and the practice of one’s own faith. The

lessons drawn from the Islamic tradition reveal that tolerance of the

Other is in fact integral to the practice of Islam– it is not some optional

extra, some cultural luxury, and still less, something one needs to import

from some other tradition. This being said, one needs to take note of an

irony: the essential sources of the Islamic faith reveal a sacred vision of

diversity and difference, plurality and indeed of universality, which is

unparalleled among world scriptures; the practice of contemporary

Muslim states, however, not to mention many vociferous extra-state

groups and actors, falls lamentably short of the current standards of

tolerance set by the secular West. In consequence, it is hardly surprising

that many argue that what the Muslim world needs in order to become

more tolerant is to learn to become more modern and secular, and less

traditional and ‘visionary’. This kind of argument, however, ignoring and

belittling the vast treasury of ethical and spiritual resources within the

Islamic tradition, will succeed only in making Muslims more, rather than

less, intolerant, by provoking defensive backlashes.

A more fruitful approach would be to encourage an honest

acknowledgement by Muslims that, as regards the practice of religious

tolerance, the secular West has indeed set high standards, albeit at the

price of a corrosive relativism, a price which is becoming increasingly

apparent to many with the passage of time. Instead of being seen as

contrary to the Islamic vision, however, such tolerant codes of conduct

can be seen as formal expressions of the universal principle of tolerance

inhering in the vision of Islam itself. In this sacred vision the plurality of

paths to the One is viewed as a reflection of the infinitude of the One;

tolerance of diversity and difference on the human plane thus flows as a

moral consequence of this divinely willed plurality, becoming thereby


not just a social ethic, but also an expression of the wisdom of the One,

being ordained first ‘from above’, and then here below. Tolerance within

the framework of a divinely ordained schema expresses both an

obligation and a right: a moral obligation to permit people of different

faiths to manifest their own specific ways of embodying and radiating

these universal values, and the spiritual right to benefit from the specific

manifestations of these universal values oneself. This accords with the

very purpose of diversity as envisioned by the Qur’an that the

“anthropological basis” of Dr. Arvind Sharma invoked:

O mankind, We have created you male and female, and We have made

you into tribes and nations in order that you might come to know one

another. Truly, in the sight of God, the most honoured amongst you is

the most pious amongst you’ (Qur’an, 49:13).

Tolerant Islam or the Liberal West, Which came first?

Before directly addressing the principle and practice of tolerance in

Islam, let us ask ourselves the question as to what is the provenance of

the secular concept of tolerance in the West, for this provides some

important– and ironic– lessons in this domain. In 1689 John Locke, one

of the founding fathers of modern liberal thought, wrote a famous text,

‘A Letter Concerning Toleration’. This letter is widely viewed as

instrumental in the process by which the ethical value of religious

tolerance was transformed into a universal ethical imperative, as far as

individual conscience is concerned, and into a legal obligation,

incumbent upon the upholders of political authority, as far as the state is

concerned. It is evident from this letter that Locke was deeply struck by

the contrast between tolerant ‘barbarians’– the Muslim Ottomans– and

violently intolerant Christians. The contrast was compounded by the fact

that Muslims exercised more tolerance towards non-Muslims than

Christians did to each other, let alone non-Christians. In his letter, Locke

ruefully reflected on the absurdity that Calvinists and Armenians were

free to practice their faith if they lived in the Muslim Ottoman Empire,

but not in Christian Europe: would the Turks not silently stand by and

laugh to see with what inhuman cruelty Christians thus rage against

Christians?

Locke passionately proclaimed the need for ‘universal tolerance’,

whatever one’s religious beliefs, and, indeed, in the prevailing Christian

climate, despite one’s beliefs. Following on logically from this secular

principle of tolerance was the right for non-Christians to live unmolested

in the state of England, and be accorded full civil and political rights:


‘…neither pagan nor Mahometan nor Jew ought to be excluded from the

civil rights of the Commonwealth because of his religion’. This strict

separation between religion and politics, church and state, so often

viewed only as part of the evolutionary trajectory of western

secularization must also be seen in the light of the historical interface

between mutually intolerant Christian states and denominations, on the

one hand, and a vibrantly tolerant Muslim polity, on the other. The

current unquestioned right of freedom of religious belief and worship in

the Western world is thus not simply a corollary of secular thought; it is

a principle inspired, at least in part, by the influence of Islam.54

‘Tolerance’, according to (Reverend) Dr Susan Ritchie, ‘was a matter of

Ottoman policy and bureaucratic structure, and an expression of the

Ottoman interpretation of Islam, which was in most instances stunningly

liberal and cosmopolitan.’55

It is thus hardly surprising that Norman

Daniel should allow himself to make the simple– and, for many,

startling– claim: ‘The notion of toleration in Christendom was borrowed

from Muslim practice’ (emphasis added).56

Ottoman tolerance of the

Jews provides an illuminating contrast with the anti-Semitism of

Christendom, which resulted in the regular pogroms and ‘ethnic

cleansing’ by which the medieval Christian world was stained.57

At the very same time as the Christian West was indulging in periodic

anti-Jewish pogroms, the Jews were experiencing what some Jewish

historians themselves have termed a kind of ‘golden age’ under Muslim

rule.58

As has been abundantly attested by historical records, the Jews

enjoyed not just freedom from oppression, but also an extraordinary

revival of cultural, religious, theological and mystical creativity.59

Same

holds good for the Christians under Muslim rule in Spain.60

Even so

fierce a critic of contemporary Islam as Bernard Lewis cannot but

confirm the facts of history as regards the true character of Muslim-

Jewish relations until recent times. In his book, The Jews of Islam, he

writes that even though there was a certain level of discrimination

against Jews and Christians under Muslim rule, ‘Persecution, that is to

say, violent and active repression, was rare and atypical. Jews and

Christians under Muslim rule were not normally called upon to suffer

martyrdom for their faith. They were not often obliged to make the

choice, which confronted Muslims and Jews in re-conquered Spain,

between exile, apostasy and death. They were not subject to any major

territorial or occupational restrictions, such as were the common lot of

Jews in pre-modern Europe.’61

This pattern of tolerance characterised the

nature of Muslim rule vis-à-vis Jews and Christians until modern times,


with very minor exceptions. As the Jewish scholar Mark Cohen notes:

“The Talmud was burned in Paris, not in Cairo or Baghdad … Staunch

Muslim opposition to polytheism convinced Jewish thinkers like

Maimonides of Islam’s unimpeachable monotheism. This essentially

‘tolerant’ view of Islam echoed Islam’s own respect for the Jewish

‘people of the Book’.”62

In our times, the secular principle of separation between church and

state derives much of its legitimacy from the religious tolerance which

fidelity to these principles fosters and protects. As stated earlier, this

cannot be disputed on empirical grounds. However, what must be

recognised and resisted is the temptation to universalise the particular

historical trajectory by which tolerance became established in the West,

and apply (or impose – as observed in the representative trend

manifesting in the Mr. Fortuyn’s observation) this trajectory normatively

to the Muslim world. Political analysts are fond of pointing to examples

of religious intolerance in the contemporary Muslim world and attribute

this absence of tolerance to the ‘backwardness’ of Islam, and in

particular to the insistence by Muslims that religion must dominate and

fashion the whole of life, that restoring God to the public and the private

sphere is non-negotiable and essential. This refusal to separate ‘mosque’

from ‘state’, such analysts conclude, is one of the main reasons why the

Muslim world lags behind the West as regards both the principle and

practice of religious tolerance.

This type of analysis is not only simplistic and erroneous; it also

obscures an irony at once historical and theological. The principle of

religious tolerance has historically been one of the hallmarks of Muslim

society, right up to its decline in the pre-modern period– a decline

accelerated by the assault of western imperialism, mimetic industrialism,

and corrosive consumerism, all of which diminished radically the

spiritual ‘sap’ of the Islamic tradition, and thereby the ethics of tolerance

and compassion. In contrast, the intolerance which characterised

Christendom for much of its history only began to be ‘deconstructed’ in

this same period, with the advent of western secularism. In other words,

the rise of religious tolerance in the West appears to be correlated to the

diminution of the influence of Christian values in public life in the

modern period; conversely, in the Muslim world, it is the decline of the

influence of Islamic values that has engendered that peculiar inferiority

complex of which religious intolerance is a major symptom. Through the

emasculation of this spiritual heritage, all sorts of imported ideological


counterfeits– from apologetic liberal Islam to militant radical Islamism–

have been manufactured in an effort to fill the vacuum, most of them

appearing as the desperate but impotent reflexes of a decaying religious

form. In such a situation, what is required is a return to the spirit of the

tradition, not another form of mimesis; it is therefore highly ironic that

Muslims are being called upon to follow the path of secularisation in

order to become more tolerant.

Rather, Muslims ought to be invited to become aware of the tolerance

which truly characterises the spirit–and the history–of the Islamic

tradition; to use this tradition as the yard-stick by which to critically

gauge contemporary Muslim conduct and attitudes; to strive to revive

and revalorise the principles of tolerance, diversity and pluralism which

are enshrined at the very heart of this tradition; and to realise that

tolerance is ‘neither of the East nor of the West’: no religion or culture

can claim a monopoly on this universal human ethic. For Muslims, then,

being tolerant of the religious Other does not require imitating any

philosophical teachings on tolerance the Western thought has to offer,

but rather returning to the moral and spiritual roots of their own tradition,

while benefiting from and acknowledging the positive aspects of

practical tolerance enacted by western nations in the realms of public

law, human rights and political governance.63

Shared Legacy: Diverse Destinies

The last remarks bring us to consider the question that we evoked

with reference to the remarks of Pim Fortuyn.64

Mr. Fortuyn’s views

have generated many debates in the Islamic communities in the West and

even reverberate in the Islamic world where the question has gained

space in the prevalent discourse. There are arguments in defence and

responses that challenge the argument but the insistent question of Mr

Fortuyn remains with us. Do we have to pass through his laundromat to

be made internally white, as it were, to have an authentic and honoured

place of belonging at the table of the modern reality? Islam has a great

history of universalism, that is to say, that Islam does not limit itself to

the uplift of any given section of humanity, but rather announces a desire

to transform the entire human family.65

Among all the religions of the

pre-Enlightenment world, only Buddhism rivalled Islam in massively

encompassing a range of cultures. However Islam, unambiguously, was

the foundation for a still wider range and variety of cultural worlds.66

Has this triumphant demonstration of Islam’s universalism come to an

end? Perhaps the greatest single issue exercising the world today is the


engagement of Islamic monotheism with the new capitalist global reality

a challenge that even Islam, with its proven ability to square circles,

cannot manage? The current agreement between zealots on both sides –

Islamic and unbelieving– that Islam and Western modernity can have no

conversation, and cannot inhabit each other, seems difficult given

traditional Islamic assurances about the universal potential of revelation.

The increasing numbers of individuals who identify themselves as

entirely Western, and entirely Muslim, demonstrate that the arguments

against the continued ability of Islam to be inclusively universal are

simply false.

Yet the question, the big new Eastern Question, will not go away

quite easily. Palpably, there are millions of Muslims who are at ease

somewhere within the spectrum of the diverse possibilities of

Westernness. We need, however, a theory to match this practice. Is the

accommodation real? What is the theological or fiqh status of this claim

to an overlap? Can Islam really square this biggest of all historical

circles, or must it now fail, and retreat into impoverished and hostile

marginality, as history passes it by? Fortuyn, a highly-educated and

liberal Islamophobe, was convinced that Islam cannot square the circle.

He would say that the past genius of Islam in adapting itself to cultures

from Senegal to Sumatra cannot be extended into our era, because the

rules of that game no longer apply. Success today demands membership

of a global reality, which means signing up to the terms of its

philosophy.67

How should Islam answer this charge? The answer is, of

course, that ‘Islam’ can’t. The religion’s strength stems in large degree

from its internal diversity. Different readings of the scriptures attract

different species of humanity. There will be no unified Islamic voice

answering Fortuyn’s interrogation. The more useful question is: who

should answer the charge? What sort of Muslim is best equipped to

speak for us, and to defeat his logic?

Fortuyn’s error was to impose a Christian squint on Islam. As a

practising Catholic, he imported assumptions about the nature of

religious authority that ignore the multi-centred reality of Islam. On

doctrine, we try to be united - but he is not interested in our doctrine. On

fiqh, we are substantially diverse. Even in the medieval period, one of

the great moral and methodological triumphs of the Muslim mind was

the confidence that a variety of madhhabs could conflict formally, but

could all be acceptable to God.68

Fortuyn and others who share his views

work with the assumption that Islam is an ideology69

and given the


nature of the Islam-West encounter the emergence of ‘ideological Islam’

was, particularly in the mid-twentieth century, entirely predictable.

Everything at that time was ideology. Spirituality seemed to have ended,

and postmodernism was not yet a twinkle in a Parisian eye. In fact, the

British historian John Gray goes so far as to describe the process which

Washington describes as the ‘war on terror’ as an internal Western

argument which has nothing to do with traditional Islam. As he puts it:

“The ideologues of political Islam are western voices, no less than Marx

or Hayek. The struggle with radical Islam is yet another western family

quarrel.”70

Nonetheless, the irony remains. We are represented by the

unrepresentative, and the West sees in us a mirror image of its less

attractive potentialities. Western Muslim theologians as well as many

Muslim theologians living in the West– René Guénon, S. H. Nasr, Tim

Winter, Tage Lindbom, Roger Garaudy to name just a few–frequently

point out that the movements which seek to represent Islam globally, or

in Western/Eastern minority situations, are typically movements which

arose as reactions against Western political hegemony that themselves

internalised substantial aspects of Western political method. In Europe,

Muslim community leaders who are called upon to justify Islam in the

face of recent terrorist activities are ironically often individuals who

subscribe to ideologised forms of Islam which adopt dimensions of

Western modernity in order to secure an anti-Western profile. It is no

surprise that such leaders arouse the suspicion of the likes of Pim

Fortuyn, or, indeed, a remarkably wide spectrum of commentators across

the political spectrum.

Islam’s universalism, however, is not well-represented by the

advocates of movement Islam. Islamic universalism is represented by the

great bulk of ordinary mosque-going Muslims who around the world live

out different degrees of accommodation with the local and global reality.

One could argue, against Fortuyn, that Muslim communities are far more

open to the West than vice-versa, and know far more about it. There is

no equivalent desire in the West to learn from and integrate into other

cultures.71

Islam, we will therefore insist, is more flexible than the West.

Where they are intelligently applied, our laws and customs, mediated

through the due instruments of ijtihad, have been reshaped substantially

by encounter with the Western juggernaut, through faculties such as the

concern for public interest, or urf– customary legislation. Western law

and society, by contrast, have not admitted significant emendation at the

hands of another culture for many centuries. From our perspective, then,

it can seem that it is the West, not the Islamic world, which stands in


need of reform in a more pluralistic direction. It claims to be open, while

we are closed, but in reality, on the ground, seems closed, while we have

been open. There is force to this defense but does it help us answer the

insistent question of Mr. Fortuyn? Historians would probably argue that

since history cannot repeat itself, the demand that Islam experience an

Enlightenment is strange, and that if the task be attempted, it cannot

remotely guarantee an outcome analogous to that experienced by Europe.

If honest and erudite enough, they may also recognize that the

Enlightenment possibilities in Europe were themselves the consequence

of a Renaissance humanism which was triggered not by an internal

European or Christian logic, but by the encounter with Islamic thought.72

The implication being that without Islam, the medieval world might have

endured forever. However Westerners, unlike the Moors of Cordova,

proved less able to tolerate diversity or fecundation by the Other, and

their own Renaissance and Enlightenment only added to the European’s

absolute sense of superiority over other cultures, a prejudice that was

augmented further by an escalating positivism that finally dethroned

God. Garaudy thus concludes that only by radically challenging its own

version of Enlightenment and accepting a Muslim version, rooted in

what he calls the Third Heritage (the first two being the Classics and the

Bible), will the West save itself from its “deadly hegemonic adventure”,

and “its suicidal model of growth and civilization.”73

Nonetheless, it is clear that the Christian and Jewish Enlightenments

of the eighteenth century did not move Europe in a religious, still less an

Islamic direction. Instead, they moved outside the Moorish paradigm to

produce disenchantment, a desacralising of the world which opened the

gates for two enormous transformations in human experience. One of

these has been the subjugation of nature to the will (or more usually the

lower desires) of man. The consequences for the environment, and even

for the sustainable habitability of our planet, are looking increasingly

disturbing. There is certainly oddness about the Western desire to

convert the Third World to a high-consumption market economy, when

it is certain that if the world were to reach American levels of fossil-fuel

consumption, global warming would soon render the planet entirely

uninhabitable.

The second dangerous consequence of ‘Enlightenment’, as Muslims

see it, is the replacement of religious autocracy and sacred kingship with

either a totalitarian political order, or with a democratic liberal

arrangement that has no fail-safe resistance to moving in a totalitarian


direction.74

The West is loath to refer to this possibility in its makeup and

believes that Srebrenica or Mr. Fortuyn, are aberrations, not a recurrent

possibility. Muslims, however, surely have the right to express deep

unease about the demand to submit to an Enlightenment project that

seems to have produced so much darkness as well as light.75

Another aspect of the question needs attention here. Western

intellectuals now speak of post-modernism as an end of Enlightenment

reason. Hence the new Muslim question becomes: why jump into the

laundromat if European thinkers have themselves turned it off? Is the

Third World to be brought to heel by importing only Europe’s

yesterdays?76

Iqbal represents a very different tradition which insists that

Islam is only itself when it recognizes that authenticity arises from

recognizing the versatility of classical Islam, rather than taking any

single reading of the scriptures as uniquely true. Ijtihad, after all, is

scarcely a modern invention!

An age of decadence, whether or not framed by Enlightenment, is an

age of extremes, and the twentieth century was precisely that. Islam has

been westernized enough, it sometimes appears, to have joined that

logic. We are either neutralized by a supposedly benign Islamic

liberalism that in practice allows nothing distinctively Islamic to leave

the home or the mosque– an Enlightenment-style privatization of

religion that abandons the world to the morality of the market leaders

and the demagogues. Or we fall back into the sensual embrace of

extremism, justifying our refusal to deal with the real world by

dismissing it as absolute evil, as kufr, unworthy of serious attention,

which will disappear if we curse it enough.77

Revelation, as always,

requires the middle way. Extremism, in any case, never succeeds even on

its own terms. It usually repels more people from religion than it holds

within it. Attempts to reject all of global modernity simply cannot

succeed, and have not succeeded anywhere. To borrow the words of Tim

Winter, “A more sane policy, albeit a more courageous, complex and

nuanced one, has to be the introduction of Islam as a prophetic,

dissenting witness within the reality of the modern world.”78

In the final analysis if there is one unredeemable part of the

Enlightenment tradition it is the fact that it allowed its critique of

illumination, wisdom and the Divine turn into an outright rejection

because of the reification of the critique. The flip-side of this reified

critique is the fact that the Enlightenment affirmation of individualism,

universalism and materialism became a set of reified/dogmatic assertions


based on completely abstract concepts rather than a living (and life-

giving) ethos. It is obviously the case that the Enlightenment and post-

Enlightenment analysis of illumination, wisdom and the Divine laid bare

deeply problematic aspects of traditional culture that were not known

before. But instead of endeavouring to redress these problematic aspects

of traditional culture as a “philosophic healer” using the resources

already present in the afflicted paradigm, Enlightenment thought played

the role of a colonizing imperialist on a mission to civilize the savages

by means of socio-cultural engineering. In short the only unredeemable

aspect of the Enlightenment is that its stance towards non-Enlightenment

paradigms is one of critique-condemn-replace.

It should not be hard to see where we naturally fit. The gaping hole in

the Enlightenment pointed out by the postmodern theologians and by

more skeptical but still anxious minds, was the Enlightenment’s inability

to form a stable and persuasive ground for virtue and hence for what it

has called ‘citizenship’.79

But why are we bound to keep our word? Why need we respect the

moral law? Religion seems to answer this far more convincingly than

any secular ethic.80

Religion offers a solution to this fatal weakness.

Applied with wisdom, it provides a fully adequate reason for virtue and

an ability to produce cultural and political leaders who embody it

themselves. Of course, it is all too often applied improperly, and there is

something of the Promethean arrogance and hubris of the philosophes in

the radical insistence that the human subject be enthroned in authority

over scriptural interpretation, without a due prelude of initiation, love,

and self-naughting. Yet the failure of the Enlightenment paradigm, as

invoked by the secular elites in the Muslim world, to deliver moral and

efficient government and cultural guidance, indicates that the solution

must be religious. Religious aberrations do not discredit the principle

they aberrantly affirm.

What manner of Islam may most safely undertake this task? It is no

accident that the overwhelming majority of Western Muslim thinkers

have been drawn into the religion by the appeal of Sufism. To us, the

ideological redefinitions of Islam are hardly more impressive than they

are to the many European xenophobes who take them as normative. We

need a form of religion that elegantly and persuasively squares the circle,

rather than insisting on a conflictual model that is unlikely to damage the

West as much as Islam. A purely non-spiritual reading of Islam, lacking

the vertical dimension, tends to produce only liberals or zealots; and both


have proved irrelevant to our needs.

Are we to conclude that modern Islam, so often sympathetic to the

Enlightenment’s claims, and in its Islamist version one of their most

powerful instantiations, has been deeply mistaken? The totalitarian forms

of Enlightenment reason which recurred throughout the twentieth

century have discredited it in the eyes of many; and are now less

dangerous only because postmodernism seems to have abolished so

many of the Enlightenment’s key beliefs.81

If the ideal of freedom is now

based less on ideas of inalienable natural rights than on the notion that all

truth is relative, then perhaps mainstream Islamist thinking will need to

unhitch itself more explicitly from the broadly Western paradigms which

it accepted for most of the twentieth century. Yet the relation

Islam/Enlightenment seems predicated on simplistic definitions of both.

Islamism may be an Enlightenment project, but conservative Sufism (for

instance) is probably not. Conversely, even without adopting a

postmodern perspective we are not so willing today to assume a

necessary antithesis between tradition and reason.82

The way forward,

probably, is to recognize that Islam genuinely converges with

Enlightenment concerns on some issues; while on other matters, notably

the Enlightenment’s individualism and its increasingly Promethean

confidence in humanity’s autonomous capacities, it is likely to demur

radically.

What matters about Islam is that it did not produce the modern world.

If modernity ends in a technologically-induced holocaust, then survivors

will probably hail the religion’s wisdom in not authoring something

similar.83

If, however, it survives, and continues to produce a global

monoculture where the past is forgotten, and where international laws

and customs are increasingly restrictive of cultural difference, then Islam

is likely to remain the world’s great heresy. The Ishmaelite alternative is

rejected. But what if Ishmael actually wishes to be rejected, since the one

who is doing the rejecting has ended up creating a world without God?

Grounded in our stubbornly immobile liturgy and doctrine, we

Ishmaelites should serve the invaluable, though deeply resented, function

of a culture which would like to be an Other, even if that is no longer

quite possible!

In the end I would like to quote Schuon’s timely remark again that “if

human societies degenerate on the one hand with the passage of time

they accumulate on the other hand experience in virtue of old age,

however intermingled with error their experience may be.” It is true that


the world was already in extreme old age two thousand years ago, but

that old age lay hidden under the youth of Christianity and then,

subsequently, also under the youth of Islam. Nonetheless, its unseen

presence below the surface has now precipitated those two latest reli-

gions towards itself, that is, in the direction of old age and “as such we

have a choice between two attributes offered us by old age, namely

senility and wisdom. Despite the fact that the vast majority of our

contemporaries have chosen the former of these– whence the present

state of the world– it is nonetheless possible and even inevitable that

some will choose wisdom, a wisdom that is calm and objective, free

from the passionate prejudices which have previously been too dominant

in human souls with regard to religions other than their own.”84

We will

close this paper with words from the Qur’an, words which might be

called the Islamic equivalent of the Christian Credo, a definite statement,

on the authority of the Word-made-Book, of the faith of the Prophet and

of those who may be considered as the most spiritual of his Companions.

They believe, all of them, in God and His Angels and His Books and His

Messengers. And they say: “We make no distinction between any of His

Messengers (Qur’an, 2, 285).

Notes and References:

1 For the Islamic house of faith, my own wisdom tradition, I have done that separately in one of my short study. See, Muhammad Suheyl Umar, In the Wake of 11th September, Perspectives on Settled Convictions– Changes and Challenges, Iqbal Academy Pakistan, Lahore, 2005.

2 Karen Armstrong, Lecture “The Role of Religion in the New Millennium”, Singapore, 18 June 2007.

3 David F. Ford, “God and Our Public Life: A Scriptural Wisdom”, The Ebor Lectures, 2006-07, York St John University.

4 Though it, like the others, is understandable in historical terms–working out the epochal, often bloody confrontation between the French Revolution and Roman Catholicism.

5 Expressed, for example, in banning official recognition of any particular religious symbols, holidays or practices and refusing to let state schools teach religious education or state universities teach theology as well as religious studies.

6 Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2004.

7 Muhammad Iqbal, Javid Namah, in Kulliyat-i-Iqbal, Iqbal Academy Pakistan, Lahore, 1994, p. 673. For a translation see A. Q. Niaz, Iqbal’s Javid Namah, Iqbal Academy Pakistan, Lahore, 1984, p. 329.

8 Javīd Nāma in Kulliyāt i Iqbal, (Persian), Iqbal Academy Pakistan, Lahore, 1994, p. 672-76.

9 Those interested in learning more about some of the criticisms we have in mind might


begin by looking at the books cited by Lawrence E. Sullivan in his masterly study, Icanchus Drum: An Orientation to Meaning in South American Religions (New York: Macmillan, 1988), pp. 884-85. What he says in the passage leading up to the suggested reading applies also to Western perceptions of Islam: “One of the great disservices to our understanding of South American religions [read: Islam] has been the perception of tribal peoples [read: Muslims) as slavishly dedicated to an unchanging order revealed in the images of myth and handed down unquestioned and unmodified from one generation to the next.

This attitude accompanies the evaluation of ‘myth’ as a banal and inane narrative. Tribal peoples (representing ‘archaic’ modes of thought) childishly cling to their myths, infantile fantasies, whereas mature contemporaries jettison myths with the passage of ‘historical time’ and the entrance’ into ‘modernity. ‘It would be fascinating to study these and other justifications proffered for avoiding a serious encounter with the reality of myth [read: Islamic thought) and symbolic acts.... This is, however, not the place to carry out a history of the ‘modern’ ideas of myth and religion. It is enough to suggest that the Western cultural imagination turned away when it encountered the stunning variety of cultural worlds that appeared for the first time in the Age of Discovery. Doubtless this inward turn sparked the appearance of all sorts of imaginary realities. The Enlightenment, the withdrawal of Western thinkers from the whirling world of cultural values into an utterly imaginary world of ‘objective’ forms of knowledge, and its intellectual follow-up coined new symbolic currency. These terms brought new meanings and new self-definition to Western culture: ‘consciousness/unconsciousness,’ ‘primitive/civilized,’ ‘ethics/mores,’ ‘law/custom,’ ‘critical or reflective thought/ action.”

10 Frithjof Schuon, “De l’ Alliance”, Etudes Traditionnelles, Paris, June, 1940. The analogy of the sun and the stars is encountered in the works of the greatest authorities of the

Islamic tradition also, for example, Shaykh Ibn ʿArabī and Rūmī. Keeping in view the

fact that the Qurʾān never criticizes the prophetic messages as such, though it often condemns misunderstandings or distortions by those who follow the prophets, one notes that Shaykh Ibn ‘Arabī sometimes criticizes specific distortions or

misunderstandings in the Qurʾānic vein, but he does not draw the conclusion that many Muslims have drawn– that the coming of Islam abrogated (naskh) previous revealed religions. Rather, he says, Islam is like the sun and other religions like the stars. Just as the stars remain when the sun rises, so also the other religions remain

valid when Islam appears. One can add a point that perhaps Ibn ʿArabī would also accept: What appears as a sun from one point of view may be seen as a star from another point of view.

11 Ibn ʿArabī, Al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya, (Vol. III, p. 153, line 12), Dār, Sādir, Beirut, n.d. In

this context one often comes across the claims of excellence. To maintain the particular excellence of the Qur’ān and the superiority of Muhammad over all other prophets is not to deny the universal validity of revelation nor the necessity of revelation’s appearing in particularized expressions.

12 Frithjof Schuon, “Diversity of Revelation”, in M. S. Umar, (Ed.) The Religious Other– Towards a Muslim Theology of Other Religions in a Post-Prophetic Age, Iqbal Academy Pakistan, Lahore, 2009, pp.

13 Frithjof Schuon, “Letter”, in Light on the Ancient Worlds, World Wisdom Books, Bloomington, Indiana, 2004.


14 There could be other motives such as the mistaken supposition that the Darwinian theory of evolution has been scientifically proved to be true, whereas it has in fact no scientific basis at all. See Martin, Lings, The Eleventh Hour, Ch. 3, Suhail Academy, Lahore, 2005; Ancient Beliefs and Modern Superstitions, Ch. 1, Suhail Academy, Lahore, 2007.

15 Moreover St. Thomas Aquinas says in his Summa Theologia that the fact of a Divine Person having manifested Itself in one human nature does not prevent It from doing so in another human nature. It is true that the words of Christ are altogether central to Christianity, whereas the equivalent saying of the Prophet Muhammad cannot be said to have the same place in Islam. We did not however quote them to distinguish this from that, but on the contrary to identify each with the other. Both are expressions of the truth that there is no way to God except through His Word. There is therefore no question here of contradiction between two religions.

16 M. S. Umar, (Ed.) The Religious Other– Towards a Muslim Theology of Other Religions in a Post-Prophetic Age, Iqbal Academy Pakistan, Lahore, 2009.

17 See Martin Lings, “With all Thy Mind”, in the anthology.

18 See In the Wake of 11th September, op. cit., p. 10.

19 “Not to mention the antinomy between such claims and the necessarily relative character of all religious mythology; only pure metaphysic and pure prayer are absolute and therefore universal. As for ‘mythology’, it is– apart from its intrinsic content of truth and efficacy– indispensable for enabling metaphysical and essential truth to ‘gain a footing’ in such and such a human collectivity.” Frithjof Schuon, “Diversity of Revelation”, in M. S. Umar, (Ed.) The Religious Other– Towards a Muslim Theology of Other Religions in a Post-Prophetic Age, Iqbal Academy Pakistan, Lahore, 2009, pp.

20 Ibid., p. 20.

21 The usual proof text/argument on the Christian side is that “no one commeth to the Father except through me” or same variation of the same theme as we mentioned earlier. 21 It was argued that “No one commeth to the Father save though the Son.” What does the word Son mean? If it is the Jesus of Nazareth, so that Jesus in gone. So there is no way that people will get to God through that reference. Is it the risen Christ? Or is it the Christ who is referred to in the first 4 verses in the Gospel of John as the Word or in Greek the “Logos”? In the beginning it was the Word, it was with God the Word was God. Through him all things were made and in some translations, without him nothing was made. If nothing in this whole world and history was made without the Word which was God, in God, that means that Buddha was created by God, Muhammad was created by God. If God made these prophets, these enlightened souls, it is up to me to honour the followers of those originators of the religions made by God. If your religion is the only true religion then God bless you. But I hope you will follow the teachings of your master who tells us to love not just our friends but our enemies. Loving people require that we not bad mouth them. So every religion asks you to live up to that command. It is, however, inconceivable, as Frithjof Schuon has said, that in speaking of the future, Christ should have passed over in silence ‘the one unique and incomparable apparition’ which was to take place between his two comings; and there can be no doubt, if the following passage from the Gospel of St John be considered objectively, that it refers to the Prophet who is referred to, and who was, in fact,


shortly to be born. The words of Christ are as follows:

I have more to tell you, but ye cannot bear it now. But when he, the spirit of truth, is come, he will tell you all things. He shall not speak of himself but what he shall hear that shall he speak and he will show you things to come. He shall glorify me.(16: 12-14.)

22 God doth what He will. But it is clearly in the interests of man that a Divine intervention which founds a new religion should be overwhelmingly recognizable as such. The accompanying guarantees must be too tremendous, and too distinctive, to leave room for doubts in any but the most perverse, which means that certain kinds of things must be kept in reserve as the special prerogative of such a period. The Qur’an refers to this ‘economy’ when it affirms that questions which are put to God during the period of Revelation will be answered (V, 101), the implication being that after the Revelation has been completed, questions will no longer be answered so directly. It is as if a door between Heaven and earth were kept open during the mission of a Divine Messenger, to be closed at all other times.

23 The change from first to third person with regard to the Divinity is frequent in the Qur’an.

24 If He had sent only one religion to a world of widely differing affinities and aptitudes, it would not have been a fair test for all. He has therefore sent different religions, specially suited to the needs and characteristics of the different sectors of humanity.

25 V, 48.

26 Muhammad.

27 Qur’an, XL, 78.

28 Muslims.

29 There is no general consensus of opinion as to what religion is referred to, and certain Muslim rulers, in India and elsewhere, have made the name in question a loophole for tolerance towards their non-Muslim, non-Christian and non Jewish subjects.

30 V, 69.

31 Ibn Ishaq, gives the standard account of this remarkable event. A. Guillaume (Tr.) The Life of Muhammad– A Translation of Ibn Ishaq’s Sirat Rasul Allah (Oxford, 1968), pp. 270-277.

32 F. E. Peters, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Princeton, 1990), vol.1, p. 217.

33 Chachnamah Retold–An Account of the Arab Conquest of Sindh, Gobind Khushalani (New Delhi: Promilla, 2006), p.156

34 Arabised as ‘al-Rūr’.

35 Abū al-Hasan al-Balādhurī, Futūh al-buldān (Beirut: Maktaba al-Hilāl, 1988), p.422-423.

36 Ibid., p.424. See for further discussion, History of Muslim Civilization in India and Pakistan, S.M. Ikram (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1989). It is thus not surprising to read, in the same historian’s work, that when Muhammad b. Qāsim died, ‘The people of India wept at the death of Muhammad, and made an image of him at Kīraj’.

37 One cannot overlook such acts as the destruction of the monastery at Valabhi by the Abbsasid army in 782. But, to quote the Buddhist scholar, Dr Alexander Berzin, ‘The destruction at Valabhi … was an exception to the general religious trends and official policies of the early Abbasid period. There are two plausible explanations for it. It was either the work of a militant fanatic general acting on his own, or a mistaken operation


ordered because of the Arabs’ confusing the local “white-clad” Jains with supporters of Abu Muslim and then not differentiating the Buddhists from the Jains. It was not part of a jihad specifically against Buddhism.’ See his ‘The Historical Interaction between the Buddhist and Islamic Cultures before the Mongol Empire’ in his ‘The Berzin Archives–the Buddhist Archives of Dr Alexander Berzin’(http://www. berzinarchives.com/web/en/archives/e-books/unpublished_manuscripts/historical interaction/pt2/history cultures_10.html). The other acts of unprincipled violence by rogue Muslim generals, such as the destruction of the temple of Nalanda by Bakhtiyar Khalji in 1193, are to be seen, likewise, as contrary to ‘the general religious trends and official policies’ of Muslim states acting in accordance with Islamic precepts. Such acts are thus to be seen as military-political exceptions which prove the religious rule: the religious rights of Hindus and Buddhists, as dhimmīs, were sacrosanct. 1193 destruction of Nalanda by Bakhtiyar Khalji

38 ‘there is no compulsion in religion’ (2:256); ‘Permission [to fight] is given to those who are being fought, for they have been wronged … Had God not driven back some by means of others, then indeed monasteries, churches, synagogues and mosques–wherein the name of God is oft-invoked–would assuredly have been destroyed (22: 39-40).

39 The plurality of revelations, like the diversity of human communities, is divinely-willed, and not the result of some human contingency. Universal revelation and human diversity alike are expressions of divine wisdom. They are also signs intimating the infinitude of the divine nature itself: ‘And among His signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the differences of your languages and colours. Indeed, herein are signs for those who know (30:22).’ Just as God is both absolutely one yet immeasurably infinite, so the human race is one in its essence, yet infinitely variegated in its forms. The fitra, or primordial nature, is the inalienable substance of each human being and this essence of human identity takes priority over all external forms of identity such as race and nation, culture or even religion: ‘So set your purpose firmly for the faith as an original monotheist, [in accordance with] the fitra of God, by which He created mankind. There can be no altering the creation of God. That is the right religion, but most people know it not’ (30:30). The diversity of religious rites is also derived directly from God, affirmed by the following verse: ‘Unto each community We have given sacred rites (mansakan) which they are to perform; so let them not dispute with you about the matter, but summon them unto your Lord (22:67). For every community there is a Messenger (10:47). And We never sent a messenger save with the language of his people, so that he might make [Our message] clear to them (14:4). Truly We inspire you, as We inspired Noah, and the prophets after him, as We inspired Abraham and Ishmael and Isaac and Jacob and the tribes, and Jesus and Job and Jonah and Aaron and Solomon, and as We bestowed unto David the Psalms; and Messengers We have mentioned to you before, and Messengers We have not mentioned to you (4:163-164). (emphasis added) And We sent no Messenger before you but We inspired him [saying]: There is no God save Me, so worship Me (21:25). Naught is said unto you [Muhammad] but what was said unto the Messengers before you (41:43).

40 The ultimate goal in such a competition between religious believers is salvation. The performance of ‘good works’ (khayrat) is intended not only to establish moral conduct on earth but also to grant access to that grace by which one attains salvation in the Hereafter. One of the key sources of religious intolerance is the exclusivist notion that one’s religion, alone, grants access to salvation, all others being false religions leading nowhere. This exclusivism is summed up in the Roman Catholic formula extra ecclesiam


nulla salus: no salvation outside of the Church. This kind of exclusivism has no place in the Qur’anic worldview, as is clearly demonstrated by such verses as the following: ‘Truly those who believe, and the Jews, and the Christians, and the Sabeans–whoever believes in God and the Last Day and performs virtuous deeds–surely their reward is with their Lord, and no fear shall come upon them, neither shall they grieve (2: 62; repeated almost verbatim at 5:69). The only criteria for salvation according to this verse are belief in the Absolute, and in accountability to that Absolute, conjoined to virtue in consequence of these beliefs. Given this clear expression of the universality of salvation, any lapse into the kind of religious chauvinism which feeds intolerance is impermissible. This is made clear in the following verses, which explicitly mention forms of religious exclusivism which the Muslims had encountered among various communities of the ‘People of the Book’: ‘And they say: “None enters Paradise unless he be a Jew or a Christian”. These are their vain desires. Say: “Bring your proof if you are truthful”. Nay, but whosoever submits his purpose to God, and he is virtuous, his reward is with his Lord. No fear shall come upon them, neither shall they grieve (2:111-112). In other words, the Muslim is not allowed to play the game of religious polemics. Instead of responding in kind to any sort of chauvinistic claims or ‘vain desires’ aimed at monopolising Paradise, the Muslim is instructed to raise the dialogue to a higher level, and to call for reasoned debate: ‘bring your proof’. The Qur’anic position is to affirm the universal salvific criteria of piety, accessible to all human beings, whatever be their religious affiliation. This position is further affirmed in the following verses: ‘It will not be in accordance with your desires, nor with the desires of the People of the Book. He who does wrong will have its recompense ... And whoso performs good works, whether male or female, and is a believer, such will enter Paradise, and will not be wronged the dint of a date-stone. (4:123-124) One can read this verse as implying that insofar as the Muslim ‘desires’ that salvation be restricted to Muslims in the specific, communal sense, he falls into exactly the same kind of exclusivism of which the Christians and Jews stand accused. It should be noted that the very same word is used both for the ‘desires’ of the Jews and the Christians, and the ‘desires’ of the Muslims, amaniyy (s. umniyya). The logic of these verses clearly indicates that one form of religious prejudice is not to be confronted with another form of the same error, but with an objective, unprejudiced recognition of the inexorable and universal law of divine justice, a law which excludes both religious nationalism and its natural concomitant, intolerance.

41 Given the fact that ‘there is no compulsion in religion’ (2:256), it follows that differences of opinion must be tolerated and not suppressed. This theme is not unconnected with the principle of divine mercy: just as God’s mercy is described as encompassing all things (7:156), so divine guidance through revelation encompasses all human communities. The Prophet is described as a ‘mercy to the whole of creation’ (21:107), and his character is described as merciful and kind in the Qur’an (9:128); in the traditional sources the trait which is most often used to define the essence of his personality is hilm, a forbearance compounded of wisdom and gentleness. The tolerance accorded to the Other by the Prophet is thus an expression not only of knowledge of the universality of revelation, but also of the mercy, love and compassion from which this universal divine will to guide and save all peoples itself springs. Seen thus, the spirit of Islamic tolerance goes infinitely beyond a merely formal toleration of the Other; it is the outward ethical form assumed by one’s conformity to the very nature of the divine, which encompasses all things ‘in mercy and knowledge’ (40:7). It is also a mode of emulation of the prophetic nature: ‘Say [O Muhammad]: If you love God, follow me; God will love you’ (3:31). To follow the Prophet means, among other things, to be gentle and lenient to


all, in accordance with the hilm which defined his character: ‘It was a mercy from God that you are gently disposed to them; had you been fierce and hard-hearted, they would have fled from you’ (3:159). In regard to the disbelievers, then, the Muslim is enjoined to let them go their way unmolested, to let them believe in their own ‘religion’: ‘Say: O you who disbelieve, I worship not that which you worship, nor do you worship that which I worship. And I shall not worship that which you worship, nor will you worship that which I worship. For you your religion, for me, mine (109:1-6)’. Returning to the duty to deliver the message and no more, there are a number of verses to note; for example: ‘If they submit, they are rightly guided, but if they turn away, you have no duty other than conveying the message ... (3:20)’ ‘If they are averse, We have not sent you as a guardian over them: your duty is but to convey the message (42:48).’

42 Martin Lings, “With all Thy Mind”, in M. S. Umar, (Ed.) The Religious Other– Towards a Muslim Theology of Other Religions in a Post-Prophetic Age, Iqbal Academy Pakistan, Lahore, 2009, pp. ; Also see Martin Lings, “Why ‘With all Thy Mind’”, Ch. III, A Return to the Spirit, Fons Vitae, 2005, p. 29.

43 Arvind Sharma, “Can Muslims Talk to Hindus?” in

44 Sharma has used the translation of Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall, The Meaning of the Glorious Koran (New York: The New American Library, 1972), p. 369.

45 “That “ethic and cultural diversity are part of God’s plan, as the Qur’an confirms (49:13)” was a fact accepted [sic. Even] by Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), see Tamara Sonn, A Brief History of Islam (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), p. 127. The verse however is cited here in the context of internal diversity within Islam.

46 I am... kind. By “the crescent and the cross” is meant the historic confrontation between Islam and Christianity that took the form of the Crusades in the Middle Ages. Iqbal is saying that, unlike many other Muslims, who remain mentally imprisoned in the past, allowing their thought and action to be determined by certain crucial events of former times, he is more concerned about the momentous developments taking place in the present age. Iqbal does not specify what he means by “an ordeal of a different kind” (fitnah-i dīgarī)—whether he means a particular major development, like communism, or whether he uses the singular “ordeal” in a generic sense to refer to several major and decisive developments taking place on the world stage. The main point of the verse, in any case, is that the issues of the present and the future have greater claim on one’s attention than issues belonging to a past that may have no more than historical or academic importance. In the second hemistich, “the womb of time” is a translation of damīr-i ayyām, which literally means “in the insides of time.” See M. Mir, (ed.), Iqbāl-Nāmah, Vol. 5, No. 3-4, Summer and Fall, 2005, p. 3-6.

47

سجود آورد مجاز پیش فرنگ فکر

بوست و رنگ تماشای مست و کور بینای

خراب بیشتر از آن مغرب و خراب مشرق

جستجوست ذوق بی و مردہ تمام عالم

Zubūr i ‘Ajam, in Kulliyāt i Iqbāl, (Persian), Iqbal Academy Pakistan, Lahore, 1994, p. 376.

48 F. Schuon, Understanding Islam, reprinted, Suhail Academy, Lahore, 2004, pp. 26.

49 That science had changed our world beyond recognition went without saying, but it was the way that it had changed our worldview that concerns us here. More


importantly, the two worldviews are contending for the mind of the future. The scientific worldview is a wasteland for the human spirit. It cannot provide us the where withal for a meaningful life. How much, then, is at stake? That is the fundamental question. The overarching question relates to the view of Reality; of the WORLDVIEWS: THE BIG PICTURE. It is of great consequence to ask as to WHO WAS RIGHT ABOUT REALITY: TRADITIONALISTS, MODERNISTS, OR THE POSTMODERNS? The problem, according to our lights, is that somewhere, during the course of its historical development, western thought took a sharp turn in a different direction. It branched off as a tangent from the collective heritage of all humanity and claimed the autonomy of reason. It chose to follow reason alone, unguided by revelation and cut off from its transcendent root. Political and social realms quickly followed suit. Autonomous statecraft and excessive individualism in the social order were the elements that shaped a dominant paradigm that did not prove successful. There are five places where these contradict each other.

According to the traditional, religious view spirit is fundamental and matter derivative. The scientific worldview turns this picture on its head.

In the religious worldview human beings are the less who have derived from the more. Science reverses this etiology, positioning humanity as the more that has derived from the less; devoid of intelligence at its start, evolving and advancing to the elevated stature that we human beings now enjoy.

The traditional worldview points toward a happy ending; the scientific worldview does not. As for the scientific worldview, there is no way that a happy ending can be worked into it. Death is the grim reaper of individual lives, and whether things as a whole will end in a freeze or a fry, with a bang or a whimper is anybody’s guess.

This fourth contrast between the competing worldviews concerns meaning. Having been intentionally created by omnipotent Perfection– or flowing from it “like a fountain ever on,”– the traditional world is meaningful throughout. In the scientific worldview, meaning is minimal if not absent. “Our modern understanding of evolution implies that ultimate meaning in life is nonexistent.” Science acknowledges that “the more the universe seems comprehensible, the more it seems pointless.”

In the traditional world people feel at home. Nothing like this sense of belonging can be derived from the scientific worldview which is the dawning of “the age of homelessness.”

An age comes to a close when people discover they can no longer understand themselves by the theory their age professes. For a while its denizens will continue to think that they believe it, but they feel otherwise and cannot understand their feelings. This has now happened to our world. Current worldview is not scientific but scientistic. It continue to honour science for what it tells us about nature or the natural order/natural world, but as that is not all that exists, science cannot provide us with a worldview– not a valid one. The most it can show us is half of the world, the half where normative and intrinsic values, existential and ultimate meanings, teleologies, qualities, immaterial realities, and beings that are superior to us do not appear. This important point is not generally recognized, so I shall spell it out. The death-knell to modernity, which had science as its source and hope, was sounded with the realization


that despite its power in limited regions, six things slip through its controlled experiments in the way sea slips through the nets of fishermen:

1. Values. Science can deal with descriptive and instrumental values, but not with intrinsic and normative ones.

2. Meanings. Science can work with cognitive meanings, but not with existential meanings (Is X meaningful?), or ultimate ones (What is the meaning of life?).

3. Purposes. Science can handle teleonomy– purposiveness in organisms– but not teleology, final causes.

4. Qualities. Quantities science is good at, but not qualities.

5. The invisible and the immaterial. It can work with invisibles that are rigorously entailed by matter’s behaviour (the movements of iron filings that require magnetic fields to account for them, e.g.) but not with others.

6. Our superiors, if such exist. This limitation does not prove that beings greater than ourselves exist, but it does leave the question open, for “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence”.

50 Already at the opening of the last century, when Postmodernism had not yet emerged on the scene, Yeats was warning that things were falling apart, that the centre didn’t hold. Gertrude Stein followed him by noting that “in the twentieth century nothing is in agreement with anything else,” and Ezra Pound saw man as “hurling himself at indomitable chaos”– the most durable line from the play Green Pastures has been, “Everything that’s tied down is coming loose.” T. S. Eliot found “The Wasteland” and “The Hollow Men” as appropriate metaphors for the outward and the inward aspects of our predicament. It is not surprising, therefore, that when in her last interview Rebecca West was asked to name the dominant mood of our time, she replied, “A desperate search for a pattern.” The search is desperate because it seems futile to look for a pattern when reality has become, in Roland Barth’s vivid image, kaleidoscopic. With every tick of the clock the pieces of experience come down in new array. The views about the prevailing human predicament converge. Fresh “infusions” are needed. The opinions about the nature and origin of these fresh “infusions” that could rectify or change it for the better are, however, divergent. Some of our cotemporaries try to find an alternative from within the dominant paradigm. Others suggest the possibility of a search for these fresh “infusions” in a different direction: different cultures, other civilizations, religious doctrines, sapiential traditions.

51 The fundamental message of the Qur’an as regards all previous revelations is one of inclusion not exclusion, protection and not destruction. Arguably the most important verse in this regard is: ‘We have revealed unto you the Scripture with the Truth, to confirm and protect the Scripture which came before it ... For each We have appointed a Law and a Way. Had God willed, He could have made you one community. But that He might try you by that which He has given you [He has made you as you are]. So vie with one another in good works. Unto God you will all return, and He will inform you of that wherein you differed’ (5:48).

52 Fortuyn’s religious views are detailed in his book Against the Islamisation of our Culture, published in 1997 (cited in Angus Roxburgh, Preachers of Hate: The Rise of the Far Right, London, 2002, 163) to celebrate Israel’s fiftieth birthday. He believed that Islam, unlike his own strongly-affirmed Christianity, is a ‘backward culture’, with an inadequate view of God and an inbuilt hostility to European culture. He called for


massive curbs on Muslim immigration, and for greater stress on Holland’s Christian heritage. A prominent homosexual activist, Fortuyn also condemned Islam’s opposition to same-sex marriage. Cited in Angus Roxburgh, Preachers of Hate: The Rise of the Far Right, London, 2002, 163.

53 The Prophet was asked: ‘which religion is most loved by God?’ His answer can be seen as a succinct commentary on the above verse. Instead of referring to such and such a religion, he highlights the key character trait which should be infused into the soul by all religions, or by religion as such; whichever religion is most successful in producing this trait becomes ‘the most beloved’ religion to God: “The primordial, generously tolerant faith” (al-hanafiyya al-samha). This strongly authenticated saying highlights the centrality of tolerance to the religious endeavour as such; it also implies, as does verse 49:13, the absolute equality of all believers, the sole permissible hierarchy within humanity being that based on intrinsic piety, not on such extrinsic factors as gender or affiliation to tribe or nation, race or religion. Given this view of equality on the human plane, and the Islamic belief in universal and cyclical revelation– no community being deprived of authentic divine revelation and guidance– intolerance of the Other is reprehensible both morally and spiritually.

54 The spectacle of Muslim Ottoman tolerance was something to which Christendom was used: ‘Better the turban of the Sultan than the mitre of the Pope’, was a well-worn saying among Eastern Orthodox Christians, acutely aware of the fact that their rights were more secure under the Ottomans than under their Catholic co-religionists. Ottoman conquest was followed almost without exception by Islamic tolerance of the conquered peoples.

55 She argues convincingly that this Ottoman tolerance decisively influenced the process leading to the famous Edict of Torda in 1568, issued by King John Sigismund of Transylvania (which was under Ottoman suzerainty), an edict hailed by western historians as expressing ‘the first European policy of expansive religious toleration.’ Susan Ritchie, ‘The Islamic Ottoman Influence on the Development of Religious Toleration in Reformation Transylvania’, in Seasons—Semi-annual Journal of Zaytuna Institute, vol.2, no.1, pp.62, 59.

56 Norman Daniel, Islam, Europe and Empire (Edinburgh, 1966), p.12.

57 Many Jews fleeing from persecution in central Europe would have received letters like the following, written by Rabbi Isaac Tzarfati, who reached the Ottomans just before their capture of Constantinople in 1453, replying to those Jews of central Europe who were calling out for help: ‘Listen, my brethren, to the counsel I will give you. I too was born in Germany and studied Torah with the German rabbis. I was driven out of my native country and came to the Turkish land, which is blessed by God and filled with all good things. Here I found rest and happiness … Here in the land of the Turks we have nothing to complain of. We are not oppressed with heavy taxes, and our commerce is free and unhindered … every one of us lives in peace and freedom. Here the Jew is not compelled to wear a yellow hat as a badge of shame, as is the case in Germany, where even wealth and great fortune are a curse for the Jew because he therewith arouses jealousy among the Christians … Arise, my brethren, gird up your loins, collect your forces, and come to us. Here you will be free of your enemies, here you will find rest …’ Quoted in S. A. Schleifer, ‘Jews and Muslims—A Hidden History’, in The Spirit of Palestine (Barcelona, 1994), p. 8.

58 As Erwin Rosenthal writes, ‘The Talmudic age apart, there is perhaps no more


formative and positive time in our long and chequered history than that under the empire of Islam.’ One particularly rich episode in this ‘golden age’ was experienced by the Jews of Muslim Spain.

59 Such great Jewish luminaries as Maimonides and Ibn Gabirol wrote their philosophical works in Arabic, and were fully ‘at home’ in Muslim Spain. With the expulsion, murder or forced conversion of all Muslims and Jews following the reconquista of Spain–brought to completion with the fall of Granada in 1492–it was to the Ottomans that the exiled Jews turned for refuge and protection. They were welcomed in Muslim lands throughout north Africa, joining the settled and prosperous Jewish communities already there.

60 We have the following interesting contemporary testimony to the practice of Muslim tolerance, from within the Christian community itself. In the middle of the 10th century embassies were exchanged between the court of Otto I of Germany and court of Cordoba. One such delegation was led by John of Gorze in 953 who met the resident bishop of Cordoba, who explained to him, how the Christians survived: “We have been driven to this by our sins, to be subjected to the rule of the pagans. We are forbidden by the Apostle’s words to resist the civil power. Only one cause of solace is left to us, that in the depths of such a great calamity, they do not forbid us to practise our own faith … For the time being, then, we keep the following counsel: that provided no harm is done to our religion, we obey them in all else, and do their commands in all that does not affect our faith. Richard Fletcher, The Cross and the Crescent—Christianity and Islam from Muhammad to the Reformation (New York/London, 2004), p. 48.

61 Bernard Lewis, The Jews of Islam (Princeton, 1984), p. 8.

62 Mark Cohen, ‘Islam and the Jews: Myth, Counter-Myth, History’, in Jerusalem Quarterly, no.38, 1986, p.135.

63 Islam teaches that tolerance, far from being the preserve of this or that religion, is a universal ethical imperative which must be infused into the moral fibre of each human being. This imperative acquires additional urgency given the fact that human society is characterised by a divinely-willed diversity of religions and cultures. Without tolerance, diversity is jeopardised; without diversity, the God-given nature of humanity is violated. If the diversity of religions and cultures is an expression of the wisdom of divine revelation, then tolerance of the differences which will always accompany that diversity becomes not just an ethical obligation to our fellow-creatures, but also a mode of respecting and reflecting the wisdom of the Creator. That wisdom is inextricably bound up with mercy, for God encompasses all things ‘in mercy and knowledge’ (40:7). From the point of view of the sacred vision of Islam, tolerance is not just a noble human ethic, it is also, and above all, an invitation to participate in the compassionate wisdom of the Creator.

64 A quick survey of the region would be in order here. In Norway, the 1997 election saw the sudden appearance of the anti-immigrant Progress Party of Carl Hagen, which now holds twenty-five out of a hundred and sixty-five parliamentary seats. Similar to Hagen’s group is the Swiss People’s Party, which commands 22.5% of the popular vote in Switzerland, and has been widely compared to the Freedom Party of Jorg Haider, which in 1999 joined the Austrian coalition government.

In Denmark, the rapidly-growing ultranationalist DPP has become the third most popular party, benefiting from widespread popular dislike of Muslims. Its folksy housewife-leader Pia Kiaersgaard opposes entry into the Eurozone, rails against


‘welfare cheats’, and is famous for her outbursts against Islam. ‘I think the Muslims are a problem,’ she stated in a recent interview. ‘It’s a problem in a Christian country to have too many Muslims.’ [http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/ europe/2000/far_right/]

In Britain, the same tendency has to some extent been paralleled in the recent growth of the British National Party. A cassette recording issued by the party, entitled ‘Islam: A Threat to Us All: A Joint Statement by the British National Party, Sikhs and Hindus’, describes itself as ‘a common effort to expose and resist the innate aggression of the imperialistic ideology of Islam’. As with its Continental allies, the BNP is gaining popularity by abandoning racist language, and by attempting to forge alliances with non-Muslim Asians and Blacks. The result has been documents such as the October 2001 ‘Anti-Islam Supplement’ of the BNP newsletter Identity, which ended with an appeal to ‘Join Our Crusade’. The chairman of the BNP, Nick Griffin, wades in with discussions of ‘The Islamic Monster’ and the ‘New Crusade for the Survival of the West’. [http://www.bnp.org.uk/articles.html]. In July 2001, Griffin and his skinheads polled 16% of the votes in Oldham West: the highest postwar vote for any extremist party in the UK. Nonetheless, British fascism remains less popular than most of its European counterparts. An issue to consider, no doubt, as Muslim communities ponder their response to growing British participation in schemes for European integration, and the long-term possibility of a federal European state.

To offer a final, more drastic example of how such attitudes are no longer marginal, but have penetrated the mainstream and contribute to the shaping of policy, often with disastrous results. On the outbreak of the Bosnian war, the German magazine Der Spiegel told its readers that ‘Soon Europe could have a fanatical theocratic state on its doorstep.’ [Cited in Andrea Lueg, ‘The Perception of Islam in Western Debate’, in Jochen Hippler and Andrea Lueg (eds), The Next Threat: Western Perceptions of Islam, London: Pluto Press, 1995, p.9.] (The logic no doubt appealed to the thirty-eight percent of Germans polled in [Brandenburg]who recently expressed support for a far-right party’s policy on ‘foreigners’. [The Independent, 5 October 1999.]).

The influential American commentator R.D. Kaplan, much admired by Bill Clinton, thought that ‘[a] cultural curtain is descending in Bosnia to replace the [Berlin] wall, a curtain separating the Christian and Islamic worlds.’ [Cited by Lueg, op. cit., p.11] Again, those who travelled through that ‘curtain’ can do no more than record that the opposite appeared to be the case. Far from reducing to essences, in this case, a pacific, pluralistic Christianity confronting a totalitarian and belligerent Islam, the Bosnian war, despite its complexities, usually presented a pacific, defensive Muslim community struggling for a multiethnic vision of society against a Christian aggressor committed to preserving the supposed ethnic hygiene of local Christendom. In Bosnia the stereotypes were so precisely reversed that it is remarkable that they could have survived at all. Here the Christians were the ‘Oriental barbarians’, while the Muslims represented the ‘European ideal’ of parliamentary democracy and conviviality. Neither can we explain away the challenge to stereotypes by asserting that religion was a minor ingredient in the very secularized landscape of post-Titoist Yugoslavia. The Bosnian President was a mosque-going Muslim who had been imprisoned for his beliefs under the Communists. The Muslim religious hierarchy had

http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/%20europe/2000/far_right/

http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/%20europe/2000/far_right/

http://www.bnp.org.uk/articles.html

http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0745309534/qid=1023578257/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_0_1/202-7931047-4488609



been consistent in its support for a multiethnic, integrated Bosnian state. Ranged against them were all the forces of the local Christian Right, as the Greek Orthodox synod conferred its highest honour, the Order of St Denis of Xante, on Serb radical leader Radovan Karadzic. Ignoring the unanimous verdict of human rights agencies, the Greek Synod apparently had no qualms about hailing him as ‘one of the most prominent sons of our Lord Jesus Christ, working for peace.’ [Michael Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996, p. 85.]

65 This is, if you like, its Ishmaelite uniqueness: the religions that spring from Isaac (a.s.), are, in our understanding, an extension of Hebrew and Occidental particularity, while Islam is universal. Islam’s civilizational eminence stemmed from a spectacular plenitude.

66 In particular, we may identify distinctive high civilizations among Muslim Africans, Arabs, Turks (including Central Asians), Persians (including, as an immensely fertile extension, Muslim India), and the population of the Malay archipelago, radiating from the complex court cultures of Java.

67 The alternative is poverty, failure, and - just possibly - the B52s.

68 In fact, we could propose as the key distinction between a great religion and a sect the ability of the former to accommodate and respect substantial diversity. Fortuyn, and other European politicians, seek to build a new Iron Curtain between Islam and Christendom, on the assumption that Islam is an ideology functionally akin to communism, or to the traditional churches of Europe.

69 The great tragedy is that some of our brethren would agree with him. There are many Muslims who are happy to describe Islam as an ideology. One suspects that they have not troubled to look the term up, and locate its totalitarian and positivistic undercurrents. It is impossible to deny that certain formulations of Islam in the twentieth century resembled European ideologies, with their obsession with the latest certainties of science, their regimented cellular structure, their utopianism, and their implicit but primary self-definition as advocates of communalism rather than of metaphysical responsibility.

70 The Independent July 28, 2002. There are, of course, significant oversimplications in this analysis. There are some individuals in the new movements who do have a substantial grounding in Islamic studies. And the juxtaposition of ‘political’ and ‘Islam’ will always be redundant, given that the Islamic, Ishmaelite message is inherently liberative, and hence militantly opposed to oppression.

71 On the ground, the West is keener to export than to import, to shape, rather than be shaped. As such, its universalism can seem imperial and hierarchical, driven by corporations and strategic imperatives that owe nothing whatsoever to non-Western cultures, and acknowledge their existence only where they might turn out to be obstacles. Likewise, Westerners, when they settle outside their cultural area, almost never assimilate to the culture which newly surrounds them.

72 Particularly the Islamized version of Aristotle which, via Ibn Rushd, took fourteenth-century Italy by storm. The stress on the individual, the reluctance to establish clerical hierarchies which hold sway over earthly kingdoms, the generalized dislike of superstition, the slowness to persecute for the sake of credal difference: all these may well be European transformations that were eased, or even enabled, by the transfusion




of a certain kind of Muslim wisdom from Spain.It has been made with particular elegance by Roger Garaudy, for whom its highest expression unfolded in medieval Cordova, a city which witnessed a combination of revealed and rational wisdom so sophisticated that it was a ‘first Renaissance’. Saint-Simon and others had claimed that the Middle Ages ended once Arab science was transmitted to the West. The case for classical Islam as an enlightenment that succeeded in retaining the sovereignty of God thus seems a credible one. It has been made with particular elegance by Roger Garaudy, for whom its highest expression unfolded in medieval Cordova, a city which witnessed a combination of revealed and rational wisdom so sophisticated that it was a ‘first Renaissance’. Saint-Simon and others had claimed that the Middle Ages ended once Arab science was transmitted to the West. Also see Luce Lopez-Baralt, The Sufi Trobar Clus, IAP, Lahore, 2000. For the humanities, George Makdisi traces European humanism to Islamic antecedents72 saying that “‘the evidence is overwhelmingly in favour of the reception of both movements, scholasticism and humanism, from classical Islam by the Christian Latin West.”

73 Roger Garaudy, Promesses de l’ Islam (Paris: Seuil, 1981), 19.

74 Take, for instance, the American Jewish philosopher Peter Ochs, for whom the Enlightenment did away with Jewish faith in God, while the Holocaust did away with Jewish faith in humanity. As he writes: “They lost faith in a utopian humanism that promised: ‘Give up your superstitions! Abandon the ethnic and religious traditions that separate us one from the other! Subject all aspects of life to rational scrutiny and the disciplines of science! This is how we will be saved.’ It didn’t work. Not that science and rationality are unworthy; what failed was the effort to abstract these from their setting in the ethics and wisdoms of received tradition.” (Peter Ochs, ‘The God of Jews and Christians’, in Tikva Frymer-Kensky et al., Christianity in Jewish Terms (Boulder and Oxford, 2000), 54.)

Another voice from deep in the American Jewish intellectual tradition that many in the Muslim world assume provides the staunchest advocates of the Enlightenment. This time it is Irving Greenberg: “The humanistic revolt for the ‘liberation’ of humankind from centuries of dependence upon God and nature has been shown to sustain a capacity for demonic evil. Twentieth-century European civilization, in part the product of the Enlightenment and liberal culture, was a Frankenstein that authored the German monster’s being. […] Moreover, the Holocaust and the failure to confront it make a repetition more likely - a limit was broken, a control or awe is gone - and the murder procedure is now better laid out and understood. (Irving Greenberg, ‘Judaism, Christianity and Partnership after the Twentieth Century’, in Frymer-Kensky, op. cit., 26.)

75 Iqbal, identifying himself with the character Zinda-Rud in his Javid Nama (Pilgrimage of Eternity), declaims, to consummate the final moment of his own version of the Mi‘raj: Inqilab-i Rus u Alman dide am: ‘I have seen the revolutions of Russia and of Germany!’ Iqbal, Javid-Nama, translated from the Persian with introduction and notes, by Arthur J. Arberry (London, 1966), 140. This in a great, final crying-out to God.

76 The implications of the collapse of Enlightenment reason for theology have been sketched out by George Lindbeck in his The Nature of Doctrine: religion and theology in a postliberal age (London, 1984).

77 Traditional Islam, as is scripturally evident, cannot sanction either policy. Extremism, however, has been probably the more damaging of the two. Al-Bukhari and Muslim both narrate from A‘isha, (r.a.), the hadith that runs: ‘Allah loves kindness is all matters.’ Imam Muslim also narrates from Ibn Mas‘ud, (r.a.), that the Prophet


(salla’Llahu ‘alayhi wa-sallam) said: ‘Extremists shall perish’ (halaka ’l-mutanatti‘ūn). Commenting on this, Imam al-Nawawi defines extremists as ‘fanatical zealots’ (al-muta‘ammiqūn al-ghālūn), who are simply ‘too intense’ (al-mushaddidūn).

78 “Faith in the future: Islam after the Enlightenment”, First Annual Altaf Gauhar Memorial Lecture, Islamabad, 23 December 2002.

79 David Hume expressed the problem as follows: If the reason be asked of that obedience which we are bound to pay to government, I readily answer: Because society could not otherwise subsist; and this answer is clear and intelligible to all mankind. Your answer is, Because we should keep our word. But besides that, nobody, till trained in a philosophical system, can either comprehend or relish this answer; besides this, say, you find yourself embarrassed when it is asked, Why we are bound to keep our word? Nor can you give any answer but what would immediately, without any circuit, have accounted for our obligation to allegiance. David Hume, Essays (Oxford, 1963), 469.

80 In spite of all stereotypes, the degree of violence in the Muslim world remains far less than that of Western lands governed by the hope of a persuasive secular social contract. [17] Perhaps this is inevitable: the Enlightenment was, after all, nothing but the end of the Delphic principle that to know the world we must know and refine and uplift ourselves. Before Descartes, Locke and Hume, all the world had taken spirituality to be the precondition of philosophical knowing. Without love, self-discipline, and care for others, that is to say, without a transformation of the human subject, there could be no knowledge at all. The Enlightenment, however, as Descartes foresaw, would propose that the mind is already self-sufficient and that moral and spiritual growth are not preconditions for intellectual eminence, so that they might function to shape the nature of its influence upon society. Not only is the precondition of the transformation of the subject repudiated, but the classical idea, shared by the religions and the Greeks, that access to truth itself brings about a personal transformation, is dethroned just as insistently. [This has been discussed with particular clarity by Michel Foucault, L’Hermeneutique du sujet: Cours au College de France (1981-2) (Paris, 2001), pp.16-17] Relationality is disposable, and the laundromat turns out to be a centrifuge.

81 Vaclav Havel could write that ‘the totalitarian systems warn of something far more serious than Western rationalism is willing to admit. They are […] a grotesquely magnified image of its own deep tendencies, an extremist offshoot of its own development’ (William Ophuls, Requiem for Modern Politics: the tragedy of the Enlightenment and the challenge of the new millennium [Boulder and Oxford: Westview, 1997], 258); this seems somewhat outdated.

82 Hans-Georg Gadamer, tr. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, Truth and Method (second edition, London: Sheed and Ward, 1989), 281.

83 Is this what Melville, whose days in Turkey had made him an admirer of Islam, meant when he made Ishmael the only survivor of the Pequod?

84 Martin Lings, A Return to the Spirit, Fons Vitae, 2005, p. 28.

49

IMAGERY OF WITHDRAWAL, VIOLENCE AND

DESTRUCTION IN THE KĀLĪKRAMA

Aleksandra Wenta

Imaging the construction of the power-reality in the Kashmiri Śaiva

Tradition

In the Kashmiri Śaiva Tradition, imagination is generally held to be

the power of the cognitive mind that gives rise to the self-referential

awareness configured exactly as the process of reflecting on the

transcendent-cum-immanent nature of consciousness. To assume, in

conformity with the Kashmiri Śaivaites, that imagination is congruent

with ‘becoming aware’, is to portend the profoundly transformative shift

from the mere possibility to concrete actualization of the supreme

knowledge (śuddhavidyā). Qualitative features of imagination rest upon

the theory of absolute non-dualism (paramādvaita) conceiving the entire

universe as a manifestation of the supreme consciousness. In effect,

transparent and all-pervading consciousness is vindicated by the unity

and continuity of its self-contained embrace that ties the knot of intrinsic

relatedness between immanence and transcendence. This assumption

dramatically alters character of imagination transforming it into a valid

tool of self-awareness aspiring for the ultimate realization. Furthermore,

the theory of absolute non-dualism (paramādvaita), entrenched in the

curious unity of its non-dual substance underlying the whole phenomena,

annihilates the imposition of distinction between mind and matter in

conformity with supposition that confers equal status of existential

authenticity to both. Though admitting an irremediable ontological

equanimity to an imaginary flower and to a common flower (that can be

A polish Sāivite scholar presently working on a research project at Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, HP

The Journal of Kashmir Studies 50

touched and smelled), it attempts at showing that all apparently opposed

phenomena truly belong to the manifestation of the supreme

consciousness1 that pervades (vyāpti) the entire universe. Apart from the

vast range of philosophical issues thematized within this conceptual

framework, the role of imagination forming the mental objects is

particularly highlighted in the domain of religious ritual where it is

employed in the techniques of contemplation (sattarka, bhāvanā,

avadhāna). As such, imagination is a powerful tool particularly attentive

to the construction of the sacred reality embodied in the powers one

wants to obtain and control. Visualization of the deities and divine

beings whose appearances are typified by in-built regulations of the

particular tradition to which they belong, entails empowerment of the

practitioner that can be used for acquirement of the magical powers

(siddhi) or for the sake of purely spiritual merits (mokśa). In the

Kālīkrama, regarded as one of the most esoteric schools of the Kashmiri

Śaiva Tradition permeating religious landscape of the early medieval

Kashmir, imaginative contemplation involves concentration on the

Goddess Kālī the main deity of this tradition. Kālīkrama system is one of

the earliest traditions of Kashmir Śaivism elaborated in the first half of

the ninth century in Uççiyāna (Kashmir). Said to have been instructed

supernaturally by the Goddess Kālī herself to Śivānanda alias Jñānanetra

who was considered to be the first preceptor of the system. The term

‘krama’, literally ‘sequence’ refers to the mystical cult of the Goddess

Kālī and her emanations. In the canonical declamation, Kālī is the image

of the omnipotent death and destruction. Therefore, imagery of

destruction employed in the contemplative absorptions is directed to

construction of the power-reality giving possibility for the mystical

realization of the Goddess Kālī. The theme of annihilation specifically

belongs to the ‘mood’ (bhāva) of Kālī, insofar as she embodies the

cosmic power of withdrawal (saṁhārakrama). Established within this

destructive mode of expression, Kālī and her attendants inhabiting the

sacred domain of the ritual are visualized by the practitioner in their

respective facades of terrifying and violent features. Kālī brings forth the

world of phenomenal existence to manifestation by means of her creative

imagination (kalpāna) which is congruent with generation of time

(kalate). Her creative imagination (kalpāna) embodies dynamics of

consciousness entrenched in the mode of withdrawal (saṁhārakrama)

that unfolds/retracts within the three-fold structure of emission,

maintenance and dissolution. In this way, each act of perception is issued

forth with intention of its subsequent dissolution.2 The same goes on

51 Imagery of withdrawal, violence and destruction

with time which is brought forth in order to be devoured by the Goddess

Kālī the embodiment of the principle of time. Ritualistic aspect of the

Kālīkrama puts emphasis on the notion of liberation, that can be

achieved through assimilation with the Goddess Kālī herself, by

replicating her creative imagination (kalpāna) embodied in the sequence

of the cognitive process of an adept following the same three-fold

sequence: 1) emission of the sense-perception in the field of

consciousness (srshti), 2) maintenance of the sense-perception for a

certain duration of time (sthiti), and afterwards, 3) dissolution (saṁhāra)

to the undifferentiated potentiality (anākhya). The creative imagination

(kalpāna) undertaken by the Goddess Kālī is generated by the

intensification of the state of withdrawal of this three-fold configuration:

emission, maintenance and dissolution. The theme of destruction

presupposed in imaginative consciousness of the Krama yogi reflects this

simple determination of the withdrawal-based creative imagination of the

Goddess Kālī. Imaging is implicated by the stages of absorptions or

withdrawals complemented by mystic immersion evolved from the

sensory experience.

Defining imagination sattarka, bhāvanā, avadhāna

Imagination as a contemplative practice directed towards mystical

realization of the Goddess Kālī assumes a central place in the Kālīkrama.

In a structural sense, imagination is intended for a certain conditioning of

the ordinary consciousness that involves intuitive reasoning,

visualization and attentive awareness. Perhaps more striking, in all these

components of imagination, the intellect (buddhi) plays a vital role. The

intellect (dhï) which is compared to the effulgent brilliance (tejas) is an

instrument by means of which dissolution and final repose of the

activities of mind (citta vishrāma) takes place.3 The intellect is

conceived as an instrument of knowledge endowed with mental stability

(dhairya, sthairya) that has ascended above the empirical, differentiated

level of consideration, and thus comprises a mystical cognition that ‘all

is one’. Mental stability, so comprehended, reaches significantly farther,

or we might rather say, to the final destination, for, it terminates with the

ultimate realization of Kālī’s nature. The Kramasadbhāva, one of the

root texts of the Kālīkrama avers: ‘Lay hold of this strength, the essence

of mental firmness (dhairyasadbhāva), which is named Kālïka, stainless

(niraṅjana)’4.

This setting appears less paradoxical, if we bear in mind that

tradition of the Kālīkrama is considered to be the representative of the


spiritual means (upāya), known as the method of power (śāktopāya). The

salient feature of this upāya is its cognitive character based only on the

cognitive energy (jȧñnashakti) that utilizes the mental process (citti)

employed in functioning of the inner mental organs (antaìkāraṅa)

intellect (buddhi), egoity (ahaṁkāra) and mind (manas). However, in the

perspective of the Kashmiri Śaiva Tradition, to which Kālīkrama

belongs, the cognitive process is founded not only on this strong mental

basis, but also on its religious utilization in service of liberation. As a

matter of fact, mind is not so much an agent of cold logical deliberation,

but rather the primordial cause for the ‘sacred intellectualization’

granting profound mystical insight into the true nature of things.

a) Sattarka and bhāvanā

Intuitive reasoning (sattarka) and mental imagination (bhāvanā) are

considered to be mystical practices following the mode of intellectual

reflection or ‘sacred intellectualization’ determining a set of rapturous

absorptions. They indicate foremost ‘an imagination conceived as an

efficient and creative power which tends to identify itself with the

imagined object’5 but have also a strong concomitance with the concepts

of ‘spiritual efficiency, infused contemplation, intense creative

imagination, evocation of imagination, conviction and obscure impulse’.6

The 10-11th

century Kashmiri Abhinavagupta, the most revered

theologian of the Kashmiri Śaiva Tradition considers sattarka as the

highest limp of yoga taking into account its great soteriological

efficiency.7

Intuitive reasoning (sattarka) and mental imagination (bhāvanā) are

generated by the intensification of the process of withdrawal which takes

place three-fold as emission, persistence and destruction. This method

implies a kind of repeated reflection, employed in visualization of the

various forms of Kālī engaged in destruction, marking the entryway to

the purification of thought-constructs (vikalpa-saṁskāra). However, here

visualization should not be understood as the contemplation on the

concrete object of thought towards which the practitioner turns his

attention, but rather as a sudden immersion in retroactive dynamism of

one’s own consciousness that consigns the sequence (krama) of

emission, persistence and dissolution of the sense-perceptions into the

purifying fire of the non-sequential (akrama) withdrawal. This

purification of thought-constructs (vikalpa-saṁskāra) includes both

process (krama) and its absence (akrama) and gives rise to the

awakening of Pure Knowledge (śuddhavidyā) by means of which the


non-dual nature of reality becomes clearly apparent. In this way,

expansion of consciousness that occurs along with intense projection of

the different forms of Kālī is paradoxically sustained by the process of

withdrawal (vilāpanakrama) which is a reverse condition of the process of

creation (udayakrama). This intensification of destructive tendency is the

mode which renders things their true being. The aim of the practices of

imaginative deliberation is to acquire a firm conviction (niścaya). In

virtue of a firm conviction, an affirmation of one’s own nature non-

different from the ultimate principle is ascertained. ‘I am all this’ is the

purest thought-construct, therefore, an adept who recognizes his own

true nature in the entire phenomena becomes a universal agent of mental

representations and attains a state of the Goddess Kālī.

b) Avadhāna

The attentive awareness (avadhāna) is yet another term used in the

KAlīkrama scriptures for description of imaginative contemplation. The

Mahānayaprākaśa of Trivandrum describes avadhāna in the following

words:

‘By constant attention (avadhāna) to one’s own reflective

awareness (vimarsha) (from Kālāgni to śiva), the existence of all

universe is suddenly (sāhasa) dissolved away (viciyat) into one’s

own nature. Thus, by constant attention to the abiding state (sthiti)

which is one’s own essential nature, by laying hold (grāha) of all

attachment (Āgraha), liberation in this life manifests. That

attention is practiced by attending to the innate nature of the

subject who experiences the objects of sense (viśaya) by the

firmness (sthairya) which is the undetermined thought-construct

(avikalpavikalpa). The best of yogis should abide firmly fixed (in

the practice) of supreme attention which roots out all obscuring

coverings by making firm his own nature (svarêpadārdhya)’.8

The practice of constant attention (avadhāna) engages mindfulness

the reflective awareness (vimarśa) as a means supporting a sudden

(sāhasa) dissolution of the thirty-six cosmic principles (from Kālāgni to

śiva) into one’s own true nature.9 Moreover, this attentiveness is

supported by firmness (sthairya) that successfully seizes generation of

desires generally presupposed in an impending determination of mental

constructs. Evident application of this constant attention entrenched in

firmness brings cessation to the differentiated mental formations. An

adept who attends to the sphere of phenomenal existences unsullied by


the sense of attachment, becomes liberated in life. In the same manner as

practices described in the previous paragraphs, avadhāna is also the

means of purification taking place through dissolution of the impure

thought-constructs. Visualizations of the terrifying forms of Kālī import

this kind of reflective awareness that helps to eradicate vestiges of

thought-constructs. Considering avadhāna as a unique practice, one issue

should be stressed, namely firmness (sthairya). As a method for

remaining alert, firmness is a necessary condition responsible for

deepening of the reflective awareness. Firmness strengthens mind due to

which its usual tendency to fickleness is overcome. It supports sustained

concentration directed towards dissociation of accidental stirrings of the

mental processes. Finally, it grants the access to undetermined

consciousness and bestows liberation from one’s own individuality.

Death as a theme of praxis - imagery of withdrawal, violence and

destruction

In the spiritual context, imagination is a field of nullification of

differentiated thought-constructs that belong to the ordinary level of

awareness. In fact, the visions of furious Kālīs are invoked to activate

this process insofar as an adept inserts himself in this imagery of

destruction and confers on it a status of spiritual legacy. A practitioner

who plunges into this meditative visions identifies himself with objects

of his contemplation with the powers representing cosmic dissolution.

Therefore, imagery of withdrawal, violence and destruction acts as the

symbols of transcendence that wrest from the ‘body’ of Kālī. This

network of images is the mode of possession (Āvesha) mounted on

merging into the body of Kālī that leads an adept to a state of divine

union (samāvesha) and to the total realization of his identity with the

ultimate principle of the Goddess Kālī.

a) The Cremation Ground

The Kālīkrama has developed on the basis of very sophisticated,

esoteric teachings related to the powerful deities of frightful facades the

residents of the cremation ground appointed to their destructive activity.

The image of the cremation ground assumes an unquestionable

importance in the Kālīkrama on account of lineage ancestry, locating

residence of several gurus in the most sacred cremation ground in

UÇÇiyāna, called Kāravīra, These gurus were the Skull-Bearers

(Kāpālikas) famous for their most abhorrent practices. Exegetically, the

Krama’s revealed scriptures claim to have position of the supreme


authority in elaboration of the secret esoteric teachings, because they

were written in the actual place of the Kāravīra cremation ground. The

Kāravīra cremation ground, regarded as the material location of the

Goddess Kālī, is ruled by a symbolic system of codes, set into

powerfully potent mythological and ritualistic realm. The great cemetery

(māhaśmaśāna) is equated with the condition of supreme

undifferentiation (akula) in which the world of phenomenal existence

reaches its final repose.10

The transference to the mythological realm of the cremation ground

aims at establishing the spatial location abiding within the frames of

imagination that would have a desirable dissolving impact upon ordinary

consciousness. It is a prelude to the experience of disintegration of the

exclusive ego11

, when, after successfully completed phase of dissolution

(symbolized by the cremation ground), one can begin to forge the new

enlightened consciousness. By the act of meditative interiorization, the

one who becomes absorbed into contemplation on the fire of his own

consciousness, enters the cremation ground of his own body, terrible

with the funeral pyres wherein all latent traces of the past actions

(karman) are burnt to ashes. In a particular way, the cremation ground

relates to the heart the seat of consciousness, for it is the spot where

differentiated nature of mental constructs is permanently devoured by the

fire of great destruction.12

b) The Fire of Time (kālāgni)

Kālī is commonly identified with the image of fire devouring time

(kāla). This image is important if we bear in mind that fire exists

exclusively by means of its fuel and after the fuel is finished, it is

destined for the final disappearance. The Fire of Time (kālāgni) is

twelve-fold insofar as it stands for diversification of the universal time

divided into twelve months of the year. In this sense, the Fire of Time

constitutes the basis of human existence because it binds people to death

by aging process. However, an adept can be released from the bonds of

time when he employs the practice of contemplation on the devouring

Fire of Time that leads to cosmicization of the individual body. The

macrocosmic dissolution is projected into the microcosm of human

corporeality. In this way, the principle of time itself, along with its

destructive ‘becoming’, functions as an instrument of liberation. The

practice of dissolution embodied in the Fire of Time (kālāgni) burning

‘fortress of the body’ is given in the Vijṅānabhairava:


‘One should meditate on one’s own fortress (the body) as if it were

consumed by the Fire of Time, rising from the foot. At the end of this

meditation the peaceful state will appear.’13

According to the Tantrāloka, on the macrocosmic level, the Fire of

Time (kālāgni) is the agency of dissolution awakening at the end of each

cosmic eon that rises up to the underworld and spreads out its flames

throughout the universe. After dissolution is completed, the beginning of

a new cosmic cycle takes place. The cosmic dissolution follows the

mode of return that engulfs the universe from the lowest plane of the

nivrtti kalā to the highest plane of the shāntatïtkalā.14

The lowest phase

of manifestation called ‘cessation’ (nivrtti) corresponds to the Fire of

Time (kālāgni), the highest phase called ‘beyond tranquility’ (shāntatïta)

that gives rise to the experience of peacefulness, is the state of Śiva. On

the microcosmic level of yogic body, the Fire of Time is a tool of

pervasion (vyāpti) when a spiritual adept, as a part of ritual procedure,

places (nyāsa) the letters of the alphabet on the limps of his body,

beginning with the left toe (kālāgni) and ending with the top of the head

(Shāntatïta). The Fire of Time (kālāgni) instigating devouring

conflagration stands, therefore, for microcosmic equivalent of cosmic

dissolution that ultimately leads spiritual adept to the experience of

peaceful state. This process is connoted with esoteric teachings of the

Kālīkrama.15

Kshemarāja in the commentary on the verse six of the

Sivasutras leaves us in no doubt about this connection when he says

thus: ‘when union by awareness of this wheel of energies (shakticakra)16

which has been made manifest is established according to the appropriate

manner as described in the secret scriptures then occurs the

disappearance of the universe from Kālāgni up to the ultimate Sāntātïta

kalā, that is to say, though external existence may continue in the form

of the body and other external objects, it is reduced to sameness with the

fire of the highest consciousness’.17

Invoked in this powerful meditation, the Fire of Time (Kālāgni) that

burns the ‘fortress of the body’ purports to articulate retroactive model of

consciousness, that in an act of reversal (pratyavrttikrama), sustains the

process of cosmic dissolution letting oneself to be disengaged from the

bonds of temporality.18

In faithful attunement with this imaginary

process, the annihilation of the sense of distinctiveness is accomplished.

More is meant still by this what dissipates the endless pursuit of the

sensory awareness. This meditative practice, at its apogee, offers fiery

assimilation with the highest consciousness the Goddess Kālī.


c) Violent Baking (hashthapāka) and Total Devouring (Alaṁgrāsa)

As we have mentioned before, the unique treasure of the Kālïkrama

tradition lies in the specific concept of the supreme consciousness

conceived as the series of withdrawals conditioned by the degrees of

intensity. The greater is the intensity of destruction, the better is the

chance of reaching the desirable threshold free of impending

determination of thought-constructs. In the Kālïkrama, dissolution

(saṁhāra) is not a final phase, though, even when thought-constructs

have retracted (saṁhāra) from the field of consciousness, their

impressions still exist in a latent state and silent they are about to surface

again. Therefore, dissolution (saṁhāra) requires another destruction.

This intensification of the destructive tendency emphasized by the

sequence of the destruction of destruction (saṁhārasaṁhārakrama) is

brought about by the processes of violent baking (hashthapāka) and total

devouring (alaṁgrāsa). The vehement power of absorption congruent

with the process of forceful baking (hashthapāka) is the witness of fast

maturation of the latent traces of thought-constructs (saṁskāra) when

‘raw’ potentiality becomes ‘cooked’ by the process of violent heating.

Alaṁgrāsa is not so much a separate process, but rather a personality of

the hashthapāka which draws the latent traces of thought-constructs to

the final extermination. The adjectives ‘violent’ (hashtha) and ‘total’

confront us with imagery of uncontrolled dynamics of the digestive track

instigated by the vehement power of complete absorption. Indeed, the

theme of destruction is closely associated with act of eating. The

beginnings of this conceptual association can be traced back to the

Upanisads. In the kālïkrama, the act of eating, digesting and assimilating

implies a unique ‘digestive awareness’ that entails perpetual assimilation

of the latent residual traces (saṁskāra) entrenched in the clutches of

transmigration (saṁsāra) intended for their complete annihilation. In the

microcosm of the yogic body, ‘baking’ takes place in the stomach where

the gastric fire (jashthāgni) that digests food is located. It is known as

Bhairava’s fire by means of which ‘yogis can realize the unity of

consciousness by virtue of which duality is assimilated into

consciousness rapidly and with great force (hashtha)’.19

Apart from

individual level symbolized by yogic stomach, this process has also a

macrocosmic dimension represented by the Great Wheel of Bhairava.

This incisively radical nature is meant to exterminate the latent traces of

the entire universal objectivity. In the pictorial representation, the Great

Wheel of Bhairava takes a form of the whirlpool of fire, its rapid rotation

enclosed within the circles of fire consumes the faint residual traces to


the point of their final extermination. Akin to the meditative vision, the

objective universe dissolves into the whirlpool of fiery conflagration and

then into consciousness prepared for it. As the merger of all being, it

ultimately reveals the true form of voidness, free from all objects20

.

d) The Emaciated Goddess and Theme of the Unsatisfied Hunger

In the tradition of the Kālīkrama, the adjectives ‘emaciated, thin’

(śuskā, krśā) are used commonly in description of the Goddess Kālī.

Surely, they endow Kālī with qualitative features pronouncing her close

association with the entire symbolic-semiotic theme of digestion. In

reference to its patent connotations, ‘devouring’ is the sole cosmic

activity of Kālī fixed upon the process of incorporation to the point of

final absorption. The act of eating yields an immense amount of power

and moreover, it stresses the very dynamics of the digestive track that

seizes/takes hold of food or, in other words, possesses the objective

content of the world. The subject of possession (Āveśa) is assuredly the

key-term that grants a direct entrance to the understanding of the

spiritual ‘phenomenology’ of the Kashmiri Śaiva Tradition, just to

mention Abhinavagupta, who defines the spiritual practices (upāyas) in

terms of the modes of possession (āveśa).21

The concept of possession

contingently exemplified in illustrations of demonical frenzy has an

exemplary status in the Kalīkrama and it is inseparable from the display

of the all-devouring ambiance attending to the Goddess Kalī.

The scriptural testimony of the Kalïkrama portrays the Goddess

suska (Emaciated One) having thin face and body exposing only bones,

and thus, devoid of flesh or blood. Her breasts are dried up and her

stomach is skinny.22

Draped in a skin of death as her coat, and decorated

with men’s blood, she is enshrined in the temple of the Fire of Time. The

lips of the goddess are enormous, spread out as a formidable sun that

resembles the devouring chasm, blazing with the bundles of fire and

greedy to swallow the entire universe. Due to her permanent hunger that

cannot be satisfied even by devouring of Brahmā and other gods, she is

called the Great Thin One (Mahākrśā).23

The permanent appetite

actualized in the feast directed towards swallowing of the universe is

elucidated in the perspective of her ‘bodily’ thinness. This apparent

contradiction is again used for enunciation of the withdrawal-founded

metaphysics of the Kālīkrama that validates retroactive model of

consciousness. Therefore, contrary to the consumption that naturally

leads to the engrossment of the material body, the goddess’s swallowing

makes her skeletally thin. In the Kālīkrama, realization, ‘creation’ goes


in a backward direction insofar as it unfolds as retraction from/to the

abyssal sphere of the transcendental emptiness which constitutes the

essential nature of the Goddess Kālī.

e) The Constructed Bodies Of Power (mudrā)

Mudrā is considered to be the corporeal ‘sign’ or ‘stamp’ denoting

particular state of consciousness associated with practices that involve

body postures, hand gestures and mental techniques. Abhinavagupta, in

his definition of ‘mudrā’ avers: it is this that bestows ‘ra’ happiness or

joy ‘mud’. Mudrā is a tool by means of which an adept attains the

supreme consciousness. Captured in a mirror-reflection symbolism,

mudrā stands for reflection (pratibimba) of the original source (bimba).24

In this sense, mudrā is related to the transformation of the individual

consciousness that becomes representation of the absolute. In the

Kālīkrama, mudrā reveals the structure and the character of the Goddess

Kālī, in a sense in which individual body of the Krama yogi becomes a

stamp of the transcendent source identified with Kālī. The deity is the

source of power one wishes to obtain, therefore construction of one’s

own body in the image of a deity he/she worships leads directly to the

empowerment of his/her psycho-mental being. Taking into consideration

mudrās prescribed in the Kālīkrama scriptures, we easily perceive

reference to the construction of the body of power reflecting a specific

nature of Kālī. The Skeleton Posture (Karaṅkinī mudrā) refers to the

scarcity of the objective ‘flesh’. This posture is called the skeleton

because it is the state of tranquility, peacefulness and retraction from any

objective dependence. The Skeleton Posture involves practice of being

supportless. This leads to this what lies ‘beyond’, to the sky of

consciousness.25

The Vijṅānabhairava gives several examples of the

Karaṅkinī mudrā.26

One of them recommends the following practice:

Sitting on a soft seat one should hold one’s hands and feet without

support. By maintaining this position the individual mind will reach a

state of supreme fullness of consciousness.27

The Wrath Posture (Krodhinī mudrā) relates to the supreme vitality

of mantric power. As the embodiment of anger this mudrā provokes

vehement consumption of the twenty-four principles starting from earth

(prthvi) and ending with nature (prakrti) constituting the sphere of

limited perception.28

On the evolutionary ladder, the earth is the last of

the gross elements (mahābhūta), while nature (prakrti) constitutes the

initial root of objectivity. Prakrti is the threshold from which the

expansion of objectivity takes place, it differentiates itself into three


principles of mental operation (buddhi, manas, ahaṁkāra). Ahaṁkāra

evolutes further into fifteen principles of sensible experience (five organs

of perception jṅānendriyas, five organs of action karmendriyas, and five

objects of perceptions - tanmātras). The principles of materiality

consisted of the five gross elements (mahābhūta) including ether, wind,

fire, water and earth are evolutes of the tanmātras. In this way, we have

twenty-four conditioned principles. The Wrath Posture conducts great

force of destruction which aims at resolving an insupportable tension

generated by the limited scope of perceptual awareness, confined to the

twenty-four conditioned principles.

The Licking Posture (Lelihānī mudrā) is portrayed as ‘the mouth of

devouring consciousness’ who destroys by mere licking.29

It corresponds

to the field of activity engrossed in the process of violent baking

(hashthapāka) and total devouring (alaṁgrāsa); it operates as the

activity of the destruction of destruction (saṁhārasaṁhārakrama). The

protruding tongue, extremely voracious and free of restraint is intent on

destroying the most subtle energies the latent traces of the seeds of

karma generated from the subtle body30

of puryashtaka31

.

Aforementioned Constructed Bodies of Power (mudrās) represent

different degrees of absorptions. The Skeleton Posture (Karaṅkinī

mudrā) relates to the grossest level, insofar as it entails withdrawal from

the objective support. The Wrath Posture (Krodhinī mudrā) assists

withdrawal from confinements of the cognitive process reduced to the

sensory experience. The Licking Posture (Lelihānī mudrā) operates on

the level of the subtle body where it carries out dilution of the seeds of

karma (saṁskāra) existing in a latent form.

Liberating Imagination

In the Kālīkrama, the imaginary life breaks through an impending

determination of the mental representations by subduing awareness to

the experience of annihilation. Relying on spiritual authenticity of these

images and by employing them for the purpose of purification, the

Krama yogi realizes voidness of his own intrinsic nature to be identical

with the Goddess Kālī, and, thereafter, achieves liberation.


Notes and References

1 Mahārthmaṅjari of Maheshvarānanda with the Auto-commentary ‘Parimala’,

stanza 32.

2 Mahānayaprakāśa of Arṅasiṅha 219.

3 Kālïkulapaṅcaśatikā (Devïpaṅcashatikā) 4.6-4.8., KP (DP) 7.46.

4 Kramasadbhāva 2.2.

5 Silburn L., Paramārthasāra, p. 46 quoted after Murphy P., Triadic Mysticism, p.

48.

6 Silburn L., Paramārthasāra, p. 46 quoted after Murphy P., Triadic Mysticism, p. 48.

7 TÈ IV.15-16.

8 MP (T) 7.25., MP (T) 7.29-31., MP (T) 7.34. trans. M. Dyczkowski (unpublished)

9 This kind of infused meditation will be discussed at length in later part of this study.

10 Śrīkalikāstotra of Śivānanda/Jñānanetra 19.

11 Rawson P., The Art of Tantra, p. 112.

12 Mahānayaprakāśa of Arṅasiṁha 16-17.

13 Vijṅānabhairava stanza 52, in: Vijṅāna Bhairava. The Practice of Centering Awareness, Indica 2002, p. 56.

14 The cosmic manifestation follows five-fold pattern represented by five phases of manifestation (kalās). The lowest is: 1) nivrtti- kalā governed by Kālāgnirudra. It

consists of the principle of earth (prthvï tattva) and has 16 planes of existence

(bhuvana). The second is: 2) pratishthā kalā governed by Amaresha. It consists of

23 principles from water (jālā tattva) to nature (prakrti tattva) and has 56 planes of

existence (bhuvana). The third is: 3) vidyā kalā governed by Bhïma. It consists of 7

principles from purusa tattva to māyā tattva and has 28 planes of existence

(bhuvana). The fourth is: 4) Shāntè kalā governed by Vāmā. It consists of 3

principles: Śuddhavïdyā, Îshvara, Sadā„ iva and has 18 planes of existence

(bhuvana). The last is: 5) Shāntātïta kalā governed by Nivrtti. It consists of one principle Śiva who is said to be of the nature of Śakti and has no plane of existence

(bhuvana). The total number of bhuvanas is 118. Mahārthamañjarï, stanza 27.

15 The close connection between the Fire of Time (kālāgni) and the esoteric teachings

of the Kālīkrama is asserted in the passage of the KālÏkramapañcāshikā, the text

attributed to Niskriyānanda which consists of fifty verses. The whole text of the

KālÏkramapaṅcā„ikā, which is a part of the Uttaragharāmnāya, found in chapter seven of the Ciñciṅïmatasārasamuccaya, is dedicated to the doctrine of the Twelve

Kālïs, the essence of the Kālïkrama, called the Sun of Kula - Bhānavï Kula. There

we are told that the density of withdrawal activated by the Fire of Time (kālāgni)

runs parallel to the arousal of the solar energy of the Twelve Kālïs due to which the

power of the fettered soul (pashu) increases. The text says:

‘Once the Fire of Time has been made dense, the supreme radiant energy dissolves away. The light of consciousness, the supreme secret, has arisen as the


Sun of Kula (the Twelve KālÏs). It has Twelve Rays and, endowed with good

power, it shines like many suns. It is the life of the living being and it illumines the

living being which is of that same nature. In this same way, the power of the

fettered soul increases.

Ciñciṅïmatasèrasamuccaya 7.208-209. trans. M. Dyczkowski.

16 Khemarāja in his commentary on the first verse of the Spandakārika explains that

the collective wheel of the shaktis (Śakticakra) denotes the aggregate of the

Twelve KālÏs engaged in cosmic play of mystical exertion (udyoga=srshti),

manifestation (avābhāsa=sthiti), relishing (carvaṅa=sañhāra), and return to the

inexplicable (anākhya), existing as their source (prabhāva). in: Spandanirṅaya

commentary on the Spandakārikā verse 1.1, op.cit. in: Jaideva Singh, Spandakārikās ³ The Divine Creative Pulsation, p. 5.

17 Śiva-Sutras commentary on stanza 6, in: Śiva-Sutras. The Yoga of Supreme

Identity, trans. Jaideva Singh, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 2000, pp. 33-34.

18 The extensive explanation of this process in connection with the yogic retraction and the cosmic cycles of the universal time is given in David Gordon White, The

Alchemical Body, pp.232-233.

19 Mahānayaprakāśa of Śitikaṅshtha 8.3

20 TÈ V 27-37.

21 TÈ I 167.

22 Devīpañcaśatikā 2.71-2.80.

23 Kulakaulinīmata 15.370cd.-374ab.

24 TÈ 32.3.

25 Cidgaganacandrikā 117.

26 Vijñānabhairava 78 - 82, quoted in the MM, stanza 37.

27 Vijñānabhairava 78.

28 Mahānayaprakāśa of Śitikanta 7.2.

29 Cidgagancandrikā 121.

30 Mahānayaprakāśa of Arṅasimha 96-98.

31 puryastaka (lit. the city of eight) is the subtle body (sūksmaśarīra) consisting of five sense-perceptions (tanmātras), mind (manas), intellect (buddhi), egoity

(ahaṅkāra)


Bibliography

Cidgaganacandrikā by Kālidāsa, ed. Swami Trivikrama Tirtha, Arthur Avalon Tantrik

Text Series (John Woodroffe), Calcutta, 1937.

Ciñcinïmatasārasamuccaya. The manuscripts of the Ciñcinïmatasārasamuccaya. All are

paper MSs deposited in the National Archives, Kathmandu (NA) photographed

by the Nepal German Manuscript Preservation Project (NGMPP).

MS K: NA MS no. 1-767 (Śaivatantra) 412, NGMPP reel no. B157/19, no. of folios: 38,

size in cms: 26 x 11, Script: Newārï. Final scribal colophon: (Nepal) samvat 854

caitrakrsṅa 12 siddha.

MS Kh: NA MS no.: 1-245 (Tantra) 411; NGMPP reel no. A 1177/7; No. of folios: 36;

Size in cms: 22.6 x 5.6; Script (remarks): DN; Folios 1-21 24-26 30-41.

MS G: NA MS no.: 1-145 (Śaivatantra) 411; NGMPP reel no. B121/9; No. of folios: 36; Size in cms: 23 x 6; Script: Nevārï (Missing folios: 22 23 27 28 29). This

manuscript has been photographed twice. So NGMPP reel no. B 121/9 is the

same as NGMPP reel no. B 123/8. Final scribal colophon simply reads: samvat

1754.

MS Gh: NA MS no.: 1-199 (Śaivatantra) 410; NGMPP reel no. B123/5; No. of folios: 69

Size in cms: 22 1/2 x 7; script: Devanāgarï.

Kālïkulapañcashatakā (Devïpañcashatikā) MS no. 5-358 (bauddhatantra), NGMPP: reel

no. B 30/26. No. of folios: 88; size: 20.5x5cm; Material: palm-leaf; Script:

NevarÏ. Complete.

Kulakaulinïmata, [in:] Manthānabhairavatantra, National Archives, Kathmandu.

Kramasadbhāva, MS National Archives, Kathmandu. Manuscript number: 1-76 Śaivatantra 144; Reel number: A 209/23; Number of leaves:15; Size in cms: 30 x

10, Script Nw., Material: Paper.

Mahānayaprakāsha of Arṅasiṁha, MS National Archives, Kathmandu.

NAK MS no. 5-5183 (called Kālikākulapacashatakam) Śaivatantra 157, NGMPP: A

150/6, Number of leaves: 35 (of which folios 26-33), Size in cms: 32 1/2 x12

1/2, Material: Paper, Script: Devanāgarï.

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Śaivism Texts Studies 1918.

Mahānayaprakā„a. Anon. Ed. K. Śambasiva Śastri, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series 130.

Mahārthmañjarï of Maheshvarānanda with the Auto- commentary ‘Parimala’ (MM).

Edited by Pt. Vrajavallabha Dviveda, Yogatantra-GranthamĀlĀ Vol.5,

Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, Varanasi, 1992.

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Kashmir, Delhi.

siva-sutras. The Yoga of Supreme Identity, trans. Singh Jaideva, Delhi 2000.


srïkālïkastotra of sivānandanātha [in:] Hymnes aux Kālï. La roue des energies divines,

Diffusion de Boccard, Paris 1995.

Spandakārikās. The Divine Creative Pulsation. The Kārikas and the Spandanirṅaya,

trans. Jaideva Singh, Delhi 2001.

TantrĀloka of Abhinavagupta with viveka by Jayaratha, ed. M.R. sastri, M.S. Kaul, Kashmir

Saivism Texts Studies, 1918-1938.

Vijñānabhairava. The Practice of Centring Awareness commentary by Swami

Lashmanajoo, Indica Books, Varanasi 2002.

White, David Gordon, 1996. The Alchemical Body, University of Chicago Press.

65

NORTHEAST AND KASHMIR: Problems in A

Comparative Perspective**

Prof. Noor Ahmad Baba

Though no two situations can be exactly same, there are a number of similar

factors that go into making of the problems in Kashmir and in the Northeast.

Some of these can be located in the colonial legacy and the manner in which

the partition was executed in 1947. This and stiffened borders pushed both

the places to a position of seclusion, disconnecting these from their

immediate surroundings. Indian federalism with all its successes failed to

accommodate peripheral regions where greater ethno regional diversity and

geographical disadvantages required to be addressed by special federal arrangement with greater quantum of autonomy. But in India such

arrangement were not seen favourably even in relation to Kashmir which

was granted special status under the Art.370. From the very beginning

stronger assimilationist forces have worked to erode it thereby complicating

the problem. Disaffection in both the places resulted in the violent protests.

However, whatever the objective causes of violence may be its consequences

are always socially disastrous. There is similar experience of suffering both

in Kashmir and the Northeast. Discontent, rooted in objective factors, needs

to be addressed and cannot be undone by mere application of coercion.

Contemporary developments are allowing options for undermining some of

these historically inherited disadvantages, in the form of a more viable federal arrangement, option of softening borders and strengthening regional

and inter-regional cooperation for empowering people. There is need to

ensure the adherence to rule of law, ensuring honest democratic practices

and demilitarization for promoting human security in its different

dimensions.

Located in a trouble spot like Kashmir, probably gives the advantage

of empathetically looking at the problems in the Northeast. Though no

two situations can be exactly same, there are a number of similarities and

common factors that go into making of the problems in the two places.

** This is improved version of a paper presented at a seminar on Northeast: Troubled

borders at Gauhati University in 2008.

Head Department of Political Science, University of Kashmir


As in the case of Kashmir, the problems in the Northeast can be traced to

a number of factors in its history. There is a colonial factor because of

which borders got erected somewhat arbitrarily with little regard to the

composition of people and their historical placement in terms of cultural

connectivity, communication and economic linkages. Because of this

factor “most of the post colonial states inherited units and borders that

had been drawn arbitrarily and had little relationship with the socio-

cultural make-up of the people and their history”.1 The situation became

all the more challenging in societies that were of plural character. In such

plural societies, nation building became all the more problematical. In

the context of India, the un-desirable brunt of this fact was largely borne

by people in areas like Kashmir and the Northeast. The two regions were

separated from their immediate surroundings. Thus these got deprived of

their geographical, economic, social, cultural centrality that these regions

had enjoyed historically within their own neighborhoods and were

pushed to a position of ‘secluded periphery’.2

The problem in the Northeast is rooted in what became East India

Company’s predicament with Burma. It started with its concern for

securing Bengal from the westward expansion of the Burmese empire

that resulted in conflict between the two. The conflict culminated in the

Burmese defeat and imposition of a treaty to draw Indo-Burma boundary

whereby the Northeastern region got divided, leading to the dislocation

and arbitrary division of various tribal communities (of Assamese and of

Sino-Tibetan and Tibeto-Burmese stock) in the region between what

subsequently became the two administrative domains of the British

Empire. Thus Assam and other parts of present day Northeast that had

remained independent of the Mughal Empire became part of the rapidly

expanding British Raj.3 After the British withdrawal the impact of these

developments survived as their permanent legacy in the region. Even at

the time of the partition borders between the two emerging states of India

and Pakistan were drawn with little regard for economic and cultural

linkages at vulnerable places. Both Kashmir and the Northeast were

deprived of their economic lifelines. This is true of Northeast because it

for its existence and survival become dependent solely on a narrow,

lengthy and vulnerable 16 km wide corridor (the so called “chicken

neck”) connecting the region with mainland India. The Chittagong hills

that connected the region to the sea port went to East Pakistan now

Bangladesh. It is reported that when the two countries gained

independence, the hill people hoisted the Indian flag in the Chittagong

Hill Tracts (CHT) on 15 August, “as they had been assured that CHT

67 Northeast And Kashmir ...

with a 93 percent non-Muslim population, would be included in India. It

was only on 17 August, two days after independence, was it announced

that Chittagong Hill Tracts had been included in East Pakistan (now

Bangladesh), together with East Bengal.”4 This deprived the Northeast

of whatever hopes it had of having link to a seaport. Even this fact alone

was sufficient to push such regions to tremendous social and economic

disadvantages. This seclusion occurred despite the region having

geographical contiguity with Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal and

China. It shares about 98 percent borders with these states and only two

percent with the mainland India.

There is a similarity with Kashmir. It needs to be noted that

historically Kashmir has been at the crossroads of civilizational, social

and economic currents through different directions and passages. That is

why it has had very close trade and cultural relations with places in

China, Tibet, a number of cities in Central Asia, Afghanistan, Iran, not to

speak of close connections with North and more particularly North

Western Indian sub-continent.5 Of various passages, the Jhelum Valley

(JV) Road via Muzaffarabad-Rawalpindi has been the most important

link that connected the valley of Kashmir with the rest of world for trade,

people to people contact and exchange of cultural and social influences.6

The 1947 political developments, resulting in the division of Indian sub-

continent and de facto division of Jammu and Kashmir and the

placement of its two parts under the actual control of two different and

hostile states, the resultant hardening of borders and blocking of the

traditional road links pushed the valley to a number of social,

psychological, political and economic disadvantages. In addition to

emotional and psychological implications of the division on the people,

Kashmir was also thus pushed to a status of secluded periphery,. From a

position of being connected through a number of passages, it became

practically dependent on a fair weather road that is less dependable and

lengthier to connect people to the centers of trade and for other types of

interaction.7 In the case of Kashmir main connecting lines and all

weather road links went on the Pakistani side and it became solely

dependent on the fair weather road link that connected it to Indian main

land. The fact to be noted is that about 82 % Jammu & Kashmir (as on

August 14/15, 1947) borders are with China, Pakistan and Afghanistan

and only about 18 percent of this touch the Indian main land. Much of

this narrow stripe touches with mountainous Himalayan barriers in the

Himachal with no possible motor-able link to Kashmir. Out of this

connecting stripe, in terms of topography, only about its two per cent,


touching Punjab at Akhnoor, has been worthy of developing a road or

rail connectivity to Jammu part of the state. This point referred to

Chicken Neck surrounded by Pakistan has remained a vulnerable point

of defense for India.8 The national highway, 1A, which links the Jammu

and Kashmir with the rest of India passes through this stripe. Connecting

the valley of Kashmir through Jammu has also remained and is likely to

continue to be a problem. With all the improvement this highway

between Jammu and Srinagar continues creating lot of inconveniences

for people of Kashmir particularly during winter months and the rainy

season. The 1998 threat of its blockade in Jammu has exposed its other

risks for the Valley. Compared to JV Road it is less secure and also

lengthier to carry goods to centers of trade. Even though it is not

generally realized, this fact has socially and economically marginalized

the people of the Kashmir Valley. Because of this fact people of

Kashmir have always remained nostalgic about the JV Road via

Muzaffarabad. That is why its reopening has figured as an important

CBM on Kashmir in different official and non-official meetings between

India and Pakistan. It is in this context opening of bus service on the

route on April 2003 made a sense.9 It was expected to gradually lead to

conversion of this road to a full-fledged trade route giving Kashmir

traders an additional option. But not much has been achieved on this

account so far.

One of the dimensions of Kashmir issue has been the division of

Jammu and Kashmir into the two. In 1947-48 Jammu and Kashmir got

divided between what is known as Indian and Pakistani controlled

Kashmir. This has divided families resulting into a lot of human

problems. After 1962 Chinese aggression the former princely state of

Jammu and Kashmir is practically divided into three parts. Out of the

total of 222,236 sq. km of what used to be Jammu and Kashmir till 1947,

Pakistan holds 78,114 sq. km i.e. about 35 percent of the territory. China

with 42,735 sq. km holds about 20 percent of the territory. Not many

people know that what is shown as Indian Territory in maps is not what

India actually holds. India controls only 101,383 sq. km i.e. only about

45 percent of the total territory indicated on the Indian maps. These

developments not only did separate different parts of the state from the

surrounding countries but different regions within the state and even on

each side of the Line of Control (LoC) were cut off from one another.10

This has caused one of the greatest disadvantages that Kashmir has

suffered because of its post 1947 political placement. This disadvantage

has also been shared by its surrounding regions like Kargil, Leh and


Punch-Rajouri which continue to suffer communication disadvantage.

The partition and the de facto division of the state pushed it, regions

within the state and even regions within each side of the Line of Control

(LoC) to a kind of isolation. For example Punch city prior to 1947 was

on about five to six hours run from the Srinagar via Rawalakot and Uri.

But because of the erection of the LoC road travel distance between

Punch and Srinagar has become practically a minimum of two day run.

The post colonial Indian state made little effort, or may be could do

little, to address some of these distortions created by the erection of

borders at locations that undermined community life of people at

vulnerable places and mistrust that must have been generated by the

British policy of divide and rule. Some of the western critics have noted

that “while South Asian governments denounce colonialism and its

entire works, they have formed an intense emotional attachment to one

of the most important legacies of colonialism, namely, their own

territorial definitions.”11

In their definition of their nationalism these,

many a times artificially evolved borders, gained a very high degree of

sanctification. It was so that even a free discourse on their feasibility and

legitimacy became a criminal offence and was strictly banned.12

This

also undermined the sense of uniqueness that the people in these two

places enjoyed. Instead, the Indian state after gaining independence, in

accordance with the logic of the times, further stiffened and sanctified

these borders making adjustment at rationalizing or softening some of

these even more difficult. It is only in recent years discourse on softening

borders or making these irrelevant and opening cross border links for

transportation and people to people contact became acceptable at least at

the level of official discourse.

Part of the problem is also rooted in the context in which India

gained independence that conditioned the mindset of its leadership in the

crucial task of the state/nation building. Somehow constitution provided

for a sort of federal framework for Indian state. However, all did not go

well with the Indian Union as there was strong unitary bias in-built in the

constitution for which it was characterized as a quasi-federal state only.13

This did not go well with the social diversity in India. So there has been

demand for greater powers to the states.14

This has had relative success

in structuring Indian state within its mainland where the degree of geo-

ethnic diversity is relatively less. However, the constitution makers

exhibited extraordinary degree of caution in dealing with greater

diversity and in applying federalism as a dynamic framework to


accommodate plurality of different order. It exhibited unwillingness to

provide for special measures for accommodating the special situations

and the sense of uniqueness and the autonomy urges of people in

Kashmir within the Indian Union. This prejudice also operated against

similar urges in places like in the Northeast.

It was in 1826 that British defeated Burma and imposed a treaty to

draw Indo-Burma boundary whereby they arbitrarily divided the Naga

areas, which had historically enjoyed certain degree of independence and

autonomy. It is reported that the subsequent British entry into the Naga

areas was strongly resisted by the Naga people. Therefore, as usual to

their colonial practice; the British used the policy of using different

tribes and ethnic communities against each other in order to stay in the

region.15

It was thus that distortions in distribution of the ethnic

communities in the region and the mistrust among them got cropped up.

In response to resistance the British right from 1919 started, even though

incrementally, conceding distinct position for Naga areas. By 1929 it

recognized self rule for the Nagas. In 1935 constitutional arrangement

the British had also recognized the distinct position of the Naga areas

and placed them as excluded areas while dividing their empire as British

India and British Burma.16

Formalization of this division and its

stiffening in 1947 as said earlier was bound to add to the disadvantages

of the region. In the backdrop of this situation Government of India

needed to make a special effort to accommodate the people’s concerns in

the region on special terms and with special provisions in the

constitution. In fact on the eve of independence a ‘nine point agreement’

was reached between the Naga National Council and British India

Government whereby among other things the Naga interest in land,

forests, culture and education in the Naga areas were to be secured. Part

of the commitment was that after the interim period of ten years under

the guardianship of the Indian State, the Naga National Council might

through negotiations with the government of India decide to continue

with the existing arrangement or alternately if necessary work out a new

agreement to determine the future dispensation of the area17

. This is

similar to the commitment that Indian government had made in case of

Kashmir. While declaring its authority on Naga areas on the day of

independence Government of India on May 9, 1948 through the then

governor of Assam Sir Akbar Hyderi reaffirmed the commitment to the

Nine-Point Agreement, and assured that it will form Sixth Schedule of

the Indian Constitution. However, the Constituent Assembly ignored the

commitments completely. Government of India subsequently de


recognized the agreement. Instead of unilaterally rejecting the agreement

the prudent way would have been to take the local leadership into

confidence and work out a compromise with it whereby Indian State

should have been willing to concede a special position for the region18

.

But the mindset at that time did not allow it to be done. Impression must

have been that all such issues can get addressed automatically with the

consolidation of the state power. In somewhat similar context it was after

a lot of resistance that the Constituent Assembly conceded to grant

special position to Jammu and Kashmir but only to be undone in the

earliest opportunity. The experiences have suggested that disregarding

the commitments has deeply added to the sense of betrayal of Kashmiri

and Naga people.19

Indian federalism may have worked well in general terms in relation

to areas that were socio-culturally in greater proximity with core

constituents of Indian nationalism. But, Indian state has had problem in

relation to the relatively peripheral regions where ethno regional

diversity is further reinforced by a distinctive religious identity as in the

Northeast, Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir. In all these areas the conflict

has taken violent form on demands ranging from greater autonomy to

separatism and independence. Because of their reinforced identity

consciousness, the general framework of the federation was not

sufficient to accommodate the demands of the diversity, with regard to

these states. With regard to them, a more viable federal arrangement with

greater quantum of autonomy could be used as a conflict resolution

mechanism. The arrangement that was worked for Kashmir was not

radical in any manner. Its provisions were not different from the normal

federal provisions of the United States’ Constitution applicable to all the

states that constitute it. Here is a comparative statement of the position

that the State enjoyed up to 1953 before the dismissal of Sheikh

Abdullah with the position that the Constitution of the Unites States of

America grants to its federating units (States).


No. Jammu & Kashmir (1952-53) under

Art. 370

States in the Unites States

1 Union jurisdiction with regard to

Jammu and Kashmir was restricted to areas corresponding to Defense,

External Affairs and Communication.

Federal government’s jurisdiction

restricted to areas connected to Foreign Affairs, War &

Peace, Currency and Communication.

2 The State had residual powers All the states are left with residual powers

3 State was in the process of framing its

own constitution

Every state has its own constitution.

4 Provision of state subject was retained in addition to National citizenship

Every citizen has double Citizenship. National citizenship and the

citizenship of the respective state

5 Head of the state (J&K) indirectly elected by state the legislature but

required the endorsement by the union

president.

Head of every state locally & directly elected by the people in every state

independent of the Federal Govt.

6 Semi-independent state Judiciary with appellate jurisdiction with the supreme

court.

Independent judiciary for each state with provisions for appeal only in

limited special cases

7 Separate civil administration Every state has separate Adminis-

trative Structure independent of Federal Bureaucracy.

Based on the comparative reading of the Indian and the US

Constitutions.20

While as in the context of the Indian Union J&K was the only state

to enjoy such a position, in the United States all fifty states enjoyed the

similar position. Here the autonomy was visualized more as a problem

and less as an arrangement of addressing the problems of nation

building. It is for this reason that from the very inception all the so-called

'nationalist' (ultra nationalist) forces grouped together to undo it. As a

contrast in the Unites States constituent states enjoyed this position for

more than two hundred years without any conscious attempt being made

to undermine their position. Federal government there has gained greater

power as it emerged most powerful country of the world, however,

without legally undermining the position of the states.

In India there has never been a consensus on using autonomy

provision as a strategy of Nation Building. It was viewed as a potential

source of the problem. It was for this reason that when because of special

circumstances a special status under Art. 370 was worked-out to regulate


the relationship of Jammu and Kashmir with the Union of India, it was

seen as aberration and a potential threat to the unity of the country.21

That is why it has not been only the Sang Pariwar that wanted the

scrapping of Art. 370 but even the Congress from the early days of the

adoption of this provision within the constitution looked to it as

compulsion of circumstances to be undone in the earliest opportunity.22

That is why severest erosion of this article took place by joint

connivance of congress government at the centre and its stooge

governments in the State.23

Because of this thinking, from the very beginning, various forces

became active within and outside the state against the autonomy. As a

result of these pressures for the erosion of the autonomy, shortly after the

adoption of the constitution in 1950, the cordiality between the

governments headed by Shiekh Abdullah (whose endorsement of

accession was crucial for India) and Pandit Nehru, was being replaced by

anger, open hostility, bitterness and frustration vis-à-vis each other. The

political events of 1953, that led to the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah, the

most potent advocate of the state's autonomy, started casting their

shadow on this special position. This facilitated the process of greater

merger (in legal terms) of the state within the Indian Union, beginning

with the Presidential Order of 1954. This further undermined the

legitimacy of the Indian State vis-a-vis the people of Kashmir.24

This is

why, in spite of greater legal integration, State authority remained fragile

and dependent on coercive agencies. Democracy became its major

victim. In order to ensure the hand picked people in the power, rigging of

the elections in the state became an accepted practice and almost a matter

of national consensus particularly with reference to the valley. State

authority rested on the continued repression leaving very little of

elementary civil and political rights to its people. This became an

important contributing factor in the present situation in Kashmir.25

Similar attitude of suspicion has been exhibited towards the similar

commitment made in the Northeast and Punjab. Indian government’s

casual attitude on fulfilling commitments made through various accords

in Kashmir, Punjab and the Northeast stems from this kind of mind set.

Various commitments and accords with various leaders in the Northeast

and Kashmir for some sort of internal empowerment were never honored

fully.26

It is time that the Indian state concedes normal and genuine

aspirations of various ethnic communities for greater share of power and

autonomy.


As mentioned, it was with great difficulty that the government of

India conceded to grant special position to Jammu and Kashmir within

the constitution as adopted in 1950. It was because of the international

dimension of the issue that the leadership in Delhi was constrained to

handle Kashmir situation with extra care. It could not afford to alienate

the local leadership completely at the critical time. But subsequently

even the commitment to the special status was not kept and on the

earliest opportunity (i.e. as early as 1952) the process of its undoing and

erosion was initiated. This was seen as a breach of trust in Kashmir.

Since there was no such external compulsion, Indian government did

little to accommodate local urges in the North East even in the nominal

way. The understandings with the Naga leadership for being granted

special position was never honored.27

Even the acceptance of the

minimum genuine political urges of people in the Northeast for political

units took much longer. The reorganization of Assam and border region,

North Eastern Frontier Agency (NEFA), took place in stages. Four new

predominantly tribal states emerged beginning with Nagaland in 1963. It

was followed by the formation of Meghalya and Arunachal Pradesh in

1972, and Mizoram in 1987. But that did not address the problems in the

region. Instead of seriously finding out solutions to the problem the

Indian state took recourse to the use of high degree coercion. The logical

consequence of the policy has been a high degree of militarization,

eruption of violence, undermining of human and democratic rights of the

people and the application of special repressive laws. All this has

undermined social, economic and the ecological assets in the two

regions.28

Any serious attempt at resolving disputes in the interest of

promoting peace in the two regions should begin with developing a

realistic appreciation of all the important dimensions of these disputes.

We must begin with an admission that all major conflicts are generally

rooted in certain objective historical situations. Every conflict passes

through different phases and may have divergent manifestations, but its

underlying causes continue to be broadly the same. With the passage of

time, such a conflict becomes an integral part of the collective

subconscious of the society in which it emerges. This is how the

problems have persisted both in the Northeast and Kashmir. Therefore,

in spite of the occasional-changing manifestation, the conflicts in the two

places have survived. Its underlying causes and the core concerns have

not only but will also continue to be the same till they are meaningfully

addressed and resolved. We must note that the present problem in the


two places is not basically the problem of militancy. In fact, the

militancy has been the outcome of the objective problems. The source of

all protests is some sort of serious dissatisfaction with the existing

political arrangement. It takes violent form only when normal and

peaceful channels of the expression of dissent get blocked and constrain

the disgruntled to revolt in a violent form. However, whatever its causes

may be, its consequences are mostly undesirable and harmful to society.

This is what happened both in Kashmir and the Northeast.29

In the Northeast violence came into politics from the early years of

independence. It started with the Naga discontent in 1950s. Gradually

this spread to other areas in the Northeast. Comparatively violence came

to Kashmir much later in late 1980's. But we need to note that violence is

always rooted in some objective factors. However, whatever the causes

of the violence its consequences are always disastrous. It leads to a

vicious circle of death and destruction, physical and psychological

strangulation of common person. Women and children suffer more.

Extortion, rape, enforced disappearances; death, destruction and

violation of human rights become a common practice. This has been the

story both in Kashmir and the Northeast. Security agencies in the both

places are armed with similar kinds of repressive powers.

On the basis of our experience in Kashmir, the eruption of militancy

and violence results in the activation and large-scale mobilization of

security agencies (military and paramilitary forces), with enormous and

arbitrary powers granted under provisions like, Public Safety Act, Armed

Forces Special Powers Act, Disturbed Areas Act, and various other such

acts applied nationally from time to time (like TADA, and POTA)

exposes common people to a number of vulnerabilities and risks. The

problem is accentuated by the fact that most of the security personnel

operating in such situations are from different ethno cultural stock and

therefore have little sensitivity and empathy to local population and their

concerns. This makes the situation much more complex and very often

terribly dangerous.30

The situation became worse as with the greater

pressure from security forces, politico-ideologically less committed

cadres and criminal elements within militants changed their side to

become what came to be known as pro-government renegades.

Operationally these renegades have had to function in subordination to

security imperatives of the state. Most often these elements cause

greatest suffering to common people. Similar situation operates in the

Northeast. In short, the cycle of violence has brought a lot of miseries to


common people in both the places. The estimate of the people who lost

their lives in the turmoil in Kashmir ranges between 40,000 (official

estimate) to over 100,000 (unofficial estimate). This is in addition to the

tremendous economic, social, psychological and material loss that the

people had to suffer in the process. There is probably no family left in

Kashmir, which has not adversely been affected by the situation.

Naturally in this situation of anarchy, insecurity, universal fear and

uncertainty, there is no section of society in Kashmir that has remained

unaffected. This is even true about the security forces operating there.

There have been credible reports of their suffering from depression and

other psychological disorders resulting in growing number of suicides

and killings of colleagues. These are similar stories in the Northeast as

well. The reports of custodial killings, civilian disappearances, sufferings

of women and children, are some of the common experiences in the two

regions. 31

Another similarity between the two places has been a high degree of

plurality in the two regions that contributed to making the problem in the

two places much more complex to be addressed to. Indian constitution

also did not attend sufficiently to social diversity present within India. At

the time of independence of India, assimilationist ideologies were

relatively stronger. However, today in the post modernist context,

multiculturalism has offered new ways of dealing with issues of diversity

and plurality. It was with some resistance that some minority rights were

conceded and Indian state did have secular features. What is needed in

the context of plurality as in the Northeast is to develop frameworks for

reconciling social diversity and allowing each one to live in peace,

security and tolerance with regard to the rest. In the context of Kashmir,

experiment with Hill Development Council in Leh and Kargil has had

reasonable success. This could be emulated in addressing regionally

based minority discontent within some of the North-eastern states.

Today the atmosphere for the viable federal arrangement has

become more conducive. Diversity has to be taken as natural and given

and cannot be undone by artificial means. There is need to develop

imaginative arrangements for accommodating them within. Today we

also have a concept of undoing, undermining and softening borders.

This, if applied in the context of Kashmir and the Northeast, will be

restoring some social and economic empowerment to the people in the

two regions. Strengthening regional and inter-regional cooperation will

address many aspects of the problems in the two places. Today instead of


erecting we are in for softening and undermining borders. The

strengthening of the SAARC framework for cooperation and networking

with ASEAN, Myanmar and China can help to address many aspects of

the problems in Kashmir and in the Northeast. There is need to develop

imaginative arrangements for addressing the issues. Fortunately the

Government of India’s look east policy is going to help in restoring to

Northeast some amount of connectivity. Under this policy the

Government of India is planning to build a 160-km road link with

Myanmar and developing a port in that country that will facilitate easier

passage of goods to and from states like Nagaland and Mizoram. It also

entails the promotion of the region’s development. Look East Policy in

the context of the Northeastern regional development is a welcome

development.32

PM’s unfolding of July 2008; “Northeastern Region

Vision 2020” document is also aimed at addressing some of the concerns

and issues in the Northeast. In the context of Kashmir starting Srinagar-

Muzaffarabad Bus service also was to begin with a small step in the right

direction. The starting of bus on April 7, 2005 and opening of five border

points in itself is a small thing as it involved only small number of

passenger exchange in a month under its present schedule. Nevertheless,

this was important because only some years back even this small

development would have been impossible to imagine happening. One

also hopes that in the context of changing character of Indo-Pak

relations, the process is taken further and the J V Road becomes

functional for frequent travel of people, removing the psychological

barriers between two divided parts. It also needs to be combined with

free flow of goods across the two sides of Kashmir and beyond to larger

markets. It is this development that is going to have tremendous positive

impact on the economy of the people as this route, for its relative

advantages of security, distance and smoothness, is going to have

considerable economic advantage for the transportation of goods and

services to the outside world.33

Therefore, urgent steps need to be taken

for early opening of this road regular trade and people to people

movement across the LoC.34

In the end, it needs to reemphasized, that discontent rooted in

objective factors cannot be undone by mere application of coercion but

by finding ways and means of addressing these and by meeting the

legitimate aspirations of the people. Contemporary developments are

allowing options for undermining some of these historically inherited

disadvantages. There is dire need for strengthening the Human Rights

Regime, restoring the Rule of Law and withdrawing the extraordinary


powers vested with security agencies. Demilitarization must be pursued

for promoting human and environmental security. People need to be

empowered and given a sense of security by guaranteeing special

provisions for their empowerment. These, in my opinion, are some of

the concerns that are common to Kashmir and the Northeast.


1 Mohammad Ayoob, The Third World Security and Predicament (London: Lynne

Rienner Publishers. 1995), pp. 34-37

2 Noor Ahmad Baba, “Peace Process and Imperative of Resolving Kashmir Problem” in Amitabh Mattoo, Kapil Kak, Happymon Jacob, eds. India & Pakistan:

Pathways Ahead, (New Delhi, Knowledge World, 2007).

3 Kingsley M de Silva, “Conflict Resolution in South Asia” in Luc Van de Goor, Kumar Puresinghe, Paul Sciarone, eds, Between Development and Destruction,

(Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Affairs,1996), pp. 309.

4 Janeneke Arens and Kirti Nishan Chakma, “Bangladesh: Indigenous Struggle in

Chittagong Hill Tracts” in Monique Mekenkamp, Paul Van Tongeren, and Hans

Van de Veen, eds. Searching Peace for Central and South Asia. Colorado, (London, Lynne Rienner publishers, 2002), pp 304-305 See also Kristoffel Lieten,

Multiple “Conflict in Northeast India” in ibid pp 407-409.

5 See Mushtaq A. Kaw, “Dynamics of Silk Route and Kashmir” Greater Kashmir,

(Srinagar), August 8, 2008. and also Wariko K , Central Asia and Kashmir (New

Delhi, 1989)

6 Robert C. Mayfield, “A Geographical Study of Kashmir Issue” Geographical

Review, April, 1955. p

7 Baba, n. 2.

8 "Chicken Neck" in the Akhnoor region, which is surrounded on three sides by Pakistani

territory The Guardian (London) May, 27, 2002

9 Noor Ahmad Baba, “Kashmir Bus: Small but a Step in the Right Direction,” Peace & Conflict, (New Delhi, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies) February, 2005.

10 Based on figures given in Kashmir Study Group Report, (New York, KSG, 2005), p. 6.

11 Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama, Vol. I. (New Delhi, Kalyani Publishers, 1982),

p.186

12 For example section 2 of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1961 states that “whoever by words either written or spoken, or by signs or by visible

representation or otherwise, question the territorial integrity or frontiers of India in

a manner which is, or is likely to be, prejudicial to the interests or safety or security

of India will be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three

years, or with the fine or the both” quoted in ibid. p. 186.

13 K.C. Wheare, 1971, Federal Government, 4th edn, (London; Oxford University press). p. 28.


14 Ashok. Behuria, “Demands for Autonomy; Internal Weaknesses of a Multiethnic, Multicultural, and Multinational State”. In Monique Mekenkamp, Paul Van

Tongeren, and Hans Van de Veen, eds. Searching Peace for Central and South

Asia. Colorado, Lynne Rienner publishers Inc, 2002 pp . 326-356.

15 Alemchiba, M. Ao, A Brief Historical Account of Nagaland, (Kohima, Naga Institute of Culture, 1970), p.166.

16 Ibid p-132

17 Bendangangshi, Glimpses of Naga History, (Mokockchung: Naga Patriots from Soyim, 1993), pp. 61-62

18 Ibid. & “Nine-Point Agreement and its Transgression” Naga Resistance And

Peace Process (Other Media 2001.), pp 10-13

19 Noor Ahmad Baba, “Kashmir Special Status and Political Dynamics of Centre-

State Relations”. in Hari OM, RD Sharma, Rekha Chowdhary, Jagmohan Singh,

and Ashutosh Kumar, (Edts) Politics of Autonomy in Jammu and Kashmir,

(Jammu; Vinod publishers,1999),

20 Art 370 of Indian Constitution and Robert S Babcock, “State Government in the United States” in Stephen K. Bailey, ed. American Government and Politics.

(Washington D.C. 1973.) pp. 203-207.

21 Behuria, n. 14, pp. 354-355

22 L. K. Advani, “When the Congress party opposed Article 370” Indian Express,

New Delhi, Feb. 17, 1992

23 Baba n. 19 and on the nature of elections see PS Verma, Jammu and Kashmir at Political Crossroads, (New Delhi, Vikas, 1994) Chapter, I.

24 Baba, Ibid

25 Election rigging is considered as an important contributing factor to post 1988

crises in Kashmir. Sten Widmalm, Kashmir in Comparative Perspective (London,

Routledge, 2002) and Baba, Noor Ahmad., “Origin and Dimensions of Crises in

Kashmir”. in Shri Prakash and Ghulam Mohd. Shah. Towards Understanding the Kashmir Crises; Delhi, Gyan Publishing House, 2002.

26 Naga n. 18. pp 10-18

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid and Human Rights Watch, Patterns of Impunity in Jammu and Kashmir,

(HRW, New York, Sept, 2006)

29 Ibid

30 Verghese Koithara, Crafting Peace in Kashmir, (New Delhi, Sage, 2004), p 71.

31 Ibid. also See also Amnesty Reports issued on the two places from time to time.

32 'Northeastern Region Vision 2020' see also PTI Report, July, 1, 2008.

33 Baba, n. 9.

34 Noor Ahmad Baba, Reconnecting Kashmir: Need for Reopening Traditional Routes, Epilogue, (Jammu) September, 2008.

80

LAL-DED: The Mystic Poet of Kashmir

Prof. M.H. Zaffar*

Lal-Ded is a rebel saint, a mystic and a poet of the 14th

century

Kashmir. Her poetry forms the foundation not only of contemporary

Kashmiri literature but also of Kashmiri culture as a whole. In the

ancient and the medieval period Kashmir produced great thinkers and

spiritual practitioners. But all their works are in Sanskrit. After the

advent of Islam in Kashmir around the 11th

century, A. D. Kashmiris

gradually lost their hold on the language (Sanskrit) due to various

political, social, religious, and linguistic reasons; and whatever

intellectual heritage their predecessors had bequeathed became

inaccessible to them. With the passage of time a deficit emerged between

pre-Islamic Kashmir and Islamic Kashmir. Lal-Ded is the most

significant historical bridge that connects the two shores of this gulf very

effectively. She was the product of the spiritual creed that had been

evolving in Kashmir for centuries and her immediate predecessors were

saints and scholars like Vasugupta Rishi, Acharaya Somanand, Acharaya

Utpal Dev and Acharaya Abhinavagupta. Her immediate successor and a

great saint and scholar in his own right, Nund Rishi the founder of

Muslim Rishi order in Kashmir has this to say about Lal-Ded1:

It was Lalla of Padmanpur, Who drank in long draught, nectar Divine.

She was the Divine Manifestation for us,

May thou Lord bestow a similar boon upon me.

Her poetry was not written down during her life time. It was because

of her power to impact her listeners that people heard her and formed her

sayings or VᾱKs into chants and mantras which continue to be sung even

* Professor (Research) UNESCO Madanjeet Singh, Institute of Kashmir Studies,

University of Kashmir

81 LAL-DED: The Mystic Poet Of Kashmir

today. She revolted against all the oppressive structures that stifle and

kill the human spirit and critically interrogated practices of inequality

and injustice that were current during the times. Lala’s poetry is not only

a continuation of the tradition; it is also simultaneously a break or

rebellion against the tradition. Her rebellion was unprecedented. She

challenged the validity of all the socio-political and religious

structures, and was deadly against maintaining the status quo, thus she

was perceived as a threat to the established social order. To

neutralise the impact of this rebellion, the elite of the times, the

custodians of the tradition declared her to be mad and insane, it is

because of these circumstances that we don’t find her mention in

any of the historical accounts written in Sanskrit during and after

her times.

Lal-ded rebelled against the educated elite of Sanskrit academia who

were the custodians of knowledge and tradition. She articulated the

spiritual path and message she had inherited; in Kashmiri language

which was the language of the man in the street. By doing so, she made

it available to all the people irrespective of caste, creed, colour, sex,

religion or region. It was no more a preserve of the Sanskrit academy.

This act on the part of Lala-ded - to make Kashmiri language the

vehicle for spreading her message of universal brotherhood through

her outpourings- was probably a part of the Divine Mission which

she had to fulfil and in recognition of which the great saint Nunda-

Rishi calls her, ‘the Divine Manifestation for us.’ This act remains the

greatest revolutionary act in the cultural history of Kashmir and

makes her the undisputed founder not only of the contemporary

Kashmiri literature but also of the contemporary Kashmiri culture.

Lal-Ded also rejected wholly the ritualistic aspect of the śaivistic

spiritual discipline. This rejection is articulated and expressed with great

force in her poetry. She denigrates the ceremonial pieties, and to her

most of these rituals are devoid of any spiritual merit and only an

uncultivated person will engage in such barren and fruitless activities

.She herself had no possessions, not even a shelter but in her ‘homeless

wisdom’ articulated in a language that provides no lulling abodes of

thought she tried to dismantle the deeply ingrained hereditary patterns of

thought and action. She had her own revolutionary views regarding the

rituals like, idol worship, animal sacrifice, fasting, visiting sacred places and

reading sacred books. In the light of her own intense spiritual experiences,

she re-evaluates these rituals and comments:2


The idol is but stone

The Temple is but stone, From top to bottom, all is but stone

Whom will you worship, O stubborn Pandit?

It covers your shame,

Saves you from cold, Its food and drink, mere water and grass

Who counselled you, O Brahmin,

To slaughter a living sheep as a sacrifice Unto a lifeless stone?

O fool, right action does not lie

In fasting and other ceremonial rites O fool right action does not lie

In providing for bodily comfort and ease

In contemplation of the self alone is right action and right council for you

The pilgrim sanyasin goes from shrine to shrine, Seeking to meet Him

Who abides within herself.

Knowing the truth, O soul, be not misled; It is distance that makes the turf look green

Some leave their home, some the hermitage

But the restless mind knows no rest. Then watch your breath day and night,

And stay where you are

I have worn out my plate and tongue reading the holy books,

But I have not learnt the practices that would please my lord. I have worn thin fingers and thumb telling my rosary beads,

But I have not been able to dispel duality from my mind.

The thoughtless read the holy books As parrots in their cages recite “Ram, Ram”

Their reading is like churning water,

Fruitless effort, ridiculous conceit.

By opposing vehemently the ritualistic aspect of Trikmat, Lalla

revolted against the powerful clergy of the times who had transformed these

rituals into a means of exploitation and a tool for perpetuating their

hereditary hegemony. She also revolted against the objectification of

women in Saiva rituals. She totally rejects the secondary dependent status

allotted to women in these rituals and emerges and dominates the

scene as a subject. On the one hand, Lala gave a new lease of life to

Kashmiri Śaivistic spiritual tradition but on the other hand, she demystified


Śaivism by articulating its tenets in the language of the common people and

deconstructed its ideology of being a Rahasya Sampradaya (a secret sect) by

making all the Upayas (means of realization) available to all those interested

in the realization of their true identity, thus making it a viable and effective

tool not only for individual emancipation but also for social unification.

There is an inbuilt dynamic reciprocal relationship between the two, and

each reinforces the other. This is the reason for total acceptance of Lal-Ded

by almost all Kashmiris. With the passage of time there was a schism in the

Saivistic Trikamat. On the one hand, we have the branch that maintains the

rituals, although not much of the traditional rituals detailed by Abhinava

Gupta have survived the ravages of the time. On the other hand, we have the

ritual free Trikamat of Lal-Ded which is a syncretic tradition that assimilates

not only the essence of Buddhist spirituality but also reaches out to the Sufi-

Mystic tradition of Islam. In Buddhist tradition being a Bodhi-sattva implies

being full of compassion conjoined with insight into reality, realising

emptiness (shunaya) or the essence of all things. In this light we may

consider the verse by Lalla:3

Realization is rare indeed, Seek not afar, it is near, by you

First slay desire, then still the mind, giving up vain imaginings

Then meditate on self within and lo! The void merges in the void

Or this one:

Let go the sacred tantra rites

Only the mantra sound remains And when the mantra sound departs

Only the chitta is left behind

Then lo! The chitta itself is gone

And there is nothing left behind The void merges in the void

In the true Buddhist spirit Lalla-Ded advocates the middle path as

the path of liberation and we may consider the following Vᾱk in this

regard:4

By pandering to your appetites and desires,

You get nowhere

By penance and fasting,

You get conceit Be moderate in food and drink


You will be moderate

Your path will surely be illuminated*

So far as reaching out to the Sufi tradition is concerned consider this

verse:5

Shiva is everywhere---know him as the sun.

Know not the Hindu different to the Muslim

Know yourself if wise, as a ray of that sun

That alone is the way to Saheb.

Writing about Lalla’s poetry Prof. Neeja Mattoo, a contemporary

scholar comments on this vᾱk: 6

Apart from the obvious idea of breaking down religious barriers by

invoking the image of the sun shining upon everyone without distinction,

notice how seamlessly Lal-Ded hangs the Islamist valance of saheb to

the apparent shaivite reference to Shiva. The verse enacts in its own

syncretic idiom, the religious, mystic and linguistic synthesis it

advocates.

Here are some of her verses that give us some idea of the path Lal-

Ded traversed:7

In life I sought neither wealth nor power,

Nor ran after the pleasures of sense,

Moderate in food and drink, I lived a controlled life; Patiently bore my lot, my pain and poverty,

And loved my god.

O fool, right action does not lie In observing fasts and ceremonial rites

O fool, right action does not lie

* Compare this with the record of the Buddha’s first sermon at the Dear Park Varanasi

which states:

“Then the blessed one addressed the group of five religious mendicants:

“Mendicants, there are two extremes which should not be practised by any person

who has left society to find salvation. What are these extremes? On the one hand

there is a realm of desire and pursuit of pleasure which is in accord with desire – it is

a base pursuit, boorish, profane, crude and without profit. On the other hand, there is a pursuit of self-mortification which is sheer misery, as well as crude and without

profit. Mendicants, Passing through these two extremes and avoiding them both is the

middle way, object of the tathagata’s perfect awakening, opening the eyes and mind,

leading to peace, to omniscience, to complete awakening, and to nirvana”


In providing for bodily comfort and ease

In contemplation of the self alone Is right action and right counsel for you

My guru gave me but one precept

“From without withdraw your gaze within

And fix it on the Inmost self." Taking to heart this one precept,

Naked I began to dance.

These Vᾱks give us an idea of the spiritual discipline that Lal

practiced and prescribed for us. Now let us see the fruit of this spiritual

labour:8

Whatever work I did became worship of the lord

Whatever word I uttered became Mantra.

What this body of mine experienced became. The sadhana! Of saiva tantra.

Illumining my path to paramsiva

I traversed the vastness of the void alone, Leaving behind me reason and sense,

Than came upon the secret of the self;

And, all of a sudden, unexpectedly, In mud the lotus bloomed for me.

Like a tenuous web Siva spreads Himself,

Penetrating all frames of all things,

If while alive, you cannot see Him, How can you see Him after death?

Think deep and sift the true Self from the self.

The last two Vᾱks are a bold statement that absolute reality can and

is to be realized in this very life. Notice the interrogative emphasis in the

two lines:

If while alive you cannot see Him,

How can you see Him after death?

And relate it to the last line of the earlier Vᾱk which reads:

In mud the lotus bloomed for me.

Through spiritual effort one has to realize the blooming of the

flower upon the dirty ground covered with litter, mud and dirt i.e.

something valueless (representing human body). One has to begin with


brute matter, the lower prakrti, the manifested universe in order to realize

the higher self within (the flower) and thence to immerse in the lake of

immortality (lay Ka’rmas amritsars) that is absorption in the Divine (to

quote her oft repeated phrase) void merging in the void (shunyas

shunyaya millith gav).

No doubt Lal-ded belongs to the spiritual tradition of Kashmir

which is in turn informed by Buddhism, Saivism and Islam but she

cannot be identified with any particular colour or segment of this multi-

faced tradition. She transcends all particularities and her message is

absolutely universal. No doubt its form that is its linguistic expression is

particular, as it is expressed in Kashmiri Language, but its Kernel, that is

its essence transcends all particularities. It is the identification and

realization of a spiritual path, shorn of all rituals, for one’s self-

recognition, that implies the recognition of the Lord.

Notes and References:

1 B. N. Paromoo: Nund Rishi Unity in Diversity, J&K Academy of Art, Culture and

Languages, Srinagar 1984, pp. 105-106.

2 Jayalal Kaul: Lal Ded Sahitya Akademi, New Delhi, 1973, pp.103-110.

3 Ibid., p. 118.

4 Ibid., p. 99.

5 Ibid., p. 107.

6 Afresh Look at Some Kashmiri Women Poets, Paper presented by Prof. Neerja

Mattoo at an International seminar at Institute of Kashmir studies held in October

2006.

7 Op. cit., n. 2, pp. 97- 98.

8 Ibid., p. 134.

87

CONTEXTUALIZING MUSHARRAF’S

FOUR-POINT FORMULA

Samir Ahmad

Since their independence from the British colonial rule in 1947, both

India and Pakistan have remained caught in a relationship of

confrontation and hostility towards each other. The Kashmir issue is

viewed as a manifestation of this mutual mistrust between the two

countries. Both countries have claims over the state of Jammu and

Kashmir and defend their positions based on their own versions of the

developments which took place at the time of the partition of the

subcontinent. Over the past more than six decades several attempts have

been made to address the problem and ameliorate the relations between

the two countries. In this regard a number of proposals have been put

forward by international organizations such as United Nations

Organization (UNO), and several other think tanks, political parties

across the border and political pundits. Besides, there have been bilateral

approaches from India and Pakistan in different forums and as well as

through high official meetings on several occasions in the past. These

proposals range from the partition of the state on geographical and ethnic

lines to a ‘soft border’ and self-rule arrangements. However, most of

these have been rejected by one or the other party involved in the

dispute. None of these attempts have led to any settlement of the dispute

so far.

Kashmir issue in the United Nations

Attempts at resolving the issue were made from the very beginning,

when the problem emerged. As stated earlier; it began with the bilateral

meeting between then Governor General of India Lord Louis

Ph.D Research Student, UNESCO Madanjeet Singh, Institute of Kashmir

Studies, University of Kashmir


Mountbatten and Governor Generals of Pakistan Mohammad Ali Jinnah,

followed by a number of bilateral meetings and agreements from time to

time. At another level the United Nations also tried to work out a

solution for the problem after the issue was referred to it for an

intervention into the matter by the Indian government through its United

Nations emissary P.P Pillia, on 1 January 1948, by invoking article 35 of

the United Nations Charter. Under the article India lodged a complaint

against Pakistan’s military support to the tribesmen invading the territory

of Jammu and Kashmir. The letter sent to then President of the United

Nations Security Council dated 1 January 1948, by the government of

India requested the Security Council to call upon Pakistan to stop

providing military aid to the tribal invaders. Otherwise, the government

of India in its self defence may be compelled to take direct military

measures against Pakistan. The Pakistani government instead of

answering these allegations charged India with the breach of

international agreements such as, division of the military stores, and cash

balance, which both nations had signed at the time of the partition.

Further, responding to India’s complaint about Pakistan’s involvement in

the tribal invasion on Kashmir, Pakistan denied playing any such role.

However, they accepted that some Pakistani nationals including few

independent tribal groups had minimal part in the invasion but added that

Pakistan was ready to discourage such activities and curb such elements

by whatever means it could.1 Pakistan requested United Nations Security

Council to take necessary measures to stop India from such actions and

put pressure on India to implement the agreements it had signed with the

government of Pakistan in connection with the partition of the

subcontinent. In this context the government of Pakistan gave a detailed

account of all the significant developments which took place before and

after the partition to the UNSC.

In the discussions held by the UNSC, Pakistan claimed that the

accession to India by Maharaja Hari Singh is not valid as Maharaja

himself did not carry any popular support in the state. In fact, there were

protests against his rule long before he signed the Instrument of

Accession in 1947. This is evident from the protests and demonstrations

in the early 1930’s. Therefore, the validity of this accession is

questionable. Moreover, Sir M. Zafrulla Khan, who was representing

Pakistan’s case in the Security Council, said that the accession which

Maharaja Hari Singh signed with the government of India runs parallel

to the accession between Maharaja of Junagadh and government of

Pakistan, which India had unilaterally set aside. In both these cases the

89 Contextualizing Musharraf’s Four-Point Formula

ruler belonged to a different religious community from his subjects—the

state of Junagadh with a Muslim ruler ruling over the Hindu subjects and

in the Jammu and Kashmir state, it was a Hindu ruler ruling over the

Muslim subjects.2 After hearing the representatives from the both the

countries the United Nations Security Council held several debates and

discussion on the issue of Kashmir’s political future and in the process

various resolutions were passed and committees were formed to look in

to the matter.

In this direction the first resolution was passed on 21 April 1948, by

nine votes against none, with the Soviet Union and Ukraine abstaining

from voting. The resolutions asked the government of India and Pakistan

to stop the fighting and create favourable conditions so that the people of

the state were able to express their wishes to decide the political future of

their state without any coercion and threat to their lives, through

plebiscite. It was recommended in the resolution that the Pakistan

government should secure the withdrawal of the tribal groups and other

Pakistani nationals who were operating in the state of Jammu and

Kashmir. On the other hand India was told to reduce the number of its

military forces to the minimum strength required for the maintenance of

the law and order in the state. The recommendation further proposed the

nomination of a plebiscite administrator with adequate powers to ensure

a free and fair plebiscite in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. However, it

is important to mention here that under Chapter VI of the United Nations

Charter, the Security Council can make recommendations only. There is

no provision for enforcing its decisions upon the concerned parties.

Parties to the dispute are not bound to act on the recommendations.

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) could only try to persuade

India and Pakistan to follow the recommendations it made under such

resolution.

The United Nations commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) a

three member committee, formed under 21 April 1948 UN resolution on

Kashmir and later expanded to five member commission; Argentina

nominated by Pakistan, Czechoslovakia nominated by India, Columbia

and Belgium selected by Security Council while United States named by

Council’s President. The commission paid a visit on July 7, 1948 in the

region with a purpose to investigate the charges of India and Pakistan

against each other and to get a firsthand account of all the developments

taking place in the region. In the mean time affairs in the Kashmir moved

towards all-out war between India and Pakistan. During its first visit the


commission held several meetings. They met the prime minister of

Pakistan Liaqat Ali khan and prime minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru.

Besides, they held several other meetings and discussions with senior

political figures and diplomats from both the countries including the

meetings with some military officials to hear their description of the

military operations.

After analyzing the situation in the region and meeting several

political leaders and other senior government officials of both the

countries, the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan

(UNCIP) framed a resolution on 13 August 1948. The resolution called

for an immediate cease-fire along the border, the appointment of a

military observer to monitor the cease-fire, the withdrawal of the

tribesmen and Pakistani troops and also that the evacuated territory be

administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the

commission.3 Under the resolution, the Government of India was asked

to reduce its military presence till such time when the final solution to

the dispute was reached. Most importantly, both the nations of India and

Pakistan were asked to reaffirm their agreement that the people of the

state of Jammu and Kashmir will determine the final political destination

of their state through the free and fair plebiscite under the resolution.4

On January 5 1949, the commission after correspondence with the

governments of the two dominions adopted a resolution supplementing

the 13 August 1948 United Nations resolution. The resolution called for

an accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan

through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. The

plebiscite was to be held when the commission was convinced that the

cease-fire and the truce arrangements set forth in Parts I and II of the

Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948 have been carried out and

arrangements for the plebiscite have been completed fairly. A Plebiscite

Administrator who shall be a personality of high international standing

and commanding general confidence was to be appointed by the

Secretary-General of the United Nations and he would be equipped with

the powers necessary for organizing and conducting the plebiscite and

for ensuring the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite in the state of

Jammu and Kashmir. The Governments of India and Pakistan and all

authorities within the State of Jammu and Kashmir were supposed to

collaborate with the Plebiscite Administrator in putting this provision

into effect and would make sure that there is no threat, coercion or

intimidation, bribing or other undue influences on the participation of the


voters during the plebiscite.5

McNaughton Proposals -1949

In December, 1949 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)

made a fresh approach to resolve the Kashmir through its representative

AGL McNaughton to negotiate directly between the two nations.

General AGL McNaughton from Canada, who was then the president of

the United Nations Security Council, was entrusted with the job of

negotiating through direct conversation with both the parties, India and

Pakistan, in order to find a permanent solution to the Kashmir dispute.

He was also accompanied by Muguel A. Marin, Elmore Jackson of the

UN secretariat and military expert called Jacob L Dever. General AGL

McNaughton recommended some steps that both the countries were to

follow in order to reach a solution. These recommendations were: First

and foremost there should be the withdrawal of military forces from the

state of the Jammu and Kashmir to the level where the remaining forces

would not cause any fear or threat at any point of time to the people or to

either side of the ceasefire line. The Northern areas of Gilgit and

Baltistan should be considered part of the disputed territory along with

the Kashmir valley, Punch and Jammu regions. However, these

territories should be administered by the existing local authorities under

the supervision of the United Nations. Finally, as per the terms of the

United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) resolution

passed on 5 January 1949, plebiscite would be held under the United

Nations monitoring body.6 The proposal put forward by General AGL

McNaughton was received with a feasible degree of interest by Pakistan

but rejected by India on the grounds that tribal invasion with a fair

support and aid from the Pakistani army has violated the accession of

Maharaja Hari Sing with the Union of India.7 Therefore, all the forces

including the tribal forces, supported by Pakistan, must leave the

territory of Kashmir unconditionally before any step for conducting a

plebiscite could be taken. The mediation by the General AGL

McNaughton yielded no result and the issue again came before the

United Nations Security Council. However, it led to the appointment of

Sir Owen Dixon, a distinguished Australian Jurist on April 12, 1950.

Owen Dixon - 1950

Sir Owen Dixon arrived on the subcontinent on 27 May, 1950 as he

was appointed by the members of the UN secretariat. During his

strenuous visit to both the nations and to the state of Jammu and


Kashmir, he held several discussions and meetings with the Prime

Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru and Prime Minister of Pakistan

Liaqat Ali Khan and other government functionaries in both countries.

He was also successful in conducting a meeting between Jawaharlal

Nehru and Liaqat Ali Khan on 20-24 July 1950 in New Delhi to discuss

the various possibilities for the resolution of the disputed territory of the

state of Jammu and Kashmir.

After spending three months in the region Sir Owen Dixon

presented his report before the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)

on 15 September 1950. The report submitted by him is considered one of

the most fascinating examples of literary elegance and wit to emerge

from the sorry story of Kashmir.8 Sir Dixon in his report tried to explore

a fresh approach for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute, which came

to be known as ‘regional plebiscite. It was a plan according to which

some areas which were certain to vote for the accession to Pakistan and

some for the accession to India, they should be allotted accordingly and

plebiscite should be confined only to uncertain areas, which appeared to

be the Kashmir valley and some adjacent areas. However, Sir Dixon also

met the same fate his predecessor AGL McNaughton had been through:

India and Pakistan could not come to an agreement on the Dixon

proposals. The recommendations were rejected by India and Pakistan

showed very little interest in implementing them. Therefore, the most

critical dispute between the two dominions seemed without any

foreseeable end. While leaving the sub-continent on 23 August 1950 Sir

Owen Dixon said that “there was nothing further that I could do now”.9

Though, with a very thoughtful approach towards the resolution of the

issue, Sir Owen Dixon left in despair and hopelessness.

Graham Proposals - 1951

Despite the failure of its previous attempts to resolve the Kashmir

problem by passing numerous resolutions and sending its various envoys

to the region to mediate between the two new countries, the United

Nations Security Council (UNSC) continued its efforts and endeavours

to bring a permanent settlement between India and Pakistan over the

Kashmir dispute. On 30 March 1951 United Nations Security Council

appointed Dr. Frank P. Graham, former United States Senator for North

Carolina, as United Nations representative in succession to Sir Owen

Dixon to mediate between Indian and Pakistan to get them to agree on

holding a plebiscite in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Frank Graham

worked from 1951-53 to secure a long lasting solution of the Kashmir


issue. He visited the Indian sub-continent and in the light of the Sheikh

Mohammad Abdullah’s activities, who had become the Prime Minister

of Jammu and Kashmir on March 15, 1948, tried to explore the

possibilities for demilitarization of the disputed territory and

implementation of the United Nations’ Resolution in order to reach a

permanent settlement of the Kashmir issue.

During his three years term Graham submitted at least five reports10

to the United Nation Security Council in order bring an end to the

confrontations on the Kashmir problem. However, none of his

recommendations were accepted by the parties to the dispute. While

rejecting the proposal put forward by the Frank Graham, India reiterated

its previous demand that until Pakistan does not withdraw its forces from

the territory of Jammu and Kashmir completely and disband the local

militia, there is no possibility of holding any plebiscite regarding the

political future of the state. On the other hand, Pakistan had its mistrust

over the fairness of any plebiscite which is not adequately supervised by

any third neutral party. Further, Pakistan rejected the recommendations

on the grounds that Pakistan was supposed to withdraw all its forces

from the State while as India was allowed to retain some of its troops to

maintain order, which could potentially lead to coercion or intimidation

of the voters by Indian forces to influence the outcome of the proposed

plebiscite.11

Following Graham’s failure, there was not much that the UN did for

the next few years. On 23 January 1957, the Jammu and Kashmir

constituent assembly led by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad ratified the

Instrument of Accession signed by the Maharaja Hari Singh with the

Union of India in October 1947. In response to this, the government of

Pakistan raised the issue in the UNSC as a result the United Nations

Security council (UNSC) passed a resolution that restated the earlier U.N

resolutions on issue and called for a final settlement of the dispute "in

accordance with the will of the people expressed through a free and

impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United

Nations."12

Although Pakistan kept raising the Kashmir issue in the United

Nations in the early 1960s, United Nation’s involvement in Kashmir was

considerably reduced. In 1962 the Kashmir Question was again debated

in the U.N Security Council. However, the United Nations Security

Council failed to pass a resolution on Kashmir in view of a Soviet veto,


which discouraged the United Nations Security Council from pursuing

the Kashmir question afterwards.13

This was followed by a number of

attempts at Tashkent and Simla in the form of agreements with a purpose

to resolve the Kashmir problem, however, without any practical effect on

it.

In the post 1990, a number of factors both local and at the

international impacted the relations between the two countries and the

regional context within which these relations operated. It began with the

end of cold war and emergence of the unipolar global order. In 1998 the

two countries tested their nuclear arsenal and emerged as de facto

nuclear powers. Subsequently, the developments of 9/11 have had

tremendous impact on how violent political movements were to be

judged and dealt with at global level. This created a context in which

continued tension and cross-border violence considerably undermined

the relations between the two states. However, it was within this context

that many people within the two nations and from outside started

highlighting the value of resolving conflicts and building peace for the

greater good of the region in general and for the people in two countries

in particular.

A number of positive initiatives were taken at different levels. These

included the initiatives at “Track Two” level encouraging the resumption

of official level talks. Also, within the same context different attempts

were made in finding an acceptable solution to Kashmir issue. In this

context one of the important and latest proposals came from the former

Pakistani president, General Pervez Musharraf.

Pakistan’s Departure from the United Nations Resolutions

There have been many ups and downs in the efforts of India and

Pakistan to resolve Kashmir problem over the last sixty years. Initiatives

to settle the Kashmir issue ranged from a direct military war to bilateral

dialogues and discussions at various levels through different peaceful

channels. However, most of these attempts have been foiled due to the

conventional position held by both the countries vis-à-vis the Kashmir

issue that became a major hurdle in changing mind sets between the two

contending states. However, from the mid 90’s a number of

developments as earlier hinted, made the two countries to become

flexible which resulted in the initiations of a number of dialogues and

discussions between them. Lahore declaration, signed between the Prime

Minister of India Atal Behari Vajpayee and Prime Minister of Pakistan


Nawaz Sharif in February 1999 was in recognition of this fact and the

nuclear capabilities acquired by both India and Pakistan had added to

their responsibility for avoiding a conflict between the two countries.

In this direction a major development took place when President

Pervez Musharraf said that Pakistan is ready to set aside its sixty year

stand that the Kashmir dispute should be resolved through Plebiscite

under United Nations resolutions. In an interview on India’s private

channel NDTV in December 2006, then President of Pakistan General

Pervez Musharraf spoke of a four-point formula for the permanent

settlement of the Kashmir problem lingering between the two countries

since the partition of the sub-continent in 1947.

Pakistan’s departure from the resolutions adopted on Kashmir by the

United Nations Security Council took place long time back, when Simla

Agreement was signed between Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and

Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on 3rd

July 1972, in Simla.

According to the Agreement, all the disputes including the dispute of

Kashmir were to be settled bilaterally, without any third party

intervention such as UNO. In a way Simla Agreement was the first

sidelining of the UNSC resolutions vis-à-vis the Kashmir problem. The

war was the result of Pakistan’s effort to retain its control on its eastern

part, now Bangladesh, but now it had to pay a price in Kashmir.14

However, one should not overlook the changes in geopolitics that the

world has witnessed since the last decade of the twentieth century. Few

of these major changes needs to be briefly analyze here vis-à-vis their

impact on world and South Asia particularly. First, after the end of the

cold war and the bipolar world, a new world order has evolved and new

geopolitical equations have developed. In the post-cold war global

scenario the earlier policy of supporting allies, whether they are right or

wrong, could no longer work as it could considerably erode the US’s

legitimacy to intervene in world affairs to promote its interests and ideas.

Further, now that world is not sharply divided into two camps, the US

could not afford to alienate countries that were likely to become

important powers and its allies in future. In this context, India’s potential

both in terms of geopolitics and in terms of its market could not be

underplayed.15

Similarly, among other major powers including China,

the perception on Kashmir has been shifting. This was witnessed during

the Kargila war, when China, Pakistan’s close ally, preferred to remain

neutral instead of extending its support as she did in the past on several

occasions.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zulfikar_Ali_Bhutto


The factors that are to be ken into consideration on this account are;

the impact of globalization with easy and rapid worldwide trans-border

movements, the information technology revolution and the rapid flow of

ideas as well as goods16

. It started creating imperatives for greater

cooperation and strategic partnership at global and regional levels to

maximize political, economic, and military gains. The concept of soft

border, free flow of trade and information, economic interdependence

are the terms being used in international relations. This prompted both

the countries to engage in an intense process of negotiations and

dialogue to promote a stable environment of peace and security rather

than continuation of acrimony and antagonism against each other.

In May 1998, both India as well as Pakistan conducted a series of

nuclear tests. The nuclear weapons revived international interest in South

Asia. The hostile atmosphere between the two newly nuclearized powers

was witnessed by the international community with serious concern.

Kashmir was seen as a nuclear flashpoint between the two countries. The

effect was most noticeable in the reaction of the international community

to the Kargil war in 1999. Pronouncements were made that the

international community now viewed military conflict between nuclear

armed India and Pakistan as unacceptable and would move against the

initiator of the irresponsible military action.17

Also a realization dawned

among the saner elements and other government functionaries within the

two countries, that the continuation of the problem could be disastrous

for the region. Lahore declaration, signed between the Prime Minister of

India Atal Behari Vajpayee and Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif

in February 1999 was in recognition of this fact, that the nuclear

capabilities acquired by both India and Pakistan had added to their

responsibility for avoiding a conflict between the two countries.18

In early 1999, there was a joint incursion by Pakistani troops and the

Kashmiri militants, who crossed the Line of Control (LoC) and occupied

the strategic mountain peaks in Mushkoh Valley, Dras, Kargil, and

Batalik sectors of Ladakh.19

The main intension of the military operation

in the sector was to “block the Dras-Kargil highway, cut off Leh from

Srinagar, trap the Indian forces on the Siachin glacier, raise the militant’s

banner of revolt in the Kashmir Valley and take the issue of Kashmir

back to the forefront of the international agenda.”20

However, Pakistan

failed to comprehend that the international environment would not

support its action and consequently did not anticipate or plan for the

unanimous international opprobrium and isolation. The G-8 countries


held Pakistan responsible for the military confrontation in Kashmir and

described the Pakistani military action to change the status quo as

“irresponsible.”21

They called upon Islamabad to withdraw its forces

north of the Line of Control. The European Union (EU) publicly called

for “immediate withdrawal of the infiltrators.22

The United States also

depicted Pakistan as the “instigator”23

and insisted that the status quo be

unconditionally and unambiguously restored. Under mounting

international pressure for withdrawal, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz

Sharif made a dash to Washington on July 4, 1999 and signed a joint

statement with President Clinton, which called for the restoration of the

“sanctity” of the Line of Control in accordance with the Simla

Agreement.

The Kargil War uncovered the inherent limitations of Pakistan’s

strategy to engage in a sub-conventional war against India in the nuclear

environment. This also constrained Pakistan to initiate the process of

dialogue and reconciliation with India, to resolve the Kashmir problem.

This was associated with great degree of recognition from Pakistan that

war scares were neither good for its image as a nuclear power state nor

for its economic development and progress in the current international

environment. One of the principal lessons of the Kargil crises for the

state of Pakistan was that it understood it paid heavily for its adventurism

in Kargil and that the international community will not support the use of

overt force in future to alter the status quo.

Following the devastating attack on the world trade center on 11th

September 2001, there was a change in America’s attitude towards

Pakistan. Washington added to its list of designated terrorist

organizations two Pakistan based terrorist groups—Lashkar-i-Tayyiba

and Jaish-e-Mohammed, both operating in the state of Jammu and

Kashmir, thus sending a strong message to Islamabad about its growing

dissatisfaction with Pakistan's Kashmir policy. During this period, a

number of events occurred that favoured New Delhi; for instance, the

UN Resolution 1373 (2001) adopted by the Security Council at its

meeting on September 28, 2001, clearly ignored the distinction between

the freedom movement and terrorism, whereas the US dubbed all

resistance movements for the right to self-determination as terrorist

campaigns. The change in the international environment followed by the

attack on the Indian parliament on 13th

December 2001, India took the

advantage of the US’s strategic shift by saying that the attack was part of

the same global militancy to which America and the West were opposed,


and even linked the attackers to those of 9/11. The Incident invited

worldwide condemnation and sympathy. This encouraged New Delhi to

put intense military pressure on Pakistan. There was a very strong

diplomatic pressure on Islamabad to stop providing shelter to such armed

groups who are active in violent activities in the Indian part of Kashmir.

Following his June 2002 visit to Islamabad, the Deputy Secretary of

State, USA, Richard Armitage, managed to extract a pledge from

President Musharraf of a “permanent end” to Islamabad’s support to

terrorist activities in Kashmir.24

In response to this Pervez Musharraf

banned several militant organizations operating in Kashmir and banned

several militant groups. He also tried to curb cross-border infiltration

following a military stand-off with India by restructuring the ISI which had

been responsible for the court war in Kashmir.25

Pakistan ranks 144 out of 170 nations in the physical quality of life

index. Below, even the nations like Bangladesh. The huge defense

budget of the nation has been very high economic toll on the nation as it

has been described by ‘The Human Development centre Islamabad in

their report (Human Development Report) released in 1997, that Pakistan

spent seven percent (7%) of its Gross Domestic product (GDP) on

defence or nearly twenty seven percent (27%) of the total central

government expenditure. This is higher than in any other South Asian

country. The per capita defence expenditure of Pakistan amounted to

$26, and it’s the nation with the eighth largest army in the world. The

total defence expenditure of Pakistan is four times more than its

expenditure on health and education.26

Between 1997 and 2001,

Pakistan’s GDP dropped from US$ 75.3 to US$ 71.5 billion and by 2001

government debt was 82 percent of its GDP. In the meantime the law and

order situation in many parts of the country, especially in the North-

western Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan, has become the

major stumbling block in the path of the many development works in the

country. Therefore, the stake holders in the country thought that instead

of remaining fixed in the hostile attitudes towards the neighboring

countries especially India, economic reconstruction and human

development should be given preference. Further, there is a need to trim

down the country’s over-commitment to military expenditure on its

borders and to devote more resources to its economic growth and

internal security. Thus, for Pakistan's own internal stability based on

these internal reasons, a stable and peaceful relationship with its

neighbouring countries especially with India is essential.


Since its inception in United Nations, a number of resolutions were

adopted under Chapter VI of the United Nations charter with regard to

and in quest of the permanent solution of the issue of Jammu and

Kashmir. However, because of the non-binding nature of these

resolutions both the countries refused to abide by them and after more

than sixty years the idea of plebiscite has become obsolete. Even United

Nations former Secretary General Mr. Kofi Anan, during his visit to

India in March 2001, remarked that Kashmir should be resolved

bilaterally by India and Pakistan as it is a bilateral issue in which the UN

resolutions had become redundant. In this regard some of the Pakistani

analysts observed that General Pervez Musharraf's suggestion of setting

aside the UN Security Council resolutions on Kashmir is a pragmatic and

realistic approach. Some of the analysts in Pakistan are of the view that

there is no reason Pakistan stick to UN resolutions when UN itself has

abdicated the same. The resolutions of the UN Security Council on

Kashmir could remain valid until they are either implemented or the

Security Council at the joint request of India and Pakistan repeals or

replaces them.27

The Islamabad government has realized now the futility

of these resolutions passed on the issue and therefore, more focus is on

other alternatives.

Lastly, there is a feeling in Islamabad that it can benefit a lot from

India by entering into a cooperative relationship in economic sphere.

Prof. Indra Nath Mukherji, an expert on the South Asia politics at

Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) Delhi, observes that due to existence

of the ‘information gap’ and lower priority attached by the businessmen

of the both countries, even pragmatic business organizations find it hard

to expand their bilateral trade and investment relations. Both the

countries have intra-industry trade in several products at the bilateral

level.28

Firms involved in industries may benefit from joint ventures

among them by identifying profitable avenues from intra-industry trade

in several products such as Information Technology, Engineering and

Agriculture and from several other similar areas.

In the context of these developments a bold shift was seen in Pervez

Musharraf’s policy towards Kashmir. However, despite, the strong

opposition from the various political parties including the heads of the

main opposition parties who categorically rejected the formula on the

grounds that it amounts to the abandoning of Pakistan’s principled

position on Kashmir, former President of Pakistan, General Pervez

Musharraf reiterated and stressed upon the his four-point formula he put


forward. On a number of occasions in the past as well, he had signalled a

shift in his approach towards the resolution of the Kashmir issue vis-à-

vis India. During the Agra summit in July 14-16, 2001 he suggested a

four–step resolution process whose first and most important step was

rejection of any solution that either country found unacceptable, the

other three being the initiation of dialogue, acceptance of Kashmir as the

core issue and exploring the remaining options.29

On 25 October 2004

President Pervez Musharraf talked about the five regions of the state of

Jammu and Kashmir—two in Pakistan administered Kashmir and three

in Indian administered Kashmir and suggested the identification of the

regions and changing the status quo in these regions without redrawing

the border. During his speech in November 2004, Pervez Musharraf

pursued a non-traditional approach on Kashmir problem by sidelining

the United Nations resolutions which called for a plebiscite in the state to

reach a final solution of the dispute. While in a meeting with the Prime

Minister of India Dr. Manmohan Singh in New Delhi on April 2005,

both the leaders described the peace process between India and Pakistan

as “irreversible” and both agreed to an important point that since Line of

Control (LoC) as an international border is not acceptable to Pakistan

and any redrawing of the current Line of Control (LoC) is not acceptable

to India, therefore the only solution left is to make the Line of Control

irrelevant. 30

Besides, some additional Cross-LoC/border routes, such as

Poonch-Rawlakot, Amritsar-Lahore, and Khokrapur-Munnabao links

will also be opened within a year.31

This had happened immediately after

the crucial breakthrough after sixty years of India-Pakistan relations in

the form of opening of Srinagar-Muzafarabad bus service, connecting the

divided parts of Kashmir in April 2005.

While speaking at a conference organized by the Washington based

think-tank, Pugwash, in March, 2006, President Pervez Musharraf

reiterated his call for the demilitarization and said that “his country’s

proposal for demilitarization and self-governance offered a practical

solution to the Kashmir dispute. An ultimate solution to the problem on

these lines would make Line of Control (LoC) irrelevant. And such a

solution would not require redrawing of borders. The demilitarization

would be a great confidence-building measure and provide relief to

Kashmir. This will also help to discourage militancy.”32

On March 24, 2006, the Indian Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan

Singh, responded positively to the move by President of Pakistan

General Pervez Musharraf, and said that while "borders cannot be


redrawn" both countries "can work toward making them irrelevant" -

towards making them "just lines on a map."33

He went on to suggest that

a "joint mechanism" be set up to advance cooperation and development

between the two parts of Jammu and Kashmir. 34

President Pervez Musharraf in his memoir In the Line of Fire

described his four-point proposal over the issue of Kashmir as ‘purely

personal’ which needed to be sold to the public by all involved parties

for acceptance’. He summarized his four-point proposal as follows:35

1. First, the identification of the geographical regions of Jammu and

Kashmir territory, including Pakistan administered Kashmir. At

present Indian part of Kashmir is divided into three division;

Jammu, Kashmir valley, and Ladakh. While the Pakistan

administered Kashmir consists of two regions: Northern Areas

(Gilgit and Baltistan) and Azad Kashmir.

2. Second, demilitarization of the identified region or regions and

restraining all the militant activities to bring down the level of

violence which has been there for years and has relentlessly affected

the lives of the people in the region. This can be done in an

incremental approach. Military could be garrisoned in at least the

residential areas. This element, Presidents Pervez Musharraf said,

will serve as a great confidence building measure and provide relief

to the Kashmiris and will discourage militancy in the region.

3. Third, introducing self-governance or self-rule in the identified

region or regions. Letting the people of Kashmir govern themselves

and having the satisfaction of running their own affairs without

having any international interference. However, he ruled out

complete independence.

4. Fourth, and most important one, is to have a joint management

mechanism with a membership of India, Pakistan and Jammu and

Kashmir State overseeing self-governance and dealing with residual

subjects common to all identified region or regions and those

subjects which are beyond the scope of self-governance. Under this

joint management mechanism, both India as well as Pakistan will

retain sovereignty over their respective parts of Kashmir, and will

look at the residual elements of foreign affairs, currency,

communication and defence.

The four-point formula based on the four core components;


identification of the regions, demilitarization, self-governance, and joint

management mechanism has been described as a unilateral concession to

India by Pakistan vis-à-vis the Kashmir problem. General Pervez

Musharraf is the first leader in the history of Pakistan who was ready to

move away from the demand for the implementation of the United

Nations Security Council resolutions as a means to resolve the Kashmir

problem between the two nations. It demonstrates that the President

Pervez Musharraf was ready to be flexible and was open to compromises

regarding the Kashmir issue. As he himself admits, he believes that there

are different options to solve the dispute and that a solution is possible

but only if there is a movement beyond the current status quo.36

The formula will allow India to keep its hold on what is already

within its jurisdiction. On the other hand, Pakistan will also be able to

legitimize its control over the Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas of

Gilgit and Baltistan. The Line of Control (LoC) will be converted into an

international border with transit points for the people-to-people

exchanges, free trade and other developmental opportunities. Kashmiris

would be given special rights to move and trade freely on both sides of

the Line of Control. Each of the former princely state’s distinct regions

would receive a greater amount of autonomy. The functions reserved

under this provision will not be subject to any limitation by any other

government. People of the state will determine the basic institutional

structure of their governing body and will have the right to govern their

internal affairs without any third party intervention. The fourth and final

component is the joint management mechanism. It is a new idea and

requires a high degree of cooperation and confidence between the two

countries. Under this, he suggested that foreign affairs, currency,

communication and defence will be the joint responsibility of India,

Pakistan with some kind of representation of Kashmiris. Under this

“Joint Control Mechanism” there will not be no serious need of any

serious readjustment in the territorial status quo in the region. Both the

countries will retain sovereignty over their respective parts of the

Kashmir territory.

The proposal raises a number of queries and questions and may also

not meet the demands of a certain sections of the people desiring

independence or the pre-1947 status. Yet, the idea has been a bold

initiative based on an unconventional and creative approach to address

the sufferings of the region and the people of the sub-continent due to the

longest running territorial disputes between two nuclear-armed


neighbouring countries in South Asia.

The four-point formula exhibits considerable degree of flexibility

and openness to dialogue by Pakistan in order to reach a greater level of

understanding between the two governments. He himself admits that,

there are different options to solve the dispute and that a solution is

possible but if there is a movement beyond the current status quo. Most

importantly, both sides have to recognize that there is a new situation

and look for new solutions rather than regard present development as a

continuation of the events going back to1947. There is new reality in the

sub-continent, a new reality in Jammu and Kashmir and new

international environment. All these demand for fresh thinking and new

approach to address the Kashmir problem. Pervez Musharraf’s Four-

Point Formula is the indication of Pakistan’s radical departure from its

long-established position on Kashmir.

References and Notes:

1 Alastair lamb, Birth of a Tragedy Kashmir 1947, Hertingfordbury: Roxford Books, 1994, pp. 78-79.

2 Tarakh Nath Das, “The Kashmir Issue and the United Nations”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol 65, no. 2 June, 1950, pp 264-282.

3 See, Josef Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, Princeton: Princeton University, 1954. pp.

118-121.

4 Ibid. pp. 121-27.

5 Ibid. p. 132.

6 Lamb, n.1, p. 167.

7 Sten Widmalm, Democracy and Violent Separatism in India: Kashmir in a Comparative Perspective, Sweden: Upsala University, 1997, p. 167.

8 Rober Worsing, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict

and its Resolution, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994, p. 171.

9 Ibid., p. 173.

10 On the following dates, 15 October, 18 December 1951; 22 April and 19 September 1952; and March 27 1953.

11 Lamb, n. 1, p. 173.

12 Ibid., p. 181.

13 Hemen Ray, How Moscow Sees Kashmir, Bombay: Jacob Publishing House, 1958,

p. 53.

14 Verghese Koithra, Crafting Peace in Kashmir: Through a Realist Lens, New Delhi:

Sage, 2004, p. 40.

15 Veena Ravi Kumar, “Mediation on Kashmir” in Kanti Bajpai, Afsir Karim and


Amitabh Mattoo (eds.) Kargil and After: Challenges For Indian Policy, New

Delhi: Har-Anand Publication, 2001, p. 398.

16 Dipankar Banerjee (ed.), South Asian Security, Sri Lanka: Regional Center for Strategic Studies, 2002, p. xi.

17 Alex Ninian, “Contemporary Review Kashmir”, http/www.usip.org/library/pa.html

18 Noor Ahmad Baba, “Peace Process and Imperatives of Resolving the Kashmir

Problem, in Amitabh Matto, Kapil Kak and Happymon Jacob (eds.) India and

Pakistan: Pathways Ahead, New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2007, p. 211.

19 General V.P. Malik, Kargil from Surprise to Victory, New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2006, p. 64.

20 Ibid., p. 339.

21 Amit Gupta, “A Post-Kargil Foreign Policy” in Kanti Bajpai, Afsir Karim and

Amitabh Matto (eds.) Kargil and After: Challenges for Indian Policy, New Delhi:

Har-Anand Publications, 2001, p. 289.

22 Ibid.

23 Pramit Pal Chaudhury, “A Post-Kargil Foreign Policy” in Kanti Bajpai, Afsir

Karim and Amitabh Matto (eds.) Kargil and After: Challenges for Indian Policy, New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2001, p. 327.

24 Robert Wirsing, "Great-Power Foreign Policies in South Asia," in Devin T.

Hagerty (ed.) South Asia in World Politics, Boulder, Co: Rowman and Littlefield,

2005, p. 144.

25 Zahid Hussain, Kashmir: The Long Road to Peace,” November 2004. www.newslince.com.pk.

26 Amitabh Mattoo, “Introduction”, in Amitabh Mattoo, Kapil Kak, Happymon Jacob (eds.) India and Pakistan.

Pathways Ahead, New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2007, p. 11.

27 Dawn, Lahore, 8 January 2004.

28 Inder Mukherji, , “India-Pakistan Trade And Investment Relations: Status And Potential”, Paper presented at the Seminar on “Contemporary Pakistan In The

Changing Global Paradigm” Held under the auspices of The Special Area Studies

Programme of Pakistani Studies, South Asia Studies Division, School of

International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi from 24th-25th

November, 2008.

29 Syed Rifaat Hussain, “Pakistan's Changing Outlook on Kashmir”, South Asian Survey, 14th February 2007.

30 Amit Baruah, "India-Pakistan Peace Process 'Irreversible,' The Hindu, April 19,

2005.

31 Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, www.mea.gov.in.

32 Moonis Ahmar, “Kashmir and the Process of Conflict Resolution”,

http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/download/attachments/748/Brief16finalised.

33 G. Parthasarathy and Radha Kumar (eds.) Frameworks for a Kashmir Settlement, New Delhi: Delhi Policy Group, 2006, p. 2.

http://www.mea.gov.in/

http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/download/attachments/748/Brief16finalised


34 Ibid., p.2.

35 Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, New York: Simon Schuster, 2006, p. 303.

36 Ibid., p. 307.

106

THE FOURTH BUDDHIST COUNCIL

The World’s Best Kept Secret

Mohammad Ajmal Shah

INTRODUCTION

There is a lot of controversy about the date of the introduction of

Buddhism in Kashmir.

One theory is that it was introduced fifty years after the death of

Buddha, while according to the others it was introduced by Ashoka after

his Buddhist council (Khosla 1972: 13).

It is commonly believed that Buddhism came to Kashmir during the

reign of Ashoka. But Kalhana’s Rajtarangani has mentioned Surrendra as

propagator of Buddhism before Ashoka who built two Viharas in

Kashmir (Stein 1961, I: 93-94). After Surrendra, Ashoka brought 5,000

Buddhist monks and settled them in Kashmir and adjacent territories. He

built several mathas and viharas and gifted the valley to the Sangha.

Ashoka’s introduction of Buddhism naturally changed the entire

social fabric in Kashmir. The scholars and pandits pursued the Buddhist

studies and took an active part in propagation of Buddhism. It is said

Ashoka built a number of Viharas, Chaitiyas and Stupas besides he is

credited of building a new capital city in Kashmir called “Shrinagri”.

“The conclusion of the deliberations of the Buddhist council held at

Patliputra under the Presidentship of Muggaliputta Tissa, Majjhantika

was sent to Kashmir and Gandhara at the head of an evangelical mission.

Hieun Tsang and Ou-Kong has mentioned, that an arrival of 5,000

monks who were settled in Kashmir by Ashoka and his gift of the valley

Research Scholar, Department of Archaeology, Deccan College, Pune

107 The Fourth Buddhist Council

to the Sangha for turning it into a centre of study and propagation of

Buddhist religious texts” (Bamzai 1994:82-83).

After the fall of the Mauryan Empire, north-western India came

under the subjugation of Indo-Greeks, was followed by the Kushanas, a

sub-division of the Yueh-chi nomads, who hailed from Central Asia.

Kashmir, which was included in their domain, witnessed a great

resurgence of Buddhism during this time. The revival of Buddhism

began in the reign of Kanishka, the greatest of the Kushan rulers. It was

in his time The Fourth Buddhist Council was held in Kashmir.

This paper will mainly deal with the venue of The Fourth Buddhist

Council selected by Kanishka and the historical background behind it.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The existence of conflicting and contradictory schools of thought

among the followers of Buddhism confused the great Kushan king

Kanishka. He explained his difficulty to Parasva, his religious preceptor.

The venerable teacher explained to him how the different interpretations

have arisen on account of a growth of number of sects after the death of

the Buddha. The King therefore decided to call an assembly of the

leading monks, with a view to reconciling their views and restoring

Buddhism to its former glory. The primary objective of the conference

was to settle various controversies and disputes that had arisen in the

principles and practices of Buddhism. The entire Buddhist literature was

reviewed. The council which sat for six months made strenuous efforts to

bring into order the scattered sayings, theories and dictums of various

doctors of the law. The texts of the Tripitika were collected and the

council, “composed 100,000 stanzas of Upadesh-Sastras explanatory of

the story of the Vinaya; and 100,000 stanzas of Abhidharma Vibhasa

Sastra, explanatory of the Abhidharma. For this exposition of Tripitika

all the learning from remote antiquity was thoroughly examined; the

general sense and the terse language was again and again made clear and

distinct and learning was widely diffused for the safe guiding of the

disciples”(Bamzai 1994: 95).

Kanishka, thereupon, got the text of the treatises engraved on sheets

made of red copper, which after having been sealed in stone boxes were

stored in a Stupa to be guarded by the Yakshas (Beal 1906, I: 156).

Various scholars have advanced contradictory views about the exact

site of the Stupa housing the stone boxes. Some have identified it with


kanzalwan or Kuentilun, the hilly slopes from Harwan to Gupkar in

Srinagar and some are of the opinion that the village Kond in Kulgam is

the actual site. It has also been claimed that kanelwan near Bijbihara is

the possible site. Some are of the opinion that the site may be at Ushkar.

The area around Yechegam, Yechhkot and Raithan has also been

claimed to be the exact site. Parihaspura and Buddhabal has also been

mentioned in this connection as the possible site. Excavations done at

Harwan, Ushkar and Ahan have revealed existence of Buddhist relics but

no traces of these copper plates have been found and this problem still

engages attention of scholars throughout the world (Hassnain 1973: 22).

There are contradictory opinions about the Fourth Buddhist Council.

Some scholars believe that it was held in Kashmir and others believe that

it was held in Jallandhar in Punjab (Taranath 1970: 93). There is also

dispute on the number of people (monks) who attended the council.

Some scholars believe that there were only 500 monks who were

selected on the basis of merit and their understanding of the doctrines of

Buddhism. Some are of the opinion that Council consisted of 500 Arhats,

500 Bodhisattvas and 500 panditas. Whatever be the case and number,

there is a general consensus among most of the scholars that the Council

was held in Kashmir. The location of the site is still a debatable issue.

While Hiuen Tsang has stated that the Council was held in Kashmir, he

has not given the exact location, but on the other hand Taranath has

mentioned ‘Kundalavana-Vihara’ as the place were this great Council

was held (Taranath 1970: 92). Many archaeologists of the world have

been searching the place but of no avail.

SELECTION OF THE SITE

Many scholars agree with the view that the council met at the

Kundalvan Monastery near the capital of Kashmir (Khosla 1972, fn. 26:

44). Kanishka wanted to conduct the council somewhere in Gandhara but

the place was objected on account of its ‘heat and dampness’. Then he

suggested Rajgriha where a similar council has been held previously. But

this was also rejected. Finally it was decided to hold the Council in

Kashmir where it was pointed out, “the land is guarded on every side by

mountains, the yakshas defend its frontiers, the soil is rich and

productive, and it is well provided with food” (Beal 1906, I: 153).

Paramarth says, Kashmir had mountains on all sides and was like a

fortified town. It had one well guarded gate and was an ideal site for a

religious assembly.


The pleasant climate and beautiful scenery of Kashmir are said to

have been praised by Gautam Buddha himself. In the Samy-uktavastu,

the Buddha is represented as saying that Kashmir is the best land for

meditation and leading a religious life.

In his introduction to the Rajtarangani, Kalhana says of the valley

that, the things which are rare in heaven are common here; Kailasa is the

best place in the Three Worlds, Himalaya the best part of Kailasa and

Kashmir the best place in Himalaya (Stein 1961, I: 42-43). About the

scholars of Kashmir, who took part in the council, Hieun Tsang remarks;

“this country from remote times was distinguished for learning, and

these priests were all of high religious merit and conspicuous virtue, as

well as of marked talent and power of clear exposition of doctrine; and

though the other priests (i.e. of other nations) were in their own was

distinguished, yet they could not be compared with these-so different

were they from the ordinary class” (Beal 1973: 71).

These statements are much valuable and testify the fact, that

Kashmir and its people were held in reverence from ancient times.

It has been accepted by almost all scholars that the Council was held

in Kundalvan or Kanzalwan in Kashmir. The view held among others by

Dr. Radhakrishnan- that the council was held at Jalandhara or Jullundur

is disproved by Hieun Tsang’s description. It is obvious that Julandhar in

Punjab would not have been selected when Gandhara was rejected on

account of its “heat and dampness”. The Chinese pilgrim has left little

scope for doubt in the matter. According to Paramarth, it was held under

the presidency of Katyayaniputra, who with the help of five hundred

Arhats and five hundred Bodhisattvas arranged the Sarvastivadin

Abhidharma texts into eight sections and drew up a commentary on the

same (Ganhar and Ganhar 1956: 34). But HieunTsang remarks,

Katyayana composed the Fo-chi-lun (Abhidharmajnana-prasantha-

shastra) in Tamasavanavihara near Jullundur three hundred years after

the Buddha’s nirvana (Beal 1906, I: 174-175).

This statement of Hieun Tsang creates confusion regarding the

venue of the Fourth Buddhist council. In this case we have to search for

either the site namely Jullundar or Tamasavanavihara in Kashmir which

may settle the controversy among the scholars.

In this connection an attempt has been made to identify two sites,

one adjacent to another, which can furnish a mine of information, if

explored and excavated systematically. One is Kanzalwan and another is


Jallindora both in the Gurez valley in Bandipora district. It would be

appropriate to draw an outline of the Gurez valley in historical

perspective, which makes it possible site for the Fourth Buddhist

Council.

Gurez is historically important as it falls along a section of the

ancient Silk Route that connected the Kashmir valley with China and

Central Asia. The ruins of the ancient shardi or Sharda University are

preserved along the Kishanganga River that flows through Gurez (now in

Pakistan Occupied Kashmir). Inhabitants of Gurez are of Dard descent-

an Indo-Aryan race believed to have originally migrated to Ladakh from

Central Asia. They speak Shina, an Indo-Aryan language. The Shina

language has been one of the main languages of a sizeable section of the

people along the old silk route touching Gilgit, Hunza and Nagari across

the line of control and parts of Central Asia Before embracing Islam;

they were the followers of Buddhism and Hinduism.


This is the region called Dardadesa, where Buddhism has reached

before Ashoka, when King Surrendra built a Vihara known as

Narendrabhavana in the town of Soraka, in the Darada country (Stein

1961, I: 93). The early years of Kushana rule has obtained a strong hold

in Darda country. Fa-hien entered India in 399 A.D. from the north-

western routes of Dardadessa. Che-mong, the Chinese pilgrim also came

to Kashmir via Dardistan (Hassnain 1973: 32). Gilgit was the chief

centre of Buddhist learning during the period. Buddhist Manuscripts

were discovered at Gilgit. This was perhaps the first find of original

works on Buddhism in India and some of the works were known only by

their Tibetan or Chinese translations.

According to Taranath, Kanishka went to Kashmir to listen to the

teachings of its former ruler Simha, who had renounced the throne and

become a monk (Taranath 1970: 91). It was after that on the advice of

Parasva he decided to hold the Council. But Kalhana’s Rajtarangani

mentions no ruler of the name of Simha or Sudarshana as he is stated to

have styled himself after ordination. But here Gilgit Buddhist

Manuscripts throws light on a hitherto unknown line of rulers in

Dardistan, some times before the sixth century A.D. The rulers

mentioned are Deva, Lalleya and Bhima of the Sahi dynasty (Hassnain

1973: 31). Bhima could be the version of simha- the possible connotation

of Kashmiri Sarda.

Buddhist Stupas have been located in Gilgit, Yasin and areas around

it. This fact has been ascertained by Sir Aurel Stein also, whose labors in

this field are remarkable and comprehensive.

Another reason for suggesting this region as the venue of the Fourth

Buddhist Council is that of Yakshas as the guardians of the records of

the Fourth Buddhist Council. This tribe has its home in Dardistan, later

on they migrated to other parts of Kashmir. Yakshas are described as the

earliest settlers in Kashmir. There were three tribes the Nagas, the

Pisachas and the Yakshas. They came from Nagar, Hunza and other

areas of Dardistan.

Another reason which may be mentioned is the extension of the

Kanishka’s empire. It extended from Bihar in the east to the borders of

Iran in the West. It also included the provinces of Kashgar, Yarkand and

Khotan. Kanishka’s extensive empire was rich and prosperous, Kashmir

which was at the heart of it naturally shared in the prosperity; more

particularly because the valley was a favorite resort of the Kushan rulers,


who detested the heat of Indian plains. Kanzalwan in Gurez valley

geographically was the best site for the Council, as from there Buddhism

came into contact with other parts of the world like China, Yarkand,

Khasgar and Khotan.

Another thing which should be kept in mind is the beginning of

urbanization in the Gangetic plains- generally assigned to the Buddhist

era in the sixth century B.C, which reached its climax around the

Christian era under the Kushana rule. Kashmir also witnessed the great

developments in building activities under Kushana Kings especially

Hushka, Jushka and Kanishka. The continued existence of the three

places, Kanishkapura, Hushkapura and Jushkapura, which are described

as foundations of these kings and which still survive to the present day,

is likely to have assisted in preserving a recollection of their founders

(Stein 1961, I: 74). No doubt archaeologists have identified many cities

but many have been left unidentified like Jayasvamipura mentioned in

Rajtarangani by Kalhana which Aurel Stein was himself unable to trace.

These gaps if filled will surely lead the archaeologists towards the

right direction. The need is to search for the new archaeological treasures

especially in Dardistan (Gurez valley) along the Kishanganga River.

CONCLUSION

Kashmir archaeological research from last 100 years has lead to the

discovery of many sites of great importance. No doubt archaeologists

have been able to excavate number of Buddhist sites also but engraved

copper plates of the Fourth Buddhist Council remains still a mystery.

Hardly any attention has been paid towards Gurez valley which is the

extreme northern part of Kashmir valley and is having great

archaeological potential.

The recent archaeological survey in the neighboring valleys of

Gurez, across the LoC, have uncovered hundreds of inscriptions in

Kharoshti, Brahmi, and Tibetan that provides insights into the origins of

Kashmiri people and the early history of Buddhism which took a definite

shape in Kashmir and gave the world the whole new interpretation of the

religion called Buddhism. Dardistan has contributed a lot in spreading

the religion outside India. There are many important archaeological sites

in Gurez valley. The ancient capital of Dards, Dawar is located in the

Gurez valley and was functioning as a watch tower of which mention has

been made by Sir Aurel Stein himself. Other archaeological sites of

importance in the Gurez valley include Kanzalwan, where the last


council of Buddhism is believed to have been held and further down

stream the ruins of ancient Shardi or Sharda University (Pakistan

Occupied Kashmir), which has been a great pilgrimage centre of the

Hindus in ancient times.

Sir Walter Lawrence in his book, points out that, “Hardly a year

passes without rumors of fabulous treasure being discovered in Kashmir”

(Lawrence 1895: 162). But there is no debate over the vast

archaeological treasure hidden in the valley. The need is to take

extensive systematic explorations and excavations which will definitely

reveal the hidden treasures of the Fourth Buddhist Council. Whenever

these treasures will be unearthed, Kashmir will be recognized once again

as the great seat of learning and will become a great pilgrimage centre

for Buddhists throughout the World.


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Publications.

Bamzi, P. N. K. 1994. Culture and Political History of Kashmir. (Reprint) V-1, Srinagar: Gulshan Books.

Beal, S. 1906. Buddhist Records of the Western World, Translations from the Chinese of Hieun Tsiang (A.D.629) V- I & II, London: Trubner and Co. Ltd.

Beal, S. 1973. The Life of Hieun-Tsiang, (Reprint), Delhi: Academica Asiatica.

Chattopadhyay, B. 1967. Age of Kushanas- A Numismatic Study, Calcutta: Punthi Pushtak.

Dutt, Nalinaksha 1985. Buddhism in Kashmir, Delhi: Eastern Book Linkers.

Ganhar, J. N and P. N. Ganhar 1956. Buddhism in Kashmir and Ladakh, New Delhi:

Tribune press.

Hassnain, F.M. 1973. Buddhist Kashmir, New Delhi: Light & Life Publishers.

Hassnain, F.M. 1998. History of Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh and Kishtawar, V-1, New Delhi: Rima Publishing House.

Hassnain, F.M. 2007. Heritage of Kashmir (Reprint) Srinagar: Gulshan Books.

Khosla, S. 1972. History of Buddhism in Kashmir, New Delhi: Sagar publications.

Kumar, Baldev 1973. The Early Kushanas, New Delhi: Sterling publishers (P) Ltd.

Lawrence, W.R. 1895. The Valley of Kashmir, London: Oxford University Press.

Mani, B.R. 1987. The Kushan Civilization, (Studies in Urban Development and Material Culture), Delhi: B. R. Publishing Corporation.

Pandita, S. N. 2004. Aurel Stein in Kashmir, New Delhi: Om Publications, Paharganj.

Prasad, Kameshwar 1984. Cities, Crafts and Commerce under the Kushanas, Delhi:


Agam Kala Parakshan.

Puri, B.N. 1965. India under the Kushanas, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan.

Puri, B.N. 1987. Buddhism in Central Asia, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Shali, S. L. 1993. Kashmir: History and Archaeology through the Ages, New Delhi: Indus Publishing Company.

Stein, M.A. 2005. Memoir- the Ancient Geography of Kashmir (Reprint) Srinagar: Ali Mohammad &Sons.

Stein, M.A. 1961. Kalhanas Rajtarangani, Translation (Reprint) V-1 & 2, Delhi:

Motilal Banarsidass.

Taranath 1970. History of Buddhism in India (Ed. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya) Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study.

115

THE 2010 ASSERTION IN KASHMIR AND THE

INDIAN DEMOCRACY

Bilal Ahmad Ganai

Introduction

The death toll in the 2010 unrest in Jammu and Kashmir crossed the

figure of 100. The killings of the more than 100 people, a large number

of whom were in their teens, talks very badly about the seriousness of the

Jammu and Kashmir problem. Furthermore, the way the Indian armed

forces and the state police handled it further aggravated the Jammu and

Kashmir problem. My research paper will analyze the historical aspects

of the problem and will try to contextualize the recent 2010 unrest in the

democratic discourse of conflict resolution in India. It is pertinent to

mention here that Indian political leadership has always maintained that

they are ready to solve the Kashmir problem but they maintain that it has

to be always within the parameters of the democracy and the Indian

constitution. But as we will see even this minimum, on which this whole

paper is based, has not been done not to talk of the other options.

The 2010 Mess

Unfortunately, the unrest which came to engulf the state in 2010 was

still framed as a law and order problem. The genuine aspirations of the

people were relegated to the back ground. The Jammu and Kashmir issue

has a multifaceted character. There can be no enduring resolution of the

Kashmir conflict without addressing the political demands of the

Kashmiri people.

All instruments of violence (ranging from guerrilla warfare to the

threat to use nuclear weapons) have failed to resolve Kashmir

imbroglio.1 The offer of Manmohan Singh which promised anything

Research scholar, Department of Political Science, Kashmir University


within the parameters of the Indian constitution was preceded by

“anything within the Ambit of Humanity” by Atal Bihari Vajpayee and

“Sky is the Limit” for self-rule of Kashmiris by Narasimha Rao. All this

“Parameter”, “Humanity” and “Sky” came to nothing. All these phrases

brought nothing to the people of the valley except the time for the Indian

government to carry on hoodwinking the Indian masses as well as that of

International community on the Jammu and Kashmir issue.

The Indian political leadership has been playing the game of saving

and defending its stand on Jammu and Kashmir in retail at the cost of

killing the civilians of the Jammu and Kashmir state in whole sale.

Kashmiris be they Hindus, Muslims or Sikhs have suffered to the nth

degree. The mess and the massacre of 2010 unrest in Jammu and

Kashmir may best be described, what Thomas Hobbes calls poor, nasty,

and brutish. The situation in the valley became very tense with both the

separatist leaders of the valley and the Central government of India

trapped in a chick and egg puzzle. Both the sides blamed each other for

not taking the initiative to bring an end to the squalor that the common

masses of the unfortunate state went through.

The visits of all – party – delegations both to and from the state of

Jammu and Kashmir bore nothing. In fact, New Delhi has all the feed-

back on Kashmir, even as it wishes to feign ignorance and asks in

bewilderment, what is it that people really want. It will be naïve to jump

to a conclusion that India is unable to understand the intricacies of

Kashmir problem. India government with the help of its institutional

memory and state structures knows Kashmir well, more than the natives

of Kashmir.

With no letup in the situation the killing spree against the common

masses went on, providing fodder to the most hungry and air conditioned

media houses of India. With all sorts of meta-narratives and modern

technologies at their disposal, the anchors of the TV-news channels

failed to keep pace with the race of killings in the state of Jammu and

Kashmir that has been going on since the partition days in general and

during the unfortunate months of 2010 in particular.

Certainly the political myopia of the mainstream political parties, be

they at the Centre or in the State, has cost them dear. Furthermore,

disowning the Kashmiri protestors as miscreants and belittling their

space by the political establishment of India and the Indian media has

done a great disservice to the cause of peace and normalcy in the Jammu

117 The 2010 Assertion In Kashmir And The Indian Democracy

and Kashmir. Grievances are to be redressed not to be allowed to

become catalysts for further infuriation. The way the protestors were

dealt with helped in further infuriating the already infuriated people. It

gave rise to the vicious circle of death and destruction. The whole valley

turned into an island of death and destruction amidst the vast continent of

relative peace and prosperity. The whole valley came to be frozen with

all the indicators of the modern human life taking a crash landing.

The young brigade of the valley took a paradigm shift.2 The bullets

and pellets which penetrated the bosoms of their fellows before their

eyes have given them some solid reasons to come out of the cable culture

of India, which earlier used to run through their veins. They have started

reciprocating and have started disowning the political culture of the

Indian democracy.

The statements of the different political leaders during the unrest,

both at the Union level and at the state level, just poisoned the

environment with so much political distrust that it seems there was no

way out. Mr. P. Chidambaram’s statement, who represents the home

ministry of the so-called great Indian political leadership, sounded

arrogant and short-sighted. He seemed to justify the killings of the

innocent souls by his false accusations of the presence of militants in the

protest. Though he represents the Home Ministry of India, but Kashmiris

never felt at home with the way he spoke about the unrest. There goes

the son of the Shaer-e-Kashmir, Dr. Farooq Abdullah. During the dance

of death in the valley he made it a point to recollect all the provocative

and poisonous words for describing the situation in the valley so as to

add fuel to the fire. A local Congress leader, Mrs. Vakhlou, in an

interview with one of the reputed announcers of the Radio Kashmir

described the stone pelting in Kashmir during those days of bloodshed as

an entertainment for the youth of Kashmir. She even laughed at the

same; citing lack of entertainment-facilities has led the Kashmiri youth

to indulge in stone pelting. She suggested that district wise cricket

tournaments should be organized to rectify the faults.3

The Historical Deficit

During this unrest and (even after that), three options were being

discussed by the people both inside and outside the state with regard to

the solution of the Kashmir imbroglio. These were azadi, revision of

alignment and autonomy.


The Indian establishment believes that Azadi is not a viable option.

They rule it out lock, stock and barrel. Alignment with Pakistan, they

believe, will be most disastrous option for the whole South Asia. The

third option of autonomy that is restoring the pre-1953 status is the only

tenable solution as per their version of the story. Granting autonomy to

J&K has always been a subject of intense debate in India. But history

bears testimony to the fact that Indian leadership has always shied away

to discuss its nitty-gritty with the political leadership of Jammu and

Kashmir. Indian leadership has never been serious about it.

The accession of Jammu and Kashmir to the dominion of India

signed by Maharaja Hari Singh was subject to two main conditions.4

First, Kashmir will be given “the right of self determination” after the

restoration of normalcy. Second, the Government of India will exercise

limited control over the state confined only to defense, communication

and foreign affairs. This limited control over the State was extended by

article 306A of the Indian constitution. The Delhi Agreement of 1952

ratified Kashmir’s autonomy and enshrined Article 306A as 370 of the

Indian constitution. The radical right-wing elements launched a massive

campaign against this ‘Special Status’ under the banner of Praja

Parishad. They demanded that the State of Jammu and Kashmir should

be assimilated (as against accommodated) to the Union of India or

Jammu should be detached from the rest of the State and granted a Union

Territory status. Their politics of communalism gave rise to a vicious

circle of political squalor.5

This agitation provoked Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah to challenge

the validity of the accession. This resulted in his dismissal and arrest.

Sheikh Abdullah’s dismissal is the biggest blot on the democratic

escutcheon of the Indian state. Indian political leadership, who swears in

name of democracy and the tolerant ethos of its culture, displayed its

fascist innards on August 9 in 1953 when Sheikh Abdullah as the duly

elected Prime Minister of the State was deposed through a coup managed

by New Delhi and arrested through a local police officer. By removing

Abdullah from the Premiership, the Indian Government both abused the

terms of the Delhi Agreement and undermined the democratic process in

Jammu and Kashmir. Regardless of the fairness or otherwise of the 1951

election results (which at the time New Delhi had been keen to accept),

Abdullah was the democratically elected Prime Minister of the state. As

such, he could only be removed by popular elections or, failing that, a

vote of no-confidence in the State Assembly. The Indian Government


had no legal authority to plot and execute this removal. New Delhi’s

actions set a precedent for future Indian administrations. The future

Indian administrations, later, felt little hesitation in interfering with the

democratic process in Jammu and Kashmir. That day symbolizes, for the

common people of J&K, New Delhi's perfidy, plain and simple. What

happened after that is well known. New Delhi imposed on the state one

puppet regime after another through rigged elections.

Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad more or less served as a political

stooge to the central leadership of India to forward the latter’s

inexpedient and undemocratic designs on J&K. It was during Bakhshi’s

regime, that the Presidential Order of 1954 empowered the Indian

Government to act on all matters in the Union List and not just defense,

foreign affairs and communication. This was the beginning of the end of

autonomy for the State. After the 1953 episode, the first point Bakshi

Ghulam Mohammad attempted to establish was that Abdullah’s goal of

Independence was to have been achieved with the assistance of a foreign

power. Such conditions, he concocted, might result in Kashmir being

turned into another Korea. It amounted to little more than a confession

that India had delivered the goods and, in the practical interests of

Kashmir, should continue to be allowed to do so. But the 2010 mess and

massacre shows that this has not worked. And that is why we are here to

discuss it and that is why we have organized this lecture and in fact all

the lectures and all the seminars that come to discuss Kashmir from

Bangalore to Boston, from New Delhi to New York.

Similarly, the constitutional amendment of 1958 brought the state

under the control of the Central administration, including extension of

Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution in 1964-65 during

G.M.Sadiq’s tenure. Article 249 was also made applicable to the state.

The designations of Head of the State (Sadr-i-Riyasat) and Prime

Minister were also changed to Governor and Chief Minister like in any

Indian State. Furthermore, the Governor is to be appointed by the Centre

rather than be a nominee of the elected Kashmir legislature. Thus, the

inherent right of autonomy was snatched away from the state in a

systematic but in an undemocratic way, by the mid-1960s and even the

Indira-Abdullah Accord of 1975 could not restore it.

It is pertinent to mention here that the Indira-Abdullah Accord of

1975 had the following as one of its provisions:


With a view to assuring freedom to the State of Jammu and Kashmir

to have its own legislation on matters like welfare measures, cultural

matters, social security, personal law and procedural laws, in a manner

suited to the special conditions in the State, it is agreed that the State

Government can review the laws made by Parliament or extended to the

State after 1953 on any matter relatable to the Concurrent List and may

decide which of them, in its opinion, needs amendment or repeal.

Thereafter, appropriate steps may be taken under Article 254 of the

Constitution of India. The grant of President's assent to such legislation

would be sympathetically considered. The same approach would be

adopted in regard to laws to be made by Parliament in future under the

Proviso to clause 2 of the Article. The State Government shall be

consulted regarding the application of any such law to the State and the

views of the State Government shall receive the fullest consideration.

The above-mentioned provision had encapsulated the recognition of

the fact that political wrongs had been done and the same need to be

rectified in the best possible way. But again showing its inability to come

up to the mark of sincerity, the Delhi government and the remote-

controlled state political leadership fizzled out to implement the same.

Again an opportunity was lost to nip the evil of political uncertainty, of

death and of destruction in the bud. The evil of distrust and of political

uncertainty was nurtured and the same came to overwhelm the valley in

2008 i.e., the Amarnath land row and the same continues up to now in

the form of the indiscriminate killings of the civilians.

Again in 1984, the unwarranted and extra-constitutional dismissal of

Farooq Abdullah became another nail in the coffin of the Indian

democratic claims in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Indira Ghandhi,

the then PM of India faced an important impediment in her efforts to

remove Farooq Abdullah from office through dubious means. The then

governor who also happened to be her cousin Mr. Braj Kumar Nehru

firmly rebuffed the dismissing of the CM Farooq Abdullah on rather

tenuous grounds. Realizing that the governor Braj Kumar Nehru would

not be any more tractable in the future, Indira Ghandhi removed him

from the governorship of Jammu and Kashmir. In his place, on April 26,

1984, she appointed Jagmohan Malhotra as governor.

With the connivance of G.M.Shah and a faction of National

Conference Members of the Legislative Assembly who were loyal to

him, Jogmohan arranged for the dismissal of Farooq Abdullah’s regime.6

After the legislators loyal to Shah professed that they no longer support


Farooq Abdullah, the National Conference lacked a majority in the state

assembly. Within hours, on july 2, 1984, Jagmohan swore in G.M.Shah

as the new Chief Minister.

The eruption of the militancy in the state of Jammu and Kashmir is

an offshoot of the undemocratic and the inexpedient policies of the

Indian political leadership towards the state. Both the principles of

democracy as well as that of political expediency were relegated to the

background. Groups like the Jamaat-e-Islami even decided (in the early

1970s) to contest elections so that, as elected representatives, they could

forcefully articulate their demands.7 Syed Ali Shah Geelani, the hard-line

separatist leader, himself was elected to the state assembly as a candidate

from the Muttahida Muslim Mahaz (“The Muslim United Front”), most

recently in 1987. That election proved to be a turning point in the history

of the Kashmiri struggle for self-determination. The Muslim United

Front (MUF) was poised to win the elections by a considerable majority

but this election was sabotaged by the Government of India, which

feared that it Muslim United Front would refuse to toe its line if it came

to power. A point made by numerous observers – that the widespread

rigging of this election in Jammu and Kashmir (as well as all previous

ones) and the indiscriminate arrests and brutal treatment of Muslim

United Front workers and candidates clearly suggested to the Kashmiris

that peaceful methods of democracy to articulate their grievances would

never work due to Indian intransigence.8 Once again India’s slogans of

democracy were exposed as a complete farce. It was now clear to the

people of Kashmir that India would never allow a truly democratically-

elected government to come to power in the state, for, such a

government, reflecting the genuine aspirations of the majority of the

people of Jammu and Kashmir, would advocate the state’s separate

identity from India. It was then and faced with no other option, that, in

1989, some Kashmiri youth decided that the time had come to take to the

militant path to seek to force India to agree to live up to its promise of

allowing the people of Jammu and Kashmir to determine their own

political future. This resulted in the birth of Fidayeen Squads, who

understood only one language of killing or being killed.

The insurgency in J & K, which has extracted an enormous price

from the people of the state, was fuelled and reinforced by the systemic

erosion of democratic and human rights. Thus the militancy in the state

of Jammu and Kashmir can be explicated to this background of historical


distrust that has bedeviled the relationship between the state of Jammu

and Kashmir and that of India.

After the eruption of militancy in 1989, the Indian Government

promised autonomy once again. The objective behind this offer was to

check the secessionist trend in Kashmir and create a favorable situation

for the pro-accession parties and hold the elections. Though the situation

was not favorable, yet dates for the parliamentary elections were fixed in

1996. The major regional and pro-accession party of the state, the

Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, threatened to boycott these

elections as its president Farooq Abdullah insisted that the quantum of

autonomy should be decided before the polls. However the Central

government remained adamant that the question of autonomy would be

decided with the elected representatives of the State.9

Farooq Abdullah, after winning the assembly elections, in 1996

concentrated on his first priority of defining, deciding and negotiating a

package of autonomy for the state and, within this package of autonomy,

the quantum of regional autonomy for the three regions of the state. It

was with this intention that the government of J & K passed the

Autonomy Resolution in 2001; but this resolution was turned down by

the Bharatiya Janata Party led NDA government at the Centre. This

again showed to us the futility of the promises and accords reached

between the Indian Central government and the Jammu and Kashmir

state government. The necessity of a third party to enforce the

agreements between these two unequal partners has been felt by many

conscientious people in the valley. Certainly, the judicial system, as

shown by the historical facts, has fizzled out in keeping the faith of the

people of the state as the defender of the rule of law.

This negative and the undemocratic attitude of the Central

government towards the restoration of autonomy to the state

strengthened the belief of Kashmiris that any sort of political solution is

a distant dream especially by entering into agreements or dialogues with

the Indian government. It also made the National Conference, which had

been an ally in the NDA government at the Centre to pay a high price in

the 2002 Assembly elections. In these elections the electorate of the state

voted the National Conference out of power, and a Congress-PDP

coalition government was formed in the state.

Now if the Government of India goes back on its promise of

autonomy, whom the people of the state are going to trust? The


relationship has to be based on trust. Even these half-baked

constitutional reforms did not find it safe under the aegis of the Indian

central government. It is pertinent to mention here that it was on August

9 in 1942 when the Indian National Congress after experimenting half-

baked constitutional reforms launched the historic "Quit India"

movement asking the British Empire to quit lock, stock and barrel

leaving the people of India free to decide their own future.

The buck doesn’t stop here. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in

May 2006 announced the setting up of five working groups to resolve the

issues confronting Jammu and Kashmir. The groups were supposed to

deal with improving the Centre's relations with the State, furthering the

relations across the Line of Control (LoC), giving a boost to the State's

economic development, rehabilitating the destitute families of militants

and reviewing the cases of detainees and ensuring good governance.

Though it was a good beginning by the UPA-I government. But all this

came to nothing as the recommendations of these working groups were

consigned to dustbins. And Indian government’s dustbins with regard to

Kashmir are very big. It all turned out to be a big joke played by the

central government on the common people of the state. This again shows

us the inefficacy of the democratic structure of the Indian government in

Jammu and Kashmir. Indian government has turned schizophrenic in its

policies towards the Kashmir imbroglio. The sincere implementation of

the recommendations of these working groups would have started a new

political era in the state.

A paralyzing atmosphere of fear and paranoia; a suffering populace

whose voice is stifled by the excessive militarization and weaponisation

is what the state of Jammu and Kashmir stands for. The militarized

culture has sapped the state of all its resources-natural as well as human

resources. The forests of the valley have suffered in many ways, both

direct and indirect, because of the excessive ammunition that these

forests are fed with, the Siachen Glacier is reported to have been polluted

and poisoned, and a vast area of land has come to be under army bunkers

with so many disadvantages of the externalities of their existence. The

people of J&K have been mourning the loss of lives, erosion of

democratic institutions and aspirations, deliberate marginalization of

their political space, all of which have occurred over the past two

decades with an unparalleled intensity. The destruction of the socio-

cultural fabric of the valley is eminent. Kashmiri language which had

earlier gained a respectable place in the educational institutions of the


state later came to be relegated to the background. It was removed from

the educational scene and the status quo is yet to be reestablished. The

world-renowned political psychologist Ashis Nandy correctly observes,

“Everyone [in Kashmir] is bereaved and everyone is a mourner. The

casualties include not merely the official and unofficial dead and the

incapacitated, but also those who have disappeared without a

trace…There is in Kashmir a miasma of depression that touches

everyone except the ubiquitous tourist determined to consume Kashmir's

unearthly beauty.”10

Torture machines have certainly accomplished the

task of creating indelible scars, fears, panic, which will not fade with the

passage of time. This conscious policy of the Indian State to erode

autonomy, populist measures, and democratic institutions in Indian

administered J & K has further alienated the people of the State from the

Indian Union. The systemic erosion of political opposition in J & K has

delegitimized the voice of dissent and radicalized antagonism toward

state-sponsored institutions and organizations. During the ongoing

insurgency, the Indian military has been granted a carte blanche without

an iota of accountability in the form of Armed Forces Special Powers

Act. The act (AFSPA) has bred all sorts of insecurities in the state. In

Kashmir, unlike in Punjab, whole homes have been blown up by the

security forces in crowded areas merely to nab a militant or two. Section

4(2) gives a carte blanche, based on a subjective opinion, to “destroy”

any “shelter” from which inter alia armed attacks are “likely to be made”

or “any structure” used as a hideout by “absconders wanted for any

offence”.

Thus, we can say that the political device of autonomy within the

parameters of the Indian constitution has been undermined and thereby

made redundant in solving the Kashmir issue. This constitutional device

has tested faulty because of the intransigence of the Indian inexpedient

political apparatus. My paper has proved the inefficacy of this

constitutional device that Indian government has been banking on since

1947 to do away with the Kashmir conflict.



1 Raṇabīr Samāddār. The Politics of Autonomy: Indian Experiences. Sage Publications. 2005.

2 Anuradha Bhasin Jamwal. Fuelling the Rage In Kashmir. July 10, 2010. Economic

and Political Weekly.

3 Radio Kashmir Srinagar. Programme Ekk Mulaqat at 9:30pm. 10 August, 2010.

4 Teng, Mohan Krishen & Bhatt, Ram Krishen Kaul, Kashmir Constitutional History and Documents. Light & Life Publishers, New Delhi.

5 M. J. Akbar. Kashmir, Behind the Vale. Roli , Pulishers, 2002.

6 Sumit Ganguly. The Origins of War in South Asia: the Indo-Pakistani Conflicts since 1947. West view Press, 1994.

7 Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Kashmir: Nava-e Hurriyat, Mizan Publications, Srinagar, 1995. The book, written in Urdu, was originally published in Pakistan by the

Islamabad-based Institute of Policy Studies, an affiliate of the Jamaat-e Islami of

Pakistan.

8 Ibid.

9 Yoginder Sikand. Jihad, Islam and Kashmir: Syed Ali Shah Geelani’s Political

Project. Economic and Political Weekly. October 2, 2010

10 Quoted in Nyla Ali Khan article Kashmir Held to Ransom. http://www.slideshare.net/nylaalikhan/article-kashmir-held-to-ransom.

http://www.google.co.in/search?tbo=p&tbm=bks&q=+inauthor:%22M.+J.+Akbar%22&source=gbs_metadata_r&cad=5

http://www.google.co.in/search?tbo=p&tbm=bks&q=+inauthor:%22Sumit+Ganguly%22

http://www.slideshare.net/nylaalikhan/article-kashmir-held-to-ransom

126

Book Review

Children at Work Depriving Future Generations of

Intellectual capital

Prof. Nazir Ahmad Gilkar

In Review

Child Labour in Jammu and Kashmir

by Dr Fayaz Ahmad Nika,

M/S Meezan publishers, Srinagar;

280 pages, Rs. 595

Year of Publication 2010

The problem of child labour has been the focus of proper attention

in India since 1980’s as a sequel to a fatal accident that took place in the

industrial town of SIVAKASI, popularly known as ‘Mini Japan’ in

Tamil Nadu. The constitution of J&K puts an obligation on the State of

Jammu and Kashmir to provide all children their right to happy

childhood, health care and equal opportunities in education. But, despite

that it is a harsh reality that children constitute a sizeable portion of the

work force in the state. The presence of child labour is observed in every

segment of economic activity in Kashmir.

The children at work are deprived of opportunity to pursue

education in schools. They stand debarred from enjoying even a

Principal, SP College, Srinagar

127 Children at Work Depriving Future Generations of Intellectual Capital

minimum amount of recreation. They are forced to put in hard labour in

hazardous jobs at a tender age. The society and future generations are

also deprived of intellectual capital. However, despite strict regulations

to stop child labour, around 2.4 lakh such workers are in J& K.

Unfortunately, not a single study has been carried out by the state

Government to ascertain the exact number of child labours in the valley

(Nika; 2010).

The book “Child Labour in Jammu and Kashmir” under review

written by Dr. Fayaz Ahmad Nika has taken up an exhaustive study of

this problem. The author is a college Professor and has obtained his Ph D

from Kashmir University. He regularly presents his research findings on

the subject at national seminars and conferences in and outside the State.

And, his research papers find a due place in various professional journals

published country-wide. The look under review primarily is the outcome

of his doctoral thesis.

The forewords contributed by two eminent personalities.

The first foreword by Justice KG Bal Krishnan Hon’ble Chief

Justice of India is an acknowledgement of the merit of the book

and Scholarship of a Kashmiri author on the subject by a

constitutional luminary of international standing. This is highly

lauded and applauded. The contents read, “It is every ones

interest to invest in welfare of children…. an emprically

grounded study as the present one…. could prove to be of

immense value to policy makers as well as Judges and lawyers”.

The second foreword by Jenab Abdul Gani Malik, Hon’ble

Minister for Higher Education, Labour and Employment, Jammu

and Kashmir Government also speaks volumes about the content,

essence and utility of the book. The Foreword reads, “By

studying this thesis, one is forced to think about those who are

future of the nation, but are being deprived of the basic facilities

like nutrition, health care and education. The thesis can help me

and my department to work with more zeal for the eradication of

the menace of child labour from our society”.

Both these revelations by two important personalities are highly

encouraging and praise worthy. In addition, the apex court of the country


and Jammu and Kashmir Ministry of labour have been impressed by the

in-depth analysis, elaborate discussion, real findings and workable

recommendations put forth in the book under review. The author has felt

the pulse rightly by presenting the manuscript to solicit valued and

honored opinions on the subject-matter the book deals with, to add its

value and offer a road map to weed out this menace from the society.

This gesture also reflects the intellectual courage on the part of the

author to make his research findings public and expose his research work

to constructive criticism for further improvement in successive editions.

The specific objective pursued in this volume is narrated by the

author in his preface which reads, “to study the magnitude extent and

causes of child labour in valley of Kashmir where children (locals and

non-locals) are working in the hilltops and hard to reach areas in life

threatening cottage level handicraft units besides restaurants,

automobiles, trash collection, brick making and so on”.

The author inter alia expresses his sincere gratitude to the

educational institutions of higher learning and advanced research centers

in the country for their academic support he received while compiling

this work. A detailed content analysis and list of diagrams, charts and

graphs follow a brief content account.

The review of relevant literature in consonance with the title of the

book gathered from the available fund of knowledge in the form of

survey reports, research theses, books, journals, periodicals and visiting

websites in the context of global, national and local scenario since 1975

onwards till 2005 spans almost three decades is a Herculian task and an

evidence itself of the hard work the author has invested in this study.

The comprehensive study and rigorous analysis of literature thus

gathered enabled the researcher to attain successfully twin purposes:

To develop as clear and unambiguous conceptual and contextual

foundation for the investigation and

To identify relevant gaps in the existing research on this problem

conducted already with a view to avoid any repetitious. It is

based on painstaking efforts and above all the academic and

research orientation that the author constructed appropriate

research problem for analysis, formulated study objectives and


hypotheses and conceived relevant research methodology by

creating adequate space for conceptual, exploratory and

empirical investigation and analysis.

The two operative chapters viz: (1) child labour in Kashmir

(Magnitude and extent of Government Intervention), and (2) Socio-

Economic-Ethical Dimensions (Data Analysis and Discussion) constitute

the core cluster of the book. The author has conducted a detailed field

work and one–to-one interactions with the working children and their

parents as a sequel to which he identified multi-dimensional; social,

economic educational, psychological factors at least 20 in number

responsible for this menace. Each factor identified has been put to

contextual and statistical analysis for verification as a vide canvas in

respect of its pros and cons with due support of references to the context.

The book accordingly delves deep in;

Analysing legal frame work on labour legislations enacted

within the provisions for prohibitions and in certain cases for

regulation of child labour.

Probing into total disagreement to the principles of ethics based

on theoretical construct followed by empirical evidence to assess

the real situation in violation of ethical norms.

The divergent views advanced by the propounders of children at

work are deep rooted in various myths associated with this problem. The

author has employed adequate academic input in exploring the validity

of such arguments during his empirical investigation. An objective

analysis and elaborate discussion there upon in the spirit of a debate has

been attempted and all those unfounded assumptions stand negated. This

exercise differentiates the book under review from the existing inventory

on the subject. A few misconceptions advanced for perpetuating the

menace of child labour critically deliberated upon in the book are quoted

thus:

that child labour is an off shoot of poverty which is a law of

nature;

that children are inquisitive and can learn the skill better;


that employers oblige poor families by employing their children;

that nimble finger argument advanced by some people;

that child labour is better alternative to child begging;

that end justify means.

The book under review has advanced a variety of superb counter

arguments to cut the aforementioned arguments. As for instance

following extract referred to ipso facto suffices how brilliantly the author

puts forth his argument to verify a particular assumption. It reads, “Child

labour and child begging are undesirable practices due to their social

stigma and a misdirection to human resource development. The adverse

effects of both are almost similar. Efforts are on to keep the society away

from both. However, it would not be wise to substitute one wrong for

another. If the rights of children are to be protected then they have to be

saved from ill effects of both….”

The book also documents short case studies based on interactions

with child workforce which constitute a very important segment of the

core cluster. These case studies are developed, framed and drafted so

well meticulously and lively as if the reader is in direct confabulations

with the children at their work spots. This speaks volumes about the

scholarship and exhibits the real beauty of the book. The aforesaid

ruthless stories present sufferings and the author in this context claims,

“that veil from certain ugly realities to which the children are subjected

to, has been pierced”. These case studies can provide a relevant study

material for a Programme on child labour.

The book at the end proposes varied recommendations based on fact

findings in the context of J&K state and have for reaching policy

implications to eradicate this evil from the society. These workable

measures are explained in all niceties to ensure their implementation.

This can be a classical example of a good connect between operational

experience and strategic to eliminate this menace.

The book is appended with research instruments like questionnaires

and interview schedules to facilitate future research. A detailed

bibliography and subject index also form part of the book.


The book has a natural flow, consistency and continuity in

presenting varied ideas as the subject with due appreciation for aesthetic

taste of readers. And this is an interesting read for all engaged in

managing labour, entrepreneurs, Government functionaries, legal

experts, social workers, academics, students, civil society organizations

and so forth.

The book has been published in 2010 by M/S Meezan publishers,

Srinagar; hard bound, ISB numbered, priced at Rs. 595 spread over

xv+280 pages. The coloured Jacket offers glimpses of tender hands

engaged in world of work. In a snap shot children voice their concern by

carrying placards in their hands invite attention of society towards their

rights.

The present review offers certain suggestions:

that the author while attempting the second edition may revisit

and redesign the entire structure of the book to give it a new

look. The present volume sans list of tasks, Glossary of

important terms on child workers given at the end may be

repositioned to form a part of start-up enabling readers to be

fully conversant with the terminology to study the matter in its

right perspective.

that the first two chapters (introduction and review of literature)

may be merged and re-arranged in a proper content sequence.

Similarly, acknowledgment may form a part of the preface.

Further, commentary testing of hypothesis based on x2 and

inferences drawn accordingly in respect of certain phenomena,

like:

i. Education status of children and parents, and

ii. Job satisfaction and gender difference need to be highlighted

in the relevant analytical tasks (Table 4.6 and Table 4.7). A

book has a different flavour contrary to a research thesis.

that the text and reference books brought out by the local

publishers is highly encouraging and well appreciated. However,

they are required to work a bit more with enthusiasm in order to

stay in book publishing business in a neck bending competitive


environment when the opportunities are available to the authors

only at the distance of a click of the mouse.

The shrinking space for research in higher education institutions is a

matter of serious concern especially in the era of assessment and

accreditation. The need of the hour is to re-energize research activities in

the colleges to perform in line with the national policy.

133

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The preference will be for endnotes and not footnotes.

Referencing Style: References should be typed in the form of the

following examples on first appearance:

a) Books: Michael Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (London:

Routledge, 1989), p.26.

b) Articles in Journals: Samina Yasmeen, “Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy:

Voices of Moderation?” Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 12, No. 2,

June 2003, pp. 187-202. In case of two journals having a similar

title, the place of publication must be mentioned, e.g., International

Affairs (London) and International Affairs (Moscow)

c) Articles in Edited Volumes: Tom Nairn, “The Curse of Reality:

Limits of Modernisation Theory,” in John A. Hall (ed.), The State of

the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.107-34.

d) Articles in Newsmagazines: P.S. Suryanarayana, “Asian Security

from US Angle,” Frontline, 19 June - 2 July 2004, pp. 58-59.

f) Articles from Newspapers: M.K. Bhadrakumar, “New Regionalism

in Central Asia,” The Hindu, 14 July 2004.

g) References to Websites: United Nations Development Programme,

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http://www.unddp.org/rbas/ahdr/english2003.html. (Date of access).

h) Reports and Documents: Canberra Commission, Report on the

Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (Canberra: Commonwealth of

Australia, 1996). Available on the Internet at http://www.dfat.

gov.au/ cc/cchome.html (Date of access).

i) Conferences Papers: Michael Williams, “The Discursive Power of

Community: Consideration on the European ‘Security Community,”

Draft Paper presented at the conference on Power, Security and

Community: IR Theory and the Politics of EU Enlargement,

Copenhagen, 9-12 October 1997.

http://www.unddp.org/rbas/ahdr/english2003.html