the influence of sea power on the punic wars

8/3/2019 The Influence of Sea Power on the Punic Wars

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THE INFLUENCEOF SEA POWERONTHE PUNIC WARS

SCHEARER 1

The Influence of Sea Power on the Punic Wars

INTRODUCTION

European history, and likewise, that of Western

Civilization, is inextricably bound in Greco-Roman tradition.

This is primarily due to two series of events. First is the

Greco-Persian War, appropriately titled "The Battle for the

West" by historian Ernle Bradford, in which the Greek victory

over King Xerxes of the Persians firmly established the place of

Greece in the history of the Occident.1 The second was the Punic

Wars, a series of three wars fought between Rome and Carthage

which saw the emergence and permanence of Roman tradition in

Western Civilization.

This discussion will focus on the least-appreciated aspect

of the conflict between Rome and Carthage, the influence of sea

power on an essentially land-based war, the Second Punic War.

Despite this, we will discuss the First Punic War, as its result

is a key factor in influencing the outcome of the Second Punic

War. To briefly introduce the historical context, the First

Punic War was a series of naval battles fought for the control

of Sicily from 264-241 B.C. The Second Punic War, on the other

hand, was essentially a series of campaigns on land, from 218-

201 B.C., with little overt significance of naval matters. The

1 Ernle Bradford, Thermopylae: The Battle for the West (NY: Da Capo

Press, 1993).


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Third Punic War was a uneven match fought between 149-146 B.C.

that saw the ultimate destruction of Carthage.

Scholarly debate about the influence of sea power on the

Second Punic War is hardly an issue that has been seriously

academically attempted. Likewise, it seems particularly ripe as

a subject of further discussion, given the circumstances. Dutch

historian J.H. Thiel provides the most succinct understanding of

the reason the influence of sea power provokes an intellectual

call-to-arms:

The problem, what was the function and importance of

sea-power in the second Punic war, how far the Romans

during this war really ruled the waves, and if, so,

whether or not this fact decisively influenced the

course and result of the war as a whole, remains as

yet a question brlante, which is judged in the most

diverging ways and consequently cries for a thorough

discussion.2

Thiel briefly discusses these diverging views not only as an

introduction to his own work, but as a means of suggesting

further scholarly work on an issue that suffers from remarkable

neglect.3

Given the fact that the Second Punic War was a land-based

war fought primarily in Spain and the Italian peninsula, it

2 J.H. Thiel, Studies on the History of Roman Sea Power in Republican

Times (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1946), p. 32.3 Ibid., p. 33.


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might seem peculiar to suggest that sea power was a primary, if

not the decisive factor in determining the outcome of the war.

As Boris Rankov notes,"[t]he war at sea has to a certain extent

been seen as a sideshow," and thus it is not surprising to see

little historical attention paid to the influence of sea power

in this second engagement between Rome and Carthage from 218-201

B.C.4 Likewise, the military geniuses Hannibal and Scipio

Africanus and the historic land battles in which their armies

fought overshadow the significance of the decisive role of sea

power. This paper will seek to explain how the outcome of the

First Punic War, which resulted in decisive Roman sea power,

played an important role in the Second Punic War. Roman command

of the seas thus gave it an important tool in terms of a

"competitive advantage" against Carthage. The concept of

competitive advantage, as an analytic tool used as a means of

understanding the war's outcome, will be briefly discussed.

Furthermore, this paper will then seek to demonstrate that

Rome's survival was due to the exploitation of this competitive

advantage. Finally, it will conclude that Roman sea power was

in fact the decisive factor in rendering the outcome of the

Second Punic War.

4 Boris Rankov, "The Second Punic War at Sea," in The Second Punic War:

A Reappraisal. eds. Tim Cornell, Boris Rankov, and Philip Sabin (London:

Institute of Classical Studies, 1996), pp. 49-57.


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CARTHAGE

At the dawn of the third century B.C., Carthage possessed

"undisputed command at sea" in the western Mediterranean Sea.5

It should be little surprise that Carthage, as a colony of the

sea-faring Phoenicians, should take to the sea in the western

Mediterranean. As Arthur Shepard writes, "the Carthaginians

inherited and transmitted in full measure the Phoenician

propensity for a seafaring life and commercial adventure..."6

This seafaring life, combined with threats on all sides ("by the

hostile native tribes of Africa, by the Etruscans to the north,

and by the everpressing westward tide of Greek migration...")

forced Carthage "by sheer self-preservation to adopt a strong

military policy."7 The consolidation of Carthaginian naval

power took place between 550 B.C., when the Carthaginian king

Malchus invaded Sicily, and 500 B.C.8,9 Despite occasional

battles with the Greeks, Carthaginian command of the sea was not

seriously challenged for nearly two centuries.10 In 264 B.C.,

the inevitable clash between two growing empires, Carthage and

Rome, flared when both islands sought to control the island of

5

J.F. Lazenby, The First Punic War(Stanford, CA: Stanford UniversityPress, 1996), p. 29.

6 Arthur MacCartney Shepard, Sea Power in Ancient History (Boston, MA:

Little, Brown. and Co., 1924), 131.7 Ibid.8 Ibid., p. 133.9 Lionel Casson, The Ancient Mariners (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 1991), p. 143.10 Chester G. Starr, The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History(NY:

Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 54.


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Sicily. The result was the First Punic War (264-241 B.C.).

ROME

The Roman civilization is not one that any historian, past,

present, or future, will ever likely succeed in suggesting that

it was regarded as one of the worlds leading thalossocratic

powers. Despite centuries of Mediterranean dominance, Rome has

always been regarded, first and foremost, as a land-based

empire. The Dutch historian J.H. Thiel asserts:

that the Romans were born land-lubbers has much of a

truism and of course it is not my intention to

overthrow it. But even a truism may stand in some

need of elucidation, the rather, because by most

people it is thoughtlessly taken for granted: the

supposed land-lubberism of the Romans is not so

simple a matter as it looks and it fully deserves the

interest of the historian.11

What Thiel is suggesting is that, without questioning the

truism of Roman land-lubberism, it is still necessary to

understand and appreciate that as a matter of course every

nation which borders upon the sea is always of a mixed

character: it contains large groups of land-lubbers as well as

seafaring and waterside folk.12 Thus, the concept of Roman

11 Thiel, Studies, p. 1.12 Ibid., pp. 1-2.


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land-lubberism can be properly appreciated as a true; however,

it must be rationalized as a simplistic notion upon which

further understanding can be achieved.

Roman sea power as the beginning of the third century B.C.

was negligible. At this period in its history, Rome did not

maintain a standing navy, preferring instead ex tempore

methods in times of war.13 Besides, Roman extension southward

had barely reached the southern shores of the Italian peninsula

and had not yet crossed over the short stretch of water to the

largely Greek and Carthaginian-controlled island of Sicily.

Rome only gained control of Tarentum in 272 B.C. and suppressed

the Sallentini and Messapii on Italy's "heel" as recently as 266

B.C.14 Therefore, it is not difficult to understand Romes

reason for such an ex tempore policy: Rome did not yet have

any significant overseas territories to defend. The beginning

of Romes entry onto the world stage began in 264 B.C., when the

Mamertimes (of Messana) looked to Rome and Carthage after being

defeated by Hiero and the Syracusans.15

THE CONCEPT OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE

Before we can fully understand the influence of sea power

in the conflicts between Rome and Carthage, it is necessary to

13 Ibid., p. 16.14 Lazenby, The First Punic War, p. 38.15 T.A. Dorey and D.R. Dudley, Rome Against Carthage (London: Secker &

Warburg, 1971), p. 1.


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depart momentarily from the historical context and move to

establish a firm grounding in a measure of effectiveness which

will help us to grasp the importance of sea power. The concept

of competitive advantage is one that is taken from business

applications, yet it does not exclude itself from elucidation as

a potential military concept. The most succinct understanding

of competitive advantage is Michael E. Porters The Competitive

Advantage of Nations.16 While Porters article is largely

geared toward explaining competitive advantage as a business

tool, the military net assessment community has embraced

competitive advantage as potential tool for military

applications and as a measure of effectiveness.

What is Competitive Advantage?

Competitive advantage is a concept which seeks to

demonstrate why some businesses (or nations or militaries) are

more prosperous than others. Based on a variety of situations,

environments, and responses, some businesses move forward while

others fall back. A competitive advantage is a national or

business superiority specific market, or industry. For example,

the Japanese ability to mass produce televisions and VCRs, or

the Swedish ability to anticipate concerns for product safety

16 Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, Harvard

Business Review, March-April 1990, pp. 73-93.


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(i.e. Volvo), could be considered competitive advantages.17

However, understanding this concept is only the first step in

taking advantage of its usefulness as a potential measure of

effectiveness.

The most important questions about competitive advantage

are: How is it achieved? How is it sustained?

Competitive advantage is achieved through innovation.

Perceiving new market opportunities, embracing technological

breakthroughs, or just finding new ways of doing old things are

good examples of acts of innovation.18 As Porter explains:

...innovation is the result of unusual effort. The

company that successfully implements a new or better

way of competing pursues its approach with dogged

determination, often in the face of harsh criticism

and tough obstacles. In fact, to succeed, innovation

usually requires pressure, necessity, and even

adversity: the fear of loss often proves more

powerful than the hope of gain.19 [Emphasis added]

As we will see, this adversity is precisely the key to Roman

innovation in the First Punic War. How is it sustained? The

only way to sustain a competitive advantage is to upgrade it

to move to more sophisticated types.20 In other words,

17 Ibid., pp. 74-75.18 Ibid.19 Ibid., p. 75.20 Ibid.


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competitive advantage can often be imitated therefore, the

competitive advantage of one time period may disappear quickly.

Only continuous effort and improvement, and ultimately upgrading

is the only way to maintain a competitive advantage.

The Diamond of National Advantage

The concept which we will use to understand how competitive

advantage is achieved is called the Diamond of National

Advantage. It seeks to demonstrate why innovation is possible.

As shown in the diagram, there are four components of the

diamond. First, factor conditions, the necessary infrastructure

to compete; demand conditions, demand for the product; related

and supporting industries, the presence or absence of related

industries; and finally firm strategy, structure, and rivalry.

Each point on the diamond - and the diamond as a system -

affects essential ingredients for achievingcompetitive


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success.21 As we will see shortly, this concept is well-suited

to describe the situation in which Rome was faced when the First

Punic War erupted.

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

A discussion about the influence of sea power on the Second

Punic War would be incomplete without a brief understanding of

the First Punic War. For, as T.A. Dorey and D.R. Dudley write,

"[t]he seeds of The Second Punic War were sown at the end of the

First."22 Furthermore, it is during the First Punic War that we

see Rome faced with adversity, a key ingredient to feed Roman

innovation.

Origins

Despite the growing power of both Carthage and Rome, J.F.

Lazenby notes that "relations between the two powers...seem to

have been reasonably cordial...as long as their interests did

not seriously clash."23 The two powers maintained a series of

treaties protecting each others' interests and spheres of

influence. However, the two expanding empires, clamoring for

Mediterranean supremacy, were bound to meet, literally, as Rome

expanded southward and Carthage solidified its hold on its

21 Ibid., p. 77.22 Dorey and Dudley, Rome Against Carthage, p. 29.23 Lazenby, The First Punic War, p. 35.


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Sicilian possessions.

These empires collided in the northeast Sicilian town of

Messana (Messina), occupied since the 280's by Campanian

mercenaries who called themselves the Mamertines.24 The

Syracusan tyrant Hiero attacked Messana, and the Mamertines

sought assistance from both Carthage and Rome.25 Carthage

immediately came to the aid of the Mamertines, placing a

garrison in Messana and sending ships to defend it.26,27 However,

Rome responded as well, crossing the strait and expelling the

Carthaginians.28 Carthage regarded this as a casus belli for

violating a treaty protecting its influence in Sicily. Polybius

disputes this, yet some modern scholars have supported the

Carthaginian claim.29

Innovation Discovered: The Corvus

For the first three years of the First Punic War, Rome had

little success against Carthage as a result of Carthaginian

strongholds on Sicily's western coast. With command of the sea,

Carthage was able to reinforce and resupply its troops and

fortifications in Sicily. Casson demonstrates the situation

Rome faced:

24 Ibid.25 Starr, The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History, pp. 54-55.26 Ibid., p. 55.27 Lazenby, The First Punic War, pp. 36-37.28 Starr, The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History, p. 55.29 Dorey and Dudley, Rome Against Carthage, pp. 3-4.


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In 264 B.C. Rome's statesmen and generals faced a

dismaying reality: sooner or later they had to take

the plunge and create a navy; David had to fight

Goliath but not with a slingshot, with the giant's

own weapons.30 [Emphasis added]

The emphasized sentence illustrates the

strategy Rome would have to follow: first,

they would have to neutralized Carthaginian

control of the sea, which was clearly a

Carthaginian competitive advantage.

Secondly, to prevail Rome would have to

seize command of the seas and use it as an

offensive competitive advantage against

Carthage.31

The adversity which Rome faced was exactly what it needed

to spur an important innovation - the corvus. The corvus was a

boarding ramp which allowed Roman legionnaires to cross over to

an enemy ship and "turn a sea fight into a land fight..." 32 In

260 B.C. off the north shore of Sicily, the Roman commander

Caius Duilius routed the Carthaginians. In the next eight

years, a number of small engagements took place. But Rome, when

faced with adversity, achieved an important innovation which

30 Casson, The Ancient Mariners, p. 144.31 Dorey and Dudley, Rome Against Carthage, p. 8.32 Casson, The Ancient Mariners, p. 146.


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effectively neutralized Carthaginian competitive advantage in

sea power.33 Now Rome had to seize that advantage.

Seizing the Competitive Advantage

We return again to the Diamond of National Advantage to

understand how Rome captured the competitive advantage from

Carthage. The first attribute is factor conditions, or the

necessary infrastructure to compete against Carthage naval

mastery. In 260 B.C., the Roman Senate authorized the

construction of 120 vessels. With Greek and Syracusan allies,

Rome found the necessary resources to compete. The second

attribute is demand conditions; the Roman David facing the

Carthaginian naval giant provided the necessary demand for

achieving naval mastery. The third attribute is related and

supporting industries, of which Rome's naval allies Syracuse

(with a sizable navy) and Greek shipbuilders are roughly

comparable. Rome relied heavily on the loyalty of these allies

for their success.34 The fourth attribute is firm strategy,

structure, and rivalry. Given Rome's dedicated shipbuilding

program and the military rivalry they faced against Carthage, it

is not difficult to see how this attribute is easily met.

Rome's innovation in the corvus neutralized Carthaginian

sea power as a competitive advantage; a dedicated shipbuilding

33 Lazenby, The First Punic War, p. 28.34 Ibid., p. 163.


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program supported by the necessary conditions seized the

competitive advantage for themselves. "Each point on the

diamond - and the diamond as a system - affects essential

ingredients for achieving...success."35 Thus, the Diamond of

National Advantage provides an excellent tool to analyze how

Rome was able to effectively respond to Carthaginian command of

the seas. By 241 B.C. near the Aegates Islands:

the tables were now turned: the Romans had the better

ships and crews and, as usual, superior numbers (200

to 170)...Carthage, the ertswhile naval power, went

into the last round with old vessels and raw crews;

Rome, the nation of lubbers, ended with a navy of two

hundred of the finest war galleys afloat, manned by

veterans.36

Rome had seized command of the seas for

itself.37 Yet it remained until the next

conflict between Rome and Carthage for the

Romans to employ their newly-gained command

of the seas as an offensive competitive

advantage.

THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

Origins

35 Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, p. 77.36 Casson, The Ancient Mariners, p. 151.37 Lazenby, The First Punic War, p. 29.


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The end of the First Punic War was not so much a permanent

piece as is was an armistice agreed to when Hamilcar asked the

Roman consul Catulus for terms of peace. Hamilcar resisted a

number of "obnoxious conditions...declar[ing] he would rather

fight then accept [them]."38 The result was that Hamilcar

withdrew, having never been defeated.

Polybius identifies three main causes of the Second Punic

War. The first, as Dorey and Dudley explain, was "the attitude

of Hamilcar himself...he felt that if he could face the Romans

again on equal terms he would have little difficulty in

reversing the decision, and he was eager for an opportunity to

renew the struggle."39 The second cause was Rome's seizure in

238 B.C. of the island of Sardinia and the unjust demand of a

twelve hundred talent indemnity.40,41 The third was Carthaginian

conquests in Spain, which culminated in Hannibal's attack on the

Spanish town of Saguntum. Rome claimed Saguntum was under its

protection and later called Hannibal's siege a casus belli for

violating the peace treaty between Rome and Carthage, despite

the fact that the treaty contained no such clause and was not

even ratified by the Roman Senate or approved by the Roman

people.42 De Beer describes the famous scene which decided the

38 Dorey and Dudley, Rome Against Carthage, p. 26.39 Ibid., p. 29.40 Ibid., p. 30.41 Lazenby, The First Punic War, p. 174.42Sir Gavin de Beer, Hannibal: Challenging Rome's Supremacy(NY: The

Viking Press, 1969), p. 113.


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result of the dispute:

The Carthaginians then invited the Romans to state

what was really in their minds, and Quintus Fabius

Maximus gathered his toga into a fold over his chest,

saying, 'Here we bring you peace or war. Choose

which you prefer.' The Carthaginians replied thatthe Romans could choose. Fabius said 'War', and the

Carthaginians added 'So be it.' The Second Punic War

had been declared.43

Hannibals Route

Most written material about the Second Punic War focuses

primarily on the remarkable Alpine journey undertaken by

Hannibal and the subsequent land battles fought against Rome on

the Italian peninsula. Hannibal's routing of the Romans during

the battles at Lake Trasimene and Cannae, in particular, are

often the center of attention for most scholars. However,

little mention is made of the circumstances that precipitated

Hannibal's treacherous journey and the reasons why he chose this

route.

As we have seen, by the end of the First Punic War, Rome

had seized command of the sea away from the Carthaginians first

through the neutralization of superior Carthaginian naval

tactics (by means of the corvus) and secondly by developing

mastery of naval tactics themselves. When Carthage sued for

peace at the end of the First Punic War, its naval advantage was

gone: severe restrictions were put on future naval activity, and

they now had only about 50 ships as compared to Rome's 220

43 Ibid.


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quinqueremes.44,45 Thus, Carthage began the Second Punic War at a

considerable naval disadvantage.

When attention has been paid to Hannibal's choice of a

treacherous overland route as compared to a amphibious invasion,

scholars have divided themselves about the reasons why. Thiel

and Mayan both place a great deal of emphasis on the importance

of naval superiority not only in Hannibal's choice of the

overland route but also in the war's outcome.46,47 Casson reaches

the same conclusion, although less convincingly.48 Starr

contends that "the real explanation was of a different order,

not directly connected to sea power," and suggests along with de

Sanctis that it was due to the difficulty in transporting large

numbers of cavalry and elephants.49,50 Finally, Mommsen's History

of Rome proffers the dull explanation that Hannibal's reasons

were "not entirely obvious."51

The most plausible explanation, however, given the

evidence, is made by Rankov:

The naval strategy of the Second Punic War was, in

essence, determined by the control of a number of key

bases and coastlines. Possibly the most spectacular

44 Ibid., p. 88.45 Starr, The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History, p. 58.46 Thiel, Studies, p. 186.47 Starr, The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History, p. 3.48 Casson, The Ancient Mariners, p. 151.49 Starr, The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History, p. 58.50 G. de Sanctis, Storia dei Romani (Turin: Fratelli Bocca, 1917) III.2,

12, in Rankov, "The Second Punic War at Sea," p. 52.51 Starr, The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History, p. 3.


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example of this is the fact that Hannibal chose

to...invade Italy through the Alps, rather than...a

passage by sea. De Sanctis [and Starr] argued that

this choice was dictated by the Carthaginians'

inability to transport horses (and presumably

elephants) by sea, but this was rightly rejected by

Thiel on the grounds that they were able to do

precisely this on other occasions.52

The logical conclusion to Rankov's

elucidation of Hannibal's choice is that a

combination of factors were at play: not

only did sea power play an important role in

the choice of routes, but the lack of

control of key bases in Sicily and Sardinia

(which, of course, were lost in the naval

battles of the First Punic War) made

Hannibal's choice a fait accompli. The

results of successful naval warfare during

the First Punic War and the command of the

sea possessed by the Romans at the beginning

of the Second Punic War were the decisive

factors in forcing Hannibal to march by

land.

52 Rankov, "The Second Punic War at Sea," p. 52.


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The Roman Invasion

"In the spring of 204 B.C., Scipio [Africanus]

set sail from Lilybaeum with thirty thousand men and

landed near Utica at Promontorium Pulchrum west of Cap

Bon."53

In 204 B.C., Rome did to Carthage exactly what Carthage

wanted to do to Rome all along. Little doubt remains that,

would Carthage have been able to invade Rome from the sea and

provide Hannibal with a constant flow of reinforcements and

supplies, Rome would have fallen. Yet Roman command of the seas

and the seizure of important Sicilian ports allowed Scipio

Africanus to use Rome's competitive advantage in sea power,

gained in the First Punic War, against Carthage. Despite Rome's

command of the seas, this marked the first time that sea power

as a competitive advantage was effectively applied in an

offensive manner. Against Carthage's now-inferior fleet and

battle-weary troops, with supply lines from Sicily and recently

conquered Spain, Roman sea power as a competitive advantage

spelled impending doom for the Carthaginians.

The battle at Zama marked the first and only time Scipio

and Hannibal faced each other. For the first time, Hannibal was

at a considerable disadvantage in cavalry. After Hannibal's

53 de Beer, Hannibal, p. 280.


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cavalry was driven off by Masinissa's Numidian cavalry, Scipio

closed the gaps in his line. According to de Beer, "[t]he

fighting became desperate, and Laelius and Masinissa, having

driven the Carthaginian cavalry from the field, now came back

and charged into the flanks and read of the wreck of Hannibal's

army. The battle was irretrievably lost."54

T.A. Dorey and D.R. Dudley, in Rome Against Carthage,

provide a succinct explanation of how, despite the Carthaginian

defeat on land at Zama, other factors prevailed:

It may seem a paradox to assert that it was Roman

sea-power that defeated Hannibal. Those who fought

at Zama would scarcely agree. But it was respect for

Roman sea-power that conditioned his strategy of

invading Italy from Spain; it was Roman sea-power

that prevented adequate reinforcements from reaching

him in southern Italy; it was that same sea-power

that made it impossible for him to concert and

offensive against Rome with the power of Macedon.55

Finally, it was that same Roman sea power

which allowed Rome to invade northern Africa

and defeat Carthage.

THE THIRD PUNIC WAR

54 Ibid., p. 289.55 Dorey and Dudley, Rome Against Carthage, p. 152.


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Fifty-two years after the peace treaty of 201

B.C., the third war broke out between Rome and

Carthage. This time the contestants were unevenly

matched. Rome was by now the dominant power in the

Mediterranean world. Carthage commanded no more than

the resources of a powerful city state. Once war had

begun, a Roman victory was inevitable, and in the end

Carthage was totally destroyed.56

In 149 B.C., a Carthaginian army under the command of

Carthalo and Hasdrubal invaded Numidia, which violated the peace

treaty of 201 B.C. and gave the opportunity for Rome to

intervene militarily against Carthage and gain decisive control

of northern Africa. Rome took an army of 80,000 infantry and

4,000 cavalry, larger than any previous Roman invasion force.57

The result, of course, was a foregone conclusion. By 146 B.C.,

Rome had besieged Carthage and physically destroyed the city.

The result that is most important to us, of course, is the

sustained ability of Rome to use its dominant sea power across

the Mediterranean for invasion forces and resupply missions. It

would be stretching to conclude that sea power was the decisive

factor in this third and final conflict. Roman victory was

already assured before the war even began. However, the key

56 Ibid., p. 153.57 Ibid., p. 160.


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point is that certainly the influence of sea power was important

and hastened the ultimate collapse of Carthage.

CONCLUSION

The goal of this paper has been to explain, first of all,

how the outcome of the First Punic War, which resulted in

decisive Roman sea power, played an important role in the Second

Punic War. Command of the seas thus gave Rome an important tool

in terms of a "competitive advantage" against Carthage. The

concept of competitive advantage, as a means of understanding

the war's outcome, was explained and applied as tool of

analysis, or measure of effectiveness. Furthermore, this paper

sought to demonstrate that Rome's survival was due to the

exploitation of this competitive advantage.

The final conclusion of this paper is to resolve that

Roman sea power was in fact the decisive factor in rendering the

war's outcome. Based on Roman innovation in a time of crisis,

Rome gained an important tool (the corvus) which effectively

neutralized Carthaginian command of the sea for a time

sufficient to develop successful naval tactics. The result of

The First Punic War saw Rome seize command of the seas from

Carthage through the achievement of competitive advantage.

The Second Punic War demonstrated the influence of sea

power by understanding how Romes newly-gained competitive


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advantage was successfully applied to war-fighting. As it has

been shown, the choice of Hannibals route (and its subsequent

resupply missions) and Roman invasion of northern Africa were

directly linked to this competitive advantage. J.H. Thiel

suggests what the likely outcome would have been given

Carthaginian, rather than Roman, command of the seas. To quote

liberally (given the circumstances) seems appropriate:

For what would have been the end, if Carthage instead

of Rome had commanded the sea? In other words, if

Rome had not been able to launch an offensive in

Spain and consequently Hasdrubal had made his

appearance in Italy at the time of the battle of

Cannae instead of in 207, when it was too late, if at

the same time Philip had landed considerable forces

in Italy and Carthage had found ample opportunity of

providing Hannibal directly by sea with all he

wanted, and if - again last, but not least - she had

profited by her naval supremacy to wrest Sicily and

Sardinia from the Romans and starve Italy by doing

so? There is but one answer: Rome wouldnt have had

the slightest chance of winning the war, on the

contrary she would have lost it within half the time.

This means that in reality naval supremacy decisively

contributed to the Roman victory, though in a

somewhat latent way; the maxim that he wins who has

the sea is certainly applicable to this war.58

58 Thiel, Studies, p. 186.


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[Emphasis added]

The Third Punic War, as we have seen, was of little

military and/or naval importance given the lopsided nature of

the conflict. The result was the ultimate destruction of

Carthage.

Thiel was speaking directly about The Second Punic War.

But it is appropriate to extend his analysis to the Punic Wars

in general. Given the evidence, it can be reasonably concluded

that the influence of sea power as a competitive advantage was

the decisive factor in the struggle between Rome and Carthage.

The Greek victory over the Persians firmly established the place

of Greece in the history of Western civilization. The gallant

defense at Thermopylae, Bradfords Battle for the West,

defined this conflict. Likewise, the Roman triumph over the

Carthaginians did the same for Romes influence. It was defined

by influence of sea power as a competitive advantage,

particularly in The Second Punic War, which ultimately made this

possible.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bradford, Ernle. Thermopylae: The Battle for the West. NY: Da

Capo Press, 1993.

Casson, Lionel. The Ancient Mariners. Princeton, NJ: Princeton


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University Press, 1991.

de Beer, Sir Gavin. Hannibal: Challenging Rome's Supremacy. NY:

The Viking Press, 1969.

Dodge, Theodore A.Hannibal: A History of the Art of War Amongthe Carthaginians and Romans Down to the Battle of Pydna,

168 B.C., With a Detailed Account of The Second Punic War.

NY: Houghton, Mifflin, and Co., 1891, Vols. 1 & 2.

Dorey, T.A., and D.R. Dudley. Rome Against Carthage. London:

Secker & Warburg, 1971.

Lazenby, J.F. The First Punic War. Stanford, CA: Stanford

University Press, 1996.

Porter, Michael E. The Competitive Advantage of Nations.

Harvard Business Review, March-April 1990.

Rankov, Boris. "The Second Punic War at Sea." in The Second

Punic War: A Reappraisal. eds. Tim Cornell, Boris Rankov,

and Philip Sabin. London: Institute of Classical Studies,

1996.

Starr, Chester G. The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History.

NY: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Thiel, J.H. Studies on the History of Roman Sea Power in

Republican Times. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1946.

the influence of sea power on the punic wars

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