the impacts of land title registration: evidence from a...

The impacts of land title

registration:

evidence from a pilot in Rwanda

Daniel Ali

Klaus Deininger

Markus Goldstein

Preliminary: Please do not cite

Do land rights matter for

productivity?• Insecure rights can lower productivity

– Goldstein and Udry, Ghana (2008)

• Registering land rights does not increase productivity– Bardhan and Mookherjee, West Bengal (2009)

• Quality of land matters

• Registering land rights does increase investments– Deininger and Ali, Ethiopia (2011)

• Registering land rights might increase productivity but is not cost effective– Jacoby and Minten, Madagascar (2007)

Impact of registration

• Channel for impacts to materialize

– Tenure security & investment

– Transferability (if there are gains to trade)

– Reduction of conflict (one-time or longer term)

– Formalization & credit supply (foreclosure,

coverage)

– Land grabbing/elite capture possible if not

transparent

• This paper aims to evaluate impact of the land

tenure regularization program in the pilot cells

Outline

• Land tenure in Rwanda

• Program characteristics

• Sample & estimation strategy

• Data & descriptive statistics

• Econometric results

• Conclusions

Land in Rwanda

• Land scarcity, dependence on agriculture

– Highest pop. density in Africa

– Average parcel size =0.35 ha, significant

variation around this

– Environmental degradation; need for

investment

– Continued fragmentation; active land market

– Contributing factor to ‘94 Genocide

Land in Rwanda

• New legislation

– 1999 inheritance legislation: Equal rights to females

– 2004 land policy based on broad consultation: General principles

– 2005 OLL • Recognizes existing (customary) rights, formalizes these

• Equality for spouses; registration compulsory

• Establishes institutional infrastructure (NLC, DLBs, LCs at cell, sector, dist. Level)

• Regulates expropriation & registration

Land in Rwanda

• Towards a national program

– Development of participatory, low-cost methodology

based on photomaps

– Fine-tuning of procedures in 4 trial cells reflecting

diversity of tenure situations 2006/7

– Launch of nation-wide program in 2009/10

– Currently 2.5 out of 11 mn. parcels registered

– Baseline IE survey is in the field

Outline






• Conclusions

Pilot registration: program basics

• Cells (4 of 2,146) were selected based on

differing tenure and land use situations

– Gatasta (Kigali, urban)

• High expropriation risk

• Interspersed with small agricultural plots

– Kabushenge (North, rural)

• Polygamy a major issue

– Biguhu (West, rural)

• Severely affected by genocide

– Mowga (East, rural)

• Past practice of land sharing leads to insecurity

• Boundaries well marked

Pilot registration: program basics

• 14,908 parcels registered, total area of 3,448 ha.

• Low tech, low cost – cost per parcel is

approximately $9-11

• Comprehensive and compulsory title registration

which gives landholders a leasehold over the

land (terms of lease vary with use)

• Claimants required to pay nominal fees

Pilot locations

Outline






• Conclusions

Estimation strategy

• We examine the effects of land

registration:

• Where Yph is the outcome of interest for parcel p

in household h, T is a title registration indicator,

X is a set of parcel characteristics, Z household

characteristics, and an error term.

phhphphph ZXTY 321

Endogenity

• If registration were voluntary, the

investment decisions, etc. would be

endogenous

• But here we have administrative units

(cells) in which registration is complete

and compulsory

• We will use the discontinuity provided by

the cell boundaries to identify effects

Sample Design

So our sample looks like this…

Estimation strategy

• Identification assumption: no other major policy or market conditions happen at the cell level to affect outcomes of interest

• Policies of interest happen at higher levels (soil = district, inheritance=national)

• In addition, we will use spatial fixed effects (Magruder 2010, G&U 2008, Conley & Udry 2008) to control for unobservable conditions (market and soil)

Outline






• Implications

Data• We undertook a quick, light survey during April-May

2010 (there was no usable baseline)

• 3560 households split across pilot cells and bordering cells

• Questions on hh included demographics, housing, assets, credit, registration participation and knowledge

• Questions on parcel included land characteristics, investment, inheritance, sales

• Took GPS readings of hh location

• The empirical results are based on the rural sample –not enough power in the urban sample

Outline






• Conclusions

Comparison of means Total Control Treatment

mean sd mean sd mean sd

Perceived risk of expropriation (1 if

yes) 0.72 0.45 0.74 0.44 0.68 0.47

***

Change in proportion of parcels receiving

soil conservation measures

Construction of new

conservation structures 0.07 0.43 0.04 0.42 0.10 0.44

***

Maintenance of existing

structures 0.09 0.37 0.07 0.35 0.11 0.38

***

New/maintenance of existing

Structures 0.14 0.51 0.10 0.50 0.19 0.52

***

Changed seed type from local to

improved variety since 2007 0.53 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.57 0.50

***

Female jointly or alone owns parcel 0.87 0.34 0.88 0.33 0.85 0.35 ***

Share of parcel owned by female (%) 42.55 27.40 42.14 27.12 43.11 27.77

Know who will inherit the parcel 0.64 0.48 0.60 0.49 0.69 0.46 ***

Sons will inherit parcel 0.74 0.44 0.72 0.45 0.77 0.42 ***

Daughters will inherit parcel 0.69 0.46 0.66 0.47 0.72 0.45 ***

Spouse will inherit parcel 0.32 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.29 0.45 ***

Children will inherit parcel 0.76 0.43 0.72 0.45 0.82 0.38 ***

Number of parcels 6312 3619 2693

Results: Expropriation riskPerceived risk of

expropriation

Treatment indicator -0.047

Treatment X Female head -0.042

Number of years possessed -0.000

Parcel was purchased -0.053*

Parcel was inherited -0.073*

Acquired through other means -0.004

Parcel size in hectares -0.010

Head's age 0.000

Female headed household -0.066

Number of observations 5345

includes controls for hh demographics, spatial FE 1000m, spatial SE

Rural investmentdependent variable soil conservation

D (new const

+ maint)imp seed

Treatment indicator 0.099** 0.064

Treatment X Female headship 0.094** 0.003

Number of years possessed -0.002** 0.001

Parcel was purchased -0.030 -0.074**

Parcel was inherited -0.065 -0.083

Acquired through other means -0.209** 0.087

Parcel size in hectares -0.002 0.032*

Head's age -0.001 -0.001

Female headed household -0.044 -0.052*

Number of observations 6325 6325


Results: Women access to landFemale spouse/head owns

or co-owns plot

Treatment indicator -0.074**

Treatment X Marriage certificate 0.171***

Treatment X Female head with no spouse 0.143**

Has marriage certificate 0.075***

Female head with no spouse 0.094***

Male head with no spouse -0.837***

Number of observations 6209

includes controls for plot characteristics, hh demographics, spatial FE 1000m, spatial SE

Results: Inheritance

dependent variableknow

inherit

son

inherit

daughter

inherit

children

inherit

Treatment indicator 0.094** 0.102** 0.096** 0.133**

Treatment X Female head -0.044 -0.052 -0.158** -0.046

Number of years possessed 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000

Parcel was purchased -0.008 0.043 0.008 -0.021

Parcel was inherited 0.026 0.072** 0.038 0.004

Acquired through other means -0.051 0.167* -0.030 0.025

Parcel size in hectares -0.023** 0.006 0.004 -0.012

Head's age 0.001 0.002 0.004** 0.003**

Female headed household 0.071* 0.210*** -0.003 0.094***

Number of observations 6325 4053 4053 6325


Results: Participation in land market

(sold/purchased)

dependent variable D (participation)D (area of land

transacted)

Treatment indicator -0.052** -0.048** -0.045*** -0.054***

Treatment X Female headship -0.020 0.044

Head's age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001

Female headed household -0.009 -0.002 0.013 -0.003

Head has at least primary education 0.021 0.021 -0.001 -0.002

Number of observations 6325 4053 4053 6325


Conclusions• This low cost, participatory method produces a

significant change in investment (maintenance and construction of soil conservation structures).

• These investments are being made for this generation, but also the next – there is a boost in projected land inheritance for children (and it is being written down).

• Improves access to land to women with certified

marriage certificate, but those without marriage

certificate tend to be negatively affected.

– There is thus a need to understand the recordation of women’s

rights on land.

• Lowers participation in land sales market.

– This has implications on subdivision and minimum plot size which is currently 1 ha (higher than the average plot size).

Characteristics of pilot cells

• Gasabo (urban; pop 3,500/km2)– Thriving informal land market

– Great demand for legalization of existing informal land records

– Expropriation risk considerable

– Interspersed with small agric. plots

• Musanze (N; pop 769/km2)– Pressure on existing tenure system

– Polygamy a major issue & source of conflict

– Land allocation to refugees & soldiers causes additional conflict

– Highly fertile land

• Karongi (W; pop 337/km2)– Severely affected by genocide

– Some earlier efforts at land registration

• Kirehe (E; pop 274/km2)– Past practice of land sharing leads to insecurity

– Boundaries well marked; few conflicts; land quality marginal

– e

Explaining process and map

Field adjudication with neighbors

Locating parcels on the index map

Processing claims receipts

the impacts of land title registration: evidence from a...

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