the impact of the covid-19 outbreak on governance, peace
TRANSCRIPT
R E G I O N A L B R I E FN O V E M B E R 2 0 2 0
The Impact of the COVID-19 Outbreak on Governance, Peace and Security in the Sahel
Jointly published by the African Union Commission and UNDP Regional Service Center Africa (2020) African Union Commission P.O. Box 3243Roosevelt Street (Old Airport Area) W21K19Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Email: [email protected]
United Nations Development Programme P.O. Box 60130Main Bole Road, Olympia round about, DRC StreetAddis Ababa, EthiopiaEmail: [email protected]
This publication is the property of the African Union Commission through the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) and the Peace and Security Department, with the generous support of UNDP. No part of this publication may be replicated in any form without the permission of the African Union Commission and UNDP.
ForewordThe novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) has spread rapidlyaround the world since it was first identified in December 2019.This pandemic represents a major crisis for countries across theAfrican continent, not only in the risk to lives. Africa has a youngpopulation, which should decrease the numbers of severe cases,but it has large numbers of people with underlying healthconditions which make them vulnerable. Perhaps mostsignificantly, health systems have very limited capacity to treatsevere cases. Importantly, the economic impacts will be severe.Measures to contain the spread of COVID-19 will inhibiteconomic activity and could hit the poor hardest, especiallythose living in cities. The World Bank’s bi-annual Africa’s Pulsereport suggests that sub-Saharan Africa could experience its firstcollective recession in 25 years.
The consequences of COVID-19 pandemic could be long-lasting.Supporting countries to address the immediate and long-termimpact of COVID-19 requires a regional approach. Theleadership of the African Union has been crucial andcommendable. It will continue to support governments to makeextremely difficult choices, rather than make false compromises,to address the impact of COVID-19 across the continent. TheAfrica Joint Continental Strategy for COVID-19 provides a clearvision for how the African Union will work with its Member Statesto address the multi-faceted challenges posed by the pandemic.
Whilst the focus has been on mitigating the health and socio-economic impacts, COVID-19 has thepossibility of significantly impacting governance, peace and security and reversing gains made in Africa.COVID-19 could delay electoral processes and could affect accountability, service delivery and the questfor improved governance on the continent. In addition, the virus has delayed the implementation ofcritical peace agreements and hampered our mediation efforts at the local level. Terrorist and non-statearmed groups have not ceased their attacks against innocent populations. In West Africa, Boko Haraminsurgents launched an offensive against an army base claiming the lives of hundreds of peacekeepers.In the Horn of Africa, Al-Shabaab has continued to pose significant risks to civilian populations in theregion, especially in Somalia and Kenya. While the spread of terrorism and extremism on the continent isworrisome, it is even more alarming to see terror groups leverage on the outbreak of coronavirus tospread misinformation as a recruitment tactic.
While COVID-19 creates clear challenges to government effectiveness and risks to peace and security,the pandemic may, in place, also present renewed opportunities for enhancing governance or achievingbreakthroughs to lasting peace in parts of Africa.
It is against this backdrop that the African Union Commission and Africa CDC through its partnershipwith UNDP Regional Service Centre for Africa launched reports to assess the impact of COVID-19 ongovernance, peace and security, with a focus on the Horn of Africa and the Sahel region.
This edition on the G5 Sahel region consolidates trends with a view to identifying multi-layeredresponses to COVID-19 in the region. It provides an overview of the epidemiological trends across theregion and a reflection on how COVID-19 is impacting governance indicators as well as peace andsecurity trends in the Sahel region. The report concludes a set of recommendations for consideration bythe African Union, Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention,Management and Resolutions (RECs/RMs) and Member States. It is hoped that the informationcontained in this brief will enhance our collective understanding of the unfolding consequences in the G5Sahel region and provide the foundation of relevant multidimensional interventions to address this crisisof humanity.
H.E Ambassador Smail Chergui AU Commissioner for Peace and Security
Acknowledgements
This report was largely drafted around August-September 2020. It has been updated in placesto reflect some major events and new data upto November 2020.
This preliminary report on the governanceresponse to COVID-19 by African Union MemberStates was prepared under the overall technicalleadership and guidance of Stan Nkwain andJide Okeke with the extraordinary support ofFatma Ahmed at UNDP Regional Service CenterAfrica. Special thanks to UNDP TechnicalReference Group for their inputs and valuablefeedback notably: Philliat Matsheza, KristofferTangri, Nika Saeedi, Nirina Kiplagat, LucyTurner, Lea Zoric, Tim Heine, Leanne McKay,Jon Dean, Usman Iftikhar, Armand-MichelBroux, Waly Ndiaye, Hawa Aw, Clement Hamon,Sofiene Bacha, David Omozuafoh, YoshihiroSaito, Raymond Gilpin, Angela Lusigi and EuniceKamwendo; and to UNDP Country Office teamsin the region: Isabelle Tschan, Jeanne-MarieZongo Sedegho, Patrick McCarthy, Aime RobeyeRirangar, Olivier Tshibola, Stephen KinlochPichat, Natacha Kunama, Mohamed AgAlhousseini, Fah Brahim Jiddou, Aziza Albachir,and Justin Singbo.
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Appreciation to UNDP Resident Representativesfor their feedback, Mathieu Ciowela (BurkinaFaso), Lisa Singh (Chad), Jo Scheuer (Mali),Anthony Ngororano (Mauritania), and DianaLouise Ofwona (Niger).
The findings also benefited from inputs fromcolleagues from the Department of Peace andSecurity as well as Political Affairs of the AfricanUnion Commission and Africa CDC, whoprovided deep insights, strong collaboration andpartnership to shape the report. Specialappreciation to Amb. Fred Ngoga, Mbari Calixte,Abdelkader Araouna, Guy Tapoko, AhmedMokhtar, Mfrekeobong Ukpanah, John Ikubaje,Edwige Mensah, Jesus Cecilio, Nessma Senhadriand Zinurine Alghali.
The report was developed in close collaborationwith Dalberg Advisors.
SUMMARY
STATUS OF COVID-19
GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO COVID-19
STATE OF THE ECONOMY, LIVELIHOODS, FOOD SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH
IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON GOVERNANCE
IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON PEACE AND SECURITY
INITIATIVES TAKEN BY AFRICAN REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS
RECOMMENDED AREAS FOR REGIONAL ACTION
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Contents
SummaryCOVID-19 cases and fatalities across theG5 Sahel nations—Burkina Faso, Chad,Mali, Mauritania and Niger—are relativelylow by international standards, but thefigures are uncertain because of thelimited testing capacity. As of 21 November,there were 17,891 cases and 551 deaths causedby COVID-19. The numbers peaked in June buthave been significantly lower in recent months.However, it is likely that many cases and deathsgo unreported given the limited testing capacity.Most governments of the G5 Sahel countrieshave taken measures to contain the spread ofCOVID-19, but they did not impose fulllockdowns or severe restrictions, and somemeasures have been relaxed or lifted in the pasttwo months following protests in Mali andBurkina Faso.
COVID-19 will hinder the complex task torestore peace and security to the G5 Sahelregion. Violence and instability, driven byextremist and organized crime groups, wasgrowing rapidly in scale, and expandinggeographically in the western Sahel, even beforethe COVID-19 outbreak. Extremist groups havecontinued their activities, including killings ofcivilians, since the onset of the COVID-19pandemic, and security forces have alsocontinued operations to combat the terroristgroups. On 23 March 2020, in the Lake ChadBasin, Boko Haram killed 98 Chadian soldiers inBoma. Regional and international efforts tocounter terrorism have continued amidstCOVID-19. The G5 Sahel Joint Force and French
7
forces have conducted joint operations againstthe Islamic State in the Greater Sahara in theLiptako-Gourma region between Burkina Faso,Mali and Niger, and the French forces killed theleader of al-Qaeda in the IslamicMaghreb, Abdelmalek Droukdel, in an operationin Mali in June. Organized crime groups remaina major source of insecurity.
Food security is a major challenge in theregion, which could be exacerbated by thesocio-economic impacts of COVID-19.According to the Famine Early Warning SystemsNetwork, the food security status of mosthouseholds displaced by conflict will remain atthe “crisis” level. COVID-19 has made thesituation worse by reducing access toagricultural inputs and labour.
The effect of COVID-19 on the state ofgovernance has varied across the G5 Sahelnations. Mali has undergone major politicalturmoil after a coup led to the President’sresignation and dissolution of the governmentfollowing months of major protests. Theseprotests started around the legislative electionsin March/April, which happened despite COVID-19 and the kidnapping of the opposition leaderSoumaïla Cissé and had a low voter turnout of35%. In Burkina Faso, presidential andparliamentary elections were held as planned on22 November 2020, while Niger is due to holdits presidential election on 27 December 2020.In Chad, however, legislative elections werepostponed amid COVID-19.
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COVID-19 has increased demand forpublic services, and at the same time,hampered governments’ ability to deliverthese services, which will further exacerbatethe dire security situation in the region. COVID-19 has further heightened public discontent,which pushed some governments to liftmovement restriction measures, such as theclosure of markets and places of worship.
Regional and international institutionshave taken several initiatives to supportthe G5 Sahel nations in their COVID-19responses. Key initiatives include the AfricanUnion’s Joint Continental Strategy on COVID-19and the African Union COVID-19 Response Fundto strengthen the continental response to thepandemic. The Sahel Alliance pledged EUR 800million to help build health capacity and assistG5 Sahel governments in limiting the impact ofthe pandemic on their economies. ECOWAS alsoprovided funding to strengthen membercountries’ health systems. Finally, ECCAS set upa regional strategy to support Member States.
There are four key elements to the currentcrisis, which the recommendations in thisreport aim to address. (i) Enhancing securityand addressing violent extremism in the regionby expanding information and direct actionagainst groups, (ii) resolving intercommunaltensions and strengthening local voices forpeace, by empowering local leaders, increasinglocal dialogues and engagement, and supportinggovernment capacities, (iii) supportingvulnerable populations, by increasing foodsecurity and addressing urgent needs, and byimproving livelihoods and curbing the diresocioeconomic impacts of the pandemic, and (iv)strengthening state presence and services tosupport governments in public service deliveryand in delivering elections, while strengtheningthe social contract with their populations.
Source: 1,3World Health Organization; 2Rapport de Situation COVID-19 Mali – September 2020
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Status of COVID-19
As of 21 November 2020, the G5 Sahelnations have confirmed 17,891 cases and551 deaths from COVID-19, with the highestconcentration being in urban centers. Mauritaniaaccounts for the largest number of cases anddeaths, probably a reflection of more extensivetesting compared to other countries. Nigerreports the lowest caseload, at 1,335, andBurkina Faso reports the lowest number offatalities, at 68.1 Since June, the number ofconfirmed daily cases and deaths from COVID-19 has drastically slowed down.
Reported case numbers are likely to besignificantly understated due to limitedtesting capacity across all countries. BySeptember 2020, for example, Mali hadadministered 39,175 tests for a population of 19million.2
The falling rates of COVID-19 cases anddeaths are perhaps surprising given thatmost measures were lifted starting in April andno new measures that would suggest that thevirus has been contained were introduced.
Figure 1: New cases and deaths of COVID-193
7-day rolling average, as of 21 November 2020
0
50
100
150
200
250
0
10
20
5
15
Number of new cases Number of new deaths
Deaths551
Cases confirmed17,891
Source: 4World Health Organization
Chad1,626 cases101 deaths
Mali4,169 cases143 deaths
Mauritania8,075 cases169 deaths
Niger1,335 cases70 deaths
Figure 2: Daily confirmed cases and deaths of COVID-194
7-day rolling average, independent scales for cases and deaths, as of 21 November 2020
10
Burkina Faso2,686 cases68 deaths
Government responses to COVID-19
G5 Sahel nations have taken a series ofmeasures to contain the spread of COVID-19, but most governments did not imposefull lockdowns or severe restrictions, andsome measures have been relaxed or liftedin the past two months. The governmentssuspended international flights, closed theirborders, shut down schools, limited publicgatherings and some introduced curfews. A fewsocial and economic measures were takenacross countries, such as helping the mostaffected business sectors and providingeconomic palliatives to vulnerable population.
Source: 5Dalberg Dashboard (Government Actions on COVID-19 in Developing Countries)
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Some measures taken by the governmentsto contain the spread of the virus such asclosure of markets and places of worshipwere met with strong opposition from thepublic in some countries, which resulted inlifting certain movement restrictionmeasures. In April 2020, traders inOuagadougou, in Burkina Faso, protested thegovernment’s decision to close markets,prompting the authorities to re-open themshortly after. In Mali, the government also liftedcertain movement restriction measures afterviolent protests erupted throughout the country.
Figure 3: Actions taken in response to COVID-19 pandemic up until end of August 20205
Category Intervention Category Burkina Faso Chad Mali Mauritania Niger
Government Coordination and Legal Authorization
Emergency administrative structures activated or established
Yes30 June
Yes15 May
Yes25 March
Yes18 March
Yes27 March
State of emergency declaration Yes26 March
Yes25 April
Yes26 March
Yes 22 March
Yes27 March
Full lockdown of some areasPartial
26 MarchEnd: 5 May
Yes8 May No Yes
22 March No
Full lockdown of whole country No No No Yes22 March No
Yes<start>
Intervention was taken and is ongoing
Yes<start><end>
Intervention was taken in the past
Partial<start>
Intervention was partially implemented
No Intervention was not taken
12
Figure 3: Actions taken in response to the COVID-19 pandemic (continued)Start to end date, if known
Category Intervention Category Burkina Faso Chad Mali Mauritania Niger
Movement Restrictions
Ban of entry for non-citizens/residents No Yes18 March No Yes
22 MarchYes
20 MarchBan on entry for all non-citizens (including residents) No Yes
18 March No Yes22 March
Yes20 March
Ban on entry for all persons Partial Yes18 March Partial Yes
18 MarchYes
20 Mar
Advice to citizens/residents against travel to other countries No No No Yes
22 March No
Suspension of flights to/from affected countries
Yes21 March
Yes18 March
Yes18 March
Yes16 March
Yes20 March
Movement Restrictions -Within Country
Advice against non-essential travel between cities/provinces
Yes26 March No Yes
18 MarchYes
27 March No
Ban on travel to/from affected cities/provinces Partial Yes
8 May No Yes27 March
Yes27 March
Social Distancing - Closures
Ban on mass gatherings of more than 250 people
Yes11 March
Yes18 March
Yes18 March
Yes27 March
Yes17 March -
End: 22 May
Ban on mass gatherings of more than 50 people
Yes11 March
Yes18 March
Yes18 March
Yes27 March
Yes17 March -
End: 22 May
Closure of schools and universitiesYes
26 March -End: 11 May
Yes23 March -
End: 25 Jun.
Yes18 March -End: 3 June
Yes14 March -End: 1 July
Yes17 March -End: 1 June
Closure of bars and other social venues
Yes24 March -
End: 17 MayYes
23 MarchYes
18 MarchYes
14 MarchYes
17 March
Closure of religious buildings and sitesYes
21 March -End: 10 May
Yes20 MarchEnd: 25
June
NoYes
14 March -End: 10 May
Yes 17 March -
End: 13 May
Closure of government offices Partial No No Yes27 March No
Closure of non-essential retail and other businesses serving public
Partial24 March
Yes23 March
Partial18 March
Yes14 March -End: 6 May
No
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Category Interventions Burkina Faso Chad Mali Mauritania Niger
Social Distancing - Physical Distancing Between People
Advice to stay at home and work from home Partial No No Yes
22 March No
Requirement to stay at home except for purchasing essentials, medical care, daily exercise and work if necessary
No No No Yes27 March No
Curfew for parts of each dayYes
21 March -End: 3 June
Yes2 April
Yes26 March -End: 8 May
Yes18 March –End : 8 July
Yes28 March -
End: 13 MayRequirement to use surgical masks in high-traffic locations
Yes27 April
Yes13 April
Yes10 April
Yes15 June
Yes10 April
Social distancing indicators and infrastructure No No No No No
Special actions for prisons, military barracks or other high-density settings
Yes2 April No Yes
8 May No Yes27 March
Strengthening the Healthcare System
Expansion of basic supplies - PPE, masks, hand sanitizers, etc. Yes Yes
14 April Yes Yes28 March
Yes27 March
Additional pay for healthcare workers No Yes15 May
Yes10 April No No
Accelerated graduation and deployment of healthcare students No No No No No
Call for volunteers from trained healthcare workers who are retired, working in other positions or working abroad
No No No YesMid-June
Yes27 March
Psychological assistance and medical social work No No No No No
Economic and Social Measures
Postponement of cancellation of payments of fees for public services
Partial2 April
Yes1 April Partial Yes
25 MarchYes
27 MarchPostponement of tax payment deadlines No Yes
1 April No Partial25 March
Yes20 May
Allowances for people required to go into quarantine or self-isolate No No No Yes
25 March No
Special payments or support for people made unemployed due to COVID-19
No No No No No
Partial coverage of wages by government if businesses don't lay off workers
No No No No Yes20 May
Direct payments to people (either payments or tax rebates)
Yes2 April No Partial
10 April No No
Emergency assistance to most affected business sectors
Yes 3 April
Yes20 May
Yes10 April
Yes25 March
Yes20 May
Figure 3: Actions taken in response to the COVID-19 pandemic (continued)Start to end date, if known
State of economy, livelihoods, food security and public health
Source: 6, 7IMF World Economic Outlook (April 2020)
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ECONOMY
The IMF downgraded its forecasts for theeconomies of the G5 Sahel nations amidCOVID-19. The IMF adjusted Mauritania’s GDPannual growth rate forecast from 6.3% to -2%,Chad from 3.2% to -0.2%, Niger from 6% to1%, Mali from 5% to 1.5% and Burkina Fasofrom 5.8% to 2.0%.6
The G5 Sahel nations are considered low-income countries and the COVID-19outbreak could strain an already difficultmacroeconomic environment in the Sahel.Mauritania is the most heavily impacted country,
which might be due to the strict measures thatthe government has imposed compared to otherG5 Sahel nations. Constrained by theirlandlocked status, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali andNiger, rely heavily on their neighboringcountries’ seaports for the movement of goodsand services to and from international markets.Due to COVID-19 lockdown measures andinternational restrictions on the movement ofgoods and people, landlocked countries facerestraints on exports and on imports of goods,medical equipment and other basiccommodities. The COVID-19 outbreak and thedrop in international oil prices have had a severeeconomic and social impact on Chad.
Figure 4: Adjusted growth forecasts7
Burkina Faso Chad Mauritania Mali Niger
Original 2020forecast 5.8% 3.2% 6,3% 5% 6%
COVID-19 adjusted 2020 forecast 2% -0.2% -2,0% 1,5% 1%
POVERTY AND LIVELIHOODS
COVID-19 risks reversing developmentgains of Agenda 2063 and the 2030Sustainable Development Agenda andthreatening the livelihoods of millions ofpeople in the Sahel and the Lake ChadBasin. G5 Sahel nations rank at the bottom ofthe Human Development Index. In the G5 Sahelregion, over 10 million people are estimated tobe in need of humanitarian assistance.8 Thissituation is likely to worsen, partly due to theimpact of COVID-19, but mostly due toincreasing violence and conflict in the region.
Most people in urban areas work in theinformal sector, which was severelyaffected by COVID-19 measures. Movementrestrictions and health measures taken by theauthorities have negatively impacted daily wageearners. In Burkina Faso, the informal economyaccounts for 49.2% GDP and employs 95% theurban population.9 Similarly, in Mali, 73% of thepopulation work in the informal sector.10
In the Sahel region, 25 million peoplework in the agro-pastoral industry and arelikely to witness a reduction in theirincomes due to COVID-19.11 Movementrestrictions and closures of businesses are
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mpacting the livelihoods of farmers as theycannot access markets.
According to a survey by Réseau BillitalMaroobé, a collective of West Africanherders, nearly half of the region'spastoralists can no longer travel with theirlivestock to graze or access water sourcesdue to movement restrictions related toCOVID-19. Humanitarian aid workers reportedthat herders are not only in need of foodassistance for themselves and their families, butthey also need animal feed for their livestock.12
Schools have been closed across the G5Sahel region to limit the spread of COVID-19, affecting the education ofapproximately 12 million children who aretemporarily out of school.14 According toUNICEF, prior to COVID-19, over 8 millionchildren between the ages of 6-14 years werealready out of school in the region and COVID-19 might jeopardize children’s formal learning,particularly girls.
Women in the G5 Sahel region will bedisproportionately affected by theeconomic slowdown. The loss of livelihoodswill disproportionately affect women who makeup large segments of the informal sector.
Source: 8ACAPS; 9ILO; 10Agence d’Information du Burkina News; 11, 13 Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel; 12UNDP HDI; 14UNICEF
0.000
0.200
0.400
0.600
0.800
1.000
Niger Chad Mali Burkina Faso Mauritania
SSAaverage
Figure 5: Human Development Index12
Rank out of 189 countries, 2018
189th
187th
184th
182nd 161st
HEALTH SYSTEMS
The G5 Sahel nations have some of theweakest health systems in the world.According to the Global Health Security Index,the G5 Sahel countries are ill-prepared for apandemic. Niger, which ranks highest amongthe Sahel countries in the 2019 Global HealthSecurity Index only ranks 132nd out of 195countries; Burkina Faso is 145th, Mali is 147th,Chad is 150th, and Mauritania ranks the lowestat 157th.15
Healthcare systems in the Sahel regionmay not be able to handle large numbersof COVID-19 cases. Health expenditure acrossthe G5 Sahel nations is an average of 5% oftotal GDP, which is below the Sub-Saharan andthe world averages.16 The health systems sufferfrom a shortage of doctors and nurses. There isa reliance on imports for medical equipment andmedicines. With the disruption of global medicalsupply chains and the increase in globalcompetition for PPE and other medicalequipment, some countries in the Sahel are athigh risk of being unable to treat people who
Figure 7: Maternal mortality ratio23
per 100,000 live births
16
are infected with COVID-19 and in a criticalcondition. When the pandemic hit, Mauritaniareportedly only had one ventilator for apopulation of over 4 million people18 and Malihad 56 ventilators for 19 million people.19 ICUcapacity was also limited across the region.Burkina Faso had 15 ICU beds while Chadreportedly had 60 ICU beds for a population of22 million people.20, 21
One of the main health challenges, womenin the Sahel region face is access to qualitymaternal health, which could worsen withmovement restrictions related to COVID-19. Chad has the highest maternal mortalityrate in the Sahel region (856 per 100,000 livebirths).22 Four out of the G5 Sahel countrieshave a higher maternal mortality rate than theaverage across Sub-Saharan Africa. Movementrestrictions affected women’s access to maternaland new-born care services. In addition, thepressure that COVID-19 puts on healthcaresystems could particularly undermine the sexualand reproductive health and rights of womenand girls.
Source: 15Global Health Security Index (2019); 16UNDP HDR; 17, 23WHO; 18, 20, 21Reuters News; 19Al Jazeera News; 22UN Women
Figure 6: Current health expenditure per capita (current USD, 2017)17
856
602 587 553
371
0
250
500
750
1,000
Mal
i
Chad
SSA average
Mau
ritan
ia
Nige
r
Burk
ina
Faso
29
30
31
44
49
84Sub-Saharan Africa
Mali
Chad
Niger
Mauritania
Burkina Faso
FOOD SECURITY
Despite the arrival of harvest season,significant numbers of people across theG5 Sahel are still at “crisis” or “stressed”levels of food insecurity, according to thephases used by the Famine Early WarningSystems Network.24 Conflict and climatechange are the primary drivers of persistentfood insecurity for millions of people across theG5 Sahel region. Conflict has led to massivedisplacement of populations, destruction orclosure of basic social services, disruption ofproductive activities, markets, and trade flows.Although harvests are above average in manyparts of the Sahel, below-average harvests areexpected in conflict zones such as the LiptakoGourma cross-border region between BurkinaFaso, Mali and Niger, and the Lake Chas Basin.25
17
COVID-19 has added to the food insecuritycrisis in the G5 Sahel nations. The FamineEarly Warning Network notes that COVID-19reduced access for farmers to inputs andagricultural labour, and that the livestock tradewas disrupted by movement restrictions (as welland conflict and violence in some pastoralareas).26 Many urban households had theirlivelihoods constrained by COVID-19 controlmeasures, and thus likely experienced losses ofincome with which to purchase food.
Roughly 2.5 million children in the Sahelregion are undernourished and COVID-19might exacerbate the malnutritionsituation in the region.27 Over 500,000children across the G5 Sahel countries lostaccess to WFP school meals due to schoolclosures.28
Source: 24, 25, 26, 27, 29 Famine Early Warning Systems Network – West Africa Food Security Outlook; 28World Food Programme
Phase 1: Minimal Phase 2: Stressed Phase 3: Crisis
Phase 4: Emergency Phase 5: Famine Not analysed
September 2020 October 2020 – January 2021
Figure 8: Food security situation in the Sahel29
September 2020 to January 2021
Impact of COVID-19 on governance
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SUMMARY Since Jan 2020 Outlook
COVID-19 effects on governance across the G5 Sahel nationshave been mixed, but overall COVID-19 has adversely affectedgovernment effectiveness in delivering public services. Mali’sPresident has resigned following months of political unrest and amilitary coup – not specifically driven by COVID-19, although itmay have contributed to low turnout in the legislative elections inMarch/April, which prompted the start of protests. The pandemichas slowed electoral processes in Burkina Faso and Niger andcontributed to the postponement of legislative elections in Chad.No major changes have been reported in Mauritania.
Positive Limitedchange Negative
Improving or deteriorating - arrow direction Impact of COVID-19 and other factors - arrow fillPrimarily driven by non-COVID-19 factors
Primarily driven by COVID-19
G5 Sahel nations rank at the bottom of theWorld Bank’s Governance Indicators,particularly with regard to political stability. Theregion includes countries that are very fragile.Mali ranks the lowest in political stabilityamongst the G5 Sahel nations.
GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS
COVID-19 has increased the need forpublic services, and, at the same time,decreased governments’ capacity todeliver quality public services. Prior toCOVID-19, there was popular discontent withgovernments’ poor record in delivering publicservices particularly in remote areas and theborderlands. COVID-19 has further exacerbatedthe public discontent, which pushed somegovernments to lift movement restrictionmeasures, such as the closure of markets andplaces of worship.
ELECTIONS
COVID-19 impacted some legislative andpresidential elections in the region, butothers have gone ahead or are planned. Insome countries which postponed elections toafter the pandemic, or considered it, some haveviewed the moves as a manifestation ofgovernments taking advantage of the situationto stretch terms beyond their constitutionallimits. However, there were also calls by citizens
and political parties for the postponement ofelections to reduce and mitigate the spread ofCOVID-19 and to avoid the disenfranchisementof citizens in areas most affected by thepandemic as well as insecurity. As always,decisions surrounding electoral processes arecomplex and must balance multiple elements—these should be well-informed and takenfollowing extensive engagements with politicalactors and civil society to foster peace anddouse tensions, anger and mistrust.
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Figure 9: Parliamentary and presidential elections
Country Parliamentary election Presidential election COVID-19 related
postponements
Burkina Faso 22 November 2020 22 November 2020
• Elections were held as planned on 22 November 2020 –although the government had previously proposed to delay the legislative elections until 2021
Chad October 2021 April 2021• Legislative elections postponed
(initially scheduled for December 2020)
Mali 29 March 2020 19 April 2020 To be determined
• Parliamentary elections were conducted amidst the COVID-19 outbreak, but results were disputed and contributed to the social unrest
• Timing of presidential election to be agreed, following the coup and resignation of President Keita
Mauritania 2023 2024 • Not applicable
Niger 27 December 2020 27 December 2020 • None
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Burkina Faso
Despite an expectation that COVID-19 would contribute to a postponementof presidential and/or legislative elections in Burkina Faso to 2021, bothelections took place as planned on 22 November. Voter registration for theelections and referendum was suspended at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic butresumed in May. After initially proposing in July to delay the legislative elections until2021, the government eventually decided to continue with the initial plan to hold theelections in November.
Despite the threat of jihadist violence, which closed some polling stations, the voteappears to have been largely successful and peaceful. Fourteen soldiers were killed in anambush on 13 November, which led candidates to suspend campaigning for two days.Closure of polling stations meant that about 400,000 voters were unable to cast theirvotes. Nevertheless, these elections represent an important opportunity to calm socialunrest and rebuild social cohesion in the country.
Chad
Legislative elections that were due to happen in December 2020 have beenpostponed amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. The scheduled vote has been delayedfive times since 2015, reportedly due to the lack of funds and the threat posed by BokoHaram. Though postponement might worsen the democratic legitimacy of theparliament, it is unlikely to affect governance.
COVID-19 is unlikely to impact the planned 2021 presidential elections, butthere is a potential risk of an increase in public’s dissatisfaction due to theworsening socio-economic situation in the country amidst the pandemic. The absence ofchange in power over the past three decades raises a risk of a potential futuresuccession crisis.
Mali
Mali held its legislative elections amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. The country’sfirst and second rounds of the legislative elections were held on 29 March and 19 April2020, respectively, despite the COVID-19 pandemic and the kidnapping of the oppositionleader Soumaïla Cissé. The voter turnout for the legislative elections, which had beenlong-delayed, was slightly above 35% in the first round.
The Malian President and several others resigned, and the government wasdissolved, following a coup on 18 August. From May, Mali experienced a wave ofprotests demanding the resignation of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita. The long-delayed legislative elections and allegations of corruption led thousands of Malians totake to the street demanding the President’s resignation. Led by Imam Mahmoud Dicko,the movement gathers his sympathizers but also opposition parties – united under theMouvement du 5 Juin - Rassemblement des Forces Patriotiques (M5-RFP). As a result ofthis political stalemate, ECOWAS, with support from the UN and the AU, has launched amediation process in Mali seeking to defuse the situation. Given Mali’s position as a keyregional player in the fight against terrorism, removing President Ibrahim Boubacar Keitawithout a clear transition plan could create a power vacuum, creating space for jihadistgroups and further threatening stability in the Sahel. The COVID-19 emergency mayhave hindered and distracted from some preventative diplomatic efforts.
21
Niger
The planned 2020 presidential elections are unlikely to be affected by COVID-19; however, there is a risk that the opposition will not participate in theelections and thus reduce their legitimacy. President Mahamadou Issoufou statedthat he is not seeking a third term in office. However, the opposition has boycottedpolitical dialogue with the government and has rejected the new electoral code adoptedin June as well as a process for renewing the electoral list. There is a risk that unless theopposition and government agree on electoral modalities, the elections might not beviewed as free and fair and the next government might not be recognized as legitimate.
WOMEN IN GOVERNANCE
Women are underrepresented in decision-making across the G5 Sahel region andCOVID-19 could delay institutionalreforms to increase women's participationin political and public spheres. Mauritaniahas the highest representation of women inparliament with 20.3%, followed by BurkinaFaso and Chad with 13.4% and 13%. Mali andNiger have the lowest representation of womenin parliament with 8.8% and 5.5%respectively.30 Similarly, Mauritania has thehighest representation of women in cabinet,with 32%, followed by Niger with 25%, and Maliand Chad both with 21%. Burkina Faso has thelowest representation with 14% of women incabinet. The conditions in which elections willtake place and have taken place in somecountries amidst COVID-19 could not allow forincreased sensitization of voters towards theparticipation of women.
Government responses to COVID-19 wouldbenefit from a stronger gender lens. Thelimited role for women in governance has likelycontributed to limited considerations on howgovernment actions may disproportionatelyharm women, e.g., increased domestic violence,and the increased burden of care at homefurther limiting economic opportunity.
Source: 30, 31UN Women & Inter-Parliamentary Union; 32, 33, 34Amnesty International
22
HUMAN RIGHTS
Allegations of human rights violations inthe region have been made since the startof COVID-19, some of which were notnecessarily caused by the pandemic.Soldiers rampaging through villages in Mali,Niger and Burkina Faso have reportedly killed orforcibly disappeared at least 199 peoplebetween February and April 2020.32 Some of thekillings amount to extrajudicial executions andamong the victims, are internally displacedpersons. The killings have been underscored byethnic dynamics, and the vast majority of peoplekilled by alleged security forces are Fulanibecause of their perceived support of the armedextremist groups.
In Mali, at least 23 people were killedextrajudicially and 27 others werearrested by the Malian army in the communesof Diabaly and Dogofry between 3 February and11 March 2020.33 Regular deadly clashesbetween Fulani and Dogon as well as Bambarapeople are reported, especially in areas underlimited government influence. Dogon self-defense militias, created to provide security forsome communities, are regularly accused oftargeting Fulani, often following terroristattacks.
In Burkina Faso, there are allegations ofseveral human rights violations committedby security forces in March and April 2020.On 29 March, Issouf Barry, a local councilor inSollé, Hamidou Barry, the village chief of Sollé,and Oumarou Barry, a member of the princelyfamily of Banh, were abducted in their homes inOuahigouya.34
COVID-19 and associated restrictions mayhave led to increased violations of humanrights. Movement restrictions may have led toincreased domestic and sexual violence,restricted movement and access to food, andthe restricted rights to vote. The loss oflivelihoods along with fragile political andsecurity contexts could lead to further violations.
20.3%
13.4% 13.0%
8.8%
5.5%
0
5
10
15
20
25
MaliBurkina Faso
Mauritania Chad Niger
Figure 10: Representation of women in parliament31
In Niger, 102 people from the south-westregion of Tillabéry were arrested by thearmy as part of Operation Almahoubetween 27 March and 2 April.35 AmnestyInternational reported that 48 people werearrested on their way to and from a market fairin Ayorou between 27 and 29 March by Nigeriensoldiers.36 The 54 others were arrested bysecurity forces in several villages on 2 April.37
Boko Haram remains responsible forhuman rights violations in Chad.Displacement linked to attacks by armed groupsin the Lake Chad province is recurrent andaffects around 169,000 people.38 Additionally,the March 2020 attack by Boko Haram in theLake Chad Basin has displaced thousands ofpeople.
There have been several cases ofpurported excessive use of force bydefense and security forces in Chad.Notably, in February 2019, defense and securityforces reportedly opened fire on a group ofwomen, wounding 10 of them, during a protestin Abéché.
Source: 35, 36, 37, 38Amnesty International; 39, 40Fragile States Index
23
RULE OF LAW
The G5 Sahel countries rank low in theHuman Rights and Rule of Law sub-indexof the Fragile States Index.39 Burkina Fasoperforms better on this sub-index than the otherG5 Sahel nations.
The effectiveness of judicial systems,already limited, could be further hindereddue to COVID-19 and reduced governmentbudgets. The impact of COVID-19 and theexpenditure on the response, coupled with othershocks, will reduce government budgets in mostcountries, which could hinder the effectivenessof judiciaries. Operations of courts were limitedand could have reduced access to justice.
The fairness of the judicial system has notchanged due to COVID-19. However,generally, judicial systems have been viewed asarbitrary across the region due to weakinstitutional capacity of legal institutions as wellas the rampant corruption in judicial systems.
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
5
1
0
7
6
8
9
10
Chad
MauritaniaNigerBurkina Faso
Mali
Figure 11: Human Rights and the Rule of Law (2020 Fragile States Sub-Index)40
Impact of COVID-19 on peace and security
24
SUMMARYSince Jan
2020 Outlook
COVID-19’s impact could worsen the rapidly deterioratingsecurity situation in the G5 Sahel, particularly in the west.Extremist groups and organized crime groups have continuedtheir violent attacks and kidnappings for ransom amidst theCOVID-19 pandemic. There is a risk that the socio-economiceffects of COVID-19 might create a window for extremist groupsto expand their propaganda and recruitment. The fragile politicalsituation in Mali could lead to increased violence and extremismas was the case in 2012. Over the past few months, regional andinternational leaders have continued their efforts and reaffirmedtheir commitment to combat violent extremism in the region, butmore has to be done given the worsening situation.
Positive Limitedchange Negative
Improving or deteriorating - arrow direction Impact of COVID-19 and other factors - arrow fillPrimarily driven by non-COVID-19 factors
Primarily driven by COVID-19
25
Likely impact of COVID-19
Radicalization and violent extremist recruitmentExtremist groups have integrated COVID-19 in their narratives andpropaganda to gain more support and also providing basic services tocommunities in dire need. There is an increased risk that COVID-19 couldsolidify extremist groups with an opportunity to act as an alternativeservice provider, reducing the state’s legitimacy. The effects of COVID-19on livelihoods might create a situation in which individuals are morereceptive to radical ideologies or might consider joining or assistingviolent extremist groups for money.
Increased risk
Ability of governments to deploy security forcesCOVID-19 has not had an impact on national governments’ willingnessand ability to deploy security forces within their countries and to the G5Sahel Joint Force. There is however a risk that as the effects of COVID-19on the economy deepens, governments might not be able to sustainmilitary spending.
Limited impact
Regional and international support for counter-terrorismoperationsTo date, COVID-19 has not affected regional and international support forcounter-terrorism operations. Regional and international leaders havereaffirmed their support and provided additional funding to address thesecurity issues in the region.
Limited impact
International support to development needs and underlyingcauses of violent extremismRegional and international leaders have continued their support to peaceand development efforts in the region, funding programs that addressthese issues and build resilience of communities in the G5 Sahel region.
Limited impact
Source: 41Fragile States Index
26
Figure 12: Fragile States Index (rank out of 178 countries) 41
2020
PEACE AND SECURITY CONTEXTPRIOR TO COVID-19
The G5 Sahel region is one of the mostunstable and vulnerable regions in theworld. All G5 Sahel nations are fragileaccording to the 2020 Fragile States Index. Theregion is characterized by violent events linkedto militant extremist groups.
There are two distinct conflict areas (1)Mali/ Burkina Faso/ Niger and (2) theLake Chad Basin.
The threat from extremist groups hasspread from northern Mali to neighboringcountries since 2012. After the collapse ofthe Qaddafi regime in Libya in 2011, heavilyarmed Tuaregs and non-Tuaregs who had beenpart of Qaddafi’s army returned to Niger andnorthern Mali, where the latter led the 2012rebellion against the government aimed atcreating an independent state.
0
40
80
120
Mali
Fragility score
Burkina FasoChad Niger
SSAaverage
Mauritania
The rebellion rapidly developed into violentextremist insurgency with the proliferation andspread of violent extremist groups throughoutthe country and into neighboring countries.
Extremist groups have exploited existingintercommunal conflicts and createdrecruitment narratives centered onmarginalization. Tensions betweenpastoralists and sedentary populations havehistorically always existed because ofcompetition over land, water and forage.Extremist groups have exploited these tensionsand targeted Fulani herders in the region,exploiting their resentment towards thegovernment and communities that havemarginalized them. The increase in extremistactivities reinforces communities’ need forprotection and endangers the social cohesionamongst communities.
Source: 42Crisis Group
27
The main threat to peace and security inthe Lake Chad Basin is the presence ofBoko Haram and Islamic State in WestAfrica Province (ISWAP). Boko Haram firstdeveloped in Nigeria in 2009. In 2014-2015,Boko Haram expanded their operations intoNorthern Cameroon, Niger and Chad. Prior to2015, Boko Haram’s presence on the Chadianside of the Lake Chad Basin was limited.Violence increased when Chad sent troops toCameroon and Niger to support their efforts incombating violent extremism. Following that,two terrorist attacks were reported inN’Djamena in 2015.
Boko Haram and the Islamic State in WestAfrica Province (ISWAP) have exploited
inter-communal conflicts over limitedresources in the Lake Chad Basin Area andthe shortcomings of the region’s states indealing with their peripheral areas.Decades of depletion of the lake due to climatechange and overuse of water resources and theshifts in population movements are contributingto the increase in competition over theresources of the lake. Populations in the LakeChad Basin have been neglected by all fourcountries—for example, there is only one doctorfor every 140,000 inhabitants.42 The lack ofpublic service delivery and the distantrelationships between the populations of theLake Chad Basin and their governments havehelped extremist groups to recruit and grow.
Source: 43, 44Africa Center for Strategic Studies; 45European Council on Foreign Relations
28
OVERVIEW OF EXTREMIST GROUPSOPERATING IN THE REGION
Over the past few years, many differentextremist groups have been formed in theG5 Sahel region. Prior to 2012, only onemilitant Islamist group, Al-Qaeda in the IslamicMaghreb (AQIM), operated in Mali. By 2018,more than ten different groups were active inMali, Burkina Faso and Niger.43 Three groups,the Macina Liberation Front (FLM) which is anaffiliate of Ansar al-Din, the Islamic State in theGreater Sahara (ISGS), and Ansarul Islam, areresponsible for two-thirds of the extremistviolence in the Mali/ Burkina Faso/ Niger regionin recent years.44
In the Lake Chad Basin, Boko Haram isresponsible for most terrorist attacks, butISWAP remains active in the region.
The violent activities in the G5 Sahelregion are mainly driven by economicfactors. Extremist groups continue usingkidnapping for ransom to sustain theiroperations. In some cases, extremist groupshave collaborated with criminal groups inkidnapping operations. They have also forgeddeals with traffickers to pay a “tax” fortransporting their goods across the territoriesthey control and have collaborated with criminalgroups in kidnapping hostages. In agriculturalareas, some communities pay “taxes” or fees inreturn for protection and security.
Figure 13: Active militant extremist groups in the G5 Sahel region45
Source: 46Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); 47European Commission; 48MINUSMA; 40The French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs; 50European Council on Foreign Relations
29
NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY RESPONSES
The governments of Mali, Burkina Fasoand Niger have increased their militaryspending to combat violent extremism.The budgets dedicated to the armed forces inthese three countries has doubled since 2013—from 5.4% of government spending, onaverage, to 10.6%.46
The Heads of State of the regionestablished the G5 Sahel in 2014 and theG5 Sahel Joint Force in 2017 to addressthe development and security challengesin the region. The G5 Sahel, anintergovernmental cooperation framework, aimsto coordinate efforts of the five Sahel countriesto respond to the development and securitychallenges of the region. The G5 Sahel JointForce was launched in 2017 to counter terrorismand to fight cross-border organized crimes(including arms and drug smuggling and humantrafficking). The Joint Force has been endorsedby the African Union Peace and Security Council(PSC) and has conducted several operationsfocusing on the Liptako-Gourma region.
Chad fights Boko Haram domestically andaround the Lake Chad Basin region, andalso contributes to forces in the Liptako-Gourma region (the tri-border areabetween Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger).Chad has contributed 3,000 troops to the Multi-National Joint Task Force against Boko Haram(MNJTF)47, 1,500 to the United Nations Multi-Dimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission inMali (MINUSMA)48 and 1,000 to the G5 SahelJoint Force.49
MINUSMA complements the efforts of theG5 Sahel Joint Force. MINUSMA supports theMalian government in restoring the Stateauthority and stabilizing the country. There areongoing efforts by the AU in collaboration withrelevant RECs/RMs to deploy 3,000 troops tothe G5 Sahel Joint Force.
The European Union has developed anintegrated approach to address thecomplex security and developmentchallenges that the Sahel region faces. TheEU has two Common Security and DefencePolicy (CSDP) missions in Mali and one in Niger,which have largely focused on providing trainingand advice to the armed and security forces inboth countries. In 2012, the EU launched theEuropean Union Capacity Building Mission(EUCAP) in Niger to strengthen the capacity ofNigerien security institutions to counterterrorism and organized crime. In 2015, The EUestablished EUCAP Sahel Mali to support theMalian security forces in stabilizing the country.
The French-led Operation Barkhaneengages in combatting patrols alongsidethe G5 Sahel Joint Force, gatheringintelligence and capacity building ofnational forces. Operation Barkhane isFrance’s largest overseas operation, with abudget of nearly EUR 600 million per year.50 InMarch 2020, in addition to Operation Barkhane,France launched a new taskforce (Takuba) withits European allies to fight jihadist groups in theLiptako-Gourma region alongside the Malian andNigerien armies.
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)51
G5 Sahel Joint Force52
Location MaliMission HQ: Bamako
Operate in all countries with military efforts concentrated in the Liptako-Gourma tri-border region HQ: Mali
Mandate •Support implementation of the Agreement on Peace & Reconciliation in Mali, stabilization, and restoration of state authority in central Mali•Protect civilians•Promote and protect human rights•Help create a secure environment for humanitarian assistance
•Fight terrorism, organized crime and human trafficking•Restore state authority•Help displaced persons to return home
Year est. 2013 2017
Personnel deployed
Over 15,000 soldiers and police officers 5,000
Annual budget (USD)
1.14 billion (2019-2020) 130 million
Major developments since January 2020
On 29 June, the Security Council extended MINUSMA’s mandate for another year until 30 June 2021.In June, two MINUSMA convoys were attacked in Northern and Eastern Mali
In January 2020, the “International Coalition for the Sahel” whose aim is to ensure coherent and holistic action at the regional level, was announced
Source: 51MINUSMA; 52The French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs
30
NIGER
CHAD
MALI
BURKINA FASO
MAURITANIA
• Tessalit
• Kidal
• Gao
• Niamey
• Agadez
• Aguelal
• Madama
• Faya-Largeau
• Abeche
• N’Djamena
• Bamako
• Timbuktu
• Mpoti
Figure 14: Major actors in the security response in the G5 Sahel region
G5 Sahel Joint Force Focus Areas Operation Barkhane
EU Training Mission and EU (EUTM) Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Source: 53French Ministry of Defence; 54EUTM Mali; 55European Union
31
Operation Barkhane53 EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM)54
EU Capacity Building Mission in the Sahel (EUCAP) – Niger55
Location • Present in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad.
• HQ: N’Djamena, Chad
Present in Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania.
Based in Niger’s capital, Niamey
Mandate • French-led operation that:
• Combats and patrols alongside Malian forces
• Gathers intelligence • Supports local
development activities
Focus on four pillars:• Advice• Training• Military education • Support to the G5
Sahel Joint Force
Strengthen the capacity of the Nigerien internal security forces to fight against terrorism, organized crime and irregular migration, through advice, training and delivery of equipment
Year est. 2014 2013 2012
Personnel deployed
5,100 soldiers 745 200
Annual budget (USD)
Over 670 million Mission 2018-2020: Over 67 million
36 million
Major developments since January 2020
France announced in early February that it was deploying 600 additional troops to reinforce Operation Barkhane.
In April, the UK and the US confirmed their intention to maintain their support to the Operation.
On 5 June 2020, French forces killed the leader of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Algerian AbdelmalekDroukdal, in Mali.
On March 2020, the European Council extended the mandate of EUTM until 18 May 2024. The Council also provided an increased indicative budget to the mission of EUR 133.7 million for a four-year period.
Germany extended the deployment of its troops to the mission until 2021
No major developments.
COVID-19 Outbreak
0102030405060708090
100110120130140150
Jun ’19
May ’19
Mar ’19
Feb ’19
Jan ’19
Apr ’19
Jul ’19
Aug ’19
Sep ’19
Oct ’19
Nov ’19
Dec ’19
Jan ’20
May ’20
Feb ’20
Mar ’20
Apr ’20
Source: 56, 57, 58, 59Africa Center for Strategic Studies; 60ACLED
32
Clashes Violence against civiliansExplosions/Remote violence RiotsProtests
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THESECURITY SITUATION
According to ACLED, 800 incidentsinvolving militant Islamist groups inBurkina Faso, Mali and Niger werereported in 2019, which is near doublingevery year since 2015.56 Most of the attackswere in Mali and Burkina Faso. Fatalities fromthese attacks were estimated at around 2,600 in2019, almost double the fatalities in 2018.57
In 2020, most of the violent incidentswere reported within Mali and BurkinaFaso and along the border areas betweenMali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Extremistgroups continued their attacks amidst theCOVID-19 pandemic.
In the Lake Chad Basin, 765 violent events
were recorded in 2019—a 35% increasefrom the previous year.58 Boko Haram isresponsible for the majority of reported violentevents in the region. Fatalities from theseattacks were estimated at around 3,225 in 2019,which is around 4% increase from 2018.59
On 23 March 2020, Boko Haram launcheda deadly attack in Boma, a town in theLake Chad Basin, which led to a battleexchange with Chadian military forces. Themilitary response by the Chadian military,“Operation Wrath of Boma”, was coordinated onthe ground by President Idris Déby.
New commitments and actions have beenmade by G5 Sahel countries and theinternational community to support andintensify counter-terrorism efforts in2020.
Figure 15: Conflicts, protests and violent events60
A joint AU-ECOWAS-G5 Sahel meeting on thedeployment of 3,000 African troops in the Sahelwas held on 16 March in Niamey, Niger. The AUwill deploy an additional 3,000 troops toreinforce G5 Sahel countries’ actions. In thiscontext and amid COVID-19, the AUC and Chinasigned an agreement to support counter-terrorism efforts of the G5 Sahel countries withmilitary equipment.
Earlier in June 2020, the French forces reportedthat they killed the leader of al-Qaeda in NorthAfrica, Abdelmalek Droukdel, in an operation inMali. On 30 June 2020, the G5 Sahel Heads ofState, the French President Emmanuel Macronand the Prime Minister of Spain, Pedro Sánchez,met in Nouakchott, Mauritania, to assess thepeace and security situation in the Sahel andrenew their commitments to combatting violentextremism in the region.
EFFECTS OF COVID-19 TO DATE ANDANTICIPATED IMPACT
The security situation in Mali/ BurkinaFaso/ Niger and the Lake Chad Basin hascontinued to deteriorate amidst theCOVID-19 pandemic. Despite stern calls for aglobal ceasefire by the UN and AU, extremist
33
Groups have continued violent attacks whilegovernments sought to contain the spread ofCOVID-19, particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso andChad. Stigmatization of particular groups iscommon in the region, which COVID-19 canonly worsen, especially in cross-border areasdue to IDP movements and competitionbetween farmer and herder communities. Localmediation and reconciliation efforts are likely tobe negatively impacted by these dynamics.
There were no major changes to the peaceand security situation in Mauritania. SinceCOVID-19 began, there have been no extremistor major violent incidents reported in thecountry.
Looking to the future, there are fourdifferent ways in which COVID-19 mightaffect the future evolution of the securitysituation in the Sahel region: (1)Environment for radicalization and recruitmentby violent extremists, (2) Scale andeffectiveness of G5 national security forces, (3)Extent of regional and international support forcounter-terrorism operations, and (4) Extent ofinternational financing and support fordevelopment and humanitarian responses totackle underlying causes of violent extremism.
Source: 61Africa Center for Strategic Studies
201820160
2017 2019
4,000
2,000
6,000IncidentsFatalities
6,000
4,000
2,000
2016 2017 20180
2019
IncidentsFatalities
Mali, Burkina Faso, Liptako-Gourmaregion Lake Chad Basin
Figure 16: Violent extremist activity61
The socio-economic effects of COVID-19might create fertile ground for recruitmentby violent extremists. Economic crisis andloss of livelihoods might lead to tensions fromcompetition over limited resources, and mightmake individuals more receptive to radicalideologies or force some people into joining orassisting violent extremist groups.
Extremist groups have integrated COVID-19 in their narratives and propaganda togain more support. COVID-19 relatedmovement restrictions and social distancemeasures, such as the closure of places ofworship, have been seized by radical ideologuesto serve as a narrative around governments’anti-Islam sentiments.
COVID-19 could provide extremist groupswith an opportunity to act as analternative service provider, reducing thestate’s legitimacy. As the resources of theSahelian governments are stretched in responseto the COVID-19 pandemic, their ability toprovide services is likely to be strained, creatingvacuums for extremist groups to emerge asservice providers.
Source: 62European Council; 63ACLED
34
In some communities in Mali, Burkina Faso andNiger, extremist groups are collecting “taxes”and fees from communities in exchange ofprovision of security and services.
COVID-19 has not affected governments’ability to deploy security forces as theHeads of State from the five Sahelcountries. In the G5 Sahel Summit that washeld in 30 June 2020 in Nouakchott, Mauritania,G5 Sahel nations and international partnershave renewed their commitment to combattingviolent extremism.
Regional and international partners havecontinued their support for counter-terrorism operations amidst the COVID-19pandemic. During the June G5 Sahel Summit,regional and international leaders agreed tointensify a military campaign against Islamistmilitants in the region. The AU, in collaborationwith relevant RECs/RMs and Stakeholderscontinues to mobilize support for thedeployment of 3,000 troops to enhance theefforts of the G5 Sahel Force, including throughthe use of the African Peace and SecurityArchitecture (APSA) frameworks and othercooperation mechanisms to consolidate
Figure 17: Geographic spread of violent events63
ClashesViolence against civiliansExplosions/ remote violenceMultiple
2020 H12,037 events
2018 H11,013 events
2016 H1554 events
coordination in the fight against terrorist andcriminal groups in the region. In March, theEuropean Council extended the mandate of theEUTM Mali until 18 May 2024 and provided anincreased budget to the mission of EUR 133.7million for a four-year period.62 Germany hasextended its troop deployment to Mali until2021. On 29 June, the Security Councilextended MINUSMA’s mandate until 30 June2021. Due to COVID-19, the troops weredeployed under quarantine measures, which didnot allow for immediate actions, and thereforeled to delayed responses. Some troop rotationswere delayed or cancelled as military and policeforces were quarantined. Some forces taskedwith counter-terrorism operations wereredeployed to enforce government measuressuch as curfews.
Source: 64Alliance Sahel; 65European Commission
35
Regional and international initiatives toaddress the development challenges in theSahel have continued during the COVID-19 outbreak. In response to COVID-19, theSahel Alliance, has provided EUR 800 million tohelp build health capacity and assist G5 Sahelgovernments in limiting the socio-economicimpacts of the pandemic on populations.64 InMay, the European Union launched the Coalitionfor the Sahel, which aims to extend the coalitionto other international partners beyond Europeandonors. The European Union announcedadditional support of EUR 194 million, includingEUR 82 million for resilience and developmentprogrammes.65
HUMANITARIAN SITUATION
Since January 2020, the number of IDPs inthe G5 Sahel region has increased by 15%and COVID-19 is projected to increase theneed for humanitarian assistance acrossthe region. As of 10 November 2020, the G5Sahel region had 1,930,482 IDPs (whichincreased six-fold in the last four years) and857,865 refugees and asylum seekers.66 Duringthe pandemic, camp overcrowding and difficultaccess to water increases the risk of contractingCOVID-19 for IDPs and refugees. In BurkinaFaso, from January 2019 to April 2020, thenumber of people displaced from theircommunities by the conflict increased from87,000 to over 830,000.67
Source: 66, 68, 69UNHCR; 67Human Rights Watch
36
COVID-19 is a risk multiplier that isfurther delaying the response of the G5Sahel nations to address immediatehumanitarian needs. While local andinternational organizations have continued toprovide crucial assistance to refugees and IDPsduring this time, measures taken across all G5Sahel countries to curb the spread of COVID-19further limited humanitarian access. Borderclosures and movement restrictions will alsolikely translate into less humanitarian staffrotation and fewer deployments to most conflictsettings. Furthermore, with several G5 countriespreparing for elections, the issue around voterregistration for IDP populations remains.
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
400 000
800 000
0
1 200 000
1 600 000
2 000 000
276 885
698 527857 865
1 930 482
RefugeesIDPs
NIGER
CHAD
BURKINAFASO
MAURITANIAMALI
336,124 Refugees99,765 IDPs
233,180 Refugees257,095 IDPs
47,991 Refugees287,496 IDPs
20,065 Refugees1,049,767 IDPs
64,644 RefugeesN/A IDPs
Figure 18: Evolution of refugee and IDP populations in the Sahel (2016-2020)68
Figure 19: Refugee and IDP populations in the G5 Sahel as of 10 November 202069
INTERCOMMUNAL VIOLENCE
COVID-19 could worsen existing stressesand lead to increased intercommunaltensions. The loss of livelihoods and economicslowdown will increase economic grievances.The uncertainty created by climate change andthe presence of armed groups is reducing thenumber of routes herders can use to movelivestock. Herders have to move livestock muchearlier in the year and for extended periods oftime in order to find land for grazing. Farmersare struggling to harvest enough cereals andvegetables. Competition for scant resources,poor economic prospects and ever-increasingdemographic pressures are creating tensionsbetween farmers and herders, which sometimesdeteriorate into communal violence. In LiptakoGourma, the escalating violence is preventingentire communities of herders and farmers fromaccessing land or and pasture, threatening theirmain incomes.
WOMEN, PEACE & SECURITY
All G5 Sahel countries score below theSub-Saharan Africa average on theWomen, Peace and Security Index. BurkinaFaso is ranked the highest in the G5 Sahel(136th out of 167 countries). Chad and Mali arethe lowest scorers, ranking 156 and 159 out of167 countries, respectively.70
The COVID-19 pandemic could exacerbatethe rate of domestic and gender-basedviolence (GBV) in the G5 Sahel. Movementrestriction measures related to COVID-19 couldincrease rates of gender-based violence. Womenmight not be able to access protection andpsychological support due to the pandemic.
Female genital mutilation (FGM) isprevalent in the Sahel region and UNFPAhas warned about an increase in femalegenital mutilation due to the COVID-19
Source: 70, 71Women, Peace and Security Index; 72, 73UNFPA
37
pandemic. The FGM practice is widespread inthe Sahel but the prevalence rate amongwomen and girls aged 15-49 years varies fromone country to another – ranging from 2% inNiger to 91% in Mali.72 As cases of COVID-19increase, health care providers may bereassigned to COVID-19 patients, which couldresult in gaps in appropriate prevention,protection and care service provision related tofemale genital mutilation in highly affectedcommunities. COVID-19 might also increase thenumber of FGM cases as with girls not attendingschool due to closures, an increase in childmarriage is expected, which in return isexpected to increase FGM.73
Women and girls in the Lake Chad Basinare also likely to be affected by anyfurther increases in violent extremism. Atleast 7,000 girls and women have suffered fromsexual violence perpetrated by Boko Haramsince 2009. Women have suffered rape andsexual abuse at the hands of male members.
The G5 Sahel Women Platform wasestablished in 2018 to increase womenengagement in peace and security in theSahel region. The platform is chaired by theMinisters of the promotion of women andgender equality from each of the G5 Sahelmember states.
Figure 20: Women, Peace and Security Index71
2019
0.539
0.553
0.554
0.583
0.622
0.651
0.703
Mali
Chad
Niger
Mauritania
World
Burkina Faso
SSA
Initiatives taken by African regional institutionsRegional and international organizationsare supporting the security response ofthe G5 Sahel; this section focuses on theefforts to support the health and economicresponse to the COVID-19 pandemic in theregion. As described previously, the G5 Sahelcreated a Joint Task Force to respond to thesecurity challenge from extremist groups, andthey have been supported by the AU andECOWAS, which agreed on 16 March to deploy3,000 troops to the region.
The African Union, Regional EconomicCommunities and Regional Mechanismshave taken initiatives to support healthsystems in the Sahel nations in theirresponse to COVID-19, and the AU createda Response Fund to help protect lives andlivelihoods. The AU activated an EmergencyOperations Centre and Incident ManagementSystem in late January as part of its AfricaCentres for Disease Control (Africa CDC)initiative. Additionally, on 26 March, the AUestablished the African Union COVID-19Response Fund to mitigate the pandemic’shumanitarian and socio-economic impact. At theregional level, the Economic Community of WestAfrican States (ECOWAS) procured anddistributed PPE and test kits to G5 Sahelnations, including Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.CEMAC facilitated loans up to $13.5 million fromthe African Development Bank for provision ofPPE, testing kits, as well as healthcare andlaboratory facilities in Chad and DRC.
Source: 75Alliance Sahel; 76World Bank
38
Several European and international donorshave channeled support through theAlliance Sahel, pledging EUR 800 million tobuild health capacity and assist G5 Sahelgovernments in limiting the economic impact ofthe pandemic.74
The World Bank and IMF are also acting tosupport G5 Sahel economies. The IMFExecutive Board approved funding under theRapid Credit Facility of USD 115.3 million toBurkina Faso, USD 115.1 million to Chad, USD200 million to Mali, USD 130 million toMauritania, and USD 114.5 million to Niger, tohelp them meet fiscal and balance-of-paymentsneeds.68 Sahelian countries were also among thefirst recipients of World Bank support through itsCOVID-19 Fast Track Facility. In April, the WorldBank approved USD 21.2 million for BurkinaFaso, USD 19.3 million for Chad, USD 29.4million for Mali, USD 6.2 million for Mauritaniaand USD 14 million for Niger.75
The African Development Bank approvedUSD 20 million to contain the spread ofCOVID-19 in the G-5 Sahel countries. TheWest African Economic and Monetary Union(WAEMU) took a number of measures to lowerthe impact of the pandemic on the banking andfinancial systems, such as extensions formicrofinance institutions.
Source: 77AU, BCEAO, AfDB and CEMAC official websites
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Strengthening the healthcare
system
• Distribution of the Jack Ma Foundation donation of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), test kits and medical equipment to all Member States
• USD 22.4 million granted to Mali, Niger and Gambia to purchase medical equipment, train staff and strengthen their health systems
• Adoption by CEMAC health ministers of a plan to manage the availability of medicines and surveillance systems at points of entry
• Approved loan package of $13.5 million from the African Development Bank (AfDB) that will target the provision of PPE, testing kits, as well as healthcare and laboratory facilities in Chad and DRC
• Accelerated procurement process for medical equipment• Creation of a fund to procure test kits and other critical equipment
to Member States• Distribution of 30,500 diagnostic test kits; 10,000 PPE; and 740,000
prescription tablets (Chloroquine and Azithromycin) to its Member States of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger
Containing the spread
• The Board of AfDB approved USD 20 million to contain the spread of COVID-19 in the G5 Sahel countries
Although COVID-19 has affected ongoingregional initiatives such as the AfricanContinental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), thecurrent crisis could present an opportunityto advance key initiatives. COVID caused thelaunch of the AfCFTA to get postponed from 1July 2020 to 1 Jan 2021, but regionalinstitutions are working on continuing suchinitiatives, as they can contribute to countries’ability to recover faster from the crisis and forfragile states to move towards greater peaceand stability. Progress made towards realizingthe AfCFTA and maximizing its impact during
This period can prove to be an opportunity toincrease local production and manufacturing,and to deploy digital solutions. Coordinatedresponses to the pandemic could strengthenregional and sub-regional solidarity, effectingnew coordination mechanisms.
The need to focus on addressing thedownstream effects of the pandemic issteadily growing, especially on politicaltransitions, election preparations, livelihoods,and welfare of IDPs and refugees.
Figure 21: Initiatives by regional and international organizations to support G5 Sahelcountries’ response to COVID-1977
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Containing the spread
• Elaboration of Africa Joint Continental Strategy on COVID-19, aimed at coordinating response efforts of AU members, international organizations and WHO in response to COVID-19
• Creation of the AU COVID-19 Response Fund to raise resources to strengthen the continental response to COVID-19
Protecting livelihoods
• WAEMU took a number of measures to lower the impact of the pandemic on the banking and financial system within the Union, such as extensions for microfinance institutions
• Support to Member States in coordinating their actions to combat COVID-19 by drawing up a plan to combat its spread and developing an economic recovery plan to mitigate the impact of the pandemic on the region
• The Sahel Alliance pledged EUR 800 million to help build health capacity and assist G5 Sahel governments in limiting the impact of the pandemic on their economies, as well as to provide social safety nets
Figure 21 (continued) : Initiatives by regional and international organizations to support G5 Sahel countries’ response to COVID-19
COVID-19 could compound an already difficult security situation in the Sahel region.Insecurity has been escalating and spreading across porous borders throughout the G5 Sahel region,which faces food insecurity, extreme poverty, and other humanitarian and development challenges. Thethreats to livelihoods and existing intercommunal conflicts, which are due to competition over scarceresources, have created an environment where violent extremist groups thrive.
Stabilizing the G5 Sahel region would require a multi-faceted approach that combinesmilitary response with development interventions and includes local communities, religiousand traditional leaders. COVID-19 reinforces the need to address the root causes of the increasingviolence in the G5 Sahel region and further highlights the need for multilateral support and internationalcooperation to protect the gains achieved so far through security mechanisms.
Recommended areas for regional action
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Breaking the links between extremist groups and criminal enterprises in the Saheland their sources of funding. International organizations could help enhance training oninvestigation techniques to dismantle terrorists and their sources of funding and strengthen theresponses of G5 Sahel nations against illicit trade in arms and weapons, including cross—bordercollaboration to fight criminal groups.
Maintaining security presence in marginalized areas, particularly the Liptako–Gourma region, and integrating local communities in security planning. The G5 SahelJoint Force capacity should be reinforced to ensure the maintenance of strong presence andincreased mobility across borders to fight the extremist groups in the region. Local communitiesshould also be engaged in security planning as they can provide information about themovement of extremist groups across borders.
Enhancing security and addressing violent extremism
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Promoting and sustaining dialogue at the local level and engaging women and youthin peace and security processes. Governments with the support of regional organizationsshould designate mediators from civil society, religious and traditional groups to promote anddeepen dialogues. The mediators can facilitate constructive discussions based on communitygrievances and the misrepresentations advanced by extremist groups propaganda. This wouldhelp to rebuild social cohesion and combat violent extremism.
Supporting national governments in taking a strong stance against thestigmatization and targeting of certain ethnic groups, not only in terms of judicialconsequences, but also in terms of the political discourse, which is often ambivalent.
Protecting and strengthening the role of traditional and religious leaders to rebuildthe social cohesion in communities. The Sahelian governments should protect traditionalleaders from jihadist attacks and support traditional and religious leaders who can gain the trustof communities and help in conflict prevention and resolution.
Resolving intercommunal tensions and strengthening local voices for peace
Addressing the issues of youth unemployment in the region to reduce thevulnerabilities of youth to exploitation and radicalization to join violent extremistgroups. More programs that aim to create jobs and provide economic opportunities for peoplein remote and borderland areas are needed.
Tackling food insecurity and protecting vulnerable populations from hunger.International organizations should support G5 Sahel nations in implementing their national plansfor food security and nutrition, taking into account the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Protecting and addressing the needs of refugees and IDPs in the region. Continuesupporting organizations that are providing lifesaving protection and assistance to refugees,IDPs, returnees and host communities in the G5 Sahel region, including implementing COVID-19prevention and response measures in displacement areas.
Supporting vulnerable populations
Encouraging and supporting countries to conduct the AU’s Country StructuralVulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA), as increased information on structuralgaps will allow for more effective and timely response during emergencies.
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Supporting electoral processes in Burkina Faso and Niger and promoting dialogueand inclusive reforms in countries affected by post-electoral unrest. In the upcomingmonths, efforts should focus on dialogue between the government and opposition partiesaround electoral processes and political reforms.
Restoring citizens’ trust in justice and the government. International organizationsshould support G5 Sahel nations in responding to crimes committed during intercommunalconflicts and ensuring that those responsible for these crimes are appropriately punished underthe rule of law. Additionally, addressing allegations of human rights violations by governmentforces would help restore accountability and the populations’ trust, which would in turn facilitatetheir collaboration with security forces in preventing violent extremism.
Supporting government effectiveness in public service delivery, particularly inremote areas and borderlands. Efforts in providing services to remote areas andborderlands where intercommunal and violent extremist activities prevail need to be sustained.Supporting local governments in responding to community needs can help them to stay relevantamid changing power dynamics and weaken violent extremists in these areas.
Improving the integration of public health into the Africa Continental Free TradeAgreement. Ensure that the AfCFTA takes on lessons learnt from the pandemic, both on howto mitigate cross-border spread of future contagious diseases and on the importance ofsustaining the continuity of supply chains across the continent.
Tackling corruption by building resilient institutions and processes. Improve processesand increase transparency (e.g., improve government payment systems, and create web-basedplatforms to provide transparency of government finances), introduce stronger anti-corruptionreforms and hold those who transgress accountable.
Strengthening state presence and services
Promoting and protecting human rights and transitional justice. Particular attentionshould be paid to unemployed youth, civil participation in governance at all levels and thereform of social structures that promote violent extremism. Transitional justice that canpromote dialogue and national cohesion and justice among the warring parties, including theradical and violent extremists should be prioritized.
Ensuring the design and implementation of more robust decentralization plans thatare inclusive of different actors and responding to the needs of the localcommunities. A more robust decentralized model of governance can enable the roll-out ofpublic services and the improvement of the social contract between the state and the citizens.
