the iaea safety culture continuous improvement process (sccip) iae… · organizational capacity...

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

The IAEA Safety Culture

Continuous Improvement Process

(SCCIP)

Making safety culture tangible

IAEA

Content

• Why SCCIP?

• Objectives and outcomes

• SCCIP Process Step-by-step


WHY SCCIP?

IAEA

Basis of SCCIP

• Behavioural & social science

• Operational experience

• IAEA Safety Standards

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• Culture is seen as something we can influence, rather than

something we can control

• Culture work needs to encompass the whole organization –

not only as a top-down process

• To effectively assess safety culture, multiple methods must

be used (interview, survey, focus group, observations,

document review) – a survey is not enough

• Edgar Schein’s well established iceberg metaphor helps to

understand and how to continuously improve safety culture

• observe visible aspects (artefacts and behaviour,

“above surface”) and;

• interpret this information to reveal the cultural reasons

behind (found in attitudes, values and basic

assumptions, “below surface”)

• For safety culture improvement, the IAEA emphasises

human interactions (shared space) including trust, mindful

communication, learning attitude, inquiring attitude, self-

accountability, diversity, self-reflection etc.

IAEAs Approach to Safety Culture Continuous

Improvement – the Foundations

IAEA

Lessons from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident –

A Matter of Unchallenged Basic Assumptions

Conclusion of the IAEA Report:

Over time, the stakeholders of the

Japanese nuclear industry developed a

shared basic assumption that plants

were safe

• Led stakeholders to believe that

a nuclear accident would not

happen

• Constrained their ability to

anticipate, prevent and mitigate

the consequences of the

earthquake triggering the

Fukushima Daiichi accident

Behaviour, artefacts

Shared Values, Norms

Shared Basic Assumptions

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Fukushima Daiichi Accident:

Shared Basic Assumptions Across Stakeholders

“We are safe”

Public/government Licensee Regulatory body

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“Individuals and organizations

need to consciously and

continuously question their own

basic assumptions and their

implications on actions that impact

nuclear safety.”

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Public/govern

ment

Licensee Regulatory

body

“Are we safe?”

Fukushima Daiichi Accident:

Lesson Learned

IAEA

Basis for SCCIP in the IAEA Safety Standards

GSR Part 1: National policy and strategy

• Requirement 1: National policy and strategy for safety • 2.3 (g): “The promotion of leadership and management for safety, including safety

culture.”

• Requirement 19: The management system of the

regulatory body • 4.15. The management system of the regulatory body has three purposes: … (3) The

third purpose is to foster and support a safety culture in the regulatory body

through the development and reinforcement of leadership, as well as good attitudes

and behaviour in relation to safety on the part of individuals and teams

• Requirement 29: Graded approach to inspections of

facilities and activities • 4.53. In conducting inspections, the regulatory body shall consider a number of

aspects, including:

• —Management systems

• —Safety culture

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Basis for SCCIP in the IAEA Safety Standards

– DS 456 (Draft GSR Part 2)

Requirement 13: Continuous improvement of safety culture

“All individuals in the organization, from senior management down, shall

demonstrate leadership by promoting safety. A normative framework

based on international best practices shall be described in the

management system to promote and support a strong safety culture”.

Requirement 14: Assessment of leadership and safety culture.

“Senior management shall regularly commission independent

assessments and provide for self-assessments of safety culture and

leadership”.


SCCIP OBJECTIVES AND OUTCOMES

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Organizational capacity building

through enhanced understanding of:

• Safety culture and how to apply safety culture assessments to improve safety

culture;

• How improvement in safety culture can enhance safety performance thorough

positive synergies; and

• Everyone’s roles and responsibilities in cultural work – incl. senior management

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June

2013

Objectives of SCCIP training

Knowledge and practical skills in

• How to perform safety culture self-

assessments

• How to develop and implement an

effective and sustainable safety culture

improvement programme

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In-house knowledge and practical skills to continuously

improve safety culture through

• Performing high quality safety culture self-assessments

• Identifying and implementing effective safety culture improvement

activities

• Engaging the whole organization

13 INLEP Module 1 19

June

2013

Outcomes of SCCIP

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Systematic and systemic process

• Systematic:

• Step-by-step support process to train organization on how to

continuously assess and improve safety culture

• Systemic:

• In a strong safety culture, there is knowledge and understanding of

human behaviour mechanisms, and established human factor

principles are applied to ensure positive safety outcomes from the

interactions of individuals–technology–organization.

• This can be achieved by having a team of safety culture

ambassadors in the organization

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Strong safety culture

HTO – embraces the

systemic interactions

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The safety culture self-assessment training is an investment, providing an

internal team of safety culture experts who are competent and confident to

assess safety culture and act as change agents throughout the organization.

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June

2013

SCCIP – Investing in a strong culture for safety

The experience of implementing SCCIP is that most

of the trained personnel have a technical

educational background with limited focus on

understanding drivers of behaviour, but that after

the first assessment, the team develops sustainable

knowledge of why people and organizations behave

the way they do. In short, they have tapped into the

behavioural and social sciences and are equipped

to proactively catch declines and improve safety

culture continuously.


THE SCCIP PROCESS STEP-BY-STEP

IAEA

IAEA Safety Culture Continuous Improvement

Process – Senior management workshop

Senior Management Safety Culture Workshop – 3 DAYS

• Relationship between safety culture and enhanced safety performance

• Role of safety culture assessments for improving safety culture

• Roles and responsibilities of senior management in cultural improvement work

• Competencies and skills needed in team to be trained to perform safety

culture self-assessment (“Safety Culture Ambassadors”, STEP 2) –

supporting senior management in selecting an effective team

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1

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Safety Culture Self Assessment Training – 2 WEEKS (separate) • Train a cross-functional, cross-hierarchical team (“Safety Culture Ambassadors”) to

• Perform high quality safety culture self-assessment applying the established IAEA Safety culture

assessment methodology

• Develop and implement effective safety culture improvement activities

• Training weeks separated – enhances learning output and allows for course reading in between

• Bridging session in the end to ensure alignment between team and senior management

• OUTCOMES: Team of Safety Culture Ambassadors who are equipped with practical tools and

knowledge to perform safety culture assessments

IAEA Safety Culture Continuous

Improvement Process – SCSA Training

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2

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SCSA performed by safety culture ambassador team

• Tailored IAEA support missions to support organization in doing safety

culture self-assessment depending on need of individual organization

• OUTCOMES: Final self-assessment report and Safety Culture Improvement

Program

IAEA Safety Culture Continuous

Improvement Process – Performing SCSA

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3

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Safety Culture Continuous Improvement

• Creation/amendment of safety culture continuous improvement programme

• Implementation of improvement activities

• Periodic safety culture assessments performed by Safety Culture Ambassadors

IAEAs Approach to Safety Culture Continuous

Improvement – Never ending journey

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…

IAEA

• IAEA Safety Standards and IAEA Safety Culture publications

• Social, Organizational and Behavioural sciences

• Past experiences – IAEA and external Safety Culture expert

knowledge and experience of Safety Culture Self Assessment

training approaches and materials

Course material is based on

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Methodology for Training – Learning-by-doing

• Core set of lectures based on the IAEA safety standards and

research/science;

• Illustration of specific examples of theory in application;

• Interactive exercises on how to apply the five data gathering methods

e.g. observations, document review, interviews, questionnaire and focus

groups;

• Performance of a “mini-self-assessment” based on a case study.

Fake data are provided to extract cultural facts, perform descriptive and

normative analyses and communicate the results;

• Fostering of a good shared space and;

• In parallel a process of team-building is facilitated to assure effective

implementation and high quality assessment results.


EXPERIENCE SO FAR

IAEA

Implementation of SCCIP

• IAEA full SCCIP support has been provided at

• Kozloduy NPP

• Belgoprocess NV

• Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA)

• Laguna Verde NPP

• Senior management safety culture workshops have

been provided to a large number of organizations

IAEA

Feedback from participants…

"Safety Culture" was at the start a very abstract and rather new world for me. In a job where you think very rationally it is not common to think about behaviours and habits of people. You just go with the flow. By this course I've learned that by taking some distance and by being neutral you see things different.

Nancy Reusen, Supervisor Production Management, Belgoprocess

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Before participating in this workshop, I was aware of the problem of a weak "Questioning Attitude" in TEPCO and wanted to find a solution to it. Through this workshop, (…) my outlook towards this problem broadened. My attention turned to the lower portion of the iceberg. The importance of conversation was one of the things I realized.

Shinichi Kawamura, General Manager of Nuclear Asset Management Dept., TEPCO

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Before the start of the SCSA project in PNRA, I was just aware about the definition of safety culture which states that safety culture is the assembly of characteristics and attitudes in the organization… but I did not know about the actual meaning of this definition. However after passing through different steps of SCSA project like participation in workshop, collecting data by using five tools (interviews, focus groups, survey, observation, review of documents), participation of descriptive analysis of data by bubble diagram in connection with the underline assumptions (cultural aspects) with the help of the support mission, now I am confident and will be able to conclude some solid, valuable and understandable outcome for further improvement in the organization. Muhammad Sadiq, Directorate of Policies & Procedures, PNRA

IAEA

“[I]t has been a great opportunity to reflect about all the information we got, how to understand culture and go deeper to really understand how the organization is driven. I learned new techniques to do things differently, think outside the box and that I need to listen to my colleagues to have a shared understanding.”

Ariadna Bazan Limón, Independent Unit of Safety Engineering, Laguna Verde

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We finally understood how to influence the culture in the organization and what tools are the most appropriate. I really appreciated the sharing of knowledge by facilitators not only as a SCAMB but also in my personal development. Ricardo Hernandez, Laguna Verde

Every organization has the ability to improve its own safety culture but not many have the tools to implement it. Thank you to the IAEA for sharing their experiences with us and for the providing a new way to achieve high performance.

Dunja Sobeida, Laguna Verde

IAEA

Support material

Document/Material Title

TECDOC Step-by-step Guidelines for Performing SCSA (forthcoming, draft

available)

Compilation Overview of curriculum (Senior Management Workshop and

SCSA Training)

Template Fact database template for performing SCSA

Safety Report Series:

No 83

How to Perform Safety Culture Self-Assessment (forthcoming –

approved draft available)

Safety Report Series How to Continuously Improve Safety Culture (forthcoming)

IAEA

Summary

The IAEA Safety Culture Continuous Improvement

Process provides comprehensive support to

• perform safety culture self- assessments

• develop an effective and sustainable safety culture

improvement programme


…Thank you for your attention


Appendix 1:

IAEA Safety Culture

Assessment Methodology

IAEA

Prerequisites for Assessment of safety culture

Safety Standard GS-G-3.5

”Safety culture self-assessement should:

• Include the entire organization

• Several different self-assessment tools should be used (e.g. interviews, focus

groups, questionnaires, observations and document reviews)

• A designated team representing all organizational levels and functions at the

installation should carry out the self-assessment

• A specialist in safety culture should be included in the team

• The self-assessment team should receive training

• The self-assessment team should summarize the results and identify areas

for improvement and may suggest actions to be taken

• The results should be reported to the management at an appropriate level

• A follow-up assessment should be performed

The independent assessment of safety culture should follow a similar approach”

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”The independent assessment of safety culture should follow a similar

approach as self-assessment

• The independence and qualification of the members of the

assessment team should be considered crucial for the success of the

assessment

• The team should be staffed with sufficient diversity of experience and

should include specialists in behavioural science, with knowledge of

statistical methods of analysis

• The independent assessment team should aim at identifying

strengths and areas for improvement”

Prerequisites for Assessment of safety culture

GS-G-3.5

IAEA

Safety culture – multi-disciplinary expertise

• Anthropology

• Organizational theory

• Social Psychology

• Sociology

• Leadership and management theory

• Cognitive science

• Psychology

• Human Factor Engineering

• Resilience Engineering

• Organizational Factors

• ITO (interaction between Individuals, Technology and Organizations)

• Basic knowledge; Nuclear technology, nuclear organizations, regulatory

framework

Prerequisite for Assessment of safety culture

GS-G-3.5

IAEA

Safety culture assessment methodology

Based on: • IAEA Standards

• Behavioural science

• Knowledge of Organisational Factors

• Application experience

3 Main Pillars: • Use several data collection methods: interview, document review,

observations, questionnaire, focus groups

• Initially, analyse data from each data collection method separately

• Separating descriptive and normative analysis

Monica Haage [email protected]

IAEA

• Using several data collection methods

IAEA Safety Culture Assessment Methodology

PILLAR 1

Interviews

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IAEA


PILLAR 2

• Initially, the data from each assessment method is treated separately,

analysis performed in silos –

Survey Interviews

Focus

groups Observations

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Overarching themes: Image(s) of culture

Interview

data

Cultural

expressions

Cultural

themes

Survey data

Cultural

expressions

Cultural

themes

Focus group

data

Cultural

expressions

Cultural

themes

Document

data

Cultural

expressions

Cultural

themes

Observation

data

Cultural

expressions

Cultural

themes

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NORMATIVE

‘should’ Based on data, a theory of

culture and a norm

DESCRIPTIVE

‘is’

Based on data and a theory of

culture

• Separating descriptive and normative analysis

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PILLAR 3

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Descriptive/Normative

Descriptive

‘is’

Based on data and a theory

of culture

Normative

‘should’

Based on data, a theory

of culture and a norm

Descriptive must come before the Normative!

• It sets standards for behaviour and

values

• It is related to practices known to lead

to safety

• It focuses on certain limited aspects of

the organization

• Being evaluative in the descriptive stage

can lead to exclusions

• Being descriptive helps to pick up weak

signals

• Being descriptive means having a broad

agenda for dialogue

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Normative,

evaluative analysis

Overarching themes: Image(s) of culture

Interview data

Cultural

expressions

Cultural

themes

Survey data

Cultural

expressions

Cultural

themes

Focus group

data

Cultural

expressions

Cultural

themes

Document

data

Cultural

expressions

Cultural

themes

Observation

data

Cultural

expressions

Cultural

themes


– Analysis Process Overview

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