the greater middle east and reform in the bush administration's ideological imagination

American Geographical Society

The Greater Middle East and Reform in the Bush Administration's Ideological ImaginationAuthor(s): Dona J. StewartReviewed work(s):Source: Geographical Review, Vol. 95, No. 3, New Geographies of the Middle East (Jul., 2005),pp. 400-424Published by: American Geographical SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30034245 .

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THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST AND REFORM IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S

IDEOLOGICAL IMAGINATION DONA J. STEWART

ABSTRACT. In pursuit of its foreign-policy goals, the administration of President George W. Bush has attempted a dramatic reshaping of the vision of the Middle East in the Ameri- can mind. References to the "new" or "greater" Middle East now include countries far out- side traditional concepts of the region, including those in West Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia. The administration argues that this region is defined not by cultural (Arab) or religious (Islam) characteristics but by a lack of democracy; hence a grand strategy is needed to execute reform. This article examines current U.S. efforts to achieve reform in the region, the components of the ideological construction of the New Middle East, the perceived role of Iraq, Turkey's potential role as a "model" for the region, and responses from the region to current U.S.-led reform efforts. Keywords: George W Bush, geopolitics, identity construction, Middle East, political geography, presidency.

in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks the Middle East, largely ignored by the George W. Bush administration since the inauguration eight months earlier, became a central focus of U.S. foreign policy. The region, and the virulent Islamist ideology ad- hered to by terrorist groups such as al-Qa'ida, were perceived as a threat to the U.S. national interest. In response, the Bush administration identified a need for an activist, preemptive policy "defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders" (White House 2002a). The decision by the administration to engage the region on these terms marked a radical departure from decades of U.S. Middle East policy that had placed primary emphasis on the stability of regimes in the region, regardless of their level of democratization and civil-society participation, and on securing a steady supply of oil, while ensuring the survival of the state of Israel by providing it with military and economic support.

Today, the administration's Middle East policy rests on a two-pronged approach. The first is an aggressive pursuit of identified terrorists and the regimes that support them through the so-called war on terror. The application of this approach can be seen clearly in the ousting of the Taliban in Afghanistan, closer cooperation with foreign security services, an increased U.S. military presence in the region, and the occupation of Iraq. The second prong, the focus of this article, is the democratic transformation of governments in the region, thereby making them less likely to harbor terrorists or tolerate activities that promote terrorism.

At the root of this Middle East policy is a very specific geographical conceptualization of the region, formed in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. This article examines that conceptualization and outlines how the creation of the newly constructed

%i DR. STEWART is an associate professor of geography and the director of the Middle East Institute at Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia 30302.

The Geographical Review 95 (3): 400-424, July 2005 Copyright C 200oo6 by the American Geographical Society of New York



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THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST AND REFORM 401

regional identity ignores geographical reality. As a result, the image of the Middle East fashioned in the Bush administration's ideological imagination is fundamen- tally flawed and has undermined its attempts to realize a regional reform agenda. The effects of this imagined geography are particularly acute in the area of political reform, where they hinder the success of programs such as the Middle East Partner- ship Initiative (MEPI), launched in December 2002, and the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI), unveiled in June 2004.

GEOGRAPHICAL PARAMETERS

From the outset, the Bush administration has struggled to define the geographical limits of the Middle East. A series of high-level policy initiatives, designed to address forces such as terrorism and the spread of violent Islamic ideology that span formal borders and operate beyond the reach of traditional state actors, spoke of the "Greater Middle East" and the "Broader Middle East." The GMEI, envisioned as the main vehicle with which to bring about reform in the region, was described as "the most ambitious U.S. democracy effort since the end of the Cold War .... The working definition of the 'greater Middle East' includes the 22 nations of the Arab world, plus Turkey in Europe, Israel, and Pakistan and Afghanistan in South Asia" (Wright 200oo4). Here, the Middle East has already been stretched beyond conven- tional limits to include Afghanistan and Pakistan. The GMEI even spanned the ad- ministrative units in the Department of State, where the policy was based, by including countries from within the purview of both the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. The policy was launched without a concrete list of the countries it addressed-the State Department announced that the countries to be included were still a "work in progress" (see, for example, Aljazeera.net. zoo4)-and rumors spread throughout the Middle East that other Muslim countries, such as Indonesia, Bangladesh, and the central Asian nations of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, would be included as well.

During the summer of 2004, in conjunction with the Group of Eight (G-8) -Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States-the Bush administration formed a partnership to promote reform in the region, identified as the "Broader Middle East and North Africa" (BMENA). The BMENA framework includes nearly thirty nations and is described by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice as a "partnership of progress between the democratic world and nearly two dozen nations, extending from Morocco to Pakistan" (White House 200oo5a). With this linkage to the G-8, the administration endorsed cooperation with existing European Union structures that facilitate reform in the Middle East, such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), further expanding the list of countries associated with U.S. Middle Eastern policy (specifically, Malta and Cyprus). Also known as the "Barcelona Process," the EMP had been launched in 1995 "to foster cooperation on political reform, economic liberalization, and social issues between the European Union (EU) and the countries on the southern and eastern



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402 THE GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

rim of the Mediterranean." The Barcelona Process includes Cyprus and Malta, as well as countries customarily considered part of the Middle East: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Tur- key (Ottaway and Carothers 2004, 4).

By defining the region in such broad geographical terms, the Bush administration was attempting to generalize a geographical landscape full of contradictions and diversity, an approach that has minimized a nuanced understanding of diversity within the region. As a result, the administration's conceptualization was strongly attacked for its failure to recognize the heterogeneity of Middle Eastern countries. One critic aptly described the administration's interpretation of the region as "a one-size-fits-all demographic construct" (Satloff 2004). The war-on-terror framework is at the root of the conceptualization, which sees the region as fertile ground for the growth and harboring of groups such as al-Qa'ida. In adopting terrorism as the dominant lens, the administration's policy-forming process has deemphasized the region's diverse political, economic, and cultural elements. Even if one assumes a narrow view of the Greater Middle East-only the twenty-two Arab countries plus Turkey, Israel, Pakistan, and Afghanistan-enormous diversity is present in economic circumstances, governance structures, and linguistic patterns, as well as in very different histories and unique cultural patterns. Nor was the new "broad and homog- enized" view of the Middle East received well within the region itself. In diplomatic parlance, the redefined region was termed "especially problematic" (Ezzat 2004). Lebanese Foreign Minister Jean Ebeid called the proposed model "poorly fitting ready-to-wear democracies that ignore the very obvious curves of the region, its history and culture" (quoted in Ezzat 2004). The overly general conceptualization has proven problematic in implementing a political reform agenda.

AGAINST TERROR-BUT NOT ISLAM

The Bush administration has assiduously avoided identifying Islam, or the presence of militant Islamic networks, as the main criterion for including a country in the expanding definition of "the Middle East." Fearing that policies will be inter- preted as against Islam, it emphasizes, at least publicly, that its imagined geography is not based on religion. The administration has taken pains to ensure that its policies are not perceived as anti-Muslim or as targeting the Islamic world overall. Pub- lic diplomacy attempts to assuage such criticism, especially from the region itself, have taken two forms: official statements that highlight the inclusion of Muslim Americans in U.S. society and statements that demonstrate U.S. official acceptance and respect for the religion of Islam.

A section of the White House Web site, "In the President's Words: Respecting Islam' is devoted to dispelling anti-Islam criticism and provides a background com- prising the president's quotations on Islam (see [www.whitehouse.gov/infocus /ramadan/quotes.html]). Days after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush spoke of the inclusion of Muslim Americans in U.S. society: "America counts millions of Mus- lims amongst our citizens, and Muslims make an incredibly valuable contribution



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to our country. Muslims are doctors, lawyers, law professors, members of the military, entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, morns and dads. And they need to be treated with respect. In our anger and emotion, our fellow Americans must treat each other with respect" (White House 200oola).

The most significant distinction the administration tries to draw is the one between Islam as practiced by peaceful people and that of the "evildoers" and other enemies of the United States. In this classic attempt to define the "other," the cultural fault line is based not on a division between the Christian and Muslim worlds or between East and West but between the United States and true believers of Islam and those who follow a misguided and violent interpretation of the faith. At its core, the conflict is presented as one between good and evil. In making this argu- ment, the administration has sought to define what Islam is and what it is not:

The face of terror is not the faith of Islam. That's not what Islam is all about. Islam is peace. These terrorists don't represent peace. They represent evil and war. (White House 200oola)

All of us here today understand this: We do not fight Islam, we fight against evil. (White House 2001b)

All Americans must recognize that the face of terror is not the true faith-face of Islam. Islam is a faith that brings comfort to a billion people around the world. It's a faith that has made brothers and sisters of every race. It's a faith based upon love, not hate. (White House 2002b)

We're taking action against evil people. Because this great nation of many religions understands, our war is not against Islam, or against faith practiced by the Muslim people. Ours is a war against evil. This is clearly a case of good versus evil, and make no mistake about it-good will prevail. (White House 200oo2c)

Within this framework, the United States is aligned with the majority of people in the Middle East, who peacefully follow Islamic practice. The main enemy is those who would use Islam as a rationalization to permit acts of violence, either against outsiders or their own people. This religious framework was used, in part, to justify the removal of Saddam Hussein, whom the administration cast as a false follower of Islam. In a document entitled "Apparatus of Lies: Saddam's Disinformation and Propaganda, 1990-200oo3," Hussein is labeled as an exploiter of Islam (White House 200oo3a, 4-5, 20-24). The document points out Hussein's use of Islamic themes in his propaganda and mosque building while he was prohibiting people from making the hajj-even under a U.N.-sponsored plan for providing vouchers for pilgrims' travel and expenses (White House 2oo003a, 21).

In the Bush administration's imagined geography of the Middle East, religiosity is presented as a characteristic shared by citizens of the United States and observant Muslims in the Middle East and the Islamic World: "Survey after survey shows that Americans are the most religious people in the developed world. The American Con- stitution and the American way of life strike a successful balance between the im-




peratives of government and the demands of conscience. Since our founding we have separated church and state, but we do not exclude religion from our lives" (White House 200oo4b). This statement conveys a double message. The first reaffirms the shared religious values of the United States and the Middle East; the second sends a strong signal about the need for secular, democratic reform in the region and reflects the administration's concern that democratic reform can result in a larger role for Islam through the rise of religious parties and the application of Islamic law.

For this reason, Turkey has figured prominently in the administration's comments on the Middle East and on the prospects for reform in the region. The administration's embrace of Turkey and its form of government, seen as balancing democracy and religion, are also presented as further evidence that U.S. policy is not specifically un-Islamic. Speaking in Istanbul, President Bush declared: "Turkey is a strong, secular democracy, a majority Muslim society, and a close ally of all free nations. Your country, with 150 years of democratic and social reform, stands as a model to others, and as Europe's bridge to the wider world. Your success is vital to a future of progress and peace in Europe and in the broader Middle East-and the Republic of Turkey can depend on the support and friendship of the United States" (White House 2oo4d). Turkey's ongoing negotiations for membership in the Euro- pean Union are another crucial element of U.S. reform plans for the region (Turk- ish Daily News 200oo4), because Turkey's success in gaining acceptance into the union is expected to encourage other countries to implement reform.

The Turkish government, however, has been less than keen about its role as the administration's poster child for "moderate Islam" and the coexistence of democracy and Islam. Representatives of the Turkish government have taken issue with the administration's definition of Turkey as an Islamic state. For example, Deputy Chief of General Staff General Ilker Basbug declared that "Turkey is a secular, democratic state" and stated in clear terms that Turkey has no intention of being a model for democratization of the region (quoted in Demirelli 2004). Turkish officials have also disputed the very notion of moderate Islam put forth by the administration. Comments by Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan expressed the official consternation: "First of all, what does moderate Islam mean? If you talk about moderate Islam, you somehow mean that there is an immoderate Islam as well .... Our state is secular, not Islamic. There can be no Islamic state in the secular state" (quoted in Demirelli 2004). In reading Turkish history, the administration erred in grossly underestimating the essential role of a secular identity in the formation of the Turkish state, despite the dominance of parliamentary elections by the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP).

Democracy in Turkey has produced results that do not always support U.S. interests, illustrating the potential pitfalls of democratization in the region. Although the rise of the AKP, which won 35 percent of the popular vote in Turkey's 2002 parliamentary election, has not threatened the secularism of the Turkish state and government, it is an important reminder of the potential for Islamist parties to play a greater role in governance through electoral strength. Even when the role of reli-




gion is not the issue, democracy can produce results that conflict with U.S. policy. In spring 2003, to the surprise of the Bush administration, the Turkish Parliament voted to forbid use of Turkish bases by U.S. and British forces to launch attacks on Iraq-hampering the U.S. war effort. More recently, elections in the West Bank and Gaza produced an overwhelming victory for Hamas, leaving the Bush administration to deal with a democratically elected group identified by the State Department as a terrorist organization.

A REGION IN NEED OF REFORM

In the Bush administration's conceptualization, the strongest defining characteristic of the Middle East is not geography or the shared history of Islam but the need for deep and wide-ranging reform, including the economic, political, and educational spheres. The Middle East's democracy deficit is the most often-cited central explanatory factor for the rise of terrorist groups such as al-Qa'ida. In this model, authoritarian rule has created an environment from which al-Qa'ida and other militant groups can draw support. The lack of political freedom directly threatens peace, prosperity, and modernity (Hawthorne 2003).

The publication of the U.N. Arab Human Development Report 200oo2 bolstered the administration's arguments for reform (UNDP 2002). The report, written by Arab intellectuals, presents reform as a pressing pan-Arab concern. Specifically cited are deficits in education, good governance, freedom, and the empowerment of women. The report links the region's low human-development status with its lack of political and social freedom (Middle East Quarterly 2002). Facts compiled in the report- for example, "The combined gross domestic product of the 22 Arab countries is smaller than that of Spain, and 40 percent of adult Arabs are illiterate"-were later quoted by the Bush administration in launching the GMEI in order to justify the need for the program (Wright 2004, 18; see also UNDP 2002). Although some com- mentators in the region have been critical of the report, which does not address in detail the causes of the region's impoverishment, the published data do depict a region facing grave challenges.

MIDDLE EAST REFORM POLICY

Democracy has never been a goal of U.S. Middle East policy, which has emphasized political stability in the region, continued access to the region's oil supplies, and attempts to mediate the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The policy articulated by the Bush administration marked a noticeable change in approach from that of previous administrations. The current reform-focused policy developed incrementally after the 9/1 attacks. The issue was barely raised in the National Security Strategy of the United States, released September 2002, which called mildly for "supporting moderate and modern government, especially in the Muslim world, to ensure that the conditions and ideologies that promote terrorism do not find fertile ground in any nation" (White House 2002a). But by June 2004 reform in the Middle East had become a central policy focus. The U.S. reform agenda, which had been launched in



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the 200oo2 MEPI, had evolved into the larger plan, the GMEI, unveiled in conjunction with the G-8 meeting at Sea Island, Georgia. Together, these initiatives lay out the administration's priorities, goals, and methods for achieving sweeping reform in Arab countries. From the outset the plans have been problematic, however. Diffi- culties include the amount of resources allocated to the policies, a leak of the draft GMEI, and the reaction of Arab governments, which caused the administration to modify and pull back on its proposals.

THE MIDDLE EAST PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE

The administration's first new Middle East policy mechanism, the MEPI, laid out a four-pronged set of priorities and goals for the region. As Secretary of State Colin Powell described them when he announced the program, "Our initiative rests on three pillars. We will engage with public and private sector groups to bridge the jobs gap with economic reform, business investment, and private-sector development. We will partner with community leaders to close the freedom gap with projects to strengthen civil society, expand political participation, and lift the voices of women. And we will work with parents and educators to bridge the knowledge gap with better schools and more opportunities for higher education" (USDOS 2002). Soon a fourth "pillar" designed to create "economic, political and educational systems where women enjoy full and equal opportunities,' was added (USDOs 2004C).

In actual implementation, however, the administration's commitment to the MEPI appeared more rhetorical than substantive, especially in budgetary terms. In the critical area of the political pillar, programs under the MEPI have been criticized for failing to address the "democracy deficit" so often cited in the administration's official statements. Launched with much fanfare by Secretary Powell, the MEPI was funded initially with a paltry $29 million, though with the promise of more funding to come. The lack of financial commitment and comments by Secretary Powell at the time suggested that the policy change may not be as significant as the administration has made it out to be. The announcement of the MEPI, staged with huge domestic emphasis by the administration, received little note in the Middle East.

Although the MEPI was presented as a groundbreaking policy, it does not represent the United States' first or only attempt to encourage democratic reform in the region. Between 1991 and George W. Bush's 2001 inauguration, the United States spent some $250 million in the region, targeting nine countries and the Palestinian Authority. Projects included strengthening parliaments, improving human-rights monitoring, and training judges. According to critics, the impact of the projects was limited, mostly due to lack of receptivity at the local level (Hawthorne 200oo3). Al- though democracy and civil-society development were featured prominently during the 1990os in the strategic objectives that set funding priorities for bilateral aid to countries in the region, it is difficult to see any tangible results from democracy and civil-society aid disbursed in that decade.

In fiscal years (FY) 2002-2005 the MEPI expenditures totaled $293 million (USDOS 2005a); $120 million was requested for FY 2006 (USDOS 2006). But this figure pales




in comparison with the bilateral aid to countries in the region, especially those that have been supportive in the "war on terror." Jordan, for example, received $250 million in economic-support funds in FY 2003, an increase of $1oo million over 2001 funding levels. Other recipients of economic-support funds included Turkey, which received $200 million as a supplemental request to the 2002 budget, and Yemen, which received $10o million (Mark 2002). The funds allocated to eradicate the "freedom deficit" during fiscal year 2002 were negligible compared with U.S. military aid to the region: Israel received $2.0 billion; Egypt, $1.3 billion; Jordan, $soo million; Turkey, $48 million; Bahrain, $28.5 million; Oman, $25 million; and Yemen, $20 million (Mark 2002). Such military aid provides key support for regimes that ex- hibit little tendency toward increasing political participation, such as Egypt, where the constitution has been suspended since 1981, and Bahrain, where the prime minister is appointed by the monarch.

In comparative terms, the level of resources devoted to the MEPI, described at its launch as a bridge between the U.S. and the Middle East that "spans the hope gap with energy, ideas and funding" (usDOS 2002), is significantly less than the level of resources directed at other major State Department programs. The FY 2006 budget requests for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative ($734.5 million), the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement ($523.9 million), and the Nonprolifera- tion, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs ($440 million) are all sub- stantially greater than the MEPI allocation (USDOS 2006). An additional $40 million was recently awarded to the National Endowment for Democracy to continue its work toward democratization in the region, bringing its total funding to $80 million (White House 200oo4g).

THE POLITICAL PILLAR

The "political" pillar of the MEPI, now in its fourth year of implementation, appears to be struggling to match its results to the ambitious rhetoric surrounding it. Al- though the administration speaks of the "historic achievement of democracy in the broader Middle East" (White House 2004d), the actual goals of the MEPI are much narrower in scope. When it was launched, critics noted that the MEPI did not seem to offer a major departure from previous policy to encourage civil-society development, with Secretary Powell calling for "a stronger political voice for the peoples of the Middle East" (USDOs 2002). As Robert Satloff notes, the "'freedom gap' pillar of MEPI is not specifically intended to promote democracy, just to strengthen civil society, expand political participation, and lift the voices of women" (2002, quoting Powell in USDOs 2002). In recent publicity material, the MEPI Democracy and Civil Society Program sets out goals that fall far short of real structural change in Middle Eastern countries:

* Strengthen political parties as a vital part of responsive governance by training political candidates in advocacy and leadership skills.

* Promote independent and responsible media through professional standards and accountability.




* Pursue legislative accountability and oversight by improving skills and knowledge of local parliamentarians.

* Bolster the rule of law through judicial programs on ethical standards and transparent, trustworthy court procedures. (USDOS 20o5a)

These goals have failed to trigger systematic governmental reform that would lead to functioning multiparty systems with direct elections. It seems likely that political reform in the region will take years, if not decades; yet the rhetoric of Middle East democratization promises much more.

At the heart of the MEPI lies the administration's attempt to explain its policies to the region and to improve the public image of the United States through a mul- timillion-dollar, multimedia public-diplomacy campaign. The public-diplomacy campaign is designed to win Arab hearts and minds and to expose Arabs to key elements of U.S. democracy. By reaching out through the media, the United States will showcase "American" values of religious tolerance, open debate, and women's rights. Study tours will bring Arabs to the United States to expose them to Ameri- can democratic institutions and practices. Fellowships and English-language study programs will help Arabs build personal links with Americans and provide useful "tools" for the modern (democratic) global community (Hawthorne 2003). The media play a crucial role in the effort to reach out to the Arab world: The United States now produces and broadcasts both radio (Radio Sawa, [www.radiosawa.com]) and television (Alhurra Television, [www.alhurra.com]) to the Middle East. Radio Sawa, with an annual budget of $22 million (Kessler 200oo4), broadcasts Arab-language pop music in an attempt to reach young people.

Assessments of their success have been mixed. A report by the U.S. inspector general's office found that Radio Sawa "has been so preoccupied with building an audience through its music that it has failed to adequately measure whether it is influencing minds" (quoted in Kessler 2004). The station's news reports, designed to counter the "biased" reports broadcast by Arab radio stations, contain such poor Arabic grammar that parents do not want their teenagers to listen to it (Kessler 2004). Not surprisingly, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, which also oversees Alhurra Television, took issue with the inspector general's report. Alhurra ("the Free One"), which broadcasts from Virginia to the twenty-two countries in the Middle East, will eventually beam "balanced" news coverage and other information, an explicit attempt to counter the influence of Arab news satellite channels such as al-Arabiya and al-Jazeera, which the administration views as having a very strong anti-American bias.

ASSESSING MEPI-BASED POLITICAL REFORM

Determining the overall impact of the MEPI's activities is difficult, in no small part because comprehensive data on the projects funded are elusive. In the political area, for example, the MEPI Web site claims the creation of a Middle East Justice Institute and regional campaign schools for women candidates (usDOS 2005b), but I could




not obtain any information about them. Even the partial list of MEPI-funded projects in Appendix I raises questions about the program's effectiveness. Funded projects range from voter education, to creating a civil-society Web portal, to a traveling theater production. Conferences and workshops figure heavily among the projects, less emphasis is placed on applied projects In many projects the number of partici- pants is very limited: The 2003 Arab Women's Forum in Cairo, for instance, drew only twenty-five women from twelve countries (USDOS 2003a).

In the political pillar, the MEPI has operated ten regionwide programs in areas ranging from democratic strengthening, to legislative strengthening, to preparing women as political leaders, to judicial and legal reform (Appendix I). Country- specific programs in areas such as parliamentary training, judicial reform, and election assistance are also under way. Some of the most interesting projects and those that appear to have the greatest impact at the grassroots level are funded under the MEPI Small Grants Program (Appendix II).

Although the efficacy and success of the MEPI cannot yet be fully assessed, some concerns must be noted. Given the relatively small number of projects funded, which are then implemented by nongovernmental organizations in collaboration with local partners in the region, the need to create an entirely new funding mechanism and bureaucracy under the MEPI may be questioned. Bypassing the existing funding mechanisms through the U.S. Agency for International Development and the State Department, the MEPI created a parallel structure focused solely on reform. In addition, an "achievement gap" seems to exist between the lofty goals associated with the program and the rhetoric that accompanied its launch. With respect to political reform, whether the MEPI meta-approach has made greater strides toward closing the freedom deficit than did the bilateral programs of the 1990os is not clear.

THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE

The MEPI was only the first step in the administration's creation of a new Middle East policy. A few months after its launch, amid a greater push for reform in the region, the administration articulated a broader policy, with far-reaching goals in the area of democratization. Against the backdrop of the impending U.S. invasion of Iraq, the administration formulated the GMEI, which was both a means for justi- fying the war in Iraq and a plan for future action in the region. Because it misread the region, the administration made critical errors in articulating this policy, which has since been scaled back, again curtailing the administration's attempts to effect democratic reform in the region.

By late 2003 the stage was being set for the June 2004 launch of the GMEI at the G-8 meeting, with links being made between removing Hussein and spreading democracy in the Middle East. According to the Bush administration, the toppling of the dictator would quickly result in a democratic Iraq, which would "unleash a democratic tsunami across the Islamic world" (Ottaway and others 2002, 1). The administration's rhetoric drew a direct link between regime change in Iraq and change throughout the Middle East:



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Iraqi democracy will succeed-and that success will send forth the news, from Dam- ascus to Tehran-that freedom can be the future of every nation. The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution. (White House 200oo3b)

Voices in that region are increasingly demanding reform and democratic change ... Now freedom is stirring in the Middle East, and no one should bet against it. (White House 200oo4f)

Speaking in February 2004 at the opening of the landmark "Churchill and the Great Republic" exhibition at the Library of Congress, President Bush compared the current U.S. drive to democratize the Middle East with Winston Churchill's stance against the post-World War II expansion of communism. At the center of the policy, the president reiterated, is a "forward strategy of freedom": "We're challenging the enemies of reform, confronting the allies of terror, and expecting a higher standard from our friends. For too long, American policy looked away while men and women were oppressed, their rights ignored and their hopes stifled. That era is over, and we can be confident. As in Germany, and Japan, and Eastern Europe, liberty will over- come oppression in the Middle East" (White House 200oo4e).

Statements such as these by President Bush and high-ranking members of his administration sparked a significant amount of interest in the GMEI; however, the lack of details so close to the GMEI's launch date led to much speculation among Middle East scholars and in the region. Early assessments of the yet-to-be-revealed policy were often unfavorable: "Democracy-promotion plans are still being formulated. What has emerged so far suggests an awkward combination of three strands: aggressive calls for democracy in certain 'unfriendly' regimes, and elsewhere, heavy doses of reaching out to civil society and modest diplomatic engagement" (Hawthorne 2003, 21-22). Such comments paled in comparison to the firestorm that erupted later in February, when the London-based Arabic newspaper al-Hayat published a leaked copy of the policy. Appearing under the title "U.S. Working Pa- per For G-8 Sherpas: G-8 Greater Middle East Partnership" ("Partnership" being used interchangeably with "Initiative"), the leaked working paper offered full details of the administration's new flagship policy (al-Hayat 2004; Satloff 2004).

Dispute centered on two key aspects of the GMEI proposal: the failure to undertake any consultation with leaders in the region as the policy was being developed and the lack of any mention of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Tension between the United States and regional actors constrained the ability for calm and substantive debate to even take place on the relative merits of the GMEI'S contents. The GMEI

evoked a visceral response among leaders in the region, including criticism from governments whose support the administration needed to legitimize the policy.

Key regional allies, among them Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, also voiced criticism, insisting that the United States should play the role of partner and not enforcer of reforms. Echoing Mubarak's concerns, Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Moussa declared, "Any initiative based on a big-brother-to-small-



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brother approach is unlikely to work. Arab countries cannot be on the receiving end. They have to be adequately consulted on matters that concern their own future" (quoted in Salhani 200oo4a). Shortly after the leak, the Saudi and the Egyptian leadership issued a joint statement against projects that attempt to externally impose reform (Mideast Mirror 200oo4a). Similarly, Kuwait's then-prime minister, Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad Al Sabah, responded, "We have not received this initiative and we don't want it" (Kuwait Times 200oo4). Even Jordan's foreign minister, Marwan Muasher, wished that the American initiative would "never see the light of day" (Aljazeera.net 2004). The administration was unable to build support in the region for the leaked proposal. Later in the spring of 2004, disagreement among Arab governments over U.S. motivations behind the GMEI left an Arab League meeting in disarray. With many member states arguing that reforms could not be externally induced, only eleven of the twenty-two foreign ministers met in advance of the Arab League summit in an attempt to draft a common position. This effort ended unsuccessfully, and the summit was "postponed" (Amrawi 200oo4).

In effect, the GMEI'S chilly reception created a stillborn policy and led to significant redrafting of the proposal prior to the June G-8 summit. The final proposal, adopted during the G-8 meeting-with only a few Arab leaders in attendance-con- tained substantive changes from the leaked U.S. draft. The changes included a larger role for European partners, especially in the key area of political reform.

The role of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is recognized as a contributing factor to the development and modernization of the region. G-8 support for reform in the region is said to be "hand in hand" with support for a just and comprehensive settlement based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.' Both parties are called upon to fulfill their obligations under the road map sponsored by the so- called Quartet (the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia), which offered a phased resolution of the conflict-starting with the cessa- tion of violence-that would ultimately lead to the creation of a Palestinian state (USDOS 2003b).

The G-8 announcement also acknowledges the heterogeneity within the region, a recognition lacking in the Bush administration's approach: "Each country is unique and their diversity should be respected. Our engagement must respond to local conditions and be based on local ownership. Each society will reach its own conclu- sions about the pace and scope of change. Yet distinctiveness, important as it is, must not be exploited to prevent reform" (White House 200oo4c). Gone is the impli- cation of a single prescription for the region, as is mention of the United States' right to establish direct relations with societal actors, without the consent of their governments. The announcement also recognizes the existence of multiple tracks in the reform dialogue between the Middle East and the West, including the Barcelona Process, the Japanese initiative for reform of the Palestinian Authority, and U.S.-led reform. Overall, the document places far greater emphasis on economics, stressing the role of "leaders of the finance and business sector,' while reference to political rights has been minimized (Mideast Mirror 200oo4b, 2004c).



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THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA INITIATIVE

Despite the constraints in the G-8 pronouncement, the White House Web site de- scribes the goals of the Partnership for Progress and a Common Future, launched with the G-8 announcement, in confident terms: "[T]he United States has adopted a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East. This strategy re- quires the same persistence and energy and idealism we have shown before. And it will yield the same results. As in Europe, as in Asia, as in every region of the world, the advance of freedom leads to peace'." (White House 200oo4a). Yet the G-8 statement offers no specific plan for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict beyond endorsing existing U.N. resolutions and the road map. Nor did the communiqu6 address the broader question of dealing with terrorism in the region (Salhani 200oo4b). Six months after the GMEI was launched, amid the worsening situation in Iraq, the administration deemphasized the importance of an event widely billed as the "cen- terpiece of BMENA": the yearly Forum for the Future (see, for example, USDOS 2oo4b). The forum was to be hosted in Morocco in December 2004 and cochaired by out- going Secretary of State Powell. Based on the declaration adopted at the June G-8 summit, the Morocco meeting was to create "a historic partnership to advance political, economic, and social reform and progress in the region" (USDOS 2004a). By the time of the meeting, however, the administration had backed off from the plan to promote political reform: "The popular view of the United States has grown so dark, even hateful, that American officials are approaching the meeting with cau- tion and with a package of financial and social initiatives that have only a scant relationship to the original goal of political change" (Brinkley 2oo4b). The conference seems to have produced few results. Its final statement reaffirmed the linkage between reform and support for a just, comprehensive, and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict (Brinkley 2oo4a). The responsibility for facilitating political reform shifted away from the United States, under the mandate of the Democ- racy Assistance Dialog, organized by Turkey, Yemen, and Italy. An initial meeting of the group in Rome in November 20oo04, however, failed to yield a plan for workshops on civil society reform (TESEV 2005).

THE FUTURE OF THE MIDDLE EAST REFORM AGENDA

Since the first anniversary of the GMEI, the Bush administration's record of success for its policy of Middle East reform has been the subject of much debate. Events such as widespread demonstrations in Lebanon against continuing Syrian occupation and the first national polls in Saudi Arabia (although women were not allowed to vote) are cited as evidence of the unleashing of democratic forces in the region. But the prime catalyst, a transitional democratic government in Iraq, has not yet been formed, months after the election dominated by the Shiite-led United Iraqi Alliance. The debate over the role of religion in Iraq's constitution has yet to take place. The set- backs in Iraq have undermined the administration's entire reform agenda.

A growing sense of defensiveness over Middle East reform policy is apparent within the administration. In 2004, comments by then-National Security Advisor




Condoleezza Rice displayed this defensiveness over the policy: "And so we are moving ahead on that agenda of engaging the Muslim world. We took the time to try to build an international coalition from which to do that. I know that you think that we do everything unilaterally, but sometimes it's a good thing to stop and to build the coalition, and that is what the President has done" (White House 200oo4b). Simi- larly, President Bush used the State of the Union Address in 2005 to clarify the U.S. position on reform, again distinguishing between the United States and its enemies in the Middle East:

The United States has no right, no desire, and no intention to impose our form of government on anyone else. That is one of the main differences between us and our enemies. They seek to impose and expand an empire of oppression, in which a tiny group of brutal, self-appointed rulers control every aspect of every life. Our aim is to build and preserve a community of free and independent nations, with governments that answer to their citizens and reflect their own cultures. (White House 2oo5b)

A closer analysis of activities the administration points to as evidence of democratization in the region, such as the Saudi national dialog on reform, seem largely designed to keep the current regimes in power, rather than to truly create participatory democracies. Such is the case in Saudi Arabia, where the elections chose only half of the members of municipal-level councils (the others members are appointed). Women, of course, were not allowed to vote. Although President Mubarak did ask the Egyptian Parliament to amend the constitution to allow direct, multiparty presidential elections (Hawthorne 2004), the constitution remains suspended, the president has ruled for twenty-five years, elected in single-candidate referendums, and his son Gamal is apparently being groomed for an eventual pharaonic succession (New York Times 2005).

Shortly after President Bush lauded Egypt at the February 2005 State of the Union address and called on it to push democratization-"And the great and proud nation of Egypt, which showed the way toward peace in the Middle East, can now show the way toward democracy in the Middle East" (White House 200oo5b)-Egypt arrested the leading prodemocracy activist Ayman Nour. The government accused Nour of faking all but fourteen of thousands of signatures collected to form his party, al- Ghad. Nour had written a letter to President Mubarak asking to participate in the debate between opposition parties and Mubarak's National Democrats and for the discussions to be open to the public (Stack 2005). Although al-Ghad had not yet been approved by the government (Stack 2005), Nour announced plans to chal- lenge Mubarak in the October 2005 presidential election, if the constitution had been changed by that time.

Pressure by the Bush administration, which threatened to withhold foreign aid to Egypt, and a trip canceled by Secretary of State Rice seem to have played a crucial role in Egypt's decision to release Nour from prison, although his party is still not authorized. Whether Egypt will undertake real reform or merely go through a su- perficial process remains to be seen. The Parliament, where reforms are initiated, is



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dominated by Mubarak's National Democratic Party, and presidential term limits have not been discussed. Nour's critics refer to him as a"cowardly agent of America;' presenting reform as externally imposed rather than responsive to the will of the Egyptian people. On the other hand, this episode is a reminder of the leverage the United States can exercise in bilateral relations, which may be more effective than rhetoric-driven, poorly conceived, regional policy.

IMAGINING THE MIDDLE EAST AND REFORM

The grand reform meta-narrative articulated by the Bush administration failed to produce results equal to its rhetoric in the area of political reform. In addition to the barriers posed by conditions in the region itself, the administration's conceptualization of the Middle East and its own efforts at implementation seri- ously hampered the potential success of the reform agenda. Among the misconceptualizations that frustrated the reform policy are a failure to compre- hend the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the lack of a democracy-ori- ented local context, and the perceptions of U.S. hypocrisy in pursuing a political reform agenda.

In failing to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, either by launching a new Middle East peace process or even in making reference to the effects of the conflict in the GMEI Sherpa paper (al-Hayat 2004; Satloff 2004), the administration unsuccessfully attempted to cast the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an issue between Israel and the Palestinians, with little or no regional impact. Nor did the administration acknowledge that the conflict is an underlying cause of regional terrorism and violence. This approach proved to be a major obstacle in the administration's attempt to deliver its reform message. Its uncritical embrace of the administration of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon during the escalation of the conflict between 2000 and 2003, including President Bush's declaration that the prime minister was a "man of peace," exacerbated tensions between the United States and the region. Statements designed to quell Arab discontent-"Yet, because America sup- ports Israel's desire for security, many in the Muslim world seem to believe that America opposes the Palestinian desire for freedom. This is a misconception that we must take head-on and dispel. Because the truth is that our policy insists on freedom" (White House 2004b)-made little impact, as progress in the conflict remained elusive.

In many ways the administration's rhetorical goals for the Middle East are far greater than what the region is likely to achieve in the short to medium term, given the local contexts. Having acknowledged the severe economic problems and educational deficits in the region cited in the U.N. Arab Human Development Report 2002

(UNDP 2002), the administration downplays their impact on the region's democratic potential, a point noted by critics:

The Middle East today lacks the domestic conditions that set the stage for democratic change elsewhere. It does not have the previous experience with democracy



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that facilitated transitions in Central Europe .... Nor has the Middle East experi- enced the prolonged periods of economic growth and the resulting dramatic changes in educational standards, living standards, and life styles that led Asian countries like Taiwan and South Korea to democratic change. The picture is instead one of socio- economic deterioration. (Ottaway and others 200oo2, 3)

The administration's articulation of goals such as increasing the effectiveness of political parties ring hollow, for only Turkey and Israel have true multiparty systems for electing their chief executive. In many countries the opposition, if it exists at all, is restricted by the ruling regime from mounting any true opposition. In- creasing the effectiveness of opposition parties without structural reform to increase their role in governance will not lead to significant democratization. Critics also point to the lack of a popular movement for democratic change in the region, not- ing that many of the current calls for reform are driven by members of the elite, who have a vested interest in the survival of current governments (Hawthorne 2004).

In promoting a platform of reform while maintaining very close ties to clearly undemocratic regimes such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the Bush administration exposed its policy to criticisms of hypocrisy. Rather than a universal good, application of democratic reform policy to a particular country could be seen as a punitive approach: "Pressing for democracy only in countries where the United States does not like the regime and seems confident it can foster a friendly successor government sends a discouraging message to the rest of the Arab world: 'democracy' is about our choices, not yours" (Hawthorne 2003, 23).

Moreover, the administration does not acknowledge the possibility that increased democratic expression in Middle Eastern countries will bring into power parties and individuals who do not favor a strong relationship with the United States or envision democracy from a secular perspective. Such was the case in Pakistan's parliamentary elections of 2002, which the United States pushed strongly. The poll saw gains by the United Action Council, an Islamic fundamentalist coalition, which won 17 percent of the federal parliament seats. The party now governs the key province of Baluchistan, where it has tried to impose Islamic law and is unwilling to assist the United States in tracking down members of al-Qa'ida (Cole 2005). Similarly, elections in Kuwait in 200oo3 saw a reduction in the number of legislators who support a Western-style democracy and a rise in support for Islamist candidates (Murphy 2004). Finally, the victory of Hamas in the January 2006 Palestinian legislative elections proved the potential for democratic processes to produce outcomes not intended by the administration (Gearan 200oo6).

With respect to policy implementation, the administration's two goals-to eradicate terror and to bring democratic reform to the region-conflict. To mount an effective "war on terror," the United States leans heavily on existing leadership in countries like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, yet the continued U.S. support for these regimes undermines the potential for democratic reform in the region and exposes the entire reform project to charges of hypocrisy.



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NOTE

1. Among other items, U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, adopted on 22 November 1967, called for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the territories occupied during the 1967 war, the settlement of all claims, and an end to belligerency (see, for example, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/i/hi /in_depth/middle_east/israel_and_the_palestinians/keydocuments/1639522.stm]). U.N. Security Council Resolution 338, adopted on 22 October 1973, called for a cease fire in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 (see, for example, [http://news.bbc.co.uk /1/hi/indepth/middleeast/2001/001/israel_andthepalestinians/keydocuments/1681243.stm]).

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Wright, R. 2004. US Readies Push for Mideast Democracy Plan. Washington Post, 28 February, A, 18.




APPENDIX

I-EXAMPLES

OF

THE

RANGE

OF

TYPES

AND

THE

GEOGRAPHICAL

SPREAD

OF

PROJECTS

FUNDED

BY

THE

POLITICAL

PILLAR

OF

THE

MIDDLE

EAST

PARTNERSHIP

INITIATIVE

FUNDING

AND

PROJECT

AND

LOCATION

GOAL

STATUS

Legislative

Processing

(region-

To create

more

effective,

transparent,

independent,

and

representative

legislatures,

so their

ability

Fiscal

year

2004

wide)

to act as a nexus

for political

participation

and

dialog

is increased

$7,000,000 (ongoing)

Democratic

Strengthening

To increase

the number

and

improve

campaign

skills

of reform-minded

candidates

for public

Fiscal

year

2003

(regionwide)

office,

especially

women;

to strengthen

and

reform

political

parties

in order

to make

them

more

$7,500oo,ooo000

effective,

representative,

transparent

and

democratic;

to improve

the administration

of elections,

(ongoing)

electoral

framework,

voting

processes,

tabulation,

voter

education

and

transparency;

and

to

strengthen

constituencies

for democratic

reform

of the electoral

process

Arab

Civic

Education

Programs

To "promote

the public

awareness

of civic

rights

and

responsibilities

through

the implementation

Fiscal

year

200oo3

(Algeria,

Bahrain,

Egypt,

Jordan,

of civic

education

programs

in primary

and

secondary

schools

that

promote

an understanding

of

$1,5o00,ooo;

Lebanon,

Morocco,

Saudi

Ara-

and

commitment

to democratic

values

and

principles

and

help

Arab

educational

leaders

imple-

fiscal

year

200oo2

bia,

Tunisia,

Yemen,

West

Bank

/

ment

civic

education

programs

in schools

and

universities

in eight

Arab

countries"

$750,000

Gaza)

(ongoing)

Training

Middle

Eastern

and

To provide

French-speaking

North

African

and

Lebanese

parliamentary

staffers

with

professional-

Fiscal

year

200oo3

North

African

Legislative

Staff

development

opportunities

through

U.S.-based

training

and

regional

workshops

$800,00ooo

(regionwide)

(ongoing)

Arab

Women's

Forum:

Towards

To support

the Egyptian

Center

for Human

Rights'

work

with

eighteen

nongovernmental

orga-

Fiscal

year

2003

More

Political

and

Legal

Rights

nizations

throughout

the region

to develop

a women's

network

via additional

conferences

and

$120,000

for Arab

Women

(regionwide)

workshops

at the regional

and

subregional

levels

(ongoing)

Middle

East

Regional

Justice

To discuss

the "best

practices

in judicial

procedure

and

ensure

that

judicial

systems

in the region

Fiscal

year

2002

Reform

Forum

and

Follow-up

satisfy

the basic

requirements

of justice,

and

properly

and

efficiently

serve

the interests

of all

$1,425,00ooo

(regionwide)

parties

concerned[,

concentrating

on]

on issues

of judicial

procedure,

independence,

ethics,

ap-

(ongoing)

pointments,

and

training";

to hold

follow-up

activities,

including

"regional

training

sessions

and

partnerships

with

law

institutions"

Women

as Political

Leaders:

To bring

"49

elected

and

appointed

officials,

aspiring

candidates,

women's

rights

activists,

civil

Fiscal

year

2002

U.S.

Elections

and

Political

society

leaders

and

journalists

to the United

States

to provide

an in-depth

look

at U.S.

electoral

$1,o80,00ooo

Campaigns

(regionwide)

politics

at the grassroots

level"

(ended)




APPENDIX

I-Continued

FUNDING

AND

PROJECT

AND

LOCATION

GOAL

STATUS

National

Endowment

for

To help

fund

"the

National

Endowment

for Democracy's

(NED's)

programs

in predominantly

Fiscal

year

2002

Democracy

(regionwide)

Muslim

countries"

$625,00ooo (completed)

Survey

of Women's

Freedom

To "fund

a comprehensive

survey

of the status

of women's

freedom

throughout

the Middle

East

Fiscal

year

2002

(regionwide)

in order

to identify

opportunities

for support

for political

reform

and

to promote

opportunities

$541,000

for women";

to help

"empower

women

by publicizing

their

status"

(not

available)

Gulf

Regional

Campaign

To "provide

political

skills

training

for Arab

political

leaders,

with

an emphasis

on female

candi-

Fiscal

year

20oo02

School

(Gulf

States)

dates,

within

the Gulf

States

region,

drawing

potential

candidates

for office

from

the

region

and

$500,000

providing

them

with

skills

for effective

operation

in increasingly

participatory

societies";

training

(ongoing)

to "include

campaigning,

managing

organizations

democratically,

monitoring

elections,

and

more"

Regional

Transparency

and

A "seed

fund"

to "build

civil

society

and

non-government

organization

networks

and

capacity

to

Fiscal

year

2002

Accountability

Program

(re-

combat

corruption

and

advocate

for good

governance

in participating

countries

across

the region

$soo,ooo

gionwide)

in order

to build

mutual

understanding

and

spread

best

practice"

(completed)

Coalition

Building

and

Manage-

To "organize

and

fund

roundtables,

workshop,

and

study

missions

to encourage

'common

cause'

Fiscal

year

2002

ment

Training

for Political

allies

from

different

sectors

to work

together

on issues

of mutual

concern,

such

as freedom

of the

$700,000

Parties,

Non-Governmental

press,

free

and

fair

elections,

disappeared

persons,

and

labor

rights

in the

context

of global

and

(not

available)

Organizations

(NGO)

and

Civil

regional

free

trade

agreements";

to train

groups

"to run

organizations

along

more

efficient

and

Society

Organizations

(CSO)

democratic

lines

(Algeria) Bahraini

Election

Reform

To assist

"Bahraini

political

parties

and

civil

society

groups

in preparing

for the October

2002

legis-

Fiscal

year

2002

(Bahrain)

lative

elections";

to "subsequently

help

train

and

prepare

those

elected

to operate

efficiently

in the

$600,000

legislative

process"

(ongoing)

Administration

of Justice

To "improve

the efficiency

and

effectiveness

of the Bahraini

court

and

legal

systems,

as requested,

Fiscal

year

2002

Phase

II (Bahrain)

by providing

technical

assistance

and

supporting

comparative

studies

of foreign

legal

systems,

in-

$360,000

country

training,

and

development

of a training

academy

for prosecutors"

(completed)




Family

Protection

Program

To "build

capacity

of public

and

voluntary

institutions

to develop

and

implement

comprehensive

Fiscal

year

2002

(Jordan)

strategy

to prevent

domestic

violence,

sexual

abuse,

and

honor

killings;"

to "expand

the Jordanian

$500,000

government's

awareness

raising

program

to promote

a human

rights-based

approach

within

the

(ongoing)

judicial

system"

Election

Assistance

(Jordan)

To "work

toward

free,

fair

and

open

parliamentary

elections

scheduled

for summer

2003

in Jordan,

Fiscal

year

2002

which

have

regional

significance,

through

the funding

of training

for campaigns,

candidates,

jour-

$400,000

nalists,

voters

and

NGOs,'

with

an emphasis

on "ensuring

that

female

candidates

are prepared"

(completed)

Women's

Advocacy

and

Political

To "train

women

activists

to develop

and

implement

an effective

strategy

for obtaining

political

Fiscal

year

2002

Participation

(Kuwait)

rights

for women"

$150,oo000 (ongoing)

Transparency

and

Account-

To "award

additional

small

grants

to a wide

variety

of civil

society

organizations

(CSOs)

aimed

at

Fiscal

year

200oo2

ability

(Lebanon)

strengthening

civil

society

advocacy

for good

governance"

$200oo,ooo000 (ongoing)

Women's

Legal

Rights

(Mo-

To strengthen

advocacy

for and

promotion

of women's

rights

through

community-based

liaison

Fiscal

year

2003

rocco)

programs

in underserved

rural

areas

and

small

cities;

to develop

institutional

capacity

of women's

$500,000;

advocacy

NGOs

and

Local

Development

Associations;

to enhance

women's

knowledge

of their

fiscal

year

200oo2

rights;

to increase

access

to information;

to support

networking

within

the women's

rights

com-

$250,000

munity

on the local

level

and

between

existing

organizations

in urban

centers

and

other

communi-

(ongoing)

ties;

to provide

international

rights

law

and

advocacy

training

Municipal

Election

Support

To implement

the distribution

and

publication

in Arabic

of several

hundred

campaign

manuals

Fiscal

year

2003

(Morocco)

and

step-by-step

guides

to winning

elections;

training

for campaign

managers

and

women

can-

$115,000

didates;

a series

of focus

groups

to gauge

voter

opinion

(completed)

Parliamentary

Training

(Mo-

To "train

newly-elected

members

of the Moroccan

Parliament

on the

functioning

of parliament

Fiscal

year

200oo2

rocco)

and

roles

and

responsibilities

in the legislative

process,

including

rules

and

procedures,

commit-

$600oo,ooo000

tees,

community

outreach,

and

media

relations"

(completed)

Democratic

Participation

and

Bring

citizens

into

local

decision

making

and

management

of public

resources

in Al Haouz,

a

Fiscal

year

200oo2

Effective

Local

Government

poor

region

south

of Marrakech,

local

citizen

groups

increasingly

identify

and

fund

development

$256,000

(Morocco)

projects

that

the communities

themselves

prioritize

(ongoing)




APPENDIX

I-Continued

FUNDING

AND

PROJECT

AND

LOCATION

GOAL

STATUS

Building

Institutional

Capac-

To "fund

training

workshops

to build

skills

in political

advocacy,

organizational

management,

Fiscal

year

2002

ity in Civil

Society

(Morocco)

intra-organization

democracy

and

transparency

and

gender

issues

and

provide

democracy

pro-

$180,000

gram

support"

(ongoing)

Judicial

Reform

(Oman)

To "continue

funding

for training

of NGOs,

lawyers,

judges

and

law

students

to bring

change

to

Fiscal

year

200o2

the

Omani

judiciary,

including

fostering

cooperation

between

different

legislative

bodies

and

im-

$150,000

proving

the flow

of information

and

legislation"

(ongoing)

Majlis

[Council]

Capacity

To "build

on previous

efforts

to foster

cooperation

between

two

different

Majlises

through

the

Fiscal

year

200o2

Building

(Oman)

training

of staffers

and

other

capacity

building

activities"

$150,oo000 (ongoing)

Election

Assistance

(Qatar)

To "ensure

smooth

Parliamentary

elections

in Qatar

for late

200oo3

by assessing

needs

and

opportu-

Fiscal

year

2o002

nities

and

implementing

necessary

reforms

through

the development

of advocacy

NGOs,

civil

so-

$750,000

ciety

organizations,

election

systems

and

procedures,

and

civic

education

and

training

for political

(completed)

reporters"

Tribal

Areas

Local

Council

Pilot

To "help

develop

local

councils

in tribal

areas

along

democratic

lines,

including

a working

group

Fiscal

year

200o2

Program

and

Political

Party

and

with

local

economic

development

agencies";

to hold

"workshops

to build

the capacity

of women

$575,0oo00

Women's

Training

Program

to function

effectively

within

Yemeni

political

life"

(ongoing)

(Yemen) Parliamentary

Election

To monitor

"the

April

200oo3

Yemeni

parliamentary

elections[;]

to complement

previously

approved

Fiscal

year

2002

Monitoring

Program

(Yemen)

tribal

council

and

political

party

training

projects;

[to provide]

"training

and

logistical

assistance

$400oo,ooo000

for domestic

election

monitors,

provision

of an international

observer

mission

and

the production

(ended)

of a final

election

report"

Voter

Registration,

Electoral

To "to aid Yemen's

Supreme

Elections

Commission

(SEC)

... promote

effective

voter

registration

Fiscal

year

2002

System

Capacity

Building

&

for elections

and

build

the capacity

of the SEC

[to]

perform

its functions

independently

in future

$325,000

Assistance

(Yemen)

elections"

(ongoing)

Source:

Data

at USDOS

n.d.

b as of November

200oo4

(the

site has been

redesigned

and

no longer

contains

an extensive

list of projects,

their

level

of funding,

and

their

status);

see also

USDOS

200oo3d,

n.d.

a.




APPENDIX

II-EXAMPLES

OF

THE

RANGE

OF

TYPES

AND

THE

GEOGRAPHICAL

SPREAD

OF

PROJECTS

FUNDED

BY

THE

SMALL

GRANTS

PROGRAM

OF

THE

MIDDLE

EAST

PARTNERSHIP

INITIATIVE

PROJECT

AND

LOCATION

ACTIVITY

Training

Ministry

Spokespersons

(Algeria)

A series

of training

workshops

for ministry

communication

officials,

journalists,

and

univer-

sity

journalism

professors

Strengthening

Democracy

in Algeria

A dialogue

among

"secular

and

moderate

Muslim

activists

from

all parts

of Algeria,"

led by a

local

nongovernmental

organization,

to develop

a "strategy

for the political

problems

that

face

their

country"

Promoting

Freedom

of Speech

and

an Open

Media

in

Supporting

"a student-run

campus

radio

station

at the University

of Bahrain"

the

Gulf

(Bahrain)

Trafficking-in-Persons

Victim

Abuse

Assistance

Supporting

"hotline

training

for the staffs

of Ministry

of Labor

and

Social

Affairs...

and

the

(Bahrain)

Bahrain

Center

for Human

Rights

Migrant

Workers

Group"

Family

Empowerment

and

Education

Reform

for Ado-

Helping

to "develop

the vocational

skills

and

talents"

of young

adults

at "a new

non-profit

lescents

with

Mental

and

Physical

Handicaps

(Bahrain)

school

for the mentally

retarded

in Bahrain"

Arab

Women

in the Media

(Jordan)

Supporting

a three-day

conference

to create

a network

of Arab

women

in the media

Eye

on the Arab

Media

(Jordan)

"Attempts

to raise

awareness

in professional

journalistic

standards

through

a regular

process

of critiquing

what

is written

and

broadcast"

Focus

on Corporate

Governance

in Jordan

Evaluation

of "the

status

of corporate

governance

through

a review

and

assessment

of Jorda-

nian

laws

and

regulations"

Empowerment

of a Better

Media

Role

in the Society

Building

freedom

for Jordan's

media

and

"a practice

standard

that

coincides

with

international

Through

Parliament

and

Judiciary

Support

(Jordan)

principles

and

practices"

Human

Rights

Advocacy

in Oman

Raising

"awareness

about

the rights

of the disabled

in Oman"

Building

a Coalition

for Public

Awareness

in Oman

"Using

road

safety

as a focus,"

creating

a coalition

of nongovernmental

organizations

to "for-

mulate

a public

awareness

campaign

aimed

at changing

driver

behavior"

Student

Horizons:

Student

Councils

and

Civil

Society

Funding

"a leadership

exchange

program

for..,.

the first

elected

student

council

in Oman"

in Oman




APPENDIX

II-Continued

PROJECT

AND

LOCATION

ACTIVITY

Friends

of the Environment

Center

(Qatar)

Allowing

a Qatari

nongovernmental

organization

"to produce

an animated

video

... that

raises

children's

awareness

of environmental

issues"

English

Language

Training

for Journalists

(Tunisia)

Improving

"the

English

language

proficiency

of local

journalists"

Berber

Village

Assistance:

Human

Rights

and

Legal

As "part

of a larger

program

package,"providing

"health,

literacy,

and

psychiatric

assistance

to

Assistance

for Berber

Women

(Tunisia)

Berber

women

and

a means

to sustain

those

services"

Awareness

Campaign:

Corporate

Governance

in

Development

of "a corporate

governance

awareness

campaign

for the Tunisian

private

sector

Tunisia

followed

by a conference

and

documentation

on the topic"

Higher

Colleges

of Technology

Students'

Study

Tour

Support

for eight

female

students

from

the Dubai

Women's

Student

Council

to travel

to the

(United

Arab

Emirates)

United

States

to "learn

about

political

advocacy

and

awareness

building"

Enhancing

Women's

Participation

in Elections,

Phase

Increasing

"voter

education

activities

among

rural

women"

through

workshops,

lectures,

and

II (West

Bank)

voter

guides

Children's

Parliament

200oo4

(Yemen)

Revival

of the Children's

Parliament,

established

in 2000

Promote

Reform

and

Development

in Al Jouf

(Yemen)

Allowing

the Al Jouf

Social

Council

for Development

"to work

with

local

leaders

to examine

and

more

effectively

allocate

public

resources"

Awareness

Campaign

on Legal

Documentation

and

"Educating

women

about

what

legal

documents

they

need,

why

they

are important,

and

how

Women's

Rights

(Yemen)

to obtain

them

without

the

intervention

of a male

relative"

Source:

USDOS

2003c.



the greater middle east and reform in the bush administration's ideological imagination

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