the great recession - university of nevada, reno · 2009-09-14 · university of nevada, reno...

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THE GREAT RECESSION Elliott Parker, Ph.D. Professor of Economics University of Nevada, Reno [email protected] 0 5,000 10,000 15,000 1949 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 Monthly Close DJIA / CPI A Look at the DJIA – Adjusting for Inflation (19492009 Monthly Close) By the 1990s, people came to think rapidly rising stock prices were normal. Boom through 1968, stagnation through 1984. Overall, the Dow just kept up with inflation for 40 years.

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Page 1: THE GREAT RECESSION - University of Nevada, Reno · 2009-09-14 · University of Nevada, Reno eparker@unr.edu 0 5,000 10,000 15,000 19 4 9 19 5 1 19 5 3 19 5 5 1 95 7 1 95 9 1 96

THE GREAT RECESSION

Elliott Parker, Ph.D.

Professor of Economics

University of Nevada, Reno

[email protected]

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Monthly Close

DJI

A /

CP

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A Look at the DJIA – Adjusting for Inflation(1949‐2009 Monthly Close)

By the 1990s, people came to think rapidly rising stock

prices were normal.

Boom through 1968, stagnation through 1984. Overall, the Dow just kept up with inflation for 40 years.

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Remember the Bubble in NASDAQ?

Remember the Enron scandal?  

How did we become so forgetful?

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Monthly Data

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10-City Composite

20-City Composite

Las Vegas Area

San Francisco

A Look at Housing Prices Since 1987Adjusting for Inflation

Why did we think that housing prices would continue to always rise faster than inflation?

The Bubble!

The Pop!

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The “Ownership Society”

Between 1994‐2004:

• Est. 15 million new homes owned,

• 9 million at trend, plus

• 6 million more (5% rise).

• California and Nevada started catching up to rest of the country.

Mortgage debt grew MUCH faster than either income or home ownershipFirst Wave (1950s)

– commercial banks

Second Wave (1980s)

– GSE‐guaranteed securities

Third Wave (>2002)

– other mortgage‐backed securities

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Real estate mortgages seemed like such good investments

8

Subprime lending had a much higher default rate, but it was less than ten percent of the mortgage market.

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$0 $3,000 $6,000 $9,000 $12,000 $15,000 $18,000

Gross Domestic Product

Total Mortgage Debt

Single‐Family Mortgages

Commercial Mortgages

Other Commercial Loans

Credit Card Debt

Other Consumer Loans

NYSE Capitalization

Nasdaq Capitalization

Institutional Money Funds

Commercial Paper

October Bailout

Billions of US Dollars, 2007 Data

Relative Size of U.S. Financial Markets

US Dollars Per‐Capita: $50,000$40,000$30,000$20,000$10,000 $60,000

$0 $3,000 $6,000 $9,000 $12,000 $15,000 $18,000

Gross Domestic Product

FDIC‐Insured Bank Assets

US Money Supply (M2)

Federal Expenditures

Total Federal Debt

Privately‐Held Federal Debt

Foreign‐Held Federal Debt

October Bailout

Billions of US Dollars, 2007 Data

Relative Size of U.S. Financial Markets (2)

US Dollars Per‐Capita: $50,000$40,000$30,000$20,000$10,000 $60,000

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$0 $50,000 $100,000 $150,000 $200,000 $250,000 $300,000 $350,000

U.S. Gross Domestic Product

World Gross Domestic Product

U.S. Single‐Family Mortgages

NYSE Capitalization

World Stock Market Capitalization

Notional Value of OTC Derivatives:

Foreign Exchange Contracts

Interest Rate Swaps

Credit Default Swaps

Gross Market Value:

Foreign Exchange Contracts

Interest Rate Swaps

Credit Default Swaps

Billions of US Dollars, 2007 Data

Relative Size of Other Markets

What Caused all this Lending?• New homebuyers, existing homeowners, and speculators.

• Mortgage brokers and predatory lenders.

• Financial market consolidation.

• Firms competing for highest returns.

• Short‐term incentives for financial managers.

• Investment banks, rating agencies, and hedge funds.

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Let’s not forget Hubris.

• Some risks are not diversifiable.

What are Derivatives?

14

A derivative is a financial asset whose value is derived from other financial assets (e.g., futures, options, swaps).A derivative is financial insurance against price changes: a risk-averse person pays another party to take their risk from them.The most common type of derivative is an interest rate swap, but there are more types of derivatives than bets in a casino.

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Why are Derivatives a Problem?

15

Insurance markets are regulated to make sure the insurer has adequate capital. Derivative markets are not.Derivative markets can be complex, and traders on both sides may not realize what they are doing. Derivatives are not transparent, often off-book, and huge.You don’t have to own the asset to buy insurance on it. This can leads to pyramiding of side bets. There are also often multiple generations far removed from the asset.All insurance markets have problems of moral hazard.

What Else Caused It?• Fannie Mae (FNMA) and Freddie Mac (FHLMC)

– Privately‐owned, government‐sponsored enterprises responsible for the mortgage‐backed securities market for conforming loans.  These were latecomers to the subprime debacle, but they also may have led many mortgage brokers to believe they would guarantee bad loans.

• Federal Reserve Bank – Monetary policy made cheap credit available, creating incentive for 

combining short‐run borrowing and long‐term lending.  Twelve FRBsare controlled by member banks, and failed to regulate bank involvement in the derivatives markets.

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02468

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Monthly Data

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30-Year Mortgage RatePrime Lending RateFederal Funds RateInflation Rate

Mortgage Rates have been much more Stable than either Prime or the FFR

Let’s Not Forget the Federal Government• Encouraged more people to buy homes, and pushed lenders to 

devote some portion of their lending for those who would normally not get loans.

• Removed regulations on lending practices and on derivative markets, and negligent in enforcing existing regulations.  Pressure to turn a blind eye to emerging problems. 

• Allowed financial mergers that made these firms too big to fail.The role of campaign contributions from financial sector…

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Financial Markets are Prone to Market Failure

• Market economies are most efficient when (1) there is competition,  (2) everybody knows what they are buying and selling, and (3) external spillover effects are minimal. 

• Finance fails on at least two:  information and contagion.• Basic problem:  banks are lending somebody else’s money. • Government insurance (FDIC) and private insurance (CDOs) 

both lead to moral hazard, excessive risk‐taking for short‐run profit.  Bailouts are just an extreme form of insurance.

Prior Financial Crises• There have been financial panics in the U.S. even before the 

Great Depression: 1816‐1819, 1825, 1837, 1857, 1873, 1893, and 1907.  Most resulted in recessions.

• Prior “depressions” included 1837, 1873, 1893, 1907, and 1920‐21.

• Government intervention was very limited – there was not even a central bank until 1913.

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A Major Cause/Effect is Household Spending

Over the last decade:

• a sharp rise in consumption

• A fall in personal domestic savings

What are the Global Implications?• Much of the savings being lent to Americans came from foreign sources.  

• Housing bubbles occurred in dozens of countries.• Many foreign banks engaged in the same practices as U.S. firms.

• Markets for derivatives are often offshore.• Foreign markets rely on exports to American consumers.

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The Great Recession• This recession is estimated to be the biggest worldwide since the Great Depression.

• In the last four quarters, OECD says GDP has fallen by:– 2.5% in the United States, 2.1% in Canada

– 13.7% in Turkey– 8.5% in Japan, 8.6% in Mexico, 8.4% in Ireland

– 3.3% in Iceland, 4.9% in United Kingdom

– 4.8% in Euro area, including 6.9% in Germany

Unemployment RateNevada, California, and USA

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9.4%

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Unemployment in Nevada and California is now the highest since the Great Depression!

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Growth in Nominal Personal Income

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Nevada was the fastest‐growing state.

Now it is the fastest‐shrinking.

Good News?

• It has significantly reduced the trade deficit.

• Personal savings has risen significantly.

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U.S. International Transactions

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Foreign Exchange Rates• From 2006‐2008, foreign currencies were becoming more 

expensive in Dollar terms, and this was starting to rein in the trade deficit.

• Falling demand for imports and troubles in other countries led this to reverse in the last three quarters.

• This is likely to be a temporary depreciation of foreign currency, with effects on the trade deficit.

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Real Direct Exchange Rates

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Real Dollar Value of Shanghai Composite Index

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Japan's Nikkei 225 Index (adjusted for inflation and exchange rate)

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Bank Bailouts

• Emergency Economic Stabilization Act:– $700 billion authorized in October 2008.– TARP funds began with plan for purchase of troubled MBS, but changed to a preferred stock model, with restrictions over executive pay.

– Some large financial institutions have begun to pay these amounts back. 

Monetary Intervention

• Federal Reserve authorized:– Purchase of government bonds, helped drive yield to zero.

– Purchase of private mortgage‐backed securities for the first time.

– Central bank currency swaps.– Target federal funds rate near zero.

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Federal ReserveMonetary Aggregates

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Federal ReserveMonetary Aggregates

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This is easier to see in logarithms…

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Worries about Inflation• Rise in Monetary Base would normally have been 

inflationary – but deposit expansion multiplier collapsed!• Primary worry was Deflation, as during the Great 

Depression.• M2 has not grown much, no sign of inflation yet.• A Good Sign – worries have switched.• Bernanke needs an exit strategy, to reduce reserves when 

banks start lending again.

Fiscal Intervention• Economic Stimulus Act of Feb. 2008:  

– Tax rebates for 2008, estimated $150 billion cost (about 1% of GDP) in 2008.

• American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009:– Estimated $800 billion cost over several years, with less than $100 billion 

spent so far, and $400 billion cost in FY 2010 (about 3% of GDP).  – About 40% in tax credits, 30% in state fiscal support, and 30% in 

infrastructure investment (education, energy, health care), and some extended benefit support.

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Fiscal Skepticism?• Economists are very skeptical about fiscal policy working when we are close to full‐employment.– Higher real interest rates crowd out investment.– Higher dollar crowds out exports.– Higher debt leads to future deficits.

• But we are NOT near full employment, and monetary policy isn’t enough when banks are scared and interest rates are zero.

• What are our choices?  

Worries about the Debt• Recent estimates have raised 2009‐2019 cumulative federal deficit projections from around $7 trillion to $9 trillion.– Falling revenues due to slower growth, assumption that tax cuts will be extended in 2012.

– Servicing growing federal debt.

– Additional tax cuts and expenditures from ARRA.

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Is it Worth it?• The total economic loss from the Great Depression was perhaps 

120% to 140% of 1929 GDP, worth about $20 Trillion now.• The total economic loss from the 1980‐1983 recessions was 

15% to 17% of 1979 GDP, about $2.4 Trillion now.• If $800 million in stimulus could prevent half of this latter 

decline, then it would be a very good investment.• If it led us to decline 2.5% instead of 5.0%, it has paid for itself.• But we don’t KNOW what would have happened without it. 

Federal Budget(as a Share GDP)

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Annual Data (Actuals through 2008)

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Federal Budget and the U.S. Economy(as a Share of 1950-2000 Trend GDP)

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1929 1934 1939 1944 1949 1954 1959 1964 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 2019

Annual Data (Actuals through 2008)

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Financial Regulation?

• How do we prevent this from happening again?

• The federal government seems afraid to shut the barn door while the horses are gone.

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Will Things Return to Normal?• On one hand – remember 9/11?

• Overconsumption is not sustainable – Households too, not just government.

– Foreign countries did our saving for us.

• Nevada was particularly dependent on gaming, construction.– Much of this was driven by Californians letting their housing 

investments do their savings for them.

We are at a turning point…• Our government debt is large, and growing, but not yet 

unsustainable.  Will the current deficit be temporary or permanent? 

• Our economic trajectory is not sustainable.  We can’t keep our spending growing faster than our income, and depending on other countries to keep financing that spending.

• Similarly, many countries with high savings rates have seen us as an export market driving their growth AND a place to invest their savings.

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How do we escape?• Time – there is still significant deleveraging that still needs to occur.  Housing prices must also stabilize.

• Confidence – consumers and investors no longer are as worried that we are in freefall.

• Restructuring – high consumption with trade deficits/foreign borrowing is not sustainable.

• Policy – difference between short‐term intervention and long‐term growth strategies.

What is the Prognosis Now?• Housing prices are stabilizing nationwide – but Nevada is still 

being wagged by California.• There is still a significant inventory of foreclosures and forced 

sales which are waiting to go on the market.• Recession is likely over now, but Recovery may take a year or 

more to get started.• Unemployment lags growth, and acts as a brake.• Investor confidence has begun to return.

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This presentation will be available online

http://www.business.unr.edu/faculty/parker

or just Google “Elliott Parker”

Look under “Hot Topics” on the right side.

Thank you!

What will the Chinese Do?• Before 1994 Devaluation:  inefficient state enterprises, 

massive NPL problem in state banks, overvalued RMB.• RMB kept low after 2000 through massive purchases of U.S. 

Bonds by PBC.  Rising forex reserves financed money growth, but accommodated by rising money demand. 

• Inflation rose after 2004, and PBC included other currencies in peg.  In real terms, RMB rose 25% against the Dollar, easing inflationary pressure but eroding value of Dollar assets.

• Problem is not just Chinese assets, but those held by others.

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What if the Chinese stop lending?“If you owe the bank $100 that's your problem. If you owe the bank 

$100 million, that's the bank's problem.” ‐ J. Paul Getty If we owe foreign central banks $1 trillion, then what happens if they 

think we can’t pay them?This debt is denominated in Dollars, so depreciation hurts them,not us.You can’t, however, keep borrowing after that.  Interest rates will rise, along with the U.S. risk premium.  We will also lose the seignorage from the Dollar’s use.