The Great Nuclear Dream of DPRK

Why North Korea pursued a nuclear option for over 30 years The state of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs Kim Jong-Il political motivations and internal pressures The current state of the North Korean regime The possibility that Kim Jong-Il becomes a “Nuke-R-Us

Agenda

Drivers(Internal)

Background

12

3

Strategic Options

CurrentSituation National

Interest

Drivers(External)

Why We Need Nukes

Nuke Is Indispensable Nuke Is Indispensable

Real,Constant Hostility

and Threatfrom the U.S.

Fear of Being Absorbed toSouth Korea(1/40 in GDP)

Agreed Framework

ProvedFraud

No LWR/Oil

Axis of Evil,Saddam’sExecution

IsolationUSSR dead

China’s SupportWaning

Important Background Factors

Lessons ofAgreed

Framework& 2000/2001

US Distractedto Iraq and Iran

JucheIdeology

Memory

Capacity

Situation

ConventionalForces(KPA)

Ideology

Outcome of the Joint Statement

30 days30 days 60 days60 days Feb. 2008Feb. 2008 Jan. 2009Jan. 2009

5 Working Groups 5 Working Groups

Talk Begins Talk Begins

Window of OpportunityWindow of Opportunity

1111

3333 Shutdown & Sealing of the Nuclear Facilities for Shutdown & Sealing of the Nuclear Facilities for Eventual AbandonmentEventual Abandonment Discussion on a list of all nuclear programsDiscussion on a list of all nuclear programs Bilateral Talk with the U.S. and JapanBilateral Talk with the U.S. and Japan Energy, Economic, and Humanitarian Assistance. Energy, Economic, and Humanitarian Assistance. (50,000 tons of HFO Supply)(50,000 tons of HFO Supply)

2222

Next 6-PartyNext 6-PartyTalk ScheduledTalk Scheduled(Mar. 19, 2007)(Mar. 19, 2007)

New Administration New Administration in the U.S.in the U.S.

New Administration New Administration in South Koreain South Korea

Olympic Games in Olympic Games in Beijing (Summer ’08)Beijing (Summer ’08)

New Administration in New Administration in Russia (Mid-2008)Russia (Mid-2008)

Our Capacity

East Sea

• Plutonium: Max. 60kg(Equiv. 10 bombs)

• HEU: little technological Capabilities with 20 Centrifuges

• Considerable Biological and Chemical Weapons Capabilities• Considerable Biological and Chemical Weapons Capabilities

National Interest

Economic Growth

DisruptROK/USAlliance

No Regional Nuclear

Arms Race

RegimeSurvival

No Attack to Us

DearLeader’s

Wellbeing

MaximizeForeignTribute

KeepChina’sSupport

NuclearCapability

Operational Objectives

Short Term (60 days/we get)Short Term (60 days/we get)• Secure Initial Economic Benefit• Lift Economic Sanctions

Long Term (20 months/we do)Long Term (20 months/we do)•Stay focused on nuclear issues only

(no ballistic missiles, no Japanese abductees outside WG,

no human rights, no democratization)•Maintain appearance of “good behavior”

•Preserve full defense and control

Long Term (20 months/we get)Long Term (20 months/we get)• Normalize Relationship with the U.S.

•Additional Economic “Tribute” from China and South Korea

Tim

e F

ram

e

Econ. Aid

Strategic Option Needed Strategic Option Needed

What We Should Get What We Should Get

Oil

Joint Venturewith

South Korea

How the Situation Will Unfold

Basic Survival Basic Survival

Short Term (60 days/we do)Short Term (60 days/we do)• Establish appearance of compliance• Maintain military readiness

Drivers/Assumptions - External

U.S.

• Unreliable: Lessons from 2000 and 2001

• Presidential Election Scheduled Nov. 2008

• Either Dem/Rep. Admin.Hard to Negotiate

South Korea

• “ATM,” but Their PatienceRapidly Wearing Thin

• Presidential Election Scheduled Dec. 2007

• Dark Omen: Current Top 1,2,3 Runners All fromthe Conservative Opposition Party (GNP)

Japan

• “Spoiler,” Potential ATM• Abe Shinzo Brand New,

So Far Being Moderate• Thorny Issue: Abductees

China• “Big Brother”• Leadership Generation

Change – Thinner Ideological Link with us

• 2008 Olympic Games• Wants to Appear a

Responsible Regional Leader

Unmissable Chance, But…the Window Is Rapidly Narrowing

Unmissable Chance, But…the Window Is Rapidly Narrowing

Drivers/Assumptions - Internal

Sense of Crisis Needed for Regime Cohesion, butto What Extent?

How Can We Domestically Propagate It as Victory?

How to Look “Tough?” to the Eyes of the Military?

National PrideNational Pride

ControlOn TheMilitary

ControlOn TheMilitary

Tight Control on People

Balancing Crisis

Option Summary

Hide-and-Seek - Save for rainy day All-in (5 vs. U.S.) – Try to Look Complying Another Salami: Next Card for Another

Carrot

Option 1: Hide-and-Seek

1. 잠재 고객

Long TermLong Term

What Should We Do? Pro/Con

Long TermLong Term

Short TermShort Term

Short TermShort Term

Short TermShort Term

• Exclude HEU from the Joint Declaration for the 60 days

•Overstate plutonium spent in the past to save more

•Constrain IAEA inspectors focused

on Yongbyon and Taechon

•Refuse to do beyond freezing until tangible compensation is made

• Continue clandestine HEU research until revealed

• Bitter History of 1994 Agreed Framework and 2000/2001: We Don’t Trust U.S. and Need It• Give up least, receive most • Domestically strong move

• Too risky: Got caught, we lose everything• Give justification to • the U.S. allegation that we are unreliable.•Clearest Path towards Nuclear Japan and S.Korea (if revealed)

Option 2: All-In

1. 잠재 고객

Long TermLong Term

What Should We Do? Pro/Con

Long TermLong Term

Long TermLong Term

Short TermShort Term

Short TermShort Term

•Declare all plutonium, Admit some HEU program

•Open all sites for inspection (except for one, two military sites)• Full cooperation with IAEA

•Constant recitation of compliance &

transparency

- Strong diplomatic push for aid

•Shifted Focus from Nuke to Money

• Isolate the U.S.: 5 vs. the U.S.• Show a good impression

•We’re responsible, hence more incentives expected (Libya redux) • Undercut the U.S. effort to isolate us• True to Great Leader’s Dying Injuction• Strike Capability Still Intactwith Conventional Weapons

•Most Vulnerable Option - Losing the Kingpin Chip• Weakest Stance - Military Discomfort - National Pride Lost - Seen as Capitulation to External Forces

• Moderate and give concessions based on political calendars

• Save the HEU Card until a new U.S.Administration Gets Sworn in

• Use HEU for the next bargain chip for peace regime and aid

Option 3: Another Salami (Recommended)

1. 잠재 고객

Long TermLong Term

What Should We Do? Pro/Con

Long TermLong Term

Long TermLong Term

Short TermShort Term

Short TermShort Term

• Be True to the Text: NCND

• Drag the Feet and Show Full Compliance as Written, not the HEU

• True to the Text, We’re Not to Blame and Welcome Another Negotiation - Cooperating in Other Areas. None Will Want to Break the Momentum

• Difficult to predict additional benefit from other parties• Potential fraying relations with other parties (fatigue)• Balancing between difficult• Seeming to be compliant might not work – could be the worst outcome

Policy Evaluation and Recommendation

1

2

3

All-InAll-In

AnotherSalami

AnotherSalami

Hide and SeekHide and Seek

FeasibleFeasible? DomesticDomesticConsensus?Consensus?

Risk?Risk?(if failed)(if failed)

Benefit?Benefit?

Medium Highest Very High Medium

Easy Low Low High

Medium Medium Low High

Policy Implementation Plan

Next 6 Party Talk

In 60 Days

Till Jan. ‘09

After Jan. ‘09

• Maintain Momentum – Be Cooperative• Stick to the Text – Avoid HEU, Abductees,

etc• Pursue Bilateral Incentives through 5 WG

• Welcome IAEA Inspectors, Look Friendly• Actively Engage in Working Groups Talk, Keep

Momentum

• When Asked, Hint We’re Willing to negotiate with next administration

• Take conciliatory stance to South Korea to Influence the Presidential Election

• Secure as much Tribute as Possible

• When Pushed to the Corner, Try to Appear a Honest Negotiator

• Use HEU as a Bargaining Chip for Peace Accord and more Aid

Appendix: NK Capability More Information Needed

Full Economic Impact under UNSCR 1718

Energy Scarcity Electricity Production Level: 30 TW (cf. South Korea: 370TW) Electric Consumption per capita: 0.71 TOE (Tons of Energy in terms of

oil. Cf. South Korea: 4.6 TOE)

Food shortage Given at Next Slide 400,000 tons of Food and Medical Aid ($70 million) from South Korea (2006) 350,000 tons of Fertilizer ($209 million) from South Korea (2006) $4.4 million by U.N. (suspended after the nuclear test) $2 billion from China

Numbers of Defectors to South Korea 1,193 (2002), 1,894 (2004), 1,383 (2005), 1,054 (til mid 2006) Cumulative numbers of North Korean Defectors to South Korea: more than

10,000 as of 2006 July Estimated 5,000 ~ 10,000 in China

Appendix: Food Shortage (thousand tons) 6,400 5,200 4,300 2,800

Condition / Priority International Standard

Minimum Int’l Standard

Ordinary Production Level

Malnutrition

2006 production level mass starvation feared

1st (1 mil, 5%)

270(800g/day)

250 (700g/day)

219(600g/day)

182(500g/day)

2nd (1.5 mil, 7%)

440(700g/day)

440(800g/day)

383 (700g/day)

274(500g/day)

3rd (4 mil, 20%)

1020(700g/day)

880(600g/day)

584(400g/day)

Mal-nutrition

365(250g/day)

Mal-nutrition

4th (6 mil, 30%)

1310(600/day)

880(400g/day)

657 (300g/day)

219(100g/day)

Starvation

Farmers(8 mil, 40%)

2000 1600 (547g/day)

1600 (547g/day)

1440(500g/day)

Subtotal 5040 4050 3443 2480

Feed 280 180 180 90

Seed 230 230. 230 230

Others 850 740 447

Appendix: Verbatim We Don’t Have Intention to Build Nuclear Weapons, Let Alone Running

(Nuclear Arms) Race with Our Big Neighbors. As the Weapons Can Obliterate the Entire Nation, We Don’t Want To Build Nuclear Weapons Kim, Il-sung, 1992

You Called Us One of Axis of Evil. You Mocked Our Dear Leader. Your Forces Have Been Deployed on the Korean Peninsula and Constant Threat To Us. We are entitled to more than that (if you force us) Kang Sok-ju, when asked by James Kelly whether they are seeking HEU

program, Oct 16, 2002

Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is still effective; It was the dying injunction of the Great Leader, Kim Il-sung. As the U.S. despises and threatens us, however, we are forced to have it. Kim Jong-il, in a talk with South Korean unification minister. June 17, 2005

Thanks to our nuclear program, the Yankee Imperialists (sic) cannot attack us. So China should be grateful to the DPRK for stability in the region Kang Sok-ju, when cornered by Chinese official, August 2005

Appendix: Economic analysis 30 Million in circulation with counterfeit

money Missile sales: Sold to Pakistan, Libya, Syria,

and Iran – Established proliferation block