the global sanctions data base: an update that includes

The Global Sanctions Data Base: An Update that Includes the Years of the Trump Presidency†

Aleksandra Kirilakha,

Gabriel Felbermayr, Constantinos Syropoulos,

Erdal Yalcin and Yoto V. Yotov∗

Abstract

We introduce and discuss 381 previously unrecorded sanction cases among which 75 emerged during 2016-2019, a period that coincides with the Trump presidency. These newly considered cases are included in the updated Global Sanctions Data Base (GSDB) of Felbermayr et al. (2020), thus raising the total of sanction cases recorded there to 1101. Our descriptive analysis reveals that a number of sanctions were lifted in 2016. However, in 2017 we witnessed a substantial increase in the deployment of new – primarily ‘smart’ (i.e., financial and travel) – sanctions of which more than half were imposed by the United States. Moreover, we observed a significant rise in the number of sanctions aiming to ‘change’ the policies of sanctioned states and to fight ‘terrorism’. Almost all sanctions initiated by the Trump administration are still in place, so assessment of their success remains open.

JEL Classification Codes: F1, F13, F14, F5, F51, H5, N4. Keywords: Sanctions, the GSDB, Trump Administration.

______________________________________ † We are indebted to numerous scholars for their positive feedback and specific suggestions on the initial release of the GSDB. We are especially grateful to, and thank, Keenan Kassa, David Comtsyan, Tobias Weirowski, James Smith, Matteo Pinna, Ruth Gibson, Zachary J. Kramer, Thmbinkosi Rushwaya, Abhinada Nandy and Carla Norrlof. We also thank Peter A.G. van Bergeijk for numerous construction comment on the version of this paper that would be contributed to the Research Handbook on Economic Sanctions he is editing. The development and maintenance of the GSDB require substantial time and effort. In return, we expect researchers who use it to cite the current paper and Felbermayer et al. (2020). Moreover, if you identify errors or omissions in the GSDB, please notify us at [email protected], where you can also obtain the latest version. ∗ Contact: Kirilakha – School of Economics, Drexel University, [email protected]; Felbermayr – Kiel Institute, [email protected]; Syropoulos – School of Economics, Drexel University, CESifo, [email protected]; Yalcin – Konstanz University of Applied Sciences, CESifo, [email protected]; Yotov – Schoool of Economics, Drexel University, CESifo, [email protected].

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“The Trump administration has imposed sanctions at a record-shattering pace

of about three times a day during the president’s time in office: a slew of

measures targeting companies, individuals and even oil tankers tied to Iran,

North Korea, China, Venezuela and Russia. President-elect Joe Biden’s team is

promising a top-to-bottom review of sanctions operations, but don’t expect a

significant slowdown on his watch.”

Bloomberg Businessweek, Dec. 8, 2020

1 Introduction

While, depending on the definition of a sanction, one may question the statement from the

opening quote that the Trump administration has imposed sanctions at a pace of about three

times a day, two parts of this quote are undeniable. The first is that, indeed, President Trump

imposed sanctions at a record-shattering rate, more than any other US president. The second is

that most of the sanctions that were imposed during the Trump presidency would probably

remain in place during the Biden administration as well. Given the prominence of the United

States in the global economy, it is natural to expect its sanctions to have significant economic

and geopolitical consequences. What’s more, the US sanctions during the Trump presidency

may trigger retaliation or, more broadly, elevate the use of sanctions to a commonly accepted

norm that stretches the length of their worldwide reach and magnifies the depth of their impact.

For these reasons, among others, the Trump administration’s sanctions underscore the need to

work to improve our understanding of their effects.

A natural starting point – and our primary objective in this Chapter – is to collect data on

sanctions and use these data to describe their key features. Accordingly, our contribution to the

related literature is threefold. First, we have been able to trace 75 publicly reported sanctions

that were imposed between 2016 and 2019 (i.e., during most of the years of the Trump

presidency). This allowed us to extend the coverage of the Global Sanctions Data Base (GSDB)

of Felbermayr et al. (2020) to 2019. Second, we have identified 306 additional sanction cases

during the period 1950-2016. These cases have also been recorded in the GSDB. As a result, the

updated version now includes a total of 1101 publicly traceable, multilateral, plurilateral, and

unilateral sanction cases over the period 1950-2019. Third, in addition to providing a report on

the salient feature of the expanded GSDB, in the Chapter we offer a descriptive analysis of the

sanctions during the entire period with a focus on the most recent sanctions (2016-2019) and

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especially on the new US sanctions employed by the Trump administration.

The inclusion of the newly identified cases in the GSDB was possible for the following

reasons. First, we relied on new sources (e.g., the Sanctions Alert initiative), which were

especially useful for sanction cases during 2013-2017. Second, we used the Intrastate Dispute

Narratives of the DADM Project led by the Political Science Department of the University of

Central Arkansas (UCA) to add cases related to financial and military aid cuts, travel bans and

diplomatic sanctions. Third, we revisited and cross-checked with existing sanction databases

(e.g., Hufbauer et al. (2007) and Morgan et al. (2014)) as well as newly-constructed datasets

(e.g., Weber and Schneider (2018)). Lastly, some of our additions to the GSDB were due to the

feedback we received from researchers who used it.

Exploiting the updated version of the GSDB, in this Chapter we conduct a descriptive

analysis of the sanctions imposed throughout 1950-2019 and arrive at the following

conclusions. First, 2017 was marked by a new and significant rise in sanction impositions across

the world. Second, the intensified sanction activities among nations are accompanied by an

increase in the number of sanctioning states (“senders”) and sanctioned states (“targets”). Third,

the most frequent policy objectives associated with the imposition of sanctions are

‘improvements in human rights’ and ‘restoration of democracy’, followed by ‘end wars’ and

‘policy change’. The first two of the above objectives are also prevalent in the most recent

sanctions imposed post-2016. Moreover, the relative use of the latter two objectives over the

same period rises. Fourth, during the period 1950-2019, increasingly more sanctions have been

classified as partially or fully successful. A possible interpretation of this observation is that

over time sanctions have become more effective in achieving their objectives.

Next, motivated by the fact that the Trump administration has been notorious for frequently

using sanctions as foreign policy tool, we zoom in on the recent US sanctions. We discern a clear

spike in sanction impositions in 2017 under the Trump presidency, which constitute more than

40% of all sanctions worldwide by 2019. The increased sanction activities by the US are also

accompanied by an increase in the impositions of the so-called ‘smart’ (i.e., targeted financial

and travel) sanctions. In terms of the objectives the recent US sanctions aim to attain, there has also

been an increase in the number of sanctions with the ‘policy change’ and `fighting terrorism’

objectives. In contrast, the number of sanctions with a ‘destabilize regime’ objective decreased.

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Last, alarmingly, we observe that all US sanctions in 2019 are ongoing.

The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 offers an overview of the GSDB

(including a descriptive analysis of the newly recorded cases) and describes general trends and

characteristics of the new sanctions in the world as a whole. Section 3 zooms in on the sanctions

that were imposed by the United States during 2016-2019. Section 4 concludes.

2 The Updated GSDB: A General Overview

In recent years, a diverse collection of economic sanctions has been used by a large number of

countries to promote a wide range of international policy objectives. Motivated by these

developments, in 2016 we initiated the creation of the GSDB and published its first version in

2020 (cf. Felbermayr et al. (2020)). In this section, we describe the salient characteristics of the

GSDB and explain the new features contained in its first update (GSDB Update 1).1

In the original construction of the GSDB, a number of sanction cases contained therein were

collected from a limited number of sources focusing on the 1950-2016 period. Multilateral

sanctions, which were mostly based on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions,

were collected from publicly available UN documents.2 In the cases of the United States (US)

and the European Union (EU), policy orders and corresponding national sources were screened.

Furthermore, for each individual country in the GSDB, national sources were searched to identify

additional cases. Likewise, international newspapers and history books were screened and keyword

web searches in online search engines were consulted to identify country specific sanctions,

especially for older bilateral sanction cases. With this procedure we were able to identify a total of

729 sanction cases.

The coverage of the first update of the GSDB has improved in two ways. First, due to the

1 Additional information about the GSDB can be found at https://www.globalsanctionsdatabase.com. The dataset can be obtained by emailing us at [email protected]. 2 We note that most multilateral sanctions, and UN sanctions in particular, require countries to implement local legislation to comply with them, and it is the responsibility of the countries to comply with UN sanctions. Thus, it is possible that sometimes some countries do not implement (in whole or in part) some multilateral sanctions. Felbermayr et al. (2019) offer empirical evidence for the heterogeneous effects of the EU sanctions on Iran across EU member states. In light of this uncertainty of countries' behavior, in the GSDB multilateral sanctions are assumed to be implemented by all member states, e.g., if the sanction is imposed by the UN, then all UN members at that time are recorded as senders of that sanction.

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discovery of new sources for sanctions and the improved listings in public databases, we were able

to identify additional cases for the period 1950-2016. Second, we extended the 1950-2016 period

by three more years (i.e., 2016-2019) and included the corresponding sanction cases in the GSDB.

As a result, the new version of the GSDB includes a total of 1101 publicly traceable, multilateral,

plurilateral, and unilateral sanction cases over the period 1950-2019.3 The Appendix to this

Chapter provides a list of all newly identified cases that are contained in the updated version of

the GSDB.

There are several reasons for the increase in the number of sanction cases in the first update of

the GSDB. First, we relied on new sources. Most notably, we utilized the Sanctions Alert (by

https://www.debevoise.com) for new sanctions imposed between 2013 and 2017. Second, we

managed to record additional sanction cases (primarily related to financial and military aid cuts,

travel bans and diplomatic sanctions) by relying on the Intrastate Dispute Narratives of the

Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) Project led by the Political Science

Department of the University of Central Arkansas. Third, we revisited existing sanction

databases and, once again, cross-checked the GSDB cases against them. In particular, we studied

in detail each sanction case in Hufbauer et al. (2007) and, within a number of sanction policies,

we identified additional cases. We also cross-checked with Morgan et al. (2014) for missing

cases (mostly for the 1950-1990 period). Fourth, we compared the cases in the GSDB with

newly constructed datasets (i.e., the EUSANCT database by Weber and Schneider (2018)).

Lastly, we added some cases per suggestions that we received from some users of the GSDB. As

a result, we discovered 306 additional cases that were imposed up to 2016 and 75 new cases

imposed during 2016-2019.

The GSDB defines sanctions as restrictive policy measures adopted by individual countries,

groups of countries, the UN, and other international organizations, to address various types of

violations of international norms and conventions. Importantly, in the GSDB, the imposition of

tariffs or anti-dumping duties is not considered a sanction. The motivation for this decision is that

3 The following pairs of sanction cases are identical in terms of the sender, the target, and the sanction beginning and sanction end: 19 and 20 (target Algeria), 281 and 282 (target Egypt), 341 and 342 (target Fiji), 371 and 372 (target Georgia), 398 and 399 (target Guatemala), 474 and 475 (Iran), 550 and 551 (North Korea), 833-834 and 838-839 (target Russia), and 1061 and 1062 (target Venezuela). However, these cases are documented separately because they have separate documents/happened separately from one another/happened in different times of the same year.

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classical trade policy measures are normally used to protect domestic economic interests within

defined rules (e.g., WTO anti-dumping rules) while sanctions are imposed to punish or compel a

targeted nation to conform to the sanctioning state’s political objective(s). We do recognize,

however, that the distinction between sanctions and standard trade policy tools is increasingly

becoming blurred (Hufbauer and Jung (2021)). For datasets on specific trade policy tools, we

refer the reader to the WTO and to the UN. For an excellent dataset that simultaneously accounts

sanctions and tariffs, we refer the reader to the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions

(TIES) by Morgan et al. (2014); see also Morgan et al. (2021). Finally, we note that trade

sanctions take central stage in the GSDB, which distinguishes between export sanctions, import

sanctions, and bilateral trade sanctions, depending on the direction of trade flows, and between

partial and complete trade sanctions, depending on their coverage.

The GSDB features sanction cases that vary along three dimensions. First, the cases are

classified on the basis of distinct types (e.g., trade sanctions, financial sanctions, travel restrictions,

arms sanctions, military assistance sanctions, and other types of sanctions). Second, for each

sanction case, the GSDB identifies the sanctioning country’s policy objectives depending on

official documents and/or press releases.4 When sanctions have several policy objectives, the

GSDB includes up to three of these objectives (though not in order of importance). The third

dimension of the GSDB aims to assess the success of each sanction case under consideration.

This assessment is based on official government statements or indirect confirmations in

international press announcements, but it still comes with the caveat that such statements can

be subjective or biased. Nonetheless, this is a good starting point in that the collected

information allows a first assessment. Moreover, as the following descriptive statistic

illustrates, we can elaborate on some general trends regarding the success or failure of specific

sanction policies.5 Table B.1 and Table B.2 in the Appendix provide several historical examples

of sanction types and sanction objectives that are documented in the GSDB.

The GSDB complements and extends a number of prominent databases such as the

4 It is possible to identify sanction objectives by capitalizing on the fact that related official documents record the declared objectives associated with specific sanction impositions.

5 In our ongoing data project, we are exploring possible ways to identify the success or failure of sanctions based on newly developed machine learning techniques that can be used to screen large databases and the internet.

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HSE/HSEO database (Hufbauer et al. (2007)), the TIES database (Morgan et al. (2014)), the TSC

database (Biersteker and Tourinho (2016)), and the EUSANCT database (Weber and Schneider

(2018)). A novel feature of the GSDB is that it records international trade sanctions and

differentiates these sanctions on the basis of several desirable characteristics. For example, in

addition to identifying the trade sanctions, the GSDB specifies the direction of affected trade

flows (exports and/or imports) and the type of trade sanction imposed (i.e., partial vs complete).

What’s more, the GSDB is available as a case-level version as well as a dyadic version. Thus,

the GSDB is very well-suited for analyses that aim to estimate the effects of alternative types of

sanctions (e.g., trade sanctions, financial sanctions, etc.) using models for bilateral flows of

trade, foreign direct investment, and migration.

Panel (a) of Figure 1 depicts the evolution of all identified sanctions between 1950 and 2019.6

For each year over this period, we identify the total number of imposed sanctions. Several distinct

time spans with changing trends can be discerned. Between 1950 and 1993, the number of

imposed sanctions rises continuously. Interestingly, in the early 1990s, there is a marked increase

in the number of these sanctions. In the subsequent decade, the trend changes significantly. Until

2004, both the total number of sanctions in force and the newly initiated sanction cases drop

slightly. However, a large and sustained increase of initiated sanction policies emerges again and

Figure 1: Evolution of Sanctions, 1950-2019

Note: This figure illustrates: (a) the number of all active sanctions (solid line) and the number of all existing (i.e., previously imposed and still active) sanctions (dashed line) in each year of the sample coverage (1950-2019). Thus, the distance between the two lines captures the number of new sanctions recorded in each year of the sample coverage; and (b) the yearly number of new sanction impositions over the period 1950-2019. A spike in new

6 The data used to construct Figure 1 can be found in Table A.2.

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sanction cases occurs in 2017, mostly driven by US sanctions.

remains in place until the beginning of Obama’s second term. At that point, the number of

active sanctions starts to drop until 2016 but begins to rise in 2017 till the end of the sample

period.7 Overall, the number of sanctions has increased continuously since 1950 and this

increase has accelerated since 2018. We view this trend as evidence of the rising popularity of

sanctions as a tool of coercive diplomacy.8 Consequently, one would expect the economic impact

of these sanctions to rise as well.

Panel (b) of Figure 1 displays the number of new sanctions in each year for the period 1950-

2019. This panel captures two patterns. First, the number of new sanction cases has, on average,

increased over time. Second, while the number of new sanction impositions fluctuated in the

2000s, their number has on the average risen. As we argue next (and as can be inferred from

Figure 2 that follows) this is so primarily because of the adoption of ‘smart’ (targeted) sanctions

(i.e., sanctions that typically target specific individuals, companies, or organizations with

financial and/or travel restrictions.

The early 2000s were marked by a rise in humanitarian concerns largely in response to the

damage and suffering that comprehensive sanctions inflicted on innocent civilians. This led to a

decrease in the usage of these sanctions and to a re-evaluation of their effectiveness as a foreign policy

tool. The new smart sanctions, or targeted sanctions, appeared at that time and were quickly

proclaimed “superior” because they aimed to target entities that were deemed to be directly

involved in the conflict that instigated the initiation of sanctions in the first place. The frequent

deployment of this novel instrument led to another increase in sanction impositions starting in

2010. In 2016, many sanction regimes (i.e., Iran, Liberia, Ivory Coast, and Myanmar) were

revoked. Yet, as indicated by the large gap between the previously existing case (captured by

the dashed-line curve in panel (a) of Figure 1) and all active cases (captured by the solid-line

curve), 2017 was different. That was the year during which the Trump administration imposed

a number of new sanctions (which account for the rise in that year shown in panel (b) of Figure

7 It should be noted that, while many sanction regimes were lifted in 2016 (i.e., Myanmar, Liberia, Ivory Coast, and Iran), the year 2017 was marked by the imposition of new sanctions. 8 In the next section we zoom in on the most recent years in the GSDB with a special focus on the U.S. sanctions that were imposed under the Trump administration.

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1). We focus on these sanctions in the next section.

Among other things, the two panels in Figure 2 illustrate the large and expanding role of

smart sanctions (travel and financial sanctions) throughout the sample period. The same figure

also captures the idea that the frequency and the share of trade sanctions in the total number of

sanctions have decreased over time, while the popularity of arms and military sanctions has

remained relatively stable over the last couple of decades.

Figure 2: Sanction Implementations by Type, 1950-2019

Note: This figure presents the evolution of sanctions by type. Panel (a) depicts the number of imposed sanctions by type for the period 1950-2019 while panel (b) illustrates the share of sanction impositions by type in each year for the period 1950-2019. To facilitate readability the order of different sanction types in the legend corresponds to the order of the shaded areas in the two panels.

The dyadic structure of the GSDB makes it easier to visualize who imposes sanctions and

on whom. Figure 3 exhibits two snapshots of chord diagrams by major regions classified

according to the UN Geoscheme. Arrows starting in a specific region and pointing to a

particular region capture the number of imposed sanctions (of all types). Panel (a) of Figure 3

refers to global sanction activities between regions for the year 2019. Accordingly, governments of

North-Western Europe (NW Europe) and African countries imposed the largest number of

sanctions on African countries mostly in response to coups/civil wars that occurred prior to or

during 2019. In contrast, not a single country from Africa imposed a sanction against any North-

Western European state. It turns out that some regions in the world rarely experience sanctions

while others (such as South Asian (S-Asia) and East Asian (E-Asia) countries) are confronted with

sanctions from all over the world. Moreover, sanctions are not imposed in a symmetric way;

that is, in most of the identified sanctions in the GSDB, we do not observe retaliation.

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Figure 3: Bilateral Structure of Sanctions

(a) 2019

(b) 1950

Note: The above chord diagrams help visualize sanctions between different regions in the world for the years 1950 and 2019. Regions are classified according to the UN Geoscheme. See the Appendix for a description of the classification of regions according to the UN Geoscheme.

Panel (b) of Figure 3 depicts a chord diagram that illustrates the sanction activities between

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regions for the year 1950.9 Panel (b) also ascertains, both qualitatively and quantitatively, the

presence of substantially fewer sanctions across the world. The biggest arrow indicates that

sanctions among Eastern and Western European countries, which are mostly related to the Cold

War events, represent the largest share at the time. A comparison between the two panels of

Figure 3 also confirms that sanctions have indeed become a more popular tool, and that the

network of sanctions in the world has become more complex. At the same time, the figure also

reveals that the US and the EU have been the most active users of sanctions, followed by North-

African nations and Canada (cf. Felbermayr et al. (2020)), during all years in the sample period.

For each sanction case, the GSDB identifies the sanctioning countries’ policy objectives

we have collected from official documents. Figure 4 presents the distribution of nine distinct

Figure 4: Sanctions by Objective - Over Time

Note: This figure depicts the yearly number of observed policy objectives declared in all sanctions listed in the GSDB (1950-2019). For each sanction considered, up to three objectives are documented (but not ranked in terms of importance/significance). A visible spike occurs post 2016 in sanctions that aim to restore human rights, fight terrorism, and change policy objectives. objectives that recur in sanction policies. Between 1950 and 2019, several changes can be

9 For comparison purposes, the figure maintains the regional classification of nations fixed (and according to the UN Geoscheme in 2019).

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observed. First, until 1960, two policy sanction objectives dominate the field: sanctions that

aim to solve territorial conflicts and to destabilize regimes. Second, from the mid-1960s onward,

a continuously rising number of sanctions emerges which aim to change policies in targeted

countries. The just noted objectives appear to diminish in importance in the early 1990s,

especially after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Figure 4 also depicts a third structural change:

sanctions aiming to address issues related to human rights and democracy start to rise

continuously from the 1970s onward. Similarly, sanction objectives that aim to end wars start to

play an increasing role.

Figure 5 summarizes the distribution of all sanction objectives over the period 1950-2019

and separates the objectives during the three new years of data (2016-2019) we introduced to

the GSDB. The overall distribution of sanction objectives enables us to us to classify them in

three broad categories depending on their frequency of use. The most frequently defined policy

Figure 5: Frequency of Sanctions by Objective

Note: This figure depicts the number of observed policy objectives declared in all sanctions listed in the GSDB for the period 1950-2019. The dark bars capture the cases imposed during 1950-2015, while the light bars show the most recent cases imposed during 2016-2019. For each sanction up to three objectives are documented (but not ranked by importance/significance). The most common objectives of sanctions imposed during 2016-2019 are: restoring human rights and democracy and fighting terrorism.

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objectives of sanctions are improvements in human rights and restoration of democracy. The

second group of most frequently defined sanction objectives aim at ending wars and changing

policies in target countries. Finally, the third group includes sanctions with objectives to prevent

war, fight terrorism, resolve territorial conflicts and destabilize regime.

Comparison between the frequency of sanction objectives before and after 2016 reveals several

patterns. First, consistent with the pre-2016 trend, most of the post-2016 objectives of sanctions

are improvements in human rights and restoration of democracy. Second, the post-2016 period

sees a significant relative (in percentage terms) increase in sanctions with objectives that aim at

terrorism and policy change in the target countries. Third, and also consistent with the pre-2016

pattern, we see very few new cases that target preventing war or resolving territorial conflict

and, in fact, no new cases that aim at destabilizing regime. Finally, we document a relative

increase in the number of sanctions with ‘other’ objectives. A possible explanation for this

trend could be the use of new smart sanctions that do not fit within the standardly defined

objectives. The implication for the GSDB is that future updates should pay closer attention to

the objectives of new sanctions in an effort to classify them better.

We conclude this section with an analysis of the success of sanctions. While, as noted earlier,

we recognize that the identification and quantification of sanctions’ success is a complex

problem that is inevitably accompanied with numerous caveats, we believe that the trends that we

identify and describe here with the help of GSDB are informative. Figure 6 presents the shares

of sanctions with different success rates over the entire sample period. Overall, the average

success rate of all identified sanction cases that have been classified as fully successful over the

1950-2019 period is around 42%, while sanctions with partial success account for about 16%.

These percentages are calculated without taking into account ongoing sanction cases. If the

latter were taken into account then the sanctions with at least partial success would account for

about 30%, which is very much in line with the effectiveness rate of 34% reported in Hufbauer

et al. (2007).

Figure 6 unveils several patterns in the evolution of sanctions depending on their success.

First, throughout the period of investigation (and with the exception of the 1990s) the share of

sanctions classified as successful increased steadily. Second, over the same period, the share

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of sanctions that were considered unsuccessful (or ‘failed’) declined steadily.

Third, we see a clear decreasing trend in the fraction of sanctions classified under

‘negotiation settlement’. Finally, after a decreasing trend until the 1970s, we see a sharp

increase in the share of sanctions with ‘partial success’ in the late 1970s and a stable share

since then. In sum, Figure 6 suggests that over time increasingly more sanctions have been

classified as partially or fully successful, thus suggesting that over time sanctions have become

more effective in achieving their goals.

Figure 6: Success Rate of Sanctions

Note: This figure depicts the registered yearly policy outcome associated with the declared policy objectives during 1950-2019. For each sanction case considered, up to three objectives are documented. To ease readability the order of sanctions classified by outcome in the legend corresponds to the order of the shaded areas in the graph. The graph identifies a significant increase in the number of ongoing sanction cases over time. 3 Economic Sanctions during the Trump Presidency

This section zooms in on the economic sanctions during 2016-2019, with a specific focus on the

sanctions imposed by the United Sates. The types of questions we are interested in answering

here may be summarized as follows: Did the Trump administration impose more sanctions than

previous administrations? Did the types of sanctions it used differ? And if they did, what are the

salient differences? Our consideration of the 2016-2019 period is motivated by two ideas. First,

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because the original edition of the GSDB included sanction up to the year 2016, all cases

recorded during 2016-2019 constitute new additions to the GSDB and, as such, deserve some

attention. The second idea is that these years coincided with most of Donald Trump’s

presidency. Our focus on the US sanctions can be attributed to the following reasons. First, as

motivated by the opening quote to the chapter, it is widely believed that the Trump administration

imposed more sanctions than any other US administration.10 Second, according to the GSDB,

since 1950 the United States has been the most frequent sanctioning nation, averaging more than

one third of all sanction cases in the world. Third, for various reasons, the US sanctions have been

of keen interest to scholars and analysts in the sanctions literature (e.g., Kohl (2021)). Finally,

due to the primacy of the United States in international affairs, its sanction policies differ

substantively from the ones imposed by other countries in the world (e.g., Schneider and Weber

(2020) and Dai et al. (2021)).

We start by considering the fraction of US sanctions over all sanctions imposed in the world

(according to the GSDB) and by commenting on whether there were significant changes during

the Trump presidency. Figure 7 plots the fraction of sanctions imposed by the United States vs. the

United Nations vs. the European Union vs. all other countries in the world during 1950-2019.

Three key observations stand out upon inspection of this figure. First, the United States has

been the single most frequent user of sanctions throughout this period: on average, more than

35% of all sanctions during 1950-2019 were imposed by the United States. A noteworthy

exception appears in the early 1970s. At that time, we observe a substantial decrease in this

fraction. The primary reason behind this fall is the resolution of the Indo-Pakistani conflict and

the lifting of many sanctions on India and Pakistan.

Second, we detect a significant and steady rise in the EU and UN sanctions since the early

1990s. Finally, we document a clear contrast between the evolution of the fraction of US sanctions

under the Obama and the Trump administrations. Specifically, at the end of the Obama

presidency in 2016, US sanctions accounted for 30% of all sanctions in the world. In contrast,

in 2019 this fraction rose to more than 40%. In summary, Figure 7 documents the dominant

10 To complement the opening quote, “On average, the Trump administration imposed sanctions on more than 900 entities or individuals each year for the last four years, nearly 80% more than the annual number of designations imposed by the Obama administration from 2009 to 2016.” (The Wall Street Journal, October 30, 2020).

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reliance of the United States since 1950 on sanctions to achieve its foreign policy objectives as

well as the increase in the frequency of their usage by the Trump administration.

Figure 7: US vs. UN vs. EU Sanctions (% Worldwide)

Note: This figure depicts the yearly % of the sanctions imposed by the US vs. the % of sanctions imposed by the UN, the EU, and the rest of the world. The US has been the most frequent imposer of unilateral sanctions throughout 1950-2019. The percentage of the US sanctions significantly increases during the Trump administration.

Next, consistent with our analysis in the previous section, we analyze Trump’s sanctions

across two primary dimensions of the GSDB: type and objective.11 Figure 8 depicts the types of

sanctions employed by the US. In addition to confirming the increase in the absolute number

of sanctions imposed by the Trump administration, two clear patterns emerge from panel (a) of

Figure 8. First, while trade sanctions appear to have risen significantly during the Obama years,

there is a sharp fall in 2017 due to the lifting of many active Obama era sanctions in 2016. The

Trump administration did not appear to favor trade sanctions. In contrast, though arms sanctions

remained relatively steady during the 2016-2019 period, military sanctions increased marginally.

11 Since these sanctions were imposed recently and are ongoing, it is too early to gauge their success.

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Figure 8: Evolution of US Sanctions by Type, 1950-2019

(a) US Sanctions by Type (Number) (b) US Sanctions by Type (%) Note: This figure illustrates the evolution of US sanctions by type. Panel (a) depicts the number of imposed sanctions by type in each year for the period 2005-2019, and panel (b) illustrates the share of sanctions by type in each year for the same period. To facilitate readability the order of different sanction types in the legend corresponds to the order of the shaded areas in the two panels. There has been a significant increase in financial and travel sanctions during the years of the Trump presidency (2017-2019), followed by a decrease in the share of arms sanctions during these years.

Second, and more interestingly, the Trump and Obama administrations differ very starkly in

their imposition of smart (i.e., travel and financial) sanctions. Specifically, we observe a sharp

increase in the number of smart sanctions under Trump’s term. This pattern is even clearer in panel

(b) of Figure 8 which reports the sanction cases in percentage terms. A possible explanation for this

relative increase in the number of smart sanctions, which is consistent with a general worldwide

trend, is that by design smart sanctions aim to influence policymakers in sanctioned countries by

imposing economic pain on targeted individuals, companies, and/or sectors in the hope of limiting

the negative impact on ordinary people. Of course, some targeted sanctions (e.g., US visa

denials, border rejections, and local currency devaluation) often still have unintended

consequences on civilians. Next, we ask whether the sanctions of the Trump administration

differ in terms of their objectives. The answer is contained in Figure 9 which suggests that,

indeed, this is the case. Specifically, panel (a) depicts the number of sanctions by objective, while

18

panel (b) converts these numbers in percentages. Figure 9 unveils a significant increase in the

sanctions whose objectives belong to the ‘policy change’ and ‘terrorism’ categories.12 We also

detect a small rise in 2019 in the ‘human rights’ objective. Prominent examples of US sanctions

targeting ‘policy change’ include the visa sanctions on Cambodia, Eritrea, Guinea, and Sierra

Leone for failing to accept the nationals that were ordered to move out of the United States. As

for the sanctions aiming to fulfill the ‘terrorism’ objective, the Trump administration imposed

travel bans on Iranian nationals, as well as nationals of numerous other Muslim countries, to

restrict immigration from regions that it viewed as “terror-prone.”

Figure 9: Evolution of US Sanctions by Objective, 1950-2019

Note: For clarity, this figure depicts the yearly number of observed policy objectives associated with US sanctions listed in the GSDB during 2005-2019. For each sanction considered, up to three objectives are documented (not ranked by importance/significance). Clearly, during the Trump presidency, we observed a significant rise in sanctions whose objectives belong to the ‘policy change’ and ‘terrorism’ categories. The number of sanctions with a ‘destabilize regime’ objective decreased in the same years.

The increased use of sanctions with ‘policy change’ and ‘terrorism’ objectives is even

clearer in panel (b) of Figure 9. Panels (a) and (b) also reveal a significant decrease in the use of

sanctions aiming to destabilize regime primarily due to the easing of the Cuban sanctions by the

Obama administration.

12 The GSDB allocates sanction objectives to the ‘Policy Change’ category when sanctions aim to enforce a domestic (i.e., an economic, political or social) policy change in a sanctioned state. The ‘Terrorism’ sanction objectives aim to motivate a sanctioned state to stop supporting or tolerating terrorist groups.

19

4 Conclusions

Under the leadership of the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations, the

number of economic sanctions has increased since 1950. As a result, sanctions have become one

of the most popular tools of coercive diplomacy in foreign affairs. Normally, a larger number of

sanctions generates increased economic and political effects. Predictably, this has stimulated the

interest of academics and policy makers in understanding the reasons for the imposition of

sanctions and their consequences. In order to analyze and understand sanctions, good data are

required.

In this Chapter, we described the first update of the Global Sanctions Data Base (GSDB) of

Felbermayr et al. (2020) along two dimensions. First, we extended the original coverage period

(1950-2016) to include three more years (2016-2019) and 75 new sanction cases. Second, on the

basis of various new sources, we were able to identify 306 additional sanction cases during the

1950-2016 period, which we recorded in the GSDB. As a result, the first update of the GSDB

includes a total of 1101 publicly traceable, multilateral, plurilateral, and unilateral sanction cases

over the period 1950-2019.

We utilized the new version of the GSDB to document the following stylized facts and

trends related to usage, types, objectives, and outcomes of sanctions in recent years. First, after a

drop in the number of active sanction cases in 2016 (due to the lifting of the sanctions on

Myanmar, Liberia, Ivory Coast, and Iran), the year 2017 was marked by impositions of new

sanctions, and this trend accelerated since 2018. Second, our descriptive analysis reveals that the

increased number of sanctions was accompanied by a larger number of target countries and,

especially, by an increased number of sender countries. Third, in terms of objectives, we see that

the most frequently defined policy aims of sanctions were ‘improvements in human rights’ and

restoration of democracy’, followed by the objectives to ‘end wars’ and to ‘change policies’ in

target countries. ‘Improvements in human rights’ and ‘restoration of democracy’ are also the

most frequent objectives of sanctions in the post-2016 period. However, during this period, we also

observe a relative increase in the sanctions that aim to address ‘terrorism’ and ‘policy change’.

Fourth, in terms of success, we find that, during the 1950-2019 period, more and more sanctions

have been classified as partially or fully successful, possibly suggesting that over time

sanctions have become more effective in achieving their goals.

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Consistent with the general belief that the Trump administration has been notorious for its

imposition of sanctions, we find that the sanctions imposed by the United States indeed

increased (both in absolute and in relative terms) during Trump’s term, reaching more than 40%

of all sanctions in the world in 2019. We also observe a sharp increase in the number of

smart (financial and travel) sanctions under Trump’s term. Consistent with the general trend in

recent years, we see a significant rise in the US sanctions with objectives to ‘change policy’ and

to ‘fight terrorism’, and a decrease in the use of sanctions that aim to ‘destabilize regime’ in the

target countries. Based on our analysis, we conclude that economic sanctions are indeed an

extremely popular foreign policy tool and that they are here to stay.

21

References Attia, Hana, Julia Grauvogel, and Christian von Soest, “The Termination of International

Sanctions: Explaining Target Compliance and Sender Capitulation,” unpublished manuscript, 2020.

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Yalcin, and Yoto V. Yotov, “Timing the Impact of Sanctions on Trade,” School of Economics

Working Paper Series 2021-7, Drexel University, 2021. Dizaji, Sajjad Faraji and Peter A. G. van Bergeijk, “Potential Early Phase Success and

Ultimate Failure of Economic Sanctions: A VAR Approach with an Application to Iran,” Journal of Peace Research, 2013, 50 (6), 721–736.

Felbermayr, Gabriel, Aleksandra Kirilakha, Constantinos Syropoulos, Erdal Yalcin, and

Yoto V. Yotov, “The Global Sanctions Data Base,” School of Economics Working Paper

Series 2020-2, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University., 2020. https://www.debevoise.com. Hufbauer, Gary C. and Euijin Jung, “What’s New in Economic Sanctions?,” unpublished

manuscript, 2020. Hufbauer, Gary C. and Euijin Jung, “Economic Sanctions in the 21st Century,” in the

Research Handbook on Economic Sanctions, Edited by Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, 2021. Hufbauer, Gary C., Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly A. Elliott, and Barbara Oegg, “Economic

Sanctions Reconsidered,” (3rd edition). Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International

Economics., 2007. Kohl, Tristan, “In and Out of the Penalty Box: U.S. Sanctions and Their Effects on

International Trade,” in the Research Handbook on Economic Sanctions, Edited by Peter A.G.

van Bergeijk, 2021. Morgan, T. Clifton, Navin Bapat, and Yoshiharu Kobayashi, “Threat and Im- position of

Economic Sanctions 1945-2005: Updating the TIES Dataset,” Conflict Management and

Peace Science, 2014, 31 (5), 541–558. Morgan, T. Clifton, Navin Bapat, and Yoshiharu Kobayashi, “The Threat and Imposition

of Economic Sanctions Data Project: A Retrospective,” in the Research Handbook on

Economic Sanctions, Edited by Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, 2021. Schneider, G. and P. Weber, “How Many Hands to Make Sanctions Work? Comparing EU and US

Sanctioning Efforts,” Manuscript 2020. Thomas, Eckert Sue Biersteker and Marcos Tourinho, Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and

Effectiveness of United Nations Action, Cambridge University Press, 2016. van Bergeijk, Peter A. G. and Charles van Marrewijk, “Why Do Sanctions Need Time to

Work? Adjustment, Learning and Anticipation,” Economic Modelling, 1995, 12 (2), 75–86. Weber, Patrick Maximilian and Gerald Schneider, “Making the World Safe for Liberalism?

Evaluating the Western Sanctions Regime with a New Dataset,” 2018.

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A Appendix This Appendix includes (A) the list of the new sanction cases that were added to the GSDB (2021 edition) and the table with the yearly number of sanctions by type from the GSDB, (B) the classification of regions based on UN Geoscheme that has been used to construct Figure 3, and (C) tables with examples of sanctions for each type and objective from the GSDB.

23

Table A.1 List of Newly Added Cases Case ID Sanctioned State Sanctioning State Begin End 1 Afghanistan US 1979 1979 2 Afghanistan EU + aligned countries 1999 2001 3 Afghanistan EU + aligned countries 2002 2019 4 Afghanistan UN 2002 2019 5 Albania, Montenegro, Liechtenstein, Iceland Russia 2015 2019 6 Algeria US 1962 1962 7 Algeria France 1965 1971 8 Algeria US 1992 2002 9 Algeria EU 1992 1994 10 Angola US 1993 2003 11 Antigua and Barbuda US 2001 2003 12 Argentina Iran 2003 2007 13 Argentina New Zealand 1982 1982 14 Argentina Australia 1982 1982 15 Argentina UK 1982 1989 16 Argentina Switzerland 1982 1982 17 Australia Russia 2014 2019 18 Austria EU 2000 2000 19 Austria US 2000 2000 20 Belarus EU + aligned countries 1998 1999 21 Belarus Russia 2010 2010 22 Belarus US 2004 2006 23 Belarus US 1998 1999 24 Belize EU 2014 2014 25 Belize US 1997 2004 26 Belize US 2018 2019 27 Belize EU 2001 2004 28 Benin US 2003 2005 29 Benin EU 2009 2017 30 Bolivia US 1978 1978 31 Bosnia and Herzegovina FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) 1994 1995 32 Brazil NAFTA 2001 2001 33 Bulgaria US 1950 1966 34 Bulgaria EU 2008 2019 35 Bulgaria US 1950 1959 36 Bulgaria US 1950 1963 37 Bulgaria Turkey 1985 1992 38 Bulgaria Turkey 1989 1992 39 Bulgaria US 1989 1990 40 Burkina Faso US 2018 2019 41 Burundi France 1996 2005 42 Burundi Belgium 2015 2019 43 Burundi Belgium 1996 2005 44 Burundi EU 2016 2019 45 Burundi EU 1997 2001 46 Burundi US 2016 2019 47 Cambodia Japan 1975 1992 48 Cambodia US 2017 2019 49 Cambodia UK 1975 1991 50 Cambodia Japan 1975 1991 51 Cambodia Japan 1968 1999 52 Cambodia EU 2017 2018 53 Cambodia Australia 1975 1992 54 Cambodia US 2018 2019 55 Cambodia Germany 1975 1979 56 Cambodia Thailand 1977 1978 57 Cambodia Australia 2018 2019 58 Cambodia US 2019 2019 59 Cameroon US 2019 2019 60 Canada Russia 2014 2019 61 Canada Taiwan 2015 2016 62 Canada Korea (South) 2015 2016 63 Canada US 2003 2005 64 Canada Mexico 2003 2016 65 Canada Japan 2003 2006 66 Canada China 2003 2016 67 Canada Spain 1995 1995 68 Canada League of Arab States 1973 1974 69 Central African Republic EU 2013 2019 70 Central African Republic US 2002 2005 71 Central African Republic US 1996 1998 72 Central African Republic US 2012 2014 73 Central African Republic Kimberly Process Participants 2013 2016 74 Chad Central African Republic 1969 1969 75 Chad US 2017 2018 76 Chile Sweden, Finland, Norway, Netherlands 1973 1990 77 Chile UK 1974 1980 78 Chile US 1974 1983

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79 Chile Germany 1973 1990 80 Chile Denmark 1973 1990 81 Chile Belgium 1973 1990 82 Chile USSR 1973 1990 83 Chile German Democratic Republic 1973 1990 84 Chile Mexico 1974 1990 85 China US 2017 2019 86 China Japan 1952 1954 87 China Hong Kong 1951 1954 88 China UK 1950 1956 89 China Italy, Belgium 1989 1989 90 China Japan 1989 1990 91 China Japan 1995 1997 92 China US 2019 2019 93 Colombia US 2003 2003 94 Colombia EU 2002 2016 95 Colombia US 2018 2019 96 Colombia US 2014 2018 97 Colombia US 2011 2014 98 Congo (Brazzaville) EU 1997 2001 99 Congo (Democratic Republic) Canada 1993 1997 100 Congo (Democratic Republic) US 2006 2019 101 Congo (Democratic Republic) US 2012 2019 102 Congo (Democratic Republic) US 1960 1963 103 Congo (Democratic Republic) US 2016 2019 104 Costa Rica US 2001 2006 105 Costa Rica US 2003 2016 106 Croatia US 2003 2008 107 Croatia US 2003 2006 108 Cuba Organization of American States 1964 1975 109 Cuba US 1958 2019 110 Cuba Germany 1963 1969 111 Cyprus US 1987 2018 112 Denmark League of Arab States 1973 1974 113 Dominica US 2003 2004 114 Dominican Republic Venezuela 1963 1963 115 Dominican Republic US 1963 1963 116 Dominican Republic US 2011 2019 117 Ecuador US 2013 2014 118 Ecuador US 1968 1969 119 Ecuador US 1971 1972 120 Egypt US 2017 2018 121 Egypt US 2013 2015 122 Egypt Saudi Arabia 2016 2017 123 Egypt EU 2013 2019 124 Egypt UK 1951 1954 125 Egypt US 1952 1952 126 Egypt US, UK, France 1956 1957 127 Egypt US 1963 1964 128 Egypt US 1964 1965 129 Egypt Germany 1965 1972 130 Egypt France 1967 1974 131 Egypt USSR 1976 1984 132 El Salvador, Honduras US 1969 1969 133 Equatorial Guinea Spain 1977 1979 134 Equatorial Guinea EU 1978 1979 135 Equatorial Guinea US 1992 1997 136 Eritrea US 2017 2019 137 Eritrea US 1977 1993 138 Eritrea US 2007 2019 139 Eritrea Russia 2009 2018 140 Eritrea Russia 2013 2018 141 Estonia Russia 1992 1992 142 Estonia Russia 1992 1993 143 Estonia Russia 1993 1993 144 Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania USSR 1990 1990 145 Ethiopia Eritrea 1998 2018 146 EU Russia 2014 2019 147 EU Canada 1996 2015 148 Fiji Australia, New Zealand 2009 2012 149 Fiji US 2003 2003 150 Finland USSR 1958 1959 151 France US 1982 1982 152 France US 1998 2017 153 France China 1992 1994 154 France UK 1995 1996 155 France US 1995 1996 156 France US 2003 2003 157 France US 1985 1985 158 France Denmark 1995 1995 159 Gambia US 2017 2019

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160 Gambia US 2016 2017 161 Gambia EU 2014 2017 162 Georgia Russia 2009 2011 163 German Democratic Republic Germany 1961 1989 164 German Democratic Republic Germany 1949 1973 165 German Democratic Republic US 1954 1974 166 Germany League of Arab States 1965 1979 167 Germany US 1977 1977 168 Ghana US 2018 2019 169 Ghana US 2019 2019 170 Gibraltar Spain 1965 1984 171 Greece US 2013 2019 172 Greece US 1967 1970 173 Greece US 1967 1972 174 Guatemala US 1954 1954 175 Guinea EU 2002 2006 176 Guinea US 2009 2010 177 Guinea US 2017 2019 178 Guinea US 2003 2004 179 Guinea-Bissau ECOWAS 2018 2019 180 Haiti US 1962 1964 181 Haiti France 1991 1994 182 Honduras Venezuela 2009 2009 183 Honduras US 2019 2019 184 Hungary US 1951 1973 185 India UK 1965 1967 186 India US 1974 2008 187 Indonesia Australia 2018 2019 188 Indonesia Malaysia 1963 1967 189 Indonesia US 1999 2010 190 Indonesia US 1964 1966 191 Iran US 1980 1981 192 Iran US 1984 2016 193 Iran UN 2008 2016 194 Iran Korea (South) 2010 2012 195 Iran Korea (South) 2018 2019 196 Iran US 2017 2019 197 Iran US 2019 2019 198 Iran US 1996 2019 199 Iraq US 1997 2009 200 Iraq EU 2004 2019 201 Iraq US 2017 2017 202 Iraq US 2019 2019 203 Ireland US 1998 2014 204 Israel France 1950 1955 205 Israel Egypt 1950 1957 206 Israel Egypt 1959 1979 207 Israel France 1967 1974 208 Israel Spain, UK 2014 2019 209 Israel UK 1982 1994 210 Ivory Coast Canada 2005 2017 211 Jamaica USA 2011 2019 212 Japan League of Arab States 1973 1974 213 Jordan Egypt, Syria 1957 1958 214 Jordan France 1967 1974 215 Kenya Norway 1990 2002 216 Korea (North) Korea (South) 2010 2019 217 Korea (North) Burkina Faso 2017 2019 218 Korea (North) Japan 1983 1984 219 Korea (North) US 2017 2019 220 Korea (South) US 1961 1961 221 Kuwait Japan 1990 1991 222 Kuwait US 1990 1991 223 Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan 2005 2006 224 Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan 2010 2010 225 Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan 2014 2014 226 Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan 2013 2014 227 Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan 2000 2000 228 Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan 2001 2001 229 Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan 1998 1998 230 Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan 1999 2000 231 Laos US 1962 1962 232 Laos US 1975 1995 233 Laos US 1958 1958 234 Laos Thailand 1977 1978 235 Laos Thailand 1975 1976 236 Laos US 2018 2019 237 Lebanon US 2018 2019 238 Lebanon Israel 1995 1995 239 Lebanon Israel 2006 2006 240 Lesotho UK 1970 1970

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241 Lesotho US 2003 2006 242 Libya Gambia 2011 2012 243 Libya UK 1984 1999 244 Libya US 2017 2019 245 Libya US 1996 2019 246 Lithuania Russia 2013 2014 247 Lithuania Russia 1992 1992 248 Malawi UK 2011 2012 249 Malawi UK 2014 2019 250 Malawi Japan 2018 2019 251 Malawi EU, US, Norway 2001 2003 252 Malawi US 2003 2003 253 Mali UN 2017 2019 254 Mali Algeria 2012 2012 255 Mali US 2019 2019 256 Mauritania EU 2005 2006 257 Mauritania US 2008 2009 258 Mauritania African Union 2009 2009 259 Mauritania EU 2009 2009 260 Myanmar China 1967 1971 261 Myanmar US 2018 2019 262 Myanmar US 2019 2019 263 Myanmar Japan 2007 2008 264 Nepal India 2015 2016 265 Nepal India 2005 2005 266 Nepal US 2005 2005 267 Nepal UK 2005 2005 268 Nepal India 1962 1965 269 Nigeria US 2003 2019 270 Nigeria Czechoslovakia 1968 1970 271 Nigeria UN 2014 2019 272 Nigeria US 2013 2019 273 Nigeria US 2019 2019 274 Norway China 2010 2017 275 Norway Russia 2014 2019 276 Norway China 2010 2018 277 Pakistan India 1949 1951 278 Pakistan Afghanistan 1961 1963 279 Pakistan India 2001 2002 280 Pakistan Netherlands 2007 2008 281 Pakistan US 2012 2013 282 Pakistan US 2018 2019 283 Pakistan India 1971 1976 284 Pakistan South Africa 1999 2001 285 Pakistan US 2018 2019 286 Pakistan US 2019 2019 287 Pakistan, India UN 1965 1975 288 Pakistan, India US 1965 1975 289 Pakistan, India UK 1965 1975 290 Panama US 1968 1968 291 Paraguay UNASUR 2012 2013 292 Peru Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic 1962 1963 293 Peru US 1968 1968 294 Peru US 1962 1962 295 Philippines US 2002 2019 296 Philippines EU 2002 2019 297 Philippines Malaysia 1963 1964 298 Philippines Malaysia 1968 1969 299 Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia US 1961 1991 300 Portugal India 1954 1975 301 Portugal India 1954 1954 302 Qatar Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Egypt 2017 2019 303 Qatar Mauritania, Djibouti, the Comoros, Jordan, Libya, Yemen, Niger 2017 2019 304 Qatar Chad 2017 2018 305 Qatar Senegal 2017 2017 306 Qatar Maldives 2017 2019 307 Romania US 1957 1960 308 Russia Switzerland 2014 2019 309 Russia Georgia 2008 2011 310 Russia EU + aligned countries 2014 2019 311 Russia EU + aligned countries 2014 2019 312 Rwanda EU 2012 2013 313 Rwanda Germany, Netherlands, Sweden 2012 2013 314 Rwanda UK 2012 2012 315 Rwanda US 2012 2013 316 Saudi Arabia US, France, Germany, Canada 2018 2019 317 Sierra Leone US 2018 2019 318 Sierra Leone US 2017 2019 319 Sierra Leone Commonwealth 1997 1998 320 Singapore Indonesia 1963 1966 321 Somalia US 2012 2019

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322 Somalia US 2017 2019 323 South Africa Japan 1964 1994 324 South Africa France 1986 1994 325 South Africa US 2019 2019 326 South Sudan EU 2014 2019 327 South Sudan US 2018 2019 328 South Vietnam China 1978 1991 329 South Vietnam France 1981 1989 330 South Vietnam France 1978 1981 331 Sri Lanka US 2012 2019 332 Sudan US 1992 2019 333 Sudan US 2006 2019 334 Sudan US 2017 2017 335 Suriname Venezuela 1990 1991 336 Suriname Netherlands 1998 2000 337 Sweden US 1968 1970 338 Switzerland US 1951 1951 339 Syria US 2017 2019 340 Syria, Russia, Iran US 2019 2019 341 Taiwan US 1994 1995 342 Taiwan US 2013 2019 343 Taiwan US 1950 1953 344 Tajikistan Uzbekistan 2009 2009 345 Tajikistan Uzbekistan 2010 2010 346 Tajikistan Uzbekistan 2012 2012 347 Tanzania Canada, EU, Japan, Norway 2014 2015 348 Tanzania Denmark 2018 2019 349 Tanzania US 2016 2016 350 Tanzania EU 2018 2019 351 Thailand EU 2014 2017 352 Thailand US 2006 2008 353 Thailand, Vietnam Cambodia 2004 2007 354 Turkey US 2018 2018 355 Turkey US 1974 1978 356 Turkey EU 2019 2019 357 Uganda UK, Norway, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden 2005 2007 358 Uganda Sweden 2014 2014 359 UK Spain 1966 1984 360 UK League of Arab States 1973 1974 361 Ukraine Russia 2006 2006 362 Ukraine Russia 2009 2009 363 Ukraine Russia 2014 2014 364 Ukraine Vietnam 2015 2018 365 US Japan 2003 2013 366 US Brazil 2003 2016 367 US Canada 2003 2006 368 US Russia 2014 2019 369 USSR EEC 1991 1991 370 USSR Japan 1991 1991 371 USSR UK 1991 1991 372 Venezuela Peru 2017 2019 373 Venezuela US 2017 2019 374 Venezuela Canada 2017 2019 375 Venezuela EU + aligned countries 2017 2019 376 Venezuela Switzerland 2018 2019 377 Venezuela US 2017 2019 378 Venezuela US 2019 2019 379 Yemen US 2017 2019 380 Yugoslavia (former) Germany 1957 1968 381 Zimbabwe UK 2002 2009

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Table A.2: Evolution of Sanctions by Type

Year Trade Sanctions

Arms Sanctions

Military Assistance Sanctions

Financial Sanctions

Travel Sanctions

Other Sanctions

Total

1950 13 1 0 2 2 3 21 1951 15 4 0 4 3 4 30 1952 16 4 0 5 3 4 32 1953 16 4 0 4 3 4 31 1954 19 4 0 5 7 7 42 1955 18 2 0 5 7 7 39 1956 17 2 1 7 7 7 41 1957 18 2 1 10 8 9 48 1958 18 3 1 11 8 9 50 1959 17 3 1 9 8 10 48 1960 20 4 4 10 5 10 53 1961 19 5 4 12 9 11 60 1962 19 5 5 16 9 13 67 1963 24 8 7 19 10 19 87 1964 28 10 4 19 9 15 85 1965 29 16 6 20 9 15 95 1966 31 18 6 17 8 17 97 1967 27 23 6 15 8 15 94 1968 27 26 5 17 9 19 103 1969 29 27 5 17 10 16 104 1970 28 25 5 20 9 15 102 1971 28 22 8 22 9 14 103 1972 27 20 5 17 9 14 92 1973 40 20 4 20 8 16 108 1974 45 22 6 22 7 17 119 1975 34 18 7 28 8 18 113 1976 34 16 6 31 7 16 110 1977 37 18 15 37 6 18 131 1978 42 19 16 41 7 20 145 1979 41 20 17 54 6 21 159 1980 33 16 15 43 5 16 128 1981 35 15 14 46 9 17 136 1982 41 20 12 53 15 21 162 1983 37 18 11 50 17 21 154 1984 35 18 9 46 14 20 142 1985 38 18 9 41 6 17 129 1986 41 22 10 48 8 19 148 1987 44 23 14 53 10 25 169 1988 40 24 15 56 8 22 165 1989 44 26 17 58 10 23 178 1990 50 29 25 67 9 24 204 1991 50 35 27 75 10 20 217 1992 55 45 34 85 15 22 256 1993 60 44 35 91 19 21 270 1994 60 49 36 77 22 21 265 1995 49 42 31 64 21 20 227 1996 42 47 33 74 21 20 237 1997 37 45 29 79 26 22 238 1998 43 48 32 78 26 20 247 1999 42 51 34 77 23 20 247 2000 47 55 40 74 29 23 268 2001 47 55 43 75 30 21 271 2002 47 48 38 66 34 22 255 2003 53 48 48 62 35 18 264 2004 44 43 41 56 29 15 228 2005 42 48 45 63 37 18 253 2006 60 48 46 78 50 18 300 2007 55 50 42 81 49 20 297 2008 54 53 45 81 51 22 306 2009 59 58 46 88 61 31 343 2010 66 61 48 89 60 34 358 2011 82 70 58 120 72 38 440 2012 91 72 67 137 77 39 483 2013 100 77 66 140 75 36 494 2014 116 84 67 162 91 38 558 2015 111 83 64 153 87 30 528 2016 112 82 63 151 88 29 525 2017 84 70 58 133 92 33 470 2018 88 70 58 144 92 30 482 2019 84 65 54 148 93 29 473

Note: This table shows the number of sanction impositions by type in each year in the period 1950-2019. Source: GSDB

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B Classification of regions based on UN Geoscheme Africa Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, DR Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mayotte, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Réunion, Republic Congo, Rwanda, Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha, São Tomé and Prìncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Western Sahara, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Northern America Bermuda, Canada, Greenland, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, United States of America.

Central America Belize, Costa Rica, Clipperton Island, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Caribbean Anguilla, Antigua and Bermuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cuba, Curacao, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Haiti, Jamaica, Marinique, Montserrat, Navassa Island, Puerto Rico, Saint-Barthélemy, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Martin, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sint Maarten, Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, United States Virgin Islands.

Southern America Argentina, Bolivia, Bouvet Island, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Falkland Islands, French Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Northwestern Europe Shetland Islands, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Faroe Island, Finland, France, Germany (Federal Republic), Guernsey, Hungary, Iceland, Isle of Man, Jersey, Latvia, Lichtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Republic of Ireland, Romania, Sark, Slovakia, Svalbard and Jan Mayen, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.

Southern Europe Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Gibraltar, Greece, Italy, Republic of Macedonia, Malta, Montenegro, Portugal, San Marino, Serbia, Kosovo, Slovenia, Spain, Vatican.

Eastern Europe Belarus, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine.

Western Asia Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Georgia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, State of Palestine, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen.

Central Asia Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan.

Southern Asia Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka.

Southeastern Asia Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thai- land, Timor-Leste, Vietnam.

Eastern Asia China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, Mongolia, DPR Korea, Republic of Korea.

Oceania Australia Christmas Island, Cocos (Keeling) Island, New Zealand, Norfolk Island, Fiji, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, American Samoa, Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Niue, Pitcairn Islands, Samoa, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Wallis and Futuna.

Table B.1: Different Types of Sanctions. Historical Examples

Trade Sanctions Case Formulation Reference

Multilateral (Partial trade sanction) (Export sanction)

UN sanction against Iran based on resolution 1696

In paragraph 5 of this resolution the UN calls upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to exercise vigilance and prevent the transfer of any items, materials, goods and technology that could contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and ballistic missile programmes.

UN Resolution 1696 (2006)

Unilateral (Full trade sanction) (Total trade sanction)

US sanction against Cuba based on proclamation 3447

In paragraphs 2 and 3 the proclamation states that the president does 2. hereby prohibit, effective 12:01 A.M., Eastern Standard Time, February 7, 1962, the importation into the United States of all goods of Cuban origin and all goods imported from or through Cuba; and I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of the Treasury to carry out such prohibition, to make such exceptions thereto, by license or otherwise, as he determines to be consistent with the effective operation of the sanction hereby proclaimed, and to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to perform such functions. 3. and further, I do hereby direct the Secretary of Commerce, under the provisions of the Export Control Act of 1949, as amended (50 U.S.C. App. 2021-2032), to continue to carry out the prohibition of all exports from the United States to Cuba, and I hereby authorize him, under that Act, to continue, make, modify or revoke exceptions from such prohibition.

US Proclamation 3447 (1962)

Unilateral (Partial trade sanction) (Import sanction)

US sanction against Liberia based on E.O. 13348

In Section 2, the Executive order states that except to the extent provided in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the effective date of this order, the direct or indirect importation into the United States of any round log or timber product originating in Liberia is prohibited.

E.O. 13348 of July 22, 2004

Financial Sanctions Case Formulation Reference

Multilateral UN sanction against Iran based on resolution 1737

In paragraph 6 of the UN resolution 1737 (2006) it is stated that all States shall also take the necessary measures to prevent the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods and technology specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 above.


Multilateral EU sanction against Mali based on Council Conclusions on Mali from January 18, 2013

4. Political progress is essential in order to ensure Mali's long-term stability. To that end, the EU urges the Malian authorities to adopt and implement a roadmap for the restoration of democracy and constitutional order in Mali as soon as possible. It encourages a national inclusive dialogue open to the northern populations and to all groups which reject terrorism and recognise the country's territorial integrity. In that context, the Council reiterates its willingness to gradually resume its development cooperation and invites the European Commission to prepare the relevant decisions so that the development funds can be rapidly disbursed as soon as the conditions are met. It also invites the HR/VP to explore the possibilities of rapid assistance through the stability instrument.

European Union Council Conclusions on Mali from January 18, 2013

Unilateral US sanction against Haiti

As a result of the election boycott and human right violations that happened in Haiti in November 2000, the US withheld government-to-government economic aid to Haiti in 2001 as per the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2001. The aid was resumed in 2004 when the new parliament was elected and the improvements in human rights.

Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2001.

Multilateral SWIFT sanction against Iran

In February 2012 the Belgium-based SWIFT, which provides banks with a system for moving funds around the world, blocked Iranian banks from using its network to transfer money. This was the first case of cutting off the country from SWIFT, and it basically shut the ability of Iran to do business outside the country.

Travel Sanctions

Case Formulation Reference

Multilateral UN sanction against Sudan based on resolution 1054

In paragraph 3 of the UN resolution 1054 (1996) it is stated that all states shall a) Significantly reduce the number and the level of the staff at Sudanese diplomatic missions and consular posts and restrict or control the movement within their territory of all such staff who remain; b) Take steps to restrict the entry into or transit through their territory of members of the Government of Sudan, officials of that Government and members of the Sudanese armed forces.


Unilateral Russia sanction against Georgia, October 2006

As a consequence of tensed relations between Russia and Georgia that aggravated in 2006, Russian authorities expelled thousands of Georgians to Georgia, including those residing legally in Russia. The act was explained as the illegal immigration prevention procedure. Georgia subsequently appealed to the Russian Government in the European Court of Human Rights.

Reciprocal Armenia-Azerbaijan border closure, 1989

The Nagorno-Karabakh War is an ethnic and territorial conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The dispute over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh with the majority of Armenian population which is located in Azerbaijan has not been resolved since 1989. As a major consequence of the conflict, the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan has been closed since then.

Arms Sanctions


Unilateral Australia sanction against Russia from September 1, 2014

Australian law prohibits the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Russia, for use in Russia, or for the benefit of Russia, of the following ‘export sanctioned goods’ for Russia: arms or related matériel; and items suited to any of the following categories of exploration and production projects in Russia, including its Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf: (i) oil exploration and production in waters deeper than 150 metres; (ii) oil exploration and production in the offshore area north of the Arctic Circle; (iii) projects that have the potential to produce oil from resources located in shale formations by way of hydraulic fracturing (other than exploration and production through shale formations to locate or extract oil from non-shale reservoirs), specified in the Autonomous Sanctions (Russia, Crimea and Sevastopol) Specification 2015. without a sanctions permit.

Expanded sanctions against Russia from September 1, 2014 (Australian Government website-Sanctions Regimes-Russia)

Unilateral US sanction against Afghanistan, Taliban regime based on 61 FR 33313

The US imposed arms sanction on Afghanistan in June 1996 after the Taliban rule got established there. The regime was notorious for its extremist views and provided home to the al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. SUMMARY: The Department of State is amending the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to reflect that it is the policy of the United States to deny licenses, other approvals, exports and imports of defense articles and defense services, destined for or originating in Afghanistan.

61 FR 33313

Multilateral UN sanction against Lebanon based on resolution 1701

In paragraph 15, the Security Council decides further that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft: (a) The sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories.


Military Assistance


Unilateral Switzerland sanction against Somalia from May 13, 2009

1. The supply, sale and transit of armaments of all kinds, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and accessories and spare parts therefor, to Somalia are prohibited. 2. The provision of services of all kinds, including financing, Mediation services and technical training relating to the supply, sale, transit, production, maintenance and use of goods referred to in paragraph 1 and to military activities in Somalia shall be prohibited.

Verordnung über Massnahmen gegenüber Somalia vom 13. Mai 2009

Multilateral UN sanction against Lebanon based on resolution 1701

In paragraph 15, the Security Council decides further that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft: (a) The sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories; and (b) The provision to any entity or individual in Lebanon of any technical training or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items listed in subparagraph (a) above;


Other Sanctions


Unilateral Turkey sanction against Cyprus from April 1987

The Turkish restrictive measures were originally introduced in April 1987 and concerned exclusively the prohibition of Cyprus flagged vessels to call at Turkish ports. In May 1997 Turkey issued new instructions to its ports and harbours to clarify uncertainties arising from the imposition of the restrictions, thus extending them against vessels under a foreign flag (of any nationality) sailing to Turkish ports directly from any Cypriot port under the effective control of the Republic of Cyprus (Limassol, Larnaca), or against vessels of any nationality related to the Republic of Cyprus in terms of ownership or ship management. The immediate effect of the May 1997 instructions was to restrict the use of Cypriot ports for transshipment operations of shipping lines in the Mediterranean. (from the Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs website)

Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, Turkish Measures Against Cyprus' Shipping

Multilateral African Union sanction against Central African Republic from March 25, 2013

In paragraph 8, the AU Council decides, in the light of the foregoing, to immediately suspend the participation of the CARin all AU activities, as well as to impose sanctions, including travel ban and asset freeze, on leaders of the Seleka group, as indicated in the attached Annex, pending the submission by the Commission of a more exhaustive list as requested by Council, in paragraph 6 of communiqué PSC/PR/Comm. (CCCLXII) of 23 March 2013.

PSC/PR/COMM. (CCCLXIII)

Multilateral Commonwealth sanction against Fiji

Fiji Islands’ membership lapsed in 1987, after a military coup imposed a constitution contrary to Commonwealth principles, and returned to membership in October 1997, when it had embarked on constitutional reform. Then following overthrow of the democratically elected government in May 2000, the country was suspended from the councils of the Commonwealth. Suspension was lifted in December 2001 when democracy and the rule of law had been restored in accordance with the constitution, but was then imposed again in December 2006 when the democratically elected government was again overthrown by the military. In May 2008 CMAG reiterated that it was essential that elections be held by the deadline of March 2009, as agreed between the Pacific Islands Forum and Fiji’s interim government. Elections did not, however, take place and CMAG subsequently deplored the fact that Fiji remained in contravention of Commonwealth values and principles. At the end of July 2009, CMAG noted that Fiji’s situation had deteriorated strikingly with the purported abrogation of its constitution and further entrenchment of authoritarian rule. It also expressed grave concern at the regime’s intention to further delay a return to democracy by more than five years. Fiji was fully suspended from the Commonwealth on 1 September 2009 (only the second such case of suspension of a country’s membership – Nigeria being the first in 1995). The Commonwealth Secretariat has nonetheless remained engaged with Fiji Islands to support and promote inclusive political dialogue and the return to civilian constitutional democracy.

The Commonwealth website (Withdrawals and Suspensions)

Table B.2: Different Objectives of Sanctions. Historical Examples

Policy Change


Unilateral US sanction against Venezuela based on 71 FR 47554

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the United States will no longer authorize the export of defense articles and defense services to Venezuela. Furthermore, all licenses and approvals to export or otherwise transfer defense articles and defense services to Venezuela pursuant to section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) are revoked.

71 FR 47554

Unilateral Japan sanction against Russia (2014)

The Japanese government released this list of new [targeted] sanctions against Russia amid Ukrainian crisis on July 28. The measures envisage the freezing assets of individuals and entities “involved in the Crimea annexation and responsible for destabilizing the situation in Ukraine." (sputniknews.com)

sputniknews.com

Destabilize Regime


Unilateral US sanction against Niger, 2009

The United States will suspend about 27 million dollars in aid to Niger and ban visits by Niger President Mamadou Tandja’s supporters to force Tandja to step down, []. "We believe that he should peacefully relinquish power, and allow transparent elections to take place. He does not want to do so," a State Department official told AFP on the condition of anonymity. "We have decided to announce that we are going to impose travel restrictions on Tandja supporters and we are going to suspend assistance to Niger," the official said. The official added that the decision concerned roughly 27 million dollars in non-humanitarian aid. (Agence France Presse)

Agence France Presse

Territorial Conflict


Unilateral UK sanction against Argentina, 1982

On April 3, the British government also broke diplomatic relations with Argentina and imposed economic sanctions. These sanctions, which were clarified over the next few days, included a freeze on Argentine assets in British banks (valued at about $1.5 billion), embargo of arms sales to Argentina, suspension of export credit insurance, and a ban on Argentine imports.

Lisa L. Martin, Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions during the Falkland Islands Conflict, International Security, Volume 16, Issue 4 (Spring, 1992), 143- 178.

Prevent War


Multilateral UN sanction against Liberia based on resolution 1521

Calling upon all States in the region, particularly the National Transitional Government of Liberia, to work together to build lasting regional peace, including through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the International Contact Group on Liberia, the Mano River Union and the Rabat Process,..Noting with concern, however, that the ceasefire and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement are not yet being universally implemented throughout Liberia, and that much of the country remains outside the authority of the National Transitional Government of Liberia, particularly those areas to which the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) has not yet deployed,... Determining that the situation in Liberia and the proliferation of arms and armed non-State actors, including mercenaries, in the subregion continue to constitute a threat to international peace and security in West Africa, in particular to the peace process in Liberia,... As a consequence the UN decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to (a) prevent the sale or supply to Liberia, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories; (b) Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent any provision to Liberia by their nationals or from their territories of technical training or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items in subparagraph (a) above.


Terrorism


Unilateral US sanction against Syria based on E.O. 13399

President of the United States of America, determine that it is in the interests of the United States to (1) assist the international independent investigation Commission (the “Commission”) established pursuant to UNSCR 1595 of April 7, 2005, (2) assist the Government of Lebanon in identifying and holding accountable in accordance with applicable law those persons who were involved in planning, sponsoring, organizing, or perpetrating the terrorist act in Beirut, Lebanon, on February 14, 2005, that resulted in the assassination of former Prime Minister of Lebanon Rafiq Hariri, and the deaths of 22 others, and other bombings or assassination attempts in Lebanon since October 1, 2004, that are related to Hariri’s assassination or that implicate the Government of Syria or its officers or agents, and (3) take note of the Commission’s conclusions in its report of October 19, 2005, that there is converging evidence pointing to both Lebanese and Syrian involvement in terrorist acts, that interviewees tried to mislead the Commission’s investigation by giving false or inaccurate statements, and that a senior official of Syria submitted false information to the Commission.

E.O. 13399 of April 25, 2006

End War


Multilateral EU sanction against Sudan based on 2005/411/CFSP

In paragraph 3, the Council deems it appropriate to maintain the arms sanction against Sudan. The policy objective of the European Union in this regard is to promote lasting peace and reconciliation within Sudan. In Article 1 of the same declaration it is stated: In accordance with UNSCR 1591 (2005), restrictive measures should be imposed against those individuals who impede the peace process, constitute a threat to stability in Darfur and the region, commit violations of international humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities, violate the arms sanction and/or are responsible for offensive military overflights in and over the Darfur region, as designated by the Committee established by paragraph 3 of UNSCR 1591(2005).

Council Common Position 2005/411/CFSP

Human Rights


Unilateral Canada sanction against Belarus, 2006

From the Export Controls to Belarus: 1. This Notice is to advise exporters that the Government of Canada has decided to add Belarus to the Area Control List (ACL), the list of countries to which the exportation of all items is only permitted with a valid export permit. 2. This Notice reflects the Government of Canada’s response concerning the deteriorating human rights situation in Belarus, following the March 19, 2006 presidential election which was deemed by international observers to be severely flawed. The campaign was marred with widespread harassment and detention of opposition party campaign workers, the physical assault of senior opposition figures, arbitrary use of state powers to support the incumbent president, pressure on state workers and students to support the President, restrictions on the ability of opposition campaigns to communicate with the electorate, and control of the state media to severely restrict access by opposition candidates. These elements resulted in a climate of intimidation and insecurity, further undermining democracy and the respect of human rights in Belarus. Since the election Belarusian authorities have continued their unwarranted imprisonment of democratic supporters. 3. All applications for permits to export items to Belarus will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. Permits for humanitarian goods, including food, clothing, medicines, medical supplies, information material, casual gifts and personal effects belonging to persons leaving Canada for Belarus, will generally be approved. Permits for other items will generally be denied. For information concerning the export permit application process, please contact the Exports Controls Division at the information provided below.

Government of Canada

Democracy


Multilateral EU sanction against Guinea- Bissau based on Council Regulation No 377/2012

Decision 2012/237/CFSP provides for the adoption of restrictive measures against certain persons, entities and bodies who seek to prevent or block a peaceful political process, or who take action that undermines stability in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. This concerns in particular those who played a leading role in the mutiny of 1 April 2010 and the coup d’état of 12 April 2012 and whose actions continue to be aimed at undermining the rule of law and the primacy of civilian power. These measures include the freezing of funds and economic resources of the natural or legal persons, entities and bodies listed in the Annex to that Decision. In Article 2 of the same regulation specific sanctions are listed to achieve the defined policy objective: 1. All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by natural or legal persons, entities and bodies who, in accordance with Article 2(1) of Decision 2012/237/CFSP, have been identified by the Council as either (i) engaging in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau or (ii) being associated with such persons, entities or bodies, as listed in Annex I, shall be frozen.

EU Council Regulation No 377/2012

Other Objectives


Multilateral EU sanction against Tunisia based on 2011/72/CFSP

In Article 1, it is stated: 1. All funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by persons responsible for misappropriation of Tunisian State funds, and natural or legal persons or entities associated with them, as listed in the Annex, shall be frozen. 2. No funds or economic resources shall be made available, directly or indirectly, to, or for the benefit of, natural or legal persons or entities listed in the Annex.

EU Council Decision 2011/72/CFSP

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