the function of epistemic justification

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

The Function of Epistemic JustificationAuthor(s): Frederick AdamsSource: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Sep., 1986), pp. 465-492Published by: Canadian Journal of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40231482 .

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CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Volume 16, Number 3, September 1986, pp. 465-492

The Function

of Epistemic Justification

FREDERICK ADAMS Central Michigan University

Mt. Pleasant, MI 48859, U.S.A.

There is a venerable and thoroughly entrenched tradition of regarding epistemic justification as playing an essential cognitive role in the acquisition, maintenance, or even loss of knowledge. Hold fixed that p is true and that S believes that p. Given this, whether S comes to know that p, still knows that p, or no longer knows that p essentially depends upon whether S has acquired, sustained, or lost justification for believing that p. I shall call any theory which regards epistemic justification as playing this essential epistemological function in cognition a Jn-theory. To simplify, we will say that a Jn-theorist is one who holds that - when the truth of p is held constant and S's belief that p is held constant - S's knowledge that p varies directly with the victory of S's justification and indirectly with its defeat. This functional relationship between justifica-

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Frederick Adams

tion and knowledge (the epistemological dynamics of the relation, if you will) has generally been captured by Jn-theorists as follows: (Jn=- justification)

( 1 ) Jn is a necessary condition for knowledge;

( 2 ) Jn is a functional part of a set of conditions sufficient for knowledge, in the respect that - though it is not itself sufficient - having it increases sufficiently the likelihood that one has satisfied the set of conditions sufficient for knowledge.

In this paper I want to do two things. First, I will argue that the traditional account of the epistemological role of justification (the functional dynamics of justification vis-a-vis knowledge) is mistaken. This will take the form of a negative thesis NT:

NT: Jn is neither a necessary nor a functional part of a set of conditions sufficient for knowledge - the negation of (1) and (2).

The basic claim will be that knowledge and justification can vary independently - contrary to the traditional view of Jn-theories.

Second, assuming that I can make clear the notion of Jn's having a functional role, I shall attempt to reconstruct what that function might be. If NT is correct we must re-think the epistemological dynamics of Jn vis-a-vis knowledge. Just what is Jn for? Suppose that knowledge can vary independently of Jn, then what is the epistemic function of Jn, if any? For it surely would not be the traditional role of bringing one to know when one has it and preventing one from knowing when one has not. My positive suggestion PS will be that:

PS: Jn has the epistemological function of inducing, sustaining, or defeating epistemic ascent.1

1 I will use the term 'ascent' rather than the more common 'assent' to indicate two things: as I see it, seeking Jn is a second-order affair and it is also normative. I will say more about epistemic ascent, but the basic idea is that Jn plays a regulative function which includes most of what Van Fraassen lists as the 'pragmatics of explanation' encountered in investigative procedures for gathering evidence and engaging in hypothesis formation. These are essentially guides for assessing one's entitlement to accept a hypothesis, theory, practice, etc. See chapter 5 of Van Fraassen.

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The Function of Epistemic Justification

I shall maintain that even if something like PS can be sustained, the negative thesis NT will still be true. PS constitutes a re-thinking of the epistemological dynamics of Jn - a radical departure from the traditional view of the epistemological function of JN ... even, say, Goldma- nian Jn.2

What counts as Jn? There are several theories of Jn and I cannot speak to each of them individually. I will restrict what I have to say to only those theories of Jn not extensionally equivalent to strict reliability theories of knowledge. By strict reliability theories (hereafter, R-theories) I mean ones which place conditions upon reliability that are at least as strong as those embodied in, say Dretske's information-theoretic analysis of (reliable) information. On that view, evidence e carries (reliable) information that p exactly when pr (p / e) = I.3 Local conditions (Dretske's 'channel conditions')4 which make it nomically possible for evidence e to carry the information that p must be stable (equivocation free) in the relevant circumstances. If, in the actual circumstances under which e occurs, there are relevant alternatives such that it is nomically non-zero probable that e and not p (pr (e & - p) # 0), then e does not

carry the information that p. The actual objective non-zero probability

2 Goldman originally held a view like NT. He has now, of course, developed a

quite different view in which he constructs a theory of Jn. His view is a target of NT. See his The Internalist Conception of Justification,' The Relation Between

Epistemology and Psychology,' and 'What is Justified Belief?'

3 I shall use the formula pr(p/e) = l for convenience. Actually, to be exact I would need something much more cumbersome. In place of 'p' we would need a state of affairs, such as a light switch's being thrown. In place of 'e' we would need another state of affairs, such as the light's going on. Then the light's going on carries the information that the switch has been thrown just in case pr (switch is

thrown/light is on) = 1. These are objective probabilities fixed by the factors

surrounding the well-functioning of the circuit, etc., not the inductive probabilities of epistemic logic!

4 See F. Dretske, Knowledge and the Flow of Information, chapter 5 where Dret- ske defines the characteristics of a communication channel in terms of the nomic interconnection of objective probabilities necessary for information to flow between events. Note: this is a theory which neither countenances nor depends upon a priori probability estimates - rendering it quite unlike most epistemic or

subjectivist theories which employ the notion of probability. In chapter 5 Dret- ske formulates the precise mathematical equivalent (unstable information channel) of the elusive notion of a relevant alternative and of what is required for the absence of them. See also The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge' for a non- technical version of the same account.

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Frederick Adams

of such alternatives introduces equivocation to the information channel between e and p - thereby making e a non-reliable source of information. This is true because the nomic interdependence between e and p has been severed by the instability of the information channel. This is the information-theoretic analogue of Goldman's barn-facsimilies in local fields, Dretske's painted mules in the zebra cages of local zoological gardens, or a real live active Cartesian demon. Were any of these actual in the local environment, we would have an unstable information channel and unreliable sources of information.

If there are theories of Jn which tie Jn to reliability such that having Jn is extensionally equivalent to having reliable evidence (on this strict reading), then I have nothing here to say about them.5 1 shall address my remarks to only those theories of Jn that are not extensionally equivalent to strict R-theories (i.e., not strict reliability theories of Jn). If the Jn- theories and R-theories are not extensionally equivalent, this will show up in a corresponding non-equivalence in what counts as instances of knowledge, respectively. Any Jn-theory which satisfies the restriction of non-equivalence is a target of NT.

5 Actually, this is not quite right. Even if what counts as having Jn were extensionally equivalent to having strictly reliable evidence e* for p, I think the reliability theory is still superior. This requires more than I can say here, but let me indicate why I hold this. R. Audi ('Defeated Knowledge, Reliability, and Justification') shows that it is possible for Jn theories and R-theories to be extensionally equivalent. It is quite easy. Let e* = something's looking like a barn and let p = that there are barns in yonder fields. Then, provided there are no barn facsimilies anywhere near, the look of a barn is reliable evidence for the presence of a barn. But notice that we could define a warranting relation as follows. Let q = that something looks like a barn (a proposition, this time), and p= the proposition that there are barns in yonder fields. Now there is a warranting relation R, such that proposition q warrants proposition p. If S believes that p on the basis of q and R holds, then S is justified in believing that p. For any e* for p there is such a warranting relation (defined over proposition) that can be constructed. Then Jn-theories (using the warranting relation) and R-theories (using only reliable evidence) become extensionally equivalent. So why are R-theories superior? Because the truth conditions for the warranting relation R are (obviously) that there is e* for p (in the look of the barns). To my mind, this is why NT is true. The Jn plays only the role that I map out on PS. This line of reasoning is taken up in sections III and IV. For now I rest my case with the point that on weaker versions of Jn (where Jn is weaker than reliable evidence e*) - which includes every theory of Jn I have been able to uncover - they all hold the following to be consistent: (i) S justifiably believes that p; (ii) p is false. Short of something like reliable evidence to use in defining a warranting relation between propositions, this will never get you knowledge.

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II

In order to motivate NT I will attempt to tease out an answer to Qn:

Qn: What is it about Jn such that Jn is a necessary condition for knowledge?6

It is surprisingly difficult to find an exact answer. It is clear that Jn is thought to be necessary to meet certain counter-examples (Gettier- examples). But we seldom find a nice formulation of what it is about Jn that allows us to block them or of what it is about Jn such that nothing else which might block them will do. For S to know that p it must not be an accident that S's belief that p is true. And that, I take it, is what Jn is for - its epistemic function, if you will. An adequate account of epistemic justification should block cases of accidentally true belief. But these days there are alternative ways to block Gettier-examples. Strict R-theories may well do the trick. This alone would remove the element of accident in the correspondence between the truth of S's belief that p and the truth of p. Indeed, some Jn-theories admit that strictly reliable evidence for p would remove the aura of accidental correspondence. Therefore, in times like these, it may be worthwhile to re-ask Qn. This is the thought that inspires the present inquiry.

There are three fundamental answers Al, A2, and A3 that a Jn- theorist might give to Qn. I believe that answers in different guises are variants of at least one of these three basic response types: (let e* =

evidence which is strictly reliable)

Al: it is almost never the case that there is e* for p;

A2: Even if there is e* for p ... it is never the case that there is e*' for

q (where q = that there is e* for p);

6 Andrew Naylor has suggested, in conversation, that what I really want here is

only a question about why Jn is presumed to be necessary for knowledge -

especially since I deny it via NT. But, of course, that is not right either. What I

really want is to ask why Jn is necessary for knowledge, if indeed it is. There must be a deeper fact that explains its necessity. I do not want the 'presumed' talk, since we are pursing matters epistemological not psychological (only). I admit the wording is awkward, but I think Qn is as close as I can get to the question I mean to be asking.

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A3: It is just intuitively obvious that Jn is necessary for knowledge.7

What I have to say in arguing for NT is by way of reply to answers A1-A3. The line of attack is as follows:

(1) If Al is true, then it is almost never the case that S knows that p (Jn or -Jn);

(2) If A2 is true, then it is often the case that S knows that p (Jn or -Jn);

(3) If A3 is true, there are intuitions and there are intuitions. Since intuitions in other areas have not always stood the test of time (the non-independence of Euclid's parallel postulate, etc.), we shall plumb the depths to see what might lie behind the intuitions.8

Al represents the suspicion that demands of e* are too severe and the belief that it is possible to have knowledge with something less, viz. with Jn. Perhaps strictly reliable evidence would support knowledge and block Gettier-examples, but what are the odds that the world is stable enough to generate very many conditional probabilities of I?9 We might

7 A3 was suggested to me by A. Goldman, when I put question Qn to him. As noted, he once held something like NT himself. Indeed, since Goldman now defines Jn in terms of something like weak reliability (not e*), he is still much closer to NT than to the traditional theories of Jn (which he himself on occasion attacks). In fact, I think Goldman does clearly see Jn and reliability (weak reliability) as equivalent notions and this explains his coming up with A3. However, since I see weak reliability as too weak to support knowledge, I shall

argue against Goldmanian Jn as well.

8 It is hard to argue against intuitions. I will take Al and A2 as primary answers

supporting the necessity of a justification clause in theories of knowledge. After

showing why I think Al and A2 are unsuccessful, I will offer an argument designed to undercut the intuition expressed in A3. See section V for the argument.

9 This response, and the general line of reasoning behind Al, was the overwhelm-

ingly dominant response of all commentators on Dretske's information-theoretic account of knowledge: S knows that p if and only if S's belief that p was caused or causally sustained by the information that p. See Dretske, Precis of

Knowledge and the Flow of Information' for the commentaries and Dretske's

responses.

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know precious little indeed, if such strict conditions were imposed on knowledge. The a priori probability of getting e* very often, as it were, may be quite low.

We might weaken the condition on evidence to a conditional probability less than 1. Still the conditional probability must be high. For the interdependence between evidence e and p is what insures the truth of the belief that p is no accident. So, although we may seldom get e* for p, we may get strong evidence for p - sufficiently strong to support knowledge. And (here is the crunch) only if one has Jn is he in a proper position such that there is a likelihood that one's evidence e is very strong for p.

It is uncertain how strong a Jn-theorist thinks the evidence for p must be - where he sets the criterion for the conditional probability relation between evidence and state of affairs - but for our purposes it does not matter. For wherever the criterion is set, it will fall short of strict reliability - given our earlier restriction. It is also not clear how one obtains Jn. Is it something that one does to get, steps one takes to get into the position of having? Or is it something that one simply falls into?10 Although there are subtle discriminations to be made, the issue we are pursuing is neutral to the outcome. It will be left open whether Jn is actively (passively) acquired, or inferential (non-inferential). Let us assume that whatever the correct determination of the finer details, S has Jn - however one gets it!

The claim that there is a special connection between having Jn and the strength of the relation between one's evidence and p is crucial. The only way the claim that Jn is a necessary condition for knowledge can pack the punch the Jn-theorists need is that there be such a connection! But I will hold that worry 'til the discussion of A2, for there is a much easier route to the denial that Al is an adequate answer to Qn.

In section IV we will consider a set of examples, one of which is designed to counter the claim that one can know that p with less than strictly reliable evidence (Jn or - Jn). Short of jumping ahead, the in- tuitive idea is this. Anything less than strictly reliable evidence e* for p

10 I have in mind the divisions in epistemology between Foundationalists and Coherentists, with respect to theories of justification. I am trying to engineer NT around these obstacles, since I see it as being neutral to the outcome. The dichotomy also goes by other logos: Internalism vs Externalism, etc. See, for ex-

ample L. Bonjour, 'Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowlege,' and Goldman, The Internalist Conception of Justification.'

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Frederick Adams

will leave open the possibility that there is some actual, objective non- zero probability that the evidence e and - p co-occur (pr (- p & e) + 0). Now imagine that S's belief that p is based on e, but that in the actual circumstances S is in there are no effective procedures available for differen- tiating the occasions (p & e) from (- p & e). Then hold p true and S's belief that p fixed - so that S is in fact at occasion (p & e). It seems that all the Jn S (or anyone in S's surrounding circumstances) can muster will not eliminate the element of accident in the truth of S's belief that p. If you like, imagine that S is looking at a genuine F, but there are fake Fs about (unknown to S or anyone). Also there are no.fake-F detectors. In these circumstances it seems that no amount of Jn available for S's believing that he's got a genuine F on his hands (short of the elimination of all fake Fs) can remove the whiff of accident in the truth of S's belief.

I suppose the only question that remains is whether S's belief is in fact justified. But this question is entirely independent of whether S knows the F he sees to be an F. It seems clear that he does not. Any increase in Jn short of strict reliability (precluded by our restriction) will come up short.

A2 represents the conditional concession to the R-theorist that it may be true that e* is necessary for knowledge. But then it reiterates the basic line of Al - that Jn is still a necessary condition of knowledge. A2 is the crucial test case for Jn-theories. If A2 is true, Jn-theorists win the day.

Notice A2 is probably stronger than the Jn-theorist needs.11 His asser-

11 The following remarks resulted from a discussion with Robert Audi. It may seem that A2 would be an appropriate response to PS, but not to NT. That is, since we do not have access to the fact that our evidence for p is reliable (usually), our accessed Jn may be all we have to go on. This I concede, and it is indeed part of the

picture of the function of Jn that I am painting with PS. But A2 is also a proper part of the response of Jn-theorists who think Jn is necessary for knowledge. So it is part of their denial of NT.

Audi's point is that A2 seems a second-order claim which may be out of place for, say, a Modest Foundationalist defending a theory of Jn. My reasons for

listing A2 are as follows:

(1) If one's foundational Jn is not simply equivalent to e* for p, then it is Al that is being claimed;

(2) If one's foundational Jn is simply equivalent to e* for p, then the Jn-theory is extensionally equivalent (at least) to the R-theories I am discussing, but not one of the Jn-theories under fire here because of our restriction;

(3) The only other way for a Jn-theorist to slip between (1) and (2) is to go to a second-order claim as in A2. As I conceive it, A2 is what a Jn-theorist

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tion that Jn is necessary for knowledge does not depend on the im- possibility of getting second-order reliable evidence e*'. Even if S had it, the Jn-theorist would claim that S still needs justification for believing the second-order evidence e*' to be reliable. But why not give the Jn-theorist the strongest position vis-a-vis R-theories and suppose second-order reliable evidence is not forthcoming? (Even an R-theorist could accept this. For he could be a second-order sceptic - claiming we have knowledge if our beliefs are based on strictly reliable evidence e*, but we can never know that we know because we never get strictly reliable evidence e*' that our first-order evidence is strictly reliable.) Surely, having A2 in this strengthened form cannot weaken the Jn-theorist's claim.

With this provision, A2 becomes: that even if S has e* for p (first- order), will S needs some good reason (second-order) for believing that S has it. Since we do not always have reliable evidence for our beliefs, we need a way to discriminate when we do (do not) have it. Otherwise, it will be highly accidental that a given belief that p is true.

The role of Jn - the reason that it is necessary for knowledge - is that it is Jn's function to remove the element of accident in a beliefs truth. Further (here is the crunch), Jn is such that only if S has it will the element of accident be sufficiently reduced to qualify S's belief for knowledge.

In A2 this amounts to the following. Having Jn increases the objective likelihood that S has e* for p. But - and this is crucial for Jn's being necessary - if S does not have Jn for believing that S has e* for p, then the objective likelihood that S does not is too large to be negligible. Minus Jn, S might not be in a situation where he has e* for p. Thus, devoid of Jn, it is simply too accidental that S's belief that p is true to be knowledge.

Let us pull apart two separate claims Cl and C2 that the Jn-theorist might be making in A2. Both concern what is accidental when Jn is absent:

Cl: If it is an accident that S has e* for p, then it is an accident that S's belief that p is true;

C2: It is an accident that (If s has e* for p, then S's belief that p is true).

should say to an R-theorist who has nothing but e* for p (first-order) in his arsenal. To deny that this is sufficient, the Jn-theorist must want something like Al or A2.

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Surely the Jn-theorist's claim cannot be C2. For having e* f or p entails that pr (p / e*) = 1. That precludes the truth of C2, leaving only Cl. But how are we to understand this sense of accident and is it sufficient for defeating knowledge?

In Cl the accident in the antecedent (so to say) is not the same as in the consequent. The accident in the consequent is the one of C2 - and it is false. The accident in the antecedent, though perhaps true, is innocuous. It is this. Suppose that no one ever would errect a barn facade ... not that no one could, but that, for whatever reason, no one ever would. Then in some sense it is an accident that we always get reliable evidence for there being barns about from their look. But that is a sense of accident with which we now get by knowing that there are barns in yonder fields.12 (We are assuming, of course, that there are no relevant alternatives to one's strictly reliable evidence in this case. Not that there could be none, but just that there are none in fact. Hence, that there are none is, in some sense, an accident, but it is not fatal to cognition.)

A3 represents, as is clear, an intuition that Jn is necessary for knowledge. Sometimes this intuition is supported with the claim that only epistemically responsible agents can be knowers. Other times it is maintained that there could be no such thing as epistemic luck sufficient to make one a knower. Intuitions are notoriously difficult to combat -

especially if armed only with competing intuitions. My intuitions do not agree, but I will not rely upon intuition alone to defeat A3.

My replies to Al and A2 have been in the form of direct arguments that they do not adequately show Jn is necessary for knowledge. My reply to A3 will be indirect in form. I shall assume that if Jn is necessary for knowledge then it must make some special contribution that reliable evidence alone cannot make. So Jn is a contributory and functional component of any set of conditions sufficient for knowledge, if Jn-theorists are right. That is just what I shall claim Jn cannot do. Jn is not a sufficient condition of knowledge (as Jn-theorists agree). But I also shall claim that it can never be the part of a set of jointly necessary and sufficient condi-

12 Notice that the 'accident gambit' is not going to save even Jn-theorists like Goldman. For, on those theories, it is possible to have Jn and one's belief still be false. So, when one knows and is justified in believing that p, one's justification does not guarantee the truth of one's belief that p. Hence, relative to the justification alone (all of it you can get), it will still be something of an accident that one knows when one has it. (If something does make the truth of one's belief non- accidental, it will not be Jn!)

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tions for knowledge that is the effective difference between knowing and not knowing. If you like, it will never be the part that boosts one over the top, such that the only thing left to be added is Jn and then you have knowledge. I will try to show that when you reach that point, you have knowledge already. If correct, this seems (indirectly) to remove the plausibility that Jn could be necessary for knowledge, despite contrary intuitions.

Ill

In the next section I will discharge the obligation of arguing for NT and PS simultaneously. Ideally, these deserve to be set out independently. However, NT will be the main objective.

The last section was devoted to motivating NT. This section will do the same for PS. Let me set it up in relation to NT, for that is what led to PS. NT is the thesis that it is not the function of defeated (victorious) Jn to defeat (actuate) knowledge.13 PS says that there must be some other functional role for Jn, such as, to defeat or prohibit (induce or sustain) epistemic ascent. Jn has a role to play in making one epistemically responsible in forming beliefs (or at least in sustaining them). Or Jn has a role to play in making one epistemically responsible in methods of gathering evidence. But it does not have the role of being an arbiter of knowledge.

I should note that there are two respects in which Jn can be important to knowledge (not independent) - so far suppressed. Namely, since belief is necessary for knowledge, if Jn can induce the appropriate belief that p - where that is all it would take to know that p - then Jn can actuate knowledge. (Assume that S has e* for p and p is true and if the belief that p is formed it will be based upon e* for p.) Obviously, it works in reverse as well. If S feels his belief is not justified, this may

13 Thomas Paxson, in correspondence, has complained that 'defeated knowledge' is

actually an incoherent expression. Justification is something that may be defeasi- ble, but not knowledge. I will not quarrel. I would be as happy with 'lost

knowledge' or something equally suggestive. For simplicity, I will just stipulate that in this paper 'defeated knowledge' will be used for times when one is either

prevented from knowing in the first place or has lost knowledge. I trust Paxson would agree that there is no incoherence on this reading (if only because we are friends).

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cause him to stop believing. Even though he has e* for p, he may not be able to bring himself to believe that p, given his lack of justificaiton for thinking his evidence is strictly reliable.

That is one way in which Jn, by inducing or sustaining the belief that p, can bring about knowledge. Another is that in the search of Jn for a belief S may acquire e* for p that S would not have acquired if S had not been an epistemically responsible agent. But in both cases the role of Jn is much closer to PS than to the denial of NT. For these cases are not at odds with NT. NT claims that even if S could form the belief that p without Jn, S could still know that p. People surely do acquire beliefs without or prior to assessing their justification. And in this instance, NT maintains that even if S is not in search of Jn for his belief (not an epistemically responsible agent this time), S may still have knowledge. (Of course, S's belief must be based on strictly reliable evidence and there must be no relevant alternatives lurking about to muck up the works.) So the role of Jn in both of these exceptions is not the traditional epistemic dynamics of Jn vis-a-vis knowledge that NT is designed to target. It is much closer to PS.14

If the spirit of PS is correct, the epistemic function of Jn has changed. It has shifted from a dynamic relation vis-a-vis knowledge to a dynamic relation vis-a-vis doxastic ascent (and other second-order pragmatic con- siderations we normally associate with theory selection and research). It has changed both its object and its function.

Assume that it does make sense to speak of the functional role of Jn. This may be controversial. For it may be said that one can have (fail to have) Jn without the ability to access cognitively that fact. Hence, it may appear that PS will run aground upon the barrier reef betwixt internalist and externalist theories of Jn. I shall maintain that Jn functions in a regulative role - regulating various doxastic decision procedures and evidence-gathering practices. For it to play that role, its status must be accessible. For if Jn (in victory or defeat) were always non-accessed, it would be functionally impotent - epistemically inert in any normative sense of justification.

14 The same holds for the loss of knowledge, where one loses knowledge by giving up the belief that p. Or, one may, by being epistemically responsible, give up reliable evidence for p because one finds inadequate justification for taking the evidence to be reliable. This may result in latching onto some unreliable evidence in its place (with good justification for taking it to be reliable), and paying the price of losing knowledge.

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To bridge the gap between internalist and externalist theories, I will suggest the following approach. We will consider the epistemic functional role of Jn to be well-defined for accessed Jn. Then we can understand the functional role for Jn with accessible but non-accessed status as the function the Jn (in victory or defeat) would have were it to be accessed.

A word about these epistemic functions15 is in order. In what follows we will be concerned with the functional role of Jn with respect to doxastic ascent (belief formation, acceptance). By doxastic ascent I mean not only what one actually comes to believe, but the normative aspect of what one should come to believe given his justification for believing. To obtain Jn for believing p includes obtaining reasons in the light of which one's believing p would be epistemically responsible. Furthermore, if S has cognitive access to the status of his Jn - say, he knows that he has followed to the letter the highest standards for a certain experiment and he knows that his results have been replicated time and time again - then the access to this fact will induce (sustain) S's belief in his results. And it should do this. (Were it to come out the other way - Jn defeated - the result would and should be doxastic defeat, but the functional dynamics would be the same.)

In addition to the function of Jn vis-a-vis doxastic ascent, there are other things it may regulate. The range includes other propositional at- titudes, investigative procedures, claims touting investigative results, paradigm shifts, and the like. I cannot catalogue the regulative functions and I will concentrate on doxastic ascent in examples, but there will be many things Jn can be for. (I have in mind regulative functions that we might call the canons of epistemic responsibility.)

Whatever the range of epistemic functions of Jn, I shall hold that Jn which is accessible is the only kind that is epistemically efficacious. Non- accessible Jn is epistemically impotent. It can play no functional role in S's epistemic procedures, hence it ought not to figure in a normative theory of Jn. If ought implies can, S cannot be held responsible for

15 After some persuasion, John Longeway convinced me of the need for a broader notion of the role of Jn. Originally, I had considered only its function as

operating on belief formation or inhibition. I now confess that a broader conception is in order. As Longeway puts it, it may be that trying to get Jn may cause us to be right, and to know, more often, and that this is the only reason we have come to conceive of Jn and to seek it. That is, Jn may play an important role not

only in belief formation but also in our practices. This is consistent with PS and NT.

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believing that p (not p) when S has no way to gain access to the fact that his belief has Jn (no Jn). So the sort of Jn that can be functionally efficacious is only the sort which S is able to access. Therefore, we shall maintain that if Jn is accessible (as it must be on any realizable theory of Jn), then it does make sense to speak of the functional role of Jn.

Assuming that it is plausible to look at the functional role of Jn in epistemology, my suspicion is that it has only a regulative (normative) epistemic function. In times of victory the function of Jn is to induce or sustain doxastic ascent. In times of defeat the function of Jn is to prevent or defeat doxastic ascent. That is how we will conceive the function of Jn. If S has no access to his Jn's status, nor can he be held to be epistemically responsible for gaining such access, then S ought to take himself to be in a position of epistemic neutrality.

In times of victory, where s has access to the victory of his Jn, S ought to take himself to be in a position of epistemic ascent. In times of defeat, where S has access to the defeat of his Jn (or could have, such that only epistemic irresponsibility prevents it), S ought not to take himself to be in a position of epistemic ascent. In the former, S should ascend. How could one be more epistemically responsible? In the latter, S should not ascend. For, doing so, how could one be more epistemically irresponsible?

To test these intuitions about the functional role of Jn, we will concentrate attention on cases of victorious (and defeated) knowledge. We want an answer to the question: when knowledge is victorious (defeated) and Jn is also victorious (defeated), what functional role does the victory (defeat) of Jn play? There are two possibilities - the denial of NT ( - NT) and PS:

-NT: The function of the victory (defeat) of Jn is to actuate (defeat) knowledge;

PS: The function of the victory (defeat) of Jn is to induce or sustain (defeat or prohibit) epistemic ascent.

It should be obvious that someone who is epistemically responsible (irresponsible) could fail to acquire (acquire) a belief - even in the face of accessed victory (defeat) of Jn. So the truth of PS had better be compatible with this obvious fact. And I think it is. It can be the function of x to do y even when (sometimes) x mis-fires. In fact, it can be the function of x to do y when at least once in the history of every x, x mis-fires. Con- sider: it is the function of the heart to circulate the blood, but, lamen-

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tably, at least once in the history of every heart it does not perform its function. That does not make it false that circulation is the heart's function. Similarly, failure of accessed victory (defeat) of Jn to induce (defeat) a belief supported by it does not falsify PS. If x never did y, that would be a different matter, but that is not the case with hearts nor with Jn.

Generally, for items with teleological functions, there is a systems- theoretic (or cybernetic) account of how they arise or are selected for.16 For systems with canons of Jn (doxastic decision procedures - as Goldman calls them), we will apply the same model to explain the etiology of the canons of Jn. The teleological function of Jn will be understood in light of various selection pressures in favor of systems which have doxastic decision procedures of Jn. Hence, Jn will not generally fail to perform its function.

In the next section I will consider the merits of -NT. I will appeal to

examples and the following principle about teleological functions TF:

TF: If the function of x is to do y, then x's doing y does not depend on z's doing y (where x + z).

When something z suffices for y and x's doing y depends on z's doing y, then at best x's doing y is a functional extravagance. This is not to say that x does not do y, nor that x contributes nothing to y. It is only to say that x has been one-upped, superseded by z, which could (and would) carry the function of doing y all by itself, were x not to do y. It is also to

say that x could not suffice, independently of z, for doing y. Wire a calculator so that a light goes on when the batteries are low.

Then have a light sensor detect when the light is on or off. When the light is on, let a beep be produced. Now for normally sighted individuals, the

beeping mechanism is a functional extravagance. Its functional contribution of informing us of weak batteries is superseded by the light's coming on.

Let this suffice for our understanding of the condition on teleological functions, functional roles and functional extravagance. When we look at cases of victorious (defeated) knowledge, where there is also victorious (defeated) Jn, I will suggest that the victory (defeat) of Jn is func-

16 See F. Adams, 'A Goal-State Theory of Function Attributions,' where I develop a

cybernetic theory of teleological functions. Achinstein in The Nature of Explana- tion chapter 8 discusses the merits of this theory and others.

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tionally extravagant, superfluous and superseded by something else - which all by itself suffices for the victory (defeat) of knowledge. That is, I shall claim that the victory (defeat) of knowledge always supersedes the victory (defeat) of Jn. And this is true even if knowledge is victorious (defeated) when and only when Jn is victorious (defeated). Furthermore, this is consistent with the fact that, in some cases, it may only be because S is looking for Jn that S stumbles onto knowledge (as well as Jn). Hence, I take victorious (defeated) Jn - when co-extensive with victorious (defeated) knowledge - to be at best an artifact of victorious (defeated) knowledge, not a source of it. This strikes me as the way the beeper's sounding on the calculator is an artifact of the light's going on, not a cause of it. If you will, the acquisition (loss) of Jn (the beeper's sounding) supervenes on the instantiation of the conditions sufficient for the acquisition (loss) of knowledge (the light's goin on). Of course, even this is true only where knowledge and Jn co-occur. I shall hold that there are cases where they come apart (vary independently) - which is the primary point of NT. The victory (defeat) of Jn is, as it were, an epistemological-dangler relative to the victory (defeat) of knowledge -

although it may very well have a unique normative function of inducing (defeating) epistemic ascent. When well-functioning, that is its job. One ought to acquire (withhold) belief, say, in times of victory (defeat) of Jn - some cases of which will also coincidentally be cases of victory (defeat) of knowledge.

IV

With the last two sections preparing the way (for NT and PS, respectively), the final stage of the argument is set to go through. The strategy is to cross knowledge with Jn in a 2 x 2 matrix. Then we will be able to see the dynamic relationship between knowledge and Jn. As we proceed through the matrix we will consider the views of Jn-theories which are offered in support of -NT. We will also consider the counterarguments for NT in light of variations on an example developed to test NT.

First the matrix. Let Jn = cases where S has Jn and has access to that fact, such that non-use of that access constitutes epistemic irresponsibility. Let R = cases where S has strictly reliable evidence e* for p. Recall, e* for p means no relevant alternatives exist that have not been ruled out by the evidence e* for p - pr (p / e*) = 1, or, equivalently, pr(- p & e*) = 0. e* includes S's powers of discrimination, differentiation, and the

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like, between any would-be relevant alternative sources of information too, in the way I am construing e* for p. We could do this differently, by isolating the various links in the causal chain of evidence leading from the fact known to S's belief state. Then we could impose the restriction that on each link of the chain the connection be reliable between links. The nice thing about the information-theoretic model is that it lets us simplify by saying that if S's evidence e* actually carries the information that p and S would base his belief only one*, then his chain of evidence is realible 'all the way down/ so to say. So specifying the reliability of all the links at once, with the information-theoretic condition on the objective probability relations between e* and p, is a simplification and is equivalent. Let K(Jn) = a Jn-theorist would attribute knowledge to S. Let K(R) = an R-theorist would attribute knowledge to S. Assume in all cases that p is true. (We could consider what happens when p is allowed to be false and then there would be two more classes to consider. But this would affect PS only, not NT.)

R -R

1 I 3 Jn

K(Jn) K(R) K(Jn)* -K(R) 2 4

-Jn -K(Jn) K(R)|-K(Jn) -K(R)

Figure #1

Let me illustrate the support for NT (and its denial -NT) by giving a base example and then modifying it three times as we move through the matrix of figure #1. We will concentrate on the arguments for each position to see if those of -NT can overturn those for NT.

Case 1: Giving DPT shots is serious business, because there is a small percentage of cases in which the shot causes brain damage. There has been no way of know-

ing, in advance, which persons are potentially in danger. Doctor D develops a test procedure P to target those in danger. Surprisingly, P is completely reliable. When given, there is nothing (no relevant alternative) that would cause it to come out positive but the dangerous factor responsible for the reaction to the shot. Before putting the procedure into use, every precaution known to medical science has been taken to access the reliability of the test . . .

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all confirming. Child A is tested by doctor D and test P comes out negative. In fact, child A is not in danger from the DPT serum and D Jn-ly believes that A is in the clear.

Class 1: The first class (1 in figure #1) represents the judgments by Jn- theorists and R-theorists. They agree that D has knowledge. They disagree only on the explanation of what facilitates knowledge. The Jn- theorist claims that D knows because of the Jn + the conditions described in case 1 pertaining to the reliability of test P. The R-theorist claims D knows because of the conditions of case 1 alone - which include belief based on test P + the reliability of test P.

Clearly, case 1 (class 1) is not a crucial test case for NT, for the judgments of both theories are extensionally equivalent relative to class 1. But since the theories disagree on why, even here we get an idea of what will, in other cases (classes), test NT. NT says Jn is neither necessary (clause 1) nor a functional factor in a set of conditions sufficient (clause 2) for knowledge. This suggests that the crucial test will come at classes 2 (for clause 1) and 3 (for clause 2). So if we can pull Jn and knowledge apart there, we will be in a position to claim that NT is true even in class 1 - that Jn and knowledge merely co-incide in class 1 will be compatible with NT (and PS), but not with -NT. That is, if Jn can vary independently with knowledge elsewhere, NT may be true, but not -NT. Therefore, the real crunch comes elsewhere (classes 2 and 3), not here. (Whereas, the crucial tests for PS come at classes 1 and 4, for that is where Jn would be performing optimally in its functional role -

inducing and inhibiting belief, respectively.)

Case 2: (Same as case 1 except for changes stated) Doctor D, a bit of an eccentric, goes to Madam X the palm-reader. X tells D that test procedure P will work. X's testimony leads D to believe that P will work. P has never been tried, so there is no antecedent reason to think it is a good test. But, desperate to find a test, D puts trust in P and (in fact) P is a strictly reliable test. Child A is tested by D with P ... the rest as before . . . with the important exception that D does not now Jn-ly believe that A is in the clear (though A is and D believes this and he believes it solely on the basis of P).17

17 This case could have been described such that D had Jn, but then lost it. Then his

Jn would have been defeated. Here it is simply a non-starter. I shall treat this as

equivalent to defeat. This will not affect the truth or falsity of NT. (See also note

#13.)

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Class 2: The second class in figure #1 represents the judgments of Jn- theorists and R-theorists, respectively. The Jn-theorist claims that D does not know that A is in the clear. The R-theorist claims that D does know that A is not in danger. Let us examine the Jn-theorist's reasoning. D is not in a position to know that he knows, nor to justifiably believe that he knows, nor to claim to know (in earnest), nor even to justifiably believe that A is in the clear. But does D know? For the Jn-theorist to deny it, he must clearly have one of A1-A3 (of section II) in mind. If it is A3, there is little to be gained by merely arguing intuitions. If it is Al, that will not work in case 2. That leaves A2.

D has no good reason for believing that P is a reliable test. In fact, D has good reason to believe that P may not be a reliable test (if D thought about it). For look at the source from which the idea for the test came. Since D does not have Jn for talking P to be reliable, D ought not to believe that A is in the clear on the basis of P. D's Jn for his belief that A is in the clear has been defeated (or is a non-starter) and if D was an epistemically responsible agent, that would defeat his belief (doxastic defeat). An epistemically well-functioning (in the normative sense) agent that instantiates a Jn-theory of rationality would have his doxastic ascent defeated (inhibited).

So far this sounds correct. Why? It is clear that D's Jn is defeated. Fur- thermore, D has access to this fact (or could have). As figure #1 shows, relative to the access of the defeat of Jn (and access to that alone), one may be in either class 2 or class 4. If one is in class 4 his knowledge would clearly be defeated as well. There is no question about that - everyone agrees. If one is in class 2, then one may well have a reliable test in P, but one does not (- Jn) have access to that fact. Therefore, given only what one has access to, defeat to Jn, one might be in class 4 and not have a reliable test in P. What one should do is to look for better Jn for taking P to be reliable and suspend belief based on P in the interim.

It is without question that this is what D should do. But notice two things. First, the discussion has completely shifted from whether test P would detect that A is not in danger, to whether D has Jn for thinking it would. We can grant that D has no access to the fact that P is a reliable test. It is also granted that D's Jn for believing A is not in danger is defeated (non-starter). Hence, D does not have access to which class he is in, 2 or 4. However, none of this bears on whether or not P is, in the circumstances of case 2, a reliable test - which it is. Nor does it change whether D is in fact in class 2 - which he is.

Second, suppose D does not do what he should. Suppose that, in a

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flight of epistemic irresponsibility (as some would describe it), he goes on to believe that A is not in danger. The defeat of Jn does not perform its epistemic function of defeating (inhibiting) doxastic ascent. Suppose that D has no experimental testing for procedure P, but the more he thinks about the medical details of the test the more he is convinced that it just may work. Still he has no adequate Jn for his beliefs based on it. So far we have grounds only for arguing that D does not know that P is reliable. Hence, he does not know that he is in class 2 - since he does not have access to all of the information about the circumstances of case 2 (circumstances which he is in fact in). But D is indeed in class 2. Suppose, further, that we beef up our understanding of the R component of class 2 - as per our understanding of section I. What it means for P to be a strictly reliable test includes that D will not - as the circumstances of case 2 dictate - be in class 4. That is, suppose R includes that there are no relevant alternatives that actually obtain which would render P an unreliable test. Nor will any arise - no unreliable tests P will be available which D might use. Let the world in case 2 be such that there are forces in nature operating so that nothing which nomically might make test P unreliable would happen. For instance, suppose the only things which might foul test P would be concentrations of toxic chemicals in the blood of sufficient proportion to kill the patient long before the test would be over. This insures that test P (administered to living patients only) will not be unreliable. Hence, D will not be in class 4, when D is in the circumstances of case 2. All of this is beyond second- order access of D, of course. But it is, I think, enough to insure that D knows that A is not in danger from the DPT serum - whether D's Jn for believing this is defeated (class 2) or not (class 1). The mere defeat of D's Jn for believing P to be reliable, does not make it objectively possible for D to pop into class 4 - where P is unreliable. The world is not like that. It stays as it is even though our inductive evidence changes. (Inductive probabilities, associated with Jn, however they may vary with the evidence, do not change the objective likelihoods one bit.) Nor does it make it objectively possible for test P to fail to be reliable in case 2 (class 2). Nor does it make D's (admittedly epistemically irresponsible) belief false, nor even possibly false relative to the circumstance of case 2. In- deed, as long as D bases his belief on P in the locally stable circumstances of case 2, D's belief never will be false and cannot be false. For test P is an information-preserving source, whether D has access to this second- order fact or not (Jn defeated or victorious). Therefore, it is, I submit, rather difficult to explain why D does not know that A is in the clear by trying to fault test P (in case 2). Perhaps there is a problem with D's

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moral character, but not with P, P's reliability, nor with the mere fact that D's Jn is defeated or absent.

I realize that resistance to saying that D has knowledge will be stag- gering. For there is the belief that latching onto reliable evidence and eliminating relevant alternatives is hard work - requiring epistemic responsibility of the sort that yields justified beliefs. And D has not worked hard enough. But, on one hand, no amount of Jn short of ab- solute certainty (which we have ruled out) totally eliminates epistemic risk. On the other hand, why cannot someone like D simply be handed reliable evidence in a world that, at every turn, eliminates relevant alternatives and epistemic risk for him (in the objective, non-accessed sense of elimination)?

We are simply packing this into case 2. It will not affect the fact that D's beliefs are not justified that the world in case 2 has eliminated all risk for him. D does not know this nor have reason to believe it that measures up to the Jn-theorist's standards. But let us remove other risks that may provide resistance to saying that D has knowledge. First, suppose D would never consider using any test but P. For whatever reason, it simply would never occur to him. Then there is no risk of his latching onto a bad test by mistake. (If it is easier, imagine that no other tests for DPT reactions is technologically possible for 100 years to come.)

Second, the bit about the palm-reader will suggest risk. So let all palm-readers be perfect predictors about medical matters. No one knows this because no one has bothered to test them on this score. Even if it is true, D's beliefs based on test P would not be justified (although they would involve no objective risk), since D would not know this fact about palm-readers.

Third, doctor D never confers with the palm-reader on non-medical matters. Even now, his trust in test P is sustained because he thinks it has certain properties that are nomically tied to the factor responsible for DPT reactions (not merely because it was suggested to him). The world has made D's beliefs epistemically safe - free of risk, relevant alternatives and the like. It is puzzling now to deny that D has knowledge when the truth of his belief is secured at every turn. (Is he not like us ad- miring what we take to be the zebras - not painted mules - at the local zoo? The zoo-keeper makes our beliefs safe for us.)

Suppose another person, doctor W, has been told by D of test P. Remembering procedures like P, W has access to strong non-defeated Jn for believing that test P is reliable. W comes to believe (with Jn) that A is in the clear. But, alas, Jn is not sufficient - as we know - to guarantee that W is in class 1, not in class 3. Yet, the Jn-theorist must maintain that

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if D told W that D used test P on patient A, then W would know that A is not in danger. But why should W be able to know what D cannot know, simply because W has non-defeated Jn? What does the non-defeat of W's Jn do for W with respect to the class W is in fact in, class 1 or class 3? What more, relative to the non-defeat of W's Jn alone, does this do for W that is different from what the defeat of D's Jn alone, does with respect to where D actually is, in class 2 or 4? Nothing! What determines where they both are (the objective facts) does not change with one's Jn (inductive probability or subjective estimate) for where one is. W's Jn alone does not guarantee that W is in class 1 any more than D's defeat of Jn alone guarantee that D might be in class 4. With respect to Jn alone (accessed), W is no better off than D. So if W knows, why does not D know as well? The effective factor for both is test P. What could Jn do for W that is any different than what the defeat of Jn does against D - with respect solely to the objective facts about which class they are in? Nothing! (W may need the Jn to get up the courage to believe A is in the clear, but D already has that. Besides, PS predicts this fact about W, not NT.)

The objective facts of the case are such that, given that D uses test P, then D and W are in classes 2 and 1, respectively. Their subjective confidence (inductive probabilities or Jn) may not guarantee that they are in these respective classes, but the objective facts surrounding the case do. That D is in class 2 guarantees that D is not in class 4. That should be all that matters in respect to whether D knows that A is in the clear in case 2, not D's confidence nor Jn (nor anyone else's). (Of course, whether D has the right to confidently claim he knows is another matter entirely. I would put the entitlement to make a claim to know under the jurisdiction of PS, not NT - not a necessary condition of knowing.)

In the scheme developed in section II, the Jn-theorist is appealing to A2 in answer to Qn. He is appealing to either reading Cl or C2. As argued there, C2 is explicitly false. And Cl is innocuous relative to the facts of case 2. It may be an accident, relative to D's Jn (defeated), that D is in class 2. But relative to the facts about the world in case 2 it is no accident that he is in class 2, nor that test P is reliable. Hence, it is no accident that D's belief that A is in the clear is true. What more could knowledge (first-order) demand? If we are right - A2 is the primary objection of the Jn-theorist in this case - and if we are also correct - that worry is defeated by seeing the truth of D's belief is no accident in this case - then there is no remaining obstacle to granting knowledge in case 2. Therefore, I submit that NT (clause 1) has been defended against A2 for case 2 (of class 2).

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With this move we will be in a position to claim that the mere defeat of Jn is not sufficient for the defeat of knowledge. When we get to class 4, therefore, we shall claim that it is not the defeat of Jn (not necessarily) that defeats knowledge there either. Hence, NT and PS will carry momentum from class 2 to class 4.

Now we move to class 3 to test for clause (2) of NT. We will gain credence for NT and PS - showing that Jn and knowledge can come apart at both classes 2 and 3. So there may be some other dynamic relation between them even at classes 1 and 4 - which is PS.

Case 3: Doctor D develops test P, which has proved to be statistically accurate. For patients with reactions to the DPT serum, test P has come out positive (no false

negatives). On new patients with no adverse reaction to the serum, test P has never come up positive (no false positives). Every counter-balancing technique available has been used to confirm P's accuracy, but unknown to D there are individuals for whom false negatives are possible with P. But A is not one of them. However, there is someone Z, who falls in the latter class, in the

building. It is sheer coincidence that Z (Z-types) escaped detection... [the rest as before]... D Jn-ly believes of A that A is in the clear.

Class 3: The R-theorist judges that D does not know that A is in the clear (though A is and D's Jn is accessed). For, test P would not discriminate A from Z - it would give a negative result for both. Z-types are relevant alternatives to test P's reliability, because it sometimes gives false

negatives for them. I have starred the entry K(Jn)* in class 3. Not all Jn-theorists agree

that there are instances of knowledge in class 3. And if no Jn-theorist thinks that D knows in case 3, then it is doubtful that any would hold that there is knowledge in class 3 - for case 3 is representative.

The reason there is a K(Jn)* in class 3 at all is in the event that a Jn- theorist wanted to take option Al in answer to our opening question Qn. Then he should believe that there are cases of knowledge in the class and case 3 is a candidate. A Jn-theorist might claim that the test P is so accurate for everyone else (A-types) that even though there are a few

(Z-types) for whom it would not be accurate, still D knows of A that A is in the clear. (There just have to be very, very few like Z.)

But how could the very same Jn for diagnosis of A's danger and for Z's give knowledge that A is in the clear, but not Z? For A and Z, the Jn would be exactly the same - test P and all that went into its confirma- tion. If the Jn in the diagnosis of Z's danger is not part of a set of conditions sufficient for knowledge, then neither is it in the diagnosis of A's danger.

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However, few Jn-theorists have thought (since Gettier) that Jn is sufficient for knowledge - holding fixed the belief that p, p's truth, appropriate basing relation, etc. At most they have held that Jn is a necessary part of a set of conditions sufficient for knowledge. Let us in- terpret this as holding that when D's belief is true and justified, then when D goes from class 3 into class 1, the Jn catapults D into the class of knowers. Yet, this is what NT (clause 2) denies! Why? The answer is the mirror image of the argument of case 2 (class 2). Since it turns on some of the same ground we have covered, we will make use of it.

NT denies that Jn is the missing link that boosts a true-believer into the epistemic class of knowers. Instead, the essential move is simply going from class 3 into class 1 itself - assuming it is correct that one does not know in class 3. Given that, the true belief plus being based on reliable evidence is sufficient for knowledge all by itself - in class 1. That a knower has Jn is an epistemological dangler in the epistemic dynamics of knowledge. It is superseded by the beliefs being based on reliable evidence e* (in case 1, upon test P). This, of course, is not to say that Jn has no functional role to play. It does suggest that PS might be that functional role.

The line of reasoning which is seductive is to think that Jn has some power to increase - to sufficient strength - the likelihood that one's belief is true or that one's evidence is reliable. Increasing one's Jn is like getting inductive evidence that one is in class 1. In D's case, it is Ps reliability which is inductively supported by D's Jn. The claim is that as the inductive probability that D's evidence is reliable increases, the objective likelihood that D is in class 1 increases. So D cannot know without Jn. And when D has got Jn, then D has satisfied a functional part of the set of conditions sufficient for knowledge. But how does (can) this work? This is the crucial test for clause (2) of Jn-theories.

Relative to the accessed Jn that D has, D may be in class 3 or in class 1. So how could the inductive probability that D is in class 1, for any probability less than 1 - which is necessarily the case given our initial restriction on Jn-theories - ever be enough to insure that D is in class 1? It cannot! Relative to inductive evidence evidence alone (assessed Jn for any value you like, less than 1), D may be in class 3. Then D will not know that A is in the clear - not on the basis of Jn alone. If you like: pr (D is in class 3/Jn) > 0; and pr (D is in class 1/Jn) < 1.

So the factor that essentially determines whether or not D knows A to be in the clear is not (is never) the amount of Jn D has, but is always the objective facts about D's evidence - test P and where D is, in class 3 or class 1. And this is not something that D (nor anyone), for all the Jn D

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can muster, has complete control over. It is simply not up to D, so to say, which class D is in - try as he may to bring it about (via his accessed Jn) that he is in class I.18

Therefore, like class 2, class 3 is pivotal for showing knowledge and Jn come apart. This supports NT (directly) and PS (indirectly). Then, when we compare the victory of Jn in class 1 (defeat of Jn in class 4) with the victory of knowledge in class 1 (defeat of knowledge in class 4), we can show how PS may go through. Even though there is a correlation of Jn (- Jn) with knowledge (defeat) there, the epistemic dynamics are not those of -NT, but those of NT and PS. The epistemic function of Jn is not the traditional one. Therefore, consideration of class 4 will complete our support for NT and PS, respectively.

Case 4: This case is very like case 3 with the single addition that doctor D either knows or has excellent reason to suspect that test P is not reliable. He either knows or has reason to believe there are people like Z (Z-types) around - people whose susceptibility to the DPT shot test P frequently mistakes (false positives, or false negatives) and who test P cannot discriminate from A (A-types). So not only is P not a reliable test, but D has access to the fact that his Jn for taking it to be so has been defeated ... the rest as before ....

Class 4: Now we expect that if D were epistemically responsible, the accessed defeat of his Jn would defeat his belief that A is in the clear. D would not know that A is not in danger, having relinquished the belief. But, of course, D may be epistemically irresponsible and continue to believe that A is not in danger. Now the Jn-theorist should claim that the

18 It seems to me undeniable that knowledge, like truth, is not solely up to us. Once S produces an assertion that p, p's truth or falsity is entirely out of S's hands. Its truth or falsity then depends on whether the world co-operates - whether it cor- responds with what is said. Since the truth condition carries over into the analysis of knowledge, it is no surprise that a correlative fact about knowledge holds. Namely, it is not strictly up to us - to anything we can do in searching for justification, our best scientific methods, etc. - whether we know. We do the best we can in forming our beliefs, but there always comes a point when the matter of knowledge is out of our hands. Let us call this the dimension of

epistemic risk that all truth-seekers have to face. The problem with most Jn- theories of knowledge is that they aim at getting a theory of Jn that will eliminate the epistemic risk in the pursuit of truth. But, I suspect, it cannot be done - not

any more than it could be done for some one whose goal was to be a 'truth-sayer.' Short of not speaking or uttering only tautologies, every professed truth-sayer faces an ineliminable element of risk. The same, I wager, holds for he who seeks to be a truth-believer.

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defeat of D's Jn defeats D's knowledge. Then the mere fact that D's Jn is defeated is the effective factor in the defeat of D's knowledge. However, this latter claim is what is in question in class 4.

It is easy to see why the argument back at case 2 (class 2) in defense of NT is pivotal. For if the argument is successful, we may help ourselves to its result here. In particular, relative to the accessed defeat of D's Jn alone, D might be in class 4 or in class 2. The defeat of Jn, by itself, does not guarantee test P is unreliable - as case 2 shows. Nor does it necessarily increase the objective likelihood that P is unreliable - a for- tiori. In fact, the inductive probabilities leave the objective probabilities unmoved. The former are only probabilities relative to the evidence accessed, and without full information there is not necessarily any direct isomorphism between the inductive and objective probabilities. I take this to be nothing less than the problem of induction. Short of solving it, D's accessed defeat of Jn will never, by itself, insure that D is in class 4, not in class 2.

Thus, pending the truth of our earlier defense of NT at class 2, if D is in class 2, D may know that A is in the clear (provided D can acquire the belief and that it is made free of objective epistemic risk). For that reason, the mere defeat of D's Jn can never guarantee the defeat of D's knowledge. So how could the defeat of D's Jn be the sole source of the defeat of D's knowledge here (in class 4)? It could not.

What does defeat D's knowledge is the mere fact that D is in class 4. Recall that this means D cannot get out of class 4 relative to the use of test P (as described in case 4). If P is the only test that D has (or has available), then D will in fact be in class 4. This is true due to the objective facts of case 4 and surrounding circumstances. Therefore, the defeat of test P's reliability - whether D has access to this fact or not - is what defeats D's knowledge in class 4.

Also note, since the defeat of P's reliability does by itself defeat D's knowledge, even if D should come to have access to the defeat of his Jn (in virtue of discovering the unreliability), this has been superseded by the defeat of D's knowledge.19

I submit, on the basis of our tour of the matrix in figure #1 and the preceding arguments, that NT and PS have been defended against any

19 See note #5. What I have in mind is Audi's attempt to save Jn-theories by showing that the defeat of justification can be tacked onto the same circumstances as those which defeat knowledge on a reliability theory. I am trying to show why this will not work.

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obvious counterarguments in support of - NT. We have simultaneously defended NT from the attack of -NT in the form of Al and A2 in reply to Qn of section II. If Al and A2 are not crushing blows - as I have sought to show - then, at the very least, NT is in the running.

To carry the argument further, if the only other reply in support of -NT is A3, then I have not directly attacked A3. However, I think there is a suitable reply available. It is simply this. If an argument which undercuts an intuition is available then the argument must be taken seriously - 'til it be shown not to withstand scrutiny. I believe the following sketch of what has been argued here contains such an argument:

Suppose S has e* for p, S believes that p (solely) on the basis of e* and there are no other unreliable sources of information about the truth of p locally available to S that S might use by mistake. What is lacking for knowledge ac- cording to the Jn-theorist? A guarantee! Something that insures that his e* for p is indeed just that: e* for p. Otherwise, it is too much of an accident that S's belief that p is true. But does (can) Jn do that for S? Can it ever supply the missing guarantee or insurance? It can only if pr(e* for p/Jn) = 1. Is it? No! Can it be? No! Not as long as Jn # strictly reliable evidence - as per our opening restriction. So can Jn ever remove the whiff of accident in S's having e* for p? No! It can never do better than e* for p alone in these conditions. So why does S need Jn to know that p? What can Jn do for S that e* for p alone cannot do equally well? Nothing! That is the point of NT.

Lastly, everywhere in the matrix that Jn has been victorious (defeated) and knowledge has also been victorious (defeated), the access to the victory or defeat of Jn has been superseded by the victory (defeat) of knowledge. Or, it has if NT is correct. Hence, the epistemolgical dynamics of Jn vis-a-vis knowledge cannot be the traditional functional role carved out by Jn-theories. The status of accessed Jn is a functional extravagance or epistemological dangler relative to knowledge. For Jn to have an important cognitive role to play, its role must be something else. I suggest PS.20

Received May, 1984

20 Research for this paper was supported by the NEH. An earlier version, entitled The Epistemological Function of Justification,' was presented to Robert Audi's NEH Seminar on Epistemology at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln during the Summer of 1983. I am grateful to the members of that seminar and to Audi for

helpful comments and advice. Ray Elugardo and John Longeway were par- ticularly helpful in our daily combat over matters epistemological.

Outside the seminar, several people have read and commented on the paper as it underwent its many changes. For encouragement and help I am especially indebted to Fred Dretske, John Barker, and Thomas Paxson.

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Frederick Adams

References

ll] Achinstein, Peter. The Nature of Explanation. New York: Oxford University Press 1983.

[2] Adams, Frederick. 'A Goal-State Theory of Function Attributions.' Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (1979), 493-518.

[3] Audi, Robert. 'Defeated Knowledge, Reliability, and Justification.' Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1980), 75-95.

[4] Bonjour, Laurence. 'Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.' Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1980), 53-73.

[5] Dretske, Fred. Knowledge And The Flow of Information. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1981.

[6] Precis of Knowledge and the Flow of Information.' The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983), 55-90.

[7] 'The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge.' Philosophical Studies 40 (1981), 363-78.

[8] Goldman, Alvin. 'The Internalist Conception of Justification.' Midwest Studies in

Philosophy 5 (1980), 27-51.

[9] The Relation Between Epistemology and Psychology.' Unpublished.

[10] What is Justified Belief?' In Pappas, 1-23.

[11] Pappas, George, ed. Justification And Knowledge. Dordrecht: Reidel 1979.

[12] Shope, Robert. The Analysis of Knowing. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1983.

[13] Swain, Marshall. Reason And Knowledge. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press 1981.

[14] Van Fraassen, Bas. The Scientific Image. Oxford: The Clarendon Press 1980.

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