the front lines of climate change: is relocation inevitable

8/11/2019 The Front Lines of Climate Change: Is Relocation Inevitable

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Pacific Islands Society

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The Front Lines of Climate

Change: Is Relocation Inevitable?By Mr. Michael Ravell Walsh

Published: March 11, 2013

Kiribati was long viewed by the metropolitanpowers as a country which would never beviable, on size, security and economic grounds.Since Independence in 1979, however, it hasbeen regarded as a success story in terms of

Governance, economic management, anddemocracy. Regional and internationalalliances have facilitated it to deal withtraditional security concerns, and to increasethe value of its EEZ. However, Kiribati is in thefront line of climate change. This paperconsiders what is, and what else could be,done to counter climate changes, but despiteefforts to mitigate these, and to adapt to theirimpact, relocation of its people may be the onlylong term option, as its physical fabric literallybecomes uninhabitable. The paper concludesby raising some of the security and other issuesthat such a move would entail.

Introduction

Some of you may be familiar with a poem, ‘TheYarn of the Nancy Bell’, by W. S. Gilbert (ofGilbert and Sullivan, rather than Gilbert andEllice, fame). The chorus runs:

“Oh, I am a cook and a captain bold,And the mate of the Nancy brig,

And a bo’sun tight, and a midshipmite,

And the crew of the captain’s gig.”

As Honorary Consul in the UK for Kiribati, Isometimes feel rather like this. Kiribati has onlyone overseas diplomatic mission (in Fiji), andour little band of Honorary Consuls round the

world do the job as best we can for everywheelse, on a part time, unpaid basis. In the near20 years that I have been doing this in the UKhave kept a list of all my official functions – aevidenced by the titles under which peopwrite to me. This list now numbers well over 5and ranges from His Excellency thAmbassador, via various specialist Counsellordown to lesser functionaries such as the CPool Administrator.

I thus feel a bit of a fraud addressing a group o

security experts in an Ambassador speakinseries, since I am neither of these. Noobviously, am I originally from Kiribati. Whathave been is associated with Kiribati and ileaders for more than 40 years, and I ahonoured, on behalf of the Government Kiribati, speak tonight.

Some Background

Addressing a Pacific Islands Society, I donhave to explain (as I usually have to do) thKiribati is an independent state in the PacifiYou may even know that its name pronounced Key-ree-bass (with the ‘ti’ as nation or station), which is as close as you caget to its colonial name, ‘Gilbert’, in its owlanguage.

But here is some necessary (althougnecessarily simplified) history and backgrounfacts, which form the backdrop to its securiissues.

Michael Ravell Walsh is the Honorar

Consul of the Republic of Kiribati i

London United Kingdom.

Ambassador Series



Pacific Islands Society Ambassador Series | March 11, 2013

The Geography

Kiribati covers an area of the world equivalent toLondon to Moscow to Ankara to Madrid. It isthe only country in the world with a presence inall four hemispheres, North and South of the

Equator and East and West of the Meridian.Until the mid-1990s, one half of the country wasofficially a day ahead of the other, since theDate Line then intervened between them.All of Kiribati is coastal; you cannot anywhere inthe country be physically much more than aquarter of a mile from the sea. It has 33 islands,in three archipelagos, with a total land areaabout the same as the Isle of Wight. With theexception of Banaba, of which more later, thehighest point above sea level is 10 feet.We do, by contrast, have the second largestExclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the world.

The Nation

The people who we now know as I Kiribatioriginally inhabited the Gilbert Islandsarchipelago and Banaba, and called themTungaru. They had arrived there at somedisputed time, between 3000 b.c. and 1300 c.e.Invasions by Samoans, Tongans and Fijiansintroduced some Polynesian and Melanesianelements to the basic Micronesian culture, butextensive intermarriage produced ahomogenous population, with only relativelyminor variations in dialect and governancearrangements across the 17 islands.

When Europeans arrived in the 1840s, theyfound a sophisticated but of course stone agesociety, governed communally through the oldmen meeting in large maneabas, representingfamily groups; and a nation with a strong senseof individual equality and self-worth – togetherwith a long tradition that decisions should betaken by consensus. These traits are stillfundamental to I Kiribati society today.

The Modern Country

Kiribati should have been a German colony.However, when Bismarck and Disraeli dividedtheir spheres of influence at the Treaty of Berlinin 1884 – with all of Micronesia supposedly

going to Germany – the Gilberts weaccidentally placed on the British side of thline. The British did nothing to enforce theterritorial claims until pressurised to do so bthe Germans, and in 1892 HMS Royalist wasent by the British Foreign Office to declare

Protectorate. However our Foreign Office dnot consult the Treasury beforehand. There iswonderful file in Kew, with the Treasuvociferously objecting to the acquisition of thes‘worthless islands’ and only very reluctantaccepting them in the end, with the proviso ththey ‘should never cost Her MajestyGovernment one penny’.

I tell this story only because those twstatements pretty much sum up HMG’s policduring the period when Britain ruled, from 189until 1979.

Part of the cost minimisation policy waimplemented by combining their administratiowith that of the Ellice Group several hundremiles to the south, and that of Banaba, whicwas separately annexed by Britain in 190Thus was created the Gilbert and Ellice IslandColony (GEIC). Again for administrativconvenience, the Phoenix Group and thSouthern Line Islands (not part of Tungarwere also incorporated into the Colony. Manof these were also claimed by the USA, but thclaims were given up in the Treaty of Tarawsigned in 1980.

Banaba was annexed because it had beediscovered that that island, at any rate, was nworthless. With its neighbour Nauru (which hacorrectly been put on the ‘German’ side of thPacific), it was packed with valuable phosphatI do not have time to tell the nasty story of thexploitation of Banaba and the Banabans, fothe benefit of Australian and New Zealanagriculture, and indirectly cheap food for thUK; but suffice it to say that when I drew up th

first ever set of National Accounts for the GEIin the mid 1970s, phosphate mining accountefor some 52% of GDP (1974). As KiribaIndependence was then approaching, we weable to up the price of our phosphate to worlevels and thus to invest substantial amounts the hitherto rather moribund Revenu




Equalisation Reserve Fund – in effect a muchneeded Sovereign Wealth Fund – that a farsighted Colonial Official had instituted as longago as 1956.

As Independence approached, the Ellice

people had become worried that they would beswamped by the more numerous Gilbertese,and in 1975 it was agreed that they wouldseparate, as Tuvalu.

The protracted bid by the residents of BanabaIsland in the 1970s to secede and have theirisland placed under the protection of Fiji hasbeen an even more emotional issue. AfterBanaba was devastated by the phosphatemining, the vast majority of Banabans werepersuaded to move to the island of Rabi in theFiji Islands, in the 1940s; they now number

some 5,000 and have full Fijian citizenship.

At Independence, the Kiribati governmentresponded by including several specialprovisions in the Constitution, such as thedesignation of a Banaban seat in the legislature,and the return of land previously acquired bythe government for phosphate mining. Onlyabout 300 people remain on Banaba. Despitebeing part of Kiribati, Banaba’s municipaladministration is by the Rabi Council of Leadersand Elders, which is based on Rabi. This hasremained a background, but currently low-key,security issue as Kiribati emerged in 1979 as anindependent nation with the shape it has today.

Since Independence

Well into the 1970s, there was a widely heldview that Kiribati could never survive as anindependent country – due to its size,dispersion, and lack of resources other than thephosphate, finally mined out in the very year ofIndependence. Successive Development Planshad tried (and failed) to come up with a ‘big

idea’ to replace the mining income, andgovernment revenue from it.

Fast forwarding the 33 years fromIndependence in 1979 to today, I think it is fairto say that they have done a lot better than mostoutside observers had expected, not least

because of the four able and far-seeinPresidents we have had. Fortunately thesleaders did not share the gloomy assessmenof the outside observers.

The upsides are:

•

Kiribati democracy has proved resilienwith sitting Governments losing electionon two occasions

• There has been no serious internal unres

• Kiribati is still a middle income countrdespite losing more than half of inational income just befoIndependence

• This has been achieved through a mix measures, not through a ‘big idea’

• The Revenue Equalisation Reserve Funhas balanced the budget, and its capit

has been carefully preserved, althougthere has recently been a worrying droin its size because of the global downtuand banking crisis

• Fishing license fees and remittanceprovide key sources of income.

However, there are also a number downsides:

•

The population has more than double(to about 100,000) since IndependencVirtually all of the increase in populatio

has moreover been concentrated in thcapital, South Tarawa, which as a resuis grossly overcrowded and polluted

•

Urban poverty has emerged, and generation has grown up witho‘subsistence’ skills

• The production and export bases arnarrow, limited to subsistence farminand fishing on ‘outer’ islands, and coprseaweed and fishing exports

• There is a high import dependence, anthe economy is very vulnerable to swing

in commodity prices and importeinflation• Kiribati relies heavily on foreign aid t

finance the resulting structural traddeficit and to provide infrastructure of akinds




• Corruption, though not pervasive, hascrept into what was 40 years agopossibly the most honest society in theworld

• The public sector still unhealthilydominates the economy (as it did in

colonial days).

Security from a Traditional Perspective

I strongly agree with the wise remarks made bythe High Commissioner for Fiji in his address toyou last week, that:

“If I were to ask the room this evening tosuggest 3 issues that you would consider to besignificant threats to security in the PacificIslands, it is likely that your collective list wouldbe dominated by traditional security issues,such as superpower rivalry, terrorism, peoplesmuggling, and drug trafficking … Were I at thesame time to ask a group of Pacific Islanderswhich three threats to security are mostpressing, I am sure that their answers woulddiffer to yours.”

The issue of security, which was then definedonly in military terms, dominated thinking in thecold war era, and during the early days ofdecolonisation – with New Zealand then oftenheld out as the ‘minimum’ size of state that

should be considered viable. This would haveruled out statehood for all the Pacific islandcountries. By the time most of them were alongthe path to independence, however, the bigpowers had pretty much accepted the conceptof micro-states, and had accepted that theywould have to learn to live with them, andevolve mechanisms to do so. Indeed Nauru –the smallest of all the independent countries inthe region – was one of the first Pacific states tobecome independent, in 1968.

Kiribati came to independence with no regular

military forces; their establishment is veryspecifically prevented by the constitution. Theonly state disciplined force in Kiribati is anational police force, which also runs prisonsand a coast guard. (This is unfortunate for oneof my correspondents, an enterprising Texan

who regularly writes to the Consulate’s ‘AAttaché’, wishing to sell used helicopter parts tthe Kiribati Air Force).

That is not to say that traditional types security threat can be wholly discounted.

We have, inevitably, had the odd run in with th‘bad guys’. Only last week, for example, thPresident publicly apologised for the sale passports to what turned out to have beeNorth Korean agents, under a revenue raisinsale-of-passports programme developed in th1990s. The current Government put a stop the programme in 2003.

As the President explained:

“We cancelled that programme because it wasomething that was not very popular: we did n

believe it was the right thing to be done. Buthink that angle with the involvement of NorKoreans and particularly with potential terroriconnections was never something we intendeto happen, nor did we expect it would happen.

‘Covering the angles’ is a recurring problem you are a micro-state, purely because of lack oresources and intelligence ‘bandwidth’. I wreturn to this in my concluding remarks.However, on the broader ‘traditional’ securifront, regional arrangements and generouinternational assistance, governmental, integovernmental and increasingly nogovernmental, have proved to be generaleffective in meeting them.

I focus on a couple of examples:• The regional security arrangements p

in place by the Pacific Islands Forum• The continuing development of c

operation on fisheries protection.

The regional security framework by the PacifIslands Forum is designed to ensure th

cooperation of national law enforcemeauthorities with each other, and to ensure standard regional approach to securiactivities. The 2000 Biketawa Declaration, onof four key instruments governing regionsecurity arrangements, relates to regional cris




management and conflict resolution initiatives,is indeed named after the islet on Tarawa Atollwhere it was signed; and we have contributed asmall number of police to RAMSI, which hasbeen a notable success for regionalmanagement of internal disturbances.

There is additionally an Australia-KiribatiSecurity Partnership, signed at the 2010 PacificIslands Forum in Port Vila, Vanuatu, whichprovides for security cooperation between thetwo countries.

Australia’s Defence Cooperation Programme inparticular provides training and other support tothe Police Maritime Unit of the Kiribati PoliceService for its operation of the patrol boat, theRKS Teanoai. Two Royal Australian Navypersonnel are based permanently in Tarawa.

The United States and Kiribati have also signeda cooperative maritime enforcement agreement,or ‘ship rider agreement,’ allowing I Kiribati lawenforcement officers to embark on U.S. CoastGuard vessels and aircraft to patrol the waters.

This supports the second focus of ‘traditional’security, the exclusive economic zonesbelonging to the islands, and most specifically,the fish that they contain. Aided by technology,security responses have evolved considerablysince the days of not so many years ago, whenthe captain of a fisheries vessel apprehended interritorial waters promptly offered to buy – as avaluable antique – the 303 rifle with which hehad been arrested. (The 303 rifle entered theservice of the British army in the 1880s).

Although the central pacific contains some 25%of the world’s skipjack tuna, fees received byKiribati and other Pacific Islands are not largerelative to the value of fish catches. The ratio ofthe fees to fishing entities’ revenues is reportedto be less than 5%, with an even smaller

proportion of the eventual value of the catchremaining in the region. Fishing license feesare nonetheless a key income source for theKiribati Government. Fishing license fees are, atmore than 30% of domestically generatedrevenue (i.e. excluding aid receipts) and around

20% of GDP, among the highest in PacifIsland countries.

Kiribati is party to The Nauru Agreement, thsubregional agreement on terms and conditionfor tuna purse seine fishing licences in th

region (an OPEC for skipjack, according to idetractors). Under this agreement the PacifIslands Forum Fisheries Agency has brougtogether eight Pacific Island countriesustainably to manage tuna. It has introduceseveral innovative conservation anmanagement measures such as the Vessel DaScheme (a system whereby a set number ofishing days will be sold and traded to thhighest bidding fishing companies), closure high seas areas to fishing, and control of FisAggregating Devices (or ‘FADs’, which ahuman-made devices to attract schools of fis

that often result in high juvenile fish catches).

A major contribution has been made by Kiribathrough the equally creative policy of diincentivising fishing, on analogous lines schemes for rain forests. Instead of receivinmoney for permitting fishing access to outsidparties, the country has found other partnewho pay to keep fishing crews away from thPhoenix Islands Protected Area (PIPA), thsecond largest marine protected area in thworld. With an area of more than 150,000 sqmiles (several hundred times our land area 280 square miles) it is the largest marinprotected area in the Pacific Ocean and thlargest marine conservation effort of its kind ba least developed country.

International co-operation on EEZs continueLast year, seven small island states sharinmaritime boundaries signed bilateral treaagreements at the Pacific Islands LeadeForum in the Cook Islands. The signinincluded seven bilateral and one trilateragreement, this being between Kiribati, th

Marshall Islands, and Nauru.There is every sign that such continuing coperation will raise the value of their marinresources to participating countries.




Security from a Non traditional

Perspective

I want now to turn to the main topic of thisevening, the impact of non-traditional issues –caused by climate change – on the security of

Kiribati and its people.

The Situation

Although a lot of attention has been given torising sea levels (it is estimated that the sealevel around Kiribati has been rising by anaverage of 3.7 millimetres a year since 1992),this only tells part of the story.

The land in Kiribati is not so much already beingdrastically eroded, but that the coral lenses arebecoming more and more saline, and there is

more temporary damage from ‘king’ tides. It ispossible that global warming will ultimatelyresult in storm waves breaching the outer reefs,which will result in all the land very rapidlywashing away. However, the science about thisis disputed by some, whereas the immediateimpact of current man-made change on thewater table and shoreline is irrefutable to all butthe most determined of climate change deniers.

The atolls of Kiribati are experiencing increasedwave heights and frequency, and this is placingincreased pressure on the shoreline andseawalls. Storm surges occur far more oftenthan in the past. During recent king tides manypeople were affected by waves that reachednearly 3 metres, devastating some villages,sweeping farmland out to sea, andcontaminating fresh water wells. These highwaves break over coastal land and seawallsand cause flooding and destruction to settledareas and fruit trees. Tebunginako village inAbaiang – which has had to be moved –provides an example.

Cyclones and hurricanes occur more frequentlyin the ocean area surrounding Kiribati and thesealso generate waves that damage the atolls.For example, in 1997 Kiritimati Island wasdevastated by an El Niño event that broughtheavy rainfall and flooding, resulting in a half-metre rise in sea level. Roughly 40% of the

island’s coral died and the island’s 14 milliobirds, among the world’s richest birpopulation, left.By contrast, other parts of Kiribati have sufferefrom long periods of drought, an endangeresupply of fresh water, and bleaching of th

coral reefs that protect the islands. (Although recent study concluded that the uniqucombination of certain currents and tidearound Kiribati may ultimately provide a refugfor corals to evolve in order to cope with risinsea temperatures, while they will be wiped ovirtually everywhere else in the world).

The atolls of Kiribati have always had limiteground water lenses. Coral limestone is porouand allows seawater to flow through it. Thwater table oscillates on a daily basis with thtides, and in the long term with the mean se

level. Potable ground water in wells hatraditionally supplied enough water for thpopulation, most of the time, but this supply haincreasingly been failing as a direct result of thclimate changes I have mentioned. As selevels have risen, many wells have becomcontaminated with salt water and can no longebe used. The water supply in Kiribati alreadfalls well short of the recommended WHstandard of 50 litres per person per day.

The Challenges

The security challenges arising directly froclimate change can be summarised as:

• The need for physical protection of thshoreline

• Severe restrictions on the availability fresh water (at an affordable price)

• Food security• Health issues, such as increase

incident of water-borne diseases and dengue fever , as well as the effects too much salt on heart disease

•

The very habitability of the atolls, and thcontinuing survival of Kiribati as a natioif these other issues cannot be overcom

•

in time.




These are just as fundamental to people’ssecurity as are the threat of foreign invasion, orof a terrorist attack. Nor would Kiribati at itscurrent stage of development be much disabledby cyber war or internet fraud, important thoughthose are to us of the developed world.

The Kiribati Adaptation Programme (KAP) wasthus started in 2003, and has beenimplemented in three phases:

•

Phase I: Preparation took place in 2003–2005. It began the process ofmainstreaming adaptation into nationaleconomic planning and identified prioritypilot investments

• Phase II: Pilot Implementation between2006 and 2010 developed anddemonstrated the systematic diagnosisof climate-related problems and thedesign and implementation of cost-effective adaptation measures, whilecontinuing the integration of climate riskawareness and responsiveness intoeconomic and operational planning

• Phase III: Expansion started in 2010.Lessons learned in the previous phaseshave informed the design andpreparation of an expanded programmefor Climate Change Adaptation (CCA)which will incorporate Disaster RiskReduction (DDR) measures which, in

Kiribati in particular, are closely linked toclimate change adaptation initiatives.

In March 2010, the government formulated anational framework for climate change andclimate change adaptation and migration.Action resulting from this is being supported bya variety of bilateral and multi-lateralorganisations, led by the World Bank.

The strategy is threefold:1. Mitigation2. Adaptation – to sustain the existing

population and land as far as istechnically and economically feasible

3.

Relocation.

Mitigation

CO2 emissions by Kiribati are estimated to blower than any those of other country in thworld, bar one. Per capita emissions in 200the last time a full survey was done, were 7%

the global average; and less than 2% of U.Sper capita emissions. Low-carbon technologiein Kiribati are therefore more desirable fopromoting development, rather than as a meanof mitigating climate change.

Kiribati hosted the Tarawa Climate ChangConference in 2010 as a consultative forubetween vulnerable states and their partnerwith a hope of creating a more effectivenvironment for multilateral negotiations undthe auspices of the UNFCCC. The Ambdeclaration (addressing the causes an

adverse impacts of climate change) waadopted at the conference on 10 Novembe2010, and endorsed by Australia and NeZealand, together with Brazil, China, JapaCuba, and other Pacific island states. But thUnited States, Canada and, to my personregret, the United Kingdom, chose not to bpart of the declaration, by taking Observstatus.

This is not the occasion to analyse that and thefforts of other international negotiators, whseem to me to be stuck at about the same levof sophistication as the negotiators of the TreaOf Berlin were on military matters – and tharguably led to two vicious world wars. Thharsh reality is that Kiribati cannot significantinfluence man’s effect on the climate ointernational efforts to combat it; nor, in anuseful timescale, would any internationagreement on climate change now matter to ipopulation. And not a penny of so-called ‘FasStart Funds’ promised at Copenhagen foyears ago, in 2009, has yet reached anyone othe ground.

Adaptation

So, what can be done to adapt to this reality?Adaptation is focused around coastmanagement, conservation of clean drinkinwater through better rainwater collection, ne




sources of cultivation, and saving of roads andinfrastructure from saltwater damage.Some of these adaptation measures are basic,and can be easily undertaken with local skillsand labour, provided these can be mobilisedeffectively.

For example, over 37,000 mangrove seedlingshave recently been planted on the islands ofAranuka, Butaritari, Maiana, Makin and in Northand South Tarawa. To lead by example, thePresident of Kiribati himself planted mangrovesalongside local youths in South Tarawa.

Mangroves, although considered a ‘soft’ optionwhen compared to seawalls, can be one of themost effective forms of coastal protection. It isa solution that is not as costly as others – and itcan be done by the community. There is noreal maintenance required, and it profits the

community by providing extra buildingmaterials, food and fire wood, as well aspreserving the traditional use of mangroves fordyes and medicines.

Other adaptation programmes are not soaffordable locally, such as construction ofapproximately 500 meters of sea walls; waterworks have been completed across Tarawa andthe outer islands, including a freshwaterinfiltration galleries and rainwater harvestingand storage facilities; groundwater monitoringboreholes and rain gauges; and changes tostandards to in the outer islands to ensure keyinfrastructure investments will be able better towithstand extreme weather and sea level rises,as well as providing for rainwater harvestingand storage. These only cover a smallpercentage of the whole population.

The World Bank has praised the Government ofthe Republic of Kiribati for being a global leaderin laying the groundwork through these andother initiatives to deal with the threat fromnatural hazards, since the mid-1990s.

But as the global food crisis also pushedimported food prices through the roof, thepeople have been struggling to cope, despitespending half of their income on food. For thefirst time ever in its existence, Kiribati last yearhad to seek World Bank emergency food aid,

for 60,000 people, or 60% of the populatioand it is estimated that 30% of the urbapopulation is now malnourished.

Adaptation is a battle that Kiribati may not bable to win. A rough estimate recently made f

the cost for the total protection of all inhabiteislands in Kiribati came to around $US2 billionor $20 million per inhabitant. Generous as thinternational community may have been Kiribati, I do not think that it will stump up thmuch.

Relocation

This leaves the third aspect of the strategrelocation.

As the President has said:

“To plan for the day when you no longer have country is indeed painful, but I think we have do that.”

The people relocation strategy of the KiribaGovernment has two key components.Firstly, opportunities must be created to enabthe migration of those who wish to do so noand in the coming years. This will assist establishing a diaspora of I-Kiribati, who will bable to absorb and support greater numbers migrants in the longer term. It will also benethose who remain, by lifting the levels remittances.

Secondly, the levels of qualifications able to bobtained in Kiribati will be raised to thosavailable in countries such as Australia anNew Zealand. This will make qualified I-Kiribamore attractive as migrants, but will alsimprove the standards of services availablocally.

The concept of ‘migration with dignity’ is cruci

to the effectiveness of the Governmentrelocation policy. I Kiribati migrants should bsought after by the countries to which they wisto relocate. For this to happen Kiribati peopmust be in a position to provide the skilneeded in receiving countries. This will create




‘win-win’ situation, where both Kiribati and thereceiving country benefit.

Remittances from workers overseas have a longhistory in Kiribati; its Marine Training Centre hasbeen sending seamen overseas to crew foreign

ships since the 1960s, and more recently theFishing School has done the same for foreignfishing fleets. Remittances are alreadyequivalent in size to more than 10% of GDP,and since they are sent to spouses and parentsall over the country, contribute especially topoverty reduction.

Since 2010, significant additional progress hasbeen achieved in creating different types oftemporary employment opportunities abroad,including seasonal worker schemes thanks tothe engagement of our development partners

(in particular Australia and New Zealand).

The Kiribati Australia Nursing Initiative is arecent example of ‘migration with dignity’.Under this scheme young Kiribati nationals aretrained as nurses in Australia, with the intentionthat they help fill the growing demand for nursescaused by the aging of population in thatcountry. New Zealand is also now accepting aquota of migrants each year, chosen through alottery. In both cases the prize is eventualcitizenship of the receiving country.

There are other kinds of relocation.

Kiribati has just purchased land in Fiji(equivalent to about 7 sq. miles). Contrary tomost press reports, this is not intended for therelocation of the entire population of Kiribati, butto provide greater food security and protectionagainst imported inflation via commodity prices.The prospect of being able to supply more offood from our own land (albeit in anothercountry) is a sensible investment. Kiribati willnot be the first country to go down this route –

for example, Brunei has for similar reasonsinvested in cattle ranches in Australia.

Conclusion: Some of the Outstandin

Issues

However much we may think outside the bo(an apparently serious proposal made last yeato replace Tarawa with a floating artificial cit

comes to mind) there remains the sad binescapable fact that the population of Kiribamay indeed ‘no longer have a country’ by thmiddle of this century.

In my concluding remarks, I should thus like raise five issues which the Government Kiribati has consistently raised about such doomsday scenario – I should be glad to havyour reflections on any of these in a feminutes.

Kiribati has relied on external assistance for

long time. I referred earlier both to the stronsense of individual equality and self-worth heby its traditional society, and its long traditiothat decisions should be taken by consensubut also the problems of bandwidth – a micrstate simply does not have another people master every issue (and I hereby dub this th‘Nancy Bell’ Syndrome – NBS, to provide thobligatory acronym). Could more be done mitigate the dangers that external assistancsubverts the national agenda to those of thdonors, promotes rent-seeking and at worcorruption, and by-passes community decisiotaking?

Is it possible or desirable for the internationcommunity formally to extend the RefugeConvention to those forced to cross nationboundaries because of climate chang(sometimes referred to as ‘environmentrefugees’, although we dislike this term)?Should the international community conceitself at all with the demise of a nation and iunique culture? After all, it has happened mantimes in history (who now remembers th

Kusans, the Visigoths, or the Avars?). I have ndoubt that if it does become necessary thAustralia and New Zealand could and wabsorb 100,000 people; but with thexpectation that they will over a couple generations become good Australians or NeZealanders, rather than remain I Kiribati.




There are plenty of uninhabited, or verysparsely inhabited, tropical ‘high’ islands of thearea of Kiribati. Why is it apparently unthinkablefor the international community (on ‘sovereignty’grounds) that Kiribati use its Reserve Fund to

purchase such an island, and to move there enmasse, still as an independent nation, but in adifferent place?

What are the security, legal and economicimplications of an ‘abandoned’ country? Andactually, Banaba will still be above water, unlikesay the atolls of Tuvalu or Tokelau. DoesBanaba become the centre of a much smallerEEZ? Do the rights of the rest of Kiribati persist,transfer, or get re-allocated by the internationalcommunity? Who becomes responsible for itsexisting EEZ, for example, and through what

mechanism? How do we deal with ‘MinervaReef’ type incidents (this was a barelysubmerged reef near Tonga, on which it wasattempted in the 1970s to construct a settlementoutside the jurisdiction of any State?).

Thank you for your patience in listening. I lookforward to any observations or questions thatyou may wish to make.

The views expressed are those of the author.

the front lines of climate change: is relocation inevitable

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