TheFrenchRevolution:AVeryShortIntroduction

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ANCIENTPHILOSOPHY JuliaAnnas

THE ANGLO-SAXONAGEJohnBlair

ARCHAEOLOGY PaulBahn

ARISTOTLE JonathanBarnes

AUGUSTINE HenryChadwick

THE BIBLE JohnRiches

BUDDHA MichaelCarrithers

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THE FRENCHREVOLUTIONWilliamDoyle

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HEGELPeterSingerHEIDEGGER MichaelInwood

HINDUISMKimKnottHISTORY John H.Arnold

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BruceSOCRATES C. C. W.Taylor

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THEFRENCH

REVOLUTIONAVeryShortIntroduction

WilliamDoyle

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Preface

Toproduceaveryshortbookaboutasubjectonwhichonehaswrittenatvaryinglengthsbeforeismoreofachallengethan it might seem. We canall think of peoplewhohave

‘written the same book’severaltimesoverindifferentforms; and we all dreadbecoming like them. So Ihave not set out primarily toretell a familiar story,although anything callingitself an introductionmust tosome extent do that. Myconcernhasbeenmuchmoreto discuss why the FrenchRevolutionmattered, andhascontinued to matter ininnumerableways in the two

centuries since it occurred.The whole story of theRevolution, both as a seriesof late eighteenth-centuryevents and as a set of ideas,images, andmemories in theminds of posterity, is apowerful argument for theimportanceofhistory,aswellas a striking example of itscomplexity. Whether it willremain as relevant forunderstandingthetwenty-firstcentury as it was for the

nineteenth and twentieth isperhaps,asaChinese sage isreputedtohaveobserved,tooearlytosay.

The first time I studied theFrench Revolution seriouslywas in my final year as anundergraduate. It was lit upby the providentialappearance of NormanHampson’sSocial History ofthe French Revolution. I am

not surprised that it is still inprint as its author enters hiseightieth year. Later it wasmy privilege to beNorman’scolleague at York. Ingratitude for that, and theyears of friendship since, Idedicate this book to him. Ihope he will not findassociation with a workslighter than any of his owntheleastwelcomeofwhataresure to be many birthdaypresents.

WilliamDoyle,Bath,8April2001

Contents

Listofillustrations

1Echoes

2Whyithappened

3Howithappened

4Whatitended

5Whatitstarted

6Whereitstands

Timeline: Importantdates of the FrenchRevolution

The RevolutionaryCalendar

Furtherreading

Index

List ofillustrations

1PortraitofLouisXVIChâteauVersailles/Giraudon

2 Cross-ChannelcontrastsasseenfromLondon by JamesGillrayinthe1790s

Musée de la Ville deParis, MuséeCarnavalet/Giraudon

3TheCivilCodeMary Evans PictureLibrary

4TheTennisCourtOathMusée de la Ville deParis, MuséeCarnavalet/Lauros-Giraudon

5 The taking of theBastille

Mary Evans PictureLibrary

6 National Guards in

uniform© Photo RMN-MichèleBellot, Musée duLouvre,Paris

7TheexecutionofLouisXVI

Mary Evans PictureLibrary

8Jacques-LouisDavid’ssketch of Marie-

Antoinetteonherwaytothescaffold

©IRPA-KIK,Brussels

9 Marat assassinated:Jacques-LouisDavid’s revolutionarypietà

© Photo RMN, MuséeduLouvre,Paris

10 Eugène Delacroix’s

LibertyLeading thePeople(1830)

Paris,Bibl.NationaledeFrance-Inv:Imprimés/Lauros-Giraudon

11 The reaction ofreviewers to thebicentenary

RichardCole

1. Louis XVI: The absolutemonarchinallhisglory

Chapter1Echoes

‘Mr Worthing,’ says LadyBracknell in The Importanceof Being Earnest (1895), ‘Ifeel somewhatbewilderedbywhat you have just told me.

To be born, or at any ratebred,inahandbag,whetherithad handles or not, seems tome todisplay a contempt fortheordinarydecenciesof lifethatremindsoneoftheworstexcesses of the FrenchRevolution. And I presumeyou know what thatunfortunate movement ledto?’

PresumablyMrWorthingdid.

Everypersonofgoodgeneralknowledge in the nineteenthcentury knew somethingabout the great upheavalwhich had marked the lastyears of the eighteenth.Serious Victorians wouldhave felt it a duty to instructthemselves about what hadhappenedinFrance,andwhy,in and after 1789; and howtheensuing turmoilhadbeenbroughttoanendonlybythegeneration-long ‘Great War’

against Napoleon which hadmarked the lives of theirparents or grandparents. MrWorthing, nibbling hiscucumber sandwiches anddreaming of marrying LadyBracknell’s daughter, wouldnothavebeensocurious.Butprobablyevenhewouldhavehad some idea of what theworst excesses of the FrenchRevolution had been, and ofhow theyhadaffronted life’sordinarydecencies.Hewould

have known that there hadbeen a popular uprisingleading to mob rule, theoverthrow of monarchy andpersecution of the nobility.He would have known thatthe chosen instrument ofrevolutionary vengeance wasthe guillotine, that relentlessmechanicaldecapitatorwhichmade the streets of Paris runwith royal and aristocraticblood. The creator of MrErnest Worthing and Lady

Bracknell (her ancestors, hadthey been French, couldscarcelyhavehoped toavoidthe dread instrument …)ended his days in moroseexile in Paris. There, OscarWilde was surrounded bysymbols and imagesdeliberately designed by therulers of the Third Republicto evoke the memory of theFirst, the Revolution’screation. The coinage andpublic buildings were

emblazoned with the sloganLiberty, Equality, Fraternity.On festive occasions thestreets fluttered with red,white, and blue bunting, thecolours of the tricolour flagadoptedbytheFrenchNationin 1789. On 14th July eachyear a national festivalcelebratedthefallonthatdayin 1789 of the Bastille, aforbidding state prisonstormed and then levelled bythe people in the name of

liberty. At such moments ofpublic jubilation FrenchpatriotssangtheMarseillaise,the battle hymn of a waragainst tyranny launched in1792. And undoubtedly thegreatest sight in Paris whenWilde lived there was theworld’s tallest building, theEiffelTower, the centrepieceof a great exhibition whichhadmarked the Revolution’sfirstcentenaryin1889.

Nobodywho lived inFrance,orvisitedit,couldavoidtheseechoes; or echoes ofNapoleon, who had marchedunderthetricolour,hadtamedand harnessed the energiesunleashed by theRevolution,andwhosenephewNapoleonIII had ruled for 22 yearsbefore the Third Republicwasestablished.Nobodywhoknew anything of Franceeven at second hand (if onlythrough learning what was

stillthefirstforeignlanguageofchoice throughoutmostofthe world) could fail toimbibe some sense that thiscountryhadbeenmarkedbyatraumatic convulsion onlyjust beyond living memory.Many believed, or felt, thatthis must have been for thebestandsomehownecessary.Everybody knew and wasshocked by the story of howQueen Marie-Antoinette,guillotined amid popular

jubilation in 1793, had said‘Letthemeatcake’whentoldthat thepeoplehadnobread.(Everybodyknowsitstill,andnobody cares that it was anoldstoryevenbeforeshewasborn, heard by Jean-JacquesRousseau as early as 1740.)Newnationshavebeenproudto proclaim theiremancipation,ortoanticipateitlikethepatriotsofBrusselsin1789,orMilanin1796,byadopting tricolour flags.This

banner of liberty still fliesfrom Rome to Mexico City,from Bucharest to Dublin.Poles, who first sang theMarseillaise in 1794 as theyresisted the carve-up of theircountry,sangitagainin1956in revolt against Soviettyranny. In 1989, as Francecommemorated theRevolution’s 200thanniversary,thesameanthemof defiance was heard inBeijing, among the doomed

student protesters inTiananmen Square. Fewcountries have failed toexperience some sort ofrevolution since1789,and inall of them there have beenpeople looking back to whathappened in France then andsubsequently for inspiration,models,patterns,orwarnings.

Cross-Channel

perspectives

Most detached from all thishave been the world’sEnglish-speaking countries.Their last revolutions, exceptin Ireland, took place before1789, and even English-speakingcontemporarieswhosympathized with the Frenchsawthemascatchingupwithliberties proclaimed in

England in1688,orAmericain 1776. In any case suchsympathizers were always ina minority. The mould formost English-speakingattitudeswas cast as early as1790, some years before theRevolution’s ‘worstexcesses’, by EdmundBurke’s Reflections on theRevolution in France.Outraged at the claims ofreformers that the Frenchwere merely carrying on the

workofthe‘Glorious’Britishrevolution of 1688 and theAmericanrebelswhosecausehe had supported in the1770s,BurkeassertedthattheFrench Revolution wassomething entirely new anddifferent. Earlier revolutionsin the anglophone world hadsought to preserve a heritageoflibertyfromattack.Bythenew French standards,indeed, they had not beenrevolutions at all; for the

French were seeking toestablish what they calledliberty by wholesaledestruction.Withcaution,andrespect for the wisdom oftheir ancestors, they mighthave corrected the few andvenial faults of their formerinstitutions, and come to runtheir affairs as freely andpeaceably as the British rantheirs.Buttheyhadchosentofollow the untried dreams ofrationalizing, self-styled

‘philosophers’ who hadsappedfaithinmonarchy,thesocial order, and GodHimself.

The result had been anarchyand the envious rule of the‘swinish multitude’. Burkepredictedworsetocome,andforetold that it would take amilitarydictatorship toend itall. Even he did not foreseehow bloody matters would

become, but he was rightabouttheeventualtriumphofa general. Burke came,therefore, to be revered as aprophet as well as a critic;even if the superiority of theBritish over the French wayof doing things seemed onlyto be fully vindicated 18years after his death, on thefieldofWaterloo.

But the French were

incorrigible, and in 1830 thetricolour was unfurled againover a new, though briefer,Parisian revolution.Whyhadit come back to haunt thefuture?Asthegenerationthathadmade or experienced theoriginalcataclysmdiedaway,historians began toappropriate it for analysis.Most of them are nowforgotten,andtheonewhoisnot commands little respectamong later practitioners of

hiscraft.ButThomasCarlyledidmore thananyoneelse tofix the popular idea of whatthe French Revolution waslike. In his wild, inimitablestyle,TheFrenchRevolution.A History (1837) painted avision of mindless andvengeful chaos. He did notfollow Burke in trying todefendtheancienrégime,theorder that the revolutionariesdestroyed.He thought it wasrotten, and deserved its fate.

While courtiers minced, andwindbags prated, the hungrymasses brooded on theiroppression: ‘unspeakableconfusion is everywherewelteringwithin,andthroughsomanycracksinthesurfacesulphur-smoke is issuing.’The Revolution was anexplosion of popularviolence, understandable ifscarcely defensibleresentment. Those whoattempted to lead or guide it

were mostly simpletons orscoundrels,alltobepitiedfortheir presumption. The mostfrightful figure of all wasRobespierre,whotriedtorulethrough terror, and who wasnow fixed forever in non-French minds as the ‘sea-green incorruptible’ (inreference to his complexionas well as to his power). Hesent his victims to their fate,and finally followed themthere himself in tumbrils (a

half-forgotten word for atippingcart,neverafterwardsused except in this context).‘Red Nightcaps howl direapproval’ as the tumbrilspass:thismeanssansculottes,men who did not weararistocratic kneebreeches butflaunted their patriotismwithred capsof liberty.Theyandtheir screaming womenfolkwere driven on by viscerallust for social revenge.Carlyleonlyrecognizedthree

men as capable of directingthese forces of nature. Onewas Mirabeau, whose deathin 1791 left his promiseunfulfilled. Another wasDanton, who saved Francewith his energy from foreigninvasion in 1792, but wasengulfed two years later bythe terror: ‘with all his drosshe was a Man; fiery-real,from the great fire-bosom ofNature herself.’ (At the timeof Carlyle’s writing, Georg

Büchner was presentingGerman speakers withDantons Tod [Danton’sDeath,1835],aplayinwhichDanton is depicted as tooheroic a figure for the pettybeings like Robespierre whocombinedtokillhim.)Finallythere was Napoleon, whobroughtthearmyintopoliticsin 1795, ending the lastParisian insurrection with a‘whiffofgrapeshot’.

2.Cross-Channelcontrastsasseen from London by thecaricaturist James Gillray in

the1790s.

Dramaticdepictions

The idiosyncratic vigour ofCarlyle’s writing leaves animpression of years ofceaseless turmoil,with bloodand violence, merciless

‘sansculottism’, and bayingmobs a daily sight. It wasirresistibly dramatic. ButCarlyle also had an eye forthepathosofinnocentvictimsfalling prey to forces mencould not control. EvenRobespierrereceivesatwingeof sympathy as he rumblestowards the guillotine in hisnew,sky-bluecoat.Thebookthrilled and appalled itsreaders,anditsold,aswellasread, like a novel. Novelists

themselves admired it, andnone more so than CharlesDickens.

Dickens’ATaleofTwoCities(1859),infact,offeredbyfarthe most influential imagethat posterity has of theFrench Revolution. FromBurke it took one of itsunderlying themes – thecontrast between turbulent,violent Paris and safe,

tranquil, and prosperousLondon. But Dickens’ mostobviousguideandinspirationwasCarlyle.Fromhimcomesthe lurid picture of a crueland oppressive old order, aworld of ‘rapacious licenceand oppression’, whereharmless and innocentvictims can be confined bythewhimsof thepowerful toyears of imprisonmentwithout trial in the grim andforbidding Bastille; where a

noblemancanthinkthelifeofa child killed under thewheels of his coach can bepaidforbyatossedgoldcoin.Worthless authorities ruleoverawretchedandpoverty-stricken population achingwith social resentment, inwhich Madame Defarge,impassively and implacablyknitting, plans for themomentwhenrevengecanbevisited on her family’s nobleoppressors. The Revolution

provides that moment: ‘“TheBastille!” With a roar thatsoundedasifallthebreathinFrance had been shaped intothe detested word, the livingsea rose, wave on wave,depth on depth, andoverflowed the city to thatpoint. Alarm bells ringing,drumsbeating, thesearagingand thundering on its ownbeach, the attack begun.’Madame Defarge helps tolead it: ‘“What! We can kill

aswell as themen…!”Andto her, with a shrill thirstycry, trooping womenvariously armed, but allarmed alike in hunger andrevenge.’ This turmoil goesonforyears,butby1792theinstrument of vengeance isthe guillotine. MadameDefargeandherfellowFuriesnowknitaroundthescaffold,counting victims with theirstitches. France is peopledwith‘patriots inredcapsand

tricoloured cockades, armedwith national muskets andsabres’,sullenandsuspicious,who instinctively curse all‘aristocrats’. ‘That a man ingoodclothesshouldbegoingto prison, was no moreremarkable than that alabourer in working clothesshouldbegoingtowork.’Bythebeginningof1794,

Every day, through the

stony streets, thetumbrils now joltedheavily, filled with thecondemned. Lovelygirls, bright women,brown-haired, black-haired,andgrey;youths,stalwart men and old;gentle born and peasantborn,allredwineforLaGuillotine, all dailybrought into light fromthe dark cellars of theloathsome prisons, and

carried to her throughthe streets to slake herdevouringthirst.Liberty,equality, fraternity, ordeath – the last, muchthe easiest to bestow,OGuillotine!

And although the Frencharistocrat Charles Darnayescapes, and his persecutorMadame Defarge is killedbefore she can pursue him,

the book concludes with theEnglish lawyer SydneyCarton sacrificing himself onthescaffoldtohervengeance.

These images, intertwinedwithapowerfullycraftedandheart-rending story, definedthe French Revolution forOscar Wilde’s generation.For the next, and for thewholetwentiethcentury,theywere reinforced by the lesser

talents of Mrs MontagueBarstow, who dubiouslycapitalized on her birth inremote Hungary to callherself Baroness Orczy. TheScarletPimpernel(1905)andits later sequels chronicledthe adventures of a foppishEnglish knight, Sir PercyBlakeney, who led a doublelife rescuing innocentaristocratsfromtheguillotineby spiriting them, in variousdisguises, across theChannel

to safety. But gone were thenuances found in Dickens.While the people of Parisremained‘asurging,seething,murmuring crowd, of beingsthatarehumanonlyinname,for to the eye and ear theyseem naught but savagecreatures, animated by vilepassions and by the lust ofvengeance andof hate’, theirvictims, ‘those aristos … allof them, men, women andchildrenwho happened to be

descendantsof thegreatmenwho since the Crusades hadmade the glory of France’were objects of pity, and inno way responsible for thesupposed oppression of theirancestors.Thewholeepisodewas pure blood lust,successfully defied only bythe efforts of ‘that demmedelusive Pimpernel’ and hisintrepidbandofsecretagents,all English gentlemen. Thereis little hint in Orczy, unlike

Carlyle or Dickens, that theoldorderhadearned the fatethat had befallen it. There issimply regret for ‘beautifulParis, now rendered hideousbythewailingofthewidows,andthecriesofthefatherlesschildren’.

The men all wore redcaps – in various stylesof cleanliness – but allwith the tricolour

cockade … their facesnow invariably wore alook of sly distrust.Every man nowadayswas a spy upon hisfellows: the mostinnocentworduttered injestmightatanytimebebroughtupasaproofofaristocratic tendencies,or of treachery againstthe people. Even thewomenwent aboutwitha curious look of fear

and of hate lurking intheirbrowneyes,andallwatched … andmurmured … ‘Sacrésaristos!’

Twentieth-centuryparallels

The Scarlet Pimpernel beganasasuccessfulplay,andwas

regularly re-adaptedforstageand screen throughout thetwentieth century. So was ATaleofTwoCities.Thescopeoffered by both for costumedrama was too rich forproducers to resist for long.But for twentieth-centuryaudiences seeking to samplerevolution there were nowmore immediate examples.The Bolshevik Revolution inRussia in1917,chronicledatonce in language that echoed

Carlyle by JohnReed inTenDays that Shook the World(1919), offered a freshparadigm. It was alsocapturedbythenewandmoreimmediate medium of film.Even more abundantly, soweresubsequentupheavalsinGermany, China, andcountless other countriesexperiencingrevolutioninthelater twentieth century.Figures like Lenin, Stalin,Hitler, and Mao have

replaced Robespierre orDanton as quintessentialrevolutionaries in thepopularimagination.Even theuniquehorror of the guillotine hasbeen dwarfed by the gaschambers of the Holocaust,theorganizedbrutalityof thegulag, the mass intimidationof Mao’s cultural revolution,or the killing fields ofCambodia. And yet manyRussians in 1917 sawthemselves, and indeed were

widely seen, as re-enactingthe struggles in France after1789. Subsequentrevolutionaries, if lessconscious of the Frenchprecedents,haveneverthelesssoughtlegitimacyindoctrinesof popular sovereignty alltraceable to claims firstexplicitly made in 1789.Many, even those like theNazis who professed todespise traditions nowespecially revered by

Communism,celebrated theirpower with rituals andceremonies redolent of thegreat set-piece festivalsorganized first in Francebetween1790and1794.

The Corsicancontribution

Andonefigurethrownupby

the French Revolution hascontinued to be widelyrecognized – Napoleon. Heremains one of the very fewcharacters in historyuniversallyknownbyhisfirstname, and by his appearance– especially if wearing hishat.Heowes this recognitionlargely to remarkableachievements as a general,but hismilitary prowess wasbuilt on the opportunitiesafforded him by the

Revolution, and when hecreated new regimes in theaftermath of his victories, hethought it self-evident thatthey should run themselveson principles elaborated inFrance since1789.Certainly,the nineteenth century washauntedbythememoryoftheway that he and therevolutionized French nationtoretherestofEurope(GreatBritain excepted) apart. TheRussians particularly,

althoughthey(oratleasttheirclimate) defeated him, weretraumatized by the invasionof1812.Halfacentury later,Tolstoy made the struggleagainst Napoleon the settingforWarandPeace (1865–9).The novel’s characters, fromCzar Alexander downwards,are at the same timeimpressedandrepelledbytheCorsicanusurperandwhathestandsfor.Forgoodorill,hetransforms all their lives.All

the inhabitants of continentalEurope during Napoleon’slifetime could have claimedas much. Even when he hadgone, many of them foundtheir everyday existence stillregulated by laws which hehad introduced. Napoleonclaimed, when hiscampaigningdayswereover,that his most enduring glorywould not be that of thebattles he had won, but hisCivil Code. In reality, the

Code was a revolutionaryproject which Napoleonmerely brought to fruition.Butitsimpactwassubstantialenough, and not only inFrance. A simple, clear, anduniform set of principles forthe holding and transfer ofproperty, it remained thebasisof civil law inmuchofGermany throughout thenineteenthcentury, inPolanduntil 1946, in Belgium andLuxembourguntilthepresent

day. Its influence stillpervadesthelegalsystemsofItaly, the Netherlands, andGermany. An even greatersuccess story has beenmetrication. Elaboratedbetween 1790 and 1799, thedecimal metric system ofweights and measures waszealously promoted underNapoleon. Even in France itwas slow to establish itsmonopoly, but in thesubsequent two centuries it

has spread to most of theworld. When the UnitedStatessuccumbs,assoonerorlater it surely will, it willmark the most completetriumph of any of the manytrends and movements thattheFrenchRevolutionbegan,its fullest and leastambiguouslivinglegacy.

3. Enduring legacies: TheCivilCode

DECLARATION OF THERIGHTSOFMANANDOFCITIZENSBytheNationalAssemblyof

France

‘THE Representatives of thepeopleofFrance,formedintoa National Assembly,considering that ignorance,neglect, or contempt ofhuman rights, are the solecauses of public misfortunesand corruptions ofGovernment,haveresolvedtoset forth, in a solemndeclaration, these natural,

imprescriptible, andunalienable rights: that thisdeclaration being constantlypresent to the minds of themembers of the body social,they may be ever keptattentive to their rights andtheir duties: that the acts ofthe legislative and executivepowersofGovernment,beingcapable of being everymoment compared with theend of political institutions,may be more respected: and

also,thatthefutureclaimsofthecitizens,beingdirectedbysimple and incontestibleprinciples, may always tendto the maintenance of theConstitution, and the generalhappiness.

‘For these reasons, theNational Assembly dothrecognize and declare, in thepresence of the SupremeBeing, and with the hope of

his blessing and favour, thefollowing sacred rights ofmenandofcitizens:

I. Men are born, and alwayscontinue, free, and equal inrespect of their rights. Civildistinctions, therefore,canbefounded only on publicutility.

II. The end of all political

associations, is, thepreservation of the naturaland imprescriptible rights ofman; and these rights areliberty, property, security,andresistanceofoppression.

III. The nation is essentiallythe sourceofall sovereignty;norcananyindividual,oranybody of men, be entitled toany authority which is notexpresslyderivedfromit.

IV. Political Liberty consistsin the power of doingwhatever does not injureanother. The exercise of thenatural rights of every man,hasnootherlimitsthanthosewhicharenecessarytosecureto every other man the freeexercise of the same rights;and these limits aredeterminableonlybythelaw.

V.The lawought to prohibit

only actions hurtful tosociety. What is notprohibitedby the law,shouldnot be hindered; nor shouldanyonebecompelled to thatwhich the law does notrequire.

VI.The law is an expressionofthewillofthecommunity.All citizens have a right toconcur, either personally, orbytheirrepresentatives,inits

formation. It should be thesame to all, whether itprotects or punishes; and allbeing equal in its sight, areequally eligible to allhonours, places, andemployments, according totheir different abilities,without any other distinctionthan that created by theirvirtuesandtalents.

VII. No man should be

accused, arrested, or held inconfinement, except in casesdetermined by the law, andaccordingtotheformswhichit has prescribed. All whopromote, solicit, execute, orcause to be executed,arbitrary orders, ought to bepunished; and every citizencalled upon, or apprehendedby virtue of the law, oughtimmediately to obey, andrenders himself culpable byresistance.

VIII. The law ought toimposenootherpenaltiesbutsuch as are absolutely andevidently necessary: and nooneoughttobepunished,butin virtue of a lawpromulgated before theoffence,andlegallyapplied.

IX. Every man beingpresumedinnocenttillhehasbeenconvicted,wheneverhisdetention becomes

indispensible, all rigour tohim, more than is necessarytosecurehisperson,oughttobe provided against by thelaw.

X. No man ought to bemolested on account of hisopinions,notevenonaccountof his religious opinions,provided his avowal of themdoes not disturb the publicorderestablishedbythelaw.

XI. The unrestrainedcommunication of thoughtsandopinionsbeingoneofthemost precious rights ofman,every citizen may speak,write, and publish freely,providedheisresponsibleforthe abuse of this liberty incasesdeterminedbylaw.

XII. A public force beingnecessary to give security tothe rights of men and of

citizens, that force isinstituted for the benefit ofthe community, and not forthe particular benefit of thepersons with whom it isentrusted.

XIII.Acommoncontributionbeing necessary for thesupport of the public force,and for defraying the otherexpences of government, itought to be divided equally

among the members of thecommunity, according totheirabilities.

XIV. Every citizen has aright,eitherbyhimselforhisrepresentative,toafreevoicein determining the necessityof public contributions, theappropriation of them, andtheir amount, mode ofassessment,andduration.

XV. Every community has aright to demand of all itsagents, an account of theirconduct.

XVI. Every community inwhichaseparationofpowersandasecurityofrightsisnotprovided for, wants aconstitution.

XVII. The right to property

being inviolable and sacred,no one ought to be deprivedof it, except in cases ofevident public necessity,legally ascertained, and oncondition of a previous justindemnity.’

ThomasPaine’stranslationintoEnglishfromtheFrenchincorporated

inhisgreatattackonBurke,RightsofMan(1791)

Humanrights

‘TheRevolutionwasagrandthing!’ exclaims PierreBezukhov in the first chapterof War and Peace. ‘“ …robbery, murder andregicide”, … interjected anironical voice. “Those wereextremes, no doubt, but theyare not what is mostimportant.What is important

are the rights of man,emancipation fromprejudices, and quality ofcitizenship.” Certainly thiswas what the Revolutionbeganwith,andon26August1789 the National Assemblypromulgated a foundingmanifesto to guide its work:theDeclaration of theRightsofManand theCitizen.Thiswas something entirely newin the history of the world.TheEnglishBillofRightsof

1689hadonlyproclaimedtherights of Englishmen. TheUnited States did notestablish its own Bill ofRights until a year after theFrench; and whereas theFrenchdeclarationwasmeantas a preamble enshriningbasic principles of aconstitution, the AmericanBill was a series ofafterthoughts,amendments toan already-existingconstitution. Its principal

architects, despite theprecedent of declarations ofrights prefacing a number ofindividual state constitutionsin the 1770s, did not feel aproperly drafted constitutionwas in need of whatAlexander Hamilton, NewYork delegate to theConstitutional Convention,called ‘aphorisms … whichwouldsoundmuchbetterinatreatise of ethics than in aconstitutionofgovernment’.

Adeclarationofhumanrightswasahostage to fortune:butthat is precisely what theFrench citizens of 1789intended. Since ‘ignorance,neglect, or contempt ofhuman rights are the solecauses of public misfortunesand corruptions ofGovernment’, a statement ofthe ‘natural, imprescriptible,and unalienable rights …constantly present to themindsof themembersof the

body social’ would ensurethat ‘they may be ever keptattentive to their rights andtheirduties’. Itwouldofferayardstick against which allcitizens could measure thebehaviour of governments.Nor were these conceived ofsimply as French rights,although all French citizenswere to enjoy them. Liberty,property, security, andresistancetooppression;civilequality, the rule of law,

freedom of conscience andexpression; the sovereignauthority of nations and theanswerabilityofgovernmentstothecitizenry;alltheseweredeclaredhumanrights,andbyimplication applicableeverywhere. It is true thatwithin six years the Frenchhad redrafted this list twice,extending it and thenrestricting it. Napoleonabandoned it entirely in hissuccessive constitutions. But

every subsequentconstitution-maker has feltobliged tomake a principleddecisionaboutwhetherornotto incorporate such adeclaration;andallthosewhohavedonesohavegonebackatsomepointtotheprototypeof 1789. When in 1948 thefledgling United Nationsdecided to adopt a UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,thepreambleand14outofits30 articles were taken in

substance, and sometimes invery wording, from theDeclaration of 1789. Twofurther articles derived fromthe more ambitiousDeclarationof1793,andonefrom the more modestDeclaration of Rights andDutiesof1795.TheEuropeanConvention on HumanRights, adopted in1953,wasalsofulloftheprovisionsandlanguage of 1789. And,whereas France itself

declined to ratify theEuropean Convention until1973, by the time of thebicentenaryoftheRevolutionin 1989, President FrançoisMitterrand had ordained thatit shouldbecelebratedas theRevolution of the Rights ofMan.

Adisputedlegacy

It was a vain hope. TheBritish, as always, weredetermined to spoil France’sparty. Their royal familyrefused to attend anycelebration of a regiciderevolution.MargaretThatcherdeclared that the rights ofmanwereaBritishinvention,and gave Mitterrand alavishlyboundcopyofATaleof Two Cities. A Britishhistorianworking inAmericaproduced a vast chronicle of

the Revolution which arguedthat its very essence wasviolence and slaughter(Citizens,bySimonSchama).Itwasabestsellerinamarketwhere Burke, Carlyle,Dickens, and Orczy hadclearly not laboured in vain.But even within France thecelebrations proved bitterlycontentious. Although whenthe Rights ofManwere firstproclaimed, the terror laymore thanfouryears into the

future, and theguillotinehadnot even been invented, fewfounditeasytolookbackontheRevolutionasotherthanasingleandconsistentepisode,for good or ill. For the left,the terror had been cruelnecessity,made inevitablebythe determination of theenemies of liberty and therightsofmantostranglethemat birth. For the right, theRevolution had been violentfrom the start in its

commitment to destroyingrespect and reverence fororderand religion. Its logicalculmination, some argued,wasnotmerelyterror,but, inthe rebellious department ofthe Vendée, slaughteramountingtogenocide.ManyCatholic clergy, meanwhile,anathematized anycelebration of what hadbrought the first attack inhistory on religious practice,using language that had

scarcely changed in thecourse of two centuries.Mitterrand,however,enjoyedit all. The Revolution, hereflected with characteristicmalice, ‘is still feared,whichinclinesmerathertorejoice’.

A century, therefore, afterthoughts of the FrenchRevolution made LadyBracknell shudder, peoplewere still deeply divided

about what ‘that unfortunatemovement’ had led to.Everybody thought theyknew, and few otherhistorical episodes beyondlivingmemoryhaveremainedcapable of arousing suchpassionate admiration orloathing. That is because somany of the institutions,habits, attitudes, and reflexesofourown timescan still betraced towhatwe thinkwentwrong,orright, then.Greater

knowledge of what occurredwill not necessarily changeanybody’smind.Butitmightoffer a sounder basis forjudgement than the randomaccumulation of snippets andsnapshotswhichstill satisfiesmostpeople’scuriosityaboutthis crossroads of modernhistory.

Chapter2Whyithappened

Wecanscarcelydiscusswhyanything happens until wehaveabasicideaofwhatitis.Almostanyattempt todefinethe French Revolution too

closely, however, will betendentious, and excludemanyofitscomplexities.Yetwhat it most certainly wasnot,wasasingleevent.Itwasa series of developments,bewildering to mostcontemporaries, whichstretched over a number ofyears. It was a sustainedperiod of uncertainty,disorder, and conflict,reverberating far beyond theborders of France. It began

between1787and1789.

Financialoverstretch

The crisis was triggered byKingLouisXVI’sattemptstoavoid bankruptcy. Over theeighteenth century, Francehad fought three great warson a worldwide scale.Accustomed by the pride,

ambition, and achievementsofLouisXIV(1643–1715)toregarding herself as thegreatest European power,France found her pretensionschallenged over the threegenerations following thegreatking’sdeathby theriseof new powers – Russia,Prussia, and above all GreatBritain. Rivalry with theBritishwasfoughtoutontheoceansoftheworld.Atstakewasdominanceofthesources

andsupplyofthetropicalandoriental luxuries for whichEurope was developing aninsatiable appetite. Footholdsin India, staging posts toChina, fur-rich Canadianforests,tropicalislandswheresugar and coffee could beproduced, access to suppliesofslavestoworkthem:theseweretheprizesforwhichtheBritish and French foughtalmost uninterruptedlythroughout the 1740s and

1750s. But France also hadland frontiers and traditionalcontinental interests todefend, and in the mid-century wars Louis XV(1715–74) found his forcesoverextended on both landand sea. In the Seven YearsWar (1756–63) the resultswere disastrous. Despitealliances with Russia andeven the traditional enemyAustria, his armies werehumiliated by the upstart

Prussians.At sea, theBritishdestroyed both the Atlanticand Mediterranean fleets,drove French power out ofIndiaandNorthAmerica,andall but strangled the trade oftheFrenchCaribbean.At thepeaceofParis(1763),Francemade noEuropean gains andlost Canada and most of herestablishments in India. Notonly was the defeatcomprehensiveandshameful,thewaralsoleftthekingdom

burdenedwithacolossaldebtwhich there was littleprospect of diminishing,much less paying off.Servicing it absorbed 60 percentoftaxrevenues.Andyetalmost at once a fresh navalbuild-up began, and when inthe 1770s the colonists ofBritish North Americadeclared their independence,France saw the opportunityfor revenge on the tyrant ofthe seas. The prospect of

destroying the BritishEmpire, and the commercialrewards that would result,seemedwellwortharenewedeffort,andin1778LouisXVIwent to war to protect thefledgling United States. Thistime it was a spectacularsuccess. While continentalEurope remained at peace,Franceledacoalitionagainstthe isolated British whichbroke their control of theAtlanticlongenoughtoshipa

French army to America.When British forcessurrendered at Yorktown in1781, the victory was moreFrenchthanAmerican.

But France made noterritorial gains when peacewas signed in 1783, and theindependent Americans gaveno sign of abandoning theirtraditional British tradinglinks.Andmeanwhilethewar

had been paid for largely bynew loans rather thansignificant increases intaxation. In financial terms itendednotamomenttoosoon;but massive borrowing nowcontinued intopeacetime.By1786a foreseeabledecline intax revenues and thescheduled repayment ofshort-termwar loans broughtafinancialcrisis.

Itwasnot thatFrance lackedthe resources to survive as agreat power. Over the nextgeneration the French woulddominate the Europeancontinent more completelythan they had ever done. Itwasratherthatmanyoftheseresources were locked up bythesystemofgovernment,theorganization of society, andthe culture of whatrevolutionarieswouldsoonbecallingtheancienrégime,the

old or former order. It tookthe Revolution to releasethem.

The ancien régime:government

In political terms pre-revolutionary France was anabsolutemonarchy.The kingshared his power with

nobody, and was answerableforitsexercisetonobodybutGod. Affairs of state,including the finances, werehisprivatedomain;andinallthingshewassovereigninthesense that his decisionswerefinal. On the other hand, noking was, or sought to be, acompletely free agent. EvenLouisXIVwascarefultotakeadvice on all importantdecisions,andmenborntobeking(forqueensregnantwere

prohibited by French law)were carefully taught thatcounselwasoftheessenceoftheir sovereign authority.Louis XVI believed thisimplicitly; but unlike hisgrandfather Louis XV (hisown father had died beforeinheriting the throne) he didnot invariably do what amajority of his ministersrecommended. Heparticularly thought heunderstoodfinance–afateful

delusionasitproved.

Nor was the king unfetteredin his choice of advisers.Althoughhecouldsackthemwithout explanation, hispractical choice was limitedto career administrators,magistrates, and courtiers.They, in turn, could only bebrought to his notice by theintrigues of other ministersand familiars of both sexes

drawn from the ranks orclientelesof the fewhundredfamiliesrichenoughtoliveinthe gilded splendour of theCourt.Imprisonedinscarcelychangingroutinesofetiquetteestablished in the previouscentury by Louis XIV, histwo successors passed theirlives peripatetically,following the hunting aroundforestpalacesoutsideParis–Fontainebleau, Compiègne,andofcourseVersailles, that

spectacular seat of powerimitated by rulers throughoutEurope. When they visitedthe capital, it was briefly.Louis XIV had establishedthis royal lifestyledeliberately to distancehimself from a turbulent andvolatile city whose peoplehad defied royal authorityduring his minority in theuprisingoftheFronde(1648–53). For their part, theParisiansremainedsuspicious

and contemptuous of theCourt. In 1789 many stillremembered how, whencelebrations in the capital tomark the future Louis XVI’smarriage to the Austrianprincess Marie-Antoinette in1770hadledtoastampedeinwhich 132 people weretrampled to death, thefestivities at Versailles hadgone on regardless.Symbolizing the ill-starredalliance with the old enemy,

the frivolous Marie-Antoinette never achievedpopularity, even when, in1781, she belatedly boreLouis XVI an heir. Herextravagance was soproverbial that even whenrumoursof itweredisproved(as with her supposed secretpurchase of a sumptuousdiamond necklace in 1786)they were still believed.Unlike his raddled oldgrandfather,LouisXVIwasa

chastefamilymanwhonevertook a mistress. But thisthrew the public spotlightontohisunpopularwifeevenmoreglaringly.

Theking’s absolute authorityover thecountryat largewasembodied in a handful ofomnicompetent executiveagents,theintendants.Oneofthesewasassignedtoeachof36 generalities into which

Louis XVI’s kingdom wasdivided. The king thoughtthem the showcase of hisgovernment,andtherewasnodoubt about their high levelof professionalism. But theywere increasingly unpopularfor their authoritarian ways,and their shortcomings andmistakes were mercilesslydenounced by bodies whoseauthority they had largelysupplanted since theseventeenthcentury.Taxation

in some large provinces, forinstance, still required theconsent of estates –representative,thoughseldomelected, assemblies with noultimate powers to resist, butwhose semblance ofindependence enabled themto borrow relatively cheaplyon the king’s behalf. Aboveall, the fiscal andadministrative work of theintendants was constantlyimpededbythecourtsoflaw,

most of which hadadministrative as well asjudicial functions. At thesummit of the judicialhierarchy sat the 13parlements, supreme or‘sovereign’ courts of appealwhere registration wasrequired for all importantroyal legislation before itbecame operative. Beforeregistering, the parlementshad the power to send theking remonstrances pointing

outflawsordrawbacksinthenew laws. Increasingly overthe eighteenth century,remonstrances were printedand published, exposing theprinciples of monarchicalgovernment to public debatein a country where overtpolitical discussion wasdeemednoneof thesubject’sbusiness.Intheend, thekingcould override such protests,but the procedure, whichinvolved the monarch or his

representative coming to acourt in person andsupervising the transcriptionof contested measures intothe judicial registers, waslaborious and spectacular. Itunderlined the magistrates’recalcitrance as much as theking’sauthority.

As in every aspect of theancien régime, the judicialand institutional map of

France had no uniformity.Some of the parlementspresidedoversmallenclaves,others over extensiveprovinces.Thejurisdictionofthe parlement of Pariscovered a third of thekingdom.Butallof the1250members of these courtsowned the offices theyoccupied, as a result of thepracticeofvenality.Sincethesixteenth century kings hadsystematically sold public

offices,alongwithhereditarytenure or free disposal, as away of borrowing for littleoutlay. By the eighteenthcentury there were perhaps70,000 venal officesstretching far beyond thejudiciary, but the prestigiouscore of the system was the3200-strong nobility of therobe, whose judicial officesconferred ennoblement.Mostprestigiousamong themwerethe magistrates of the

parlements, and becausedismissing them would haveentailed reimbursing thevalue of their offices, theyenjoyed virtuallyunchallengeable tenure. Theking could bully them byshows of force, but withoutthe money to buy them out,hecouldnotdispossessthem.

Accordingly, throughout theeighteenth century they were

able to keep up a growingvolume of criticism andobstruction against thecrown’s religious andfinancial policies. Only in1771 did Louis XV’sministersfeelabletopromiseany compensation forsuppressed offices, and thenthe parlements wereruthlessly remodelled andmuzzled.Anopportunitywascreated for unobstructedreform, but Maupeou, the

chancellor responsible, hadno serious reformingintentions, and no advantagewas taken. Meanwhile hisattack on the parlements,which had increasingly cometobeseenasthevoiceoftheking’sunrepresentedsubjects,proved hugely unpopular.Anxioustobeginhisreigninan atmosphere of confidenceand popularity, the youngLouis XVIwas persuaded todismissMaupeou and restore

them.

In the short run it worked.Although some provincialparlements remainedfractious,andobstructedtheirlocal intendant more thanever, the crucially importantparlement of Paris provedfairlypliableforthebestpartof a dozen years. It was,however, at the cost of theking attempting nothing too

radical. Innovationwas seen,and accepted even by mostministers,asdangerous.‘Anysystem’, declared theparlement in remonstrancesof 1776 against thereplacement of forced labourontheroadswithatax,

tending under the guiseof humanity andbenevolence to establishan equality of duties

between men, and todestroy thosedistinctions necessary ina well-orderedmonarchy, would soonlead to disorder … Theresult would be theoverthrow of civilsociety, the harmony ofwhichismaintainedonlyby that hierarchy ofpowers, authorities,preeminences anddistinctionswhichkeeps

each man in his placeand keeps all Estatesfrom confusion. Thissocial order is not onlyessential to the practiceof every soundgovernment: it has itsoriginindivinelaw.Theinfinite and immutablewisdom in the plan ofthe universe establishedan unequal distributionof strength andcharacter, necessarily

resulting in inequality inthe conditions of menwithin thecivilorder…These institutions werenot formed by chance,and time cannot changethem. To abolish them,the whole Frenchconstitution would havetobeoverturned.

The ancien régime:

society

Yet itwashard to seehowaFrenchkingcouldkeepuphisinternational pretensionswithoutsomemodification inhis subjects’ time-honouredprivileges and inequalities.Nowhere was the kingdom’slack of uniformity moreglaring than in the structureof privilege and exemption

which gave each and everyinstitution, group, or area astatusnotquitelikeanyother.The kingdom had been builtup overmany centuries by agradual and often haphazardprocess of conquest anddynastic accumulation, andsuccessivekingshadwontheobedience of their newsubjects more by confirmingtheir distinct institutions thanby imposing a preferredpattern of their own. Ever

since the sixteenth centurythese confusions had beencompounded by the practiceof selling privileges andexemptions (usually but notalways as part of the sale ofoffices) as a roundaboutwayofborrowing.Inearliertimesitwaseasiertodothantryingtoforcetherichtopaytaxes.Themostpowerfulgroups insociety, in any case, hadelaborated persuasiverationalesforexemption.The

clergy, a vast corporationdrawing revenues from atenth of the kingdom’s land,andcreamingoff,intheformof tithes, a notional tenth ofthe yield of the rest, paid nodirect taxes on the groundsthatitperformeditsservicetosociety by praying andinterceding with God. Thenobility,thesocialelitewhichowned over a quarter of theland, levied feudal dues overmuchoftherest,andsteadily

suckedmostofthenewlyrichinto its ranks via ennoblingoffices, resisted the paymentof direct taxes as well.Nobles, the argument went,servedthekingdomwiththeirblood, by fighting to defendit. Many did (though asofficersonly),butmanymorenever drew the swords theywore to demonstrate theirstatus. In any case theseancient arguments failed tokeep the nobility exempt

from new direct taxesintroduced in and after 1695.Nevertheless, in mostprovinces, nobles continuedto escape the oldest basicdirect tax, the taille, not tomention forced labouron theroads.Itwaseasyenoughforrich commoners to buythemselves exemption aswell, even if an ennoblingoffice was beyond theirmeans; simply moving toanother town or province

might be enough to securereal fiscal advantages. Theburden of taxation, in otherwords, felldisproportionatelyonthoseleastabletopay.Tooneextentoranother,therichwere able to avoid it. It wastheboastoftheking’srichestsubject, his cousin the Duked’Orléans, that he paid whatheliked.

In real terms the total tax

burden borne by the Frenchhadfallenovertheeighteenthcentury. Yet whatever theypaid they all consideredthemselves over-taxed. Thatwas one reason why theresistance of the parlements,even though theirmagistrateswere all nobles andrepresented nobody butthemselves, was so popular.Even they recognized,however, that someemergencies necessitated

higher taxes, and theyacquiescedinanewlevyofatwentieth on income fromrealestatein1749.Theyevenagreedtoitsdoublingin1756and tripling in 1760. But thethird twentieth lapsed whenthe Seven YearsWar ended,and meanwhile all sorts ofprovincial and institutionalabatements had beennegotiated, notably with theclergy and provincesretaining estates. Once

assessmentswereestablished,the parlements alwaysresisted their revision, eventhough this was an age ofsteady inflation. Theirscepticismabouttheneedforfiscal reform was onlyconfirmed in the late 1770swhen the American war waslaunched and sustained forfour years without anysubstantialnewtaxation.ThiswastheworkoftheGenevanbanker Jacques Necker, who

claimed tohaveachieved theincredible feat by‘economies’attheexpenseofcourtiers and venalgovernment financiers, twogroupstraditionallysuspectedof milking the public purse.But the purpose of suchostentatious savings was notto pay directly for the war,but to boost French credit inthe international moneymarket so as to sustainborrowing.Necker trumpeted

his success in 1781 bypublishing the first everpublic statement of the royalaccounts, the Compte renduau roi. It showed the king’s‘ordinary’accountsinmodestsurplus. It was what thepublic wanted to hear, andfew cared that the massive‘extraordinary’ expenditure,covered by loans raised onthe credit of the ordinarysurplus, went unmentioned.The longer termconsequence

wastoundermineallattemptsby Necker’s successors toimprove the kingdom’s taxyield,especiallyoncethewarwasover.Ifallhadbeenwellin 1781, people later asked,what had gone wrong since,andwhowasresponsible?

Necker had been brought inmore as a credit consultantthan as a minister. As aforeign-born Protestant, in

fact,hewaslegallyineligibleforpublicofficeinakingdomwhere Protestantism had notbeen recognized since 1685.But he soon learned that hecould not impose financialdiscipline on ministerswithout the regular directaccesstothekingwhichtheiroffice gave them. When heattempted to use hispopularitytoforcethekingtoadmit him to his innermostcounsels, however, Necker

was rebuffed, and resigned.The gesture wasunprecedented: one did notresignon thekingofFrance.Nor had previous ex-ministers behaved as Neckernow did, continuing topublish on financial affairsand orchestrating publiccriticismofthepoliciesofhissuccessors.Whatthisoutsiderto the habits of absolutemonarchy had grasped wasthat,inpoliticalasmuchasin

financial affairs, publicopinion,orwhatgovernmentstook it to be, was of ever-increasing importance; andthat without publicconfidenceeven,andperhapsespecially, the most absoluterulercouldachieveverylittle.

Publicopinion

Theconstraintswereobviousin innumerable ways. If, forinstance, the whole financialhistory of the monarchybetween1720and1788wasastruggle to avoidbankruptcy,that was because renouncingdebts,whichearlierkingshaddonealmostroutinely,wasnolonger accepted as alegitimate option. Thousandshad been ruined by a greatfinancialcrashin1720,whenanother Protestant outsider,

the Scotsman John Law, hadattempted to liquidate thefinancial legacy of LouisXIV’swars by absorbing theaccumulated debt into thecapital of a commercial‘RoyalBank’.Thecollapseofthisexperimentalsoproducedanenduringmistrustofbanksand paper money despite allthey had done in Holland orGreat Britain to sustain anunprecedented war effortagainst France. For

subsequent generations, anyexpedient which stirred suchpainful memories wasgenerally regarded asunthinkable.

Kings who renounced theirdebts, or paid them inprecarious paper rather thanclinking coinage, were seenas conjuring irresponsiblywith their subjects’ property,behaving arbitrarily; whereas

inFrenchlegaltraditionroyalauthority was expected toobserve the law, proceed byadvice, and respect the rightsandprivilegesofthosewhomGodhadentrusted to its careand protection. In theeighteenth century theseexpectations were reinforcedby thewidespreadconvictionthat since nature herself (asIsaac Newton had shown)worked by invariable lawsandnotdivinecaprice,human

affairs should also beconducted so far as waspossible according to fixedandregularprinciples, rootedin rationality, in which thescope for arbitrariness wasreduced to a minimum.Anything else,when a singleindividual governed, wasdespotism; which the mostinfluential political writer ofthecentury,Montesquieuhadtaught his compatriots toregard as the worst of all

governments, where no lawprotectedthesubjectfromtheruler’swhims.Sothatwhenaseries of draconian debtconsolidationsin1770,whichmany saw as a partialbankruptcy,was followed byMaupeou’s attack on theparlements, despotismappeared to have struck.Traditional intermediarybuffers between ruler andsubjecthadbeensweptaside.And despite Louis XVI’s

restoration of the oldparlements upon hissuccession, instinctiveconfidence in the traditionalconstitutional structure couldneverbefullyrevived.

Yet although the public sawno need for either highertaxes or bankruptcy, only agovernment strong andconfident enough to attempteitherwaslikelytobeableto

carry other reforms that hadwidespread support. Thejudiciary, for example, wasperceived to be overstaffed,underemployed, and itsprocedures slow, expensive,and unreliable. A series ofmiscarriages of criminaljustice exposed the crueltiesand caprices of a systemwhere magistrates wererecruited by heredity orpurchase rather than rationaltests of competence. The

labyrinthine complexities ofthe law, where attempts atcodification had petered outin the 1670s, were sustainedby innumerable local andprovincial customs andprivileges, many of themrepeatedly confirmed inreturnforcashpaymentsoverthe centuries. To reform anyof thiswithout compensatingthe losers would be widelyseen as a breach of publicfaith, bankruptcy in disguise;

but there was no prospect ofever finding the money toachieveitotherwise.

More thoughtful observersbelieved there were ways tosquare some circles. Ifeconomic productivity couldbe improved, fiscal benefitswould be almost automatic.The Physiocrats orEconomists (the first peopletouse thisname)argued that

all true wealth derived fromagriculture, and that the landwould produce more ifnatural lawswereunimpededby artificial humanconstraints. That implied taxreform – the abolition ofburdensome charges likefeudalduesincashorkind,ortithes. It also meantcommercial liberalization –the removal of controls onprices and free exchange,particularlyinthegraintrade.

In comparison withagriculture, industry andcommercewereheldbythesethinkers to be less important,and not generators of truewealth: but here too naturalactivity was impeded byover-regulation, theconstraints imposed by tradeguilds, and commercialmonopolies. Administratorsat every level found suchreforming ideas increasinglyattractive after mid-century;

but as soon as they began toexperiment with them theymet with endless difficulties.Governments could notcontemplate even thetemporary loss of revenue,not to mention likelyopposition from courts,estates,andvariouscorporatebodies, which introducing asingle tax would entail.Similarly with feudal dues:these were property rights,whichcouldnotbeabolished

equitably withoutcompensation. A bookadvocating their suppressionwaspubliclyburnedbyorderof the Paris parlement in1776. As to the tithe, it wasthemainsourceofincomeofthe parish clergy. Wherewould a substitute comefrom? The merest hint ofcommercial and industrialderegulation,meanwhile,wasvigorously opposed by well-organized lobbies of

merchants, chambers ofcommerce,andguildmasters.Only in 1786was tradewithoverseas colonies madecompletelyfreeandopen,andan attempt to abolish themonopolies of Parisian tradeguilds ten years earlier wasabandoned after only a fewmonths of chaos. The onlypeople, in fact,whocouldbesubjected to the full force ofPhysiocratic policies werethose too weak to resist: the

king’spoorest subjects.Theyborethebruntofexperimentsfrom the 1760s onwards toderegulate the grain trade.Theideawastoletpricesriseto a ‘natural’ level. Highprices, so the theory went,would encourage growers toincrease production, and theend result would be‘abundance’. In the shortterm, however, higher grainprices meant dearer bread,especially when harvests

were poor. The firstexperiments withderegulation, between 1763and 1775, coincided with aseries of such shortfalls; andas magistrates and localauthorities had warned fromthe start, public order brokedown as prices shot up andmarkets were bare. Whenministers made agreementswith contractors to guaranteeemergency supplies, theywere accused of a ‘famine

pact’ to starve the people. IntheweeksbeforeLouisXVI’scoronation in May 1775,popular goodwill wassquandered by renewedderegulation and severerepression of the ‘flour war’grain riots which followed.And although Necker,sniffingpopularityasalways,kept the trade firmly undercontrol, his successorsresumed tinkering. When, in1788, the harvest failed

completely, free export inprevious years had denudedthe kingdom of stocks. Andthe confidence of ordinarypeople that the king wouldprotect them from starvationhad been completely erodedby a generation of economicexperimentsattheirexpense.

Nor did they any longerexpect much comfort fromGod’sservantsintheChurch.

While there was plenty ofrespect for underpaid parishpriests and the selfless nunswho staffed hospitals andpoorhouses, there waswidespread disgust at thegrotesque maldistribution oftheChurch’swealth, and thedetermination with which itsricher beneficiaries defendedtheir privileges. In mid-century the hierarchy hadsquandered much popularrespect by zealous

persecution of dissidentpriests who questionedauthorityintheChurchinthename of Jansenism, anaustere set of beliefscondemned as heretical bythe papal bull Unigenitus of1713. Jansenists wereprotected by sympathizers intheparlementofParis,andinthe 1740s and 1750s a seriesof lawsuits against priestsrefusingthelastritestodyingJansenists stirred up

widespread fury against thehierarchy. When in 1757Louis XV was (harmlessly)stabbed, his half-crazedassailant seemed to haveacted out of vague sympathyforJansenisttribulations.AndJansenism appeared totriumphinthe1760swhenitsoldest and most inveterateenemies, the Jesuits, foundthemselvesinvolvedinacasebefore the parlement. Themagistrates used it as a

pretext to expel them fromthecourt’sjurisdiction.Otherparlementsfollowedthelead,and a divided governmentacquiesced. The expulsionfromthekingdomofasocietywhich had educated most ofthe social elite for threecenturies caused enormouseducational upheaval. Withthe closure of their 106colleges, something like anational curriculum wasdissolved,andagenerationof

educational debate andexperiment began. Almost atthe same moment theestablishment of acommission to review andconsolidate failingmonasteries suggested thateven wider reform in theChurchmightbepossible.

Educatedcriticshadcertainlybeen calling for it ever sincethe1720s,whenthescientific

and humanistic developmentofthepreviouscenturybeganto crystallize into theutilitarian movement ofcriticism that came to beknown as theEnlightenment.For the self-styled‘philosophers’whosetout topopularize enlightenedvalues, the establishedChurchwas the root ofmostof the evils in society.WhilethebenevolentmessageoftheGospel was never disputed,

clerics down the ages weredeemed to have overlaid itwith a mass of superstitionand irrationality which theyperpetuated through theirinfluence in the state andcontrol of the educationalsystem. Happy to promotecruelty and intolerance, theyhadamasseddisproportionateriches to support the idlenessof unproductive monks andspendthrift chapters andprelates. Even the social

services provided by theChurch, such as poor reliefand hospital care, wereirrationally funded andinefficientlyorganized.Thesecharges were pressed homewith innuendo and ridicule,for which the mid-centuryquarrels within the Churchprovided plenty of material.TheChurch’sresponsewastocall for ever more vigorousandvigilantcensorship,whileattempting to reduce its own

vulnerability by internalreformssuchastheactiononredundant monasteries. Butneither approach restoredconfidence in an institutionwhose basic inertia,inflexibility, and self-satisfaction had alienatedsympathy, in different ways,ateverylevelofsociety.

Inonesense,theChurchwasa victim of its own success.

Nothing had donemore overthecenturythantheeffortsofdedicated clerical teachers toincrease levels of literacyfrom around a fifth of thepopulation to nearer a third.More readers produced arising demand for printedmaterials of all kinds. Bookproductionsoared;sodidthatof more ephemeral materiallike chapbooks, legal briefssold for public consumption,and newspapers. By Louis

XVI’stime,Parishadadailypaper and most provincialtownshadweeklies.Itistruethat they were mainlyadvertising sheets, and whenthey printed news it waslargelywithoutcomment.Butserious interest in publicaffairscouldbegratifiedbyaflourishing French-languagepress published abroad; andthe cost of regular readingcould be spread by joiningone of the rapidly

proliferating literary orreading societies whoselibraries subscribed to all themajor periodicals. Anotherindication of expandingdemand for the printed wordwasthegrowthinthenumberof government censors towhomallsubstantialwritingsfor the public had to besubmitted; and the increasingamount of time and energydevoted by customs officialsto blocking imports of

subversive pornographic,blasphemous, or, as it wasincreasingly called,‘philosophical’ literature.Afteraperiodinmid-centurywhen ministers despaired ofstemming the flood, andturnedablindeye tomostofit, under Louis XVI thegovernment redoubled itsefforts to control whatreached the reading public.But the market was toostrong, and as much effort

was soon being devoted toinfluencing what wasreported and discussed as topreventing its appearance.Louis XIV had told hissubjectswhattodo,andwhattothink.UnderLouisXVI,itwas recognized that theyhadtobepersuaded.

The virtues of activecooperation between kingsand their subjects had long

been displayed across theChannel. Ever since the1720s writers likeMontesquieu and Voltairehad extolled the enablingfreedoms of British liberty,toleration, and parliamentarygovernment. British successin mid-century wars hadshown that the system, stillsuspect to many for itsdangerousvolatility,wasalsoformidablyefficient.Someofthe glosswas taken from the

image of Great Britain whenher colonies rebelled, andAnglomania was partiallyeclipsedbyenthusiasmforallthings American. But libertyand political representationwere at the heart of theAnglo-Americanquarrel; andwhen Louis XVI allied withrepublican rebels who hadproclaimed no taxationwithout representation, hissubjects could scarcely helpreflecting on why this

principle was not deemedappropriate in France. In thehandful of provinces withestates,ofcourse, itwas;butthat made the situationelsewhere seem even moreanomalous. As fiscalpressures increased, certainmagistrates in the 1760sbegan to call for lost estatesto be restored. WhenMaupeou attacked theparlements in 1771, somewent further and called for a

meetingofthenearestFrenchequivalent to the Britishparliament, the medievalEstates-General, lastconvened in 1614. Others,with the comfortableambiguities of absolutemonarchy now exposed asempty, began to think ofmore rationally designedrepresentativeinstitutionsthatwould visibly involvetaxpayers in administration.Nor were ministers

necessarily opposed to aprinciple which mightsideline the parlements andtheir influence. Necker evenbegan a programme ofintroducing ‘provincialadministrations’, nominatedassemblies of locallandownerswhowould sharethe functions of intendants.Only two were establishedbefore his resignation, butthey did not disappear withhim. Slowly, hesitantly, with

many misgivings but awarethat institutional paralysiswas the only alternative, themonarchywasbecoming lessabsolute under Louis XVI.The king and his ministersincreasingly recognized thatFrance must be governedwiththeeffectiveconsentandcooperation of the crown’smostprominentandeducatedsubjects.

The‘Pre-Revolution’

Sothecrisisof1787wasnotjust financial. Calonne, thefinanceminister appointed in1783 to manage a return topeacetime conditions, beganwith lavish expenditures inthe hope of sustainingconfidence. The borrowingwhich this required achievedjust the reverse. As attempts

to float new loans ran intoincreasing resistance in theParis parlement, Calonneturned his thoughts to moreradical solutions. On 20August1786hepresentedtheking with a comprehensiveplan of reform, laterdescribed by the courtierbishopTalleyrandas‘moreorlesstheresultofallthatgoodmindshavebeenthinkingforseveralyears’.Theking,afterconsidering it carefully,

accepted it with genuineenthusiasm.

The planwas threefold. Firstcame fiscal reform, in theguiseof anew,uniform landtax,withnoexemptions,tobeleviedinkind.This,andotherless important innovations,were to be overseenthroughout the kingdom byprovincial assemblies electedbyallprominent landowners.

Representative governmentwas to be universalized –though not centralized in anational assembly. Secondly,thefiscalyieldofthereformswas to be boosted by aprogramme of economicstimulation on Physiocraticlines: abolition of internalcustoms barriers, of forcedlabour on the roads, and ofcontrols over the grain trade.In 1786, a commercialagreementwithGreatBritain

had already opened Frenchmarkets to Britishmanufacturers in exchangefor agricultural products.None of these measures,however, could be expectedto yield immediate benefits.More borrowing would berequireduntiltheeffectswerefelt. A major new boost inconfidence was thereforerequired to encouragelenders. Calonne hoped toachieve this by having his

plans endorsed by ahandpicked Assembly ofNotables,people(asheputit)‘of weight, worthy of thepublic’s confidence and suchthat their approbation wouldpowerfully influence generalopinion’. He consideredconvoking the Estates-General, but thought themlikely to be uncontrollable.Instead he nominated 144princes, prelates, noblemen,andmagistrates,beforewhom

he laid his proposals inFebruary1787.

It was a political disaster.FewoftheNotablesacceptedCalonne’s version of thecrisis confronting the state.Eventhosewhodidtendedtohold him responsible, andthereforenot therightpersonto resolve it. An attempt byCalonne to appeal over hiscritics’ heads to the wider

public, by depicting them asmere selfish defenders oftheir own privileges,backfired; and the king wasforced to dismiss him. Anamended version of his planwas then brought forward byBrienne, an archbishop whohad used the Notables as aladder to power. It gotnowhere when Louis XVIrefused the Notables’proposal for a permanentcommissionofauditorstovet

the royal accounts. By now,in fact, growing numbers inthe assembly were declaringthemselves incompetent tosanction reform of any sort.That, they declared, requirednothing less than theEstates-General.

Experiencewith theNotablesonly made this seem moredangerous and unpredictablethanever,andon25Maythe

assembly was dissolved. Anattempt was now made topush the reforms through theparlements, but they tooclaimed incompetence. Ascrowds came onto the streetsto cheer for the Estates-General, the Parisianmagistrates were sent intoexile. Thewider significanceof the crisis was underlinedmeanwhile in the DutchRepublic,whichwasoverrunby a Prussian invasion in

mid-September. Louis XVIhadthreatenedtointerveneifDutch territory was violated;but,witholdtaxationrunningout and new unauthorized,Brienne advised him that hecouldnotaffordto.ItwastheendoftheBourbonmonarchyas a military power; anadmission that, even close toits own frontiers, it could nolonger pay for itsinternationalpretensions.

Within a year its domesticpolitical authority had alsoevaporated. Attempts toengineer a consensual reformplanwiththeParisparlementcollapsed amid suspiciousrecriminations, and for sixmonths the sovereign courtsrefused to transact business.InMay1788,aMaupeou-likeattemptwasmadetoremodelthemandreducetheirpowers.Towinpublicsupportawiderange of legal and

institutional reforms weresimultaneously announced,but they were ignored in thepublicuproar thatnowsweptthe country. Even a promiseto convoke the Estates-Generaloncethereformshadtakeneffectwasgreetedwithcontempt. And when, at thebeginning of August, thecrown’s usual sources ofshort-term credit refused tolend more, the fate ofBrienne’s ministry was

sealed. On 16 August,payments from the treasurywere suspended. It was thebankruptcy which successiveministrieshad spent30yearstrying to avoid. Brienneresigned, recommending therecall of Necker. The firstthing the Genevan miracle-workerdidonhis triumphantreturn to office was toproclaim that the Estates-Generalwouldmeetin1789.

Theconvocationofanationalrepresentative assemblymeant the end of absolutemonarchy. It had finallysuccumbed to institutionaland cultural paralysis. Itsplans for reform fell with it.Nobody knew what theEstates-Generalwould do, oreven how it would be madeup or chosen. There was acomplete vacuum of power.The French Revolution wasthe process by which this

vacuumwasfilled.

Chapter3Howithappened

A month before monarchicalauthority collapsed intobankruptcy, a colossalhailstorm swept acrossnorthern France and

destroyed most of theripening harvest. Withreserves already low afterCalonne had authorized freeexport of grain in 1787, theinevitable result was that themonths before the harvest of1789 would bring severeeconomic difficulties. Breadprices would rise, and asconsumers spent more oftheir incomes on food,demand for other goodswould fall.Manufactures, hit

by cheaper Britishcompetition under thecommercial treaty of 1786,were already slumping; andtherewerewidespreadlayoffsat the very time when breadprices began to soar. On topof all this cameanunusuallycold winter, when riversfroze,immobilizingmillsandbulk transport and producingwidespread flooding when athaw finally came. So thepoliticalstormthatwasabout

to break would take placeagainst a background ofeconomic crisis, and wouldbeprofoundlyaffectedbyit.

Electoralpolitics

Necker moved quickly onreturning to office toreimpose controls on thegrain trade. It was too late,

but thegestureonlyadded tohis phenomenal popularity.He needed it all to dealwithother problems. The mostpressing was the form to betakenby theEstates-General.OneofBrienne’slastactshadbeen to declare that the kinghad no fixed view on thequestion.TotheparlementofParis this seemed to imply adesire to rig the assembly inadvance; and to prevent anysuch move the magistrates

declared on 25 Septemberthat the Estates-Generalshould be constituted in thesame way as when they hadlast met, according to theforms of 1614. Well-informed observers realizedatonce that thiswasa recipefor prolonging theinstitutional paralysis whichhad brought down absolutemonarchy. In 1614, theEstates-General had sat inthree separate orders,

representing clergy, nobility,andthethirdestate–meaningeverybody else. They hadvoted by order, so any twocouldoutvote a third.Suchadistribution of powers andrepresentation no longerreflected the realities ofeducation, wealth, andproperty as they haddevelopedovertheeighteenthcentury; and a thoughtfulgroup of Parisians, mostlynoblemen, set out in a so-

called‘committeeofthirty’toarousepublicopinionagainstit. They flooded the excitedcountry with pamphlets, andtheir efforts were only lentstrength when a reconvenedAssembly of NotablesrejectedNecker’surgingsandrallied behind the forms of1614. The Notables’ cautionlooked,orwasmade to look,like a bid for power by theold ‘privileged orders’ at theexpense of the vast majority

of the nation. For the firsttime since the beginning ofthecrisisin1787,thepoliticsofsocialantagonismbegantodominate public debate.‘What is the Third Estate?’asked the title of the mostcelebrated pamphlet of thatwinter, by the renegadeclergyman Sieyès,‘Everything.Whathasitbeenuntilnowinthepublicorder?Nothing.Whatdoesitwanttobe? Something.’ Anyone

laying claim to any sort ofprivilege, Sieyès went on toargue, excluded themselvesby that very fact from thenational community.Privilegeswereacancer.

By December the clamouragainsttheformsof1614wasso well established thatNecker felt emboldened toact. He decreed that, inrecognitionoftheirweightin

the nation, the number ofthird-estatedeputieswouldbedoubled. It was obvious thatthismeantlittleifvotingwasstilltobebyorderratherthanbyhead,butNeckerbelievedthat the clergy and nobilitycouldbeinducedtorenouncethe privilege for themselvesoncetheEstates-Generalmet.He relied on generaldissatisfaction with the half-measureofdoublingthethirdto dominate the elections of

the spring of 1789 to such adegree that resistance touniting the orders wouldbecomeunthinkable.Votebyhead was indeed one of thecentral preoccupations of theelectoral assemblies; butsince they toowere separate,with each order electing itsown deputies, the effect wasto polarize matters stillfurther. In the face oftumultuous popular supportfor third-estate aspirations,

clerical and noble electorstended to see their privilegesas an essential safeguard oftheir identity; and most ofthose they elected torepresent them wereintransigents. Opinion wascrystallized further on allsides by the process ofdrafting cahiers (grievancelists which were also part ofthe forms of 1614) to guidethe deputies chosen. Nowemerged questions not only

ofhowtheestatesweretobeconstituted, but of what theywere actually to do. Anamazing range of grievancesand aspirations werearticulated inwhat amountedtothefirstpublicopinionpollof modern times. Suddenlychanges seemedpossible thatonlyafewmonthsearlierhadbeenthestuffofdreams;andthe tone of the cahiersmadeclear that many electorsactually expected them to

happenthroughtheagencyoftheEstates-General.

Nationalsovereignty

ButwhentheEstates-Generalmet at Versailles on 5 Maythey proved a massivedisappointment. Neckeropened proceedings with aboring speech, and from the

start the third-estate deputiesmade clear that they wouldtransact no business as aseparate order. Their calls tothe nobility and clergy tounitewiththem,however,fellon deaf ears. Even the smallnumber of noble deputieswho favoured deliberationand voting in commonrefused to break ranks. Thestalemate continued for sixweeks, during which breadprices continued to rise,

public order began to breakdown in many districts, andthe widespread hopes of thespring began to turn sour.Eventually, on 10 June,Sieyèsproposedthatthethirdestate ‘cut the cable’ andbegin proceedingsunilaterally. After anoverwhelmingvoteinfavour,they invited the other ordersto verify credentials incommon,andthreedayslatera handful of parish priests

broke the solidarity of theprivileged orders to answerthe invitation. Other clergytrickled in over the next fewdays,andabodythatwasnolonger just representative ofthe third estate recognizedthat it now needed a newname. Once again at Sieyès’instigation, on 17 June itchose an obvious butuncompromising title: theNational Assembly.Immediately afterwards it

decreed the cancellation andthen reauthorization of alltaxes. The implication wasclear. This assembly hadseizedsovereignpowerinthenameoftheFrenchNation.

ItwasthefoundingactoftheFrench Revolution. If theNation was sovereign, theking no longer was. LouisXVI, shaking off the griefwhich had paralysed him

since the death of his elderson a few days before, nowdeclaredthathewouldholdaRoyal Session to promulgatea programme of his own.Locked out of its usualmeetingplacebypreparationsfor this, the suspicious self-proclaimed NationalAssembly convened on 20Juneinanindoortenniscourtand took an emotional oathnever to separate until theyhad given France a

constitution. The first test ofthedeputies’ resolutioncamethree days later at the RoyalSession when the king, afterannouncing a number ofconcessions, quashed all theclaimsmade between 10 and17 June, and instructed theorders to reconveneseparately.Theyrefused;and,flusteredbynewsthatNeckerhad resigned, the king letthemstay.BynowVersailleswas filled daily with restive

crowds from Paris. Awarethattheycouldnolongerrelyon support from the throne,noble and clerical separatistsfound their solidaritycrumbling. Soon they werejoining the NationalAssembly in droves, and on27 June the king formallyorderedthelastdiehardstodoso. Necker withdrew hisresignation. The royalsurrenderseemedcomplete.

Unknown to Necker,however, andperhaps at firstto the king himself,ministerial orders had beenissued on 26 June to certainregiments to converge onVersailles. More wereordered up in the weeks thatfollowed, and by early Julythe nervous Assembly wasimportuning the king towithdraw the troops. Hereplied, plausibly enough,that their presence was

necessary to secure publicorder; but when on 12 JulyNecker was dismissed moresinister suspicions seemedborne out. The 20,000soldiers now encampedaround the Île de Franceappeared poised to overawethe capital while action wastaken to subdue theAssembly. On hearing thenews about Necker, Parisexploded with a mixture offear and indignation.

Tentative moves by Germanmercenary troops to dispersecrowds only made thingsworse, and members of thepermanent Paris garrison ofFrench Guards began todesert.Soonbandsofhungryinsurgents were ransackingstrongpoints in the city forarms, powder, and hoards offlour. On 14 July theyconverged on the massivestate prison of the Bastille,which commanded the entire

east end of the city with itsguns. With the help ofmilitary deserters, theystormedtheprisonandforcedits surrender, massacring thecommanderwhohadfiredonthemearlyintheattack.Pariswas now in rebel hands.There were certainly enoughtroopssurroundingthecitytosubdue the revolt, butcommandersadvisedthekingthat they might not obeyorders to shoot. In these

circumstances he waspowerless, and ordered awithdrawal. A counter-revolutionhadbeendefeated.The National Assembly hadbeensaved.

4. 20 June 1789: TheTennisCourt Oath. The NationalAssembly vows never to

disperse until it has givenFranceaconstitution.

Thefirstreforms

The 14 July was not,therefore, the beginning oftheFrenchRevolution.Itwastheendofthebeginning.Nor

did the opening of the grimand mysterious Bastillerelease the expected host oflanguishing victims ofdespotism. There were onlyseven prisoners. But themedieval fortress was asymbol of royal power, andthespontaneousdemolitionofit which began at once wasequally symbolic of the endof a discredited old order.Those who had orchestratedroyal resistance over the

month since 17 Junerecognized the situation, too:the king’s brotherArtois andhis closest courtier friendsleft the country at once, thefirst émigrés. After the kinghad been to Paris and,accepting the new tricolourcockadeof revolution fromahastily formed citizens’militia (soon to be called theNationalGuard),confirmedaself-appointed municipaladministration, the National

Assembly at last beganworkontheconstitutiontowhichithad committed itself in thetennis court oath. Bindingmandatesimposedbyelectorsin the springwereabrogated,and a preamble to theconstitution, a declaration ofrights, began to be drafted.But by now upheavals inParis and certain provincialcities had spread to thecountryside,wheretheweeksbefore the new harvest

ripened were marked by a‘great fear’ that ‘brigands’were scouring the land todestroy crops and pillagehelpless peasantcommunities.Inthisparanoidatmosphere there werewidespread attacks on thehouses of lords and thesymbols of feudal power,which, as the cahiers hadshown, peasants regarded asthe least justifiable of themanyburdens theybore.The

menofpropertywhomadeupthe Assembly, whetherowners of feudal rights ornot, were genuinely alarmedthat the country wascollapsing into anarchy. Todefuse the chaos, a radicalgroup planned a dramaticgesture in which feudal dueswould be abolished. It waslaunchedbyagreatnoblemanon the evening of 4 August,and was greeted with a rushofenthusiasminanAssembly

that had impatiently heldback frompositiveaction formuch of the threemonths ofitsexistence.Soonmorethanfeudal rights were proposedfor abolition. All sorts ofprivileges, the very lifebloodof ancien régime socialorganization, weregrandiloquently renounced.So was venality of offices,from which many privilegeshadderived.Free justicewasproclaimed, and equality of

taxation. The Church wasdeprived of tithes, the basicincome of the parish clergy.By the end of the session,when the Assembly declaredthe king ‘Restorer of FrenchLiberties’much of the fabricofFrenchsociallifehadbeencondemned to destruction inthemostradicalfewhoursoftheentireRevolution.

5.14July1789:ThetakingoftheBastille

As several of those presentobserved, there had been asort of magic in the air thatnight: but themagicworked.Gradually rural disordersubsided. The Assembly(now calling itself theNational ConstituentAssembly) returned to itsconstitution-making. On 26AugustitfinallypromulgatedaDeclarationoftheRightsofMan and the Citizen, andover subsequent weeks it

establishedthefirstprinciplesof a constitutionalmonarchy,ruling out a bicamerallegislature and granting theking limited powers of vetoon new laws. The king,however, seemed innohurryto accept this restriction, orindeed any of the greatmeasures enacted in August.Suspicions aroused in Julynow began to fester anew inParis,whosepopulaceclearlyregarded themselves as the

saviours and watchdogs ofthe Revolution. When, earlyin October, new militaryarrivals were reported fromVersaillesbyaParisianpressnow free and constantlyproliferating, fear spread thatthekingwasabouttoattemptagain what had failed in thesummer. Sweeping asideattempts by the NationalGuard to restrain them,thousandsofwomenmarchedon Versailles to coerce the

king. There they invaded thehall of the Assembly, brokeinto the palace, andthreatened the life of thequeen. The only thing thatwould satisfy them, theyeventually clamoured, wasfor the royal family to comewith them to Paris. Themonarch quickly saw that hehad little choice, and on 6Octoberhewasescortedbackto his capital by thetriumphant women. The

Assembly followed a fewdayslater.

Polarization:religion

Louis XVI was now theprisoner ofParis.Apart froman ill-fated attempt to escapein June 1791, he wouldremainsountil themonarchywas overthrown in August

1792.So,however,wouldtheAssembly. Although thedeputies knew that theyprobably owed their survivalto Parisian popular action,most of them remaineddeeply uneasy about theobligation. That was shownby their enactment of amartial law against tumults,andbythewaytheyconfinedpolitical rights under theconstitution to substantialtaxpayers. Their aim was to

set up a constitutionalmonarchy controlled by theelected representatives ofsubstantial men of property.Their commitment toproperty owners was alsoshown in their refusal torenouncethedebtbequeathedby absolute monarchy, andindeed a massive expansionof it by promises tocompensateall those,suchasvenal office-holders, whosepropertywoulddisappearasa

result of their reforms. Theysoon saw that all this couldnot possibly be met out oftaxation. Tax revenues, infact, were fallingcatastrophically in theabsence of any effectivemeans of coercion. Theirsolution was to satisfy thenation’s creditors at theexpenseoftheChurch.

Bytheabolitionof titheon4

August the Assembly hadalready committed itself toecclesiastical reform.Findingan alternative source ofincome for the parish clergywas not the least of the newobligations it had taken on.ButtheChurchremainedrichinlandsandendowmentsandalready on 4 August isolatedvoices had claimed that therightfulowneroftheseassetswas the Nation. On 2November it was decided to

placethem‘atthedisposaloftheNation’.Theywere tobesold to support an issue ofstate bonds, called assignats,in which other public debtswouldberedeemed.Tomanyclergy and devout laity thesemeasureslookedlikepartofawider attack on the Catholicfaith. Amid triumphantinvocations of thephilosophers who hadattacked the Churchthroughout the eighteenth

century, the Assemblyproclaimed civil equality forProtestants and prohibitedmonastic vows. When urgedin April 1790 to declareCatholicismthestatereligion,it refused; and by then civilstrifehadbrokenoutbetweenCatholics and Protestants inthe south, around Nîmes.Finally,giventhat theNationwasnowtopaytheclergyoutofpublicfunds,theAssemblydecided to reorganize the

Church in accordance withthe same broad principles itwasapplyingtothecountryatlarge. And so the civilconstitution of the clergy,enacted in July 1790,provided for lay election ofpriests and bishops,nationalization ofecclesiasticalboundaries,andapurelyhonorificroleforthepope–whoasaforeignrulerwas not consulted on any oftheseprinciples.Norwerethe

clergy themselves,which leftmany of them uncertainwhether such a radicalreorganizationwasacceptabletotheChurchasawhole.TheAssemblysawtheirhesitationas a deliberate obstruction ofthe national will, and inNovember imposed an oathof obedience on all clergy.‘Refractories’ who refused itwere to be ineligible forbenefices under the neworder.

They expected that to settlematters; but in fact onlyaround half of the clergycomplied. Many retractedwhen in the spring of 1791the pope publicly denouncedthe civil constitution. It wasthe beginning of the first,deepest, and most persistentpolarization of theRevolution. As revolutionary‘patriots’ mobilized topromote compliancewith theoath, producing a massive

expansion of the political‘Jacobin’ clubs that hadbegun to be established overthe previous winter, counter-revolutionarieswere quick toassociate their own causewith threatened Christianity.Acceptanceofthesacramentsfrom a ‘constitutional’ priestwho had taken the oathbecame a touchstone ofloyalty to the entireRevolution. No sincereCatholic could evade this

decision; and this includedtheking.

Polarization:monarchy

After his return to Paris,Louis XVI had grudginglyaccepted all the reforms ofthe Constituent Assembly,with occasional displays

almost of enthusiasm. Heeven sanctioned theecclesiastical legislation,althoughheprivatelyknewofthe pope’s hostility. It wassoonobviousinthespringof1791, however, that he wasavoiding receiving thesacraments fromconstitutionals. Threateningdemonstrations began tooccur around the Tuileriespalace, for inParis therewasoverwhelming support for

oath-taking. This renewedpopular hostility determinedthe royal family to attemptescape. On the night of 20JunetheyslippedoutofParis,making for the easternfrontier. The kingimprudently left behind himan open letter denouncingmuch of the work of theRevolution. But the fugitiveswere captured at Varennes,and brought back to Paris indisgrace.

The flight to Varennesopened up the second greatschism of the Revolution.There had been hardly anyrepublicanism in 1789, andwhat there was abated oncethe king was back in Parisand accepting all theAssemblysenthim.But,afterVarennes, the mistrust builtup by his long record ofapparent ambivalence burstout intowidespread demandsfrom the populace of the

capital and a number ofradicalpublicistsforthekingto be dethroned. Mostmembers of the Assembly,however, were horrified,conniving hastily at theobvious official lie that thekeystone of their constitutionhadbeenabducted.WhentheParisJacobinclubflirtedwitha republican petition, mostdeputies seceded from it toform a more moderate‘Feuillant’ club; and when

crowds gathered in the greatmilitaryparadeground to thewest of the city, the Champde Mars, to sign the samepetition National Guardsopened fire on them. TheAssembly decided that theconstitution must now bequickly finished, and revisedat the same time to make itmore acceptable to the king,so that normal political lifecould begin. After hurriedchanges to exclude religious

clausesandlimitthefreedomof the press and of politicalclubs, the constitution of1791 was presented to theking who, having publiclyaccepted it, was officiallyreinstated.On the last dayofSeptember, the ConstituentAssemblycametoanend,itsmembers having formallydisqualified themselves fromsitting in the LegislativeAssembly that was now toassumepower.

6. National Guards inuniform,withthetricolour

The Legislative Assemblymet in an atmosphere ofinternational crisis. For thefirst time since 1787, theflight to Varennes had madeFrench affairs a subject ofconcernratherthandisdainfulsatisfaction to foreignpowers. In May 1790 theConstituent Assembly hadpositively renounced war asan instrument of policy,

except in self-defence. Butafter the ignominiousrecapture of a king whoappeared bent oninternationalizing his plight,other monarchs werealarmed.IntheDeclarationofPillnitz (27August1791) theEmperor and the king ofPrussia were induced byLouis XVI’s two émigrébrothers, Artois andProvence,tothreatenmilitaryintervention. Thousands of

army officers had joined theémigrés after Varennes, andwerenowmassingacross thefrontier dreaming of a returnwithforeignarmies.Thekingand queen shared thesedreams;but thenewdeputiessaw them as a provocation.Over the autumn and wintertheir language becamehysterically belligerenttowards the Germanprincelings who harbouredtheémigrésand,behindthem,

theHabsburgEmperor.Theyalso sought toprovokeLouisXVI into compromisinghimself by passing decreesintensifying penalties againstrefractorypriestsandémigréswhich they knew he wouldnot sanction. Generalparanoia was intensified bynews of a massive slaveuprisingintheCaribbean,andthe coffee and sugarshortages that followed.Despite fears, evinced by

Jacobins like Robespierre,that the debilitated armywasin no state to defeat thedisciplined forces of Austriaand Prussia, most of thecountrywas carried away bywar fever. The king (whosharedRobespierre’sanalysisbut saw it as a sign of hopefor his own rescue) wastherefore happy to declarewar on the Emperor on 20April1792.

Polarization:war

War was the third greatpolarizing issue of theRevolution.Aswas intended,it forced everybody to takesides on everything else. Itidentified the defeat orsurvival of the Revolutionwith that of the nation itself,so that critics of anythingachievedsince1789couldbe

plausibly stigmatized astraitors. Most vulnerable tothis charge was the kinghimself, who persisted in hisvetoes of laws againstrefractories and émigrésdespite being mobbed in hispalace on 20 June byParisians now callingthemselves sansculottes. Nodoubt his resolution wassteeled by news of disastersfrom the front, as Prussiaentered thewarandprepared

to invade French territory.Even French generals calledfor peace negotiations. Butthis too looked like little lessthan treason, and theAssembly decreed thereinforcement of the linearmy by National Guardvolunteers (féderés). As theybegantoarriveinParis,thosefrom Marseilles singing anew and bloodthirsty battlehymn that would foreverafterwards bear their name,

the Prussian commanderthreatened to destroy Paris ifthe king was harmed. Thatcompleted the identificationofLouisXVIwiththeenemy,and on 10 August aninsurrectionary commune ofParis launched a force ofsansculottes and féderésagainst the royal palace. Theking took refuge with theAssembly while his Swisslife-guards were massacreddefending his empty

residence; but this did notsave his throne. TheAssembly voted to suspendthemonarchy and convoke anew body elected bymanhood suffrage, theConvention, to draw up arepublicanconstitutionforthecountry.

The full impact andimplicationsoftheoverthrowofmonarchy took the rest of

the year to becomemanifest.Meanwhile the PrussianspushedintoFrance,andParisremained panic-stricken. Aprovisional executive councildominated by the Parisiandemagogue Dantonfrenziedly attempted toorganizedefencewithaseriesof draconian emergencypowers which filled theprisons with suspects. Aspatriotic sansculottes wereurged to join up, anxiety

spreadaboutapossibleprisonbreakoutintheirabsence.On2September,asnewsarrivedthat the Prussians hadcaptured Verdun, prisonswere broken into and theirinmates taken out andmassacred.Thecarnagewenton for four days, leavingabout 1400 victims dead,among themmany refractorypriests. Although theinflammatory populistjournalist Marat urged

provincial France to followthe capital’s example, newsof the massacres horrifiedopinion both in France andabroad. This was somethingaltogether more serious thanthe occasional lynchings of1789andsince,agrimlessonofwhathappenedifthelowerorders were not kept undercontrol. Enemies of theRevolution had alwayspredictedbloodychaos;thosewho wished it well mostly

found the massacres equallyhard to justify. Everybody inParis, however, livedhenceforth in the fear thattheymight very well happenagain.

And yet within weeks thecrisis seemed to be over.Onthe day before theConvention replaced theLegislative, a French armyconfronted the Prussian

invaders at Valmy anddefeated them (20September). It was thebeginning of six months ofbrilliant military success inwhich the AustrianNetherlandsandtheleftbankof the Rhine were overrun.ByNovember,intoxicatedbythe apparent ease of theirsuccess, the French wereoffering ‘Fraternity and helpto all peoples wishing torecovertheirliberty’and‘war

on the castles, peace to thecottages’ in the path of theirarmies. They promised toimplement revolutionarysocial policieswherever theywent,andmakechurchesandnobles pay for the process.‘We cannot be calm’,declaredthejournalistdeputyBrissot, consistently theleadingadvocateofwarsinceOctober 1791, ‘until Europe,allEurope, is inflames.’Thechallenge was compounded

bythefateofLouisXVI.Thefirst act of the Conventionwas to declare themonarchyabolished. Later it wouldretrospectively date a newrepublicancalendar from thismoment, the Year I ofLiberty.Thatleftthequestionof what to do with ‘LouisCapet’ or ‘Louis the Last’.When it was argued that heshould be put on trial forcrimes against the nation,some argued that his very

overthrow by the populaceconstituted a trial and guiltyverdict.Buta trialbefore theConvention was eventuallyagreed, the indictmentcovering the king’s wholerecordsince1789.Ittooklessthan two days in December,and despite the defendant’sdenialofallthecharges,therewasneveranydoubtwhattheverdict would be. Only thesentence was contentious, adecision to execute him

passing by a single vote.Therewerealsounsuccessfulproposalstosubjecttheresulttoareferendum,andtograntclemency. But the majorityknew that the watchingsansculottes would probablynot have allowed either; andso on 21 January 1793 theformer king went to publicexecution. ‘You have throwndown your gauntlet’, Dantonexulted in the Convention,‘and this gauntlet is a king’s

head!’

Civilwarandterror

Thechallengewassoontakenup. Within days of theexecution Great Britain andtheDutchRepublicjoinedtheRepublic’s enemies, soonfollowed by Spain andseveral Italian states. When

the Convention sought toaugment its armed forces byconscripting 300,000 newrecruits, there waswidespread resistance acrossthe west of the country,where the persecution ofrefractory priests had alreadycausedrioting.IntheVendée,south of the Loire, civil warwas soon raging, with therebels organizing themselvesinto a self-styled ‘Catholicand Royal Army’ dedicated

to restoring the heirs of themartyredking.Now, too, thewar against the Republic’sforeign enemies began to gobadly. French forces weredriven out of the Rhinelandand Belgium, where theirgeneral deserted to theenemy. The crisisexacerbated long-standingpolitical divisions within theConvention.Theadvocatesofopen-ended war, led byBrissot and a number of

Bordeaux deputies whomRobespierre called the‘faction of the Gironde’thought that it could andshould be conducted withoutcompromising theRevolution’s original andrepresentative principles athome.Itwastheywhosoughtnational endorsement of thejudgements against the king.And, in the wake of theSeptember massacres, theGirondins argued loudly

againsttheintimidationoftheConvention’s proceedings bythe bloodstained populace ofParis. These stances wonthem expulsion from theJacobin club, whose leaders,such as Robespierre, weresoon called Montagnards(literally ‘mountain men’,from the high benches theyoccupied in theConvention).Montagnards, apart frompersonal dislike, thought theGirondins’ vendetta against

Paris suicidally distractingfrommorepracticalpriorities.They saw no safe alternativeto humouring thesansculottes, even if thatmeant turning a blind eye totheir more violent instinctsand excesses. By May, withbad news arriving from allsides,theyhadconcludedthatthe only way to silence theGirondins was to acceptsansculottedemands for theirexpulsion from the

Convention.On2June,29ofthemwerearrested.

7. 21 January 1793: TheexecutionofLouisXVI.Notethevacantpedestalwherehisgrandfather’s statue hadpreviouslystood.

The immediate effect wasonly to intensify the crisis.Already restive at theirinability to influence eventsin Paris, several provincial

citiesnowcameoutintoopenrevolt. Over the summer,Marseille, Bordeaux, andLyon were beyond theConvention’s control, and atthe end of August the greatMediterranean naval port ofToulon surrendered to theBritish. On 13 July,meanwhile, Marat, thejournalistic idol of thesansculottes,wasassassinatedin his bath by CharlotteCorday, an insurgent from

Caen.Much of this so-called‘Federalist Revolt’ was notcounter-revolutionary in theway the Vendée uprisingquite explicitlywas. Itwas aprotestagainstextremismandinstability in the capital. Butrebellion,howevermotivated,in time of war wasundoubtedly treasonable; andas, over the autumn, theConvention’s forces re-established control overcentres which proved unable

to coordinate their efforts,rebel leaders and activistspaid the traitors’ penalty.Almost 14,000 weresentenced todeathbyspecialcourts in the provinces overthe autumn andwinter.Overhalf were in the west, wherethe last Vendéan army wasdefeated in December. Somewere shot or drowned, butmost died under theinstrument that haddispatched the king, the

guillotine – introduced onlyinApril1792anddesignedasahumanemeansofexecutionbyrationalmenwhofailedtoforeseetheeffectoftheriversof blood it released whenused on large numbers ofvictims.

The aim of such retributionwasasmuchtoterrorizeastopunish;andbySeptemberthesansculottes, unable to

understand why theelimination of their legislatorenemies had not producedmore positive results, werepressing for terror to beadopted as a principle ofgovernment.Intimidatedoncemorebymassdemonstrationson 5 September, theConvention declared terrortheorderoftheday.Withinafewweeks ithaddecreed thearrest of all suspects,expanded a revolutionary

tribunal established earlier inthe year to try politicalcrimes, imposed pricecontrols on all basiccommodities (the‘maximum’), and authorizedso-called ‘revolutionaryarmies’ of sansculottes toforce peasants to disgorgetheir surpluses to feed thecities.ThegovernmentoftheRepublic was now to be‘revolutionary until thepeace’ – centralized,

arbitrary, and armed withemergency powers, all thevery opposite of theconstitutional conduct ofaffairs to which theRevolution had committeditselffromtheoutset.

Now the Girondins arrestedinJune,andthehatedwidowof Louis XVI, Marie-Antoinette, were sent to thescaffold, for what they

symbolized as much as forwhat they had done. Anumber of deputies,dispatched to disturbedprovinces as ‘representativesonmission’andinvestedwiththe full powers of theConvention also began toidentify, reasonably enoughinmanycases,religionasthelife-blood of counter-revolution. They decided to‘dechristianize’theirdistricts,andbyNovemberthisfashion

reached Paris. As a new‘revolutionary calendar’replaced the old Christianone, large numbers ofchurches began to be closed.TheaimwastostampoutallformsofChristianpractice ifnot belief. The government,now largely vested in thehands of the Convention’sCommittee of Public Safety,never officially sponsored apolicywhichitrecognizedaslikely to alienate more

citizensthanitwonover,butbefore it was strong enoughto stem the dechristianizingtide in the spring of 1794,virtually every church inFrancehadbeencloseddown,and throughout much of this‘Year II of Liberty’ mostpriests were in exile orhiding.

Terror appeared to haveachieved its purpose of

crushing internal oppositionfrom every quarter. Even thesansculottes, drafted into theservice of a ruthless anddecisive state, seemedsatisfied.Thefortunesofwarwere improving too. Thelevéeenmasse,anattempttomobilize the Nation’s entirehuman resources, proclaimedinAugust 1793,was helpingto man and equip armies ofunprecedented size. Late inDecember the British were

driven from Toulon, and bythe spring the Republic’sterritory was once more freefrom foreign occupation. Bynow some deputies werearguing for an end to terror.When popular leaders inParis, calledHébertistes aftertheir journalist spokesmanHébert, attempted to silenceterror’scriticsbymountingacoup d’état, they wereoutmanoeuvred by theCommittee of Public Safety

and themselves guillotined.ButRobespierre,increasinglythe dominant voice on thecommittee, was alsosuspicious of the self-servingmotives of the so-called‘indulgents’,allfriendsoftheunpredictable Danton, andthree weeks later (5 April1794) it was their turn to beexecuted. The rhythm ofterror began to accelerateagain, and with all politicaltrialsnowchannelledthrough

the Paris revolutionarytribunal, the 2000 victimscondemned there down toJulymademoreimpactontheworld outside than thethousands more who hadperished in previous monthsintheprovinces.InearlyJunethelastjudicialsafeguardsforinnocence were removed bythe notorious Law of 22prairial, two days after theintroduction underRobespierre’s sponsorship of

a new, non-Christian statereligion, the cult of theSupremeBeing.

8.16October1793:Jacques-Louis David’s sketch ofMarie-Antoinette on herwaytothescaffold

Thiswastheperiodoftheso-called ‘Great Terror’, oftenknown, too, from the

moralisticrationalegiventoitin the speeches ofRobespierre, as the Republicof Virtue. Political crimeswere now so widely definedthat nobody felt safe. Manywere now being executedalmost for their counter-revolutionarypotential alone:the number of noble victims,for instance, hitherto quitemodest, rosemarkedly.Whatnobody could imagine washow it would all end, since

even to express doubt aboutthe need for terror was toinvite suspicion.And yet thenecessity for government bybloodlettingwaslessandlessobvious. The whole countrywas now firmly back undertheConvention’scontrol,andthe armies were taking thewaroncemoretotheenemy.People began to blame thecontinuing terror on thesuspicious mind ofRobespierre, and a group of

deputies who feared theymightbehisnexttargetbeganto plot against him. Matterscame to a head in aconfrontation in theConventionon26July,whenthe ‘Incorruptible’ underwentthenovelexperienceofbeingshouted down. He appealedforsupportthenextdaytotheJacobin club and to thesansculottes; but not enoughrallied to him to make hisappeal seem more than

defiance of the Convention.He was outlawed, whichmeant that when he wasarrestedtherewasnoneedfora trial. Having failed to killhimselfpriortoarrest,heandhis closest associates wereguillotinedon28July.

The thermidoreandilemma

The fallofRobespierre,on9thermidorintherevolutionarycalendar,hasoftenbeenseenas the endof theRevolution.Itwasnothingofthesort.Theterror,which did come to anend with his execution, wascertainlyaspectacularclimaxto developments since 1789,but it solved none of theproblemswhich had torn theRevolution apart – religion,monarchy,andwar. In fact itaddedanother,intheformof

Jacobinism.

OutsideFrance, the termhadbecome as early as 1790shorthand for all theRevolution’s excesses. Nowit began to acquire the sameconnotations in France – alegacy of clubs, populism,social levelling, andauthoritarianism in the nameof these principles, allunderpinned by terror. The

so-called Thermidoreans inthe Convention who hadtaken over power werecommitted to dismantling allthat had made Jacobinismpossible. Thus the prisonswereemptiedofsuspects,theJacobincluband itsaffiliatesclosed, economic controlslike the maximumabandoned. The assignats,whosevaluehadbeenerodedby massive overissue afterwar broke out, had been

somewhat sustained as legaltender by the controlledeconomyof theYear II:nowtheywentintofreefall.Asin1788–9 accidents of natureexacerbated the situation. Amediocreharvestandperhapsthecoldestwintersince1709left the sansculottes somiserable that by the springthey were clamouring for areturn to the times whenbread and blood were bothplentiful. In April and May

(germinal and prairial in therevolutionary calendar) theConvention was twicemobbedbyangrycrowdsanda deputy was lynched. Butthey lacked the oldorganization,andfor thefirsttime since 1789 theauthoritiesfelttheycouldrelyon soldiers to restoredomestic order. TheConvention spurned theinsurgents’ demands; andalthough latter-day Jacobins

wouldcontinuetodreamofareturn to the Year II, thepeopleofPariswerefinishedas a political force for twogenerations. Hithertopersecuted Catholics andRoyalists now began to taketheir revenge. In Paris,extravagantly clad ‘gildedyouths’ beat up veteransansculottes and Jacobinactivists,while inthesouthafar-reaching ‘White Terror’brought informal but brutal

retribution to those who hadwielded local power duringtheYearII.

If the recent past had been aseries of terrible mistakes,when had they begun?Probably, thought theThermidoreans, in 1791.Their dream was to recoverthe lost consensus and civicidealism of the earlyrevolution. That meant

conciliatingthosealienatedinthemeantime–CatholicsandRoyalists. And so althoughtheRepublic now disclaimedany religion, churches wereallowed to reopen, and thepolicy of depopulationapplied in the Vendée overtheYearIIwasostentatiouslyabandoned. Serious talk wasalso heard in the spring of1795 of restoring monarchyin thepersonofLouisXVI’ssurviving son, a sickly child

who might be madeacceptable by a carefullycontrolled, public-spiritededucation. These hopes,however, were destroyed inJune1795when‘LouisXVII’died; and from his exile inVerona the next month, hisuncle theCount de Provenceproclaimed his ownsuccessionasLouisXVIII ina chillingly uncompromisingdeclaration which promisedan almost total restoration of

theoldregimeintheeventofhis return. That obviouslymeant giving back nationallands to the Church and toémigrés who had incurredconfiscation once war brokeout.Someémigréschose thismoment to demonstrate theircontinued intransigence byattempting to invadeBrittanywith British support in thehopeofmarchingonParisattheheadofahordeofBretonRoyalists. They never got

beyond the beaches atQuiberon and were shot intheir hundreds by theirrepublicancaptors.

Allthisblightedanyhopesofa restoration. Yet, consciousthat theConventionhadbeenelected to giveFrance a newconstitution, the deputiesknew they had now sat longenough. Technically, aconstitution already existed:

anextremelydemocraticone,embodying variousprovisions for social welfareandeventherighttolegalizedinsurrection,hadbeenframedand adopted in 1793 in theaftermath of the downfall ofthe Girondins. It had beensuspended at once for thewar’s duration. Theinsurgents of germinal andprairialhadcalledforittobeimplemented, but that aloneensured that it was

unthinkable. Accordingly theConventionspentthesummerof 1795 elaborating a newrepublican constitution, moreheavily dependent on largeproperty owners even thanthat of 1791. It was full ofelaborate checks andbalances, including annualelections and a constantlyrotating five-man executive,the Directory. Nor did itsdraftersmake what they sawasthefundamentalmistakeof

1791 by excludingthemselves from the newmachinery. Indeed, theyinsistedthat two-thirdsofthefirst deputies in the two newlegislative ‘councils’ shouldbe drawn from their ownranks. Royalists, who hadhoped that they might winfreeelections,wereoutraged,but a mass protest in Pariswas dispersed by the armyunderthecommandofyounggeneral Bonaparte

(insurrection of vendémiaire:5October).

TheDirectory

During all this time, Frencharmies had been triumphanteverywhere. Belgium wasoverrun, and annexed underthe doctrine first proclaimedin1793,ofFrance’s‘natural’

frontiersalongtheRhine.TheDutchRepublicwas invaded,and surrendered. ThePrussians and the Spaniardsmade peace. By the end of1795 only the Austrians andthe British were still at warwiththeRepublic,andneitherof them threatened itsterritory.For1796aknockoutblowwasplannedagainsttheEmperor,witharmiesstrikingtowards Vienna fromGermany and Italy. The

ItaliancommandwasgiventoBonaparte. The front wassupposedtobesecondary,butin the twelve months fromApril 1796 he drove theAustrians out of Italy towithin striking distance oftheir capital, and on his owninitiative concluded peacepreliminariesatLeoben.

Even the British were nownegotiating;buttheresultsof

the first regular electionsundertheconstitutionof1795led all parties to drag theirfeet. The Directory hadbegun,intheaftermathofthevendémiaireinsurrection,inamilitant mood, andconcessions were made toJacobins persecuted sincegerminal and prairial. Butthey emerged radicalizedfrom prison and hiding, andby the spring of 1796 somewere calling for the 1793

constitution and theequalization of property.Forced underground again, asmall group led by thejournalist Babeuf plotted acoup. This ‘conspiracy ofequals’, the first attempt atcommunistic revolution inhistory, was soon thwarted;but it provoked a new swingto the right which wasreflected in the results of the1797 elections. In a reactionagainst the remaining

‘perpetuals’ of theConvention,conservativeandRoyalist deputies weremuchreinforced, giving theBritishand Austrians hopes of amore advantageous peacethan their military positionwarranted. Fearing that thefruits of his Italian victoriesmight be jeopardized,Bonapartegavehissupporttothree of the directors equallyalarmed by the reactionarytide. In the coup of fructidor

Year V (September 1797),electionresultswereannulledin over half the departments,and 177 deputies werepurged. Both subsequentrounds of election under thedirectorial constitution, in1798and1799,wouldalsobeadjusted in accordance withpolitical convenience; so thatthis constitution was neverallowed the time andopportunity to work freely.There is littlewonder that so

fewin1799wouldmourn itspassing.

Meanwhile fructidor seemedtojustifyitselfbyresults.Thevery next month theAustrians made peace atCampo Formio, recognizingthe lossofBelgiumand theirold Italian possessions, nowtransformed by BonaparteintotheCisalpineRepublic,aFrenchpuppetstate.Athome,

a confident new Directorybroke the Revolution’slongest-standing commitmentby renouncing most of thestate’sdebts.Itactedtoowithrenewed harshness againstpriests and nobles. TheBritish,however, so far fromfollowingtheirAustrianalliesin coming to terms, nowchose to fight on alone,emphasizing their navalpowerinOctober1797inthevictory of Camperdown.

Bonaparte, back from Italy,wasputinchargeofinvasionplans; but soon decided thatthe commercial British weremore likely tomake peace ifFrance could threaten thesource of their wealth inIndia.Thisatanyratewasthemain justification for hisexpedition to Egypt in May1798–althoughthedirectorswere happy enough to seesuchanambitiousgeneralgo.The diplomatic effect,

however, especially afterNelson cut him off in Egyptby destroying his fleet at thebattle of the Nile in August,was to trigger the formationof a new coalition led byRussia. When Austriaallowed Russian troops tocrossherterritorytoreachtheFrenchadversaryinItaly, thewhole peninsula rose upagainstthepuppetregimessetuptherebyBonaparteandhissuccessors. The French

withdrew, taking the popewith them as a prisoner, andhe died in French captivity.Suddenly the Republicseemed as dangerouslyisolated as in 1793.Was theanswer the same as it hadbeen then? Amid talk offorced loans and hostage-taking, General Jourdanmoved a comprehensive lawon conscription. The effectwas to stir up the west oncemore, and produce a new

Vendée in the form of apriest-led peasant uprising inthe annexed Belgianterritories (October 1798). Itwas soon put down, but themilitary crisis lasted untilnew victories the nextsummer, and prolongedpoliticaluncertainties asneo-Jacobins opened clubs andclamoured for emergencymeasurestosavethecountry.Sieyès, re-emerging as adirectorafteryearsofprudent

obscurity, concluded that theconstitution was unworkable.What France needed was‘authority from above,confidence from below’. Hecast about for a reliablegeneral to help himmount acoup. It was at this momentthat Napoleon BonapartemadehisfamousescapefromtheisolationofEgypt.

Napoleon

Hewasmore thanwilling tocooperate with Sieyès indissolving the legislativecouncils in brumaire YearVIII (November 1799), buthe, rather than his would-bepatronhad thedecisivevoicein framing the newauthoritarian constitutionwhichwas promulgated after

a hasty referendum inDecember. It investedNapoleon with practicallylimitless powers as FirstConsul of the Republic.‘Citizens’, he proclaimed,‘theRevolutionisestablishedon the principles with whichitbegan.Itisover.’

None of this was true, butover the next two yearsNapoleon ensured that the

second sentence at leastbegan to seem credible. Bydefeating the Austrians(himselfatMarengo in1800,and through GeneralMoreauatHohenlindenthenextyear)he ended the war on thecontinent. The war-wearyBritish gave up the struggletoo in 1802 at the peace ofAmiens. The revolutionarywar was won, in a completevictory for France. That inturn gave Napoleon the

strength to dash all LouisXVIII’s hopes that he mightprove the instrument of aBourbon restoration. IfFrance was to have amonarch, Napoleon himselfwas now a more crediblecandidate, as he was todemonstrate by crowninghimselfin1804.Bythen,too,hehaddeprivedtheBourbonsof their main source ofsupportbysettlingthequarrelbetween France and Rome.

Under the concordatnegotiated with a new pope,Pius VII, in 1801, openCatholic worship wasrestored in France and paidforbythestate.Buttosecurethisdeal,thepopewasforcedto recognize Napoleon’s oneprecondition:thatthelandsofthe Church confiscated andsoldsince1789weregoneforever.Theirnewownerscouldat last feel secure in theirgains, and became natural

supportersofthenewregime,ratherthanoftheonlypartieshithertotopromisethemsuchguarantees – the discreditedDirectory, and thebloodstained Jacobins. TheBrumairecoupitselfhadbeenglorified as saving thecountry from these twotainted prescriptions, andshortly afterwards the lastJacobin activists wereroundedupandblamedwhendesperate Royalists tried to

assassinate the First Consul.Thenationwide sighof reliefwas practically audible.Napoleonic rule would bringits own problems andcontradictions,but it enduredbecauseitbeganbyresolvingothers that had torn thecountryapartformorethanadecade.

Chapter4Whatitended

The initial impulse of theFrench Revolution wasdestructive. Therevolutionaries wanted toabolish what, by the end of

1789, everybody was callingthe old or former order, theancien régime. When, in thesummer of 1791, theConstituent Assemblyfinalized the constitution onwhich it had been workingsinceJune1789, thedeputiesthought itwouldbeuseful insuchafundamentaldocumentto list the main things thattheir revolution had got ridof, what they called ‘theinstitutions which wounded

libertyandequalityofrights’.And so the constitutiondeclaredthat:

Thereisnolongereithera nobility or a peerage,or hereditarydistinctions, ordistinctionsoforders,ora feudal regime, or anyof the corporations ordecorations for whichproofs of nobility were

required, or whichimplied distinctions ofbirth, or any othersuperiority but that ofpublic officials in theexerciseoftheirduties.

There is no longervenality or heredity ofpublicoffice.

There is no longer for

anypartof thenationorfor any individual anyprivilegeorexception tothe common law of alltheFrench.

There are no longereither guilds, orcorporations ofprofessions, arts andcrafts.

The law no longerrecognizes eitherreligious vows or anyother engagementcontrarytonaturalrightsandtheconstitution.

The list was far fromexhaustive. In theconstitution, it cameimmediately after theDeclaration of the Rights ofMan and the Citizen, which

by proclaiming a number ofprinciples of political andcivil life, implicitlycondemnedpracticesopposedto them in previous times.The extended declarationwhich prefaced the never-implemented constitution of1793 made this even moreclear: ‘The necessity ofdeclaring these rightspresupposes the presence orthe recent memory ofdespotism.’ As the

Revolution proceeded, therange of its destructiveambitions widened. By 1793they were so comprehensivethatanoutragedpriestcoinedanewwordtodescribethem:vandalism, evoking the anti-Christian depredations ofancient barbarians. On theother hand, the Revolution’sdestructive achievementsoften fell far short of itsambitions; andwhat themenof1789or1793thoughtthey

had abolished forever oftenreappeared,andquitesoon,informsostensiblydifferentbutwhich those who hadsurvived had no difficulty inrecognizingwithdismay.

Despotism

The Revolution began as anattack on despotism.

MontesquieuhaddefineditinDel’Espritdeslois(1748)asthe rule of one, according tono law. Obeying no law,despotic authority wasarbitrary, and its animatingspirit was fear. As usual,regularusagesoondilutedtheoriginal rigour of the word’smeaning. Already by 1762,RousseauwasimplyinginhisSocial Contract that therewasnomeaningfuldifferencebetween the authority of a

despotandthatofamonarch.By the end of that decadedespotism was widelyunderstood as the abuse ofmonarchical power, andindeed of any sort ofauthority. By 1789 this hadcome to mean above allimposing taxation withoutconsent, arbitrary powers ofarrest and imprisonment,stiflingfreedomofexpressionandopinion,andtheactivitiesof all who served these

purposes, such as ministersandintendants.Inaword,nodistinction was now drawnbetween despotism, tyranny,andabsolutemonarchy.

The Revolution provided anopportunity to dispense withit all. By locating sovereignpower in theNation, itmadethekingFrance’sservant,notitsmaster.Bysubjectinghimand all other officials to a

constitution, it sought toreplace the rule ofarbitrariness by the rule oflaw. There was of courseplenty of law under the oldregime – too much, therevolutionaries thought.Theysaw one of their longer-termtasksasitssimplificationandcodification.Butthekinghadappearedabletooverrideanyofitwithimpunity.Thatwaswhy the Bastille was such apowerful symbol – it was

where unnamed stateprisoners could be confinedwithout trial, under thenotorious lettres de cachet,sealedwarrantssignedbytheking and revocable only byhim. Once demolished, theBastille was never rebuilt,and all that remainswhere itoncestoodistheoutlineofitsplan in the cobblestones.Almost as powerfullysymbolic was theabandonmentofVersailleson

6 October 1789, the greatpalacewhich LouisXIV hadmade the seat of absolutemonarchy. It was too big todemolish (though not tovandalize) but not evenNapoleon, whose real powerdwarfed that wielded byLouisXVI,thoughtitwisetomove in there when hebecameacrowned rulerwitha court. It evoked too manyundesirable memories. Nordid Louis XVI’s brothers

return there after theBourbons were restored in1815. Even they recognizedthat the old nerve-centre ofabsolute monarchy was aninappropriate residence forconstitutional rulers. Louis-Philippe,whofollowedthem,sawthat itsonlypossibleusenowwasasamuseum.

Aristocracy

ButVersailleswasmorethana symbol of politicalauthority. With its glitteringpopulation of titled courtiers,it also symbolized a wholesocialsystemdominatedbyaprivileged nobility. From theautumn of 1788, theRevolution acquired a socialthrust, and that thrust wasanti-noble.

By the middle of 1789,

aristocracywasthetermusedto encapsulate all that theRevolution was against. Itwasthequarrelovertheformof the Estates-General whichbrought these preoccupationsto the surface, and the loudand prolonged resistance ofmost nobles to giving up theguaranteed share of futurepolitical power that the‘forms of 1614’ held out tothem. Insults andexaggerationsexchangedthen

could not be expunged; anddespite the constructive roleplayed by many nobledeputiesoncetheordersweremerged, the emigration ofothers, and the gratuitouslyobstructionist behaviour ofsomewho remained, ensuredthat suspicions about thenobility never died away. InJune1790nobility itself, andthe display of itsappurtenances like titles andcoatsofarms,wereforbidden

by law,whichonly increasedthesenseamongmostnoblesthat they were aliens in theland of their birth. Afterfructidor in 1797, in thereaction against the renewedthreat of royalism, nobleswere indeed legally madealiens, and deprived of theirrights as French citizens.They were now ci-devants,relics of a former time, nobetter than the thousands oftheir traitrous relatives who

hademigratedratherthanliveinacountrysochanged.

Once war began, émigréswhorefusedtoreturn,andfora time even those related tothem, were deprived of theirproperty. Itwas added to thesaleable stock of nationallands.Butnoblepropertywasunder attack almost from thebeginning, in the formof the‘feudal regime’ abolished on

the night of 4 August 1789.Feudalrightswerenotalwaysvery lucrative, and theirincidence varied enormously.But there was no doubt oftheir vast symbolicsignificance, as earlierpeasant attacks on weathervanes and other lordlyappurtenances bear witness.And although, recognized bythe Assembly as a form ofproperty,duesweresupposedto go on being levied until

bought out, most peasantsstopped paying them at onceand never offeredcompensation. In 1793, theConventionconfirmedthefaitaccompli,andthe‘timeofthelords’ rapidlybecameamerefolk memory. But theabolitionofthefeudalregimewasonlythemostdirectblowsufferedbynoblesasaresultof the night of 4 August.What began as an attempt topacify the peasantry soon

broadened out into an attackon privileges in general.Nobleswerealreadyresignedto the loss of their separatefiscal status, and to a regimeof careers open to talentsrather than to birth orinheritance. These had beentheoverwhelmingdemandofthe third estate cahiers, andmany noble ones had alsoendorsed them. Now theypassed into law.More subtlewas the impact of the

abolition of venality ofoffices. The ostensible pointwas to open the judiciary totalentandability;butvenalityhadbeen the sourceofmanyof the privileges that hadproliferated since thesixteenth century, andthroughthesaleofennoblingoffices it had become themainavenueofentryintothenobility.Thewholecharacterof the French nobility hadbeen transformed by these

procedures;butnowitsimplyceasedtorecruit–arecipeforeventualextinction.

Corporatism andprivilege

But the bonfire of privilegeson4Augustwasgeneral.Asthe implementing decree of11 August put it: ‘All

particular privileges ofprovinces, principalities,countries,cantons, townsandcommunities of inhabitants,whether pecuniary or of anyother nature, are irrevocablyabolished, and will remainabsorbed into the commonlaw of all French people.’This was to consign thewhole chaotic and luxuriantvariety of the old regime tooblivionandopenthewaytoa more rational and uniform

organization of the countryandof society.Theoldorderhad been corporative, everyorganizationdefiningitselfbyitsprivilegesandmonopolies.But the revolutionaries of1789 did not believe inmonopolies of any sort,which they saw asconspiracies against thepublic or national interest.This included all types ofprofessional organizationsand trade guilds,whichwere

abolishedbytheAllardeLawof 23 April 1791; andcombinations of artisans,primitive trade unions,forbiddenbytheLeChapelierlaw of 14 June following,which declared ‘theannihilation of all sorts ofcorporationsofcitizensofthesamecallingorprofession’tobe ‘one of the fundamentalbases of the Frenchconstitution’.

The greatest corporation ofallwasofcoursetheChurch:independently wealthy,largely self-governing, andowingpartofitsallegiancetoa foreign potentate beyondtheAlps.Aswiththenobility,the clergy’s loss of separaterepresentation in the Estates-General heralded far moresubstantial damage. Clericalelectors had hoped that thenewregimewouldstrengthenthe role of the Catholic

Church in national life aftertwo generations ofphilosophic erosion, butinstead the clergy foundthemselves appalled andapprehensive at theuncompensated abolition oftithe on 4 August. Religiousfreedom, vouchsafed a fewweekslaterintheDeclarationof theRightsofManand theCitizen,wasafurtherblowtotheir spiritualmonopoly.Theconfiscation of Church lands

inNovemberspelledthefinalend of the Church’sindependence; and madeinevitable too the dissolutionof monasteries and theabrogation of monastic vowsin the following spring. Theelective civil constitution ofthe clergy then destroyed thehierarchical autonomy of theChurch, and priestly proteststhat one way or another itmust give its consent to anysuch changes only aroused

the anti-corporative fury oftheNationalAssembly.

The confessionalstate

Itwas not surprising that thepope anathematized the civilconstitution, and his enmitywas only confirmed inSeptember1791whenFrance

annexed his territories ofAvignon and the Comtat-Venaissin. All this meantthat, when France went towar the next year, Frenchsoldiers would make aparticular point of attackingecclesiastical institutions andinstallations wherever theywent. By the Year II theRepublichadevenabandonedthe ‘constitutional’ churchcreatedunder theConstituentAssembly, and had become

the enemy of all religiousestablishment. In September1794, although the extremesof dechristianization wereover, theRepublic renouncedall religious affiliations; butthroughout the Directorythere were periodiccrackdowns on suspectrefractory clergy, whenhundreds were sent to the‘dry guillotine’ of Guiana inSouth America, while inGermany and Italy territories

ruled by the Church weresecularized. The youngNapoleon, still making hisreputation, was too cautiousto do more than bully thepope. But generals whosucceeded him in 1798dissolvedthepapalstates,setup a secular ‘RomanRepublic’, and carried thepontiff off to captivity inFrance. Many thought thatwhen Pius VI died there inAugust1799thepapacyitself

hadcometoanend.

Dynasticdiplomacy

ItwassavedbytheAustrians,who allowed a conclave tomeet in Venice severalmonths later. They did itmainly to spite the Frenchenemy which had plaguedthem since 1792. In

diplomatic terms the wars ofthe French Revolutionbrought to an end an uneasyand unpopular alliance withAustria which went back to1755 and was blamed bothfor thedisastersof theSevenYears War and for bringingMarie-Antoinette to France.But even before the breakwith Austria, therevolutionaries had begun tospurn the old dynasticdiplomacy. When in May

1790theKingofSpaincalledupon France, in the name ofthe long-standing ‘FamilyCompact’ between theBourbon rulers of the twokingdoms, to back Spainagainst Great Britain in aterritorial dispute overNootkaSound(onthePacificcoast ofNorthAmerica), theNational Assembly refused.The new France, it declared,would only fight to preserveits national territory from

attack and not to honour theprivate compacts of dynasts.‘It is not’, one deputy laterdeclared, ‘the treaties ofprinces which govern therights of nations.’ Thisseemed to turn intosomething like principle thediplomaticnullitythatFrancehad fallen into in 1787, andwhich the decay of her armyin the meantime had onlycompounded. That decayproved irreversible, as early

defeats in the war of 1792showed; and even if it wasthetrainedartilleryoftheoldregime which saved the newrepublic at Valmy, by thebeginning of 1793 it wasobvious that an entirely newsort of army would berequired to fight the war ofnational survival that theconflict so thoughtlesslylaunched the previous Aprilhad become. The new army,capitalizing on the advantage

of France’s vast population,wouldbemadeup largelyofcitizen conscripts. No longerwould its recruitment dependon the volunteering ofdrifters,itsnumberssustainedby regiments of foreignmercenaries. Nor would itstactics and behaviour be theself-contained, tightlycontrolledmanoeuvresofoldregime forces, dependent ontheirbaggagetrainsandmoreconcerned to preserve their

ownexpensiveexistencethanto take battle to the enemy.The restraint and timidity ofoldregimewarfarecaneasilybe caricatured andexaggerated; nevertheless itwas mild indeed comparedwith the all-out conflictwaged by the French – and,increasingly,theiradversaries–overthenextgeneration.Sodynastic diplomacy, and thestyle of warfare which hadunderpinned it, scarcely

survived the 1790s. WhenNapoleon,whobuilt a careeronmasteryofthenewwayoffighting,attemptedtobuttresshis monarchical pretensionsby marrying an Austrianprincessin1810,ittookonlythree years before he foundhimself once more at warwith his father-in-law inVienna.

Colonialslavery

It was of course the costs ofwar that had brought downthe old monarchy, but thecrucial element in theescalation of those costs hadnotbeen thearmy.Whathadbeen really ruinous was theadded burden of navalcompetition with GreatBritain,wherethestakeswere

not dynastic advantage, butworldwide economichegemony.Frenchhopesherehad been blighted by thedefeats of the Seven YearsWar, but not destroyed. AndevenifhelpingtheAmericanstotheirindependencehadnotyielded the hoped-forbenefits, fortunes in theIndianOceanrevived,Frenchislands were the mostflourishing in the Caribbean,and the ports serving them,

suchasBordeauxandNantes,were the most spectacularlyexpanding cities in thekingdom. The Revolutionruined all this for ever. Amovement proclaimingequality and freedomprovoked turmoil in islandsbuilt on slavery and racialdiscrimination. In Saint-Domingue, themostvaluableterritory on earth in 1789,chaos among whites andmixed-race creoles opened

theway threeyears later toamassive uprising among the450,000 black slaves – thegreatest slave revolt inhistory, and the mostsuccessful. Attempts to re-establish control in 1793culminated in the firstabolition of slavery inmodern times, endorsed bythe Convention in Paris inFebruary 1794. But by thenrenewed war against GreatBritainhadseveredlinkswith

overseas colonies. AttemptsbyNapoleonduringthepeaceof Amiens in 1802 toreimpose slavery by amilitary expedition to Saint-Domingue also failed, and inits aftermath the formerslaves established theindependent state of Haiti.Meanwhile the French slavetrade had collapsed, and theeconomyofthegreatAtlanticports shrivelled. Thepopulation of Bordeaux

shrank by 15 per centbetween 1790 and 1801, andseven years later Napoleonwasshockedbytheemptinessof its immense quayside. Bythen,themainimpedimenttomaritime trade was theBritish navy, which hadcompletely destroyed itsFrench rival between 1798and 1805, and used itstriumphtoimposethetightestblockade ever known on thecontinental coastline. But

when thewars finally ended,there was no hope of everreconstructing the oldAtlantic economy of slaves,sugar, and coffee. When, ageneration later, Frenchimperial ambitions revived,Africa and Indochina wouldbe the main targets, andcommercialincentives,whichhaddriventhecreationofthepre-revolutionary empire,weresecondary.

Redrawnmaps

And by then not only theFrench empire had fallenapart. As early as 1795French armies destroyed theDutch Republic and, byforcing its successor‘Batavian’sister-republicintoanallianceagainsttheBritish,opened Dutch colonies inthreecontinentstothehostile

depredations of the tyrant ofthe seas. Meanwhile theoldest political entity inEurope, the thousand-year-old Holy Roman Empire ofthe German Nation, wassteadily dismembered, aprocess accelerated byNapoleon and brought to aconclusion in 1806 when heforcedFrancisIItoresigntheimperial crown and retreatinto a purely Austrianhereditarymonarchy.Nobody

ever thought seriously oftrying to revive the corpsewhen Napoleon fell nineyears later. When, finally,Napoleon deposed theSpanish Bourbons in 1808and flooded Spain withFrench troops, the world’slargest and furthest-flungcolonial empire absolveditself from any obligation toobey orders from Madrid.Some parts, such asVenezuela, declared their

independence almostimmediately. Bolívar, the‘Liberator’ who led thismovement,hadonce idolizedNapoleon as a republicanhero and saw theestablishment of the Frenchempire as a betrayal ofrevolutionary ideals. But inany case attempts by thereactionary Ferdinand VII toreimposetheoldregimeafterthe Bourbon restoration inSpain merely provoked the

whole of Spanish SouthAmerica into republicanresistance. It had triumphedeverywhere by the mid-1820s, the last ripples of therepublicanism launched inParisin1792.

Achievabledreams

For those who lived through

all,orevenpart,ofthesevastupheavals, the shock wasoverwhelming. From June1789onwards,thediariesandobservations ofcontemporaries echo withwonderand increasinghorrorat the scale of what wasoccurring. Nobody waspreparedfor it.Andalthoughfrom the start revolutionarieswere happy to depict theirmovement as the triumph ofeighteenth-century

‘philosophy’ andEnlightenment (an analysisruefully accepted bymost oftheircriticsandenemies),itishard to imagine eitherVoltaire or Rousseaurevellingintheeventswhich,from only eleven years aftertheir deaths, were often soglibly attributed to theirinfluence. Robespierre, asproudadiscipleasanyoftheEnlightenment, declared:‘Politicalwriters…hadinno

way foreseen thisRevolution.’ They hadexpected that reform, if itcame at all, would occurgradually andpiecemeal, andwould be the work ofenlightened authoritariansrather than electedrepresentatives. In thesecircumstances, the sort ofheadlong, comprehensivechange undertaken by therevolutionaries wasexhilarating. The English

poet Wordsworth was farfromtheonlypersontofeelitablissfulmomenttobealive,andthatchangewaspossible:

Not in Utopia,subterraneanfields

Orsomesecretedisland,Heavenknowswhere!

But in the very world,whichistheworld

Ofallofus…

Nothing, in other words,needed to be accepted anymore as set in the nature ofthings. If the mighty Frenchmonarchy, the nobility andthe feudal law fromwhich itjustifieditspre-eminence,notto mention the CatholicChurch itself, could bechallenged and rejected ongroundsof rationality,utility,

and humanity, then nothingwas beyond challenge.Dreams of all sorts wereachievable. Rousseau hadtaught that human societywas hopelessly corrupt andcorrupting,andthatonlytotalchangecould redeem it.Thatwaswhyhewas such a heroto the revolutionaries: theyhad proved his vision to bepossible. Never again wouldinstitutions, habits, or beliefsbe accepted merely because

thiswashowtheyhadalwaysbeenorwere(anotherwayofputting it) ordained by God.The Revolution overturnedforeveraninnocentworldofunquestioning compliancewhere most things seemedbeyond change or remedy.The German philosopherKant, in a famous essay of1784, had definedEnlightenment as mankind’semancipation from self-imposed immaturity, and

unwillingness to think freelyfor oneself. The propositionwas purely intellectual. Kantthought Enlightenment couldonlyprogressslowly,andthata revolution would neverproduceatruereforminwaysof thinking. Five years later,he changed his mind.Althoughhebelieved thatnorevolutionwas ever justified,he convinced himself thatwhathadhappenedinFrancewas a voluntary surrender of

powerbyLouisXVI,becausehe recognized that themoment of emancipationfromunthinking routines andsupine reflexes had suddenlyarrived.

Resistance andpersistence

And yet: although the

Revolution symbolized theassertion of political willagainst the constraints ofhistory, circumstance, andvested interest,revolutionaries soon foundthemselves learning the hardlessonthatwillalonewasnotenough to destroy the oldregime.Itfoughtback;anditis the strength anddetermination of resistanceand counter-revolution thatlargely explains the ferocity

of the terror. And when allthe strength that therevolutionaries could musterhad been spent, terrorabandoned, and Napoleonfinally defeated,many of thethings that revolutionarieshad sought to destroy in andafter1789werestill there,orhad rapidly re-emerged.Napoleon himself, whosecareer is inconceivablewithout the Revolution, wasresponsible for many of the

revivals.Heinturnsawthemas the mere recognition ofpoliticalrealities.

Despite dechristianization,religious practice had notbeen stamped out. In fact, itwas the mainspring ofopposition to the new order,and showed no sign ofabating. The concordat withthepope,however,reconciledCatholics with the new

regime by re-establishingtheir Church. Similarly withnobility. Born a noblehimself, Napoleon knew aswell as anyone that blueblood couldnot be abolishedshort of exterminating allthose who believed theypossessed it. And so heencouragedémigréstoreturn,and ignored directoriallegislation depriving ci-devants of their citizenship.He also knew that the orders

and distinctions particularlyassociatedwith nobilitywerethesortof‘baublesbywhichmenaregoverned’.ThatwaswhyheintroducedtheLegionof Honour, with its scarletribbonsandinsignia,in1802.Finally, in 1808, he set up afull-blown imperial nobility,making special efforts torecruit authentic nobles fromtheoldordertoit.Bythen,ofcourse, he hadmade himselfahereditarymonarch, andhe

believed that no crownedhead could look authenticwithoutacourtandanobility.And his rule was even moreabsolute than that of theBourbons,withprefects evenmore omnicompetent thanthose hated agents of the old‘despotism’,theintendants.

Whenhefell,moreover,noneofthisdisappeared.Althoughthe line of hereditary

succession would twice beinterrupted, with theexception of the years 1848–52 France would be amonarchy down to 1870,under either Bourbons or aBonaparte. Noble statuswould be officiallyrecognized throughout thattime, and in the 1820sémigrés would becompensated by the state forthe lands theyhad lost in theRevolution. Prefects

continued to representauthority in the country atlarge, and even a form ofvenalityofofficesre-emergedamong notaries and otherlegal functionaries. TheCatholic Church, meanwhile,remained established in itsNapoleonic form, its priestspaid out of state funds, until1905.In1825,CharlesX,lastsurviving brother of LouisXVI, even underwent anelaborate coronation, in the

traditional setting of ReimsCathedral,toreconsecratethebondbetweenhisdynastyandGod.Acasualobservermightbe forgiven for concludingthatallthedestructivezealofthe Revolution had achievednothing.

Illusoryrestorations

But nothing would be moresuperficial. Apart from itsgaudy trappings, themonarchy of Napoleon hadlittle in commonwith thatofLouis XVI. Consciouslyimperial, it sought to evokeCharlemagne rather than theBourbons. There were nobuilt-invehiclesofoppositionsuch as the parlements orprovincial estates. Thenobility which the Emperorcreated to decorate his

monarchical pretensions wasmuch smaller than its pre-revolutionary namesake,enjoyed no legal privileges,and titles were not evenhereditary without a certainlevelofwealth.Entrywasbyimperial nomination, not bypurchase of venal office.Moreoldnobles shunned thechance of joining such afactitious creation thansuccumbed to Napoleon’sinducements.

Nor was the restoredmonarchyofLouisXVIIIandCharles X at all like that oftheir martyred brother. Inmany respects, as has oftenbeen said, it was not histhrone but Napoleon’s thatthey inherited. None of theold regime governmentalapparatus was brought backand theCivil Code remainedthe backbone of French law.For much of the restorationperiod the state was

compelled to rely on menwho had establishedthemselves under theEmperor. And if the oldnobility was formallyrecognized once again,imperial titles were stillaccepted and the Legion ofHonour maintained. On theother hand, the CharterproclaimedbyLouisXVIIIin1814, which served as thebasis of a constitution downto1848,wasimbuedwiththe

spiritof1789.Inpracticetherestoration monarchy wasconstitutional, with regularelections to the lower houseof a two-chamber legislature,guarantees of individual andpress freedom, and equalitybefore the law and intaxation. Above all, perhaps,the Charter, just likeNapoleon when his rulebegan, explicitly confirmedthe revolutionary landsettlement.Landsconfiscated

from the Church and theémigrés and then sold onwouldnotbereturnedtotheiroriginal owners. Indeed, bygranting the indemnity of1825 to those who had lostlands, the government ofCharles X unwittinglyendorsed the loss. And sosuccessiveregimesprofessingto deplore the work of theRevolution accepted andguaranteed the massivetransferofpropertythatithad

effected.

This alone was enough toensure that the CatholicChurch restored under theconcordat bore littleresemblance to the formerGallican church. Withoutlands,endowments,ortitlesitwas dependent on the statefor all its material supportapart from the piousdonations of the faithful. All

beneficed clergy were nowstate nominees. The oldchaotic and unevenecclesiastical geography hadgone, too, as had theChurch’s exemptions andfiscal privileges, and theinstitutional independence ofregular assemblies of theclergy. Nor were monasticordersallowed to re-establishthemselves – althoughwithout endowments therewould in anycasehavebeen

littleprospectofthat.Finally,religious toleration ensuredthat the official confessionalunity of the old regime(alreadycrumbling,toclericaloutrage, by 1789) had alsogoneforever.

Although it liked to depictitself as a restoration ofthroneandaltar, theBourbonregime that succeededNapoleon changed little of

this. The more extreme, orultra, supporters of theBourbons would have likednot so much to restore thepre-revolutionary Church, astomakeitevenstronger thanit had been then. TheyblamedtheRevolutionontheundermining of religiousauthority under the oldregime.Buttheironlysuccesswas the passage of anunenforceable act in 1825stipulating the death penalty

for sacrilege. Meanwhile thepiousbehaviourofCharlesXat his coronation arousedmore ridicule than reverence.The cousin who succeededhim as Louis-Philippe aftertheRevolutionof1830nevermade any claims to rule bythegraceofGod,butmerelyas the choice of the FrenchNation.

Aworldtransformed

Attempts outside France torestore what the FrenchRevolution or its influencehad smashed were similarlydoomed. Here Napoleonmade no contribution. Hisstrongestclaim,indeed,tobethe instrument of theRevolution is perhaps theway he systematically

demolished the old order inItaly, Germany, and Spain,annihilating whole states,introducing the Civil Codeand the concordat. Only inPoland,wipedoffthemapbypartitioning powers in 1795in the face of Frenchimpotence, and perhapsindifference, did he resurrectanechooftheoldorderintheDuchy of Warsaw. After allthis, there was no prospectthat the Congress of Vienna

whichmettoestablishapost-Napoleonic Europe couldrestore anything like theinternational old regime. Infact, it redrew frontiers andreallocated sovereigns quiteasconfidentlyashehad,anddid nothing to restore anyecclesiastical principalitiesexcept the pope’s own inItaly. It is true that all thegreatpowersofthe1780shadre-emerged stronger thanever; but the ‘concert of

Europe’bywhichtheysoughttoprevent futureconflictsona Napoleonic scale wasentirely new, and owed littlebeyond a vaguely expresseddesire for ‘balance’ to theruthless and opportunisticinternational order of theeighteenthcentury.Similarly,the‘HolyAlliance’toutedbyEastEuropeanmonarchsafter1815 was more redolent ofthesixteenthcenturythantheeighteenth,andwasformedto

pre-empt the disruption ofEurope by the forces of anyotherGodlessrevolution.

Even, therefore, whenattempts were made to bringback the old regime orelementsof it, theseattemptscould never be innocent.They were always infused,notonlybyawareness that ithad once fallen, but also byconvictions about what had

broughtitdown,andbywhatmight have prevented thedisaster. There would be nopoint in restoring an oldregime that was just asvulnerable as before. So notrue restoration was everpossible, and althoughmonarchies, nobilities, andchurches might all reappearafter revolutionary attemptsto annihilate them, none ofthem really resembled theirgeneric namesakes of before

1789. Despite appearances,fewof the thingsattackedbytheRevolution truly survivedunscathed.

Quite literally, nothing wasanylongersacred.Allpower,all authority, all institutionswere now provisional, validonlysolongastheycouldbejustified in terms ofrationality and utility. In thissense, the FrenchRevolution

really did represent thetriumph of theEnlightenment, and usheredin thementalworld inwhichwestilllive.

Chapter5Whatitstarted

The Revolution began as anassertion of nationalsovereignty. Nations – notkings, not hereditary elites,not churches – were the

supreme source of authorityin human affairs. It was thisconviction which led theNationalAssemblyin1790todeclare that France wouldnever make war except inself-defence,andimpelledtheConvention, two years laterasthenewRepublicappearedto have survived the hostileonslaughts of the leagueddespots ofGermany, to offerfraternity and help to allpeoples seeking to recover

their liberty. It only took afew months for theConvention to recognize theimpossibility of such anopen-ended pledge; and theforces unleashed by theRevolution would bedefeated, a generation later,by an alliance of kingssupported by intransigentnobles and vengeful priestswhospurnedanythoughtthatnations could be sovereign.Nevertheless a new principle

of political legitimacy hadbeen irrevocably launched,andwithinahundredyearsofthe apparent triumph ofreaction in 1815, thesovereignty of nations hadachieved acceptancethroughout Europe and theAmericas. In the twentiethcentury it would be invokedinitsturntoexpelEuropeansfrom all their overseascolonies.

Totalitariandemocracy

Whatconstitutesanationhasremained problematic.Sieyès’ definition of 1789,usedtolambasttheprivilegesof the nobility, was ‘A bodyof associates living undercommon laws andrepresented by the samelegislative assembly’. It

proved a beginning, but nomore – too loose for thosewho considered language,traditions, and territory atleast as important. Butnations, once self-defined,have seldom been contentover the last twocenturies tobe governed by authoritiesnot of their own choosing.The revolutionaries of 1789assumed that nationalsovereignty could only beexercised representatively,

butwithintenyearsNapoleonhad begun to show how itcould be appropriated tolegitimize dictatorship andeven monarchy. Each of thesteps he took between 1799and 1804 towards makinghimself a hereditary emperorwas endorsed by a plebisciteresponding to a carefullyphrased question.The resultswere never in doubt and allwere almost certainly riggedto make them even more

emphatic. His nephewNapoleon III would use thesame device to give nationallegitimacytohisownseizureof power in 1851 and 1852;and as recently as 1958 theFifth Republic was launchedby a referendum giving vastpowers toGeneraldeGaulle.TheworldbeyondFrancehadto wait mostly until thetwentieth century for thetechniques of plebiscitary ortotalitarian democracy to

becomewidespread; but theywere as firmly rooted in thegreatlegitimizingprincipleof1789 as any of the moreliberal ideals alsoproclaimedthen.

Liberalism

Theterm‘liberalism’wasnotinvented until Napoleon’s

powerwas in decline. Itwasfirst used to describe theaspirations of the Cortes ofCadiz between 1810 and1813 to establishrepresentative government inpost-Napoleonic Spain. Butwhat the Spanish liberalsdreamedofwasbasedon thepolitical model firstestablished in France by theConstituent Assembly:representative governmentunderpinned by a written

constitution guaranteeing abasic range of human rights.These would constitute theminimum demands ofpoliticalreformersthroughoutthe nineteenth century anddowntotheoverthrowof thelast absolute monarchy inRussia in 1917. The essenceof liberal beliefs was to befound in the Declaration ofthe Rights of Man and theCitizen. That meant freedomto vote; freedom of thought,

belief, and expression; andfreedom from arbitraryimposition or imprisonment.Liberals believed in theequality embodied in theDeclaration, which meantequality before the law,equality of rights, andequalityofopportunity.Theydid not, however, believe inequality of property, andoneof the main functions of therule of law which theyconsistently invoked was to

secure property owners intheirabsoluterights.

Beyond that there was scopefor wide disagreement. Notuntilthetwentiethcenturydidmore than a small minorityaccept that women shouldenjoy the same liberty andequality as men; and duringthe Revolution the few boldspiritsofeithersexwhomadeliberal claims on behalf of

women were ridiculed orsilenced. One reason whyFrenchwomenhadtowaitsolong for the political rightstheyfinallyachieved in1944wasthatthepoliticiansoftheThird Republic feared thatfemale voters would bedominated by their priests:ever since 1793 women hadproved the mainstay ofCatholic resistance torevolutionary secularism.Racial equality left liberals

ambivalent too. The firststirrings of anti-slaverysentimentinFrancecoincidedwith the onset of theRevolution, but slaves wereproperty, and their laboursunderpinned a vast networkofwealthandcommerce.Thedangers of loosening theirbonds seemed vividlydemonstrated by the greatslave uprising in Saint-Domingue in 1791. In anattempt to regain control

there, the Convention’srepresentatives proclaimedthe abolition of slavery, andinFebruary1794 theiractionwas confirmed in Paris. Thedeputies congratulatedthemselves on being the firstrulers ever to abolish slavery– which they were, but onlythrough recognizing a faitaccompli. Napoleon in anycase restored it less than tenyears later in islandsremaining under French

control, and regimesostensibly more liberal thanhis maintained it until therevolutionariesof1848madeitpartoftheirfirstbusinesstohonourthelegacyof1794.

The new ConstituentAssembly that made thisgesture had been elected byuniversalmanhoodsuffrage–afurtherbelatedhomagetoaprinciple used to elect the

Conventionin1792butneversince. Even then it hadexcluded servants and theunemployed. The men of1789 had been much morerestrictive.Theybelievedthatonlypropertyownershadtheright to politicalrepresentation: if all werenowcitizens,only thosewitha minimum level of wealthcould beactive citizens. Thedistinction reflected amistrust of popular

participation in public life asold as history, butwhich theevents of the Revolution didnothing to dispel.Revolutionwas born amid riot,intimidation, and bloodshedin the crisis of 1789, andpopularviolenceorthethreatofithadflickeredthroughoutthe early years beforebursting out with appallingcarnage in the SeptemberMassacres of 1792.Everybody recognized how

much the vengeful demandsof the sansculottes had doneto precipitate terror a yearlater, so that when, after itended, the Conventionproduced the constitution of1795itdeliberatelysetouttoexclude even more peoplefrompubliclifethanin1791.Therebyapatternwassetforhalf a century, under whichrepresentative regimeswouldrepresent only the very rich,people with something to

lose; and evenunrepresentativeregimes,likeNapoleon’s, would studytheirinterestsandseektorulewiththeircooperation.

ThePeople

Theproblematicparadoxwasthat a revolution whichushered in the principles of

liberalism could not havecome about without popularsupport. The people of Parishad saved the NationalAssembly on 14 July, andperhaps in October 1789 aswell. What only counter-revolutionaries still dared tocall mobs were nowmanifestations of the peoplearoused and in action, andvoicescouldalwaysbefoundto justify their excesses. Theferocious Marat, in his

newspaper The People’sFriend, built a journalisticcareer on doing so, and afterhisassassinationin1793,wasrevered (and commemoratedin David’s most memorablepainting) as a martyr to thepopular cause. By 1792popular activists wereglorying in being‘sansculottes’, and after theoverthrow of the monarchypopulist style and rhetoricdominated public life for

about three years, politeforms of dress and addresswereabandoned,andpoliticalrightswereequalized(atleastamong men). An egalitarianconstitution was proclaimedor at any rate promised,vouchsafing free educationand ‘the social guarantee’ ofwelfare support for theindigent, the sick, and thedisabled.Meanwhile the richwere mulcted in a forcedloan, there was talk of

redistributing the property ofémigrés and traitors to poorpatriots, and prices of basiccommodities were kept lowby the maximum. All thesepolicieswereabandonedafterthe fall of Robespierre; butalmost at once they began tobe regarded by many as thelost promise of true socialequality. Babeuf and his co-conspirators of 1796proposedtobasetheirseizureof power on the never-

implemented constitution of1793.Later, SocialistswouldlookbacktotheYearIIoftherevolutionarycalendartofindthe earliest ‘anticipations’ oftheir ideals at the momentwhen the People enteredpolitics for the first time inpursuitoftheirowninterests,rather than as the tools ofmorepowerfulmanipulators.

9. Marat assassinated:Jacques-Louis David’srevolutionarypietà

Terror

But here too there was aproblematic paradox. TheYear II was also the time oftheterror,whoselastphaseatleast looked very like socialrevenge in action. Werepopular power and terrorinseparable? Drawing ontheoretical justificationsframedat the timebyoratorssuchasRobespierreorSaint-Just, some later Socialist orCommunist revolutionariesdidnotshrinkfromaccepting

thatonlyexterminationwoulddefeat the enemies of thepeople. There could be notruerevolutionwithoutterror.And although the nineteenthcentury shuddered at thememory of the revolutionarytribunalandtheshowtrialsitconducted, the twentiethwouldseethemechoedundermany regimes claiminglegitimacy from revolutions.Manylatersympathizerswiththe Revolution’s broad

aspirations wereunderstandably reluctant tobelieve that society couldonly be made more equalthrough bloodshed. They,alongwith liberalswhowereasconcernedbythethreatstopropertyheard in theYear IIas the threats to life, saw theterror as at best a cruelnecessity, forced upon theFirst Republic not by theinexorable logic of theRevolutionbutbytheforceof

‘circumstances’. In a countrydivided by rashly imposedreligious choices and thefeckless behaviour of LouisXVI and his queen, thefortunes of war dictatedextrememeasuresofnationaldefence as the distinctionbetween opposition andtreason became blurred. ButtheRevolutionwasawarningof what might happen ratherthan a prescription of whatmust.

Leftandright

All such perceptions weregrounded in the convictionthat, however mixed itscharacter, there was moregood in the Revolution thanbad. Thiswas the view fromthe left, itself a way ofdescribing politics whichoriginated in the Revolution,when proponents of further

change tended in successiveassembliestositontheleftofthe president’s chair, whileconservatives congregatedonhis right. The right, in factmodern politicalconservatism,was asmuch acreation of the FrenchRevolutionasallthethingsitopposed. The instinctiveinertia of the ancien régimehad gone forever: those whosought to preservegovernments, power

structures, and socialinstitutionsfromrevolutioninthenewsensewereobligedtoformulate unprecedentedrationales and strategies fordoingso.

Conspirators andrevolutionaries

Thecollapseoftheoldorder,

andtheheadlongchangesthatfollowed, took everyone bysurprise. In the confusion ofthenextfiveyears,withevermore horrific news ofdestruction, outrage, andmassacre, bewilderedonlookers cast about forexplanations for such aboundless upheaval. Hostileobservers thought it couldonly be a conspiracy. As anetworkofpoliticalclubs,theJacobins, emerged as the

vectors of the revolutionaryradicalism, it began to besuspected that these werenone other than themysterious freemasons whohad proliferated sospectacularly over theeighteenth century. Deisticbut tolerant (and condemnedtwiceforthatbytheCatholicChurch) and glorying insecrecywhileinvokingvaluessuch as liberty, equality, andbenevolence, masonic aims

and ideas seemed inretrospect to be corrosive ofall established values – eventhough the old elites hadflocked to join lodges. Nocredible causal link has everbeen established betweenfreemasonry and the FrenchRevolution or indeed theJacobin clubs, but in 1797 abook purporting todemonstrate their connectionin a plot to subvert religion,monarchy, and the social

hierarchywas aEurope-widebestseller. Barruel’sMemoirsto Serve for the History ofJacobinism remained in printinto the twentieth century,reflecting an undyingsuspicionofamovementthatbefore 1789 had alarmednobodyexceptafewparanoidpriests. So indelibly, indeed,didfreemasonrynowcometobe associated in certaincontinental countries withrepublicanism and anti-

clericalism, that to join alodge became a gesture ofradical political conviction –which it had never beenbefore the Revolution.Conservative regimes, rightdown to the Nazis and theirVichy puppets, wouldaccordingly continue to viewfreemasonrywith thedeepestsuspicion, and wouldperiodically close itsnetworksdown.

10. The enduring legend:Eugène Delacroix’s Liberty

LeadingthePeople(1830)

Nor were such suspicionsentirely groundless, in thesense that throughout thenineteenth century manypoliticalradicalshadcometobelieve that theway to bringabout revolutionactuallywasthrough secret conspiracies.Before 1789 there was no

suchthingasarevolutionary.Nobody believed that anestablishedordercouldbe socomprehensively overthrown.But once itwas shown to bepossible,thehistoryofFrancein the 1790s became theclassic episode of modernhistory, whether asinspiration or warning, amodelforallsidesofwhattodoorwhattoavoid.Notevensympathizers could afford toaccept that conspiracy was

not a way to achieverevolution,becauseotherwiseit would be the work of ablind fate beyond theinfluenceofconscioushumanagency. And so the 1790sthemselvessawsecretgroupsplotting revolution in manycountries of Europe. InPoland and Ireland theyplayed a significant part inbringing about vast andbloody uprisings. Theirdefeated leaders who had

turned to France for help,menlikeTadeuszKosciuszkoand Wolfe Tone, have beenreveredeversinceasprophetsor martyrs of nationalindependence.Andwhen theRevolution in France itselfbegan to disappoint itsadherents, a genuine Jacobinplotwashatched–butagainstthe new regime rather thanthe old. The first attempt inhistory at communistrevolution, Babeuf’s

‘conspiracy of equals’ of1796failedmiserably;buthisco-conspirator Buonarrotispent the rest of a long lifesetting up conspiratorialrevolutionary networks, andperpetuated the memory ofthefirstoneinabookof1828(Conspiracy for Equality)which inspired threegenerations of subversivesand became a sacred text ofsuccessful Communism afterthe Russian Revolution of

1917. Throughout the firstquarter of the twentiethcentury, in fact,whenRussiaexperienced two revolutions,Frenchprecedentsbecameanobsession among Russianintellectuals, and in 1917even the leading playersbrooded constantly on whowere the Jacobins, who theGirondins, and whether aNapoleonwas lurkingamongthem.

Patterns andparadigms

In France itself, meanwhile,recourse to further revolutionhad been a standard, and formany people entirelyreputable,politicaloption formuch of the nineteenthcentury. When in 1830Charles X seemed poised toabandon even the attenuated

parts of the revolutionarylegacy accepted by hisbrother Louis XVIII as theprice for succeedingNapoleon,hewasoverthrownby three days of insurgencyon the streets of Paris. Hiscousin and successor Louis-Philippe ostentatiously flewthe tricolour, and hoped toreconcile the bitterly dividedtraditionsoriginatingin1789.Hefailed,andwasdrivenoutin his turn by more popular

defiance in the revolution of1848. Another Bonaparteclosed this one off, but hisdefeatintheFranco-PrusssianWar led to the bloodiestepisodesince the terror– theParis Commune of 1871 inwhichperhaps25,000peopledied. The very namecommune evoked 1792, andmany communards sawthemselves as sansculottesreincarnate,fightingthesameenemiesastheFirstRepublic

– Royalists, Catholics,duplicitous generals, and thegreedy rich. Only the lastcategory derived muchbenefit from their defeat,however, and the ThirdRepublic which emergedfromthetraumasof theearly1870s would glory inrevolutionary imagery andmodestly pursue democraticand anticlerical aspirationsfirst articulated in the 1790s.Forhalfacenturyafter1917,

many French intellectualsregarded the RussianRevolution as the belatedfulfilment of the promise oftheir own, and thehistoriography of therevolutionary decade wasdominated bymembers of orsympathizerswith theFrenchCommunist party. But theirgripon theRevolutionbeganto be challenged from themid-1950s,and,astheSovietempirecrumbledin1989,the

hegemonic interpretation ofthebicentennialyearwasthatof the neo-conservative, ex-CommunistFrançoisFuret.

Although he saw terror asinherent in the Revolutionfromitsverybeginning,Furetnevertheless saw therevolutionary experience asthe foundation of modernpolitical culture. Americanshave the best grounds for

disputing this, with afounding revolution thatpreceded the French one bymore than a decade. Havinghelped to make Americanindependence possible, manyFrench contemporariescertainly found thetransatlantic exampleinspiring,butnobodythoughtit could be transplanted toEurope.Bythetimethatmostenduring monument toeighteenth-century political

creativity, the United Statesconstitution, was finalized,the French were engaged intheir own constitution-making and claiming, withsome justice, that theirrevolution was like no otherin history, and owed littleexcept fraternal good feelingto previous upheavalselsewhere. The Americansthemselvesweresoonenoughbitterlydividedaboutwhetherthe new France was in any

sensethesamecountrywhichhad helped them toindependence, and uncertainabout how much of its newregime they could admire.Remote from the oldercontinent, ambivalent aboutcontactswithit,andspeakingwhat was still a peripherallanguage, America wasmarginalized by the FrenchRevolutionuntilthetwentiethcentury – even if it owed itswestward expansion to the

sale by Napoleon ofLouisianain1803.

Conservatism,reaction,andreligion

Convinced, meanwhile, thatwhat had allowed an oldregimeofstability,deference,and order to be overthrownwas a lack of vigilance,

Europeanconservatismstruckout at the sources ofsubversion.Before the 1790swere out, all governmentswere rapidly expanding theirrepressive resources, with aproliferation of spies andinformers and experimentswith regular public policeforces. Lists of suspectswould be routinely kept andtheir movements tracked.Strict censorship would beimposed on all forms of

publishing, and the press,blamed for disseminatinginsubordination and freethought both before andduring the Revolution,subjected to the closestsupervision.Among themostefficient of these repressiveregimes would be that ofNapoleon himself, who,although a product of theRevolution, sought togroundhis appeal in reassuringproperty owners that the

social threat of Jacobinismhad been stifled. Napoleonalso recognized that theoriginal,andstillthedeepest,woundinflictedonFrancebythe Revolution had been thequarrel with the RomanCatholicChurch;andnothingdid more to bring theRevolutiontoanendthanhisconcordat with Pius VII. Hewas convinced, like allconservative regimes afterhimthroughoutthenineteenth

century, that the firmestsupport for order andauthority lay in a secure andrecognizedrole fororganizedreligion, in which he sawnothingmoreorlessthan‘themysteryofthesocialorder’.

Traumatized by theexperience of the 1790s,which included the firstattempt in history in 1793 tostamp out religious practice

entirely, and then therenunciation by theConvention the next year ofall religious affiliation (thefirst overt creation in thehistoryofEuropeofasecularstate), theChurch for its partwas only too eager to renewits age-old alliance withsecular powers. Theexperience proved less thansatisfactory. Within eightyears of concluding theconcordat, Pius VII found

himself, like his predecessor,aFrenchprisoner,deprivedofhis central Italian dominions,and about to undergo fouryearsofrelentlessbullyingbyNapoleon. Fromimprisonment on St Helena,the former emperor claimedthathehadplannedtoabolishthe papacy outright. TheBourbonswhosucceededhimweremuchfriendlier towardstheChurch,buttheyhadlonggivenupanyideaofreturning

it to its position of before1789. An attempt torenegotiate the concordatfoundered, and the newregime confirmed the loss ofChurch lands whichNapoleon had insisted thepopeacceptasapreconditionof the original negotiation.Fromnowon the fortunesofthe Church echoed everyvicissitudeintheFrenchstatethroughout a turbulentcentury;andwheneventually

that state became a republicvaunting itsdescent from theone which had severed alllinks between Church andstate in1794, the coursewasset for a separation whicheventually occurred in 1905.Beyond France meanwhile,although the pope receivedhis Italian territories back in1814, ecclesiastical rule wasnotrestoredanywhereelseinEurope, and Italiannationalists increasingly

regarded the papal states asthemainobstacle tounifyingthe peninsula. Until thedownfall of Napoleon III in1870, monarchical Francewas the papacy’s mainsupporter; but, increasinglyembattled, Pius IX fell backuponpowersthatwerenotofthisworld.TheendofFrenchsupport, and with it theabsorption of former papalterritories into the newkingdom of Italy, coincided

with thepromulgationby theVatican Council of thedoctrine of papal infallibility– never beforeunambiguously claimed forfear of the reactions ofsecular rulers. And what theexperience of Church–staterelations had demonstratedsince1790wasthatfaithwasat least as likely to flourishwithout the backing of thestate as with it. The lessonwasreinforcedwhenthenew

German empire launched theKulturkampf against theCatholicChurchinthe1870s.Rome would continue toanathematize the FrenchRevolution as the origin ofmodern impiety and anti-clericalism, a change happilyaccepted by all those whogloriedintheseattitudes.Butthetraumasofthe1790salsobegan a process of slowrecognitionwithintheChurchthat it might be better off

independent of secularauthority, free to make itsowndecisionsanddemandingonly toleration for itspracticesandactivities.Whenpower was offered it, as inmid-twentieth-century Spain,or in Ireland, the clergy stillfoundithardtoresist;butinaworld (again traceable to theFrench Revolution) whereregular political change wasnormal and to be expected,the unwisdom of identifying

too closely with any regime,however sympathetic, hasbecome more and moreobvious to thoughtfulchurchmen.

The Church continued, afterall, to pay the penalty ofclinging too closely toreactionary and repressiveregimes throughout thenineteenthcentury.Aslateasthe 1920s, the later stages of

the Mexican revolutionbrought conscious echoes ofthe dechristianization of1793, and theCristero revoltof devout Indians in supportof the embattled churchrecalled theVendée revoltofthatsameyear.Thelastgreattriumph of extreme anti-clericalism, however, strucknot so much at the CatholicChurch(oratleastnotuntilitreached Poland,Czechoslovakia,andHungary

after 1945) as the RussianOrthodox. By 1922, Leninhad ‘reached the firmconclusion thatwemustnowinstigate a decisive andmerciless battle against theclergy, we must suppresstheiroppositionwithsomuchcruelty that they will notforget it for several decades.The more … we succeed inshooting for this reason, thebetter’. Like several of themore zealousdechristianizers

of 1793, Stalin had trainedbefore the Revolution as apriest, and the Soviet Unionunder his rule was officiallycommittedtoatheismandtheeradication of ‘superstition’.Most churches were closed,many demolished, anddevotion was largely keptalive (as in France in the1790s) by peasant women.These policies weremaintained, although lessruthlessly,afterhisdeath;and

yettheChurchre-emergedasthe Soviet Union collapsed.Its East European satelliteregimes, meanwhile, knewbetter than to confront theCatholicChurch too fiercely.The emergence of a popefromPolandin1978mightbeseen, in retrospect, as a signof the Church’s recoveringconfidence at the momentwhenan ideologyofextremesecularism first formulatedalmost two centuries earlier

wasbeginningtocrumble.

Rationalization

The revolutionary critique ofreligion, even before itbecameanall-outattack,waspartofthewidercommitmentof the men of 1789 topromoting rationality inhuman affairs. The collapse

of the old regime, theythought, presented themwithanopportunitytotakecontrolof their circumstances andremould them according to aconscious plan or set ofprinciples. Nobody beforehad ever had such anextraordinary chance. Whentheir armies and Napoleon’sin turn overthrew other oldregimes, they gave theirsubjects – forced upon them,indeed – the same chance.

The keynote of all the newarrangements and institutionswhich now appeared wasrationality and uniformity.Administrative maps andboundaries were redrawn,divisions equalized,anomalies of all sortseliminated. The departmentsinto which France was thendivided remainedunmodifieduntil the twentieth century.Uniformity of means ofexchangeandcommunication

was also introduced –currency, weights andmeasures, and language;underpinned by a centralizedand carefully regulatedsystem of education, and asimple,concisecodeoflaws.Some of these things wereonly sketched out or barelybegun in the 1790s; but thedrive and singleness ofpurpose of Napoleon fixedmost of them firmly in placeand established them all as

goals to be pursued bysuccessive regimes.Thiswashowmodern states organizedthemselves. It is true that,under the inexorablepressureof interstate competition,moves in this direction hadalready been underway in anumber of countries before1789: but they were bitterlycontentious, and it wascontention over just suchmoves thatbroughtdowntheFrench old regime. The

Revolution swept theinstitutions and forces ofresistance aside, both inFrance and wherever elseFrench power reached. In sodoing, it offered an objectlesson to all regimes of howeasymodernizationcouldbe,givendetermination.

Or so it seemed. In reality,the victories of the FrenchRevolutionhadbeenfarfrom

easy. They had only beensecured though paranoidsavagery at home andmilitary ruthlessness abroad.Tothe16,000officialvictimsof the terror shouldbeaddedperhaps 150,000 more whoperished in the fighting andreprisals of 1793–4. Thedevastated Vendée, in fact,has been identified by someof its most recent historiansasthefirstmodernattemptatgenocide. The wars against

old regime Europe between1792 and 1815 cost the livesof well over 5 millionEuropeans (1.4 million ofthemFrench)–aslaughterasgreat, although over a longerperiod, as that of the war of1914–18. Such costs wereoverlooked,orbrushedaside,bylaterobserversinspiredbythe ambitions andachievements of therevolutionaries.Thecorollarywas that when such

enthusiasts triumphed, as intwentieth-century Russia orChina, the carnage wasrepeated. Nor have thevictories achieved at suchcostendured.

Alimitedlegacy

The legacy of the FrenchRevolution to the nineteenth

century,wehaveseen in thischapter,wasmomentous, butalways partial and oftenparadoxical. The regimes ofrevolutionary Communismestablished in the twentiethcentury have not outlasted itin Europe, and those stillsurviving beyond aretransforming themselves inways which would haveoutraged their foundingfathers.Whathasdefeatedtherevolutionary impulse in the

longtermisthepersistenceofcultural diversity.Rationalizing ideologiesimposed by state power, andthe intellectuals andadministrators who haveplaced such faith in themsince 1789, have neversucceeded in effacing theimportance of less rationalsources of identity in habits,traditions, religious beliefs,regional and local loyalties,ordistinctlanguages.Perhaps

themost ambitious of all theRevolution’s rationalizationswastheattempttorestarttimeitselffromthefoundingoftherepublic in September 1792.The very months wererescheduled and renamed,and seven-day weeksreplaced by ten-day‘decades’.Itnevercaughton,and the revolutionarycalendar was officiallyabandoned by Napoleon atthe end of the year XIV

(1806). It was a portent ofmanyotherfailuresofreasonin the face of humanresistance or indifference.And with the collapse sincethemid-1980sofmostof theworld’s regimes ofCommunist universalism,these forces have re-emergedwithrenewedvigour.EvenincountrieswhereCommunismnever triumphed in thetwentieth century, includingFrance, decentralization and

devolution,acknowledgementof linguistic diversity, andabandonment by the state ofobligations too readilyassumedor acquired,markedthe last two decades of thetwentieth century. As thebicentenary of 1989 recedes,what was intended as acelebration of the enduringvalues launched by theRevolution begins to seemmoreliketheirfuneral.

Chapter6Whereitstands

‘The whole business nowseems over’, wrote theEnglish observer ArthurYoung in Paris on 27 June1789, ‘and the revolution

complete.’ People wouldrepeatedly make the sameobservation, usually more inhope than conviction, overthe next ten years untilNapoleon officiallyproclaimed the end of theRevolution in December1799.Eventhenallhemeantwas the end of a series ofspectacular events in France;hewas to continue to exportthem for another sixteenyears. Besides, the

Revolution was not simply ameaningless sequence ofupheavals. These conflictswere about principles andideas which continued toclash throughout thenineteenth century, andwouldbereinvigoratedbythetriumphs of MarxistCommunisminthetwentieth.Thus it still seemedoutrageous to many Frenchintellectuals when, in 1978,the historian François Furet

proclaimed, at the start of acelebrated essay, that ‘TheFrench Revolution isfinished’(terminée).

Ahistoricalchallenge

What he meant was that theRevolutionwasnow,oroughtto be, a subject for historicalenquiry as detached and

dispassionate as that ofmedievalists studying (hisexample) the Merovingiankings.WhereasthehistoryoftheRevolutionas ithasbeenwritteninFranceformuchofthe twentieth century hadbeen more a matter ofcommemoration thanscholarly analysis, itslegitimacymonopolized by asuccessionofCommunists orfellow-travellers entrenchedin the university hierarchy.

Furet’s attack was suffusedwithpersonalhistory.Thougha Sorbonne graduate, he hadalways despised theuniversity world, and hadbuilt a career in the rivalEcole pratique des HautesEtudes (later EHESS). ACommunist in youth, like somany others he wasdisillusioned by the SovietinvasionofHungaryin1956,andrenouncedtheparty.Andwhen he and a fellow

apostate,DenisRichet,wrotea new history of theRevolution in 1965, theywereunanimouslydenouncedby leading specialists in thesubject as intruders, notqualified in the subject,who,in offering an interpretationsuggesting that it had‘skidded off course’, hadtraduced the Revolution’sessentialunityofpurposeanddirection.By 1978Furet hadabandoned this view, but not

the enmities it had aroused.For the rest of his life (hedied in 1997), he pressedhome his attack, particularlyduring the debates of thebicentenary. As that yearcametoanend,hecheerfullyproclaimedthathehadwon.

The classicinterpretation

What had he defeated? Hecalled it the ‘Jacobino-Marxist Vulgate’. Hisopponents called it the‘classic’ interpretation of theRevolution.Itsbasiswas(andis, since despite Furet’striumphalism it retains manyadherents)theconvictionthatthe Revolution was a forcefor progress. The fruit andvindication of theEnlightenment, it set out toemancipate not just the

French, but humanity as awhole, from the grip ofsuperstition, prejudice,routine, and unjustifiablesocial inequities by resoluteand democratic politicalaction.Thiswasthe‘Jacobin’bedrock, differing little fromthe professions of countlessclubbists in the 1790s. As ahistorical interpretation, itbuilt on the work ofnineteenth-centurycustodiansof revolutionary traditions,

most famously perhaps JulesMichelet, that apocalypticidolizer of ‘The People’.Confident and complacent,the Jacobin perspective wasdisturbed only by the terror,which it did not seek todefend except as a cruelnecessity and a reflex ofnationaldefence.

Around the turn of thetwentieth century, this

historiographical Jacobinismbegan to acquire a newpolitical overlay. From 1898the great left-wing politicianJeanJaurèsbegan toproducea Socialist History of theFrench Revolution whichemphasized its economicandsocial dimensions andintroduced an element ofMarxist analysis. Marxhimself had written littledirectly on the Revolution,butitwaseasyenoughtofita

movement which had begunwith an attack on nobles andfeudalism into a theory ofhistory that emphasized classstruggle and the conflictbetween capitalism andfeudalism. The FrenchRevolution from thisviewpoint was the keymoment in modern history,when the capitalistbourgeoisieoverthrewtheoldfeudal nobility. Thefundamental questions about

it were therefore economicand social. At the verymoment when Jaurès waswriting, a fierce youngprofessional historian, AlbertMathiez, was beginning alifelong campaign torehabilitate Robespierre,under whose terroristic ruleclear ‘anticipations’ of latersocialist ideals had appeared.Mathiez set out to stamp hisown viewpoint on the entirehistoriography of the

Revolution, and his nativevigour was redoubled from1917 by the example andinspiration of the BolshevikRevolution in Russia, whichseemed to revive the lostpromise of 1794.Robespierre’s Republic ofVirtue would live again inLenin’s Soviet Union.Mathiez only belongedbriefly to the CommunistParty, but he established aparallelhistoricalpartyofhis

ownintheformofa‘Societyof Robespierrist Studies’. Itsjournal, the AnnalesHistoriques de la Révolutionfrançaise, is still the mainFrench-language periodicaldevoted to the Revolution.Apart from the years ofVichy,when it was silenced,from thedeathofMathiez in1932untiltheadventofFuretthis society and its membersdominated teaching andwriting about the Revolution

in France, and its successiveleading figures occupied thechair of the History of theRevolution at the Sorbonne.When Furet launched hispolemics, the incumbent ofthis apostolic successionwasthe lifelong CommunistAlbert Soboul (d.1982),againstwhoseconvictionsthewaters of what he naturallycalled ‘revisionism’ broke invain.

Revisionism

But revisionism had notbegun with Furet. Itoriginated in the English-speakingworldinthe1950s–in England with AlfredCobban, in the USA withGeorge V. Taylor. Althoughmany of the great minds ofnineteenth-centuryanglophone culture had been

fascinated by the FrenchRevolution and Napoleon,interestlapsedduringthefirsthalf of the twentieth century.Thehandfulofhistoriansstillattracted to the subjectworked little in France andachieved almost norecognition there. After theSecondWorldWar,however,as Western democracyappeared threatened byMarxists both domestic andforeign, it seemed urgent to

rescue the great episodes ofmodern history fromtendentious distortions. BothCobban and Taylor chose toconfrontwhat theycalled theFrench ‘orthodoxies’ head-on. It was a myth, Cobbanclaimed, that therevolutionaries of 1789 werethe spokesmen of capitalism;the deputies who destroyedthe ancien régime wereoffice-holders andlandowners. In any case,

Taylor argued, most pre-revolutionary wealth wasnon-capitalist, and suchcapitalism as there was hadno interest in the destructionof the old order. Thatdestruction, indeed, so farfrom sweeping away theobstacles holding back athrusting capitalistbourgeoisie, proved aneconomic disaster and droveeveryone with money toinvest inthesecurityof land.

Takingtheircuefromthevastrange of questions raised bythese critiques, throughoutthe 1960s and 1970s a newgeneration of scholars fromEnglish-speaking countriesinvaded the French archivesto test the new hypotheses.Bythe1980stheyhadlargelydemolished the empiricalbasis and the intellectualcoherence of the ‘classic’interpretation of theRevolution’sorigins.

Initially the Frenchmaintained their traditionaldisdain for the ‘Anglo-Saxons’, dismissing Taylorand Cobban as cold warriorswhohadreadtoomuchBurkeandwishedonly todisparagethe Revolution as acontinuing threat to thehegemony of the Westernbourgeoisie. But when Furetand Richet challenged theclassic interpretation fromwithin the introverted world

of French culture, theRobespierrists were forcedonto the defensive. Furet,who had no problems withtheEnglish language, hadbythe early 1970s begun toincorporate the findings andarguments of the foreignersinto his own interpretations;as well as those of acompatriot long neglected inFrance but always takenseriously by Englishspeakers, Alexis de

Tocqueville (d. 1859).Tocqueville saw theRevolution as the advent ofdemocracy and equality butnot of liberty. Napoleon andhis nephew, whom thisaristocrat of old stock hated,had shown how dictatorshipcould be established withdemocratic support, since theRevolution had swept awayall the institutions which, inimpeding the relentlessgrowth of state power, had

keptthespiritoflibertyalive.These insights persuadedFuret that theRevolutionhadnot after all skidded offcourse into terror. Thepotential for terror had beeninherent right from the start,from the moment whennational sovereignty wasproclaimed and norecognition given to thelegitimacy of conflictinginterests within the nationalcommunity. For all its

libertarian rhetoric, theRevolutionhadnomorebeendisposed to tolerateopposition than the oldmonarchy, and the origins ofmodern totalitarianismwouldbefoundintheyearsbetween1789and1794.

Post-revisionism

This was more thanrevisionism.TheapproachofCobban, Taylor, and thosewho came after them haslargely been empirical,undermining the sweepingsocial and economic claimsof the classic interpretationwith new evidence, butseldom seeking to establishnew grand overviews. Themost they claimed was thattheRevolutioncouldbemoreconvincingly explained in

terms of politics,contingency, and perhapsevenaccident.This is largelythe approach adopted inearlier chapters of this book.Such suggestions did notsatisfybolderminds.AsFuretbegan to depict a Revolutionin the grip of attitudes andconvictions which propelledit inevitably towards terror,others, mostly in America,soughtwiderexplanationsforrevolutionary behaviour in

cultural terms. They saw anumber of ‘discourses’emerging from the politicalconflict between 1770 and1789, which laid thefoundation for much of theuncompromising languageand arguments of therevolutionaries. Borrowingfrom the speculations of theGerman left-wingphilosopher JürgenHabermas,theyarguedthatinthe generation before the

Revolution public opinionescaped from the king’scontrol, and that in theprocessrespectandreverencefor the monarchy ebbedaway. Furet found theseinterpretative trends evenmorecongenial than thoseofearly revisionism, and spentincreasingamountsoftimeinAmerica and at conferencesabroad, where yet anothergeneration of young scholarscommitted to the cultural

approachtreatedthetriumphsof revisionism as yesterday’sbattles.By1987,thesetrendswere crystallizing into a neworthodoxy, and were beinglabelledaspost-revisionism.

Thebicentenary

Whatever might be saidagainst the classic

interpretation, it was at leastcoherentandcomprehensible.By contrast, the ‘linguisticturn’ of post-revisionism,increasingly influenced byphilosophers and literarytheorists, produced muchabstruse material that couldbarely be understood outsidespecialist circles. When,therefore, the Socialistpresident of France decreed,some years in advance, thatthe revolutionary bicentenary

of 1989 must be celebrated,he entrusted the academicside of the festivities to thestill well-entrencheddefendersofwhatSoboulhadcalled, just before he died,‘our good old orthodoxy’.Soboul’s successor at theSorbonne, Michel Vovelle,was given a worldwidemission of coordinatingacademic commemoration.Heworked so hard at it thateventually doctors instructed

him to stop. But the learnedbicentenary proved just asunmanageable as the morepublic one. While bothVovelle and Furet touredcolloquia in every continent,they never appeared togetheron the same platform, andFuret and his cohortsboycotted the biggestconference of the yearorganized by Vovelle inParis. This was scarcely theattitude of scholarly

detachment for which Furethad seemed to be calling in1978. As a subject arousingsectarian passions, theRevolution was clearly farfrom finished, even for thoseclaimingitwas.

11. Scholarly overload: Thereaction of reviewers to thebicentenary(DailyTelegraph,3June1989)

The bicentenary, in fact,released a torrent ofvituperative publishing, mostofitdenouncingoneaspectoranotheroftheRevolutionandits legacy. Particularly vocal

in France were defenders ofthe Vendée rebels, the mostpersistent contemporaryFrench enemies of theRevolution, and inconsequence victims of themost savage repression. Theheroism of devout peasantguerillas, long derided assuperstitious fanatics, wasnow lovingly chronicled.Catholic clergy remindedtheir flocks of when modernimpiety had begun. In the

English-speaking world,meanwhile, while hundredsof learned gatherings pickedover the debris of ageneration of scholarlyclashes, and publishers andthemediafeltobligedtomarkthebicentenaryinonewayoranother, the sensation of theyear was the publication ofSimon Schama’s Citizens, avast ‘chronicle’ of theRevolutionwhichignoredthehistorical debate almost

entirely in the interests oftelling a colourful and luridstory. The overall messagewas the folly of undertakingrevolutions (one fortunatelylost on the East Europeanswho were at that momentdefying Soviet satelliteregimes). Yet there was anintellectual stance behindSchama’s Dickensiannarrative,anditwasbasicallythe same as Furet’s. Theterror, declared the most

famous sentence in thebook,was merely 1789 with ahigher body count; and‘violence… was not just anunfortunate side effect … itwas the Revolution’s sourceof collective energy. It waswhat made the Revolutionrevolutionary’. Significantly,Schama’s taleendedabruptlyin 1794 with the fall ofRobespierre and the end oftheterror.

One of the favouritemantrasof the Revolution’s classicinterpreters was taken fromGeorges Clemenceau, thestatesman of the ThirdRepublic who gloried in theachievements of the First.The Revolution, he declared,was a bloc. It had to beaccepted in its totality, terrorand all. It could not bedisaggregated. Revisionism,with its emphasis on thecontingent, the accidental,

and the reality of choicesfacing those involved,suggestedotherwise–ashadtheyoungFuretwhenheandRichet spoke of theRevolution skidding offcourse. Only by approachingevents as contemporarieshadto, without an awareness ofhorrors to come, couldregicide, dechristianization,and the guillotine bepreventedfromthrowingtheirshadows over what preceded

them, as they did overeverything that followed.Post-revisionists, however,turned against this approach.In emphasizing the culturalconstraints that determinedwhathistory’sactorscouldorcould not think or do, theyopened the way to adeterminism not unlike thatof the economic and socialfactors emphasized by theclassic historians in theirMarxist-inspiredheyday.And

in insisting that terror wasinherent in the Revolutionfrom the start, Furet made itthe central issue bywhich tojudge the movement’s entiresignificance. For post-revisionists of all stamps, infact, the Revolution was asmuch a bloc as it was forthose they claimed to havevanquished.

It was, of course, a different

sort of bloc. And while thepost-revisionist emphasis onthe centrality of terrorencouraged blanketdenunciationsnotonlyof theRevolution but also of theveryattempttocommemorateit, there were also plenty ofcelebrations throughoutFrance, as Mitterrandintended, of two hundredyears of human rights.Vovelle, for his part, whilereiteratinghiscommitmentto

left-wing values traceableback to Jacobinism, refusedto accept that there had beenanysortofcontestwithFuret,observing meekly thatscholarlyenquirywasopentoall viewpoints. But, apartfrom a few hard-lineCommunists,theadherentsofthe once-hegemonic classictradition emerged from thebicentenary chastened. In the1990s, the AnnalesHistoriques de la Révolution

began gingerly to open itspages tonon-membersof theRobespierrist studies circle,and to reviewtheirbooksforpurposes other thandenunciation. The chair ofMathiez,Soboul,andVovelleis now occupied by ahistorianof theVendée.Andalthough since the death ofFuret new sympatheticanalyses of Jacobinism havebegun to appear, they havebeen anxious to deny that

terror was part of itsmainstream. The heaviestblows, however, were notdelivered by scholarlyrevisionists or post-revisionists.They came fromthe spectacular collapse ofSoviet Communism, and therepressive attempts of itsChinese variant, just a fewweeksbefore14July1989,toshore up its authority againststudents calling for libertyandsingingtheMarseillaise.

Theendofadream?

Awareness of the fullrepressive record of SovietCommunism had beengrowing at least sinceKrushchev had begun todenounceStalin in1956.Butso long as the Soviet Unioncontinued apparentlyflourishing and powerful, itcould be argued that its

Marxist ideologyworkedandthat its bloodypast had beena worthwhile price to pay tosecure popular democracy.Similar arguments had beenusedtojustifyterrorin1793–4, and by later pro-Jacobinhistorians. When the rule ofGorbachev revealed thewhole Soviet edifice to beunviable, and incapable ofsustaining its sister-republicsin Eastern Europe, thisdelusion collapsed.A regime

invested for seventy yearswithallthehopesanddreamsrepeatedlyfrustratedsincethefall of Robespierre hadproved scarcely moresuccessful, and at far heavierhuman cost, than theprototype which it and itsfriendsheldinreverence.TheChinese, whose historicalloyaltiesweresimilar,hadnoanswertotheirowndomesticcritics other than to shoot orimprison them. If such

regimeswerethetrueheirsofthe French Revolution, thenTocqueville and Furet wereright in their perception thatits significance laynot in theenhancementoflibertybutinthepromotionofstatepower.Faith in the benevolentpotential of a rationalizingstate was the first, andperhaps the last, illusion oftheEnlightenment;andinthissense the FrenchRevolution,and all the others that

followed over two hundredyears, were its authenticheirs.Theillusiondiedwhilsthistorians in the Westsquabbledabouthow,orevenwhether, to mark theRevolution’s secondcentenary.

But of course totalitarianpeoples’ democracy was notthe only legacy of ways ofthinking that first triumphed

in the 1790s. FrançoisMitterrand’s decision tocelebratetherightsofmanatthe bicentenary was morethan a doomed attempt todissociate thememory of theRevolutionfromthe terror. Itwas also a recognition thatthe ideology of human rightswas, if anything, moreimportant than it had everbeen.Regimesoftyrannyandmassacre have no monopolyin the heritage of the

Revolution. Citizens ofmodern constitutionaldemocracies whose civil andpolitical rights areguaranteed, and whose lifechances are equal before thelaw, can find much in it tocelebrate.TheambitionoftheFrench Revolution was socomprehensive that almostanyone living since can findsomething there to admire aswellastodeplore.Norareallthe battles it launched yet

over. If the collapse ofCommunism can be seen asdefeat for Jacobins, theEuropean Union looks verylike a Girondin project tobring the liberal benefits of1789toEuropeasawhole.Inturn, this aspiration meetsmost resistancefromnationalreflexesfirstfullyarousedbythe challenges emanatingfrom revolutionary France.‘The barest enumeration ofsome of the principal

consequencesof1789’,wrotean eminent literary critic in1987, even before the fullsymbolic significance of thebicentennial year hademerged,

enforce the realisationthat the world as weknow it today… is thecomposite of reflexes,political assumptionsandstructures,rhetorical

postulates, bred by theFrench Revolution.More than arguably, forit entails subsequent, sooften mimeticrevolutionarymovements andstruggles across the restoftheplanet, theFrenchRevolutionisthepivotalhistorical-social dateafter that of thefoundation ofChristianity … Time

itself, the cycle of livedhistory, was deemed tohave begun a secondtime … 1789 continuestobenow.

G.Steiner,‘AspectsofCounter-Revolution’,

inG.Best(ed.)ThePermanent

Revolution

The last word, however,should perhaps be left to the

author with whom this bookbegan. ‘That,mydearAlgy’,saysErnestWorthing, ‘is thewholetruthpureandsimple.’‘Thetruth’,hisfriendreplies,‘is rarely pure and neversimple.’

Timeline:Important datesof the FrenchRevolution

BEFORE

1756–1763

SevenYearsWar

1770

FutureLouisXVImarriesMarie-Antoinette

1771–4

Maupeouremodelsparlements

1774

AccessionofLouisXVI.DismissalofMaupeou

1776

AmericanDeclarationofIndependence.Neckerjoinsgovernment

1778

FranceentersAmericanWarofIndependence.DeathofVoltaireandRousseau

1781 Neckerresigns

1783

PeaceofParis;Calonnebecomesfinanceminister

1787 AssemblyofNotables

1788

8Aug.Estates-Generalconvokedfor1789

16Aug.Payments

suspendedfromTreasury

Oct.–Dec.SecondAssemblyofNotables

27Dec.Doublingofthirdestate

DURINGFeb.–June.Elections

1789 toEstates-General

Feb.Sieyès,WhatistheThirdEstate?

5May.Estates-Generalconvene

17May.NationalAssemblyproclaimsnationalsovereignty

20May.TennisCourtOath

27May.Ordersfinallyunite

14July.Bastillefalls

July.‘GreatFear’incountryside

4Aug.Abolitionoffeudalism,privileges,andvenality

26Aug.DeclarationofRightsofManandtheCitizen

5–6October.‘OctoberDays’:womenmarchtoVersailles,kingandAssemblymovetoParis

2Nov.Churchpropertynationalized

12Dec.Assignatsintroduced.

1790 13Feb.Monasticvowsforbidden

22May.Foreignconquestsrenounced

19June.Nobilityabolished

12July.CivilConstitutionoftheClergy

16Aug.Parlementsabolished

27Nov.Oathoftheclergy

Nov.Burke,

ReflectionsontheRevolutioninFrance

1791 Mar.Paine,RightsofMan

2Mar.Guildsdissolved

13Apr.PopecondemnsCivilConstitution

14May.LeChapelierlawbanstradeunions

20–21June.FlighttoVarennes

16July.LouisXVIreinstated

17July.ChampdeMarsmassacre

14Aug.SlaverebellioninSaint-Domingue

27Aug.DeclarationofPillnitz

14Sept.LouisXVIaccepts

constitution

30Sept.ConstituentAssemblydissolved

1Oct.LegislativeAssemblyconvenes

19Dec.LouisXVIvetoesdecreesagainstémigrésandunswornpriests

20April.War

1792 declaredonAustria

25April.Firstuseofguillotine

13June.PrussiadeclareswaronFrance

20June.Sansculottesinvaderoyalpalace

30June.FédérésenterParis

singingtheMarseillaise

10August.Overthrowofmonarchy

2–6Sept.Septembermassacres

20Sept.FirstvictoryofFrenchforcesatValmy

21Sept.Conventionmeets

22Sept.Republicproclaimed

19Nov.Fraternityandhelpofferedtoallpeoples‘seekingtorecovertheirliberty’

3and26Dec.TrialofLouisXVI

179316Jan.LouisXVIcondemnedtodeath

21Jan.Kingexecuted

1Feb.WaragainstBritishandDutch

11Mar.Vendéerebellionbegins

19Mar.DefeatinBelgiumatNeerwinden

6April.CommitteeofPublicSafetycreated

31May–2June.

PurgeofGirondins

June.Spreadof‘FederalistRevolt’

13July.Maratassassinated

27July.RobespierrejoinsCommitteeofPublicSafety

23Aug.Levéeenmassedecree

27Aug.Toulon

surrenderstotheBritish

5Sept.SansculottesforceConventiontodeclareterrortheorderoftheday

29Sept.Generalmaximumonprices

Oct.–Dec.Dechristianizationcampaign

5Oct.Revolutionarycalendarintroduced

9Oct.FallofLyontoConvention’sforces

16Oct.Marie-Antoinetteexecuted

31Oct.Girondinsexecuted

19Dec.Fallof

Toulon

23Dec.VendéansdefeatedatSavenay

1794 4Feb.Abolitionofslavery

24Mar.ExecutionofHébertists

5Apr.ExecutionofDantonists

8June.FestivaloftheSupreme

Being

10June.Lawof22prairialinaugurates‘GreatTerror’inParis

27–8July(9–10thermidor).FallofRobespierre;endofterror

Aug.–Dec.‘ThermidoreanReaction’

18Sept.Republicrenoucesallreligiousaffiliations

12Nov.Jacobinclubclosed

24Dec.InvasionofDutchRepublic

17951–2Apr.Germinaluprisingofsansculottes

20–23May.Prairialuprisingof

sansculottes

8June.DeathofLouisXVII

24June.DeclarationofVeronabyLouisXVIII

27June–21July.EmigrélandingatQuiberon

22Aug.ConstitutionofYearIIIandTwoThirdsLaw

approved

1Oct.Belgiumannexed

5Oct.VendémiaireuprisinginParis:‘whiffofgrapeshot’

2Nov.Directoryinaugurated

1796 19Feb.Abolitionofassignats

11April.BonaparteinvadesItaly

10May.ArrestofBabeufandconspiratorsforequality

1797

18April.BonaparteforcespeacepreliminariesofLeobenontheAustrians

29June.CisalpineRepubliccreated

4September.Councilsand

Directorypurgedincoupoffructidor

30Sept.BankruptcyofTwoThirds

18Oct.PeaceofCampoFormioendswaronthecontinent

179815Feb.RomanRepublicproclaimed

11May.Electoral

resultsannulledincoupoffloréal

19May.BonapartesailsforEgypt

21May.Irishrebellion

1Aug.BattleoftheNile.BonapartemaroonedinEgypt

5Sept.Jourdanlawuniversalizesconscription

1799

26Jan.ParthenopeanRepublicproclaimedinNaples

12Mar.Austriadeclareswar:WaroftheSecondCoalition

10Apr.PopePiusVIbroughttoFrance

18June.Directory

purgedincoupofprairial

22Aug.BonaparteleavesEgypt

29Aug.DeathofPiusVI

9Oct.BonapartelandsinFrance

9–10Nov.Bonapartetakespowerincoupof18–19brumaire

25Dec.Consular

constitutionpromulgated

1800

14June.FirstConsuldefeatsAustriansatMarengo.Negotiationswithnewpope,PiusVII,follow

3Dec.FinaldefeatofAustriansatHohenlinden

1801 16July.Concordat

signed

1802

27Mar.BritishmakepeaceatAmiens.EndofFrenchrevolutionarywars

18Apr.Concordatpromulgated

AFTERPromulgation

1804 oftheCivilCode

1804

CoronationoftheEmperorNapoleon;endoftheFirstRepublic

1806

DissolutionoftheHolyRomanEmpire

Depositionof

1808 SpanishBourbons

1812

NapoleoninvadesRussia;retreatfromMoscow

1814–15

FirstBourbonrestoration

1815

20March–22June.The‘HundredDays’

18June.FinaldefeatofNapoleonatWaterloo

1815–30

Restorationmonarchy

1821DeathofNapoleononSt.Helena

1830June:Revolutionof1830

JulyMonarchy:

1830–48

reignofLouis-Philippe

1835Büchner,Danton’sDeath

1836

Carlyle,TheFrenchRevolution.AHistory

1840

ReturnofNapoleon’sremainsto

France

1848February.Revolutionof1848

December.Louis-NapoleonBonaparteelectedpresident

1848–52

SecondRepublic

SecondEmpire:

1852–70

reignofNapoleonIII

1856

Tocqueville,TheAncienRegimeandtheFrenchRevolution

1859 Dickens,ATaleofTwoCities

1870

Franco-PrussianWar;abdicationof

NapoleonIII1871 ParisCommune1873–

1940 ThirdRepublic

1905Separationofchurchandstate

1917 RussianRevolution

1940–4 VichyState

1944–58

FourthRepublic

1958 FifthRepublicestablished

1989BicentenaryoftheFrenchRevolution

THE REVOLUTIONARYCALENDAR: introduced inOctober 1793 and datingfrom 22 September, theanniversaryofthedeclarationof theRepublic, the calendarremained in official use until1806. The names of itsmonths, invented by Fabred’Eglantine,wereintendedtoevoke the seasons, but defyeasy translation. ScornfulBritish contemporaries,however, rendered them:

Slippy, Nippy, Drippy;Freezy, Wheezy, Sneezy;Showery, Flowery, Bowery;Heaty, Wheaty, Sweety.Twelvethirty-daymonthsleftfive days over. These dayswere originally calledsansculottides, but under theDirectory were relabelledcomplementary days. Belowisaconcordancebetweentherevolutionary and Gregoriancalendars.

Furtherreading

If this book has achieved itsaims, readers will not besurprised to learn that theliterature of the FrenchRevolution is truly vast.Muchof thedetailedwork is

alsoinFrench,althoughthereismore of quality inEnglishthanonmosthistoricaltopicsoutside the anglophonesphere. Fortunately most ofthe books in the followingvery select list havesubstantialbibliographiesandoften detailed footnotes fromwhich particular aspects ofthe subject can be pursuedbeyondanythingpossibleinaveryshortintroduction.

Generalsurveys

M.Broers,EuropeunderNapoleon 1799–1815(London, 1996).Treats theNapoleonicepicasaprolongationof the Revolution. Atourdeforce.

W. Doyle, The OxfordHistory of the FrenchRevolution (Oxford,1989). Not simply

about the RevolutioninFrance, but also itsimpactonEuropeasawhole.

F. Furet, RevolutionaryFrance 1770–1870(Oxford, 1992). Theleadinglatetwentieth-century Frenchauthority sets theRevolution in thelonger-term sweep ofhiscountry’shistory.

C. Jones, The LongmanCompanion to theFrench Revolution(London, 1988). Aninvaluablecompendiumofusefulinformation.

A.Mathiez,The FrenchRevolution (London,1928). The classicaccount: compellinglywritten withpassionate

commitment.

S. Schama, Citizens. AChronicle of theFrench Revolution(London, 1989). Thebestseller of thebicentennial year,immensely readable,extremely long,accelerating towardsan abrupt conclusionin1794.

D. M. G. Sutherland,France 1789–1815.Revolution andCounter-Revolution(London, 1986). Richin detail, taking inNapoleon as well asthe revolutionarydecade.

Interpretations

T. C.W. Blanning, The

French Revolution,ClassWar or CultureClash? (London,1998). Spikilyreadable reflectionsonthedirectionofthedebate since the1950s.

A. Cobban, The SocialInterpretation of theFrench Revolution(2nd edition,Cambridge, 1999). A

reissue of thefounding text ofrevisionism, with anintroduction byGwynneLewis.

F.Furet,InterpretingtheFrench Revolution(Cambridge, 1982).Furet’s initialmanifesto against the‘Jacobino-MarxistVulgate’.

G. Lewis, The FrenchRevolution.RethinkingtheDebate(London, 1993).Vigorously writtenattempt to salvageclassic traditionsfroma generation ofrevisionism and post-revisionism.

C. Lucas (ed.),Rewriting the FrenchRevolution (Oxford,

1991). Bicentenniallectures by aninternational panel ofauthorities.

J. M. Roberts, TheFrench Revolution(2nd edition, Oxford,1999). Thoughtfulreflections on theRevolution’sambiguities.

A. de Tocqueville, The

Old Regime and theRevolution (London,1988). There aremany editions of thismost enduring ofanalyses.Thisonehasa useful introductionbyNormanHampson.

Origins

R.Chartier,TheCulturalOrigins of theFrench

Revolution (Durham,NC, 1991).Authoritative post-revisionistsurvey.

W.Doyle,OriginsoftheFrench Revolution(3rd edition, Oxford,1999). Contains ahistoriographicalsurvey as well as ananalyticalaccount.

G. Lefebvre, The

ComingoftheFrenchRevolution (Princeton,1947). The bestanalysis in the classictradition.

B.Stone,TheGenesisofthe FrenchRevolution. AGlobal-historicalInterpretation(Cambridge, 1994).Attempts to set theorigins in a wider

context.

T. Tackett, Becoming aRevolutionary. TheDeputies of theFrench NationalAssembly and theEmergence of aRevolutionaryCulture(1789–1790)(Princeton, 1996).Carefulanalysisoftheearly stages of therevolutionaryprocess.

Topics

F. Aftalion, The FrenchRevolution. AnEconomicInterpretation(Cambridge,1990).

D. Arasse, TheGuillotine and theTerror (London,1989).

N. Aston, Religion and

Revolution in France1780–1804 (London,2000). Incorporatesthirty years ofscholarship sinceMcManners.

T. C.W. Blanning, TheFrench RevolutionaryWars 1787–1802(London,1996).

M. Crook, Elections intheFrenchRevolution

(Cambridge,1996).

A. Forrest, The FrenchRevolution and thePoor(Oxford,1981).

H. Gough, TheNewspaper Press intheFrenchRevolution(London,1988).

_____TheTerror in theFrench Revolution(London,1998).

P. Jones,The Peasantryand the FrenchRevolution(Cambridge,1988).

D.P.Jordan,TheKing’sTrial. Louis XVIversus the FrenchRevolution (Berkeley,1979).

M. Lyons, NapoleonBonaparte andLegacy of the French

Revolution (London,1994).

J. McManners, TheFrench Revolutionand the Church(London, 1969).Elegant and movingbrief survey, superblyreadable.

S. E. Melzer and L. E.Rabine (eds.), RebelDaughters. Women

and the FrenchRevolution (NewYork,1992).

J.Roberts,TheCounter-Revolution in France1787–1830 (London,1991).

G. Rudé, The Crowd intheFrenchRevolution(Oxford,1965).

P. W. Schroeder, The

Transformation ofEuropean Politics,1763–1848 (Oxford,1994). The latestthinking oninternational relationsin the age ofrevolutions.

G.A.Williams,Artisansand Sansculottes.Popular MovementsinFranceandBritainduring the French

Revolution (2ndedition, London,1988).

People

I. Germani, Jean-PaulMarat,HeroandAnti-hero of the FrenchRevolution (Lampeter,1992).

N. Hampson, The Life

and Opinions ofMaximilienRobespierre (London,1974). Brilliantreflections on theproblems ofinterpreting thiscentralfigure.

_____Danton (London,1978).

J. Hardman, Louis XVI(London and New

Haven, 1993).Idiosyncraticbiography, at its bestbefore1789.

C. Haydon and W.Doyle (eds.),Robespierre(Cambridge, 1998).Essays on thesignificance ofRobespierre in theRevolutionandlater.

F. Markham, Napoleon(London, 1963). Stillthe best shortintroduction toNapoleon’slife.

W. Roberts, Jacques-Louis David,Revolutionary Artist.Art, Politics and theFrench Revolution(Chapel Hill, NC,1989).

R. B. Rose, GracchusBabeuf. The FirstRevolutionaryCommunist (London,1978).

Legacies

H. Ben Israel, EnglishHistorians of theFrench Revolution(Cambridge, 1968).Surveys nineteenth-

centurydebates.

G. Best (ed.), ThePermanentRevolution. TheFrench RevolutionanditsLegacy,1789–1989 (London, 1988).Eight distinguishedessayists explore theRevolution’senduringimportance.

R. Gildea, The Past in

French History (NewHaven and London,1994). Analyses thehaunting of modernFrench history byrevolutionaryghosts.

E.J.Hobsbawm,Echoesof the Marseillaise.Two Centuries LookBack on the FrenchRevolution (London,1990). A Marxistlament for the loss of

oldcertainties.

S. L. Kaplan, Farewell,Revolution (2 vols,Ithaca, New York,1995). Long andwordy, but the fullestaccount of thebicentenaryof1989inFrance. Volume Icovers the publiccommemoration,volume II thehistoricaldebate.

J. Klaits and M. H.Haltzel (eds.), TheGlobal Ramificationsof the FrenchRevolution(Cambridge, 1994).Wide-ranging essaystouching someunexpectedareas.

Index

Aabsolutism21,22,27,36,38,46,67,76,83Africa73agriculture29Allardelaw(1791)69Alps70

America3,20,33,71,74,81,91,102,103seealsoUnitedStatesAmerican War ofIndependence20,26,33,72Amiens, peace of (1802) 63,73ancienrégime3,4,21–7,69,71,75,79,80,87,95,101Annales historiques de laRévolutionfrançaise100,106anti-clericalism94–5army 40, 42, 49, 50, 51, 54,56,58,61,71–2,95

artillery71ArtoisseeCharlesXassignats46,59Austria20,50,61,62,71,73Avignon70

BBabeuf,FrançoisNoël,calledGracchus (1760–97),journalist, originator of the‘Conspiracy for Equality’1796, forwhich hewas triedandexecuted61,86,90bankruptcy27,28,29,36,37

Barruel, Augustin de (1741–1820),priestandconservativejournalist before theRevolution; émigré andauthor of best-sellingdenunciation of theRevolution as a conspiracy,Memoirs to serve for theHistory of Jacobinism, 179789Bastille2,7,42,67BatavianRepublic73Beijing3Belgium10,54,61,63

Bicentenary(1989)3,17,91,97,99,102–7,108Bolsheviks9,100Bolivar, Simon (1783–1830),‘Liberator’offormerSpanishSouthAmerica74Bonaparte, Napoleon (1769–1821), Republican generalandconquerorof Italy1796–7; leader of EgyptianExpedition 1798–9; FirstConsul of the FrenchRepublic 1799–1804;Emperor 1804–14, 1815;

exiled toSt.Helena1815–211,2,6,9–10,16,61,62,63–4,67,71,72,73, 74, 76, 77,78,79,82,83,84,90,92,93,95,97,98,101,102Bordeaux54,72,73Bourbons 35–6, 63, 64, 67,71,73,76,77,78,93bourgeoisie100,101Bracknell,Lady1,2,18bread37,39Brienne, Etienne-Charles deLoménie de (1727–94),Cardinal, Archbishop of

Toulouse, and then Senlis,Chief of Royal Council ofFinances1787–835,36Brissot, Jacques-Pierre(1754–93), journalist, leadingdeputy in LegislativeAssembly and Conventionuntil purged in June 1793;guillotinedinOctober52,54Brittany60brumaire (1799), coup of 63,64Brussels2Bucharest3

Büchner, Georg (1804–37),playwright, author ofDanton’sDeath18356Buonarroti, Filippo Michele(1761–1837), ItalianenthusiastfortheRevolution,collaborated in and laterchronicledtheConspiracyforEquality 1796; imprisoneduntil1802;devotedtherestofhis life to organizing secretrevolutionarynetworks90Burke, Edmund (1729–97),Britishpolitician,philosopher

and polemicist, author ofReflectionson theRevolutioninFrance17903–4,17,101

CCadiz82cahiers39,44,69Calonne, Charles Alexandrede(1734–1802),comptroller-general of finances 1783–8734–5,37calendar59,96–7Cambodia9Camperdown(1797)62

Campo Formio, peace of(1797)62Canada19,20capitalism100,101capofliberty4–5,8Caribbean20,50,72Carlyle, Thomas (1795–1881), philosopher andhistorian, author of TheFrenchRevolution.AHistory18374–5,8,9,17CatholicandRoyalArmy54CatholicChurch17,30–1,44,46,52,52,64,70,75,76,77,

78,79,83,89,92,93–5censorship32–3,92ChampdeMars49Charlemagne77Charles X (1757–1836),count d’Artois, king ofFrance 1824–30, 42, 77, 79,90Charterof181478China9,19,96,107CisalpineRepublic62CivilCode10–11,77,79,95civilconstitutionoftheclergy46–7,70

classic interpretation 99–100,101,105,106Clemenceau,Georges(1841–1929),radicalpolitician105clergy17,25,30,31,38,39,40,44,46,47,56,70,78,94,105Cobban, Alfred (1901–68),historian101,102coffee19,50,73coinage2,95committeeofpublicsafety56‘committeeofThirty’38Communeof187191

Communism 9, 86, 90, 91,96,97,98,99,106,107,108Compiègne22ComtatVenaissin70ConcertofEurope79concordatof180164,76,78,79,92,93conservatism87,92conspiracy69,86,87,89–90‘Conspiracy of Equals’(1796)61,86,90Constitutionof179149,84Constitution of 1793 60, 66,86

Constitution of 1795 60–1,62,84Consulate63–4Convention 51, 52–61, 68,73,81,83,84,92–3Corday, Marie AnneCharlotte (1768–93),murdererofMarat54coronation30,77Corsica9,10Cristeros94crusades8Czechoslovakia94

DDanton, Georges Jacques(1759–94), Parisiandemagogue, minister ofJustice, Aug.–Sept. 1792;memberofConvention1792–4; leading campaigner formoderation of terror beforehisexecutioninApril17946,9,51,52,56David, JacquesLouis (1748–1825), painter, elected toConvention1792;memberofcommitteeofgeneralsecurity

and orchestrator ofrevolutionary festivals, 1794;painter to Napoleon; died inexileasaregicide85,86dechristianization 56, 70, 76,92,94,106Declaration of the Rights ofMan and the Citizen (1789)12–15,16–17,45,66,70,83De Gaulle, Charles (1890–1970),general,founderoftheFifth Republic and its firstpresident1958–6982despotism28,66,67,76

Dickens, Charles JohnHuffham (1812–70), authorofATaleofTwoCities18596–8,17,105dictatorship82,102Directory60,61–3,64Dublin3DutchRepublic35,52,73

EEconomists29,34education95Egypt62,63EiffelTower2

émigrés 42, 49, 50, 60, 68,76,77,86England3seealsoGreatBritainEnlightenment 31–2, 74, 75,80,99,107Estates-General 33, 35, 36,37,38,39,68,70European Covention onHumanRights17EuropeanUnion108

FFamilyCompact71

‘faminepact’30FederalistRevolt54–5fédérés50,51feudalism29,44,65,68,100Ferdinand VII (1784–1833),kingofSpain1808and1814–3374Feuillantclub49‘flourwar’30Fontainebleau22Francis II (1768–1835),HolyRoman Emperor 1792–1806,Emperor of Austria 1804–3573

Franco-Prussian War (1870)91freemasonry89Fronde22fructidor, coup of (1797) 62,68Furet, François (1927–97),historian 91, 98–9, 100, 101,102,103,105,106,107

Ggenocide17,96Germany9,10,61,70,79,93germinal and prairial

insurrections(1795)59‘gildedyouth’59Girondins54,55,60,90,108God3,21,25,28,30,75,77,79Gorbachev,Mikhail(1931–),Sovietleader107graintrade30,34Great Britain 10, 19, 28, 33,34,52,61,62,72,73‘greatfear’44Guiana70guilds29,30,65,69guillotine1,6,7,8,9,17,55,

70,106gulag9

HHabermas, Jürgen (1929– ),philosopher103Habsburgs50Haiti72–3,83Hamilton, Alexander (1755–1804), American statesman16harvests30,37Hébert, Jacques-René (1757–94), journalist, publisher of

the populist journal PèreDuchesne, executed afterattempted coup in March179456Hébertists56Hitler,Adolf(1889–1945)9Hohenlinden(1801)63Holocaust9HolyAlliance79HolyRomanEmpire73Hungary94

IIndia19,20,62

IndianOcean72Indo-China73‘Indulgents’56intendants22,23,67,76Ireland3,90,94Italy10,61,62,70,79,93

JJacobin clubs47,49, 50, 54,58,59,89,99Jacobinism 50, 58–9, 61, 63,64,90,92,99,100,106,107,108Jansenism31

Jaurès, Jean (1859–1914),socialist politician andhistorian100Jesuits31Jourdan,JeanBaptiste(1762–1833), general, victor ofFleurus (1794), proposer ofconscriptionlawof179863Jourdanlaw(1798)63

KKant, Immanuel (1724–1804), German philosopherandadmireroftheRevolution

75Kosciuscko,AndrzejTadeuszBonawentura (1746–1817),Polishnobleman, fought as avolunteer in the AmericanWar of Independence, leaderof Polish resistance topartition1793–490Krushchev,NikitaSergeevich(1894–1971), Soviet leader107Kulturkampf93

L

Law, John (1671–1729),Scottish financial adventurer,comptroller-general offinances172027–8LeChapelierlaw(1791)69LegionofHonour76LegislativeAssembly (1791–2)49–50,82Lenin, Vladimir IlyichUlyanov, called (1870–1924)9,94,100Leoben, preliminaries of(1797)61levéeenmasse56

liberalism82–4,87literacy32Loire52London6LouisXIV(1638–1715),kingof France 1643–1715 19,21,22,33,67LouisXV(1709–74),kingofFrance 1715–74 20, 21, 24,27,31LouisXVI(1754–93),kingofFrance 1774–92 19, 20, 21,22,24,27,28,30,32,33,34,35,40,44,45,47,49,50,51,

52,55,60,67,75,77,87LouisXVII(1785–95),sonofLouisXVI,neverreigned60Louis XVIII (1755–1824),count de Provence, king ofFrance 1814–24 49, 60, 63,77,78,90Louisiana92Louis-Philippe (1773–1850),duked’Orleans1793,kingofthe French 1830–48 67, 79,90Luxembourg10Lyon54

MMadrid74MaoZedong(1873–1976)9Marat, Jean-Paul (1743–93),journalist, Jacobinmartyr51,54,84–6,104Marengo(1800)63Marie-Antoinette (1755–93),Queen of France 1774–92 2,22,45,49,55,71,87Marseillaise2,3,50,107Marseille50,54Marx, Karl (1818–83),politicalphilosopher100

Marxism 98, 99, 100, 101,106,107Mathiez,AlbertXavierEmile(1874–1932), historian 100,106Maupeou, René NicolasCharles Augustin de (1714–92), chancellor of France1768–92, disgraced 1774 24,28,33,36maximum55,59,86metricsystem10Mexico3,94Michelet, Jules (1798–1874),

historian99Milan3Mirabeau, Honoré GabrielRiqueti, count de (1749–91),journalist and adventurer,member of ConstituentAssembly1789–91,aleadingorator and secret adviser totheking6Mitterrand, FrançoisMauriceMarie (1916–97), PresidentoftheFrenchRepublic1982–9617,103,106,107monarchy1,3,66,75,77,80,

82,86,89,102,103monasticism 31, 32, 46, 70,78monopolies69Montagnards54Montesquieu, Charles LouisdeSecondat,baronde(1689–1755), magistrate andphilosopher, author of Del’EspritdesLois174828,33,66Moreau, Jean Victor (1763–1813), general, victor ofHohenlinden (1801) and

opponentofNapoleon63

NNantes72NapoleonseeBonaparteNapoleon III (1808–73), sonofNapoleon’s brother Louis,political adventurer until1848, when he was electedpresident of the SecondRepublic; overthrew theRepublic 1851; Emperor ofFrance 1852–70 2, 82, 93,102

National Assembly 15, 40,41,44–9, 65, 70, 71, 81, 82,84NationalGuard44,45,49Nationallands46,60,68,77,78Nazis9,89Necker, Jacques (1732–1804),Swissbanker,director-general of finances 1777–81,minister of finances 1789–9026–7,30, 33, 36, 37, 38, 40,41Nelson,Horatio(1758–1805),

Britishadmiral62Netherlands10,51Newton, Isaac (1642–1727),mathematician and physicist28NewYork16night of 4 August 1789 44,46,68,69,70Nile,battleof(1798)62Nîmes46nobility1,23,25,38,39,52,62,65, 67–9, 70, 75, 76, 77,80,81,82,100NootkaSound71

Notables,Assemblyof35,38notaries77

Ooathoftheclergy179047Orczy, Baroness (Mrs.Montague Barstow 1865–1947), author of The ScarletPimpernel19058–9,17Orléans, Louis PhilippeJoseph, duke d’ (1747–93),called Philippe-Egalité in179326Orthodoxchurch94

PPaine, Thomas (1737–1809),Polemicist, author of RightsofMan,1791–215Paris1,2,4,6,8,20,22,23,24,29,30,31,32,34,35,36,38,40,42,44,45,47,49,50,51,54,56,59,73,83,84,103parlements 23–5, 26, 28, 29,31,33,34,36,38peasants44,68,69,94philosophers3,31,70,74PhysiocratsseeEconomistsPillnitz, Declaration of (27

Aug.1791)49Pius VI (Giovanni AngelicoBraschi) (1717–99), popefrom 1775, denounced civilconstitution of clergy 1791;capturedbyFrench1798anddiedinFrance71,93Pius VII (BarnabaChiaramonti) (1740–1823),pope from 1799, concludedconcordat of 1801 withNapoleon64,92,93Pius IX (Giovanni MariaMastai-Ferretti) (1792–1878),

popefrom1846,convenorofVatican Council (1869–70)which proclaimed papalinfallibility93plebiscites82Poland3,10,79,90,94pope 46, 47, 62, 64, 70, 71,76,79,93post-revisionism102–3,106prefects76,77press32–3,45,92privilege 25, 29, 35, 38, 39,40,4465,67,69–70,77,78,82

Protestantism27,46Provence,countdeseeLouisXVIIIPrussia19,20,35,49,50,51,61publicopinion27–34,103

QQuiberon60

RReed, John (1887–1920),authorofTenDaysthatshooktheWorld19199

Reims77representativesonmission55Republic,First2,87,91,105Republic,Third2,83,91,105Republic,Fifth82RepublicofVirtue58,100republicanism47,74Restoration63,67,77–9,80revisionism100, 101–2, 103,105,106Revolutionof18304,79,90Revolutionof184883,91‘revolutionaryarmies’55revolutionary tribunal55, 56,

86‘revolutionary government’55Rhine51,54,61Richet, Denis (1927–90)historian99,101,106Robespierre, MaximilienFrançois Isidore (1758–94)provincial lawyer, deputy inConstituent Assembly 1789–91 and Convention 1792–4;member of Committee ofPublicSafety1793–44,6,9,50, 54, 56, 58, 74, 86, 100,

105,107RomanRepublic(1798–9)71Rome3,64,93Rousseau, Jean-Jacques(1712–78), novelist andphilosopher, author ofSocialContract (1762), regarded asa prophet by therevolutionaries2,66,74,75RoyalSession(1789)40Russia19,20,62,83,90,96RussianRevolution(1917)9,90,91,94,100

SSaint-DomingueseeHaitiSt.Helena93Saint-Just, Louis Antoine(1767–94), elected to theConvention1792,memberofcommittee of public safety1793–4, famous for hisextremeanduncompromisingviews, executed withRobespierre in thermidor179486sansculottes 4–5, 6, 50, 51,52,54,55,56,59,84,86,91

Schama, Simon (1945– ) 17,105SecondWorldWar101September massacres 179251,54,84servants84Seven Years War (1756–63)20,26,71,72Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph(1748–1836), author ofWhatistheThirdEstate?,moverofdeclaration of NationalAssembly 1789; Director1799;presidentof theSenate

1800–0438,39,63,82slavery20,50,72–3,83Soboul,AlbertMarius(1914–82),historian100,103,106socialism86Sorbonne100SouthAmerica70SovietUnion 3, 91, 94, 100,105,107Spain52,61, 71, 74, 79, 82,94Stalin, Iossif VissarionovichDzhugashvili, called (1879–1953)9,94

Steiner, Francis George(1929–),literarycritic108sugar19,50,73SupremeBeing,cultof58

Ttaille26Talleyrand, Charles Mauricede (1754–1838), bishop ofAutun 1788–91; émigré,diplomat, foreign ministerunder Napoleon and againundertheRestoration34taxation20,22,25,26–7,28,

29,34,40,44,46,66,78Taylor, George V (1919– ),historian101,102TennisCourtoath40–1terror4,17,55–8,59,76,86–7, 91, 91, 96, 99, 102, 105,106,107,108Thatcher, Margaret Hilda(1925–)17Thermidoreans58–61thirdestate38,39,40,69TiananmenSquare3tithes25,29–30,44,46Tocqueville, Alexis de

(1805–1859), historian 101,107toleration46Tolstoy, Lev Nikolaevich(1828–1910), author of WarandPeace,1865–910,15Tone, Theobald Wolfe(1763–98), Irish lawyer andpamphleteer; founder ofUnited Irishmen1791; exiledin France advising oninvasion of Ireland 1796–98;committed suicide in Dublinprison90

totalitarianism102,107Toulon54,56tradeunions69tricolour2,4,7,8,42–3,90Tuileriespalace47tumbrils4

UUnigenitus31UnitedNations16United States 10, 15–16, 20,91–2Universal Declaration ofHumanRights16

VValmy(1792)51,71vandalism66,67Varennes, flight to (1791)47–8Vatican Council (1869–70)93venality 23, 25, 29, 44, 46,65,69,77Vendée17,52–3,55,60,63,94,96,105,106vendémiaire insurrection(1795)61Venezuela74

Venice71Verdun51Verona,declarationof(1795)60Versailles22,39,40,45,67Vichy89,100Vienna61,72Congressof79Voltaire, François MarieArouetde(1694–1778),poet,playwright, polemicist,philosopher33,74Vovelle, Michel (1933– ),historian103,106

WWarsaw,duchyof79Waterloo(1815)4WhiteTerror59Wilde, Oscar FingalO’Flahertie Wills (1854–1900), playwright, author ofThe Importance of BeingEarnest18952,8Wordsworth,William(1770–1850),Englishpoet74–5women5,45,83Worthing,Ernest1,2,108

YYorktown(1781)20Young,Arthur (1741 -1820),English agronome andtraveller98