the flemish government's responsibility for local government modernization

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The Flemish government'sresponsibility for localgovernment modernizationDr Ellen Wayenberg aa Public Management Institute, Catholic University ofLeuven , Belgium E-mail:Published online: 18 Feb 2007.

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THE FLEMISHGOVERNMENT’SRESPONSIBILITY FORLOCAL GOVERNMENTMODERNIZATION

Ellen Wayenberg

Dr Ellen WayenbergPublic Management InstituteCatholic University of Leuven

BelgiumE-mail: [email protected]

Abstract

Throughout Western Europe, local govern-

ment is modernized. Central and regional

governments carry responsibility for this

modernization because they decide upon its

nature. However, this responsibility reaches

out further since a higher-level government

also carries responsibility for the success of

its modernization at the local level. The article

unravels this responsibility for local govern-

ment modernization in the case of the

Flemish government. As a result of Belgian

state reform, this government counts today

as the most important higher-level govern-

ment from the viewpoint of local government

in Flanders.

Key wordsCentral – local relations, implementation,

local government, modernization, neo-

institutionalism, partnership

Vol. 8 Issue 1 2006 47 – 65

Public Management Review ISSN 1471-9037 print/ISSN 1471-9045 online

� 2006 Taylor & Francis

http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals

DOI: 10.1080/14719030500518741

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INTRODUCTION

Throughout Western Europe, local government is subject to modernization. Often, centraland regional governments play an important role in this modernization due to theirintroduction of reforms on the local level. As such, these higher-level governments areresponsible for local government modernization. The article aims at grasping the scope ofthe responsibility of a higher-level government that reforms its local counterpart. After all,such a government can be assumed to be responsible for more than just the nature of thelocal modernization at stake. Its responsibility can also encompass the success of thismodernization on the basis of the assumption that this success is dependent upon thisgovernment’s relationship to local government during reform.

This assumption will be unfolded in the next section. Subsequently, it will be testedin the case of the relationship between the Flemish government and four of the 308local governments on its territory.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT MODERNIZATION

Since the last decade, the New Public Management (NPM) – reform wave is washingover the local level all around Western Europe. So far, this wave has modernized localgovernment in a twofold manner given the prevalence of both management and market-oriented reforms locally (Clark 1997; Peters and Pierre 2001). The former have turnedlocal government’s rule-bound procedure into a modern output and outcome-orientedmanagement while the latter have broken down this government’s hierarchicalstructure. After all, market-oriented reforms bring about that tasks are no longerfulfilled within local government itself but either by or together with (semi-)privateorganizations that operate at the local level.

In many Western European countries, local government is not the driving forcebehind its NPM modernization. This role comes to central and/or regionalgovernments that have used their competences over local government to reform thelatter in a management and/or market-oriented manner (Caulfield and Larsen 2002;Vetter and Kersting 2002). The decision upon the nature of local governmentmodernization thus often fell under the responsibility of higher-level governments.Does their responsibility for this modernization reach any further? The article puts thisquestion at its centre because there is reason to assume that a higher-level governmentthat reforms its local counterpart carries a responsibility that goes beyond merelydeciding upon the nature of the local government modernization at stake.

This reason follows out of the sociological variant of the Neo-Institutionalism (NI).This variant holds as a core assumption about the relationship between an institution andthe subject that is open to its impact that the latter’s behaviour is determined by thatinstitution (Hall and Taylor 1997: 955; Lowdnes 2001: 1960). According to Fox andMiller (1995: 92), institutions can be defined as ‘sets of rules that exist within and between

48 Public Management Review

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organizations as well as under, over and around them’. Consequently, the set of rulesthat a higher-level government imposes upon its local counterpart for the purpose ofimplementing a reform can be seen as an institution. And this institution can then – inline with the sociological variant of the NI – be assumed to determine local government’simplementation behaviour. As a result, there is reason to state that a higher-levelgovernment’s responsibility for local modernization goes beyond merely deciding uponthe nature of this modernization. Such responsibility also comes from this government’sdecision upon the set of rules that will guide the local modernization. After all, choosinganother set than the one in which local government has been historically socialized can beassumed to cause the latter failure in showing the required implementation behaviour. Inthis way, a higher-level government can be assumed also to carry responsibility for thesuccess of the modernization that it pursues itself on the local level.

This so-called ‘responsibility assumption’ deserves empirical testing in the light of thefact that central and regional governments throughout Western Europe increasinglymodernize their relationship to local government. More and more, they want to relateto the latter as its ‘partner’ (OECD 1997, 2001). Hence, these governments thus tendto choose for other rules than before to guide their (further) modernization of localgovernment. A choice that might in turn affect local government’s implementation ofthe reform(s) concerned if it is correctly assumed that the success of this modernizationdepends upon the accompanying relationship between the reformer and the reformed.Before proceeding with the conditions for an empirical test of this assumption, anelaboration is needed on the different sets of rules among which the reformer i.e. ahigher-level government can choose.

Sets of rules to guide local modernization

In theory, a higher-level government such as a central or regional government can opt forthree sets of rules to shape its relationship to local government during modernization.This statement is grounded on the work of four authors who all model this relationship ina three-fold manner.1 Wright distinguishes between a co-ordinate authority, anoverlapping authority and an inclusive authority model (Wright 2000). Kjellberg speaksof an autonomous, a partnership and a principal – agent model (Kjellberg 1995). AndBatley and Stoker mention a relative autonomy, an interaction and an agency model(Stoker 1991). Basically, each tripartite of models or rule-sets can be set out alongside acontinuum of power exercised by a higher-level government over its local counterpart asis shown in Figure 1. The manner in which these four authors describe their modelsclarifies that these were meant to cover a relationship that is respectively characterized bya minimal, partial and maximal amount of power thus exercised.

Despite this correspondence in their work, these four authors do not seem to agreefully on the types of rules that make up each rule-set. At first sight, this disagreementseems the strongest between Wright and Kjellberg. Whereas the former looks at the

Wayenberg: Local government modernization in Belgium 49

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extent by which a higher-level government has outlined a task of local government, thelatter focuses upon the extent of central or regional supervision over the local executionof such a task (Kjellberg 1995; Wright 2000). Nevertheless, there is also someagreement between these two authors since they both see the occurrence of two-trafficcommunication between the two governments as a second type of rule to identify amodel’s prevalence. All three of these types of rules are recognized by Batley andStoker (Stoker 1991). This means that these authors agree with both Wright andKjellberg as far as their second but also their first type of rule is concerned. Thisseemingly contradictory agreement with regard to that first type can be explained byintroducing the concept of regulation in connection with the relationship between ahigher-level government and its local counterpart. In general, regulation refers to twointerrelated activities. This double reference comes forward in definitions of regulationsuch as ‘all acts of directing and controlling according to a rule, principle or system’(Daintith 1994: 26) or ‘the use of public authority to set and apply rules and standards’(Hood et al. 1999: 3). Each of these activities can be linked to the first type of rule thatWright and Kjellberg use to identify the prevalence of a specific model or rule-set inpractice. The extent by which a higher-level government outlines a task of its localcounterpart – as Wright’s first type – corresponds with the extent to which the formerdirects or uses its public authority to set rules and standards on behalf of the latter.Likewise, the extent by which central or regional government supervises localgovernment’s execution of a task – as Kjellberg’s first type – corresponds with theextent to which the former controls the latter as far as its application of those rules andstandards is concerned. Consequently, given the interrelatedness between theirrespective first type of rule, there is no real disagreement between Wright andKjellberg as far as their types of rules are concerned to identify a model’s prevalence inpractice. Apart from helping to reveal this agreement between Wright and Kjellberg,there is another merit to Batley’s and Stoker’s work. Both authors have stipulated theobject of the regulatory activities more clearly in comparison with the other two. Inother words, they have given more attention to what is directed and controlled bycentral or regional government with regard to local government or to which rules andstandards are set and applied by the former in relation to the latter. In their opinion,this object is twofold. First of all, a higher-level government directs and controls the

Figure 1: Continuum of central power over local governmentSource: Stoker (1991), Kjellberg (1995) and Wright (2000).


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content of a local task. And second, also the financing of this task is the object of its rulesetting and application (Stoker 1991).2

So far, the types of rules have been elaborated upon that need to be taken intoaccount for the purpose of identifying a model’s prevalence in the relationshipbetween a central or regional government and its local counterpart. Actually, it ismore accurate to state that this elaboration served to identify all models’ prevalence inthat relationship because no attention has yet been given to the manner in which aminimal, partial and maximal amount of higher-level power being exercised overlocal government reveals itself through each type of rule. However, paying attentionto this manner is necessary in order to verify whether it is the relative autonomy, thepartnership or the agency model – as our respective label for the three models – thatprevails in the relationship under study. Again, Batley and Stoker are ahead of Wrightand Kjellberg since they have specified more consistently how every amount ofhigher-level power over local government reveals itself through each type of rule.Table 1 reflects their specification in the case of the types of rules that have to dowith the first regulatory activity – the central or regional direction on behalf of localgovernment.

Is Batley’s and Stoker’s rule-specification precise enough to identify a certain model’sprevalence in practice? Our answer to this question is negative as far as the two firsttypes of rules out of Table 1 are concerned: the ones with regard to the content and thefinancing of a local task. In our view, the task content – as the object of the first type ofrule – deserves further delimitation for two reasons. First, it is arguable when centralor regional government has for example imposed minimal duties on local government(relative autonomy model) or – inversely – specified the latter’s task in a detailedmanner (agency model). Second, Batley and Stoker have gone past the fact that the taskcontent covers in itself two elements that both can be seen as the object of a separatetype of rule namely of the purpose of a task (what has to be done locally?) and of the

Table 1: Sets of rules in the case of the relative autonomy, partnership and agency model of central – local

relationship

Amount of central power Minimal Partial Maximal

Type of rule

Content of a local task Minimal local duties and

maximal local rights

Joint plans Detailed central task

specification

Financing of a local task Local taxes Local taxes and central

grants

Central grants

Two-traffic communication Not prevalent Prevalent Not prevalent

Model Relative autonomy Partnership Agency

Source: Stoker (1991).


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procedure to fulfil it (how does this have to be done locally?). The last element – thetask procedure – can even be further subdivided in the context of the prevailing NPMreforms on the local level. As said earlier, the new character of the managementprocedure that has thus been locally introduced is twofold since it is typified by both aresult and a market orientation. Hence, the first type of rule with regard to the taskcontent can in total be split up into three separate types of rules that each in turn can bespecified in the case of the three models of the relationship between a higher-levelgovernment and its local counterpart according to Table 2.

That same table also reveals our specification of a minimal, partial and maximalamount of power that is exercised from higher-up with regard to the financing of a localtask – as the object of Batley’s and Stoker’s second type of rule. Basically, we havereplaced the latter’s reference to local taxes and central funds with one to earmarkedsubsidies that central or regional government transfer to local government for thepurpose of financing a specific task. The underlying reason for this replacement is thatlocal taxes are not an incontestable indicator of local government’s financial autonomysince a part of their yield can be demanded by central or regional government.Conversely, these governments’ funds do not solely indicate financial dependence of

Table 2: Sets of rules in the case of the relative autonomy, partnership and agency model of central – local

relationship adaptation

Amount of central power Minimal Partial Maximal

Type of rule

Content of a local task

– task purpose Mission at utmost Objectives at utmost Action

– task procedure

– result orientation Principle of result

orientation at utmost

General prescription of

the process to be

locally followed to get

results at utmost

Specific prescription of

the process to be

locally followed to get

results

– market orientation Principle of market

orientation at utmost

General prescription of

the actors to be locally

involved and the

manner of their

involvement at utmost

Specific prescription of

the actors to be locally

involved and the

manner of their

involvement

Financing of a local task No earmarked subsidies Insufficient earmarked

subsidies

Sufficient earmarked

subsidies

Two-traffic communication Not prevalent Prevalent Not prevalent

Model Relative autonomy Partnership Agency


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local government because they can be provided for no task in particular like in the caseof the municipal fund.

To sum up, Table 2 specifies the three rule-sets among which a higher-levelgovernment can choose to shape its relationship to local government duringmodernization.

Conditions to test the responsibility assumption

As said earlier, central and regional governments throughout Western Europeincreasingly favour relating themselves to local government as its partner. The Flemishgovernment – as one of Belgium’s regional governments – is no exception in thisregard. Already in the mid-1990s, this government has announced its intention to shapeits relationship to local government on the basis of partnership. More so, thisannouncement was explicitly marked as the starting-point of a new era in its dealingswith local government (Vlaamse regering 1995). As such, the relationship between theFlemish government and its local counterpart seems to fulfil a first condition to testempirically the responsibility assumption: the condition that the higher-levelgovernment involved has opted for a new set of rules to guide the implementationof its further local government reforms. Did the Flemish government use partnershiprules further to reform its local counterpart after its announcement of intergovern-mental partnership? And did these rules then count as new? These questions deserve ananswer in order to conclude firmly that already a first condition to test the so-calledresponsibility assumption is met in the case of the relationship between the Flemishgovernment and its local counterpart.

Prevalence of the new partnership rules . . .At first sight, there seem to be three policy fields in which the Flemish government hasacted in accordance with its announcement of intergovernmental partnership in themid-1990s: the fields of social, environmental and mobility policy. The reason is thatthe Flemish government has opted to use the policy instrument of the covenant in eachof these fields. And in theory, this choice equals one for intergovernmental partnershipsince a covenant is an agreement that two (governmental) parties make to giveexpression to their intention for joint policy making (Wayenberg 2000). By choosingfor this policy instrument, the Flemish government has thus engaged itself to execute nomore than a partial amount of power with regard to the purpose, the procedure and thefinancing of local government’s tasks on social, environmental and mobility matters aswell as to be open towards the latter for bilateral communication on its task execution.But was this engagement on the part of the Flemish government also visible in policypractice? In other words, was the local implementation of these tasks really guidedby partnership rules? Yes, but to a varying degree in the three fields under study.


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This variance became clear after an analysis of the Flemish legislation with regard tothese three fields in combination with a series of semi-structured interviews on theFlemish and local level.3 Basically, the Flemish government has acted upon itsannouncement to use partnership rules more in the field of social policy than in those ofenvironmental and mobility policy. Figure 2 visualizes the differences that wereobserved among these three fields under study.

As far as the rules with regard to the task content are concerned, the field ofsocial policy is the only one in which the Flemish government has not exercised amaximal but a partial amount of power over local government. First of all, thisdifference is visible with regard to what had to be done locally (i.e. the purpose oflocal government’s task). In social policy, the Flemish government has prescribed itslocal counterpart at utmost to realize certain policy objectives such as a reduction inthe number of people on its territory with full unemployment for over more than ayear. Clearly, this government’s prescriptions of what had to be done locally weremore far-reaching in the fields of environmental and mobility policy. Signing acovenant with the Flemish government in those fields meant that local governmentengaged itself to fulfil concrete actions that the former had determined such ascollecting specific sorts of garbage or constructing roundabouts. Second, that samedifference in amount of central power also shows itself with regard to the result-oriented manner in which local government had to operate (i.e. the result-orientedprocedure it had to follow to fulfil its task). In all three policy fields, the Flemishgovernment has prescribed its local counterpart to draft and then to implement astrategic policy plan. However, the level of detail of these prescriptions clearlydiffered. In the social field, they were rather general in nature. Local governmentwas merely expected to couple results at each one of its objectives as well asindicators that would allow the measurement of whether these results were obtainedor not. Conversely, similar prescriptions were much more specific with regard toenvironmental and mobility policy. The different steps that local government had to

Figure 2: Central power over local government in the fields of social policy (SP), environmental policy (EP)and mobility policy (MP)


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take in order to for example collect X kilos of garbage a person or build Yroundabouts on its territory were carefully laid down in legislation. That samelegislation did not in any way impose a market-oriented procedure on localgovernment for the purpose of implementing its environmental or mobility tasks. Onthe other hand, such a procedure was part of the legislation on social policy, be itthat the concerning prescriptions were again rather general in nature. Obtaining theresults that were coupled at the objectives of its plan was something that localgovernment did not have to do on its own since it was legally prescribed to seek theinvolvement of local actors to this end. In short, the three fields under study clearlydiffer as far as the rules are concerned that shaped the relationship between theFlemish government and its local counterpart with regard to the content of thelatter’s tasks. Whereas partnership rules prevailed in social policy, agency rulesapplied both in environmental and mobility policy – be it only with regard to thepurpose of local government’s tasks and the management-oriented procedure to fulfillthem locally.

A completely reversed picture arises when the intergovernmental relationship istaken into account that relates to the financing of local government’s tasks. Now, anagency rule can be identified in the case of social policy. After all, local government hasbeen able to finance its policy completely by means of its part out of the so-called‘Social Impulse Fund’ that the Flemish government had founded. Conversely, apartnership rule is observed for both environmental and mobility policy. In both fields,the Flemish government has granted subsidies to its local counterpart after signing acovenant but not to an extent that has allowed the latter to cover all its costs for taskexecution.

The picture is yet again completely reversed – and thus similar to the one withregard to the task content – when the focus is on the prevalence of two-trafficcommunication during local government’s task execution. In social policy, every localgovernment has been assigned a civil servant on the Flemish level with the task ofsupervising its task execution in a manner open to intergovernmental dialogue andnegotiation. Two-traffic communication has thus been prevalent in this field. A similarbilateral manner of supervision by the Flemish government has been absent in mobilityas well as in environmental policy since local government’s action within both fields wasmerely supervised in a unilateral or top – down way.

In sum, the Flemish government has acted upon its announcement to use partnershiprules the most within the field of social policy. Among the three fields under study, it isthe one in which local government has the strongest experience of these rules. Did thisexperience now really mark a renewal in the relationship between the Flemishgovernment and its local counterpart? In other words, did local government used toimplement social tasks in assignment of the Flemish government according to otherrules? In order to answer these questions, we have analysed the relationship betweenthe Flemish government and its local counterpart in the field of social policy prior to theintroduction of social covenants in 1996.


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Before its use of covenants, the Flemish government related to its local counterpartin the field of social policy via two distinct policy programmes. In Figure 3, theseprogrammes are labelled as the ‘VFIK’ and the ‘BD’ programme. The abbreviation intheir label refers to two funds that the Flemish government introduced at the beginningof the 1990s to provide local government with money for its social policy.4 Basically,these two funds were complementary as far as their beneficiaries were concerned. All308 local governments in Flanders thus always benefited from one of them. Which onedepended upon the severity of the local state of social deprivation? In total, eighteenlocal governments that were confronted with the most severe social deprivationbenefited from the VFIK whereas the rest got subsidized out of the BD. In general, thelatter’s subsidies were much lower than the ones received by the beneficiaries of theVFIK. This difference in subsidization by the Flemish government is not the only onethat separated both groups of local governments. They also experienced a differentamount of power being exercised by the Flemish government over their taskimplementation as is visualized in Figure 3.5

Basically, the local governments that benefited from the VFIK had the same overallexperience of power exercise as the one that was observed for all local governmentsafter the introduction of covenants in social policy. Hence, this introduction did notgo along with a renewal of the rules that guided the local task implementation in thecase of the VFIK beneficiaries. The same cannot be said on behalf of the localgovernments that benefited from the BD. In their case, signing a social covenant wentalong with a change in the prevailing rules with regard to both the content of theirtasks and their communication about task implementation to the Flemish government.More specifically, these local governments went through a renewal on these two rulesfrom relative autonomy to partnership vis-a-vis the Flemish government. With theexception of the financial rule, the BD beneficiaries were thus confronted with a newset of rules to guide their task implementation after covenants were introduced in thefield of social policy. From that moment onwards, the relationship of the Flemishgovernment to these local governments thus almost completely fulfils the firstcondition to put the responsibility assumption to the test. As said earlier, this

Figure 3: Central power over the local governments that benefited from the VFIK and the BD


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condition boils down to the fact that the higher-level government involved ought tohave opted for a new set of rules to guide its further modernization of localgovernment. With its introduction of covenants, the Flemish government has takenthe option of renewing the prevailing implementation rules, be it with the exceptionof the financial rule.

. . . but not for all local governmentsThe responsibility assumption postulates that a higher-level government’s rule-set has asocializing impact upon a local government’s implementation behaviour. On the basis ofthis assumption, the local governments that used to benefit from the BD are expected tohave almost completely failed in showing the required behaviour to implement theirsocial covenant tasks. Put differently, they are expected to have implemented these tasksbadly – be it with the exception of their way of financing them. But how badly exactly?There ought to be some sort of reference point to which their implementation behaviourcan be compared before any conclusion is to be drawn about a rule-set’s socializingimpact. Such a reference point can be found in the implementation behaviour of localgovernments that used to benefit from the VFIK. After all, they did not face a renewal inthe prevailing rules to implement their tasks after the introduction of the social policycovenants. And this means that – on the basis of the responsibility assumption – thesegovernments can be expected to have implemented their covenant tasks successfullysince they were socialized in the required behaviour to do so. Compared to the latter, thelocal governments that benefited from the BD and thus did face new rules are thenexpected to have implemented these tasks worse. After all, they were not historicallysocialized in the required implementation behaviour.

In sum, the Flemish government’s choice for covenants in the field of socialpolicy went along with a renewal in the prevailing rules for local task implemen-tation that did not count for all 308 local governments. As such, its relationship tothese governments also met a second condition to put the responsibility assumptionto the test: the condition of a selective renewal of the prevailing implementationrules as to make it possible to compare the implementation behaviour and successof local governments that can be ascribed a different historical socialization inthese rules.

THE FLEMISH GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTMODERNIZATION

Is there now empirical ground to grant the Flemish government responsibility forthe success of its modernization on the local level via its choice of rule-set? Appliedto the field of social policy, did this government’s choice for partnership rules whenintroducing covenants really impact upon the task implementation of local


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governments as expected on the basis of this assumption? In order to answer thesequestions, we have focused upon the implementation of the social covenant tasks byfour of Flanders’ regional cities: Genk, Mechelen, Aalst and Kortrijk. Due to thesevere state of social deprivation on their territory, Genk and Mechelen used tobenefit from the VFIK. Hence, these two cities are expected to have implementedtheir social covenant tasks successfully as they can be ascribed historical socializationin the required behavior to do so. Aalst and Kortrijk were beneficiaries of the BDbecause they then had to deal with little social deprivation. Consequently, a lesssuccessful implementation is expected of these two cities in comparison with Genkand Mechelen. After all, they cannot be assumed to have been historically socializedin the required behaviour to implement their social covenant tasks successfully.

As said earlier, implementing these tasks meant that local government had both tostrive for policy objectives that were laid down by the Flemish government and use amanagement and market-oriented procedure to this end that answered to the latter’sgeneral prescriptions. More so, it had to be open to bilateral communication with theFlemish government about every aspect of its task execution. To what extent have thefour cities under study now shown this required behaviour for a successfulimplementation of their social covenant tasks? This question will be answered in thenext section. First, we will concentrate on Genk and Mechelen as the two cities thatimplemented these tasks under the usual rules. Subsequently, the focus will be on Aalstand Kortrijk for which this implementation took place under the new rules. All fourcities are looked at from 1997 until 2000 as the period during which the first socialcovenant was locally implemented.

Local implementation under the usual rules

The case of GenkThe Flemish official who supervised Genk has labelled this city as a ‘special case’ as faras its implementation of the social covenant tasks are concerned. The reason for this liesin the fact that

the people from Genk were the only ones who gave us here in Brussels a general plan of their social

policy and then said to us: if you agree with this plan, then we can start to concretize and

implement it. As a result, we did not have a clear idea about what precisely happened in Genk with

our money.

However, ‘Brussels’ did have an idea about this on a more general level. After all,Genk’s plan clearly laid out the social objectives that the local policy-makers wantedto pursue as well as their manner to do so. As expressed by one of them, theseobjectives were ‘left untouched by the [supervising] team from Brussels. Atutmost, they have just made some suggestions to change our way of formulating


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them.’ This observation is hardly surprising given the fact that these objectivesencompassed the seven goals that the Flemish government’s social policy team hadidentified as worthy of pursuance in Genk (Gemeente Genk and OCMW Genk 1999:7 – 12). More surprising is that Genk’s supervisor from that team asked for anaddendum to its policy plan that listed all the local actors that would be involved inthe pursuance of the plan’s goals as well as the way of their involvement. After all,these concrete data were not legally prescribed as part of the social policy plan.Hence, Genk’s policy-makers had not included them in theirs (Gemeente Genk andOCMW Genk 1997: 13 – 14).

Neither did the plan of Genk contain (enough) results for each objective norindicators to measure whether these results were obtained or not (Gemeente Genk andOCMW Genk 1997: 57 – 8). This absence was not caused by reluctance on the part ofthe local policy-makers to use the result-oriented procedure because – as expressedby the alderman for social policy – ‘we here in Genk were very eager to work thatway’. The city’s supervisor affirmed this eagerness as well as the alderman’s explanationfor the lack of results and indicators. In his words, this was due to

the unfamiliarity both here and in Brussels [with the result-oriented procedure]. So we have

spent hours and hours in meetings together – discussing over results and the indicators that

are most suitable for measuring them. To give an example with regard to our objective of revitalizing

our deprived areas: do you have a good result if citizen complaints in these areas increase or

decrease? I thought: when they increase because people have then obviously gained ability to

manage for themselves by using ways of formally channeling a complaint. But Brussels thought the

opposite.

And initially, ‘Brussels’ did not depart from its view as Genk was supervised onreaching its goal of revitalizing deprived areas by looking at the percentage to whichcitizen complaints from these areas had decreased (Vlaamse Gemeenschap, GemeenteGenk and OCMW Genk 1997: 5). This supervision brought to the fore that thispercentage had increased. At that moment, Genk’s supervisor took a flexible stanceas – in the words of a local civil servant – ‘she did not sanction us financially but wasopen to communication and negotiation – just as always’. According to thissupervisor, that same openness was present among the policy-makers of Genk. Assuch, she also judged this city as a special case because of its ‘model executors’ ofsocial covenant tasks.

The case of MechelenThat label of ‘model executors’ was not applicable to the policy-makers of Mechelenin the view of this city’s supervisor. Two reasons underscored her view. First, thesepolicy-makers had clearly shown themselves reluctant in implementing all of theeight policy objectives that were ascribed to them by the Flemish government.


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In particular, their reluctance concerned two objectives that respectively urged themto revitalize three specified deprived areas on the local territory and to improve theliving conditions of Mechelen’s foreign population. The first of these objectives wasincluded in the city’s policy plan but not entirely (Stad Mechelen and OCMWMechelen 1997: 26). According to the alderman for social policy, this was due to thefact that

as soon as we saw this objective, we got the feeling: this is not correct, this objective is not in line

with reality because we did not have real deprived areas at that time. We do have a couple of streets

where life is a bit difficult now but these have become difficult after the Flemish identification of

deprived areas on the local level. That is why we have chosen in our plan for revitalization of six other

parts of the territory.

This choice has been accepted by the city’s supervisor. However, the same cannot besaid about the choice that the local policy-makers made in their plan with regard to thatsecond objective of improving the living conditions of local foreigners. That objectivewas completely left out of their plan. According to the city’s supervisor, this choice wasmade because the policy-makers in Mechelen ‘thought that it was not appropriate totake policy measures specifically for that target group and then bring them all togetherunder the label of our ‘‘foreigners policy’’.’ This viewpoint needs to be put in the lightof the local political situation. At that time, the extreme-right party ‘Vlaams Blok’ waswell represented in the local opposition.6 In any case, this second objective needed tobe locally pursued on the command of the city’s supervisor – a choice thus on the partof the Flemish government that in the latter’s words was locally ‘not accepted withgratitude’.

Neither were the local policy-makers grateful for the Flemish impulse towardsmaking use of a market-oriented manner for the purpose of obtaining their socialobjectives. In their plan, they foresaw little involvement of local actors to this end (StadMechelen and OCMW Mechelen 1997: 67). More so, the latter had hardly beencontacted throughout the plan’s genesis. As a result, several local actors complained toMechelen’s supervisor about their lack of involvement in the city’s social policy. In herown words, these complaints urged the latter

to put this issue repeatedly on the table during our meetings. Over and over again, I have asked them in

Mechelen to think about ways of relating themselves to local actors for the purpose of reaching their

objectives. Initially, there was much reluctance in the city for getting involved. But gradually, they have

started to do so and have realized the merit of it.

Herein lies the second reason why Mechelen’s policy-makers were not granted the labelof ‘model executors’ by their Flemish supervisor. A third reason might be found intheir rather poor coupling in their policy plan of results and indicators to each of theirobjectives (Stad Mechelen and OCMW Mechelen 1997: 33 – 57). But this was


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differently perceived by their supervisor because ‘working with results and indicatorswas then still difficult for everyone – us included. And they really made an effort in thecity of Mechelen to co-operate during our meetings.’

Local implementation under new rules

The case of AalstJust like their colleagues in Mechelen, the policy-makers of Aalst faced difficulties incoupling results and indicators to their social policy objectives. In the words of one ofthem, this was ‘new for us and we still had to learn how to do this properly’. However,they turn out to have a few more behavioural traits in common with their colleagues inMechelen. Two of these have to do with their willingness to implement the eight policyobjectives that were identified on the Flemish level as worthy of pursuance in Aalst.Among these objectives was the revitalization of two deprived areas in the localterritory. But just one of these areas was really perceived as being deprived by the localpolicy-makers. Hence, they took a similar decision to their colleagues in Mechelen:announcing in their plan to strive for revitalization but only where they thought this wasreally necessary (Stad Aalst and OCMW Aalst 1997: 43). The Flemish official whosupervised the city of Aalst went along with this decision. More so, she also took thesame stance as her colleague who was dealing with Mechelen with regard to anothercommonality between ‘their’ cities. This commonality concerns the obvious reluctanceamong the local policy-makers to engage themselves with the objective of improvingthe living conditions of the city’s foreign population. According to the supervisingofficial, ‘the idea of specifically making a ‘‘foreigners policy’’ could count on littleenthusiasm in Aalst’. As such, the city’s policy-makers behaved similarly to theircolleagues in Mechelen although, compared to the latter, their policy decisions facedless extreme-right opposition due to the lower number of seats of the Vlaams Blok inthe city council.7

The policy-makers of Aalst also showed little enthusiasm to use the prescribedmarket-oriented procedure in order to reach their social objectives. In the words of alocal civil servant, they saw it as ‘the best thing for Aalst that we here in the city do themajority [of social projects] ourselves instead of handing out money to third parties’. Assuch, their policy plan foresaw little involvement of local actors (Stad Aalst and OCMWAalst 1997: 66 – 7). In this initial reluctance of working with these actors thus liesanother behavioural trait that the policy-makers of Aalst share with the ones ofMechelen – although the former did have a certain tradition of ‘handing out money’.Prior to the introduction of the social covenant, there was a so-called ‘social fund’ inAalst to which local actors could apply for subsidization of their (project) work. Assuch, a number of actors were subsidized by the city. Precisely these actors – and noothers – were the ones that the local policy-makers did want to involve in their socialpolicy according to their plan. Hence, the comment of the city’s supervisor that ‘Aalst


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just wanted to use this policy to continue the things that were started therebefore.’ According to the latter, this intention obstructed her interaction with the city’spolicy-makers and this not only in the period of her rejection of their plan on the basisof its faulty application of the market-oriented procedure. Also afterwards, theirbilateral communication stuck because

the people of Aalst did not really want to ask local actors how they scored on the indicators as to measure

the results of the policy. . . . And this was because they simply just wanted to keep on working as before

[the introduction of the social covenant].

The case of KortrijkWorking as before was something that also guided the policy-makers of Kortrijk whilethey were drafting their social policy plan. This intention emerged out of the fact thatthis plan did not only contain the six objectives that the Flemish government hadidentified for Kortrijk. Two others were included as well, i.e. improving theaccessibility of the local housing market for groups that are financially weak and fightingagainst the unemployment amongst them (Stad Kortrijk and OCMW Kortrijk 1997:33 – 5). These extra objectives were not rejected at the Flemish level. As expressed by alocal official, ‘our supervisor went along with [all] our objectives. So, we could workthat way.’

The same goes for the way in which the policy-makers of Kortrijk worked to reachtheir objectives in a market-oriented manner. According to the alderman of socialpolicy,

a plenum was organized on which all the local actors were invited to come and talk to us about social

policy in Kortrijk. So that afterwards, we knew what they could do and we could make choices to involve

them.

As such, quite a large number of local actors were involved (Stad Kortrijk and OCMWKortrijk 1997: 55 – 6). However, this involvement did not always go as smoothly asexpected. The alderman explained this on the ground that ‘many of the local actors thatcame to our plenum had the idea: that social policy of the city gives us the possibility ofbeing subsidized. We want these subsidies but then, they have to leave us alone.’ Inother words, local actors were often not very eager to step into the result-orientedprocedure that the local policy-makers had spelt out in their social plan. This repeatedlyurged the latter to explain to their supervisor why a specific result was either notobtained in time or why it was not measured with the indicator that was agreed upon.However, according to the city’s supervisor, these and other contacts with the localpolicy-makers always took place in the best circumstances as the latter ‘really wanted towork with us on their social policy’.


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CONCLUSION

Do these four cases now provide empirical ground to grant the Flemish governmentresponsibility for the success of its modernization at the local level via its choice ofrule-set? Put differently, did this government’s choice for partnership rules whenintroducing the social covenant really impact upon the task implementation of the fourlocal governments under study as expected on the basis of this assumption? In the caseof both Genk and Mechelen, a successful implementation of the social covenant taskswas expected since both cities could be ascribed a historical socialization in theprevailing partnership rules. This expectation was met in the case of Genk. After all,this city’s policy-makers were looked upon as model executors by their Flemishsupervisor. The same cannot be said for Mechelen in which case the local policy-makers were reluctant to implement all of their prescribed objectives. Moreover, theyalso quite poorly made use of the NPM procedures that the Flemish government hadworked out to do so – especially the market-oriented one. As indicated, there aresome striking similarities between the case of Mechelen and the one of Aalst. As such,the latter seems to fulfil the expectation of an unsuccessful implementation that wasmade vis-a-vis the local governments for which the prevailing partnership rules werenew. Kortrijk also was in this case. However, its policy-makers did not quite behaveas expected since they implemented their social covenant tasks with success. As such,the case of Kortrijk resembles the one of Genk. In sum, the prevailing partnershiprules have only in half of the cases impacted upon the local task implementation asexpected on the basis of the responsibility assumption. Hence, our conclusion that thefour cases provide too little empirical ground to grant the Flemish governmentresponsibility for the success of its modernization on the local level via its choice ofrule-set.

Does this conclusion now mean that the responsibility of a higher-level governmentsuch as the Flemish one is played out once it has decided upon the nature of its localgovernment modernization? No, because the four cases do provide empirical ground foranother type of responsibility that then rests upon this government. They all emphasizethat higher-level reforms are successfully implemented at the local level if the prevailingrule-set allows local government still to express its own will. Hence, a higher-levelgovernment such as the Flemish one will be responsible for failure of its localgovernment modernization if it refuses any openness to its local counterpart duringreform.

NOTES1 The work of these four authors is part of the literature on central – local relations. Their models all concern

the relationship between central and local government. In our view, these models are also applicable to the

relationship between a regional government and the local governments on its territory.


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2 In fact, Wright and Kjellberg also refer to the content and the financing of a local task throughout the

description of their models. The difference in emphasis that they put on these types of rules in comparison

with Batley and Stoker lies in the fact that – at the most – they just refer to one of them while describing a

model. On the contrary, Batley and Stoker always refer to both types of rules for each model.

3 Decree on social impulse policy 1996; Model of environmental covenant 1997; Model of mobility covenant,

1996.

4 In particular, ‘VFIK’ stands for ‘Vlaams Fonds voor de Integratie van Kansarmen’ while ‘BD’ is the

abbreviation of ‘Bijzondere Dotatie’.

5 Again, this figure is based on an analysis of the relevant legislation in combination with a series of semi-

structured interviews on the central and local level.

6 At that time, the Vlaams Blok held nine out of the forty-one seats in the local council. This party has recently

changed its name into ‘Vlaams Belang’.

7 At that time, the Vlaams Blok held three out of the forty-one seats in the local council.

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the flemish government's responsibility for local government modernization

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