the fiscal institution in the economic and monetary union: the contribution of spain by ricardo...

The fiscal institution in the Economicand Monetary Union:

the contribution of Spain

* Public Sector economist, on leave, and Founding Partner, President and CEO of Equipo

Económico, S.L. He has held office as Deputy Finance Minister Working inside the team

of the Deputy Prime Minister, Rodrigo Rato, and Finance Minister, Cristóbal Montoro.

Graduate cum laude in Business Administration at the University of Zaragoza, he stu-

dies in the Deutsche Schule of Bilbao and Valencia. He has attended postgraduate cour-

ses at the London School of Economics, Kennedy School at Harvard University and

Wharton Business School.

1. Introduction

The current financial crisis in the European Union (EU) has

highlighted the importance of establishing a common framework

/RICARDO MARTÍNEZ RICO*/

227

1. Introduction; 2. Evolution of the fiscal policies in Europe and Spain;3. Analysis of the relationship between fiscal rigour, macroeconomic sta-bility and growth; 4. Next steps in the Fiscal Institution of the Economicand Monetary Union: the necessary contribution of Spain; 5. Conclusion

The fiscal institution in the Economic and Monetary Union:the contribution of Spain

which enables the economic agents to act in a macroeconomic sce-

nario of stability and confidence in the coming years.

In this crisis situation, once again the discussion has sparked

the debate in Europe of whether the necessary fiscal stability,

which will demand the rationalisation of public spending in the

member states, will be achieved at the expense of prolonging the

crisis and limiting economic growth possibilities. However, there

should be no dilemma between sustainability of public accounts

and medium term economic growth. The crisis of the European

sovereign debt is a consequence of overspending and debt which

the markets are not prepared to fund. In this regard, the only

recourse is a fiscal policy designed to mitigate the harsh effects of

the crisis and boost economic growth within the framework of

macroeconomic stability, continuous supervision over the sustai-

nability of public sector accounts and economic reforms.

Spain must cease to be a burden for Europe and once again

become a driver of growth. Compliance with a route of plausible

cuts in public spending in all Public Administrations is a necessary

condition to do so, though not the only. As previously shown, in

the case of the Spanish economy, stability and reforms make up the

formula required to revitalize investment, consumption and job

creation. Thus, economic reforms and budgetary discipline are

equally important.

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The Future of the Euro

The Spanish case is a clear example of a solid and plausible bud-

getary institution, where the principle of subsidiarity enables each

government with sound finances to tackle its internal decisions in

accordance with its economic and social reality (not only because

of its significance from a regulatory perspective but also because of

the parallels between the European scenario relative to the coun-

tries and the Spanish scenario relative to the Autonomous

Communities). At the same time, those who are forced to ask for

help must abide by the ensuing conditionality.

In Europe, likewise, the need for greater economic and mone-

tary integration must take us along the path of clear fiscal rules. But

it must also do so to encouraging income transmission mechanisms

between countries and regions, availability of financial resources

and support by way of providing the necessary liquidity to face

emergency situations and the pooling of risks, always in exchange

for strong sets of conditions to prevent moral hazard. Moreover,

within the monetary and economic union the imbalances must be

addressed, not only of highly indebted countries, but also those

with surplus balances. In some way, it must be recovered an incen-

tive system to ensure political commitment and compliance with

goals set. Nowadays, the fiscal institution1 is a basic component of

European and Spanish economic policy.

229

1 González Páramo defines it as "the rules which govern the preparation of the budgets, their

debate and approval in parliament, execution and subsequent control”. "Costs and benefits of fis-

cal discipline: the Law of Fiscal Stability in perspective” (Costes y beneficios de la disciplina fis-

cal: la Ley de Estabilidad presupuestaria en perspectiva), J.M. González-Páramo, 2001.


Throughout this work we shall examine, in first place, how the

sustainability of the public finances requires a solid fiscal institu-

tion and a firm political commitment by the different European

governments. Only on the basis of the conviction of the benefits of

this statement can one contribute towards the construction of a

stronger Europe.

Then we shall go on to examine the close relationship between

fiscal rigour, macroeconomic stability and growth, arriving at the

conclusion that the establishment of simple, transparent, automati-

cally applied rules with preventive control mechanisms for all

Public Administrations is essential for this ‘positive’ interrelation.

All these components are basic for the design of a fiscal policy

which helps to recover the credibility that Europe needs in its path

towards greater integration to face the sovereign debt crisis.

In the last chapter we shall examine the measures taken in Europe

and in Spain since the start of the sovereign debt crisis, and we shall

reflect on the following steps to be taken in support of the budgetary

institution. Then close with the appropriate conclusions.

2. Evolution of fiscal policy in Europe and Spain

The European political integration project came about in the

post World War years, as an extension of the economic integration

process. This was envisaged by one of the founding fathers of the

230


current Union, Jean Monnet. In 1950, he proposed the creation of

a space of peace and prosperity for Europe, via the formation of the

European Coal and Steel Community, which became a reality a

year later. His way of conceiving the European construction as a

project made up of very specific steps – beginning with the eco-

nomy – is the way to understand many of the milestones that

Europe has achieved in the last sixty years. Examples of this have

been the creation of the European Economic Communities, the

launch of the European Monetary System, the creation of the sin-

gle European market and the firm commitment that has led to the

Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

During the first decades of the European unification project,

Spain was but a mere observer, although fully embraced the inte-

gration process along the same lines and endorsed the way of tra-

velling the path towards a united Europe. Thus, in the mid-1980s,

Spain understood that the current EU offered a chance to take a

decisive step in its integration into an international market which

would bring gains in efficiency, reinforce macroeconomic stability

and contribute to the increase of wealth and per capita income.

That would lead to the development and modernisation of the

country. And, indeed, this was the case in the first years, where eco-

nomic growth rate of Spain was positive over that of the EU, by a

maximum of 3pp in 1987 (see Chart 1). However, as of this time,

macroeconomic instability driven by an expansive fiscal policy,

became a burden for economic growth and job creation, and gene-

rated a fast and continuous rise in public debt. The importance of

231

having a solid fiscal institution in the economic development of

the Spanish economy became patently clear.

After the repeated failures of the European Monetary System star-

ted up in 1979, and the progress of the approval of the Single

European Act (1986) in favour of an internal market, the EU mem-

ber states took an additional step in Maastricht. EU member states

support, via the adoption of the Treaty on the European Union

(TEU) (1992), the creation of an Economic and Monetary Union,

whose third phase would entail the launch of the single currency,

the Euro. Title VIII of the Maastricht Treaty set three main axes

around which the design of the EMU should be built around: sin-


232

Chart 1Year-on-year growth in real GDP in Spain and in the European Union

Source: Prepared by Equipo Económico with data from the International MonetaryFund

gle monetary policy, fiscal policies subject to common rules and

coordination mechanisms for the remaining economic policies. A

clear view of establishing nominal convergence mechanisms based

on the fiscal institution was already existent at that stage, founded

on the following common rules: absolute ban on monetary funding

of public deficits, no liability held by the EU or by any other State

in regard to debts acquired by another member state, and the set-

ting of limits on deficit (3%) and public debt (60%). As of 1997, the

Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) introduce stricter rules with a defi-

cit target of balance or surplus, supported by an early alert system

and a disciplinary penalty structure designed to correct deviations.

For Spain the commitment to meet the convergence criteria esta-

blished in the TEU for eligibility for the third phase of the EMU

demanded a radical change to be made in our fiscal policy. Europe

then began to act as an anchor in Spanish budgetary policy.

However, even when the worst of the recession was over for Spain,

governments continued to face enormous difficulties in balancing

the budget in the pursuit of macroeconomic stability.

It would not be until the political change of 1996, and with the

reference and encouragement arising from the creation of the sin-

gle currency, when the necessary fiscal consolidation was finally

tackled, that macroeconomic stability was achieved and the bases

for a new economic growth phase were put in place. The starting

point was poor, in 1995 with a deficit around 7% of the GDP and a

growing public indebtedness which reached 67% in 1996.


233

Although the level of indebtedness was lower than the average for

the EU, in the case of Spain the combination of the primary defi-

cit, the high cost of financing of the debt and the recession had

rendered unsustainable the growing public debt. As of that time

there was a change in fiscal policy, which took on a markedly coun-

ter-cyclical approach. As shown in chart 2, an ambitious fiscal con-

solidation programme was implemented which allowed the annual

budgets to close with primary surpluses from 1996 until the end of

the period and to slow down the growth trend in public debt

which, after peaking in 1996, dropped by more than 20pp of GDP

until 2004.


234

Chart 2Evolution of income and expenditure of Public Administrations and of their budgetbalances

Source: Prepared by Equipo Económico with data from the Ministry of Finance andPublic Administrations

During the period, the fiscal consolidation drive contributed

towards a strong growth in GDP (average rate of 3.6 between 1996

and 2004), which helped reducing debt stock via the positive spre-

ad between the economic growth rates and interest rates. The suc-

cess in the change of direction in fiscal policy was due to a firm

political commitment, a well-designed fiscal consolidation pro-

gramme and a substantial reform of the fiscal institution.2

For countries that, like Spain, managed to take part in its foun-

dation and for others which joined subsequently – such as the case

of Greece which, with the support of Germany and despite not

meeting at the time the requirements established by the Maastricht

Treaty, became part of the Eurozone two years later – the incorpo-

ration to the euro meant the relinquishment of monetary policy in

favour of the European Central Bank (ECB). And this total integra-

tion in the establishment of monetary policy has fostered greater

price stability during these years. On the other hand, this relin-

quishment made budgetary policy, along with economic liberalisa-

tion policies, into the main economic policy instruments in each of

the Eurozone member countries.

We must highlight that, once the objective of forming part of

the euro was met in full, Spain took an additional step beyond what

was required in Maastricht. And, in line with the principles agreed


235

2 “The Spanish fiscal institution: from the Stability Pact to the rules of fiscal stability” (La

institución presupuestaria española: del Pacto de Estabilidad a las reglas de estabilidad

pre¬supuestaria), R. Martínez Rico (2005).

in the SGP, it rounded off the fiscal consolidation effort with a deep

reform of the fiscal institution. As a result thereof, the approval of

the fiscal stability laws (the General Law on Fiscal Stability and the

Organic Law additional thereto) brought about a change in the

budgeting process. This mainly consisted of: the definition of a fis-

cal stability target (fiscal balance) in the medium term for all Public

Administrations; for the State, a non-financial expenditure limit,

the so-called expenditure ceiling, was applied following parliamen-

tary approval during the first half of the year; as a novelty, the

Contingency Fund was added into the State budget, as a flexibility

component during the life of the budget which removes the need

for making fiscal adjustments, equal to 2% of the non-financial

expenditure ceiling approved by Parliament. The approval of the

Fiscal Stability Laws was further completed with a new General

Fiscal Law and a new General Subsidies Law. Specifically, the

General Fiscal Law aimed at achieving greater rationalisation of the

fiscal process, whereas the General Subsidies Law, on its part, aimed

at transferring the governing principles of Fiscal Stability Laws (effi-

ciency, transparency and multi-annual framework) to the expendi-

ture on subsidies (which would mean 20% of expenditure budget).

However, in 2005, the European process of integration and

reform came to a halt. The solution provided to the reiterated vio-

lations of the 3% limit on public deficit established at Maastricht –

and following the pressure exerted by Germany and France in this

regard, backed by the European Commission – was none other

than the SGP, introducing greater discretionary power and taking a


236

step back in the capacity of the fiscal institution to contribute to

growth.

Along the same lines, with a comfortable fiscal position and

with the same philosophy as that of the reform of the SGP, Spain in

2006 approved a reform to render the fiscal and Territorial

Administration funding processes more flexible, which is the sour-

ce of our current fiscal crisis. The relaxation of fiscal stability led to

a loss of transparency in its application as a result of the flexible

new rules.

With the outbreak of the international financial crisis as of 2008,

the primary surplus of the first years of the period quickly ran out.

Discretionary expenditure decisions, the impact of automatic sta-

bilisers and the major errors in revenue estimates led to a deficit

balance, which worsened over two years (from 2007 to 2009) by

13pp of GDP. This deterioration, which had also taken place in the

rest of EU members, was more notable in Spain due to its speed and

magnitude (see Chart 3), with few comparable examples within the

scope of the OECD (except for the cases of Iceland or Ireland). The

deficit fiscal position generated a fast increase in public debt, lea-

ding to doubts about sustainability thereof, and translating into

significant rises in the risk premium of the country.

At the start of 2010, given the lack of confidence displayed by

international markets, and in light of the fast deterioration of

public finances, the previous Government was forced to implement


237

a radical change in its fiscal policy and announce a fiscal consoli-

dation programme.

The sovereign debt crisis, which especially affects several of the

“peripheral” member states of the Eurozone (but which has also

affect countries such as France and Austria), has highlighted the

need to reinforce the budgetary coordination mechanisms within

the EMU. In the face of the problems arising from the sovereign


238

Chart 3Budget balance in 2006 and change in budget balance in 2007-2009

Source: Prepared by Equipo Económico with OECD data

debt crisis and as a result of the fluctuations in the risk premiums

of the Eurozone member states, a double reinforcement movement

of the budgetary crisis has taken place from Brussels since the onset

of the crisis. On the one hand, that implemented by the European

Commission, the result of which is, for instance, the legislative pac-

kage comprising five regulations and one directive designed to rein-

force the preventive part and the disciplinary part of EC mecha-

nisms. On the other, that of the member states which, via the

European Council, have brought about agreements such as the

Fiscal Pact, which seeks to guarantee that all countries will commit

to fiscal stability under the highest level of regulation. The reform

enacted last year of the Spanish Constitution must be understood

within the framework of this new drive from Europe in support of

the fiscal institution. The reform, as we shall discuss further in this

paper, guarantees the principle of fiscal stability via the highest ran-

king law.

Despite efforts invested, and despite the positive effect of the

liquidity injections made by the ECB, the current economic scena-

rio in Europe continues to be marked by the risk premiums of EU

peripheral countries, which continue to be too high. The questions

as to the capacity of such countries to meet their debt commit-

ments have burdened economic European Union results over the

last two years. This has led the Commission to forecast a drop in

GDP for all of the EU of -0.5% for this year, which sets it back in

terms of the growth of the world economy. Although it must be

said, that all countries are not behaving in the same way. Germany,


239

for instance, closed last year with 3% growth, expecting to do so

this year at 0.6%, whereas Italy will experience a drop of around -

1.3% of GDP. From a growth perspective, there is an important dif-

ference between northern and southern European countries arising

from the financial crisis. However, it is worth remembering the

strong interdependence between all member states, including

Germany (second country in the world in terms of export volume,

of which 60% are directed to the EU).

On its part, the Spanish economy is clearly included in the “slo-

wer” group, at an extremely difficult time. In recent months, the

return to recession, which accumulates after four years of crisis, the

adverse effect on employment and on businesses, has led to a 24%

unemployment rate. At the same time, there is high external debt,

exceeding 160% of the GDP, with a high accumulation of public and

private debt maturities this year. All these factors have led to a risk

premium of around 340 basis points in the last few months and, more

recently, well above 450 basis points, and to be closely watched by the

markets, that is to say, our creditors. Given this scenario, in 2012, the

Spanish economy faces challenges associated with its macroeconomic

imbalances yet to be corrected, as well as the potential problems ari-

sing from a new challenge from international financial markets. In

this framework, we expect a drop in GDP during the first quarters,

and although its performance will improve towards the end of the

year, it will result in an overall drop in GDP of around -1.5% this year.

Meanwhile, the reality experienced by the rest of the world is diffe-

rent, with a world economy growth rate of around 3.5% of GDP.


240

Undoubtedly, the unemployment rate is our main negative dif-

ferentiating factor compared to all other EU members and the main

concern for Spanish society. As a result of the economic crisis, no

country in the OECD has experienced a downturn in the jobless

rate as negative as ours. Our rate of unemployment has gone from

8.3% of active population in 2007 to almost 24% at the end of

2011. The crisis has highlighted the problem with our employment

model, as our economy is adjusted by means of redundancies ins-

tead of by adding greater flexibility to employment conditions.

Despite the gradual correction of the external imbalance (the

current account deficit has been reduced from 10% of GDP recor-

ded for 2007 to less than 4% in 2011), Spain continues to be signi-

ficantly reliant on foreign funding (around 40,000M€ per annum).

The need for funds shown by the current account deficit, cannot in

fact be met by attracting foreign investment to our country.

Indeed, the opposite is the case, with recent years witnessing a

divestment process, particularly of portfolio assets. The forecast

drop in the GDP combined with the high level of debt, puts the

sustainability of our funding at risk. Given such conditions, the cri-

sis is requiring a must faster deleveraging process than that initially

expected.

Since the common denominator of the European sovereign debt

crisis is insufficient GDP growth, only by articulating the reforms

in Europe and in Spain in an expedient and firm manner can the

current increasing loss of confidence by financial markets be sta-


241

lled. In the case of the Spanish economy, this is a path which we

travelled successfully in the second half of the nineties, when

Spain took part in the foundation of the euro and then went on to

lead the fiscal consolidation process in Europe. The new govern-

ment seems to have understood this, having begun reforms in

three main areas: sustainability of the public finances and moder-

nisation of the public sector, the restructuring and reorganization

of the financial sector and the reform of the labour market. In the

coming years, political commitment to fiscal rigour, macroecono-

mic stability and growth must go hand in hand in Spain and

Europe, and happen in parallel.

3. Analysis of the relationship between fiscal rigour, macroe-conomic stability and growth

In the context described in the previous section, fiscal consolida-

tion within the EMU is a fundamental tool for recovering macroeco-

nomic stability, the confidence of economic players and the path to

growth, leading in turn to job creation.

Moreover, the balance in public finances provides the econo-

mies participating in the monetary union, which therefore cannot

resort to instruments such as currency rates, with greater leeway to

deal with external shocks, enabling the implementation of anti-

cyclical policies and of automatic stabilisers.


242

At the same time, as has been amply studied in the literature,3

fiscal balance fosters a macroeconomic stability scenario which pro-

vides a more efficient framework for the development of economic

activity. The reduction in the deficit increases the confidence of

savers and investors. This translates into a stimulus for investment

and job creation, as well as allowing households and businesses to

plan the purchase of durable goods in the long term, thus leading to

sustained consumption, which is a key factor of economic growth.

One of the most relevant aspects is the stronger credibility of the

economic policy and the improvement in the funding terms of the

economies in the international markets, thanks to the reduction of

the risk premium, which in turn leads to a drop in financial costs,

as shown in Chart 4 in the case of Spain as of 1996. The subjection

of European monetary and fiscal policies to certain rules, and the

assumption thereof by Spain as a participant in the foundation of

the Euro, helped to provide additional credibility to the govern-

ment’s fiscal consolidation strategy. This strategy was strengthened

by the regulatory reforms introduced by said government as we dis-

cussed in the previous section. This positive impact4 on the expec-

tations and on the confidence of economic agents explains the

sharp drop in long term interest rates, compared to the 10 year

German bond. The spread in the Spanish risk premium was actually

zeroed as of 2003.


243

3 “Fiscal policy and long-run growth”, V. Tanzi and H. Zee, 1997.

4 “The Spanish economic model 1996-2004” (El modelo económico español 1996-2004), L.

Bernaldo de Quirós and R. Martínez Rico, 2005.

However, since 2008, with the arrival of the international finan-

cial crisis, the macroeconomic imbalances accumulated by the

Spanish economy led to the opposite effect. Furthermore, as a

result of the degradation of Spanish public finances between 2003

and 2009, as shown in the aforementioned graph 3, and the doubts

in regard to the sustainability of the Spanish public debt, the risk

premium increased once again in a significant way as of 2010, now

reaching the 450 base point mark.

The significance of fiscal consolidation as a tool for the recovery

of stability and long term growth has also been proven in practice

in many successful fiscal adjustment processes implemented in the

last decades in certain European countries, such as Spain (1996-

2004), Ireland (1982-1989) or Sweden and Finland (1993-2000),

some of which have been studied in depth in the literature.5

The most successful process was the one implemented in

Finland between 1993 and 2000, which managed to reduce pri-

mary expenditure by 14pp of GDP. This was mainly based on per-

sonnel cost containment, reduction in transfers from the Central

Administration to Local Corporations and the pursuit of efficiency

in social expenditure, particularly in health services, education and

pensions. Moreover, the fiscal institution underwent a reform with

the introduction of expenditure ceilings, which proved to be a key


244

5 "Fiscal expansions and adjustments in OECD countries", A. Alesina y R. Perotti, 1995. “An

Empirical Analysis of Fiscal Adjustments", C. McDermott & R. Wescott, 1996.

tool for cost containment. At the same time, the pension system,

the labour market and the financial system underwent a structural

reform. The only expenditure programme that was deliberately

maintained, thus keeping its 1% share of the GDP, was that of

Research and Development.

The Swedish experience between 1993 and 2000 obtained similar

results in terms of a reduction in primary expenditure (14% GDP),

which led to the attainment of fiscal balance in 1997, having closed

financial year 1993 with a deficit of 12.9%. In contrast with Finland,


245

Chart 4Evolution of risk premium

Source: Financial Times

in Sweden the fiscal consolidation took place due to both the cut in

expenditure and the increase in revenue through a tax rise, while

also implementing simultaneous structural reforms such as the pri-

vatisation of public corporations and the liberalisation of the labour

market. Public spending was reduced by 16pp of GDP over a seven

year period, mainly through a reduction of the expenses in transfers

and benefits (including unemployment benefits) and a reduction in

personnel and current costs of all public administrations. The intro-

duction of three-year expenditure ceilings and annual productivity

targets must be added to such measures.

The starting point of all the above was the strict cut in primary

expenditure, as the basis for the adjustment process, mainly cen-

tred on personnel costs, transfers and health services.

Undoubtedly, a key factor in all such measures is that they were

done hand in hand with important structural reforms, particularly

those implemented in the labour market, the fiscal system and the

privatisations. Those allowed the adjustment process consolidation

and the increase in potential growth, on the basis of a firm politi-

cal commitment. Furthermore, it helped proved that fiscal consoli-

dation strategies based on spending cuts are more enduring and

promote a better economic performance than those based on reve-

nue increase.

Experience has likewise proven that fiscal consolidation cannot

be maintained in the medium term without a proper fiscal institu-

tion articulation. As shown in the previous section, from the start,


246


247

the construction of Europe has been evolving towards a greater

relinquishment of national policies in favour of European ones. It

is a slow and complicated process in which political divergences

often prevail over the overall view of what this process means. This

relinquishment has meant the need for greater autonomy in the

establishment of rules and objectives, as has been the case, for ins-

tance, with monetary policy. Aside from the current supervision

problems, it is clear that the role of the ECB in regard to price con-

trol has been a success. This example should be transferred to the

fiscal policy as a source of inspiration to maintain the necessary

political commitment and thus achieve effective fiscal coordina-

tion in the Eurozone.

We live in an open economy, where freedom of movement of

persons, goods, capital, information and technology are necessary

conditions for improvement of competitiveness and economic

development. A globalised market, with a high level of competi-

tion, but also great opportunities, requires a disciplined, foreseea-

ble and transparent behaviour by the countries, designed to gene-

rate confidence among economic agents. The EMU was born out of

this perspective although there have been mechanisms, or even

relevant design components, which have failed.

In general, The European construction has been preceded by the

establishment of rules seeking to limit the risks of integration. The

problem has arisen from the lack of rigour in compliance with such

rules, probably as result of the insufficient clarity of the rules and

of political leadership committed to integration. When this hap-

pens, it is easier to interpret the situation in one’s own favour, par-

ticularly when high political power is held. Therefore, it is impor-

tant to have clear and simple rules, in order to reduce the possibili-

ties of interpretation and to help control subsequent compliance.

At the same time, the establishment of preventing rules to ena-

ble the anticipation of sharp increases in public deficit, should be

articulated via a greater participation by the EU in the preparation

of national budgets, in line with the latest legislative proposals of

the European Commission on the matter. Preliminary control is a

guarantee of compliance and greater co-responsibility with Brussels,

which should in turn lead to better access to European funding.

According to economic literature,6 those countries exerting con-

siderable effort to achieve fiscal consolidation amid a context of

economic uncertainty, should design and announce the establish-

ment of a fiscal rule within a reasonable period of time designed to

improve credibility. In the case of Spain, this step has been taken by

way of the reform of section 135 of the Constitution, a historical

event of special political relevance.

In our case, constitutional reform has managed to raise to the

level of fundamental Law – a relevant issue in our highly decentra-

lised State – the commitment of all the Administrations to fiscal


248

6 “Fiscal Rules – anchoring expectations for sustainable public finances”, FMI, 2009.


249

sustainability. The approval of this reform has meant the recogni-

tion of the benefits of fiscal discipline, having assumed the flaws in

the relaxation of the Stability Laws in 2006 as well as the need to

provide a new common legal framework for all of the public sector.

Except for force majeure cases (natural disasters or emergency

situations), compliance with the limits on public debt and fiscal

balance set by the EU are guaranteed. Likewise, priority is given to

servicing the debt in the budget, a condition which helps build the

necessary confidence in lenders, and is an appropriate antidote for

preventing the loss of confidence in Eurozone countries.

The reform also established the need for articulation in a new

organic Law, designed, on the one hand, to regulate the distribu-

tion of deficit and debt limits between the various

Administrations, the exceptional cases of surpluses therein, and

the means and terms for correction of any deviations in one or the

other that might take place. On the other hand, it had to establish

the methodology and procedure for calculation of structural defi-

cit. It is important that the calculation methodology respects the

procedure used in the EU, to provide discipline and transparency

to the fiscal process and help in the statement of accounts. The cal-

culation rule must be clear, and serve to consolidate fiscal discipli-

ne, as a permanent long term commitment. Lastly, it must esta-

blish the responsibility of the Administrations in the event of fai-

lure to achieve fiscal stability targets. In this regard, the credibility

of the reform will depend on the existence of efficient systems

which encourage the Administrations to meet the fiscal targets. As

we shall mention in the next section, such principles have been

included in the Law on Fiscal Stability and Financial Sustainability

of Public Administrations.

4. Next steps in the Fiscal Institution of the Economic andMonetary Union: the necessary contribution of Spain

The European debate on sustainability of public finances and

the future of the Euro is set at a time in which, following the con-

version of the international crisis into the crisis of the sovereign

debt of several Eurozone countries, we have witnessed myriad

European summits, each of which seeming to be the last chance to

tackle the doubts of the markets in relation to the viability of the

debt, in the first place, of Greece, Portugal and Ireland, and more

recently, of Italy and Spain.

It is true that the crisis is far from being resolved. The EU has not

always shown a capacity to react with the speed required by econo-

mic relations nowadays – until the tensions reached non peripheral

economies such as Austria or France, the pace in reaching consen-

sus had been much slower than necessary. Moreover, during the cri-

sis, it has become obvious that the institutional design of the

Monetary Union was incomplete and, above all, as we have men-

tioned in this paper, that there has been insufficient political com-

mitment to the application of the existing mechanisms of fiscal

coordination. But it is also true that in the last four years, a consi-


250

derable path has been travelled towards European construction,

towards an improvement in economic governance, so that in addi-

tion to a single monetary policy, Europe is also able to benefit from

greater integration of fiscal policies.

As such, it is worth highlighting the agreements reached, either

via the community procedure or via inter-governmental agree-

ments, in terms of strengthening coordination, supervision and

policing mechanisms of fiscal and macroeconomic policies.

In the first place, the European Semester establishes a new sche-

dule whereby, on the basis of the macroeconomic situation of each

member state and its growth forecast, the budgets and economic

policies required to meet the commitments undertaken in the Euro

Plus Pact and the 2020 Growth Strategy are discussed during the

first six months of the year in a coordinated fashion and in accor-

dance with common rules.

In the second place, the adoption of the so-called Six-pack (one

directive and five regulations) constitutes the greatest reform of the

SGP and of economic Governance since the Maastricht Treaty

which created the EMU. As of the adoption of the new legislation,

the European Commission may establish automatic penalties (of

up 0.2% of GDP) for those countries with excessive deficits which

do not follow the recommendations for correction. At the same

time, the public debt control mechanism and the required reduc-

tion are reinforced in the event of exceeding the 60% GDP level


251

assumed. It also introduces a mechanism designed to prevent

excessive imbalances such as unsustainable current account defi-

cits, loss of competitiveness and other macroeconomic imbalances.

Lastly, the signature of the new Treaty on Stability,

Coordination and Growth (by all member states of the EU except

for the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic) brings changes at

the highest legislative level to fiscal stability regulation. This must

be translated in each country in that the structural deficit of the

public sector may not exceed 0.5 GDP per annum, subject to auto-

matic penalties.

These steps will be followed in the months to come by impro-

vements seeking to fine-tune the mechanisms of economic con-

vergence, via two legislative proposals7 of the European

Commission, by establishing a clearer and more demanding sche-

dule for fiscal coordination in Europe and implementing fiscal

control and monitoring mechanisms in countries facing serious

difficulties in regard to their financial stability within the

Eurozone.

All these measures help towards the consolidation of economic

governance, and establish the bases to enable progress to be made


252

7 "Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on common

provi¬sions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of

exces¬sive deficit of the Member States in the euro area" and "Proposal for a regulation of the

European Parliament and of the Council on the strengthening of economic and budgetary sur-

via other instruments, in order to provide funding and liquidity to

handle emergency situations, to the extent of including euro-

bonds, if necessary, as well as helping the ECB to have greater lee-

way when acting in the markets in pursuit of economic stability.

Without doubt, greater fiscal coordination broadens the funding

margin of these countries. But we must be clear that access to fun-

ding requires preliminary fiscal control, and not the reverse.

Conditionality in all these mechanisms is an essential requirement

when seeking to limit risk. Any funding requires certain minimum

guarantees of repayment of the loan, and this translates into

adjustments and reforms. This is nothing new, but something that

has cropped up on many occasions in IMF interventions.

Eurobonds might get to play a key role, but cannot be the only

item to support the fiscal union, which will drive the Eurozone

towards optimum monetary union, and for which to date there is

no more than a highly experimental road map.

Within this working programme so badly needed in Europe, and

supported by conditionality, greater mechanisms for EU income

transmission should be created to help countries facing serious pro-

blems – such as that of the sovereign debt crisis – in order to imple-

ment the structural reforms required by their economies, with the

support of Europe in driving growth. This can be done via the

encouragement of youth employment and entrepreneur program-


253

veillance of Member States experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to

their finan¬cial stability in the euro area", European Commission, November 2011

mes, the reinforcement of resources available, among other uses,

for structural funds or for the activity of the European Investment

Bank.

On their part, the Eurozone member states can and must con-

tribute to guarantee the future of the single currency, and to the

generation of the economic growth required to clear any doubts as

to the sustainability of sovereign debt, either via their contribu-

tions towards the establishment of common rules so that the EMU

becomes an optimum monetary zone, or via the reforms on a

national scale which constitute an example for all the others.

There is also a high degree of parallelism between the rules

required and which must be institutionalized in the Monetary

Union at a European level, and the process which must be follo-

wed in Spain in regard to responsibility, conditionality and subsi-

diarity of regional and local Public Administrations. In both cases,

the need for a political will capable of applying clear and straight-

forward rules, with prevention mechanisms, supported by coordi-

nation, monitoring and automatic sanction systems for those who

fail to comply with the targets undertaken, has become clearly evi-

dent. In this sense, the fact that the new fiscal pact at a European

level and the recent legislative changes in Spain seem to be going

in the same direction is a positive factor.

The case of Spain, where we have a very high degree of decentra-

lisation and where the Autonomous Communities and Local


254

Corporations manage approximately 50% of the public expenditure,

is a clear example of the need for coordination of fiscal policies to

ensure that the right signals are sent to markets and investors in

regard to the orientation of the fiscal policy. The consolidation efforts

made by some countries and regions are useless if there are others

which do not honour their commitments and destabilise the zone,

region or country. Europe and, of course, Spain have their own iden-

tity, and this applies to act as a unique body in order to establish the

aims. The scope of action of each government to achieve fiscal targets

undertaken, via the instruments deemed appropriate, is a different

thing altogether. The principle of subsidiarity must be respected pro-

vided that the principle of fiscal balance is observed. Each country

must have autonomy to define and design its fiscal structure so

long as the limits set for deficit, debt and growth in expenditure are

respected. Fiscal competition allows for improvement in revenue

collection efficiency and greater rigour in expenditure control, and

thus the greater fiscal coordination in Europe must not be envisaged

as a single fiscal policy. However, one of the main instruments at the

disposal of the governments when coordinating fiscal policies is con-

ditionality. In any regional funding system there are income transmis-

sion mechanisms and penalties aiming to fulfil the set fiscal targets.

Therefore, in the event that fiscal stability criteria are not met, be it at

a national level within the Eurozone or at a regional level within

Spain, the aid provided, as the case may be via special liquidity facili-

ties and even, if necessary, by way of eurobonds or hispanobonds, or

by way of larger revenue transmissions at a European level, cannot

take place without the acceptance of the conditionality it carries.


255

Spain has understood the need to contribute to the stability in

Europe and is leading, for the second time, a solid process of

reforms towards fiscal balance. Following the general elections of

November 2011, the new government and a reinforced political

capital constitute the main assets to bring about the necessary

reforms. The proof thereof is evident in the fiscal reforms: the

Royal Decree of non-availability, the reform of the Law on

Stability, the new system for payment to suppliers, the new bill on

Transparency or the bill of General State Budgets for 2012 (which

establishes an adjustment of 27,300 million euros to be made bet-

ween cost control and revenue increase).

The modification of section 135 of the Spanish Constitution

assumed its inclusion in a subsequent organic Law (the Law of

Budgetary Stability and Financial Sustainability of the Public

Administrations, recently presented), which specifies changes in

the preparation, execution and control of the Spanish fiscal insti-

tution. The recent approval of this bill means a return to the com-

mitment to the control of public finances and, more importantly,

it adds all of the Public Administrations to its scope of application,

which the previous Stability Law failed to do.

The three main objectives of this bill are to guarantee the fiscal

sustainability of all Public Administrations, to strengthen econo-

mic confidence and to reinforce the commits of Spain with the

European Union.


256

All Public Administrations must present a balance or a surplus

calculated according to EAS terms and none may incur in structural

deficit. However, there are two exceptions in the case of structural

reforms with long term fiscal effects (a structural deficit of 0.4% of

the GDP may be achieved) and in the event of natural disasters, eco-

nomic recession and extraordinary economic emergency.

In establishing the objectives of stability and public debt, the

recommendations of the EU in regard to the Stability Programme

must be taken into account, and all Public Administrations must

approve an expenditure ceiling in line with the stability target and

the expenditure rule. One of the most important aspects, in accor-

dance with European regulations, restricts the growth in expendi-

ture by the Public Administrations, as this may not exceed the GDP

growth rate.

Failure to comply with the targets shall require the presenta-

tion of an economic and financial plan to allow the correction of

the deviation for a period of one year. This plan must explain the

causes underlying the deviation and the measures which will

bring it back within the limit. In the event of non-compliance

with the plan, the responsible Administration must automatically

approve the non-availability of loans to guarantee compliance

with the set target and the meeting of the targets shall be taken

into account when authorising debt issues, granting subsidies and

signing agreements.


257

The Law, on the other hand, strengthens the preventive and

monitoring systems of stability and debt objectives. Therefore, a

debt threshold of a preventive nature is established, beyond which

the only debt operations allowed will be cash transactions.

In order to render all Public Administrations jointly responsible,

the penalties imposed in Spain in matters of stability shall be assu-

med by the responsible administration. In the event of failure to

produce an economic-financial plan, the administration in breach

must put of a deposit of 0.2% of its nominal GDP, which after six

months may be converted into a penalty in the event that the vio-

lations should continue. After nine months, the Ministry of

Finance and Public Administrations may send a delegation to

assess the economic and budgetary situation of the delinquent

Administration.

In order to strengthen the principle of transparency, each

Public Administration must establish the equivalence between

the budget and the national accounts. Prior to approval, each

Public Administration must provide information on its main

budget guidelines, in order to comply with European regulatory

requirements.

As was set forth in the new draft of section 135 of the

Constitution, the Law establishes a temporary period until 2020

for gradual compliance, until public debt is 60% of GDP. In order

to ensure compliance with this scenario, public debt must be redu-


258

ced whenever the economy experiences positive real growth. Upon

reaching a growth rate of 2% or net yearly employment is genera-

ted, the debt ratio shall be reduced each year at least by two GDP

points. On its part, the global structural deficit must be reduced by

0.8% of the annual average GDP.

Beyond the institutional importance of the reform, it is worth

considering the political capital that is allowing the deficit problem

to be addressed in an integral way and with long term vision. Doubts

as to possible deficit deviations in the current and following finan-

cial years should not lead us to lose perspective of the importance of

the reform. This reform set a trend designed to transform public bud-

gets into a reliable institution, with a simple structure, with no room

for interpretation, equal for all and with an automatic application

which allows it to be protected from temptations from other govern-

ments. In this regard, we also view the provisions included in the Bill

for the Transparency Law, which, undoubtedly, shall contribute

towards generating better knowledge of public finances.

The fiscal systems being approved in Spain matched with the

European model. There is a strong parallelism between the two,

and the construction errors of the European design and of the fis-

cal institution in Spain must be corrected by means of a coordina-

tion of fiscal policies in which the principles of regulatory equity,

subsidiarity, conditionality and sustainability should prevail above

all others.


259

Without doubt, the future of the euro requires more Europe.

The construction of Europe needs rules, adjustments and reforms.

Without growth the European model is doomed for failure. The

current crisis is but a result of the structural deficiencies of our eco-

nomy, of our excess indebtedness, of our lack of flexibility and our

lack of competitiveness in some aspects.

Once again, Spain, on its part, must become a role model of the

fiscal institution in Europe, and of the benefits which macroeco-

nomic stability brings to the economies, in terms of higher growth,

more wealth and greater employment. This is unquestionably the

best way to redistribute income. This is the only way we will mana-

ge to get Europe and Spain out of the sovereign debt crisis they

face, ensuring a solid future for the process of European construc-

tion, which is the greatest milestone in the search for peace and

prosperity in Europe.

5. Conclusion

Following the same pattern set since the inception of the

European integration project after the World War, the EMU came

about in 1999 as a result of the political aspiration of increasing

integration and as a European response to the globalisation pro-

cess. In reality, the integration via the monetary union which

makes up the Eurozone was not an objective in and of itself, but

rather a means to improve competitiveness and efficiency among


260

member countries. The ultimate goal, therefore, was growth, job

creation and the improvement of social welfare, while at the same

time making inroads in terms of political integration.

At that time the countries were aware of the need to set fiscal dis-

cipline targets as stability factors for Europe. However, those impor-

tant advances in the European construction process became diluted

over the years with the introduction of components carrying greater

flexibility and discretionality in the fiscal institution. The best exam-

ple is that the solution provided in 2005 to the violation of the SGP

by Germany and France was none other than the reform thereof

which included greater ambiguity in the search for fiscal stability, for

which they gained the support of the European Commission. The

diminishing political commitment with the fiscal institution and its

fragility in the face of the vicissitudes of the different governments

and ideologies became clear at that time. Therefore, with an institu-

tional design which was incomplete, and gradually declining over

the years, the EMU was far from representing an optimal monetary

area, and therefore the imbalances of the Eurozone economies incre-

ased, instead of decreasing, placing Europe in a difficult situation in

the face of the global financial crisis.

In this context, the current European debt crisis has highlighted

the urgent need for better coordination of the fiscal policies in

Europe. At the same time and particularly during the crisis, the

experience since the foundation of the euro has shown the impor-

tance of political commitment with the fiscal institution and the


261

need for preventive rules instead of penalties which are difficult to

apply. It is essential to ensure that the accumulation of excessive

deficits does not lead to unsustainable situations which call into

question traditional European security and seriously complicate

the capacity for funding growth and job creation. Rules are a

necessary condition to ensure compliance with fiscal targets. But

these rules must be of straightforward and automatic application.

Despite the difficulties, the present economic time obliges

Europe and Spain to make fast and efficient decisions in order to

straighten out the situation. It is important to take advantage of

current circumstances to tackle ambitious reforms designed to

correct some of the structural flaws of the Eurozone and of our eco-

nomy. It is important to face the current problems from a long

term outlook and to establish the rules of a fiscal institution which

ensure the viability of the European project.

The future and survival of the euro rests on all member states

being able to implement domestic reforms seriously, thus genera-

ting a sign of confidence for international investors and which

shall also serve, again in our case, as a calling card for our busines-

ses abroad. In Spain, one of the countries which has sustained the

most damage from the sharp budgetary deviations of recent years,

regional configuration shows evident parallelisms with Europe,

both in terms of the need to establish common objectives, and in

terms of the control systems or the transmission and penalty

mechanisms.


262

Spain, as a country which has already proven its ability to take

on this role at the end of the 1990s in the foundation of the Euro,

once again has an important role to play. In this regard, it is worth

mentioning that, thanks to the latest reforms implemented in sup-

port of the fiscal institution, Spain is once again contributing to

the European debate in pursuit of macroeconomic stability in the

Eurozone and its recovery. The challenge to be addressed, by means

of a change in the economic policy, is to recover confidence and

credibility of our economy, to enable businesses and consumers to

concentrate efforts in business, labour or consumer decisions, and

that macroeconomic issues, such as the risk premium, cease to be

cause for concern. Only in this way may Spain avoid lagging

behind like a second rate club, to which we have already said no a

few years back.

In order to move forward in building a fiscal union in Europe,

which succeeds in turning the EMU into an optimal monetary area

and ensures the good health of the euro and of the European eco-

nomy, the necessary mechanisms of income transmission, ensure

the availability of financial resources and required liquidity, to the

extent, if necessary, of creating risk pooling instruments, such as

eurobonds and, in parallel, the hispanobonds in the case of Spain.

These require, however, the establishment of prerequisites, that is,

economic adjustments and reforms to be implemented by the

countries facing the most difficulties. The rules are very important,

but without reforms it is impossible to grow, and without growth,

budgets become unsustainable. A different issue is, provided agre-


263

ed commitments are met, the respect for the autonomy of each

country to decide on its income and expenditure structure.

Subsidiarity must govern in Europe for those who are taking the

necessary steps, as is being done in Spain, in order to adapt the

budgets to the economic and social reality of each country.

The European construction has taken important steps since the

start of the crisis, but it needs to continue to progress via an incen-

tive system to ensure the political commitment with the fiscal ins-

titution in the medium and long term. The objectives of peace and

prosperity established by the founding fathers of the European

construction, on a long term horizon, once again depend on our

capacity to recover the growth and competitiveness of the eco-

nomy, and hence employment and the European welfare model.


264

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