The Firm as a ‘‘Community of Persons’’: A Pillar of HumanisticBusiness Ethos

Domenec Mele

Published online: 14 October 2011

� Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Abstract The article starts by arguing that seeing the firm

as a mere nexus of contracts or as an abstract entity where

different stakeholder interests concur is insufficient for a

‘‘humanistic business ethos’’, which entails a complete

view of the human being. It seems more appropriate to

understand the firm as a human community, a concept

which can be found in several sources, including mana-

gerial literature, business ethics scholars, and Catholic

Social Teaching. In addition, there are also philosophical

grounds that support the idea of business as a human

community. Extending this concept, and drawing from

some Phenomenological-Personalist philosophers, we pro-

pose that the firm should be seen as a particular ‘‘com-

munity of persons’’ oriented to providing goods and

services efficiently and profitably. Being a ‘‘community of

persons’’ emphasizes both individuals and the whole, and

makes explicit the uniqueness, conscience, free will, dig-

nity, and openness to human flourishing. This requires

appropriate communication about and participation in

matters which affect people’s life, and makes it essential to

cooperate for the common good of the business firm and

the society.

Keywords Aristotle � Business as a community �Business enterprise � Business ethos � Catholic Social

Teaching � Corporation � Firm � Personalism

Introduction

The concept of ‘‘business ethos’’ is none too common in

either business or business ethics literature. Two excep-

tions are Woller (1996), who considers that there is a

‘‘liberal business ethos’’ and Castro (1999) who uses

‘‘business ethos’’ in the sense of customs and activities

around business, although he reduces the meaning of

‘‘business ethos’’ to ‘‘making profits’’ without any further

consideration. In spite of the scarce use of the term, we

suggest that it makes sense to discuss the ‘‘business ethos’’

underlying any particular way of understanding business.

As we try to explain here, business ethos is relevant for a

sound understanding of business and also to open horizons

for business ethics.

Etymologically, ethos, a word coming from Greek,

means ‘‘moral character, nature, disposition, habit, cus-

tom.’’1 The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines ethos as

‘‘the distinguishing character, sentiment, moral nature, or

guiding beliefs of a person, group, or institution.’’2 Thus,

we can talk of business ethos as the guiding ideas and

values which provide a ‘‘distinctive spirit’’ in understand-

ing business. Epistemology, anthropological philosophy,

ethics, and esthetics may be relevant disciplines in ana-

lyzing ethos.

For many decades an ‘‘economism-based business

ethos’’ has been the mainstream in business, and particu-

larly in business schools. Although without actually

employing the concept of ‘‘business ethos’’, several well-

known scholars (Donaldson 2002; Pfeffer and Fong 2002;

Ghoshal 2005; Pfeffer 2005, among others), have criticized

D. Mele (&)

IESE Business School, University of Navarra, Pamplona, Spain

e-mail: mele@iese.edu

1 ‘‘Ethos’’ in Online Etymology Dictionary: www.etymonline.com/

index.php?search=ethos&searchmode=none.2 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ethos.

123

J Bus Ethics (2012) 106:89–101

DOI 10.1007/s10551-011-1051-2

a vision of business schools dominated by social science

and, more specifically by economics. Ghoshal (2005) was

particularly explicit in pointing out that economic theories

dominant in many business schools entailed an ‘‘ideology-

based gloomy vision’’ about people and institutions. These

theories assume that human behavior is based on a view of

the human individual defined as a rational, self-interested,

utility-maximizing homo oeconomicus, and on the idea that

the purpose of the firm should be to maximize shareholder

value.

The view of the human being adopted is a pillar of each

business ethos. But there is another pillar on which we will

focus: the view of the firm (understood here as synonymous

of the corporation or the business enterprise). The

‘‘economism-based business ethos’’ generally sees the firm

as a set of contracts. In contrast, there is a humanist busi-

ness ethos, which tries to see business enterprises in their

human wholeness.

Aligned with the challenge for a humanistic manage-

ment (Mele 2003), the aim of this article is to provide a

better understanding of what the business enterprise is by

considering its human wholeness. We will proceed as fol-

lows. First, we will discuss two current views of the firm,

and show the limitations of these. One of these views

reduces the firm to a nexus of contracts; another sees the

firm as a set of interests of autonomous subjects with a

stake in the corporation or firm. Second, we will provide a

bibliographical review which shows that the view of the

firm as a human community can be found in several

sources, including managerial literature, business ethics

scholars, and Catholic Social Teaching. Third, we will

present some philosophical grounds to support the idea of

business as a community. Fourth, drawing from some

Phenomenological-Personalist philosophers we will go into

the concept of ‘community of persons’, suggesting that this

concept entails an axiological meaning that fits well with a

business enterprise, and becomes a pillar of a humanistic

business ethos. Finally, we will explore some of the ethical

implications for managing organizations of being a

‘‘community of persons’’.

Two Current Views of the Firm

The Firm as a Nexus of Contracts

There is a view of the firm associated with the idea that the

firm is a mere aggregate of individuals united exclusively

for reasons of power and interests, through a set of con-

tracts. Hessen, a leading proponent of this position,

affirmed: ‘‘every organization regardless of its legal form

or features consists only of individuals (…) The term

corporation actually means a group of individuals who

engage in a particular type of contractual relationship with

each other’’ (1979, p. xiii).

This way of understanding the firm can be found in the

work of the influential economist Ronald Coase (1937) on

the nature of the firm.3 He considered the business firm

exclusively from an economic point of view, and therefore

as an instrument for economic efficiency. According to

him, there is a reduction of costs, and therefore more

economic efficiency when a hierarchical structure and an

appropriate organization are used, rather than business

being conducted by individuals, who exchange products in

the marketplace.

Coase’s theory was extended with Agency Cost Theory

(Ross 1973, Jensen and Meckling 1976), which has become

very popular in Neoclassical economics, corporate finance,

and in business management. In accordance with this the-

ory, within the organization relations are articulated

through explicit and implicit contracts between two groups.

One of these (principal) engages another group (agent) to

perform some activity on their behalf. Management is seen

as the agent of those who hold the company stock (stock-

holders), who are the principal. Other sets of contracts

between ‘‘principals’’ and ‘‘agents’’ can also be found

within the firm. From this position it can be affirmed that

‘‘the private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal

fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting relation-

ships.’’ (Jensen and Meckling 1976, p. 311)

Written contracts identify mutual duties and responsi-

bilities in a generalized form. This includes an often very

unspecific set of duties and rights. Some scholars extend

existing contracts in organizations to so-called ‘‘psycho-

logical contracts’’ (Conway and Briner 2005). These refer

to informal obligations for the employer and the employee

which specify in detail practical aspects of how the work

should be done and how it will be compensated.

Some authors extend this vision by introducing the idea

that people in corporations are linked through ‘‘social

contracts’’, a concept used in political theory to explain

society. This is the case of Keeley (1995), who considered

that organizations have ‘‘social contracts’’ with their

employees and with other stakeholders.

The view of the firm as a set of contracts is actually a

hypothesis for economic purposes and one which is useful

for developing theories to understand empirical facts and to

make predictions; but it is not what the firm actually is, as

we will discuss below.

3 See also Coase (1991a, b), where he explains the meaning and

influence of this seminal article.

90 D. Mele

123

The Firm a Set of Concurrent Interests

A different perspective is to assume that ‘‘corporations are

connected networks of stakeholder interests’ (Freeman and

Liedtka 1991, p. 96). From a dynamic perspective, the

corporation is then seen as a center of coordination of

stakeholder interests, or in Freeman’s words, ‘‘a clearing-

house or nexus of activity where stakeholders satisfy their

desires.’’ (2000, p. 176) According to Clarkson, another

proponent of this view, ‘‘the corporation itself can be

defined as a system of primary stakeholder groups [those

who are necessary for the survival of the firm], a complex

set of relationships between and among interest groups

with different rights, objectives, expectations, and respon-

sibilities.’’ (1995, pp. 196–107)

Although the stakeholder-interests-view goes beyond

the idea that the firm is a mere nexus of contracts, it

maintains the idea that the firm is an abstract and fictitious

entity, not a real entity.4 Donaldson and Preston connected

this view with normative obligations by arguing that

stakeholders not only have interests in the affairs of the

corporation, but also ‘‘the interests of all stakeholders have

intrinsic value.’’ (1995, p. 81)

Understanding the firm as a constellation of interests

adds a human aspect to the ‘‘skeleton’’ of contracts, but it is

still insufficient for a whole view of the firm. Corporations

are much more than a nexus of contracts or a set of

interests, and to see the firm as being articulated by social

contracts seems insufficient.

Not Only Contracts or Interests

Modern psychology has proved the existence of interper-

sonal and social links and exchanges based on emotions

(Lawler and Thye 1999). There are also links based on

commitments and moral behaviors. As Solomon wrote, ‘‘in

a corporation, relationships between people, whether of

affection, friendship, loyalty, power, position or expertise,

define the organization. Social contract theory only mud-

dles this picture because it suggests, almost always falsely,

that the primary relationships involved are predominantly

contractual. This is a sure way to misunderstand the notion

that corporations are communities.’’ (1994, p. 274)

Messick (1998) suggested that people inherently cate-

gorize others and act altruistically towards certain people in

a given person’s in-group. Fort (2000) added that there is

an anthropological reason for this grouping tendency—a

limited human neural ability to process large numbers of

relationships. This is an insight which indicates that

altruistic behaviors exist and express human sociability, in

the Aristotelian sense.

Managerial literature also shows that commitment,

loyalty and willingness to cooperate in a common purpose

beyond self-interest is something else that can be found in

employees, at least in certain organizations. There are even

a number of concepts widely used in organizational

behavior research which consider bonds between an indi-

vidual and his or her organization, other than those of

contacts and interests. Thus, the concept of ‘‘organizational

commitment’’, which regards the attachment of employees

to the organization and involves economic, sentimental and

also normative motives for such attachment (Meyer and

Allen 1997); ‘‘organizational identification’’, or degree to

which an employee experiences a ‘‘sense of oneness’’ or

psychological bonding between themselves and his or her

work organization (Rotondi 1975; Reade 2001); and

‘‘organizational citizenship behavior’’ which has been

defined as ‘‘individual behavior that is discretionary, not

directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward

system, and that in aggregate promotes the effective

functioning of the organization.’’ (Organ 1988, p. 4); that

is, a behavior which goes above and beyond the call of

duty. Case-studies exist showing this reality, for example

Gittell (2003), who focused on Southwest Airlines, a

company in which coordination is solidly based on inter-

personal trust and mutual adjustment of behavior.

Another perspective, which leads to understanding

organizations and firms as complex sets of relationships

comes from social capital theory (Kogut and Zander 1992,

1995). In organizations a social capital exists which can be

defined as ‘‘a resource reflecting the character of social

relations within the organization’’ (Leana and Van Buren

III 1999, p. 538). This concept, in which trust and coop-

eration are crucial, seems an appropriate factor to explain

several organizational phenomena (Adler and Kwon 2002).

Drawing on social capital theory, Nahapiet and Ghoshal

(1998) argued that organizations have factors such as sta-

bility over time, interdependence, interaction, and closure

which help develop high levels of social capital.

In light of these contributions, we suggest that consid-

ering a business enterprise as a human community is more

appropriate than seeing it as a set of contracts or an abstract

entity with concurrent interests. In the next section, we will

provide a deeper justification for such a proposal.

Business as a Human Community

The term ‘‘community’’ comes from the Latin word com-

munitatem, the roots of which are in communis, meaning

‘‘common’’, ‘‘shared by all or many’’. In Medieval Latin,

communitatem was used concretely in the sense of ‘‘a body

4 This is made explicit in Evan and Freeman (1988, p. 151) and

Freeman (1997, p. 71).

The Firm as a ‘‘Community of Persons’’ 91

123

of fellows or fellow-townsmen’’.5 Community is made up

of relations or feelings with a sense of ‘‘fellowship’’.

Although there are dozens of different definitions of

community,6 most conventional meanings of community

have to do with its etymological roots. Community is

understood as a unified body of individuals; people with

common interests or living in a particular area or having a

common history. A community is also a group of people

with common characteristics or beliefs, or who are inter-

connected, or a group organized around common values

and with certain social cohesion.

In sociology, the concept of community was introduced

by the German sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies in the late

nineteenth century when considering the young industrial

European society he encountered. Tonnies distinguished

between community (Gemeinschaft) and society (Gesell-

schaft) (2001/1887), as two sociological concepts with dif-

ferent logical forms, which in essence derive from the

substance of their respective relationships. Communities are

the result of what Tonnies termed ‘‘essential will’’ derived

from blood relations, spatial relations and spiritual relations.

Family, a small village, and churches are typically commu-

nities in Tonnies’s sense. In contrast, societies emerged by

‘‘will of choice’’ for common interests or to attain specific

ends. A large city is a society, as is a large bureaucratic

factory such as those existing in Tonnies’ time.

Wider than Tonnies’s original definition, today a com-

munity is generally understood as the result of personal and

affective stable relationships with reciprocal trust. Com-

munities mature in reciprocal sentiments and in a sense of

belonging, moral conscience and willingness to cooperate;

individuals focus on the social whole they belong to rather

than on their own interest. Within a community people are

regulated by common rules and beliefs about what a right

behavior is and what responsibilities exist of individuals

toward the community.

Regarding the firm, three types of sources support the

idea that firm is and should be considered as a community:

managerial literature, business ethics—mainly scholars

within the Aristotelian tradition, and Catholic Social

Teaching. We will now review some significant contribu-

tions from these three fields.

Managerial Literature

Managerial literature often refers to a business firm as an

organization, an analysis which only expresses one of its

dimensions, or it alternatively considers the two above-

mentioned views based on contracts (particularly the con-

tract between the agent-manager and the principal-owner)

or interests. Seeing the business as a community provides a

different perspective. Seeing a firm as a community is not

very common in managerial literature, since this is gener-

ally a descriptive discipline, and examines particular forms

of organizations or how a firm is managed or governed in

practice.

Long ago, however, pioneers of management thought,

such as Mary Parker Follett and Chester Barnard high-

lighted cooperation as being crucial for any business firm;

and one might well doubt whether contracts and interests

are sufficient to achieve strong cooperation. Follett stressed

that ‘‘the fact of management has seen that an enterprise

can be successfully run by securing the co-operation of the

workers.’’ (Follett 1940, p. 172, the original writing come

from the 1920s) In addition, she suggested changing a

management understood as ‘‘power-over’’ for one con-

ceived as ‘‘power-with’’ which provided a sense of par-

ticipation and cooperation (Mele and Rosanas 2003). Her

idea of cooperation underlies a type of relationship which

is much more than a mere nexus of contracts. Similarly,

Chester Barnard (1968/1938) stressed the necessity for

cooperation to meet common goals in the firm, although

people can have different motives for doing so. Barnard

also underlined the theoretical and practical importance of

the ‘‘willingness of persons to contribute efforts to the

cooperative system’’ (p. 83). According to this writer,

cooperation entails technical aspects and also leadership,

‘‘as the factor of chief significance in human cooperation’’

(pp. 258–259). Leadership creates faith, which is ‘‘the

catalyst by which the living system of human efforts is

enabled to continue its incessant interchanges of energies

and satisfactions.’’ (p. 259).

No doubt leadership is important in business, but a

leadership based only on transactions and interests is quite

poor. James MacGregor Burns (1979), from descriptive

research on political and organizational leaders, introduced

a clear distinction between leadership based on interchange

or ‘‘transactional leadership’’, and another type of leader-

ship which creates significant change in the life of people

and organizations, and which is now know as ‘‘transfor-

mational leadership’’. This leadership is based neither on

contracts (give and take, in colloquial terms), nor on static

interests but in obtaining fellowship and cooperation; it

operates through example, articulation of an energizing

vision and challenging goals. This latter leadership fits

better with the notion of the firm as a community, rather

than a society based on a nexus of contracts or a set of

interests. Along with leadership, the understanding that

companies have an organizational culture entails shared

beliefs and values and practices, and not only contracts and

interests (Kotter and Heskett 1992; Schein 1997).

5 Online Etymology Dictionary: http://www.etymonline.com/index.

php?term=community, Accessed June 29, 2010.6 More than 50 years ago, Hillery (1955, p. 111) found 94 discrete

definitions of the term ‘community’.

92 D. Mele

123

In contrast to the individualistic and collectivistic views

of the firm, Ouchi proposed Theory Z, in which the firm is

seen as a clan-like relationship among people (1981, with

precedents in Ouchi and Jaeger 1978). In line with the

‘‘Japanese style of management’’ in the Japan’s successful

years of the 1980s, Ouchi focuses on increasing employee

loyalty to the company by providing a job for life with a

strong focus on the well-being of the employee, both on

and off the job. Theory Z considers strong links between

the firm and its employees as necessary, which is charac-

teristic of the view of business as a community. However,

seeing business as a community does not necessarily mean

adopting this or any other specific model of management,

nor does it mean assuring a job for life.

Sampson (1995), without mentioning the concept of

community, talked about ‘‘company man’’ (‘‘company-

person’’ we could say now), which once existed in the

USA, but no longer does. ‘‘Company man’’ also includes a

view of the firm. It was a different model to the Japanese

one, but at one time US firms, as well as European firms,

had loyal and committed employees, who felt that their

company was a certain source of identity and meaning for

him or her.

Pfeffer (2006) regretted that, in recent decades, US

companies, with noteworthy exceptions, have increasingly

lost the sense of community. He observed a tending away

from communal and caring relationships towards more

arms-length and market-like transactions between organi-

zations and their employees. As a consequence employees

have less trust of and psychological attachment to their

employers and organizations. Job satisfaction, employee

engagement, and trust in management are all low and

declining. In contrast with this situation, Pfeffer focused on

companies who have arrangements for helping employees

in need, offer generous employee benefits and assistance,

have adopted anti-nepotism policies, have more company-

sponsored social events, are better at resolving work–

family issues, and foster long-term employment relations.

He added that although there are clearly disadvantages

accrued from building a more inclusive relationship with

the workforce, some case evidence and theory suggest that

organizations that have become more community-like

enjoy significant advantages.

The writings of Sampson (1995) and Pfeffer (2006) lead

one to think that there are different degrees of intensity in

being a community, and even that the sense of community

has been lost in some companies. It is not fully clear

whether they consider that the business enterprise is a

community by nature—although every firm to differing

degrees—or being a community is ideal. They present

descriptions of companies with a strong sense of commu-

nity based not only on the unity given by contracts and

interests but also on commitment, loyalty and a sense of

belonging, shared beliefs and values, and cooperation

towards common goals. There are also companies in which

the presence of such elements is very weak. However,

these scholars went beyond mere descriptions, and

expressed their favor of building companies with a strong

sense of community.

Business Ethics Writers

Some scholars have pointed out that human relationships

are closely related to the efficiency of the organization.

Solomon stated that ‘‘what makes a corporation efficient or

inefficient is not a series of well-oriented mechanical

operations but the working interrelations, the coordination

and rivalries, team spirit and morale of many people who

work there and are in turn shaped and defined by the cor-

poration.’’ (1992, p. 150) Freeman himself, who, as noted

above defended the view of the firm as a center of coor-

dination of stakeholder interests, has more recently con-

sidered that the corporation also required motivation by

values. ‘Cooperating with stakeholders and motivated by

values, business people continuously create new sources of

value.’ (2000, p. 177)

Business as community is especially the position of

scholars in the Aristotelian tradition. Robert Solomon, for

instance, defended with particular emphasis his claim that

corporations are communities (1992, pp. 145–152; 1994,

2004). According to Solomon relationships between

members of the firm make the community, since ‘‘a com-

munity is, first of all, an open-ended and immensely

complex set of relations between members, who may

within the context, be called ‘individuals’’’ (italics of the

author) (1994, p. 277). From this perspective the business

springs as a real entity, not only a mere aggregate of

individuals, and not a homogeneous body in which the

person practically disappears. On the contrary, Solomon

(2000) stressed that a corporation is a heterogeneous con-

glomerate that is bound to be riddled with personality

clashes, competing aims and methodologies, cliques and

rivalries, and divided loyalties but still presenting unity in

its activity.

Koehn noted that people become what they are within a

community and their moral character is relevant for making

contributions to the society or communal enterprises (1995,

p. 537). Hartman (1994), going back to Aristotle, suggested

that the organization should be a ‘good community’ in the

sense that, among other things, it permits the disaffected to

exit, encourages reflective consideration of morality and

the good life, and creates appropriate loyalty. Solomon

(1994) applauded the idea that morality and virtues are

essential in corporations, although he disagreed with

Hartman on other points.

The Firm as a ‘‘Community of Persons’’ 93

123

Business as a Community in Catholic Social Teaching

Catholic Social Teaching (see a compendium in PCJP

2004) includes relevant insights on business ethics,

including the consideration of the firm. A recurring idea in

such teaching is that of the business firm as a community,

and sometimes as a community of persons. This thought

explicitly appeared firstly in 1961 the Encyclical Mater et

Magistra by Pope John XXIII. He affirmed that the ideal

form of the enterprise is modeled ‘‘on the basis of a

community of persons working together for the advance-

ment of their mutual interests in accordance with the

principles of justice and other Christian teachings.’’ (John

XXIII 1961, # 142) In these words, being a community has

a dynamic and normative sense, as ‘‘ideal’’. It is taken for

granted that in the firm there are interests; and this is a

minimum of community (‘‘a community of interests’’) but,

if my interpretation is correct, this proposes that any firm

will become a more human community by adding moral

bonds based on justice and other ethical values. This nor-

mative sense is made clearer in another paragraph of this

document, where one can read: ‘‘Every effort must be

made to ensure that the enterprise is indeed a true human

community, concerned about the needs, the activities and

the standing of each of its members.’’ (John XXIII 1961, #

91) This entails certain ethical requirements, to which we

will return toward the end of this article.

The Second Vatican Council, in one of its most famous

documents (Gaudium et spes, # 68), emphasized the

condition of persons of those who join to contribute to the

firm’s goals: ‘‘In economic enterprises it is persons who

are joined together, that is, free and independent human

beings created to the image of God.’’ This conception is

far from one which sees the firm as a set of impersonal

elements who merely join forces to produce or as a

simple contract through which workers exchange labor for

wages.

On his part, Pope John Paul II, considered ‘‘the fact that

people work with each other, sharing in a ‘‘community of

work’’ (1991, # 32, italics in the original) and stressed the

business firm as a ‘‘society of persons’’ in contrast with the

vision of a mere ‘‘society of capital goods’’: ‘‘A business –

he said– cannot be considered only as a ‘society of capital

goods’; it is also a ‘society of persons’ in which people

participate in different ways and with specific responsi-

bilities, whether they supply the capital necessary for the

company’s activities or take part in such activities through

their labour.’’ (1991, # 43) Even more explicitly, he refers

to the firm as a ‘‘community of persons’’ in talking about

the purpose of the firm. According to Pope John Paul II,

‘‘the purpose of a business firm is not simply to make a

profit, but is to be found in its very existence as a com-

munity of persons who in various ways are endeavouring to

satisfy their basic needs, and who form a particular group

at the service of the whole of society.’’ (1991, # 35)

In conclusion, according to several sources a business

enterprise is a community and there are some associated

ethical requirements. The question which arises is what

philosophical arguments can give rational support to this

vision, which is the topic of the next section.

Being a Community: Philosophical Grounds

More than 2,400 years ago, Aristotle stated that the human

being is by nature a politikon zoon, this is, a political (or

social) animal, in a sense quite different from a bee or any

other gregarious animal (Politics, I, 2). Aristotle observed

that human beings have a tendency or disposition to

associate with their fellows and, in fact, they live in com-

munity. He explicitly stated that ‘‘among all men [for

human beings] there is a natural impulse towards this kind

of association’’ (Politics, I, 2). This tendency is usually

called ‘‘sociability’’. Sociability entails that humans have a

capacity for empathizing with others and a willingness to

cooperate with, and to help people in need. Exchanges and

their corresponding contracts are not excluded from

sociability. On the contrary, sociability is a pre-condition

for trade-offs and for making contracts, but sociability is

much more than having the capability for contractual

exchanges. Sociability also leads to a sense of reciprocity

and permits the developing of associations to satisfy human

needs.

In the Aristotelian tradition, sociability explains the

origin of society and communities, where people satisfy a

great variety of human needs, including human flourishing.

Aristotle, in his Politics, after observing historical facts,

explained that the oldest and most basic human community

is the family. Villages (or towns) derived from the union of

several families. These can satisfy different and wider

needs than the family can. The city–state (polis) is formed

by several towns. In Aristotle’s words, ‘‘Every state is a

community of some kind, and every community is estab-

lished with a view to some good; for mankind always acts

in order to obtain that which they think good’’ (Politics, I,

1). In the pursuit of the human good, ethics and politics are

co-joined, which elevates political science (containing the

theory of economics) to a position of the highest impor-

tance. In Aristotle’s words, ‘‘in all sciences and arts the end

is a good; and the greatest good and in the highest degree a

good in the most authoritative of all – this is the political

science of which the good is justice, in other words, the

common interest.’’ (Politics, III, 12) Nowadays, we could

extend this vision to any association for different purposes

established by people (civil society) or by public authori-

ties. Supra-state communities and business firms, among

94 D. Mele

123

many other associations, also have their anthropological

base in human sociability.

Drawing from Aristotle, one can affirm that the social

order is not based on social contracts, as the individualistic

view of the society suggests, but on the existence of human

communities the roots of which are in human sociability.

But what kinds of relationship build a community?

Finnis, after affirming that a ‘‘community is a form of

unifying relationship between human beings’’ (1980,

p. 136), distinguished four basic ways in which unifying

relationships can take place: (1) physical unity, (2) unity

for shared knowledge, (3) cultural unity, and (4) unity for

common action. Applying this classification to a firm, the

first—physical unity—is extrinsic to the firm, but the three

other ways are much more common in business.

Within firms people will share known-how, knowledge

regarding corporate history and ideals, goals, objectives,

proceeds, descriptions, explanations, and arguments related

to the organization; messages transmitted by decisions and

practices, and so on. Obviously, not everybody shares the

same knowledge but everyone in a firm has some common

knowledge, which gives certain unity.

Cultural unity can also be found in many firms in which

people share some values and internalize some basic con-

victions. In addition, people will share a language which

permits communication and even, to some extent, the

possession of a symbolic language, which permits them to

decode formalized signs, expressions, symbols, and

attitudes.

Finally, people in organizations are united by actions

connected with the actions of other people within the

organization. In a certain sense, people participate in a

common action, although they can have different motives

for doing so and the subsequent relationships can also

differ. Complementary to this perspective is another which

proposes three types or categories of unifying relationships.

These can be found within a business organization or even

in a working team: (1) ‘‘utilitarian relationships’’ based on

utilitarian interests, (2) ‘‘emotional relationships’’, based

on enjoyment, and (3) and ‘‘virtuous relationship’’, based

on moral motives.7

Imagine, for instance, a business project. People of

various backgrounds have a common interest in working

together because, in this way, the interests of each party in

achieving results will be satisfied. In this case, the source

for the unifying relationship is based on utilitarian interests.

They are ‘‘utilitarian relationships.’’

It may also be enjoyment of working with people who

make the work particularly pleasant, or because of the

human climate around the project. Here the union is pro-

duced by sharing a good time. These kinds of relationships

are found in certain organizations or in working teams

where people are happy to carry out their activity in a

pleasant environment or to work with peers with whom

they get on. These are ‘‘emotional relationships’’.

Finally, there are relationships motivated by goodwill

and willingness to help others or to cooperate, in some

way, with a good cause. This is the case when people are

aware that their work or collaboration is making a positive

contribution to human needs. These are ‘‘virtuous

relationships’’.

On her part, Edith Stein, a pupil of Edmund Husserl, the

founder of the phenomenology school of thought,8 argued

that the human condition is not isolated individuality, but

inter-human sociability. ‘‘Man finds himself in community

with others’’ (1998, p. 250). For her, as well as for Husserl,

‘‘you’’ are another ‘‘I’’ located over there. Community is

based on inter-subjective relations and empathy becomes

the foundation of such relations (Stein 1989).

Stein gave two definitions of community, one in a broad

sense and other in a strict sense. In a broad sense, she stated

that ‘‘community can be talked about where there are not

only mutual relationships between persons but further,

where these persons form an unity and shape a ‘we’’’

(1998, p. 248). In a strict sense, ‘‘a community entails a

permanent community of life between persons that affects

them in the depth of their being and confers on them a

lasting stamp.’’ (1998, p. 249). There are ‘‘ephemeral’’

communities, such as an occasional meeting. In contrast, a

stable group of friends or any association is a ‘‘substan-

tive’’ community (a community in the strict sense).

Accordingly, there are types of communities as diverse as

families, churches or cultural associations, and different

degrees of involvement within the same community.

Accepting this definition, a business firm would nor-

mally be considered as a substantive community, although

if you look at how the persons involved are affected in the

depth of their being by working in the firm, then the firm

can be seen as a strong or a weak community, probably

depending on several factors, including organization size,

contacts, types of links, etc. Within a large corporation one

could consider that departments, business unities, project

teams, etc., are small communities, maybe with strong

intersubjective relationships with larger communities, and

these within the community of the whole corporation.

7 Similarly, this approach can be applied to the practice of

networking (Mele, 2010). As Finnis (1980) noted, these three kinds

of relationship can already be found in Aristotle’s treatise on

friendship, elaborated after a careful observation of reality in

Nicomachean Ethics, chap. VIII.

8 Explained in a very simple way, the phenomenological method

introduced by Edmund Husserl focuses purely on phenomena and on

describing them. It consists of recognizing the presence of an object

and elucidating its meaning through intuition.

The Firm as a ‘‘Community of Persons’’ 95

123

Another relevant philosophical contribution in line with

the phenomenological-personalist approach can be found

in Wojtyla (1979, 1993), who developed a creative and

original line of thought.9 Although not easy to understand

for a non-specialist in philosophy, we will try to present

some elements of his approach which might serve our

purpose.

Similar to others, Wojtyla considered the relation

between ‘I’ and ‘you’ as the ‘‘precedent’’ to explain human

communities. The relationship ‘‘I-you’’ refers more directly

to the relationship between two persons (inter-subjectivity)

who possess full subjective personalities and interests,

while the multiplicity of the ‘‘we’’, without eliminating the

full subjective personalities and interests of ‘‘I’’ and ‘‘you’’

refers in a more direct manner to the pursuit of a common

goal.

According to Wojtyla a community is the unity of a

multiplicity of subjects. This unity arises as a relationship

or as a sum of relationships between individuals. In onto-

logical terms, these individuals are substantial subjects

while the unity is accidental. The ‘‘we’’ involves neither

diminishing nor distorting the ‘‘I’’. However, this unity

gives sense to talking about people as members belonging

to the community created by such unity.

Many corporations are aware of how important it is that

employees have a sense of belonging to the corporation and

internalize appropriate shared attitudes (Riketta and Lan-

derer 2005). Every newcomer socializes with other mem-

bers of the organization, and goes through the fore-

mentioned stages, one by one, at least to the third. The

fourth will be completed by some people, at least partially.

The Firm as a Community of Persons: Its Axiological

Meaning

Adding ‘‘of persons’’ to the concept of ‘‘community’’ can

seem superfluous if we are talking of human communities;

but it’s not. First of all, it helps us avoid a collectivist view

of the firm in which the individual practically disappears.

Person entails both an individual and a relational meaning

(Spaemann 2006).

The word ‘‘person’’, generally considered as synony-

mous of ‘‘human being’’, comes from the Latin word

persona (probably borrowed from Etruscan phersu

‘‘mask’’10). It translates prosopon in Greek, a term origi-

nally used in the ancient theater denoting a mask or face.

This has a connotation of individuality, uniqueness, and

possession of intimacy. A ‘‘person’’ is someone possessing

self-conscience, self-determination, and consequently, a

subject of moral acts, and endowed with intrinsic dignity

(Crosby 1996; see also Ferrer 2002). Spaemann (2006),

who has studied the concept of person in depth, agreed in

that ‘‘person’’ denotes dignity (see also Zaborowski 2010).

Following the phenomenological method, something

else can be added. Wojtyla (1979, 1993) by looking in

depth at self-determination in the acting person, argues that

human action is not only aimed at external good but is also

oriented toward the person him or herself. A person tran-

scends him or herself in the very action of making free

decisions regarding a certain action and gives or denies his

or her own assent to it. Each action is not a simple deed,

but includes a moral judgment by which the person

determines him or herself as a human being. The person

who acts realizes that his or her action not only brings

about external outcomes, but is also an act of self-deter-

mination and self-realization of the acting person. Certain

actions contribute to human flourishing while others erode

the humanity of the person who acts. Our conscience shows

this as an internal experience of humans. In this way, a

person experiences the value of his or her action not by

results but by its human or personalistic characteristics,

different to an action performed by machines or animals.

This is the ‘‘personalistic value’’ of the human action,

which derives from the fact that it is performed by someone

with freedom and capacity of self-realization. The ‘‘per-

sonalistic value’’ of an action is previous to the ‘‘ethical

value’’ of this action. While the former is related with the

fact that the subject of the action is a person, a rational, and

free subject; the latter is evaluated by ethical norms.

Wojtyla identifies the ‘‘personalistic value’’ inherent in

every human action when this is performed working with

others. When a human action is preformed together with

another or others, the action has an intrinsic social or

communitarian dimension and communities emerge when

people are working together. Acting with others requires

the respecting of the personalistic value of the action in

oneself and in others. Being aware of ‘‘you’’ as another

‘‘I’’, one is participating in the very humanity of other

people, and dealing with others by respecting and caring

for their humanity leads to self-realization. Furthermore,

participating in the humanity of others is the base on which

an ‘‘authentic’’ community is built.

The word ‘‘participation’’ is used by Wojtyla (1979,

1993) in a different way than that common in management.

In his approach, ‘‘participation’’ indicates the way in

which, in common actions, the person protects the per-

sonalistic value of his or her own action and participates

together with another in the realization of the common

activity and its outcomes respecting ‘‘you’’ as another ‘‘I’’.

9 He enriched the philosophical anthropology learned from Aquinas

with insights taken from the phenomenology of the philosopher Max

Scheller.10 ‘‘Person’’ in Online Etymology Dictionary: http://www.etym

online.com/index.php?search=persona&searchmode=none. Accessed

on January 18, 2011.

96 D. Mele

123

Here, the idea of ‘‘participation’’ is not a form of man-

agement, as usually appears in managerial literature, but a

philosophical concept with a normative significance.

Participating in the humanity of others, and conse-

quently recognizing their dignity, respecting their rights

and taking care of their real needs requires a sort of

organization or living together in which the person is

respected and is able to experience every act of the col-

lectivity as his or her own. This happens when the choices

of those who lead are directed towards the common good

and are made with the responsible involvement of all

members of the organization. Individual interests should be

subordinated to the common good. Such subordination,

however, must not diminish or destroy the person.

Being aware of the transcendence of the person in the

action, one should engage him or herself in the task of

recognizing the same value in other persons. This permits

Wojtyla to reformulate the well-known Kantian categorical

imperative, in its second enunciation, regarding human

dignity. What he called ‘‘personalistic norm’’ states that

‘‘…whenever a person is the object of your activity,

remember that you must not treat that person as only the

means to an end, as a instrument, but must allow for the

fact that he or she, too, has, or at least should have, distinct

personal ends.’’ (Wojtyla 1981, p. 28) It can be also called

‘‘Personalist Principle’’ (Mele 2009).

This vision goes beyond both sociological determinism,

which attempts to explain the person’s action through a set

of social relations in which person is only a cog within a

mechanism, and the other position in which individuals are

crucial in explaining human actions, but the inter-sub-

jective dimension present in any action is seen as irrele-

vant, or even as something added from outside (Buttiglione

1997, p. 168ff).

Considering the firm as ‘‘community of persons’’ pro-

vides, therefore, an anthropological and axiological

meaning richer than saying that the firm is merely a

‘‘community’’. ‘‘Community of persons’’ is a concept of

great human richness and also comprehensive of the

complexity of the links which maintain people united

within a business enterprise. Thus, it should be included

within a humanistic business ethos, since it expresses a

more complete humanity.

However, being a community of persons is not exclusive

to the firm. Stronger arguments could be found to see the

family, the school and others institutions as communities of

persons. Consequently, other dimensions should be consid-

ered for a sound understanding of the firm. Business enter-

prises, first of all, are involved in trading and in creating

economic value and being competitive within the market

system. However, saying that a business enterprise is only a

productive unity or an instrument for profits is not sufficient

either. Business enterprises are also networks of

relationships, social actors within the society, who may also

be political actors, apart from being a community of persons.

A simple way to express what a business enterprise is could

be that the business enterprise is a community of persons

based on cooperative activity to provide goods and services

in an efficient, competitive and profitable way.

Ethical Implications of Being a Community of Persons

Summarizing, when we affirm that a firm is a community

of persons, we emphasize both individuals and the whole,

making explicit the uniqueness, conscience, free will,

dignity, and openness to self-realization of each one who

forms the community. This entails ethical requirements

toward persons because they deserve respect, benevolence,

and care (Mele 2009). In addition, the idea of community,

and therefore a community of persons, involves a teleo-

logical meaning. Solomon dealt with this point in several

writings. Following Alasdair MacIntyre (1984/1981), and

ultimately Aristotle, he stated that a community presumes

some higher purpose, ‘‘a teleology, which includes the

cultivation and improvement (by whatever standards) of its

members as well as its own perpetuation.’’ (1994, p. 275).

Such a teleological perspective sheds some light on busi-

ness ethics within the organization. ‘‘In business ethics–wrote

Solomon (1992, p. 148)–, the corporation becomes one’s

immediate community (…) A corporation that encourages

mutual cooperation and encourages individual excellence as

an essential part of teamwork is very different to a corporation

which incites ‘either/or competition, antagonism, and con-

tinuous jostling for status and recognition.’’

Likewise, the concept of community entails an under-

standing of societal business ethics. For Aristotle, small

communities must contribute to the common good of the

larger communities to which they belong: ‘‘if all commu-

nities aim at some good, the state or political community,

which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest,

aims at good in a greater degree than any other, and at the

highest good.’’ (Politics I, 1) Solomon applied this view to

societal business ethics. He stated that ‘‘the first principle

of business ethics is that the corporation is itself a citizen, a

member of the larger community, and inconceivable

without it.’’ (1992, p. 148)

Saying that business is a community within a large

community brings about a view which is different to a

voluntaristic assumption of corporate social responsibili-

ties. Solomon criticized the classic arguments for the social

responsibility of business by affirming that they ‘‘fall into

the trap of beginning with the assumption of the corpora-

tion as an autonomous, independent entity, which then

needs to consider its obligations to the surrounding com-

munity. But corporations, like individuals, are part and

The Firm as a ‘‘Community of Persons’’ 97

123

parcel of the community that created them, and the

responsibilities that they bear are not the products of

argument or implicit contracts but intrinsic to their very

existence as social entities.’’ (1992, p. 149) In line with this

view of the corporation, Fort (1996) defended the idea that

a business can be helpfully conceived of as a mediating

institution, which serves a vital function in a free society to

provide social justice out of an expanded civil society and

provides a framework for a flourishing free market.

Hartman (1994), as noted above, stressed that a ‘good

community’ permits the disaffected to exit, encourages

reflective consideration of morality and the good life, and

creates appropriate loyalty. Seeing the firm as a community of

persons allows us to add some other business ethics require-

ments associated with this notion, apart from those presented

by Solomon and Hartman. Although appropriate development

of this point would require a whole paper, we will proceed here

to briefly explore such ethical requirements.

If the firm is a community of persons, managers should

pay attention to groups and individuals who are part of this

community. Some stakeholders (employees, managers,

committed stockholders) are at the core of this community,

while others (habitual suppliers and clients) are closely

related. This is an argument as to why managers bear

responsibility for these stakeholders, and should treat them

with respect and a sense of cooperative reciprocity.

The dignity and uniqueness of each person requires not

only respecting the human rights associated with their

human dignity, and not dealing with them as mere means,

but also the consideration of personal conditions, activities,

real needs and standing of each person, even adopting an

attitude of benevolence and care (Mele 2009). Respect for

personal diversity and spirituality at the workplace is also a

manifestation of consideration to each person.

As noted above, Pfeffer mentioned a number of issues

he perceived as expression of a sense of community:

helping employees in need, offering generous employee

benefits and assistance, solving work–family issues, and

fostering a more inclusive relationship with the workforce

and long-term employment relations, among others. They

seem good illustrative examples, although specific policies

and personal practices will depend on the given situation,

each of which should be considered with practical wisdom.

Acting with a sense of benevolence (wishing do good)

and care does not mean lack of attention to provide goods

and services in an efficient, competitive, and profitable

way. This can bring about situations of tension between

people and profits, which will require an appropriate bal-

ance, although without violating human dignity and human

rights. In addition, and facing such tension, one should not

forget that acting with benevolence and care has beneficial

consequences in terms of trust, loyalty, and willingness to

cooperate on the part of people in the firm.

Another ethical requirement which generally converges

with good managerial practice is to provide communication

on and participation in matters which affect people’s life.

People tend to want to know what is happening in orga-

nizations in which they are involved. Communication gives

knowledge of the whole and fosters a sense of belonging.

Knowledge-sharing is a form and resource of social capital

(Rheingold 2002). Human dignity requires that such com-

munication is based on trust and relevant information and

on trustworthiness. A moral and trustworthy communica-

tion builds a community (Etzioni 2001).

As noted above, following Wojtyla, a person within a

community participates together with others in the reali-

zation of the common activity. But participation also

means taking part in the community or in the decision-

making on matter which affect one’s own life. Through

appropriate formulas within each situation, a community of

persons requires participation in this latter activity. Par-

ticipation within the organization constitutes respect for the

freedom of corporate employees (Brenkert 1992), but also

expresses their condition as a person, one who can never be

treated as a passive or unconscious element within the

organization.

Last, but not least, a community has common goals

which are in benefit of the whole community. They become

‘‘common good’’. Cooperating to achieve them is an ethical

requirement of each member of the community. Managers

should foster cooperation in common goals within the

organization. This is an essential responsibility of the

executive within an organization (Barnard 1968/1938).

In a community of persons, contractual agreements and

the ethical requirement of honoring them are not elimi-

nated, but relationships are not only contractual, and ethical

requirements go beyond contractual duties. In communities

of persons, the stress should be put on developing good

faith and commitment towards the common good and, in

this way, on fostering human flourishing.

Conclusion

Several arguments presented here suggest that under-

standing firms as human communities is more appropriate

than seeing them as a nexus of contracts or a set of inter-

ests, as common models generally assume. Firms contain

multitudes of unifying relationships, and the contractual

relationship and the satisfaction of a set of interests are

only some of these. Thus, we have tried to show that

considering firms as human communities is more appro-

priate than seeing them as an aggregate of individuals

united exclusively by contracts or interests. This has strong

support in human sociability. In addition, we have sug-

gested extending the notion of ‘‘human community’’ to a

98 D. Mele

123

more explicit notion of ‘‘community of persons’’, which is

also more meaningful in axiological terms.

Being a ‘‘community of persons’’ emphasizes both

individuals and the whole and makes explicit the unique-

ness, conscience, free will, dignity, and openness to self-

realization and human flourishing of each one who form

the community. This requires an appropriate communica-

tion and participation in matters which affect people’s own

lives, and the necessity of fostering good will and com-

mitment towards the common good of the organization and

the society. This challenges managers to change their

commonly accepted role of being the builder of systems,

structures, and strategy, to being the facilitator of goodwill

in the firm’s stakeholder relationships.

Being a community of persons is a pillar of a managerial

ethos which stimulates the managerial role to favor the

development of people within the community. This con-

trasts with the economism-based managerial ethos, which

is often limited to preventing possible employee misbe-

haviors. The control mechanisms associated with this latter

ethos neither stimulate ethics in the organization nor the

personal development of its members.

A manager’s ability to build communities is significantly

constrained by prevailing assumptions of an economism-

based managerial ethos. Using economic models, as Rocha

and Ghoshal (2006) suggested, human intentionality such as

self-interest and opportunism leads to a restrictive form of

social exchange. From this under-socialized perspective,

relationships between people are seen as primarily instru-

mental, self-interest being the dominant intention. Contras-

tingly, in humanistic-based management models which take

the firm as a community of persons, persons are seen as

conscious and free beings who make decisions on their own

and who are owners of their own destiny.

Since a community of person is continuously under

construction, managers also have the challenge of building

such communities. The type of managerial behavior nec-

essary to develop a community of persons falls outside any

job description or any mandatory rule or procedure. It is

difficult to imagine that management can construct social

relations based on goodwill when the usual practices are

based on protecting the organization from its own

employees, using hierarchical authority to prevent oppor-

tunistic behavior, or rewarding and punishing employees to

guarantee that everyone does what they are expected to do

(Adler and Kwon 2002).

References

Adler, P. S., & Kwon, S. (2002). Social capital: Prospects for a new

concept. Academy of Management Review, 27, 17–40.

Aristotle. (1925). The Nicomachean Ethics (D. Ross, Trans.). Oxford:

Oxford University Press.

Aristotle. (1981). The Politics (T. A. Sinclair & T. J. Saunders,

Trans.). London: Penguin.

Barnard, C. (1968/1938). The Functions of the Executive. Introduc-tion of K. Andrews London: Oxford University Press.

Brenkert, G. G. (1992). Freedom, participation and corporations: The

issue of corporate (economic) democracy. Business EthicsQuarterly, 2(3), 251–269.

Burns, J. M. (1979). Leadership. New York: Harper Torchbooks.

Buttiglione, R. (1997). Karol Wojtyla: The thought of the man whobecame Pope John Paul II (Foreword by M. Novak. P. Guietti &

F. Murphy, Trans.). Grand Rapids, MI: WmB Eerdmans

Publishers.

Castro, B. (1999). Faust and the ethos of business: A report from

Grand Rapids, Ciudad Juarez, and Muskegon. Journal ofBusiness Ethics, 19/1(2), 181–191.

Clarkson, M. B. E. (1995). A stakeholder framework for analyzing

and evaluating corporate social performance. Academy ofManagement Review, 92, 92–117.

Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica 4, 386–405

(Reprinted in The nature of the firm: Origins, evolution, anddevelopment: 1961–1974, by O. E. Williamson & S. G. Winter,

Eds., 1991, New York: Oxford University Press).

Coase, R. H. (1991a). The nature of the firm: Meaning. In O.

E. Williamson & S. G. Winter (Eds.), The nature of the firm:Origins evolution and development (pp. 48–60). New York:

Oxford University Press.

Coase, R. H. (1991b). The nature of the firm: Influence. In O.

E. Williamson & S. G. Winter (Eds.), The nature of the firm:Origins evolution and development (pp. 61–74). New York:

Oxford University Press.

Conway, N., & Briner, R. B. (2005). Understanding psychologicalcontracts at work: A critical evaluation of theory and research.

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Crosby, J. F. (1996). The selfhood of the human person. Washington:

Catholic University of America Press.

Donaldson, L. (2002). Damned by our own theories: Contradictions

between theories and management education. Academy ofManagement Learning & Education, 1, 96–106.

Donaldson, T., & Preston, L. E. (1995). The stakeholder theory of the

corporation: Concepts, evidence, and implications. Academy ofManagement Review, 20(1), 65–91.

Etzioni, A. (2001). The monochrome society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press.

Evan, W. M., & Freeman, R. E. (1988). A stakeholder theory of

the modern corporation: Kantian Capitalism. In T. Beauchamp &

N. Bowie (Eds.), Ethical theory and business (3rd ed.,

pp. 145–154). Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.

Ferrer, U. (2002). Que significa ser persona?. Madrid: Palabra.

Finnis, J. (1980). Natural law and natural rights. Oxford: Clarendon

Press.

Follett, M. P. (1940). Dynamic administration. The Collected Papersof Mary Parker Follett, ed. by H. C. Metcalf y L. Urwick. New

York, London: Harper & Brothers.

Fort, T. L. (1996). Business as mediating institutions. Business EthicsQuarterly, 6(2), 149–164.

Fort, T. (2000). On social psychology, business ethics, and corporate

governance. Business Ethics Quarterly, 10(3), 725–733.

Freeman, R. E. (1997). A stakeholder theory of the modern

corporation. In T. L. Beauchamp & N. E. Bowie (Eds.), Ethicaltheory and business (5th ed., pp. 66–76). Englewood Cliffs:

Prentice Hall.

Freeman, R. E. (2000). Business ethics at the Millennium. BusinessEthics Quarterly, 10(1), 169–180.

The Firm as a ‘‘Community of Persons’’ 99

123

Freeman, R. E., & Liedtka, J. (1991). Corporate social responsibility:

A critical approach. Business Horizons, 34(4), 92–99.

Ghoshal, S. (2005). Bad management theories are destroying good

management practices. Academy of Management Learning &Education, 4(1), 75–91.

Gittell, J. H. (2003). The Southwest Airlines Way: Using the power ofrelationships to achieve high performance. New York: McGraw-

Hill.

Hartman, E. M. (1994). The commons and the moral organization.

Business Ethics Quarterly, 4(3), 253–269.

Hessen, R. (1979). In defense of the corporation. Stanford University

Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution.

Hillery, G. A., Jr. (1955). Definitions of community—areas of

agreement. Rural Sociology, 20(4), 111–123.

Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm:

Managerial behavior agency cost, and ownership structure.

Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305–360.

John XXIII. (1961). Encyclical-Letter ‘Mater et magistra’. http://

www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/encyclicals/documents/

hf_j-xxiii_enc_15051961_mater_en.html. Accessed June 29,

2010.

John Paul II. (1991). Letter-Encyclical ‘Centesimus annus’ (May 1).

http://www.vatican.va/edocs/ENG0214/_INDEX.HTM. Acces-

sed June 29, 2010.

Keeley, M. (1995). Continuing the social contract tradition. BusinessEthics Quarterly, 5(2), 241–256.

Koehn, D. (1995). A role for virtue ethics in the analysis of business

practice. Business Ethics Quarterly, 5(3), 533–539.

Kogut, B., & Zander, U. (1992). Knowledge of the firm, combinative

capabilities, and the replication of technology. OrganizationScience, 3, 383–397.

Kogut, B., & Zander, U. (1995). Knowledge, market failure and the

multinational enterprise: A reply. Journal of InternationalBusiness Studies, 26, 417–426.

Kotter, J. P., & Heskett, J. L. (1992). Corporate culture andperformance. New York: Free Press.

Lawler, E., & Thye, S. R. (1999). Bringing emotions into social

exchange theory. Annual Review of Sociology, 25(1), 217–244.

Leana, C. R., & Van Buren III, H. J. (1999). Organizational social

capital and employment practices. Academy of ManagementReview, 24(3), 538–555.

MacIntryre, A. (1984/1981). After virtue. A study in moral theory(2nd ed.) Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press.

Mele, D. (2003). The challenge of humanistic management. Journalof Business Ethics, 44(44), 77–88.

Mele, D. (2009). Integrating personalism into virtue-based business

ethics: The personalist and the common good principles. Journalof Business Ethics, 88(1), 227–244.

Mele, D. (2010). The practice of networking: An ethical approach.

Journal of Business Ethics, 90(4), 487–503.

Mele, D., & Rosanas, J. M. (2003). Power, freedom and authority in

management: Mary Parket Follett’s ‘Power-with’. Philosophy ofManagement, 3(2), 35–46.

Messick, D. M. (1998). Social categories and business ethics.

Business Ethics Quarterly Special Issue. The Ruffin Series (1),

149–172.

Meyer, J. P., & Allen, N. J. (1997). Commitment in the workplace:Theory, research, and application. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Nahapiet, J., & Ghoshal, S. (1998). Social capital, intellectual capital,

and the organizational advantage. Academy of ManagementReview, 23(2), 242–266.

Organ, D. W. (1988). Organizational citizenship behavior: The goodsoldier syndrome. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

Ouchi, W. G. (1981). Theory Z: How American business can meet theJapanese challenge. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Ouchi, W. G., & Jaeger, A. M. (1978). Type Z organization: Stability

in the midst of mobility. Academy of Management Review, 3(2),

305–314.

PCJP (Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace). (2004). Compendiumof the Social Doctrine of the Church (Libreria Editrice Vaticana,

Citta del Vaticano). http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_

councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_com

pendio-dott-soc_en.html. Accessed September 3.

Pfeffer, J. (2005). Why do bad management theories persist? A

comment on Goshal. Academy of Management Learning &Education, 4(1), 96–100.

Pfeffer, J. (2006). Working alone: What ever happened to the idea of

organizations as communities? In J. O’Toole & E. E. Lawler III

(Eds.), America at work: Choices and challenges. New York:

Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 2–21.

Pfeffer, J., & Fong, C. T. (2002). The end of business schools? Less

success than meets the eye. Academy of Management Learning& Education, 1, 78–95.

Reade, C. (2001). Antecedents of organizational identification in

multinational corporations: Fostering psychological attachment

to the local subsidiary and the global organization. HumanResource Management, 12(8), 1269–1291.

Rheingold, H. (2002). Smart mobs. Cambridge: Perseus.

Riketta, M., & Landerer, A. (2005). Does perceived threat to

organizational status moderate the relation between organiza-

tional commitment and work behavior? International Journal ofManagement, 22(2), 193–200.

Rocha, H. O., & Ghoshal, S. (2006). Beyond self-interest revisited.

Journal of Management Studies, 43(3), 585–619.

Ross, S. (1973). The economy theory of the agency: the principal’s

problem. American Economic Review, 63, 134–139.

Rotondi, T., Jr. (1975). Organizational identification: Issues and

implications. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance,13, 95–109.

Sampson, A. (1995). Company man: The rise and fall of the corporatelife. New York: Times Business.

Schein, E. H. (1997). Corporate culture and leadership (2nd ed.). San

Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Solomon, R. C. (1992). Ethics and excellence. Cooperation andintegrity in business. New York: Oxford University Press.

Solomon, R. (1994). The corporation as community. A reply to Ed

Hartmann. Business Ethics Quarterly, 4, 271–285.

Solomon, R. (2000). Historicism, communitarianism, and commerce:

An Aristotelian Approach to Business Ethics. In P. Koslowski

(Ed.), Contemporary economic ethics and business ethics.Berlin: Springer, pp. 117–147.

Solomon, R. C. (2004). Aristotle, ethics and business organizations.

Organization Studies, 25(6), 1021–1043.

Spaemann, R. (2006). Persons: The difference between ‘someone’and ‘something’ (O. O’Donovan, Trans.). Oxford: Oxford

University Press.

Stein, E. (1989). On the problem of empathy (W. Stein, Trans.).

Washington, DC: ICS Publications.

Stein, E. (1998). La estructura de la persona humana (first published

in German as ‘Der aufbau der menschlichenperson’, 1994) (BAC

Madrid).

Tonnies, F. (2001/1887). Community and civil society. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

Vatican Council II. (1965). Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et spes.

http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/

documents/vat-ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html.

Accessed September 3, 2009.

Wojtyla, K. (1979). The acting person. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel

(Translated from Polish by Andrzej Potocki and edited by Anna-

Teresa Tymieniecka. Originally published in 1969).

100 D. Mele

123

Wojtyla, K. (1981). Love and responsibility (first published in Polish,

Miłosc i Odpowiedzialnosc. Studium etyczne. Lublin: KUL,

1960). San Francisco: Harper-Collins.

Wojtyla, K. (1993). Person and community. Selected essays(O. Theresa Sandok, Trans.). New York: Peter Lang.

Woller, G. M. (1996). Business ethics, society, and Adam Smith:

Some observations on the liberal business ethos. Journal ofSocio-Economics, 25(3), 311–332.

Zaborowski, H. (2010). Robert Spaemann’s philosophy of the humanperson: Nature, freedom, and the critique of modernity. Oxford:

Oxford University Press.

The Firm as a ‘‘Community of Persons’’ 101

123