The Fight Against TerrorSINGAPORE’S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The Fight Against TerrorSINGAPORE’S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

© 2004 National Security Coordination Centre

ISBN: 981-05-1539-1

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To the people of Singapore

Preface

A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR SINGAPORE 6

Chapter One

CONFRONTING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM 10

Chapter Two

SINGAPORE’S EXPERIENCE WITH TERRORISM 18

Chapter Three

THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 26

Chapter Four

SINGAPORE’S NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 34

Chapter Five

IMPLEMENTING OUR STRATEGY 42

Chapter Six

NATIONAL SECURITY: A NATIONAL EFFORT 58

CONTENTS

A NATIONALSECURITYSTRATEGY FORSINGAPORE

PREFACE

P R E FA C E [ A N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y S T R AT E G Y F O R S I N G A P O R E ] ONE [CONFRONTING TRANSNATIONALTERRORISM] TWO [S INGAPORE’S EXPERIENCE WITH TERRORISM] THREE [THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT]F O U R [ S I N G A P O R E ’ S N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y A R C H I T E C T U R E ] F I V E [ I M P L E M E N T I N G O U R S T R AT E G Y ]S IX [NATIONAL SECURITY: A NATIONAL EFFORT]

Transnational terrorism poses a seriousand prolonged threat to Singapore’s

national security. Because of the strongstand we have taken against terrorism inSingapore and in the region, and becauseof the part we have played in the globaleffort against terrorism, Singapore willremain a prime target for terrorists.Therefore, we have to prepare for a long-drawn campaign against terrorism, and weneed to learn to live with the real prospectthat a terrorist attack could occur in thiscountry.

Dr Tony Tan Keng YamDeputy Prime MinisterCoordinating Minister for Security and Defence

We have met the short-term objective of hardeningSingapore by implementing various measures tosafeguard our homefront security. However, we arenot dealing with isolated or episodic events, but withthe potential for organized, deliberate and prolongedterrorist action against Singapore. We thus need a totalapproach to the problem, as the impact of terrorismwill be felt across many areas. We have to find creativesolutions for these unprecedented challenges.

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Dear Fellow Singaporeans,

Dr Tony Tan Keng YamDeputy Prime MinisterCoordinating Minister for Security and Defence

August 2004

Given our geo-strategic circumstances and the evolvingnature of transnational terrorism, we should take anevolutionary approach to developing our nationalsecurity strategy. The Fight Against Terror: Singapore’sNational Security Strategy lays out a useful foundation.We now have a better understanding of the threat andof how we can counter it. The key ideas behind thisstrategy should be disseminated widely to createawareness and enlist support.

We need to get our starting point right, and it entails acorrect understanding of the problems and threats thatSingapore is up against. In this regard, we must have aconsensus on the definition and characteristics oftransnational terrorism. The threat is strategic. It isdifferent from the terrorism we experienced in thepast. Transnational terrorism is not a passing menace.It is a long-term peril. It has deep ideological roots. Ithas a global reach, and terrorists are prepared to go toextreme lengths to realize their aims. Terrorist groupsare also capable of strategic calculations. A case inpoint is the recent train bombings in Madrid, where atragic incident led to domestic political changes withforeign policy implications.

We must develop the appropriate strategy to combattransnational terrorism. The cornerstone ofSingapore’s strategy is a stronger and more robust

inter-agency network. Given that transnationalterrorism’s centre of gravity lies outside Singapore, astove-piped approach to internal security and externaldefence will no longer work. We need to implement asuitable structure that will prevail over the traditionalboundaries of the various policy, intelligence andoperations agencies. At its core, our national securitystrategy should aim to enhance coordination amongthe different ministries and national security agenciesin Singapore.

We need, furthermore, to strengthen our nationalresilience. We have to encourage Singaporeans to staycalm and work together in the face of adversity. Weneed to take both collective action and individualresponsibility for our security. We have committedourselves to the global campaign against terrorism. Inthis, we must not waiver. We may face setbacks, butterrorism cannot defeat us unless we allow it to. I amconfident Singaporeans will rise to the challenge.

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CONFRONTINGTRANSNATIONALTERRORISM

CHAPTER ONE

If there is any doubt as to the intent ofterrorists today, we need only recollect

the events of September 11, 2001. Theattacks against the United States claimedthe lives of nearly 3,000 people from some85 countries, underscoring thecatastrophic nature of militanttransnational terrorism. Closer to home,developments such as the Bali bombingsin October 2002 which killed 202 peopleshowed that South-east Asia is alsovulnerable to attacks.

Singapore is high on the list of targets for terroristaction. It is important that we recognize this starkreality. The extremist regional network JemaahIslamiyah (JI), which is intent on subvertinggovernments in the region, has targeted us before.Those plots were foiled, but we can anticipate thatthere will be more attempts to attack us. Besides JI, wemay face action from other extremist groups as well.Worldwide, Al-Qaeda elements remain active, planningfuture action against American and other interests.

We are not alone in the struggle against terrorism.Yet, we must realize that we are ultimatelyresponsible for our own security. Terrorism iscertainly not new to Singapore. It can be understoodas the mounting of tactical operations aimed atachieving certain political goals. In terrorism,relatively little effort may be required to producedevastating results. It capitalizes on the element ofsurprise, but works over long time frames. Even ifdisrupted, terror organizations may regeneratethemselves, and wait years before pursuing theirobjectives again.

PREFACE [A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR SINGAPORE] ONE [CONFRONTING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM]T W O [ S I N G A P O R E ’ S E X P E R I E N C E W I T H T E R R O R I S M ] T H R E E [ T H E N E W S E C U R I T Y E N V I R O N M E N T ]F O U R [ S I N G A P O R E ’ S N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y A R C H I T E C T U R E ] F I V E [ I M P L E M E N T I N G O U R S T R AT E G Y ]S IX [NATIONAL SECURITY: A NATIONAL EFFORT]

Osama bin Laden, leader ofthe Al-Qaeda global terrornetwork.

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What is new in what we are facing, however, is thelethal combination of several especially extremefactors. The current trend of transnational terrorism isstrategic in nature. It demonstrates a clear globalreach, employs particularly sophisticated methods, andexhibits catastrophic outcomes. In particular, the Al-Qaeda-inspired movement also springs from a radicaland dangerous ideology based upon distortions ofIslam, devoid of any moral restraint. What we arewitnessing currently is, in essence, an immensecontest between those who seek peace and securityand a ruthless fanaticism that must have no place inthe modern world.

Singapore is part of this fight. We cannot simply optout of it. We have to prepare for it, and meet it headon. To do this, we need new policies, structures andcapabilities. What is our goal? There is no silver bulletavailable. Our goal is to minimize the country’svulnerability by deploying the strongest possibledefences against terror attacks. We cannot guard everyinstallation or scan every visitor. What we can do isreduce the threat to a tolerable level, so that terrorismdoes not have a significant impact on our society andeconomy.

to fortify Singapore by implementing a number ofmeasures to safeguard our homefront.

We have raised Singapore’s security standards incrucial areas such as aviation security, maritimesecurity, land transport security, border control, andcritical infrastructure protection.

In the past three years, we have also introduced newstructures and enhanced existing organizations in thepolicy, intelligence and operations domains. Forinstance, we formed new agencies such as theHomefront Security Office and the Joint CounterTerrorism Centre, while also reinvigorating existingunits such as the National Security Secretariat, to give astronger focus to inter-agency coordination andintegration. Together, these agencies have contributedgreatly to anticipating threats, and in organizing andbuilding up Singapore’s defences against terrorism.

Although the Government has done much to protectSingapore against terrorism, the threat has by nomeans been eliminated. The arrests of terrorists likeMas Selamat Kastari and Hambali may have disrupted

JI’s operations in theregion, but other keyleaders are still at large.JI’s regenerativepotential has not beencurtailed, as there willbe those who willcontinue to be misled byits particular brand ofideology. As such, overtime, JI can rebuild itscapability. Although itwould probably be moredifficult for the group to

We have done muchsince the September 11attacks to deal with theproblem of transnationalterrorism. TheGovernment has sought

WHY DO WENEED A NATIONALSECURITYSTRATEGY?

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“. . . no one can guarantee that a terroristattack will not happen here. Our approachmust be to make it extremely difficult forterrorists to carry out their evil deeds whileat the same time, be well prepared andready to deal with the repercussions if suchan attack does happen.”

Minister for Home Affairs Wong Kan SengAddressing Parliament on 14 March 2003

Inter-agency cooperation isdemonstrated in Exercise Apex -a joint maritime securityexercise between the PoliceCoast Guard (PCG) and theRepublic of Singapore Navy(RSN).

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carry out high-profile and complex terrorist attacks,they would still be capable of mounting small-scaleattacks against targets in Singapore and beyond.

Terrorism will be with us for many years to come. “Itwill be a long war for Singapore and the region, andthe end is not yet in sight,” Deputy Prime Minister LeeHsien Loong has cautioned. Singapore will continue tobe vulnerable because of the very strong stand we havetaken against terrorism, the arrests we have made tocrack down on JI in Singapore, the assistance we haveextended to regional efforts against terrorist groups,and the support we have given to the Americanreconstruction actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Wemust thus expect that if the opportunity presentsitself, terrorists will launch an attack on the islandor against Singapore assets and interests overseas.

In dealing with such terrorism, we must develop asustainable, long-term national security strategy and acoherent strategic framework. To do so, we have tocontinue to evolve beyond our traditional boundariesand established national security structures.

We need a total approach to the problem, as theimpact of terrorism will be felt in many areas,affecting Singapore’s foreign, defence, homefront,social and economic policies. If we do notcontinually shape our collective responses, thesolutions that emerge may not be sufficientlycomprehensive. We need a disciplined and deliberatestrategy to anticipate the threat, to understand it, andto devise a response. It will focus our minds andsustain our efforts, even when the threat is notimmediately apparent.

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WHY DO WE NEEDTHIS DOCUMENT?

The Fight Against Terror: Singapore’s NationalSecurity Strategy outlines the nature of the threat thatconfronts Singapore today, briefly explains Singapore’ssecurity priorities, and describes the strategy we willadopt to counter terrorism. It seeks to provide allSingaporeans with a sense of where we are now,where we must go and what we must do in thissecurity landscape. It is a common compass androadmap for all stakeholders in national security.

Singapore’s national security strategy aims, principally,to prevent threats to national security from developingin the first instance; protect Singapore against themore likely threats; respond to such threats ifprevention and protection should fail; and achieve aquick recovery to return Singapore to a state ofnormalcy.

How will we do this? We will build up the criticalexpertise and competencies required to confrontthese challenges. We will strengthen existing agencies,and establish new ones, if necessary, to best meet thedemands of national security.

We intend to achieve these aims through tighternetworking and inter-agency coordination. This is thekey tenet and cornerstone of our national securitystrategy. We need to build strong and durable bridgesfor a more robust national security network.Terrorism is a problem that cuts throughgovernmental divides. The various ministries andgovernment bodies in Singapore may work welltogether in the aftermath of a crisis, but we need tobe certain that we can sustain the momentum.Equally important, we must ensure that ourcoordination in the lead-up to crisis situations fallsinto place as a matter of routine. Networking will

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harness the capabilitiesof each party andmaximize the use oflimited nationalresources. We havetaken a key step byestablishing a NationalSecurity CoordinationSecretariat at the PrimeMinister’s Office, rightat the heart ofgovernment.

But networking goesbeyond having separatesecurity agenciesworking together. Itmust mean, also, that thefight against terrorismhas to be a national one.Terrorism can be foughtonly through a strategythat brings together thewhole of Singapore - theGovernment, businesses,civil society andindividuals.

Beyond Singapore,networking efforts arealso critical. TheGovernment will workwith like-mindedcountries from theregion and beyond in intelligence exchanges, capacity-building activities and counter-terrorism operations. Informulating our national security strategy, we have alsostudied the counter-terrorism experiences of other

countries, taking in keyperspectives andinsights. Singaporerecognizes that the waragainst terrorism cannotbe won by the efforts ofone country alone.Nations need to build aunited front againstterrorism.

Yet, ultimately, ourability to deal withterrorism effectivelydepends not just on thelines of defence weerect, or the number ofterrorists we arrest, orthe amount of moneywe spend. It will alsodepend on howSingapore andSingaporeans face thischallengepsychologically, asindividuals and as asociety. Terrorists areprepared to go toextremes and to escalateterrorist acts to inducefear and panic. We needto strike the rightbalance in gettingSingaporeans to realize

the gravity of the threat while not being paralysed byit. We will have to learn to live with terrorism, adjustourselves to its daily reality, and remain resolute andresilient in the face of adversity.

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Deputy Prime Minister Dr Tony Tan and Minister for Home AffairsWong Kan Seng inspecting an emergency planning exercise.

“Our environment has become verycomplex. We will have to prepare ourselvesboth operationally and psychologically todeal with threats that may hit us - includingthose we cannot even anticipate now. TheGovernment will make its best efforts andcommit the necessary resources. On their part, Singaporeans need to understand andtake a sensible perspective on issues such asterrorism... We have to see this as a featureof our environment and live with it withoutletting it paralyse us with fear. ”

Deputy Prime Minister and CMSD Dr Tony TanSpeaking at the 2003 Temasek Seminar on 30 July 2003

SINGAPORE’SEXPERIENCEWITH TERRORISM

CHAPTER TWO

Singapore has been struck by incidentsof terrorism in the past, but these were

isolated and episodic, and not at allrepresentative of the transnationalterrorism facing us today. Yet, these earlyevents should be understood in theirhistorical contexts, serving as milestones ofour collective past. We dealt with themfirmly and with resolve. We rememberthem as early challenges to our statehood.

Even before the country gained its independence,Singaporeans had to contend with sustained periods ofdanger. The Communist insurgency of the 1950s and1960s gave rise to various acts of subversion and civiluprising. Elements were seeking then to install aCommunist order in both Singapore and Malaya. Theauthorities carried out a series of successful operationsagainst pro-Communist agents during those turbulenttimes.

PREFACE [A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR SINGAPORE] ONE [CONFRONTING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM]TWO [ S I N G A P O R E ’ S E X P E R I E N C E W I T H T E R R O R I S M ] THREE [ T H E N E W S E C U R I T Y E N V I RO N M E N T ]FOUR [ S I N G A P O R E ’ S N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y A R C H I T E C T U R E ] FIVE [ I M P L E M E N T I N G O U R S T R AT E G Y ]SIX [NATIONAL SECURITY: A NATIONAL EFFORT]

Even as Singapore moved towards statehood, thefledging government had to confront many securitythreats. A grave act of sabotage was the MacDonaldHouse incident on 10 March 1965, during the periodknown as the Indonesian Confrontation, when thethen Indonesian government opposed Singapore’smerger with Malaya to form a federal Malaysia. A bombexplosion at MacDonald House along Singapore’sOrchard Road killed three and injured 33. The aim ofthe attack was to create public alarm and panic as wellas lower public morale.

Although the incident did come as a shock to many inSingapore, the operatives behind the MacDonaldHouse bombing were apprehended, tried andconvicted - an early testament to the determination ofthe Singapore authorities to counter terrorismdecisively. The country was able to recover quicklyfrom this event.

THE MACDONALDHOUSE BOMBING

A scene of devastation after thebombing of MacDonald House on10 March 1965. 19

THE LAJU INCIDENT

On 26 March 1991, at about six in the evening,Singapore Airlines (SIA) flight SQ 117 took off fromSubang Airport in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, with 129passengers and crew onboard. En route to Singapore,four passengers who claimed to be members of thePakistan Peoples Party (PPP) took control of theaircraft. At about 10pm, SQ 117 landed at Singapore’sChangi Airport. The hijackers demanded the releasefrom detention of former Pakistani Prime MinisterBenazir Bhutto’s husband and other PPP members.They also asked that the plane be refuelled, so thatthey could fly to Australia.

Singapore immediately activated a high-level crisisteam. Early the following morning at 2.30am, SQ 117was moved to an outer tarmac. The hijackers pushedtwo SIA stewards out of the plane, injuring them.They also threatened to kill one passenger every 10

THE SQ 117 HIJACK

Nine years later, on 31 January 1974, four men armedwith submachine guns and explosives attempted tostorm the Shell oil refinery complex on Pulau Bukom.The group comprised two Japanese nationals from theJapanese Red Army and two Arabs from the PopularFront for the Liberation of Palestine. Their goal was todisrupt the supply of oil from Singapore to countriessuch as South Vietnam, which had been engaged withthe United States in a bitter war against theCommunist North.

The operation, however, went awry and the terroristshad to flee the scene. They hijacked the ferryboat Lajuat the Bukom jetty and headed out to sea. But thegroup was quickly intercepted and surrounded bymarine police boats, customs launches and navygunboats. Following several days of intensenegotiations, the terrorists agreed to release thecrewmembers they were holding hostage in exchangefor a party of guarantors for their safe passage. A weekafter the abortive attack on Pulau Bukom,

arrangements were made to transfer the terrorists fromthe Laju to the airport, where they surrendered theirarms. The following day, 8 February, the terrorists leftSingapore for Kuwait, bringing to an end a dramaticsequence of events.

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minutes after dawn if their demands were not met.The situation was grave. An order was given to stormthe aircraft. Elite commandos entered the plane in theearly dawn hours, killing the four Pakistani hijackersand freeing unharmed all 118 passengers and ninecrewmembers.

THE NEW FACE OF TERRORISM

A decade on, terrorism continues to cast a darkshadow worldwide, threatening peaceful societies andestablished governments. From the 1993 bombing ofthe World Trade Center in New York, to the 1995 saringas attack in a Tokyo subway, and the 1998 US embassybombings in Kenya and Tanzania, acts of terrorism haveled to numerous casualties across several continentsover the past few years.

Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network and its affiliates,which were behind much of the terrorist violence ofthe past decade around the world, present a new formof terrorism that is radically different from whatSingapore and the rest of the world have been familiarwith. Nonetheless, we have not stood idle in the wakeof some of their recent operations.

MAJOR PRE-SEPTEMBER 11AL-QAEDA ATTACKS

• 1993 World Trade Center bombing, New York• 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, Saudi Arabia• 1998 US Embassy bombings, East Africa• 2000 USS Cole bombing, Yemen

A catastrophic act of terrorism - the World Trade Center towers in NewYork hit by Al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001.

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“Unlike some other countries, Singaporedoes not roll over and play dead whenthreatened with a gun. It can and will fightback, effectively, ruthlessly.”

The Straits Times, 28 March 1991

Jemaah Islamiyah’s links with foreign organizations

Source : Ministry of Home Affairs

At least 11 local JI detainees areknown to have attended military

training in Al-Qaeda camps inAfghanistan. Following the 11 Sep

terrorist attacks on the US, Al-Qaedasent its operative, “Sammy” (@MohamedMansour Jabarah), into Singapore to

direct operations. In addition,reconnaissance videotape of the Yishun

Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) stationproduced by JI members and fourpieces of notes made on the MRT

station were found in the rubble ofAl-Qaeda member Abu Haf

(@Mohd Atef)’s home in Kabul.

KMM member, YazidSufaat, is said to havehosted some of the Al-Qaeda suicide hijackersinvolved in the Sep 11terrorist attacks in the US.

AL-QAEDASINGAPORE

JEMAAHISLAMIYAH (JI)

MORO ISLAMICLIBERATION FRONT

(MILF)

At least 4 local JI detainees are knownto have previously undergone militarytraining by the MILF in Mindanao.Another one detainee was a MILFmember who had trained and performedguard duty for the group in Mindanao.“Mike”(@Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi), ademolition expert and explosive trainerwith MILF directed local JI members totarget US and other establishments witha view to attacking them.

Al-Qaeda provided fundsand training to the MILFthrough a network offront organisations orlegitimate Muslimorganisations.

KUMPULAN MILITANMALAYSIA (KMM)

JI helped KMM in purchasing a boatto ferry foodstuff and Laskar Jihadfighters for the sectarian conflict inMalukus, Indonesia. KMM alsoassisted JI in its procurement ofammonium nitrate to be used in themaking of explosives.

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Ibrahim Maidin, spiritual leaderof the Singapore JI cell.

Thirty-one persons were arrested and detained in twosecurity operations against Jemaah Islamiyah in Januaryand September 2002. Seven other persons werearrested and detained between October 2002 andDecember 2003. In January 2004, restriction ordersunder the Internal Security Act were issued against 12persons. Many of those under detention or restrictionorders were members, sympathizers or supporters of JI,while the rest were members of or affiliated to theMoro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines.

Authorities revealed that the Singapore JI operativeswere planning to attack a range of targets inSingapore, including Western interests and localinstallations. They had sought to obtain tonnes ofammonium nitrate to be used for truck bombs. JI alsoplanned to hijack an airplane and crash it intoSingapore’s Changi Airport. Andrew Tan, a terrorismanalyst at Singapore’s Institute of Defence andStrategic Studies, noted that if realized, the JI attackswould have had grave consequences for Singapore.

The American Embassy in Singapore was one of the targets forterrorist action.

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“Had these attacks succeeded, not only would theyhave inflicted heavy civilian casualties, they would alsohave had a devastating effect on the economy andshattered business confidence, with potentiallyuncertain consequences for communal relations aswell,” he commented.

Investigations further uncovered an elaborate network,in which local cell members worked under thedirection of JI leaders based outside Singapore, andunder the guidance of Al-Qaeda-linked agents. Througha combination of good intelligence and early action,Singapore was able to thwart the planned attacks.

With their capture, JI operations in Singapore havealso been severely disrupted.

However, the threat will persist if JI terrorists intenton targeting Singapore are at large in the region. JIand MILF networks in Singapore may have been madeineffective by recent actions. Yet, in the longer term,the spectre of terrorism will hang over South-east Asiaas long as JI-linked schools continue to train militantswho receive instruction in camps like those under theMILF in Mindanao. At the same time, we must alsoguard against other extremist threats. The danger toSingapore’s security remains.

“One cannot forget that since theSeptember 11 attacks on the UnitedStates, Jemaah Islamiyah has been one ofthe most active Al-Qaeda affiliates, andSoutheast Asia one of the most importanttheatres of operation. . . It would befoolish to underestimate JI’s capabilitiesor goals.”

Dr Zachary AbuzaTerrorism Analyst at Simmons College, Boston29 October 2003

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CHAPTER THREE

THE NEWSECURITYENVIRONMENT

PREFACE [A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR SINGAPORE] ONE [CONFRONTING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM]TWO [ S I N G A P O R E ’ S E X P E R I E N C E W I T H T E R R O R I S M ] THREE [ T H E N E W S E C U R I T Y E N V I R O N M E N T ]FOUR [ S I N G A P O R E ’ S N A T I O N A L S E C U R I T Y A R C H I T E C T U R E ] F IVE [ I M P L E M E N T I N G O U R S T R A T E G Y ]SIX [NATIONAL SECURITY: A NATIONAL EFFORT]

Before the events of September 11highlighted the new era of transnational

terrorism, Singapore’s national securitystrategy had focused largely on buildingstrong external defence capabilities.Singapore assembled a credible, citizen-based defence force. Well trained and wellequipped, it was tasked with meeting clearmilitary challenges from state-based threats.It was chiefly a conventional army gearedtowards fighting a conventional war.

At home, no less importantly, the Singapore PoliceForce and other homefront agencies were responsiblefor internal order and security. They dealt successfullywith a wide range of threats, from Communistsubversion to dangers posed by foreign terroristelements. In the international arena, the Ministry ofForeign Affairs focused on diplomacy and managedSingapore’s external relations.

But the regional security environment of today isdifferent and complex. Singapore finds itself confrontedby a form of terrorism that transcends borders. This

Global Ambitions, Global Reach: Modern transnationalterrorism has taken on a clear international dimension,with a global agenda and global network. Many otherterrorist groups were more limited in their aims and

FEATURES OFTRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

Abu Bakar Bashir, spiritualleader of Jemaah Islamiyah.

areas of operation.Examples include theLiberation Tigers ofTamil Eelam, the IrishRepublican Army and theBasque separatist groupETA. In South-east Asia,for instance, the AbuSayyaf operates mainlyagainst the Philippinesgovernment. Thesegroups generally mountterrorist activities largelywithin their ownnational boundaries.

terrorism, as highlighted earlier, has a global reach, isrooted in ideology, and employs sophisticated methodsto achieve catastrophic outcomes.

27Images from a Jemaah Islamiyah surveillance video ofYishun MRT station and its surroundings.

However, the transnational terrorism of the 21stcentury is strikingly different. Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda has explicit global aims. It seeks to destroy theUnited States and its Western allies, and establish pan-Islamic caliphates, overturning the internationalpolitical order. In its quest, Al-Qaeda has spawned anetwork of affiliated terrorist groups across the globethat subscribes not only to its extreme terror tacticsbut also to its deviant ideology. Jemaah Islamiyah, amovement inspired by a similar vision for the world, isits principal South-east Asian representative.

The Singapore JI plot highlighted the internationalnature of the struggle. After authorities haduncovered the plan against the country, their

Jemaah Islamiyah’s terror plot againstSingapore was not entirely home-grown. JImembers received critical help from twoforeign operatives, codenamed “Sammy” and“Mike”. Sammy, who was subsequentlyidentified as Mohamed Mansour Jabarah, aCanadian national of Arab origin, was an Al-Qaeda agent dispatched to Singapore to assistthe local JI cell in surveillance and theselection of targets. He has since beencaptured by US forces. Mike, who was alsoinvolved in directing the Singapore JI plot,was the name given to Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi, an Indonesian bomb expert who hadserved with the Moro Islamic Liberation Frontin the Philippines. He was captured in thePhilippines and subsequently shot dead threemonths after escaping from detention.

THE ROLE OF MIKE AND SAMMY

“The most alarming aspect of the attackson September 11th is that they conformto a trend in international terrorism thathas emerged in recent years…theinfliction of mass, indiscriminatecasualties by enigmatic adversaries,striking far beyond terrorism’straditional operational theatres inEurope and the Middle East.”

Dr Bruce HoffmanTerrorism Analyst at the RAND Corporation8 October 2002

subsequent investigations revealed that while thesurveillance work was conducted by Singaporeans, theplanning was done by an Al-Qaeda operative of Arabdescent holding a Canadian passport. The bomb makerwas an Indonesian living in the Philippines.

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Ideological Perversion: Underpinning transnationalterrorism is an extremist ideology that justifies terrorattacks against civilized and open societies. It is anideology based upon a gross misreading of Islamicreligious texts, which is then used to rationalizecurrent acts of terrorism. It debases concepts likejihad. All who stand in the way are consideredlegitimate targets, even co-religionists who do notshare the same degree of fervour.

The current terrorist threat against Singapore has deepideological roots. The social profiles of the JI suspectswho had been arrested were no different from thoseof normal Singaporeans. They were educated, heldstable jobs, and had families. They were neither

destitute nor disenfranchised nor dispossessed. Yet,they shared a willingness to cause destruction and killothers in the name of a higher spiritual calling. Wehave to recognize this extreme element and remainconscious of this ideological dimension when dealingwith transnational terrorism.

Sophisticated Methods, Catastrophic Outcomes:Transnational terrorism is characterized by a highdegree of operational and technical sophistication,making attacks more lethal and dangerous. Al-Qaedaand its subsidiary groups have repeatedly shown acapacity to mount multiple, well-coordinated strikes.

The September 11 attacks, where flight-trainedterrorists were able to commandeer four separateairplanes, are well documented. But Al-Qaeda and itsaffiliates have been able to maintain the momentum,and subsequent incidents in Riyadh, Istanbul andMadrid demonstrated their ability to launch highlysynchronized terror bombings that resulted inhundreds of casualties.

Singapore’s Minister for Home Affairs Wong Kan Senghas noted the fanaticism in modern-day terrorism.

More than 200 people lost theirlives in the October 2002 Balibombing.

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“Nothing is unthinkable,” he observed. “This moralfree-fall and lack of restraint is what makes us sensethat the scale of violence of this current terrorism hasno boundaries other than what the imaginationsupported by opportunity and access to relevantresource can achieve.”

Such sophisticated methods and tactics have allowedmodern terror networks to seek catastrophicoutcomes from their actions, looking to inflictmaximum casualties. Attacks are often aimed atdefenceless civilians, with little regard for human life,instead of hardened military targets. In an assessmentof likely terrorism trends for 2004, terrorism analystRohan Gunaratna noted that Al-Qaeda poses morethreat to such soft targets. “Because of governmenthardening of military and diplomatic targets, terroristswill shift their attacks to economic targets andpopulation centres,” he wrote.

The number of fatalities arising from a terrorist attackusing weapons of mass destruction is likely to besignificantly higher. While recent terrorist incidentshave mainly employed conventional explosives, thereis growing evidence that terrorist groups would seekto obtain chemical, biological and radiologicalweapons. It is crucial, therefore, that their efforts bestopped. In a recent speech, Singapore’s DefenceMinister RADM Teo Chee Hean warned, “The threat ofterrorism is amplified by the risk of proliferation ofweapons of mass destruction.” He spoke of anightmare scenario of terrorists and rogue regimescollaborating in the use of weapons of massdestruction - a scenario within the “realm ofpossibility”. “If terrorists were to set off a nucleardevice or chemical or biological agents, the damageand panic would be massive,” he said.

POLICY CHALLENGES

The Government has to examine some critical issuesthat will shape our long-term national security strategy.

First, can we be totally safe? While the outcome of aconventional war can be definitive, the same cannot besaid of the campaign against transnational terrorism.Given the nature of these terrorist threats, absolutesecurity is unattainable. Even if the Government

STRATEGIC CONVERGENCE

Clearly, the new security environment facing us iscomplex and varied. It does not permit us to simplysay that we are a nation either at peace or at war.Consequently, Singapore’s definition of nationalsecurity must extend beyond the containment ofconventional threats. It must take into accounttransnational terrorist threats from non-state elements.

The current structure for dealing with nationalsecurity is characterized by sharp distinctions betweenforeign and domestic interests, and between externaland internal issues, with functions largely performedby individual agencies. The emergence of transnationalterrorism has created a new effect in national securitypolicy and practice - the blurring of boundariesbetween government bodies responsible for nationalsecurity. The separate and apparently distinctfunctions and capacities of the government agenciesinvolved in national security converge when dealingwith transnational terrorism. In devising a newapproach to managing national security, the key lies,therefore, in strengthening coordination andintegration among government agencies.

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aspires to achieve it, attempting to plug everyconceivable capability gap will become an immensedrain on our resources. As there are other nationalconcerns such as education, housing, good andaffordable health care, and sustainable economicgrowth, there is a need to prioritize and strike abalance between different goals. Security issuescannot become an overriding concern that displacesother national imperatives.

Second, what must change in our processes andstructures? Having separate, specialized securityprocesses can help sharpen the responses needed for

specific problems. But seen against the context ofthreats to national security, separate processes, forexample, to deal with internal and external threatswould not be optimal when the line between the twohas blurred. The SARS crisis has taught us theimportance of a total approach to a national problem.Security requires us to confront a spectrum of threats,and for that, we would need to have a comprehensiveapproach and an over-arching strategy.

We are familiar with a hierarchical organizationalstructure where clear lines of command and controlhave always proven to be expeditious. The hierarchical

SARS – A VALUABLE LEARNINGEXPERIENCE FOR SINGAPORE

The unexpected outbreak of SARS (Severe AcuteRespiratory Syndrome) in 2003 taught Singaporemany valuable lessons. Although it was not acase of bio-terrorism, it served as a usefulexercise for government authorities, businessesand the public in tackling the spread of aninfectious disease. Furthermore, SARS impactednot just Singapore’s health system, but also hadsignificant effects on the economy and daily life.SARS had to be defeated not only through theefforts of doctors and nurses, but also through thework of all Singaporeans. The episodedemonstrated the need for tight inter-agencycoordination and widespread communityparticipation – elements which will be critical inmeeting future national crises.

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structure favours consolidation, and a common visionand purpose. The national security mission of today,however, is complex. It involves too many entities andit is not possible to bring them all under one roof. Thenetwork approach would be a better fit for Singapore,given our small size and limited resources. Thisnetwork, though, would need direction andcoordination from a central hub that has sufficientinfluence to motivate constituent agencies. It would

also need dedicated and forward-looking staff toanticipate, cope with and direct future events.

In short, the organizational challenge of nationalsecurity is to mobilize, coordinate and leadgovernment agencies, the business community andthe general public to make Singapore better prepared,more secure and more responsive to an array ofthreats.

HAZMAT (Hazardous Materials) teams train for both civil andsecurity emergencies.

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SINGAPORE’SNATIONALSECURITYARCHITECTURE

CHAPTER FOUR

Singapore recognizes the diverse andconstantly evolving nature of terrorism.

To fight the terrorist threat in the longhaul, the Government has adopted a multi-ministry networked approach. Networkingintegrates the work of otherwise separatebodies, enables inter-agency coordinationand allows us to leverage upon thestrengths of diverse organizations.

Traditionally, no single central body has directedSingapore’s national security apparatus. Instead,various ministries share jurisdiction over security-related functions. Defence against conventionalexternal threats comes under the Singapore ArmedForces and the Ministry of Defence. Internal securityhas been the responsibility of Home Team agencies,such as the Police and the Ministry of Home Affairs.However, the problems of transnational terrorismpresent scenarios that involve multiple authorities andrequire varied expertise. No single agency will have allthe resources or capabilities needed to handle therange of threats at all levels.

PREFACE [A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR SINGAPORE] ONE [CONFRONTING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM]TWO [ S I N G A P O R E ’ S E X P E R I E N C E W I T H T E R R O R I S M ] THREE [ T H E N E W S E C U R I T Y E N V I R O N M E N T ]FOUR [ S I N G A P O R E ’ S N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y A R C H I T E C T U R E ] F IVE [ I M P L E M E N T I N G O U R S T R AT E G Y ]SIX [NATIONAL SECURITY: A NATIONAL EFFORT]

Agencies within the Ministry of Home Affairsare organized around the Home Team concept.It comprises the MHA Headquarters and theSingapore Police Force, the Singapore CivilDefence Force, the Internal SecurityDepartment, the Immigration and CheckpointsAuthority, the Prisons Department, the CentralNarcotics Bureau, the Commercial andIndustrial Security Corporation (CISCO), andthe Singapore Corporation for RehabilitativeEnterprises (SCORE).Many differentorganizations, amultiplicity of purpose,but one shared goal ofmaking Singapore thebest home for all, onewhich is safe and secure.

THE HOME TEAM

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How can this networked government be responsive andeffective? A few critical efforts must be undertaken.First, an autonomous and influential node should beestablished at the centre of government to coordinatenational security policies. It must be a strong centrewhich sets clear policy directions, but which leavesoperational coordination and responses to otheragencies. Structures and processes should beintroduced to help maintain discipline and continuity.Where possible, structures should be built on what wealready have to maintain a clear focus. Those that haveproven to be robust should be allowed to continue tooperate.

Next, the Government will put in place strategicforums to discuss critical issues and to promote a

shared understanding of security concerns among allsecurity policy-makers and practitioners. A nationalsecurity strategic planning and policy process shouldbe institutionalized.

Over time, there may be a tendency for organizationsto expand rather than to build alliances. Networks andcoordinating structures must be encouraged, as theywill help agencies to leverage on each other’sstrengths, rather than duplicate resources and buildcompeting capabilities.

While structures and processes for effectivenetworking can be put in place, the real emphasisshould be on cultivating a culture of collaboration.We have to nurture a propensity to think about how

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Army-Police patrols at Changi Airport – a practical example ofinter-agency coordination and convergence.

NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Policy Coordination

What are the elements of Singapore’s revised nationalsecurity architecture? Essentially, we have put in placea robust system that organizes the various agenciesaround the three essential security pillars of policy,operations and capability development.

For effective policy coordination, a new NationalSecurity Coordination Secretariat (NSCS), workingunder the guidance of the existing Security PolicyReview Committee (SPRC), has been institutionalizedat the heart of the Singapore Government.

Security Policy Review Committee: The CoordinatingMinister for Security and Defence chairs thisCommittee, which also comprises the Ministers forDefence, Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs. TheCommittee meets regularly to guide national securitystrategy and policy formulation. It examines thecountry’s most critical national security capabilitydevelopment goals, discusses critical issues and threats,and reviews prevailing national security measures.

National Security Coordination Secretariat: TheSecretariat is an important central hub located withinthe Prime Minister’s Office, tasked with nationalsecurity planning and the coordination of policy andintelligence issues. A Permanent Secretary for NationalSecurity and Intelligence Coordination has been

we can achieve more as a team even as we play ourfunctional roles. The key to doing this is to develop acommon vision and invest in team building.

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Security Policy Coordination in Singapore

National Security Coordination Secretariat(Prime Minister’s Office)

Prime Minister

Security PolicyReview Committee

Joint CounterTerrorism Centre

National SecurityCoordination Centre

Permanent Secretary(National Security

& Intelligence Coordination)

appointed to head the Secretariat. The PermanentSecretary will report directly to the Prime Ministerthrough the Coordinating Minister for Security andDefence. He will chair a National Security CoordinatingCommittee comprising other permanent secretaries.This Committee will be responsible to SPRC forsecurity policy coordination. In addition, thePermanent Secretary will also chair an IntelligenceCoordinating Committee which will be in charge ofcoordinating Singapore’s counter-terrorismintelligence activities.

The National Security Coordination Secretariatdepends on two key agencies - the National SecurityCoordination Centre (NSCC) and the Joint Counter

The Executive Group (EG) mechanism has been activated on a number ofoccasions, such as during the collapse of the Hotel New World in 1986,which killed 33 and injured 17.

“The enhancements to the crisismanagement structure will enable myMinistry to plan for contingencyresponses more holistically.”

Minister for Home Affairs Wong Kan SengAddressing Parliament on 12 March 2004

There are established arrangements in Singapore todeal with national crises. Since 1978, the Governmenthas maintained an inter-agency crisis management

structure called theExecutive Group (EG).The EG is a testedsystem, having beendeployed for crisissituations ranging fromthe collapse of theHotel New World in1986 to the hijacking ofSQ 117 in 1991. In2003, the EG wasactivated to coordinate

Singapore’s response to the SARS crisis.

In fact, drawing from our experience with SARS, weknow that national crises may come in unexpectedforms. The threats and challenges we face areunpredictable and may cut across the ambit of anumber of ministries and agencies. A robust crisismanagement framework is required to coordinatenational responses, allocate resources and manage far-reaching consequences and implications. For betteroperational coordination, the Ministry of Home Affairshas introduced a Homefront Crisis ManagementSystem consisting of a Homefront Crisis MinisterialCommittee (HCMC) and a Homefront Crisis ExecutiveGroup (HCEG).

Homefront Crisis Ministerial Committee: The HCMC ischaired by the Minister for Home Affairs andcomprises other Cabinet Ministers as principalmembers. The HCMC provides strategic and political

Operational Coordination

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Terrorism Centre (JCTC) - to support its policy andintelligence functions. The NSCC comprises separategroups to undertake policy, planning and risk-assessment and horizon-scanning responsibilities,including the operation of a Horizon Scanning Centre.

The JCTC providesintelligence andassessments on terroristthreats to facilitatepolicy-making andcounter-terrorism efforts.It serves as a multi-agency centre ofexpertise on terrorism toprovide comprehensiveand timely terrorist-related threat assessments. The JCTC thus integratesthe work of the various intelligence agencies anddepartments in Singapore.

Capability Development Coordination

Deputy Prime Minister and then Defence Minister Dr Tony Tanaddressing the inaugural National Security Seminar in June 2003,attended by senior security officials across the Singapore government.

Understanding Networking: A network must besupported by individuals equipped not just with theirrespective skills and specialties, but also with acommon understanding of Singapore’s nationalsecurity strategy and policies. The Government willimplement several programmes to further inter-agencyexchanges.

For a start, a national security course will be conductedfor senior security practitioners. The course, to becoordinated by the National Security CoordinationCentre, will focus on the inter-agency and network-centric character of Singapore’s national securityarchitecture. It will be useful to the national securitycommunity in a number of ways. It enables a betterunderstanding of transnational terrorism and explainsthe need for continued vigilance. It enhances the

awareness of the specific organizations, linkages andprocesses that have been created or strengthened todeal with national security issues. In addition, itincreases awareness of the various national securitypolicies, and capability development and contingencyplans.

The Government will also hold annual nationalsecurity seminars for national security agencies. Theseminars are organized by the National SecurityCoordination Centre. The Coordinating Minister forSecurity and Defence will use the occasion to presentthe broad national security objectives for theimmediate future. The National Security Seminar willhelp to align individual government ministries andagencies with the larger national security picture andkeep them updated on government policies. In thisregard, it will provide insights into current issues andhelp explain new security initiatives.

Anticipating Surprises: In the longer term, we need toestablish a risk-assessment and horizon-scanningcapability to anticipate strategic surprises. In a world

guidance on the handling of crises with the aim ofmaintaining normalcy as far as possible.

Homefront Crisis Executive Group: The HCEG is adecision-making group, staffed by high-level policydecision-makers from the various ministries andgovernment agencies. It is led by the PermanentSecretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Generally, theresponsibility of the HCEG is to provide policy guidanceand strategic decisions on the management of majorcrises. It will also provide operational coordinationsupport to the Ministerial Committee, resolve cross-ministry issues and ensure that decisions and directivesfrom the Ministerial Committee are implemented. TheHCEG is supported by multi-agency and multi-disciplineCrisis Management Groups where cross-agency issuescan be coordinated and resolved quickly.

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where threats can come right out of the blue, as wehave learnt from our experience with SARS, it is usefulto have a framework to help us deal with them in acoherent way.

Uncertainty and unpredictability are the keychallenges, and our focus will be on anticipatingsurprises. Deputy Prime Minister and CoordinatingMinister for Security and Defence Dr Tony Tan haswarned that globalization and our open borderspresent many more possibilities for the unexpected,which can inflict great damage and even alter our wayof life. “SARS, for example, caught us completely bysurprise,” he noted. “We have learnt many valuablelessons from the experience, but the next strategicsurprise may be very different from the last. Beyondthe actual damage, the psychological impact of thesesurprises can be extremely serious and we would needto guard against being dislocated by such shocks.”

The Government will strengthen risk-assessment andhorizon-scanning capabilities to bring togetherdifferent agencies in the tasks of monitoring andauthoring scenarios, assessing risks and sounding earlywarnings. We will also work with think-tanks andresearch institutes, such as the International Centre forPolitical Violence and Terrorism Research at theInstitute of Defence and Strategic Studies to develop acommon, in-depth understanding of the terrorismproblem, especially its ideological underpinnings.

Renamed in August 2004, the NSCC is staffedby officers seconded from the Ministry ofDefence, the Singapore Armed Forces, theSingapore Police Force, the Security andIntelligence Division, the Singapore CivilDefence Force and the Ministry ofInformation, Communications and the Arts.

STRENGTHENING CONVERGENCE:THE NATIONAL SECURITYCOORDINATION CENTRE

EVOLVING ARCHITECTURE

The series of security structures and programmesoutlined here serves to fully equip the Government todeal with various contingencies, whether episodic orof a prolonged nature, whether focused internally orwith an external dimension. In summary, the National

Security Coordination Secretariat will provide overallsecurity policy direction in the national counter-terrorism effort. It will also coordinate Singapore’snational intelligence agencies. As structures cannotremain inflexible in the face of evolving threats, we willcontinue to strengthen and upgrade the nationalsecurity architecture to meet new challenges.

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The National Security Coordination Centre atthe Prime Minister’s Office was formed in 1999as the National Security Secretariat, a unitdesigned to strengthen coordination amongSingapore’s existing security agencies. NSSsought to forge and strengthen inter-agencylinks through the strategic convergence of theseorganizations and other relevant governmentministries, directing efforts against theemerging threats of non-conventional warfareand transnational terrorism.

IMPLEMENTINGOUR STRATEGY

CHAPTER FIVE

PREFACE [A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR SINGAPORE] ONE [CONFRONTING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM]TWO [ S I N G A P O R E ’ S E X P E R I E N C E W I T H T E R R O R I S M ] T HREE [ T H E N E W S E C U R I T Y E N V I R O N M E N T ]FOUR [ S I N G A P O R E ’ S N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y A R C H I T E C T U R E ] FIVE [ I M P L E M E N T I N G O U R S T R AT E G Y ]SIX [NATIONAL SECRITY: A NATIONAL EFFORT]

To deal effectively with the threat oftransnational terrorism, Singapore has

deployed a robust defence strategy builtupon a well-organized network ofgovernment agencies, often working inpartnership with commercial and privateparties. This integrated, layered approach isstructured around the Prevention,Protection and Response domains. By aneffective combination of various measures,we can be confident of meeting majorterror threats.

An Integrated Approach to National Security

PREVENTION

Prevention represents the most critical layer ofdefence against terrorism. A successful strategy saveslives, preserves property, and avoids potentialdisruption to our economy and society. It entails anintegration of effective diplomacy, good intelligencework, and strong border controls. Where we can, wemust ensure that terror threats are eliminated beforethey materialize.

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Singapore As a ResponsibleGlobal Citizen

asean

“We share together a lot of informationon terrorism. We work together closely ontrying to ensure that terrorism in theregion is progressively brought undercontrol. . .”

Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer27 July 2003

“Your nation has also been a vital andsteadfast friend in the fight againstglobal terror. Singapore has madedetermined and successful efforts tobreak up terror plots before they can takeinnocent lives.”

United States President George W. Bush6 May 2003

Singapore works diligently with partners in the regionand the wider international community on variousfronts. We recognize that the war against terrorism notonly affects us, but is also a problem shared by manyother countries.Singapore leaders havespoken out clearly andconsistently at variouslocal and internationalforums against the threatof transnationalterrorism.

More specifically, theGovernment has workedclosely with othercountries inimplementing a series ofpractical anti-terrormeasures. For instance,Singapore respondedswiftly in the passage ofthe landmark UnitedNations Security CouncilResolution 1373 of 2001,which established a legalfoundation forinternational actionagainst terrorism.According to Minister forForeign Affairs Prof S. Jayakumar, this was “a landmarkresolution which dealt comprehensively with counter-terrorism”, providing “a legal basis for all states to takeaction against terrorists and their supporters.”

Singapore also signed the UN Convention for theSuppression of the Financing of Terrorism inDecember 2001, ratifying it the following year. Themonitoring and cutting off of funds to terroristorganizations constitutes a crucial stroke in theinternational effort against terrorism. Singapore is alsoa participant in the US-led Proliferation Security

Initiative, a multilateraleffort to combat thespread of weapons ofmass destruction.

In the region, Singaporehas joined other ASEANstates in appointingpoints of contact forintelligence liaison. Thiswas formalized duringthe Special ASEANMinisterial Meeting onTerrorism in May 2002.In addition, Singaporeco-hosted a workshopwith the United States

on counter-terrorism financing in January 2003. Theworkshop sought to help ASEAN and Pacific IslandsForum members strengthen their domestic effortsagainst terrorism.

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WHAT IS THE CONTAINERSECURITY INITIATIVE?

Singapore is the first Asian country to jointhe US-led Container Security Initiative.The CSI recognizes the potential dangersposed by illicit seaborne cargo, such asbomb materials. CSI ports use intelligenceto identify and target high-risk American-bound containers and pre-screen thembefore they are shipped to US ports. Manyother ports worldwide have agreed to jointhe CSI and are at various stages ofimplementing the Initiative. Collectively,these ports handle two-thirds of containertraffic shipped to the US.

WHAT ARE SOLAS AND THEISPS CODE?

The International Convention for the Safety ofLife at Sea (SOLAS) is one of the most importantinternational conventions dealing withmaritime safety. It is also one of the oldest, withthe first version having been adopted at a 1914convention. Since then, four other SOLASconventions have been held. SOLAS specifiesstandards on safety for the construction,equipping and operations of ships.

The ISPS (International Ship and Port FacilitySecurity) Code contains mandatory detailedsecurity-related requirements for governments,port authorities, port facilities and shippingcompanies. A non-mandatory section containsa series of guidelines on how to meet theserequirements. The Code provides astandardized framework to evaluate the riskof terrorist acts, enabling governments andship operators to calibrate preparedness levelsand potential responses to correspondingthreat levels. ISPS-compliant ports put in placea wide series of security plans, with regularassessments and drills.

US Customs Commissioner Robert C. Bonner signs the CSIwith Koh Cheng Hwa, Director-General of Singapore’sCustoms and Excise Department.

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Successful Intelligence Coordination

One critical component in combating transnationalterrorism is good intelligence. Accurate and earlyintelligence allows authorities to disrupt terror plots

and arrest key operatives before attacks can belaunched. The foiling of the JI plots stemmed fromeffective intelligence work. Singapore’s intelligenceagencies also cooperate closely with their regionalcounterparts on information exchanges. The arrest inIndonesia of Mas Selamat Kastari, the Singapore JI cellleader, and the arrest in Thailand of Arifin Ali, a seniormember of the cell, demonstrated the effectiveness ofcoordinated action and intelligence sharing with otherpartners.

Effective Border Controls

The security of individual Singaporeans isstrengthened not just by protective measures at theirdoorstep, but also by strong controls at the borders ofthe country. Land, sea and air access into Singaporemust be fortified by effective controls. Stringentmeasures are necessary to prevent the entry offoreign terrorist elements and materials. Recognizingthe need to create a clear, coordinated border controlsystem, the Government merged the border controlfunctions of both the Customs and ExciseDepartment and the Singapore Immigration andRegistration to form the Immigration andCheckpoints Authority, or ICA, on 1 April 2003. TheICA now has seamless operational capabilities tomonitor and regulate the movement of goods andpeople across Singapore’s borders.

PROTECTION

Improved capabilities to prevent terrorist actions willhelp to reduce the overall threat. Nonetheless, we stillneed to harden Singapore with a layer of strong,protective measures. Rather than protect everypossible target, we have to prioritize our efforts, given

Singapore was also the first port in Asia to implementthe US Container Security Initiative (CSI) in January2003. The CSI aims to screen high-risk containersbefore they arrive at American ports.

In other areas of maritime security, Singaporecooperates closely with member states of theInternational Maritime Organization to formulatemeasures to enhance security. Singapore hasimplemented special amendments to the InternationalConvention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and theInternational Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPSCode).

Mas Selamat Kastari, the head of JI in Singapore, was arrested inIndonesia following a tip-off from Singapore intelligence agencies. He wasaccused of plotting an airborne attack on Singapore’s Changi Airport.

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our limited resources, and focus on areas of greatestconcern.

Protection of Critical Infrastructure andKey Installations

Since the September 11 attacks, the Government hasenhanced the security of Singapore’s criticalinfrastructure. We have instituted a range of securitymeasures, such as the installation of surveillancecameras at power stations and water networks. Morebroadly, a National Critical Infrastructure AssuranceCommittee was formed to study the vulnerabilities ofSingapore’s critical infrastructure, and to recommendthe protective steps to take.

Security at other local and overseas key installations,such as our embassies, has also been strengthened.

On Jurong Island, the site of Singapore’s petrochemicalhub, armed personnel, including Singapore ArmedForces (SAF) troops, have been deployed to increasesecurity. They work closely with the Police CoastGuard and commercial security forces that guard seaand land access to Jurong Island.

Apart from the emphasis on the protection of keyinstallations, security at prominent public places suchas Boat Quay, the Esplanade and Holland Village hasbeen stepped up as well.

Enhanced Security at High-profile Events

Singapore plays host to various prominentinternational events each year, many of which drawtop foreign dignitaries. These include regular fixturessuch as the Asian Aerospace airshow and the Asia

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Standing guard at access pointsto Jurong Island.

Security Conference, also known as the Shangri-LaDialogue. A disruption of any of these events will notonly offer terrorists a great symbolic victory, but willalso inflict great harm on Singapore. The Governmentconducts thorough security assessments of each event.Depending on the level of risk, the appropriatesecurity measures will be enforced to counterpotential terrorist threats.

Land Transport Security

The security ofSingapore’s landtransport system is acritical issue for allcitizens. Millions ofjourneys are made eachday on Singapore’s railand bus networks. Theeconomy dependssignificantly on theefficiency of this massmovement of people. Itis vital, therefore, forcommuters to beassured that theirregular journeys are notonly fast and efficient,but also safe andprotected. This issomething that theGovernment andtransport operators areworking hard to ensure.

In terms of emergencyresponses, there are

extensive measures to deal with contingencies in theMass Rapid Transit (MRT) network. Agencies such asthe Home Affairs Ministry, the Singapore Police Force,the Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF), the LandTransport Authority and rail operators work closely toformulate detailed response plans. Exercises are heldto test disaster management procedures, and regularsecurity audits are conducted on emergency systems.

Many of the security measures in place at trainstations, such as tightened access to vital premises andthe use of close-circuit television to monitor the MRT

network, wereimplemented as part ofthe security planning forSingapore’s trainsystems. However, theMarch 2004 terroristtrain bombings inMadrid have prompted afurther review of landtransport security inSingapore. Both thePolice and transportoperators will deploysecurity personnel atkey locations. Publicvigilance broadcastmessages and postershave also beenintroduced.

Furthermore, a PublicTransport SecurityCommittee has beenformed to undertake acomprehensive reviewof security arrangements,

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Millions of journeys are made each day onSingapore’s public transport system.

and to recommend and oversee improvements to thesecurity of the public transport system, coveringinfrastructure such as bus interchanges, terminals, MRTstations and depots.

Aviation Security

The Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore and theRepublic of Singapore Air Force will continue theirround-the-clock air defence capability, and remain onthe alert for civilian airliners that may be hijacked foruse as suicide weapons.

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Air defence detachments keep watch overthe security of Singapore’s skies.

Singapore’s status as an international aviation hub isnot just a source of national pride, but is also thefoundation on which much of the economy rests. It isa vital asset that must be well guarded. An AviationSecurity Task Force was established in December 2002to comprehensively review security measures atChangi Airport, on board SIA and SilkAir aircraft, and atoverseas destinations. The Task Force has sincecompleted its work. An ongoing National Civil AviationSecurity Committee will oversee the implementationof the various recommendations and continuemonitoring developments in the global aviationindustry.

Some of the security measures enacted are visible tothe public. At Changi Airport, access to restricted areasof the airport, aircraft and other key installations isguarded and closely monitored. The Police and SAFmount joint patrols of the airport concourse and othersensitive areas. All checked-in baggage is also screenedthrough an in-line baggage screening system.

In the air, Singapore’s two main airlines have moved totighten and control access to the cockpit, and improveawareness in the cockpit of potential terroristsituations. Both carriers have implemented measuressuch as the installation of bullet-proof doors andsurveillance cameras for the cockpit entry area. Themost significant of the in-flight security measures isthe deployment of air marshals on selected SIA andSilkAir flights.

Maritime Security

Since the September 11attacks, securitymeasures in theSingapore Straits andterritorial waters havebeen constantlyreviewed and upgraded.The maritime securityagencies, such as theRepublic of SingaporeNavy (RSN), the PoliceCoast Guard (PCG), andthe Maritime and PortAuthority (MPA)cooperate closely toprotect Singaporeagainst seaborne threats.For example, RSN shipsescort selected high-value merchant vesselsin the Singapore Straitswhile PCG boats haveintensified patrols ofsensitive vessels berthedin our territorial waters.

Among the securitymeasures that have beenimplemented is themarking out of routes forferries, pleasure craft andcommercial vessels tokeep them clear ofsensitive anchorages andinstallations. The

“The global shipping and port industry isan important cog in the machinery ofworld trade. An attack on a port orshipping lane would seriously disrupttrade... Southeast Asia, Singaporeincluded, cannot escape fromsuch threats.”

Minister for Transport Yeo Cheow TongAddressing the International Maritime and Port SecurityConference on 21 January 2003

Government has alsostrengthened security atsea checkpointsincluding the SingaporeCruise Centre and TanahMerah Ferry Terminal,and the waters aroundSembawang Wharves andislands such as PulauBukom.

An integratedsurveillance andinformation network atthe Port OperationsControl Centre, knownas the Vessel TrafficInformation System orVTIS, enables closecooperation between thevarious maritimeagencies. It allows theCentre to monitor andprovide timelyinformation to vesselsplying the SingaporeStraits and territorialwaters.

The Government hasalso set up a MaritimeSecurity Task Force tolook into further ways ofenhancing maritimesecurity and ofpromoting Singapore’sbroader maritime

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(Top) Naval escorts for selected merchant vessels.(Bottom) Inside Singapore’s Port Operations Control Centre.

interests. Singapore can be a useful reference port toother countries keen on strengthening maritimesecurity. For example, we have gone beyond theprovisions laid down by the International MaritimeOrganization to also equip smaller craft withtransponder systems.

RESPONSE

Should terrorist atrocities occur, Singapore must havethe means of responding swiftly to restore the countryto a state of normalcy. Major efforts will range fromthe saving of lives and the mitigation of the immediateeffects of the incident to the broader restoration ofeconomic activity. Emergency agencies, including theSCDF and hospitals, hold frequent exercises to testdisaster processes and procedures.

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Conventional Attacks

(a) Bombing response capabilitiesBombing continues to be the favoured tactic amongterrorists, including those from Al-Qaeda and JemaahIslamiyah. While military and commercial explosiveshave been used in terrorist bombs, stronger controlson access to these explosives have led terrorists toshift towards easily available dual-use materials. Theseinclude ammonium nitrate and potassium chlorate.Suicide bombers are also used to perpetrate these acts.

As bombing is the terror scenario that is most likely tooccur in Singapore, our security agencies have takennote of the changing trends and adjusted our responsesaccordingly. Besides stepping up our detectioncapabilities at Singapore’s border checkpoints, post-blastinvestigation capabilities are also being enhanced.

PIPE BOMBSTerrorists use pipebombs more than anyother kind of bomb.They are easy to make,and can be hiddeninside clothing or cars.Pipe bombs are madefrom iron, steel, copperor aluminium pipesfilled with gunpowder.Sometimes the bombsare encased in acoating of nails tomake them morepotent.

FERTILIZER TRUCKBOMBSThese are powerfulbombs made fromfertilizer materials,comprising mainlyammonium nitrate.These bombs can bepowerful enough todestroy large buildings.

MOLOTOV COCKTAILThese bombs can causea great deal of damage.Explosive substances arepoured into a bottle thatbreaks when thrownagainst any hardsurface. The explosivematerials used might begasoline, diesel fuel,kerosene or methylalcohol. An improvisedfuse is lit before thebottle is thrown.

BAROMETRIC BOMBThis is a moreadvanced type ofexplosive device. Itis activated whenplaced in anairplane or elevatorthat rises to differentaltitudes. The bombis set to arm itselfwhen it reaches acertain pressure.

COMMON TYPES OF EXPLOSIVES

(b) Aircraft HijackingAlthough aircraft hijackings began to lose favouramong terrorists in the last decade, the September 11incident in the United States refocused global counter-terrorism efforts on this tactic. Our security agencieshave stepped up airport security considerably inresponse to this. As part of broader aviation securitymeasures, the Ministry of Home Affairs has establishedan air marshal unit. Members of the unit serve as a last-resort attempt to thwart any hijacking while in flight.

Non-Conventional Attacks

Although less likely than conventional attacks, non-conventional threats by terrorist groups represent oneimportant focus for response agencies. To handle thedangers posed by chemical, biological and radiologicalattacks, the SCDF and SAF have both been steadilybuilding up their capabilities over the years. The Tokyosarin gas incident in 1995 was a major catalyst forcurrent improvements. Today, the SCDF has animmediate response capability to handle chemical andbiological attacks. In January 2003, the existence of

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the SAF CBRE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, andExplosives) Defence Group was revealed as well. TheGroup aims to enhance capabilities against this multi-faceted threat.

Meanwhile, the Defence Science Organization NationalLaboratories (DSO NL) works closely withcounterparts in countries like the United States, Franceand Sweden on CBRE-related research anddevelopment efforts. It also hosts internationalsymposiums to promote the exchange of experiencesamong industry experts on chemical and biologicalagents. The Chemical Verification Laboratory at DSO isonly one of 15 centres worldwide accorded a specialstatus by the Organization for the Prohibition ofChemical Weapons to test samples of suspectedchemical agents.

(a) Chemical Response CapabilitiesChemical weapons use the toxic properties ofchemical substances, rather than any explosiveproperties, to produce physical or physiological effectson targets. In their attacks, terrorists may use chemicalweapons, including mustard gas, sarin or cyanide. TheGovernment has invested heavily in building chemicaldefence capabilities over the years, with valuable workcarried out by the Centre for Chemical Defence andthe Defence Medical and Environmental ResearchInstitute at DSO.

WHAT IS A DIRTY BOMB?

Some fears have been expressed that terroristgroups might resort to the use of “dirtybombs”. This is a common name given todevices that injure and kill through thespread of radiation. A dirty bomb comprisesconventional explosives, such as dynamite,attached to radiological material. When thebomb is detonated, the dynamite acts as adispersal agent, propelling dangerousradiological fragments through the air. Sucha bomb does not constitute a nuclear blast,but the immediate blast may affecthundreds, with many more exposed toradiological contamination.

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BEATING THE NEW THREAT:EXERCISE DIAMOND SHIELD

Ex. Diamond Shield was an integrated incident responseexercise organized to counter both chemical andexplosives threats. Units of the SAF CBRE Defence Groupwere activated to respond to a complex scenariocomprising an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and achemical device. The exercise featured search operationsinvolving robots and chemical detectors, the removal ofthe IED, the decontamination and disposal of the toxicchemical device, and the treatment of chemicalcasualties. In their response to such a complex scenario,the units demonstrated their capabilities to dealeffectively with a range of threats.

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Source: Singapore Press Holdings

(b) Biological Response CapabilitiesThe threat of bio-terrorism has taken a heightenedprofile, as the potential for rogue states or terroristgroups to acquire and use biological weapons such asthe smallpox virus has risen. The United States wentthrough an anthrax terror scare at the end of 2001.Thus far, there has been no specific bio-terrorismthreat against Singapore. Nonetheless, we face highrisks because of our openness and high populationdensity, and must prepare accordingly.

Security agencies are working together withSingapore’s health authorities to develop a nation-widesurveillance and alert system for the early detection ofbiological outbreaks. In addition, as these incidentscould potentially affect large numbers of people, ourmedical authorities have looked into increasing theiremergency treatment capacity to handle a potentialinflux of contagious victims quickly.

(c) Radiological Response CapabilitiesIntelligence assessments indicate that the use of cruderadiological dispersal devices, or “dirty bombs”, may bewithin the current capabilities of terrorist groups.Such attacks may not necessarily cause as manycasualties as biological or chemical attacks. However,they can spark off widespread alarm and mass panic.To counter this threat, the Government has deployedradiation detection equipment at border entry pointsto screen containers and personnel for radiologicalmaterials. Specialized detection and responsecapabilities to deal with radioactive releases will alsobe explored. In addition, the movement of radiologicalmaterials in Singapore is closely regulated andmonitored by the relevant government agencies.

HOW DSO DETECTSANTHRAX SPORES

In the aftermath of the September 11attacks, the United States faced an anthraxscare, in which letters containing harmfulanthrax spores were sent to several publicfigures. Copycat incidents then startedappearing in other countries, includingSingapore. A large number of hoax mail wasdiscovered with suspicious-looking whitepowder which looked like anthrax spores.

With their effective containment andfiltration capabilities, laboratories at DSOare able to handle both chemical andbiological contamination. The suspect lettersand parcels were sent there for biologicalanalysis. DSO researchers were activatedeven at odd hours, in order to conduct swiftchecks of dubious powder found.

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A secure method of handling suspect mail.

LOOKING AHEAD

Beyond the specific steps described, there is more thatcan be done. The various measures listed can determost types of attack. However, as terrorism presents awide spectrum of threats, we need to constantly assesswhat we can improve on, and what we can prepareagainst. We must also continue to build corecapabilities in critical areas of defence, harnessing thebest technologies available. Many of our currentpreventive, protective and response capabilities arebased on good use of the latest technology.For example, information technology played a largepart in the investigation of the JI plot againstSingapore. We were facing IT-savvy terrorists. TheInternal Security Department had to employ ITforensic techniques to penetrate a web of terrorist

data, and useful information was eventually recovered.Through such effective use of technology andtechnical knowledge, Singapore can enhance its edgein the deployment of an advanced national securitystrategy.

The way ahead is clear. Technology specific to thecounter-terrorism programme is one domain where,currently, possibly the greatest potential fordevelopment rests. We must ensure thatimprovements to both security hardware andsoftware are complemented by imaginativeapproaches that constantly explore radically differentand new options.

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NATIONALSECURITY:A NATIONALEFFORT

CHAPTER SIX

PREFACE [A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR SINGAPORE] ONE [CONFRONTING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM]T W O [ S I N G A P O R E ’ S E X P E R I E N C E W I T H T E R R O R I S M ] T H R E E [ T H E N E W S E C U R I T Y E N V I R O N M E N T ]F O U R [ S I N G A P O R E ’ S N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y A R C H I T E C T U R E ] F I V E [ I M P L E M E N T I N G O U R S T R AT E G Y ]S I X [ N AT I O N A L S E C U R I T Y : A N AT I O N A L E F F O RT ]

Defending Singapore is theGovernment’s most fundamental

commitment to its citizens. Whatever thethreat, whatever the time, this task remainscritical to the country’s future security andprosperity. Transnational terrorism has thepotential to hinder Singapore’s journeyforward. It can destroy lives, disrupt theeconomy, and damage our collectiveidentity as a nation.

Our security is threatened because we have adoptedan uncompromising posture on terrorism. Yet, on amore fundamental level, Singapore’s very existencepresents problems for some. Singapore is a target for JIactivity because of its place as part of the DaulahIslamiyah Nusantara - a conception rooted in historyand myth of a pan-Islamic superstate comprising muchof South-east Asia. As long as we remain a secular statethat represents modernity and progress, we will findourselves standing against the extremist visions ofterrorist groups.

Singapore is particularly vulnerable for a variety ofreasons. We have open borders and an open society.

Many American and other multinational corporationsare based here. Millions of tourists visit Singaporeeach year. The economy is heavily dependent oninternational trade carried out through extensive land,air and sea links which must not be disrupted. Thesociety is cosmopolitan, making it easy for infiltration.

Ultimately, the new transnational terrorism does notthreaten Singapore’s very existence as an independent,sovereign nation. Nonetheless, it has the capacity toinflict serious shocks on our economy and society,causing not only material and human damage, but alsopsychological injury. It further has the potential to pitdifferent communities against each other, weakeningthe multi-racial, multi-religious character of Singaporethat is vital to our success.

The national security strategy outlined in thisdocument maps out how Singapore can be defended.It is a comprehensive solution designed to preventterrorist incidents, protect our vulnerabilities, and helpus respond effectively should attacks occur. TheGovernment has shared this with the public to providea common understanding on the threats we face, andthe steps we are taking to confront the challenges ofour times. It serves as a useful framework of referencefor all of us.

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WHAT IS TOTAL DEFENCE?

Many people think of Total Defence as adefence strategy or plan that is rolled out onlyduring times of war. But it is more than that.

Total Defence is about the different things wecan do every day in every sector of oursociety to strengthen our resilience as anation. When we take National Serviceseriously, participate in civil emergencyexercises, upgrade ourselves and learn newskills, build strong bonds with different racesand religions, and feel the pride of beingSingaporean, we contribute to Total Defence.Introduced in 1984, the concept of TotalDefence was adapted from the experiences ofSwitzerland and Sweden. There are tworeasons why we adopted it. First, as a youngnation with a small population, we cannotafford to maintain a regular armed force.Thus, we need to involve every Singaporeanto multiply our defence capability. Second, thenature of modern warfare has changed. Warsare no longer limited to the battlefield.Instead, potential aggressors can strike in lessobvious, non-military ways. The five elementsof Total Defencework together as acomprehensivedefence strategyfor Singapore.

But the battle against terrorism is not that of theGovernment alone. Now, more than ever, Singaporeanscan see how the principles of Total Defence arerelevant and must be applied to this fight. The fivecomponents of Total Defence - Military, Civil,Economic, Social and Psychological Defence - providethe framework for a comprehensive and coherentresponse. We need to muster our collective resilienceand individual strengths to live with terrorism. Thishas to be a united effort against a national threat.

Source: http://www.totaldefence.org.sg

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WHAT IS EPIC?

“EPIC”, short for “Emergency Public Information Centre”, is acentral information dissemination system, available at<www.epic.gov.sg>. EPIC is designed to cater to the public’sneed for official information related to major emergencies ofnationwide impact, such as the collapse of a building or a bigindustrial fire. The public will also be able to obtain security-related information, such as what to do in the event of abomb threat. Information dissemination is made possiblethrough the coordination and integration of news releasesand announcements from the various participatinggovernment agencies.

These are some features offered by the EPIC website:• Useful tips on how to prepare for various contingencies/emergency situations• Search for news of loved ones as a result of a major emergency in Singapore• Be alerted to emergency-related news via email• Search for important hotline numbers in the event of a major emergency and other useful

contact numbers of emergency-related public services

PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT

Since the September 11 attacks and the disclosure ofthe JI plots, the Government has sought to increasepublic understanding of the terrorist threat, andhighlight the roles each of us can play in the safety ofour family, community and nation.

Public preparedness and vigilance are important.What should one do in the event of an emergency?How best do we respond? Where do we go to getmore information? The Ministry of Home Affairs andthe SCDF have programmes to brief households on

Source: http://www.epic.gov.sg

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the critical steps to take in times of emergencies. Inthe event that a catastrophic terrorist incident strikesSingapore, citizens must be ready to respond; theymust be well prepared and well organized.

Beyond fending for themselves and their families,individuals have broader responsibilities. Each of uscan serve as valuable eyes and ears of the nationalsecurity system by looking out for suspicious personsor unattended items at public areas such as MRTstations or the airport.We can report possiblegaps in our defences ifwe spot them.

The contributionswhich one individualcan make should neverbe underestimated. In

December 2001, it was an alert passengeron board a flight from Europe to theUnited States who spotted “shoe bomber”Richard Reid. The passenger’s quick actionprevented a terrible airborne tragedy. Athome, it was through public tips thatauthorities were able to uncover the fullextent of JI’s plots against local targets.

Commercial owners, too, have a duty toprovide security for their respectivebuildings or premises. After theSeptember 11 attacks, the Governmenthardened critical infrastructure and keypublic installations. However, thesemeasures are no guarantee that a terroristattack against civil targets would nothappen in Singapore. The strikes against

nightclubs in Bali, cafes in Casablanca and the MarriottHotel in Jakarta show that terrorists target commercial,retail and entertainment outlets.

The Ministry of Home Affairs and other agencies havebeen briefing building managers on the need to stepup both their security provisions and response plans.However, hard defences alone are barely sufficient. Afundamental change in business mindset is required.Companies must come to see security as an integralissue in their work, and not as a peripheral concern.

They must be proactivein constantly upgradingtheir security andemergency provisions.The necessary steps totake include businesscontinuity planning,disaster planning andsecurity certification.

Security posters on Singapore’s public transport system, remindingcommuters to be vigilant.

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The bombing of the JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in August 2003killed 13 and injured many more.

“I strongly urge our Muslims to. . . speakup against developments whichthreaten the harmony of our multi-racial, multi-religious society. They muststand up against those who advocateintolerance and extremism. They shouldnot allow the extremists and militantsto set the Islamic agenda. They shouldnot accept extremist views propagatedin some other Muslim societies, as thoseare aimed at achieving political goals.”

Prime Minister Goh Chok TongSpeaking at the 2002 National Day Rally on18 August 2002

Singaporeans must also guard against extremistinterpretations of religious teachings.

The continued successand viability ofSingapore restsfundamentally on themulti-racial, multi-religious compact thatforms its cornerstone.In generations past, wewere no stranger toconflicts rooted in race,religion and ideology. Inthe 1950s and 1960s,Singapore was a poorand divided society withvarious groups pullingin different directions.We recall tragicincidents such as the

SOCIAL HARMONY

At a more important level, even if terrorism inflictsproperty or human damage, we cannot let it destroySingapore’s national psyche and sense of nationhood.Crucially, terrorism must not be allowed to breakSingapore’s multi-racial accord and divide Singaporeansalong racial and religious lines. We have to respond asone people, cohesive and determined.

Al-Qaeda and related terrorist groups around the world,including JI, have rationalized their action in the nameof Islam. Fighting Western and other seculargovernments, they seek to overthrow the existinginternational global order and replace it with onebased on an erroneous interpretation of the religion.Transnational terrorism is an elemental strugglebetween competing ideologies. Al-Qaeda, with its anti-modern message,represents intoleranceand extremism. ManyMuslims worldwidehave rejected Al-Qaeda’sviews of jihad and itsperversions of Islam.

How do we in Singaporecounter the divisivemessages from Al-Qaedaand JI? The SingaporeMuslim community hasspoken out stronglyagainst the actions of JI.It is moderate, tolerantand law-abiding, andcondemns the actions ofthe militants. All

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Maria Hertogh Riots of 1950, the Prophet Muhammad’sBirthday Riots of 1964, and the clashes betweencommunist sympathizers and authorities.

But this countrybecame independenton the basis of apeaceful co-existencebetween the races.Through the years,nation-building hasenabled everySingaporean to claimSingapore as a home forall. Living, studying,playing and workingside by side,Singaporeans of allraces and religions have

“We condemn terrorism and will notallow Islam to be misused by anyindividuals or groups for their violentand destructive agendas. The Muslimcommunity has always and will continueto stand united with other fellowSingaporeans to protect this nationagainst terrorism.”

Statement from MUIS (Islamic Religious Council ofSingapore), 10 January 2003

built up mutual understanding and common values.All communities have contributed to Singapore’sdevelopment and progress.

In order to denymilitants any ideologicalspace, Muslims mustspeak out and denouncethose who distort Islam.They have to engage theextremists, from themedia to the mosque tothe madrassah, andassert mainstreamIslamic values.Singapore’s SeniorMinister Lee Kuan Yewhas highlighted thispoint frequently. “The

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Muslim community must play a crucial role,” he said.“Only Muslims can do this to challenge and correctthese perverted interpretations of Islam,” he stressed.

Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong has also emphasizedthat “every community must speak up againstextremist voices that sow racial and religious discordamong Singaporeans.” Extremist elements, he said,sought to determine the agenda for their community,often against its interests, and those of the largersociety. “If you do not disown such views, in time,they will gain legitimacy. Others will also come toassociate these extreme views with the community,and distrust will set in.”

Singaporeans of other faiths have a role too. Theymust be careful not to link acts that are perpetratedby terrorists, whether globally or in Singapore, to thelocal Muslim community and cause them to be

defensive for no reason other than sharing a commonfaith. In their reporting and analysis of such events,journalists can play a key role as well, byunderstanding the local context and reflectingcorrect perspectives in the news media.

Shortly after the September 11 attacks, Singaporeestablished Inter-Racial Confidence Circles (IRCCs) topromote multi-racialism and inter-communalharmony. The IRCCs serve as important platforms forreligious and community leaders to build personaltrust and confidence. Regular interactions will helpbuild mutual rapport between the races, and provideopportunities for parties to address racial andreligious problems on the ground. In announcing thesetting up of the IRCCs in 2002, Prime Minister Gohsaid, “The primary objective is to get our irrationalfears off our chest, and get to know each otherbetter.”

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ROBUST SECURITY, RESILIENT NATION

Our Singapore story is the account of how a smallisland-nation overcame its vulnerabilities andprospered, despite overwhelming odds. Thecomfortable life we enjoy today is built upon thedifficulties of yesterday. Previous generations haveweathered colonialism and the Japanese occupation,and fought against Communism and communalism.Their efforts have not been in vain; modern Singaporestands as a testament to their courage and fortitude.

Today, we find ourselves confronted by the peril oftransnational terrorism. Elements from beyond andwithin are seeking to destroy what we have built.Thus far, we have beaten off the challenges thatthreatened our security. Over the past two years, theGovernment has done much to raise the standardfor security measures in Singapore. It hascomprehensively reviewed areas such as criticalinfrastructure protection and border controls.Beyond implementing robust security measures, ithas focused on shoring up psychological resilience.It is vital that we remain undaunted as a people inthis battle against terrorism, as strong in mind as thecountry is steadfast in purpose.

With an understanding of the trials of our times, wemust be prepared for and geared up to confrontfurther terrorist action. As long as the Governmentstays resolute and the people remain united in thefight against terror, Singapore faces a secure future.Like our forebears, all of us who call this island-nation home must work together to build a lastinglegacy and write another shining chapter in theSingapore story.

“What if the terrorists had succeeded?Supposing the bombs had gone off, andinnocent Singaporeans had been killed.What would have happened to our racialharmony? Then whatever we said aboutthis being the work of a tiny extremistminority, there would have beenheightened distrust and fear among thedifferent communities. We could easilyhave had racial incidents, leading toretaliation and counter-retaliation.Overnight this would undo 40 years ofbuilding a multi-racial society. To forestall this, we set up the IRCCs. If anyterrorist attack should happen, thecommunity and religious leaders in theIRCCs would already have worked witheach other, and built up trust andconfidence in each other. ”

Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien LoongSpeaking at the IRCC Forum on 4 April 2003

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To date, IRCCs have been formed in all 84constituencies in Singapore. The IRCCscomplement the ongoing efforts of many in thecommunity - schools, religious institutions, civicorganizations, corporations - that have workedtirelessly to strengthen community bonding andsocial harmony.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The National Security Coordination Centre would like to thank the many individuals andorganizations who have assisted in the production of this book. NSCC also thanks the

following contributors of images:

Ang Jing MeiGetty Images

Land Transport AuthorityMinistry of Defence

Ministry of Home AffairsNEXUSPioneerReuters

SBS TransitSingapore Civil Defence Force

Singapore Police ForceSingapore Press HoldingsSingapore Tourism Board

SMRT

Every effort has been made to identify and contact copyright holders of the images featured inthis publication. NSCC apologizes if any party has been excluded.