the family today: sociological highlights on an embattled institution

EUROPEAN DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION BULLETIN

Volume XIII 1982 No. 2

THE FAMILY TODAY : SOCIOLOGICAL HIGHLIGHTS

ON AN EMBATTLED INSTITUTION

by

Josef SCHMID

U n i v e r s i t y of Bamberg*

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Family life is the overwhelming experience of Man. No standards of value, attitude and behaviour can hold good throughout society apart from the functions or achievements of the family. No wonder that all societal changes affecting the family are considered with suspicion and usually cause controversies about the family's future. Most debates encompass extreme standpoints of radicals who assume, in view of changes in family structure, the decay of Western civilization, and of those who feel obliged to accelerate the destruction of the institution of the family, in order to free men from a prison which prevents them from realising themselves. These extreme points of view may represent the two sides of one coin and each one takes the importance of the family for granted. The controversial debates appear to be an everlasting battle where ideological points of view are exchanged or a sort of partisanship is practised regardless of any facts.

Moreover there are several "waves" of interest in family studies and they are concomitant with new developments in the social, economic, and ideological spheres of a society with which family life is inevitably bound up. Nowadays, we are confronted with some changes in the life styles of family and in marriage patterns which give rise to the need for an explanation.

What demography, sociology, and social policy are dealing with is not so much the rise of completely unknown phenomena but the increasing occurrence of phenomena that were once rare or single cases and rather thinly scattered over the social scene : unmarried cohabitation, "sucessive polygamy", divorce, desertion, abortion and the like.

The rising occurrence of such phenomena must be the outcome of deep-rooted movements developing as our societies advance and the "operative units" : the people, react in their own ways : for conservatives there is a threat, for radicals, encouragement.

(*) Paper presented at the British Society for Population Studies Conference on Recent Developments in the Population of Europe, University of Exeter, 16-18 September 1981.

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Now, l e t us t u r n to a more s y s t e m a t i c v i e w a n d to some a v a i l a b l e f a c t s to t h r o w l i g h t u p o n t h e E u r o p e a n f a m i l y w h i c h in t h e l a s t d e c a d e c a u s e d much c o n c e r n a n d c o n f u s i o n , fo r s o c i a l s c i e n c e a n d t h e p u b l i c a s w e l l .

I . THE PRE-INDUSTRIAL OR PRE-MODERN FAMILY

1. Concep t

Whenever we speak of "concept" we think of an instrument for understanding a special complex phenomenon and not so much a model covering a11 past or present realities of that kind. The following has to be read in a Weberian sense.

The family in pre-industrial or pre-modern times was characterized by a home-centred, fundamentally agrarian mode of production. The family was the basic unit in the whole economy. The head of the family was equally the owner of the "economy" (i) and also the employer of the members ; the family had an authoritarian structure, backed by cultural, or even religious tradition and work practice : there were clear channels of power from male to female and from parents to children. Although the main responsibility was laid upon the owner, there was a rather sharp division of labour between the owner whose activities concentrated on fields, crops, animals and market trade, and his wife, entrusted with all home-bound work in the kitchen and the supervis{on of children and servants. The prestige and influence of a farmowner's wife was higher than is assumed in some contemporary feminist l i t e r a t u r e .

2. The meaning of the pre-modern family to the individual

To the individual member of the family, which encompassed also persons with only occupational ties beyond the regular consanguinous ones, the family represented the source of occupational skills, and of basic education, employment, nutrition and, in a wide sense, protection, an early form of "social security". The traditional standards of work and views governed everyone's life and relationships. Individual wishes and goals were usually subordinated to those of the kin or the "familial production community", notwithstanding the arbitrariness this may have meant on occasion. The socialization process of pre-modern man was likely to endow him with the subconscious fear of giving way too much to h-is own drives which would only endanger his survival.

3. The pre-modern family as "multifunctiona1" and "extended"

In terms of a "Social System Approach" the pre-modern (agrarian) family must be seen as "multifunctiona1", i.e. it embraced all functions necessary to maintain a system in its existence and to satisfy the needs of the individual members : socialization of the young, adaptation to cultural tradition and occupational skills, reproduction and maintenance of life and the satisfaction of emotional and physical needs - embedded in a historical frame.

(i) In German this term ("Wirtschaft") is still used to denote the farmstead.

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The family guaranteed survival ; outside the family, the existence of the individual showed a touch of marginality, excepting lifelong army service. But even for those employed in early handicrafts service in a household meant entering a family group which provided the necessities of life.

It is evident that social development will diminish family functions in number and, moreover, some of them also in intensity.

The concept of the pre-modern family clung for a long time to the stereotype of an "extended" or "large family" ("Gross-familie"). The dichotomy of the ancient extended vs. today's nuclear family constituted a commonly accepted interpretation of the historical perspective.

4. New findings of historical demography

The typification method seemed to have found its valid and illustrative paradigma, but historical demography and family research continue to correct the simple picture of a static peasant family which produced much offspring to obtain helping hands with their parents' work as soon as they were physically able to do so and, consequently, created the phenomenon of "extension". The results of recent research led to the following remarkable points (i) :

-The term "family" is highly questionable in view of the wide variety of forms of communal living in pre-industrial times. Research finds itself in a blind alley when it looks for the family in the modern sense, because

-the subject of analysis should be "life under one roof", common activities, and - among others - relations by blood and marriage.

-The number of children, heavily restricted by infant mortality, did not exceed 4 on the average.

- The agrarian household or "houseful" (Laslett), or "das ganze Haus" (W.-H. Riehl & O. Brunner) formed a "co-resident domestic group" (Laslett) which showed a considerable occupational mobility : servants stayed no longer than 2 years.

Although historical demography and family research are very active and successful in revising and differentiating old simplifications about the old family, the transformations caused by the industrial revolution affected both the form and the essential nature of the family so deeply that the construction of a contrasting dichotomy seems reasonable. A look back into the past will justify the picture of the pre-modern family as a rather

(i) Literature : P. Laslett & R. Wall (eds.), Household and Family in Past Time, Cambridge, 1972 (esp. Introduction by P. Laslett) ; J. Hajnal, "European Marriage Patterns in Perspective", in D. Glass & D.E.C. Eversley (eds.), Populafion in History : Essays in Historical Demogra- phy, London, 1965; H.-V. Wehler (Hsg.), Historische Familienforschung und Demographie, Geschichte und Gesellschaft (i), 2/3, 1975 (particularly : M. Mitterauer, "Familiengr~sse - Familientypen - Familienzyklus", ibid.) ; R.D. Lee (ed.), Population Patterns in the Past, New York - London, 1977 (cf. its review by D.E.C. Eversley in Demography, vol. 14, n o 4, 1977, pp. 539-548).

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w e l l - d e f i n e d e n t i t y of a b y g o n e a g e , o r a t l e a s t , a s a r e l a t i v e l y c losed sys t em w h i c h a s c r i b e s s t a t u s on g r o u n d s of d e s c e n t , a n d t h u s of an immobi le and feudal stratification.

II. THE "MAKING" OF THE NUCLEAR FAMILY

1. The concep t

Industrialization lessened the importance of land ownership and increased that of capital and of educational level. New facilities for earning one's living reduced the importance of common work on common local grounds and diluted the role of the father. He no longer deserved unconditional respect and gratitude, because he was no longer the proprietor of the "means of production" who could ensure an appropriate education.

Moreover, liberalism intruded into family life and emphasized indivi- dualistic goals and the responsibility for one's own fate in the course of life. That means a turning away from matchmaking on purely material grounds (and its arrangement by parents) and the rise of "romantic love", or, at least, mutual sympathy and liking as the prime cause for entering a marriage. Under those ideological conditions the relationship between parents and children is put to a new test.

Efficiency of industrial production needs highly skilled and flexible manpower and asks for personal abilities and no longer for an ascriptive status by birth. Personal success and upward mobility depend more on one's individual achievements in educational institutions, controlled not by the family but by society. This marks a shift from the child as a helping hand to the child as a subject for ever increasing investments. The reversal of the "intergenerational flow of resources", from parents to children, as Caldwell put it (i), boosts the cost of children, diminishes their benefits to parents and, therefore, gives way to an increase in birth control.

The conviction that only a small family may sufficiently enjoy the pleasures of an affluent society brought into existence the nuclear or conjugal family as the predominant pattern.

Thi s r a t h e r t h e o r e t i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n of the c h a n g e of f ami ly s t r u c t u r e d u r i n g the i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n i s b a s e d on German s o u r c e s b u t i t a p p e a r s to c o n s t i t u t e a n i n s i g h t common to the whole s o c i a l s c i e n t i f i c c o m m u n i t y .

The historical perspective in categorical terms may be shown as in Table 1 (below).

2. Towards a redefinition of "family" under modern conditions

Some hints for a redefinition of the family are implied in Table 1 : the nuclear or conjugal family, often simply called the modern family, consists only of the married couple and their immature offspring.

(I) J.C. Caldwell, "A Theory of Fertility : From High Plateau to Desta- bilization", Population and Development Review, vol. 4, ~, Dec. 1978.

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Table 1

Extended f a m i l i e s N u c l e a r / c o n j u g a l f a m i l i e s

Based on blood ties (and common activities around a farmstead)

Allegiance to one's blood kin (and to a "house" ("Haus") do- minated by it)

Patrilocal or matrilocal residence

Patriarchal (or matriarchal) power

Patrilineal or matrilineal (inheritance from ancestors on the father's or mother's side)

() applies to unmarried permanent servants and relatives

Based on m a r r i a g e t i e s

A l l e g i a n c e to o n e ' s s p o u s e

Neolocal residence

Egalitarian power

Bilateral descent (children inherit from both sides)

Source : a d a p t e d from L. D u b e r m a n & D.A. H a r t j e n , Sociology : Fo- cus on Soc ie ty , Glencoe , I I 1 . , 1979, p . 182.

The d e f i n i t i o n s of t he f a m i l y were o u t l i n e d t h r e e d e c a d e s ago , d o u b t l e s s l y u n d e r t he i n f l u e n c e of G.P . M u r d o c k ' s f u n d a m e n t a l a n a l y t i c f rame (1 ) . Much work w a s done i n t he f o l l o w i n g y e a r s to con f i rm the n u c l e a r f ami ly as be ing " u n i v e r s a l " . Moreove r , the p r e o c c u p a t i o n wi th the d e f i n i t i o n a n d n a t u r e of the n u c l e a r f a m i l y were u s e f u l fo r s e v e r a l p u r p o s e s .

F i r s t l y a s the c o n c e p t of an i n s t i t u t i o n t h a t p r o v e d to be the most d u r a b l e in the h i s t o r y of m a n k i n d a n d , in a c e r t a i n s e n s e , a " u n i v e r s a l " one (2 ) . The c o n f u s i n g s u b j e c t of the f a m i l y v a r y i n g wi th t ime a n d c u l t u r e cou ld be r e d u c e d to i t s core f u n c t i o n s a n d a p p e a r e d a s a n a b s t r a c t i o n of o r g a n i z e d h a b i t s a n d w a y s of m a r r y i n g a n d c h i l d b e a r i n g t h r o u g h o u t a l l a g e s of h i s t o r y .

Second ly , the c o n c e p t of t he n u c l e a r f ami ly b e s t r e v e a l s f a m i l y f u n c t i o n s a s a p r e r e q u i s i t e of a d v a n c e d i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s , much in t une w i th the r e q u i r e m e n t s of m ode rn l i f e , i . e . i t s work s t y l e , i t s c o n s u m p t i o n a n d r e c r e a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . T h e r e f o r e , the concept may be a n a d e q u a t e i l l u s - t r a t i o n of the c o n t e m p o r a r y f a m i l i a l r e a l i t y .

Let us h a v e a look a t s e l ec t ed d e f i n i t i o n s :

- L . D u b e r m a n a n d D.A. H a r t j e n de f i ne f ami ly as "a u n i v e r s a l i n s t i t u t i o n whose most i m p o r t a n t f u n c t i o n s a r e s o c i a l i z i n g a n d n u r t u r i n g the y o u n g e r g e n e r a t i o n " (3) ;

(1) G.P. Murdock , Socia l S t r u c t u r e , New York, 1949.

(2) R. E i c k e l p a s c h , " I s t d ie K e r n f a m i l i e u n i v e r s a l ?" , Z e i t s c h r i f t ffir Sozio- log ie , Vol. 3, n o 4, 1974, p p . 323-338.

(3) L. D u b e r m a n & D.A. H a r t j e n , Soc io logy , Glencoe, I I1 . , 1979, p . 174.

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-]. Victor Baldridge determines the nuclear family as consisting of "two or more persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption" (i).

Definitions of that kind show the deficiency of the "basic unit"-concept of the nuclear family. This becomes evident when social preconditions of family life such as marriage and stratumbound patterns of arranging one's life course must be brought into account.

Table 2. Difference between the concepts of marriase and the family by social-demographic criteria (2)

Marriage Family

i. Usually initiated by ceremony

2. It involves two people

3. Ages of the individuals tend to be similar

g. Individuals choose each other

5. Ends when one spouse dies

i. Public ceremony not essential

2. It involves three or more people

3. Individuals are of varying ages, more than one generation

g. Children do not choose, they are born or adopted into the unit

5. Continues when one spouse dies

A further step brings us deeper into the social field : we must discern between the "family of orientation .... that rears us and gives us our basic orientation to our life", and the "family of procreation" which a married pair begins with the birth of their first child and which, in turn, will become their child's family of orientation.

Socialization, education and aspiration levels are formed by the orientation family and it proves its power when grown-up children move into their procreation family, according to patterns that show "homogamy", meaning marriage to someone who possesses traits and characteristics similar to oneself.

Broader definitions show the family involved in the whole social setting and allow a comprehensive view of the status and problems of the family.

Baldridge goes beyond deficient and abstract definitions by stating that

"a family is a long-term association of adults whose major concerns are emotional and economic support of one another, procreation of children, training of children, and the transmission of goods and culture from one generation to the next." (3)

(i) J.V. Baldridge, Sociolosy : A Critical Approach to Power, Conflict, and Chan~e, New York, etc., 1980, p. 21g.

(2) D. Knox, Exploring Marriase and the Family, Glencoe, Ill., 1979, p. iO.

(3) ].V. Baldridge, ibid.

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The Third Report on the Situation of the Family prepared for the Federal Republic's Government ("Dritter Familienbericht") contains a chapter on "Definition and Tasks of the Family", and its statements on how to define family are very cautious : "Family", it is said, comes into being "if a marriage grows by birth or adoption of children and forms a small group of persons living together" (i). The Report lays stress upon the fact that the definition is only applied to the "normal" or complete family and by no means to the numerous deviant cases ranging from single-parent families to households maintained by relatives.

Incidentally, the German "Kommission" echoes in the Report the view of the "Union Internationale des Organismes Familiaux" (Paris), which finds in the family the acknowledged basic unit in a11 societies, but refuses to release a normative and always valid definition of family as "neither possible nor desirable". Family structures vary according to culture and stage of social development (2).

When the former US President Carter in 1976 tried to convene a White House Conference on the family in order to explore governmental policy measures, the early planning meetings dealt superficially with the definition of the term "family" and had to be prepared for objections to the topic itself on the grounds that family values and attitudes were a private matter, and not a suitable subject for public discussion. In the subsequent papers, the original term "family" became "families" to emphasize pluralism and the diversi{y among family units (3).

3. Changing norms

We found out that the structure of the family is as diverse and varied as culture itself. Therefore, conservative or moral fixations about the nature of the family are always in trouble with reality. The cleavage between beliefs or norms, on the one side, and actions and facts, on the other, indicates social change and sometimes at a faster pace as the adaptive forces for renewing the cultural superstructure are able to exert themselves. A remarkable gap between family norms and family life as it exists is demonstrated in the face of two traditional prescriptions :

i. Sexual relations are a11owed only between married couples ; ii. Marriage is considered to be lifelong and unbreakable.

Beginning with the decade of the 196Os sexual norms have been gradually liberalized, especially as regards premarital sex, so that entering a marriage only for sexual reasons became unnecessary and foolish.

Another source of change is the dramatic influx of women into the labour force which altered stereotyped sex roles ; furthermore, increased education of women opened the way to the growth of identity and self-esteem outside a family framework.

(i) Die Lage der Familien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Dritter Fa- milienbericht (Bericht der Sachverst~ndigenkommission der Bundesregie- rung), Bonn, 1979, p. 13.

(2) 9~ % of the complete families in the FRG are equally "households" (ibid., p. 15).

(3) J. Gernard, "Facing the Future", Society, Vol. 18, n ~ 2, 1981, p. 58.

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Working wives provoke several changes in a nuclear family ; at first a more egalitarian division of labour meaning an increasing involvement of the husband in activities once exclusively reserved for the female sex role (kitchen, children, cleaning up). There may be a movement towards an androgynous marriage with "no stereotyped behavioural differences between the roles of males and females on the basis of their sex alone" (i).

Closely related with the trend to sexual equality is the concept of open marriage. The basic idea is that the mutual encouragement of the partners "to develop their personality" pays off better than the jealous attempt to possess or control each other. This family style may get into difficulties over the question of acceptance of extra-marital sex and the fact that the compulsive "search for personal growth" ("Selbstverwirklichung") may become as annoying and stress-provoking as boredom in marital routine may do. Open marriage seems to be a rather ephemeral phenomenon and appropriate for an experimental phase at an early stage of the life cycle : "Some open marriages are little more than the gradual drifting apart of two people who grow in different directions" (2).

As to the second point where a gap between desirability and reality is too obvious, that is in the idea of an unbreakable marriage, much concern is voiced. It is linked with the previously mentioned arguments, and could be explained by the continuing secularization process which put an end to marriage as a religious bond, by the rise of new roles which are offered to women, notwithstanding the impact of liberalism on our values which include more stress on individuality, personal happiness and success. Summing up the normative trends over the last two decades one can find that societies became more permissive and liberal about sexuality as was demonstrated in open discussions and displays in the mass media. They suggest new attitudes toward sexual pleasure that should be at everyone's disposal and they call for more tolerance of such topics as premarital sex, adultery, sexual deviance, abortion, and voluntary childlessness. The changes in sexual values towards a greater "progressiveness" may be i11ustrated by the results of a Dutch survey (see Table 3).

Ill. ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL FAMILY LIFE

Contemporary advanced society confronts the individual with new claims and options. The complete or "normal" nuclear family which had replaced the extended family of former periods comes under stress as society continues to grow and to modernize its parts. The increase of leisure time, social security and the enlargement of personal choices raised the aspiration and expectation levels of people. Even a pessimistic outlook on the economic future of industrial societies will hardly suspend the overriding "pleasure principle" according to which people seem to act.

Those who argue on grounds of a post-industrial society postulate a "hedonistic culture" furthering a "what's-in-it-for-me"-attitude and an escape

(i) I.D. Osofsky & H.]. Osofsky, "Androgyny as a Life Style", Family Coordi- nator, Vol. 21, n o 4, 1972, pp. ~ll-g18.

(2) ].W. Coleman & D.R. Cressey, Social Problems, New York, 1980, p. 139.

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Table 3 : Cultural changes regarding marriage, the family, sexuality (The Netherlands, 1965-1974)

Question on : Proportion of respondents giving

a progressive answer

1965 1966 1968 1970 1974 (a)

I. The way children should address their parents 31.1 31.5 - &6.3 48.9

2. Whether a girl should remain a virgin until marriage 27.0 31.7 - 62.0 61.8

3. The acceptability of an in- fidelity on the part of the husband 20.3 - - 45.5 48.8

4. The conditions under which abortion should be allowed - - 58.0 79.2 85.2

5. The acceptability of voluntary childlessness 21.8 27.2 - 59.4 64.7

6. The participation in the labour force of married women With schoolgoing children 17.9 - - 55.4 69.8

7. The tolerance in respect of h o m o s e x u a l s - - 56 .4 69.1 83 .8

N - s i z e of s a m p l e 1302 121g 1274 1593 623

(a) Non-response reported to be unusually low.

Source : C.P. Middendorp, 1974, 1975 ; op. cit. in D.J. Van de Kaa, "Recent Trends in Fertility in Western ~urope", in R.W. Hiorns (4d.), Demographic Patterns in Developed Societies, London, Tay- lor and Francis, 1980, p. 77.

from toil and trouble. Under such conditions, conventional marriage and family with its balance of rewards and indispensable duties will increasingly be submitted to correcting movements. In this category all arrangements are aimed at getting rid of obligations that mean a constraint of one's own perspectives.

As far as marriage and family life are concerned it comprehends the following phenomena :

i. the single state

2. cohabitation

3. divorce

4. desertion.

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I. The single state

Reports of an ever-growing proportion of people staying single come in from nearly all advanced societies. The assumption of an increasing proportion of single people may be substantiated by the obvious decline of marriage rates in Western Europe since 1970 with relatively constant cohorts of persons in the average age at marriage groups. But it is difficult to determine exactly the proportion of people who choose never to marry, for the extended periods of education and training and the desire to find one's place in the labour market will, automatically, postpone the age at marriage and produce a growing number of people still in the single state. A considerable proportion of them will eventually marry.

Table 4. Unmarried Germans, 24 years of a~e (in (%)

Year Men Women

1970 52 22 1977 62 33

Source : K. Schwarz, Demographic ma%erials, Wiesbaden, 1980 (unpublished manuscrip%).

In spite of the objections to premature judgements on the extent of the single state in a birth cohort or a society, we can assume that marriage rates are falling (in the FRG from 9.4 in 1960 to 5.4 in 1978) not only for purely demographic (age structure) reasons or postponement of marriage but also, as sample surveys of the younger generation confirm, because of a lessening inclination to marry. According to societal trends, whereby more women become financially independent and sexual norms become more permissive, the proportion of people choosing never to marry will continue to grow (i).

2. C o h a b i t a t i o n

Cohabitation or two persons of opposite sex living together without being married became widespread during the last decade. It has long been known in the case of elderly persons whose pensions would be reduced if they were to marry. What, however, has created some disturbance is the living together of the younger adults.

Living together has become a lifestyle which tries to combine the pleasures of marriage and celibate fancies. The question is : to what extent is cohabitation a preparation for marriage and, therefore, a temporary phenomenon ? And how is one to estimate and evaluate the state of living together, durable and by mutual decision ?

In any event, lasting cohabitation is increasing and the temporary variety emerges even faster and incorporates more and mbre sexual relationships of different kinds. Left in the lurch by the public bureaux of

(i) P.]. Stein, Single, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1976.

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statistics, demographers and sociologists must mobilize their empirical inventiveness to get records and results, however vague.

The forerunners in cohabitation are the Scandinavian states, Denmark and Sweden, followed during the 7O's by the United States, the Netherlands, France and Belgium (i).

The results of surveys on cohabitation are rather selective and allow hardly conclusions applicable to the whole society. In the USA cohabitation has mostly been studied in college and university areas where $$ per cent of the students admitted to ever having lived together with someone of the opposite sex (2).

Altogether, there are more than 2 million couples in the USA in cohabitation (3). According to Strayer, Heiden and Robert, seven per cent cohabited in the Netherlands in 1979. Roussel shows figures on cohabitation in France, where in 1977 a sample of men and women aged 18-28 was studied. Among those marrying in 1976-77, 44 per cent cohabited before marriage whereas of marriages which took place between 1968-69 only 17 per cent were preceded by cohabitation. Roussel and particularly Festy found a declining propensity to marry among women between 21-24 which, surely, will lead to substitution of marriage by cohabitation. In Sweden, there exists high tolerance of cohabitation. Almost all Iii unmarried couples interviewed by J. Trost denied any pressure from parents or relatives to get married. As Roussel states, France is in a period of change, because cohabitation is deviant, but it occurs frequently. K. Pohl surveyed 240 German women living together with a male friend. 50 per cent of them confessed to having difficulties with neighbours and 40 per cent felt difficulties with relatives. Much speculation has turned on the "career" of cohabitation : how often does it end in marriage, how often is it ended by separation or death ? The Swedish are able to produce "an educated guess.., that more than half of the cohabitations starting as cohabitations under marriage-like conditions will end in a marriage and thus less than half will end in separation or death of one of the spouses" (4).

(I) R.R. Clayton & H.L. Voss, "Shacking Up - Cohabitation in the 1970's", J. of Marriage and the Family, Vol. $9, 1977, pp. 273-283 ; P. Festy, "The New Context of Marriage in Western Europe", Population and Devel- opment Review, Vol. 6, n ~ 2, June 1980, pp. 311-315 ; P.C. Glick & A.J. Norton, "Marrying, Divorcing, and Living Together in the USA Today", Population Bulletin, 32, n ~ 5, 1977 (Pop. Ref. Bureau) ; K. Pohl, "Marriages without marriage certificates - Results of an enquiry with 18-28 years old women conducted in 1978 by order of the Federal Institute for Population Research (BIB)", BIB, Materialien zur Bev~Ikerungswissen- schaft, n o 15, Wiesbaden, 1980 ; L. Roussel, "La cohabitation juv@nile en France", Population, Vol. 33, 1978, n o I, pp. 15-42 ; C.J. Straver, A.M. v.d. Heiden & W.C.J. Robert, Tweerelaties, anders dan her huwelijk ? (Relations between two people other than marriage ?), Alphen, Netherl., 1980 ; J. Trost, Unmarried Cohabitation, V~steras, Sweden, 1979.

(2) D.J. Peterman et al., "A Comparison of Cohabiting and Non-cohabiting College Students", J. of Marriage and the Family, Vol. 36, 1974, pp. 344-354.

(3) Ch. Westoff, "The Predictability of Fertility in Developed Countries", Population Bulletin of the UN, n ~ ii, 1978.

(4) ]. Trost, op.cit., p. 173.

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Most of the latter group is attributable, without doubt, to separation and the mean duration of a cohabiting union will throw light on what is called "successive polygamy".

But even in the cases where cohabitation is a mere prelude to marriage the consequences for the nuptiality of a population are obvious : the incidence of never-married women and men 20-24 years old may steadily rise to a higher ratio and it may postpone the age at first birth for women in a country like Germany where children outside a marriage are not considered desirable.

As to personal development and societal needs, cohabitation could deserve more discussion. For instance young people tend to enter cohabitation in order to be taken seriously earlier by adults and treated equally. Conspicuous premarital sex appears to be a means to get rid of one's awkward half-grown status.

The psychologist Uri Bronfenbrenner argues that cohabitation is weakening the family and the sense of obligation in love and work relationships : "In sleeping together you don't develop those commitments" (1).

3- Divorce

In all advanced countries, there is great concern about the prevalence of divorce. Particularly in the last two decades it has grown to disconcerting proportions : in the USA it rose to 45 per cent between 1970 and 1975 and has now reached a level where at least one of every two marriages will be dissolved sooner or later. In Sweden, the number of divorces tripled over the decade ending in 1975 (2).

Table 5. Divorce in the Federal Republic of German}, (3)

per per iO,000 Year Numbers i0,000 existing

marriages

1965 59 039 10.0 39.2 1970 76 520 12.6 50.9 1975 106 829 15.9 62.4 1976 108 258 17.5 68.8 1977 74 658 12.2 47.7 1978 32 462 5.3 20.8 1979 79 490 13.0 51.0

(i) Quot. in Baldridge, op.cit., p. 228.

(2) Ch. Westoff, ibid., p. 4.

(3) Ch. HOhn, "Rechtliche und demographische Einfl(~sse auf die Entwicklung der Ehescheidungen seit 1946" (Legal and Demographic Influences on the Trend of Divorces Since 1946), Zeitschrift fdr BevDlkerungswissenschaft, nr. 3/4, 1980, pp. 335-371.

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The Federal Republic of Germany may represent an interesting case : there the divorce rate has been climbing steadily from 1963 onwards (1963 : 8.8 per iO,OOO ; 1976 : 17.5) and showed a sharp decline in the years 1977 and 1978 in the course of the reform of the marriage and family law of July 1977 which made divorce subject to a new rule ; it substituted for the old "guilt principle" a "disruption principle" and, therefore, complicated the legal procedures. The drop was due to a "wait and see" attitude in view of the new legal difficulties but could not lessen or reverse the propensity to divorce.

Divorce rates are recovering at an accelerating pace and rose from 5.3 (to IO,OOO) in 1978 to 13.O in 1979 (i). Trends in divorce are better analyzed according to rates by duration of marriage, by marriage cohorts, the number of children involved or by other socio-demographic or socio-cultural characteristics but, nowadays, all point to the upward trend. N. Ryder countered the uproar on rising divorce rates by the assertion, that "the burden of proof has shifted from what the individual can do for the family to what the family can do for the individual.., divorce is the understandable consequence of making the satisfaction of the individual the test of a good marriage" (2). Some findings in an evaluative study on divorce in Germany by K. Schwarz allow the assumption that divorce tends to become a correction of one's personally defined environment and that women are increasingly able to determine it : 58 per cent of the divorces in 1979 were initiated by women. Opinion polls confirm a high aspiration level of women towards an "intact marriage and family life". Women are to a lesser degree content with their marriage life than the husbands. At the third survey of a given sample (197~) only 50 per cent of women would marry the same partner again, wheras 80 per cent of men would choose their wife (3)- The results demonstrate the growing difficulties of men in meeting or understanding the preferences of women, but a growing willingness of women to look critically at their situation and to alter it.

Divorce has made it more likely that low fertility will persist. After six years of marriage in Germany, only 50 per cent of the expected children were born. The proportion of children affected by divorce ("Scheidungswaisen", orphans by divorce) has diminished as a result of a declining birth rate in the particular age group at risk (4).

As to divorce, Germany seems to enter a transitional period. In public opinion, divorce is seen as a deplorable event, but it occurs more and more frequently. The idea that divorce is a "functional prerequisite" to preserve marriage and family as an institution is questioned sometimes by practitio- ners of social work and youth and family counselling. Divorce, then, does not always entail a remarriage that bestows on divorce the character of an easy transition from a restricting and corrosive situation to a happier one.

(i) Ch. H~Shn, ibid.

(2) N.B. Ryder, "The Future of American Fertility", Social Problems, Vol. 26, n o 3, 1979, p. 365.

(3) Opinion poll conducted by the Allensbach Institute 1977 : ~ i n K. Schwarz, Materialien zu Eheschliessun~en und Ehel~Ssungen, Wiesbaden, 1981.

(4) According to P.C. G1ick, a third of a11 children in the United States will spend a significant amount of time with a divorced or separated parent ; of. Ch. Westoff, op.cit.

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There may also arise costs of liquidating the old partnership and arranging one's life anew, that could outweigh the benefits of divorce. It is always bound up with a material and emotional friction burden calling for administrative measures and social services.

~. Desertion

A phenomenon that deserves increasing attention is desertion : an informal way of ending a marriage. Ironically, desertion is said to be the divorce of the poor little man. The husband is more likely to abandon or "desert" the family home without leaving any address because he is less hesitant about leaving his children compared to a woman (i). There may be some prejudice hidden in that assertion, because some others estimate the "runaway wives" as high in number as male desertion rates.

The informal nature of the phenomenon and the prevalence of legal categories in social statistics and research is the cause of the lack of reliable data on desertion. In the USA it is supposed to range from IOO,OOO per year to four times that number. Some hints are given by family welfare and aid organizations for dependent children and the few studies are too patchy to encompass the whole problem. In Philadelphia desertions were twice the number of regular divorces (2). One presumes that in the USA desertion rates outnumber in incidence the divorces because of the incapacity of the authorities to control the residence and mobility of people effectively. For Eur9pe we have no base points for reckoning the extent of desertion. Some light may be shed on the causes of desertion because they very often overlap with those of legal separation. Desertion is reported to be "due to a piling up of adverse factors" (3) such as early marriage, premarital pregnancy, an oppressive and destructive atmosphere at home, disillusion about married life, lack of communication and shared tasks (as put in footnote I), sexual problems, addiction to alcohol or drugs, and idleness.

Social research is in difficulties due to the fact that many couples have these symptoms without ever deserting each other. Some scientists are about to look for characterising explanations : people are driven to escape by a11eged unsupportable difficulties : "The fact some men deserted at pregnancy just as they do at unemployment or some other unfavourable condition would tend to show that desertion may become a habit of escape from any disconcerting situation" (4).

It seems it is a permanent challenge for research to discover the answer to the question why some people remain'with their families on grounds of a "nobody-is-perfect-philosophy", and others desert.

(I) A reason for desertion may be the existence of a purely maternalistic home where the husband has no chance to find a role with the exception of that of a bread-winner.

(2) W.M. Kephart & Th.P. Monahan, "Divorce and Desertion in Philadelphia", Amer. Sociol. Review, Vol. 17, 1952, pp. 719-727.

(3) Cf. the early study by D. O'Rourke, "Fifty Family Deserters'(...) 1931", in R. SchDnauer, "Desertion : Eine Analyse der familiensoziologischen Literatur", BIB - Materialien zur Bev~Ikerungswissenschaft, Nr 20, Wies- baden, 1981.

(4) D. O'Rourke, in R. Sch~nauer, op.cit., p. 52.

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IV. REPRODUCTION AND BIRTH CONTROL

i. Reproductive patterns

The low fertility pattern in advanced societies appears to be the paramount precondition for the strange "libertarianism" in contemporary marital and familial matters.

Table 6. Total fertility rates (per iOO women) from 1965 to 1979

Country 1965 1975 1979

Australia 268 184 162 Belgium 254 174 170 Denmark 261 192 160 France 283 193 186 F. R. of Germany 251 145 137 Netherlands 304 166 157 Norway 293 199 175 Sweden 241 178 165 Switzerland 261 160 150 United Kingdom 286 182 188 (1)

Source : Council of Europe, "Recent Demographic Developments in the Member States of the Council of Europe, 1980 edition", CAHED 55 (80) rev., Strasbourg, 1980.

The drop of Eu ropean f e r t i l i t y (total f e r t i l i t y r a t e s , Tab le 6) p r o g r e s s e s wi th a s t o n i s h i n g e v e n n e s s a n d then u n d e r l i n e s the o v e r r i d i n g e f fec t s of a social order which is very similar in the countries concerned. But in order to mention fertility decline or birth decline some remarks seem necessary.

Looking back on the demographic history of Europe during the industrial revolution we find a "secular birth decline" brought about in a long wave of about a hundred years by the steady improvement of the conditions of life and, concomitantly, the motivation to limit the family size.

The "secular" birth decline stopped appreciably above the replacement level until the period after World War If. What confronts us in the last 20 years is a "renewed birth decline" with its own properties. Notwithstanding the causes of birth decline, sufficiently well known and not worth being reported here again, we should note the following :

i. The "new" low ferti]ity syndrome, staggering in its extent, expresses a change in attitude induced by the reorganization of productive forces, labour conditions, and improved social security (Table 7).

(i) Cf. W. Taylor, "Births in the U.K. in 1978 : Is the Decline Over ?", Research in Reproduction, Vol. II, Nr 2, March 1979.

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Table 7. Two views of the family and parenting

The Traditionalists The New Breed

P a r e n t s a r e c h i l d - o r i e n t e d - r e a d y to s a c r i f i c e t h e i r c h i l d r e n

P a r e n t s w a n t t h e i r c h i l d r e n to be o u t s t a n d i n g

P a r e n t s w a n t to b e i n c h a r g e - b e l i e v e p a r e n t s s h o u l d make decisions for their children

Parents respect authority

Parents are not permissive with their children

Parents believe boys and girls should be raised differently

Parents believe old-fashioned upbringing is best

Parents see having children as a very important value

Parents are self-oriented - not ready to sacrifice their children

Parents don't push their children

Parents have a laissez-faire attitude - children should be free to make their own decisions

Parents question authority

Parents are permissive with their children

Parents believe boys and girls should be raised alike

Parents believe their children have no future obligation to them

Parents see having children as an option, not a social responsibility

Source : Adapted from G. Mills, "Raising Children in a Changing Society (Minneapolis, 1977)", in D. Knox, Exploring Marriage and the Family, Glencoe, Ill., 1979, p. g60.

ii. The renewed fertility decline, however, does not correspond to long-run processes of societal evolution as the "secular" one did but, rather, to short-run "competitive success patterns" to which people have been submitted in advanced societies.

iii. Reproductive decisions correspond no longer to the conventional differentials like social stratum, residence, occupation and religious affiliation. More revealing are questions on how people accept the manifold options of advanced and affluent societies and how they manage to harmonize individual strivings with partnership and child- rearing.

iv. It would be misguided to study the renewed fertility decline on grounds of macro-sociological or institutional movements ; reproductive decisions must be examined against the background of individually structured family life and personal prospects.

On an aggregate level, fertility is characterized by unpredictable fluctuations around very low rates ; - on a family level by an ever

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shrinking total family size and the timing of births and birth intervals in the context of life cycles. In Germany, some attention is drawn to increasing "late births" of women of about 30 years or more who felt a desire for a child after having undergone some experience in the labour force or even a professional career.

Table 8. Final family size of marriages contracted in 1946 to 1977, Federal Republic of Germany*

Marriages with.., children (%) Children Marriage per i00 Cohort none 1 2 3 4+ marriages

1946-1950 13 26 30 17 14 207 1951-1955 13 25 31 17 14 205 1958-1962 13 22 36 19 I0 200 1963-1967 (a) 13 26 40 15 6 185 1968-1972 (a) 17 29 36 13 5 160

Necessary to maintain replacement (estimates) i0 I0 35 40 5 (b) 225

* Results of the 1970 Census and Microcensus. German couples only including children of eventual prior marriages.

(a) Births later than 1978 estimated. (b) Assuming that there will be only very few marriages with 5 and more children.

Source : C. H~Shn & K. Schwarz, "Demographische Lage", in BevOlkerungsent- wicklung und nachwachsende Generation. Schriftenreihe des Bundes- ministers for Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit, Band 93, Kohlham- met.

Shrinking family size (as seen in Table 8) means an increase in childlessness, a cluster around first and second births and, at the same time, a gradual vanishing of fourth (or even third) order births and more.

The social implications of the loss in fertility for family life are widely discussed by eminent scholars (I). Let us state just these :

Fewer children mean more facilities and options in favour of a family career or of family members themselves. Fewer children, however, mean fewer obstacles to parents in the way of separation, divorce or alternatives to family life.

The possibility of an upward trend of fertility in the advanced world is intensively discussed. On the theoretical side, there are cyclical theories

(i) ].A. Sweet, "Continued Low Fertility and the Family", in A.A. Campbe]] et al. (eds), Social, Economic and Health Aspects of Low Fertility, Wash- ington D.C. (U.S. Dep. of Health, Educ. and Welfare), 1980, pp. 193-226.

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a v a i l a b l e t h a t s t i p u l a t e a r i s e a f t e r a d e c l i n e h a s l a s t e d long e n o u g h . The E a s t e r l i n h y p o t h e s i s i s the most d e b a t e d s t a r t i n g p o i n t and much s o p h i s t i c a - ted work i s done to v e r i f y i t . On t h e s i d e of soc ia l b e h a v i o u r , to be e m p i r i c a l l y t e s t ed , such h y p o t h e s e s a r e a l s o b e i n g f o r m u l a t e d : it may be t h a t f e r t i l i t y r i s e s by v i r t u e of a " b a c k - t o - t h e - h o m e " movement and a r e v a l u a t i o n of the s t a t u s of the h o u s e w i f e a n d f ami ly l i fe in g e n e r a l u n d e r the impac t of h e m i s p h e r i c a l economic s t a g n a t i o n .

2. On abortion

Because of the current revisions of abortion laws in a liberalizing direction in many countries of the West, abortion incidence emerges more and more out of its subculture-like existence and comes increasingly under the scrutiny of statistics, demography and social science. There was no mystery about the fact that abortion displayed its full extent outside the law and that liberalized abortion laws will bring it gradually under quantitative scrutiny.

Countries where abortion is induced on simple request do not offer such problems of registration and analysis as countries in which abortion is legal but dependent on specified reasons (Germ. "Indikationen"). The whole phenomenon is composed of legal and illegal cases and, moreover, cases that are announced to the authorities and those that are not. Abortion analysis has to look for :

i. the numbers of legally induced abortions in the woman's own country,

ii. official numbers of abortions induced in a foreign country,

iii. numbers of non-registered abortions induced in a foreign country,

iv. illegal abortions in her own country.

In 1976 the Federal Republic of Germany liberalized its abortion law according to which a pregnancy is allowed to be terminated for four specified reasons : medical, psychological, eugenic, criminological and emergency or personal predicament, i.e. intolerable material or social circumstances.

In this chapter, I will rely mostly on German experience ; which may be representative for Countries in a "normative transition". In 1979 83,000 abortions were registered by the German Federal Bureau of Statistics, 32,000 were induced in the Netherlands, 800 in England and Wales and an unknown number in Austria. Experts thought it to be wi.se to add 20,000 in order to approximate to reality. Thus it may be inferred that only 60 per cent of all abortions are registered by the Federal Office. The fact that most cases were granted on grounds of the fourth indication, that is "emergency", provoked severe attacks and polemics between the defenders and the critics of the new law : "Why should one count Germany still among the rich countries of the world in view of so many cases of misery ?"

Anyhow, the 83,000 legal abortions comprise 30,000 unmarried women, 46,000 married ones and 7,000 divorcees. This breakdown does not constitute much evidence because the exposure to pregnancy of married women is higher than of all other female groups.

If we consider the age composition of women, then the unmarried and divorced outnumber the married women. Taking into account all pregnancies and the proportion occurring to broken marriages amongst them the Expert

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"Kommission" stated that only the 12th pregnancy of married women will be terminated by abortion, but every second one of unmarried ones (I).

To sum up most decisions to obtain an abortion occur amongst the unmarried women and the married ones rising with parity and age. An interesting result is shown in a Viennese survey of 355 pregnancy careers (2). It was astonishing to learn that only 26 per cent were due to conscious planning. Among the remaining pregnancies one third were fully accepted, a fifth of them were completed with passive acceptance and another third were ended by abortion.

The German situation relating to the abortion problem shows a very ambiguous picture. The growing incidence is still accompanied by a hesitancy of many physicians in notifying all cases to the authorities and an obvious regional inequality of access to abortion services. If we would put the regional sub-divisions on a scale by social characteristics, from high to low, then we would place first the big Northern German cities like Berlin and Hamburg with liberal protestant and social democratic traditions. On the lowest scale we would put the Southern German village, conservative and Roman Catholic. In Germany, we speak of a "North-South-Slope" ("Nord-S~d- Gef~lle") of abortion incidence, and the so-called "abortion tourism" ("Abtrei- bungstourismus") to other European countries. When this will become unnecessary, remains to be seen.

V. IS THE FAMILY DECAYING ? THE STATUS OF AN OLD PRO-AND-CON BATTLE

The new trends transforming traditional family life and decomposing the clear-cut ideas of what each partner in a marriage had to expect from the other must, inevitably, revive debates begun in the 2O's when the modern nuclear family came into existence and spread throughout society. They began, in the following period, the controversy between those who believe that the family has outlived its usefulness and those who think that society will crumble if it is allowed to degenerate.

i. The pessimists

Those who cling to a pessimistic outlook for the future of the family are heavily concerned about the trends that are occurring anyway and are

(i) Bericht der "Kommission zur Auswertung der Erfahrungen nit den reformierten w 218 des Strafgesetzbuches", Bundesdrucksache 8/3630, Bonn, 31.O1.80. K. Schwarz, "Soziologische Aspekte des Schwangerschaftsabbruchs in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland", unpubl, manuscript, Wiesbaden, 1980 ; Ch. H~hn, U. Mammey & K. Schwarz, "Die demographische Lage in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland" (The Demographic Situation in the Federal Republic of Germany), Zeitschrift fi~r BevD1kerungswissenschaft, Nr 2, 1980, pp. 175 seq. ; K. Pohl, Familie-P1anung oder Schicksal, Wiesbaden (BIB), 1980 ; cf. the regular study by Chr. Tietze, Induced Abortion : 1979, New York (The Population Council), 1979.

(2) R. Mfinz & J.M. Pelikan, Geburt oder Abtreibung - Eine soziologische Analyse yon Schwangerschaftskarrieren, Vienna, Austria, 1978.

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s t r i k i n g a t t h e m o d e r n n u c l e a r f a m i l y i t s e l f in a d i s i n t e g r a t i n g w a y : h i g h d i v o r c e r a t e s , t h e n u m b e r of s i n g l e p a r e n t h o m e s , s i n g l e h o o d , u n c o m m i t t e d l i v i n g t o g e t h e r , t h e s e x u a l p e r m i s s i v e n e s s a m o n g t h e y o u n g , i n c r e a s i n g c h i l d l e s s n e s s a n d i l l e g i t i m a c y .

According to their point of view, the ever-increasing number of children born and growing up in unstable families, in alternatives to it, and in broken homes, will learn to think of socio-pathological conditions as a normal part of family life. So family problems will pile up in each generation, until the social system breaks down. Today's small, unstable families are not suited to provide enough emotional support for a sane socialization of children and a mutual understanding between the spouses : "As the competition between husbands and wives has grown, the home has become a battleground rather than a refuge from the pressures of the world" (i).

2. The optimists

The optimistic view on the family's future is represented by :

a) the (structural-)functionalist approach to social phenomena,

and, moreover, by

b) a progressive radicalism recognizing the necessity for destroying the family for supposed humanistic reasons.

a) _F_u_ n_ c_ti_o_ _n_a_ lj_s_m_ _ i_n_ _ r_e_ l_a_ tio_n_ t o _ f a_m_ .ijT_ _c h a n g_ _e -

F u n c t i o n a l i s t s c o n c e i v e s o c i e t y a s a w o r k i n g w h o l e , i . e . a n i n t e r p l a y of f u n c t i o n s t h a t k e e p s s o c i e t y g o i n g . A c c o r d i n g to t h e f u n c t i o n a l i s t s , t h e r e a r e o r d e r l y p a t t e r n s of b e h a v i o u r p e r f o r m e d b y m e m b e r s of a s o c i e t y in s u c h i n s t i t u t i o n s a s t h e f a m i l y . When t h e s e p a t t e r n s a r e common to mos t i n d i v i d u a l s o r , a t l e a s t , a c c e p t e d b y n e a r l y a l l i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h i n a s o c i e t y , t h e y b e c o m e " n o r m a t i v e " . F u n c t i o n a l i s t s e v a l u a t e p a t t e r n s of b e h a v i o u r a s to w h e t h e r o r no t t h e y a r e n o r m a t i v e . T h u s b e h a v i o u r i s e i t h e r " n o r m a l " o r " a b n o r m a l " . For f u n c t i o n a l i s t s s o c i e t y i s s t a b l e w i t h i n t h e m i d s t of c h a n g e . T h e r e i s a l s o no " l o s s of f u n c t i o n s " d e t e c t a b l e b u t r a t h e r a " s h i f t " w h e r e v a n i s h i n g f u n c t i o n s wi l l be s u b s t i t u t e d b y new o n e s a n d d e c l i n i n g f u n c t i o n s , in t h e c o u r s e of m o d e r n i z a t i o n , r e p l a c e d b y f u n c t i o n s w i t h r i s i n g i m p o r t a n c e ( " f u n c t i o n a l e q u i v a l e n t s " ) .

A look a t t h e mos t f r e q u e n t l y p o s t u l a t e d f a m i l y f u n c t i o n s wi l l c l a r i f y t h i s t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t of v i ew wi t h i t s p r a c t i c a l c o n s e q u e n c e s :

i . R e p r o d u c t i o n : D e c l i n i n g i n f a n t m o r t a l i t y l e d to few b i r t h s , i . e . i t m a d e t h e o ld q u a n t u m of " i n s u r a n c e b i r t h s " u n n e c e s s a r y . L i m i t a t i o n of f a m i l y s i z e m e a n s g r e a t e r o p p o r t u n i t i e s a n d o p t i o n s a s s o c i e t y d e v e l o p s . I l l e g i t i - m a c y r i v a l s i n c r e a s i n g l y t h e f a m i l y a s t h e o n l y a p p r o p r i a t e a n d a p p r o v e d s p h e r e of r e p r o d u c t i o n . Low f e r t i l i t y a n d s m a l l f a m i l y s i z e a r e f u n c t i o n a l i n r e l a t i o n to m o d e r n l i f e s t y l e s .

i t . S e x u a l r e g u l a t i o n : The " s e x u a l p r i v i l e g e " of m a r i t a l r e l a t i o n s , once b a c k e d b y r e l i g i o n

(I) Cf. ].W. Coleman & D.Ra Cressey, Social Problems, New York, 1980, p. 127.

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and traditional mores, is breaking up. Sanctions against pre-marital and even extramarital sex are rapidly retreating. Adultery becomes obsolete as a cause for divorce. The trespassing of sexuality beyond the borderlines of legal marriage may be functional in respect of self-determination of physical and mental aspects in a liberalizing society~

iii. Economic function : The ancient division of labour among family members has shifted to the larger scale of society as a whole. The family remained the unit for the distribution of earnings according to the remaining family goals. No significant contribution to the family income is expected from the c h i l d r e n , w h i c h i n d i c a t e s a s h i f t of c h i l d r e n from economic a s s e t s to economic l i a b i l i t i e s . Low f e r t i l i t y a n d smal l f ami ly s ize a r e f u n c t i o n a l c o n s e q u e n c e s .

iv . S o c i a l i z a t i o n : Once most l e a r n i n g was a c q u i r e d a t home ; now, we d i s t i n g u i s h be tween p r i m a r y a n d s e c o n d a r y s o c i a l i z a t i o n w h e r e the fo rmer means the a d a p t a t i o n to p r i m a r y f u n c t i o n s of l i fe i n c l u d i n g emot iona l s u p p o r t ( in German " A f f e k t b i l d u n g " ) a n d the l a t t e r s t a n d s fo r e d u c a t i o n a l t r a i n i n g ( " S a c h b i l d u n g " ) t h a t i s f u l l y r e l a t e d to soc i e t a l n e e d s . The r i s i n g r e f l u i r e m e n t s of q u a l i f i c a t i o n l eve l s of the i n d u s t r i a l w o r k p l a c e made t h i s t r e n d f u n c t i o n a l .

v . P r o t e c t i v e f u n c t i o n : A- v i t a l p r o t e c t i v e f u n c t i o n , in the a b s e n c e of n e i g h b o u r s a n d pol ice f o r c e s , g a v e w a y to the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a n d e x e c u t i v e f o r ce s (po l ice ) of the s t a t e . Economic p r o t e c t i o n , in g e n e r a l , e s p e c i a l l y fo r o ld peop le , c h i l d r e n a n d o r p h a n a g e s s h i f t e d to w e l f a r e a g e n c i e s a n d soc ia l s e c u r i t y . Hea l th p r o t e c t i o n s h i f t e d to a modern medical s y s t e m i n c l u d i n g d o c t o r s , h o s p i t a l s a n d s t a t e - s u p p o r t e d i n s t i t u t i o n a l homes .

v i . Re l ig ious f u n c t i o n : Th i s f u n c t i o n seems to h a v e s u f f e r e d most . In the modern home, t he r e i s no l o n g e r room for p r a y i n g t o g e t h e r , r e a d i n g the Bible a n d for c o n d u c t i n g w o r s h i p . R e l i g i o u s e d u c a t i o n i s , i f a t a l l , to be o b t a i n e d in the fo rma l c h u r c h . The f a m i l y , h o w e v e r , p r o v i d e s a v a g u e r e l i g i o u s e n t i t y . "The v a l u e s t h a t once l en t a s a c r a l q u a l i t y to the f ami ly no l o n g e r c l a im the s u p p o r t of communi ty or s o c i e t y " (1 ) .

v i i . R e c r e a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n : The r e c r e a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n i s , may be , concomi t an t w i t h the r e l i g i o u s f u n c t i o n , the " b i g l o s e r " of m o d e r n i z a t i o n . Modern work a n d l i f e - s t y l e d e s t r o y e d the f a m i l i a l e v e n i n g a f t e r the d a i l y work w a s done (of . the German " F e i e r a b e n d " ) . The f ami ly became a loose b o n d whe re the members follow their own, age-specific interests, recreational facilities and entertainment, -a trend that is backed powerfully by the mass media.

viii. Status and placement function : Status placement function exists till our own time, but is more difficult to implement than it was in former times. The above-mentioned "family of orientation" formed in a literal sense the life of the children which was very similar to that of the parents. But the modern family has less

(I) E.M. Levine, "Middle-Class Family Decline", Society, Vol. 18, n o 2, 1981, p. 76.

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influence over the child's place in the social hierarchy. Certainly, it is still more advantageous to be born into a rich family than into a poor one, but young people must to a greater extent control their own destinies. The functional equivalents may be the educational opportuni- ties t h a t a r e more a v a i l a b l e to them t h a n e v e r be f o r e , t h a t b r i n g a b o u t i n d i v i d u a l a c h i e v e m e n t m o t i v a t i o n s a n d , c o n s e q u e n t l y , an "open so- c i e t y " .

F u n c t i o n a l i s t s de tec t e q u i v a l e n t s a n d s u b s t i t u t e s fo r d e c a y i n g f a m i l y t a s k s . Divorce , from the f u n c t i o n a l v i e w p o i n t , s e r v e s as a u se fu l c o r r e c t i v e o r r e g e n e r a t i o n of the r o m a n t i c love p r i n c i p l e , t h a t a l l ows one to b lame the p r e m a t u r e l y chosen mate for the d i s e n c h a n t m e n t and not the m a r r i a g e as s u c h . It keeps the i n s t i t u t i o n u n q u e s t i o n e d .

T h e r e f o r e , as f a r as the c h a n g e of f a m i l y s t r u c t u r e i s c o n c e r n e d , t he r e is n o t h i n g lef t to mourn o r to dep l o r e b e c a u s e a l l c h a n g e s a r e p r o v o k e d by e v o l u t i o n a r y fo rces in s o c i e t y , f u n c t i o n i n g o r w o r k i n g for the m a i n t e n a n c e a n d i m p r o v e m e n t of h u m a n c o n d i t i o n s . F u n c t i o n a l i s t s w a r n a g a i n s t the c o n f u s i o n of c h a n g e wi th d e c a y .

To sum up , the f am i l y was g r a d u a l l y s t r i p p e d of i t s economic , r e l i g i o u s a n d c iv ic r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ; i t became , in t u r n , a s p e c i a l i z e d i n s t i t u t i o n for the deve lopmen t and m a i n t e n a n c e of the i n d i v i d u a l se l f . Loss and g a i n of f ami ly f u n c t i o n s a r e , a f t e r a l l , in b a l a n c e .

b ) The j'_p_Eogr_e_ssige"fa_dj_cajspnf_amijy_j~g2_

The radicals do not hold such an emotion-free and distant view of changes in family life as the functionalists do. In their opinion, the pessimistic or frankly reactionary mourning of the death of the modern family is ridiculous and dangerous as well. It places the golden age of the family in the past and breeds a strange nostalgia which is a bad guide to the interpretation of old and new occurrences. The pessimists are blind towards the stifling oppression of the family and family members in former times : the denial of the most basic economic and political rights to women, the hard work done by children, the unrestricted authoritarianism in a traditional family, the hypocrisy in sexual morality during the Victorian and Wilhelminian era, etc., are arguments enough to condemn the past and to welcome just such trends as are feared by the pessimists.

A high divorce rate does by no means indicate that people are less satisfied with their marriages than they were i.n the past. On the contrary, the rise in the divorce rate is a healthy trend because unhappy mates are no longer forced to stay together but set out to find a new, more appropriate partner. Radicals accuse the family of being a suffocating institution ; that means a constant oppression of the individual which prevents him from developing his potential. Some critics add that family relations could also be fatal to the mental health of the children because of the browing amount of suppressed and subconscious drives which are sacrificed in order to breed conforming humans.

3. Argumen t v s . " W e l t a n s c h a u u n g "

There are, surely, many points in all the two (or three) conceptual f r a m e w o r k s t h a t we may a c c e p t a n d we wil l f ind l i t t l e in them to r e f u t e b e c a u s e of t h e i r o b v i o u s a b s t r u s e n e s s . Tha t b r i n g s us to the i s s u e how to

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d i s t i n g u i s h w e l l - b a s e d h y p o t h e s e s or s c i e n t i f i c a r g u m e n t s from a mere ly p l a u s i b l e , w e l l - s o u n d i n g p h r a s e a n d , t h u s , we c a n n o t he lp b u t d r a w the l ine to s e p a r a t e soc ia l s c i e n c e from " W e l t a n s c h a u u n g " , a c l e a r , f a l s i f i a b l e a r g u m e n t c o n c e r n i n g a top ic from a p e n s i v e r e f l e c t i v e wor ld v i ew , an a t t empt to g r a s p r e a l i t y , from the e x p r e s s i o n s of the i n n e r mood ( G e m f i t s v e r f a s s u n g ) of s c h o l a r s , fo r i n t e l l e c t u a l s .

For t h i s r e a s o n , we mus t b r i n g in to the open the c o u n t e r - c u l t u r e a t t i t u d e of bo th the c o n s e r v a t i v e s a n d the r a d i c a l s , r e p r e s e n t e d in g u i s e s such as r o m a n t i c i s m a n d g l o r i f i c a t i o n o r c o n d e m n a t i o n of the p a s t , in a l l p r o n o u n c e m e n t s on the s u b j e c t . They a l l show the p a t h from an a n c i e n t good s t a t e to the new worse o r , to p a r a p h r a s e a theme in c l a s s i c German soc io logy , from a G e m e i n s c h a f t - l i k e t r a d i t i o n a l f a m i l y to a n u c l e a r f ami ly t h r e a t e n e d by i s o l a t i o n in a G e s e l l s c h a f t - l i k e mass soc ie ty t h a t t u r n s out to be a t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m in an i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c d i s g u i s e .

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In o u r r ev iew of c u r r e n t t r e n d s , t h e r e may be some p h e n o m e n a i n s u f f i c i e n t l y s p e l l e d ou t , e s p e c i a l l y those wh ich touch upon the f i e lds of soc ia l . p r o b l e m s a n d soc ia l p o l i c y .

Thus i l l e g i t i m a c y i n c l u d e s not on ly the b i r t h , bu t a l s o the r e a r i n g of a ch i ld b o r n ou t of wed lock . S ince the l ega l a n d socia l s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t i l l e g i t i m a t e b i r t h s were r em oved , the p rob lem of i l l e g i t i m a c y l i e s l e s s in t he d e m o g r a p h i c s p h e r e b u t more in the s p h e r e of soc ia l p r o b l e m s a n d a t t e m p t s to so lve them.

I l l e g i t i m a c y g e n e r a t e s p r o b l e m s of the s i n g l e - p a r e n t f a m i l y , of the mother b r i n g i n g up c h i l d r e n a lone ( the most u s u a l term in Ge r ma ny) a n d of the incomple te f a m i l y . I t g e n e r a t e s , f u r t h e r m o r e , the need for s i n g l e p a r e n t s to t ake a job a n d , c o n s e q u e n t l y , the o v e r l o a d from p e r f o r m i n g bo th t h e i r b r e a d w i n n i n g a n d the c h i l d r e a r i n g ro le s ; - not to ment ion the p r o b l e m s fo l lowing from l e s s c a r e for the c h i l d . Incomple te f ami l i e s c r e a t e the b u l k of j u v e n i l e d e l i n q u e n c y .

Another topic, beyond the purely demographic aspect, is "juvenile" or "adolescent pregnancy" that is subject to socio-psychological analysis and social policy.

Fundamentally, all the trends in the change of family structure bear an innate social policy aspect, as far as the problems of human beings of all ages are concerned, to which a community has to respond.

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ABSTRACT

As soon as a measure of social policy, or simply an evolution of behaviours, has an impact however slight on the family, numerous reactions are expressed, in order to attack or defend the family, their vehemence bearing witness to the crucial importance of this institution for individuals and society. This article examines the historical changes in the concept of family, and the possible future trends according to various theories. A large place is given to the relationships between the family and its mutations, and the evolution of social and economic variables, in particular the diversification of concepts on sexuality and marriage, the impact of contraception and abortion, the redistribution of male and female roles, etc.

RESUME. - "Eclairages sociologiques sur une 'Bastille' moderne : la famille"

D~s qu'une mesure de politique sociale, ou simplement ]'@volution des moeurs, affecte un tant soit peu la famille, des r@actions vari@es - pour la d@fendre ou la maudire- affluent de tous ]es horizons, et leur v@h@mence t@moigne de l'importance cruciale de cette institution dans ]a vie des individus et des soci@t@s. Cet article fait le point sur l'@volution historique du concept de famille et sur les alternatives de son @volution future selon diverses th@ories. II accorde une large place aux relations que la famille et ses mutations entretiennent avec l'@volution de ]a vie @conomique et sociale, sp@cialement avec des ph@nom@nes comme la diversification des conceptions de la sexualit@ etl du mariage, l'incidence de la contraception et de l'avor- tement, la redistribution des rOles masculin et f@minin, etc.

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the family today: sociological highlights on an embattled institution

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