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The Eye and the Sight:

Duality and Unity in Fusūs al-hikam

Alida Ogren-Gunderson

28 April 2009

Senior Seminar



“Thou art not He, yea, thou art He, and Him thou seest

In all things’ quintessence, both as boundless and qualified." 1

In the course of history, there are some people whose influence cannot be

exaggerated. In American schools, children are familiarized with the names

of national heroes like George Washington and Abraham Lincoln,

philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates, artists like Da Vinci and

Michelangelo. Yet we rarely, if ever, learn about the brilliant Islamic

philosophers, theologians, poets, scientists, or legalists. One of these people

with whom most Americans are woefully unfamiliar is Muhammad ibn ‘Ali ibn

al-‘Arabī, often known by the honorific title Shaykh al-Akbar or “Greatest

Master”. Ibn al-‘Arabī was an enormously significant thinker in Islam, tackling

mysticism, philosophy, theology, law, cosmology, anthropology, psychology,

and other sciences. It is debatable whether this is any part of Islam that

hasn’t been influenced by this one man’s brilliance. His writings were vast

and diverse, covering every possible topic and bringing his own unique

perspective to both common and never before asked questions. Born in 1165

C.E., Ibn al-‘Arabī traveled far and wide through the Muslim world. His

journey began in southern Spain and included travel through what is now

modern Morocco, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Turkey before finally

settling in Damascus, Syria for the last years of his life.

In 1229 C.E., just months after Jerusalem was surrendered to the Christians,

Ibn al-‘Arabī had a vision of the Prophet. He considered this a very good

omen during this turbulent time. In his vision, the Prophet held in his hand a

book and he said to Ibn al-‘Arabī, “This is the book of the Fusūs al-hikam.

1 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 41.



Take it and give it to humanity so that they may obtain benefit from it.”2 Ibn

al-‘Arabī set about to create the book just as the Messenger of God had given

it to him, “without adding anything nor taking away anything.”3 The book

contained twenty-seven chapters, each devoted to a prophet and the

particular wisdom that can be learned from that the life and teachings of that

prophet. The book is based on esoteric interpretation of Qur’anic verses so

as to bring to light meanings previously unrealized. The text is

extraordinarily rich in ideas worthy of further investigation by modern

scholars. One such idea that deserves to be immediately explored is the

relationship between sūra and ma‘nā, or form and meaning, and how this

relationship speaks to the ultimate Unity of God. In Fusūs al-hikam, Ibn

al-‘Arabī uses the opposing ideas of form (sūra) and meaning (ma‘nā ) to

illustrate the multiplicity that is inherent in the Divine Unity, which can be

truly comprehended by understanding this relationship between form and

meaning.

Sūra and ma‘nā are terms that would be familiar to most Sufi mystics,

both today and during the time of Ibn al-‘Arabī. Sūra translates most often as

“form” or sometimes as “image”. In his commentary on Fusūs al-hikam,

Caner K. Dagli provides an introductory explanation of the form and meaning:

As a technical term a meaning is an essence that has no spatio-

temporal dimension in itself. It is a formless entity in the sense that in

itself it is extended neither statically (in space) nor dynamically (in

time). A form, when considered in opposition to meaning, is an essence

that does possess spatio-temporal dimensions. A form is a formal

essence, and by definition is that which is extended in space and time.4

2 Addas, 277.3 Addas, 277.

4 Dagli, 21-22 n. 19.



“But,” as William Chittick, a well respected scholar of Ibn al-‘Arabī,

comments, “the term “form” normally calls to mind a second reality which

the form manifests. X is the form of y. This second reality is often called the

“meaning” (ma‘nā ) of the form.”5 This distinction between “form” and

“meaning” is so well known that Dagli refers to a phrase that specifies

between them (fī’l-ma‘nā or “in meaning”) as “a crucial technical term in all

of Islamic metaphysics.”6 The two are set in such opposition that Chittick

asserts that “meanings and sensory forms are mutually contradictory ”.7 This

is reflective of the way most scholars have understood the relationship

between form and meaning. Form and meaning are contrasted with such

dichotomies as external/internal, visible/invisible, deceptive/truthful, and

insignificant/significant. In order to understand the relationship between

these terms, we will look at each of these dichotomies individually in a

moment.

First, it must be understood that human beings could never truly

comprehend ma‘nā without sūra. “Form and meaning interweave and

together comprise the objects of the world and hence the objects of our

knowledge.”8 As Ibn al-‘Arabī states, “it is not within the scope of the

creature, when God has shown him the states of his immutable identity upon

which the form of existence has descended, that he should, in this state,

attain to the knowledge the Real has of the immutable identities in their state

of non-existence, for they are attributions of the Essence which have no

form.”9 A human being can only know something that exists within a specific

form because it is the form which makes an attribute of the Essence

5 Chittick, SPK, 11.6 Dagli 21 n. 19.7 Chittick, SPK, 115.8 Dagli, 22 n. 19.9 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 24.



intelligible to a human mind. In a state of non-existence, that is, without

form, all attributes of the Essence are unknowable for a human being. As

Dagli makes clear, “In the world of forms, these meaning could only appear in

form.”10 Later in the text, he points out that “from one point of view form and

meaning, sūra and ma‘nā, are separable only mentally.”11 From this

perspective, then, within the sphere of human experience form and meaning

are mutually dependent. This can be seen in Dagli’s observation that “when

a form manifests, God means something by that form, and when God means

something He manifests it in form.”12

Despite the inseparability of sūra and ma‘nā, the two are understood as

intrinsically opposing concepts. The first and most obvious contrast between

form and meaning are as external and internal respectively. Form is clearly

seen as the external component, with which meaning is contrasted as an

“internal reality”. In human beings, Chittick notes that “every human

microcosm is the outward form (sūra) of an inward meaning (ma‘nā)...”13 In

the words of Dagli, “it is quite correct to think of the meaning as the spirit of

the form. It is that formless something that is the inward reality of the

outward form.”14 At a later point, Dagli goes on to state that “so too is the

spirit inward or hidden in relation to the multiple states which are outward or

manifest.” In Ibn al-‘Arabī’s description of a human, “the makeup of his

outward form is made up of the realities of the world and its forms, and his

inward form is modeled on the Form of God most high. For this reason He

has said of him, “I will be his sight…and his hearing.” He did not say, “I will

10 Dagli, 22 n. 19.11 Dagli, 70 n. 9.12 Dagli, 22 n. 19.13 Chittick, SPK, 20.14 Dagli, 22 n. 19 (emphasis added).



be his eye and his ear,” thus differentiating between the two forms.”15 In this

passage, Ibn al-‘Arabī makes an additional distinction between the faculties

and the bodily parts of a human being, associating the faculties with the spirit

or meaning within the form and the bodily parts with the form itself

exclusively. The Real is seen as present in the meaning rather than the form,

which indicates a hierarchical relationship that will be discussed in greater

depth below. Ibn al-Arabī continues to distinguish between bodily parts and

faculties later when discussing how humans can accomplish prayer. He says

that “If He [God] allows you to ask with your tongue, He will have you hear

with your ears, and if He allows you to do so as meaning, then He will have

you hear with your hearing .”16 Ears, in this context, refer to form while

hearing refers to spiritual hearing, which is related to ma‘nā rather than sūra.

The ears hear what is external, while the spiritual hearing is able to hear the

internal Word through the ma‘nā of the form.

Closely related to the external/internal relationship is the dichotomy between

visible and invisible. Chittick describes this relationship between external

visibility and internal invisibility by stating that “the form would be the

outward, witnessed aspect of a thing and the meaning its inward, absent

dimension.”17 As Ibn al-‘Arabī states, “No vision perceiveth Him, just as it

does not perceive spirits governing their manifest figures and forms.”18

Thus, it is impossible for a human being to literally see God or, by extension,

the invisible meanings that inhabit the clearly visible physical forms. Dagli

explains this further by saying that “physical vision as such cannot perceive

the spirit that governs a particular form. No matter how exalted the level of

15 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 14.16 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 175 (emphasis added).17 Chittick, SDG, 27 (emphases added).18 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 251.



vision, man can never see the Self that discloses Itself in all forms the way he

sees those forms, no matter the ontological level of those forms.”19 Whether

it is the meaning in the most sophisticated of human beings or in the basest

of inanimate objects, it is still impossible to actually see the ma‘nā within the

sūra. Ibn al-‘Arabī approaches this matter from another angle with an

interesting analogy: “Know that whenever a thing is permeated by another

thing, it bears it. Thus, what permeates is veiled by what is permeated. The

passive participle is manifest, while the active participle is hidden and veiled.

It is nourishment for it, like water that penetrates wool, causing it to grow and

expand.”20

In this analogy, the form is permeated by its meaning. Despite

the fact that the meaning pervades the form and exists within every aspect

of it, the meaning itself is not visible. Only the form which hosts the meaning

can be seen, just as it is the wool rather than the droplets of water which is

visible.

Dagli calls the meaning “the hidden in the apparent”21, which hints at the

next distinction made between sūra and ma‘nā . The sūra is often seen as a

deceptive veil that hides the spiritual reality that is the ma‘nā . As William

Chittick observed, “The Shaykh and other Sufis would consider most of what

passes for knowledge in modern times as veils over real knowledge… Instead

of seeing inward meanings (ma‘ānī ), they fix their gaze on outward forms

(suwar ).”22 In discussing another aspect of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s thought, Chittick

associates suwar “with “veils” (hujub), that is, the things inasmuch as they

prevent us from seeing God, though they alert us to the fact that God is

hidden behind them.”23 The implication here is that the forms obfuscate the

19 Dagli, 251 n. 34.20Ibn al-‘Arabī, 60.21 Dagli, 22 n. 19.22 Chittick, IW, 42.23 Chittick, SPK,44-45.



understanding which could be gained from the internal ma‘nā of the form.

Ibn al-‘Arabī supports this implication when he calls for people to practice

interpretation, which “means to pass from the form that is seen to arrive at

something else.”24 This indicates that Ibn al-‘Arabī himself promoted the idea

that forms were something which needed to be seen beyond rather than

understood at face value. The forms “can be differentiated from a reality

that they manifest, i.e. the Essence of God.”25 Thus, the forms themselves

are not “real” but rather manifest Reality through their ma‘nā.

This distinction alludes to the hierarchy between sūra and ma‘nā mentioned

earlier. The relationship isn’t between Real and not-real, as it might seem.

Dagli clarifies for readers that “form and meaning are both actualities; both

the form and meaning of a thing have a real essence of what-it-is…”26

However, in this hierarchy, meaning is considered much more significant than

form. The meaning is more closely related to the “Real” or the “Essence of

God” than is the form itself, as was represented in the quotation in the

previous paragraph. In the words of Dagli, “as the deepest selfhood of all

things, God is the spirit that governs and manages form, the spirit coming

‘first’ and the form ‘last’.”27 In a less severe interpretation, Chittick avers that

“revelation is an outward form (sūra), while God’s own knowledge of Himself

and the cosmos is the inner meaning (ma‘nā), the spirit and life behind the

form.”28 Ibn al-‘Arabī supports this assertion with his statement that “His

[God’s] relationship to the manifest forms of the world is that of governing

24 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 71.25 Chittick, SDG, 27 (emphasis added).26 Dagli, 22 n. 19.27 Dagli, 211 n. 19.28 Chittick, SPK, 34.



spirit to form.”29 In this interpretation, sūra is not discounted as completely

insignificant, but it is certainly not as significant as ma‘nā.

It is through their relationship with one another that sūra and ma‘nā are most

often understood. By examining how sūra and ma‘nā are used together, one

can achieve a certain level of appreciation of each concept. They are distinct

facets of the world and their dissimilarity is brought alive by contrasting one

with the other. The relationships of external/internal, visible/invisible,

deceptive/truthful, and insignificant/significant each bring to light a different

aspect of each concept. However, the knowledge achieved through the

oppositional relationship does not exhaust the possible ways that sūra and

ma‘nā can be understood. In order to truly fathom the nature of each, they

must be investigated individually.

Ma‘nā is most often described as a spiritual reality. Chittick explains

that “meanings are “disengaged” (mujarrad), which is to say that they have

no necessary connection to any locus of manifestation. They are essentially

non-manifest in relation to the external world or human knowledge.”30 Ibn

al-‘Arabī describes that “[a thing’s] immutable essence in its state of non-

existence31 corresponds to the Essence of the Existentiator.”32 That is to say,

when ma‘nā is not housed within a particular form, it is one with the Essence

of God. Meaning, then, is identical with the Essence and only becomes

conceivably separate from that Essence when it becomes a “meaning

residing in a locus…”33 Dagli makes it clear that “the soul is able to discern

29 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 38.30 Chittick, IM, 74.31 Non-existence refers in this case to something which has no physical or formal existencebut exists

only within God’s Knowledge.32 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 120.33 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 222 (emphasis added).



the meanings that are expressed by a given form in the world.”34 This

indicates that meaning is the most direct correspondent of the Essence that a

human being encounters in the realm of human experience.

Once ma‘nā has been placed within a human form, Chittick explains that “all

[perfect men] represent full actualization of the name Allah, which is the

“meaning” (ma‘nā) or innermost reality of every human form.”35 Once again,

ma‘nā is understood as a reality closely related to or even directly

corresponding to the Reality of God, especially in its fullest representation as

Allah, that Name which encapsulates all other Names and Qualities of God.

Thus, it is clear that ma‘nā is set in a unique relationship of correspondence

with the Real. This is further evidenced by the use of ma‘nā to refer to

spiritual perception. As Dagli points out, “the word ma‘nā can also be used to

refer to the inward faculties of man as opposed to his outward faculties.

One’s ‘meaning’ hearing is the dimension of the Heart that forms the

principle of one’s sensory hearing. It is one’s spiritual hearing.”36 Ibn al-Arabī

takes this to the next spiritual level when he points out that “Speaking of

Himself, He says that He is identical with the faculties of his slave, in His

Words, “I will be his hearing,” which one of the faculties of the slave, “his

sight”, which is one of the faculties of the slave…”37 That is to say, God is

identical with a human being’s ability to perceive or their ma‘nā. This

reinforces the understanding that ma‘nā is a spiritual reality that is closely

related to the Reality, which was already hinted at in its relationship with

sūra. In fact, it is sūra that is the most desperately in need of individual

34 Dagli, 68 n. 9.35 Chittick, SPK, 28.36 Dagli, 22 n 19 (emphasis added).37 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 241.



investigation to get beyond the corporeal and insignificant definition to which

it is limited through a dichotomous relationship with ma‘nā.

A more sophisticated understanding of sūra can be achieved by

considering how it is discussed without reference to ma‘nā. In this context,

the true nature of the form becomes more apparent. Ibn al-‘Arabī makes it

clear that the world itself can be understood as the Divine Sūra. Forms can

then be seen as manifestations of and imbued with the Real. Once one

realizes this, then it becomes possible to achieve a more detailed knowledge

of the Real by studying the forms of the world, which are actually forms of

the Real. This underlying nature of sūra is all too easy to overlook when

examining form solely in opposition to ma‘nā. It is only through individual

investigation that the potentialities of form become evident. Through proper

scrutiny of the usage of sūra in Fusūs al-hikam, each of these different facets

of form will be explored.

The first way that sūra is used without reference to ma‘nā is as the Divine

Form of the world. Ibn al-‘Arabī unequivocally states that “the world is His

Image (sūra) and He is the governing Spirit of the world…”38 Suddenly, in

accord with this new definition, the world takes on a new significance that

was absent in the understanding of form gained through an oppositional

relationship with meaning. Rather than being inconsequential, the forms of

the world are now seen as the Form of God. As Dagli observes, “the qualities

of the world are none other than the Qualities of God, which is to say that all

forms unfold His Form or Image.”39 Ibn al-‘Arabī goes on the further explain

the world’s relationship with God, which is actually as the Names and

Qualities of God. “He [God] governs it [the world] through none other than

38 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 113.39 Dagli 14 n. 56.



itself or its form. … As for our words, “or its form”, by which is meant the

form of the world, I am referring to the Most Beautiful Names and the Exalted

Qualities by which the Real is named and described.”40 Each of the Names

and Qualities is manifest in and through the forms of the world, which makes

each of those forms a manifestation of God. Chittick notes that “the cosmos

considered as a single whole is the locus of manifestation for all the divine

names, or what comes down to the same thing, for the name Allah, which is

the name that brings together all the other names. Hence, says Ibn al-‘Arabī,

God created the cosmos in His own image, or, to use the better translation of

the Arabic term sūra, in His own “form”.”41

Once one realizes that the world is the Divine Form, then it necessarily

follows that forms are the Real. Chittick explicates that “the outward forms

of the cosmos reflect the name “All-merciful” (al-rahmān), whose Breath

(nafas) is the underlying stuff of the universe.”42 Dagli clarifies Chittick’s

statement by saying that “the use of the word ‘materia’ or ‘stuff’ can be

misleading because the nature of any level or mode of reality is none other

than the manifestation of a divine Quality…and is not a collection of building

blocks or pliable material.”43 The forms of the world are literally made up of

the Real; that is, the Real is the substance which makes the existence of

forms possible. Ibn al-‘Arabī makes this clear when he avers that “the Real

can never leave the forms of the world.”44 Despite the fact that “forms do not

abide”45, as Ibn al-‘Arabī states, all of the forms of the world are a part of the

Real and exist solely through their dependency on the Real. Ibn al-‘Arabī

40 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 255.41 Chittick, SPK, 16.42 Chittick, SPK, 34.43 Dagli, 70 n. 9.44 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 39.45 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 246.



explains that “were it not for the Real’s pervasion of existent things through

the Form, the world would have no existence...”46

The forms are not just manifestations of the Real, but are in fact self-

disclosures of God. Ibn al-‘Arabī asserts that “the self-disclosure of the Real

is variegated in forms”47. This gives sūra even greater importance as a

means to gain greater knowledge of God. Chittick expounds on this point in

Sufi Path of Knowledge:

Few teachings are as basic to Sufism—or to Islam for that matter—as

the idea that something more real stands beyond the realm of

appearances. In Koranic terms, all creature are “signs” (āyāt ) of God.

Most Sufis take the position that the outward from (sūra) is a deceptive

veil, even though it reveals the Divine Reality in some manner. Ibn

al-‘Arabī says nothing basically different, but he radically affirms the

revelatory nature of phenomena. That which appears is in fact Being,

the Divine Reality Itself. … What appears to us is the One Being, but

colored by the properties of the nonexistent possible things.48

Ibn al-‘Arabī does indeed “radically affirm the revelatory nature of

phenomena”, as Chittick says. Rather than seeing forms as deceptive veils,

suddenly there is much to be learned from forms as the never-ending self-

disclosures of God. Ibn al’-Arabī highlights forms as an ongoing source of

knowledge of God when he says that “Indeed, the forms of self-disclosure

have no end where one might stop.”49 He goes on to emphasize the

importance of forms as a way for humankind to come to a better knowledge

of God: “He [who has a heart] knows the fluctuation of the Real in forms

46 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 14.47 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 126.48 Chittick, SPK, 89.49 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 129.



through pondering the appearances.”50 However, Ibn al-‘Arabī does not claim

that this is an easy process or accessible to everyone. He underscores the

difficulty of interpreting the forms by comparing the forms of the world with

the forms of mankind. “Just as the manifest form of man praises its spirit

and its governing soul with its tongue, so too did God make the forms of the

world to glorify with His praises, although we do not understand their

glorification, since we do not wholly grasp the forms of the world. They are

all tongues of the Real, and so speak the praises of the Real.”51 Again, in this

passage, Ibn al-‘Arabī clearly stresses the importance of forms as a source of

knowledge of God because “they are all tongues of the Real”, but he also

acknowledges the difficulty of this pursuit as “we do not wholly grasp the

forms of the world”. He makes this point in another context by saying that

“the definition of the Real remains unknown, for His definition could only be

known by knowing the definition of every form. To do so is impossible, and

so it is impossible to define the Real.”52 Ibn al-‘Arabī again emphasizes the

impossibility of this task because of humankind’s inability to know the

definition of every form. However, the implication that it is even conceivably

possible to know the “definition of the Real” shows the incredible revelatory

power of the forms.

By examining the use of sūra and ma‘nā first in contrast to one

another and then independently of the other, a fuller understanding of each

has been achieved. When understood through their oppositional

relationship, their differences are undeniable. They can be accurately

represented by the dichotomies of external/internal, visible/invisible, and the

rest. However, that is not the whole truth about form and meaning, as made

50 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 131.51 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 39-40.52 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 38.



evident by exploring their usages independently. When scrutinized

individually, it became clear that ma’nā is a spiritual reality that is identical

with the Reality of God and sūra is equally a manifestation of the same

Reality. Thus, the two are simultaneously a duality in purport and a unity in

essence. “The one “identity”, namely existence, is one, but from the point of

view of multiplicity the relationships of power and dependence are real and

not imagined.”53 But this seems contradictory, even impossible. How can

they be the same and yet still different? In order to answer that question, it

is necessary to better understand the nature of humankind, the world, and

God in the view of Ibn al-‘Arabī.

In Fusūs al-hikam, Ibn al-‘Arabī developed a sophisticated theory of

philosophical anthropology. According to his thought, humankind is both

multiple and singular in identity and is identical to the Self in both multiplicity

and singularity. To fully comprehend these concepts, it is best to look at the

text itself. Ibn al-‘Arabī makes an analogy that is very helpful in

understanding the relationship between multiplicity and singularity in

humankind. “Though the caller is identical with the Answerer, there is no

contention over the difference of forms, for there are no doubt two forms. All

of these forms are like Zayd’s bodily parts: it is known that Zayd is a single,

individual reality, and that his head is not the form of his foot, his hand, his

eye, or his eyebrow. He is many and one: many in form, one in identity.”54

Ibn al-‘Arabī stresses the importance of not overlooking the multiplicity in

preference of the unity which is equally existent in humankind. In order to

truly understand the nature of humankind, both concepts must be

comprehended in concert rather than individually. As he says, “there is no

53 Dagli, 269 n. 69.54 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 232.



doubt that we are multiple—as individuals and species—and although we all

possess a single reality that unites us, we know absolutely that there is a

separating factor that distinguishes each of us from the other. If this were

not so, there would be no multiplicity in the one.”55

To understand humankind, both the multiplicity and the unity are equally

necessary. This is not the only necessity, however: it is also vital to

recognize that in both multiplicity and unity humankind is identical with the

Real. In this way, humans can learn about themselves and about the Self

simultaneously through attention to humankind itself. Ibn al-‘Arabī affirms

that

He has shown Himself to us through us. We describe Him by no quality

without ourselves being that quality, although this is not the case for

that necessity which is unique to the Essence. When we know Him

through ourselves and from ourselves, we attribute everything to Him

that we attribute to ourselves, and to this point the divine sayings have

come down to us on the tongues of the interpreters. He described

Himself to us through us. When we witness Him, we witness ourselves,

and when He witnesses us, He witnesses Himself.56

Ibn al-‘Arabī emphasizes many times that knowledge of the Self can only be

gained through knowledge of the self. Later in the text, he states that “

Whosoever amongst you imagines that he sees Him knows not, and

whosoever amongst you sees himself is the one who knows.”57 Once again,

he is highlighting that knowledge of God can only be achieved through self-

knowledge. This is just one way that he shows humankind to be identical

with the Self. He insists that “from himself he knows himself, and his self is

55 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 12.56 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 11-12.57 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 44.



not other than the Selfhood of the Real. No being is there that is and is other

than the Selfhood of the Real; indeed, it is identical with that Selfhood.”58

This is not limited to the internal spiritual faculties of humankind, as was

suggested by the dichotomy between sūra and ma‘na. Ibn al-‘Arabī makes

this clear when he interprets the Words of God:

If you contemplate His Words, “I will be his foot with which he steppeth,

His hand by which he graspeth, his tongue by which he speaketh…” and

so forth for the other faculties, and whose locus is the bodily parts, you

will make no separations, and will say that the thing is entirely the Real

or entirely creation. It is creation according to a certain ascription and is

the Real in accordance with another, and the identity is one. The

identity of the form that discloses itself is the identity of the form that

receives that self-disclosure. He is the self-disclosure and the locus of

self-disclosure.59

With the statement “He is the self-disclosure and the locus of self-disclosure”,

Ibn al-Arabī is reminding readers that God and humankind are identical in

essence. As he says, one can attempt to make a distinction between the

Real and creation, but this is impossible to do with accuracy. From one

perspective, there is a “creation” which is separate from the Real, but from

another perspective, there is nothing which is separate from the Real. And

regardless of this distinction, Ibn al-‘Arabī says, the Real and creation is

nonetheless one in identity.

Ibn al-‘Arabī also established his own particular cosmology that further

developed the relationship between multiplicity and unity. He repeatedly

brings to light the inherent duality between the manifest and hidden realities

58 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 131.59 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 129.



of the world and he theorized that these different facets of the world were

created for a specific purpose. His elucidation was that “ in order for you

come to know that the Real has described Himself as being Manifest and

Hidden, He existentiated the world as a world of invisible and visible, in order

for us to grasp what is hidden through what is invisible in us, and to grasp

what is manifest through what is visible in us.”60 Through learning from the

visible and invisible aspects of the world, a more perfect knowledge of God

can be attained. Ibn al-‘Arabī goes on to explain that “the Real has a special

manifestation in every created thing. He is the Manifest in every object of

understanding, and is the Hidden from all understanding, though He is not

hidden from the understanding of one who holds that the world is His Image

and His Selfhood.”61 Ibn al-‘Arabī makes this point slightly more clear when

he says that “[the forms of the world] are the manifest aspect of the Real,

since He is the Manifest, and that He is their hidden aspect, since He is the

Hidden.”62 Thus, Ibn al-‘Arabī once again affirmed the importance of

recognizing the intrinsic duality of the world, of those aspects which are

hidden and those which are manifest.

Yet, with the world as with humankind, this duality is also a unity that it

identical with the Unity of the Real. As Dagli comments, “To truly abide in

God requires more than a simple acknowledgement that multiplicity is

reflected in the mirror of the one divine Essence. The one who truly

undergoes both unveilings [fanā and baqā] experiences the world in its

apparent multiplicity, but because this appearance is wholly transparent to

him he equally experiences the unity that is inward to all things.”63 Ibn

60 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 12.61 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 38.62 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 113.63 Dagli, 61 n. 13.



al-‘Arabī notes the world’s relationship with God with some humor: “If you so

wish, you may say that it is creation, and if you so wish you may say that it is

the Real, and if you so wish you may say that it is the Real-creation, and if

you so wish you may say that in no respect is it the Real and in no respect is

it creation, and if you so wish you may speak of bewilderment in this.”64

However, he adduces that “All things, from their first to their last, come from

Him”65. He goes on to passionately assert that the world

becomes manifest out of Him, And to Him the whole affair shall be

returned. It is He and no other. Everything we perceive consists of the

existence of the Real in the identities of contingent things. With respect

to the Real’s Selfhood they are His existence, and with respect to the

diversity of the forms they are the identities of contingent things. Just

as the name “shadow” does not disappear due to the diversity of forms,

so too is it the case that the name “the world” or “what is other than

God” does not disappear due to the diversity of forms. With respect to

the unity of its being a shadow it is the Real, for He is Unique, the One,

while with respect to the multiplicity of forms it is the world.

Understand and realize what I have explained to you.66

The point that though the world is undeniably multiple it is still the One in

essence, just as “shadow” is one despite its multiplicity of forms, is one that

Ibn al-‘Arabī clearly wanted to have well understood by his readers.

Dagli asserts that “after the knowledge that God is the divinity of the world,

one comes to realize that all things are none other than self-disclosures of

God Himself.”67 The world, like the forms within it, is a self-disclosure of God

64 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 114-115.65 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 4-5.66 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 100.67 Dagli, 61 n 13.



and thus Ibn al-‘Arabī says that “He is identical with existence.”68 This is an

assertion which Ibn al-‘Arabī makes numerous times in different ways and

contexts. As Dagli points out, “It is from our point of view that we speak of

God and the world, but from the point of view of the Supreme Self there is

only Self.”69 In Ibn al-‘Arabī’s words, “the Real Himself is the very indication

of Himself and of His divinity, and that the world is naught but His self-

disclosure…”70 With conscious effort, humankind can come to see this in

nature, and this is a one of the highest possible goods a human can achieve.

Ibn al-‘Arabi says that “If it is unveiled to one that nature is identical with the

Breath of the All-Merciful, then he has been given much good [2:269]…He will

also then witness things in their principles and forms, and will be complete. If

he witnesses the Breath then with this completeness there will be perfection.

He will see nothing without seeing God as being identical with what he sees.

He will see the seer as being identical with the seen. This much suffices.”71

Once again, the point is that what seems to be a duality, in this example the

seer and the seen, is actually a unity and this unity is identical with God.

The question must be raised at this point, identical with what? What is

God’s nature, that both humankind and the world are called identical to it?

Ibn al-‘Arabī answers this question with a response that should be familiar at

this point: God should be described with the characteristics of multiplicity as

well as unity. As Ibn al-‘Arabī says, “the Unity of God, with respect to the

divine Names which require us, is the Unity of multiplicity.”72 In the language

of Ibn al-‘Arabī, God is similar and incomparable simultaneously and the two

concepts, while seeming to be mutually exclusive are actually inseparably

68 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 112.69 Dagli, 4 n. 5.70 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 61.71 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 236.72 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 103.



intertwined. “The descended Laws came using it, asserting similarity and

asserting incomparability—asserting similarity within incomparability through

imagination and asserting incomparability within similarity through the

intellect. Thus, everything is connected to everything. The assertion of

similarity is not capable of escaping the assertion of incomparability, nor is

the assertion of incomparability capable of escaping the assertion of

similarity.”73 The Real is capable of duality in all characteristics, as Ibn

al-‘Arabī reminds readers that “the Principle allows of possessing such

qualities, such the Majestic and the Beautiful, the Hidden and the Manifest,

the First and the Last. These are none other than Himself.”74

Much later in

the text, Ibn al-‘Arabī seems to continue this thought with the statement that

“The Object of these attributions does not undergo distinction, for there is

naught but His Identity in all the attributions. It is a single Identity that

possesses attributions, relations, and qualities.”75

Thus, the Real is intrinsically multiple in self-disclosures and

attributions. However, Ibn al-‘Arabī goes to great pains to clarify that “the

Identity does not undergo separation and in its essence is not divided.”76

Dagli helps explain this concept: “All multiplicity is in reality contained in

original oneness the same way that [the number] two is included in [the

number] one.”77 The number two exists within the concept of the number one

and is actually impossible without the number one. In this same way, the

duality of God exists within the unity and is impossible without that unity.

Dagli provides a more lengthy explanation that is quite helpful:

73 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 229.74 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 32.75 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 241.76 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 269.77 Dagli, 145 n. 31.



Precisely because it is the Self that discloses It will always remain Itself,

while the reality of its own disclosure makes real the selves to which Its

disclosure gives rise. To say that these are entailments of the Essence

is to say that the Self, by its very nature—that is to say, in being Itself—

discloses Itself such that from a certain perspective many derivative and

separate selves result, while from another perspective it is precisely

because this apparent multiplicity of independent selves is the result of

the Self being Itself that the Self never undergoes any division and

never becomes multiple. To say that the self-disclosure of God

introduces multiplicity into the divine Unity is to say that in being Itself

the Self ceases to be Itself, which would be absurd.78

Once the theme of Unity and Multiplicity has been brought to the fore,

suddenly Ibn al-‘Arabī’s intentions with his use of sūra and ma‘nā become

evident. A close reading of the text shows that Ibn al-‘Arabī was actually

using form and meaning as a way of illustrating this complex relationship

between duality and unity. “The man of realization sees multiplicity in the

one, just as he knows that what the divine Names indicate, is a single

identity. This multiplicity is intelligible in an identity that is one.”79 In order to

exemplify this concept, Ibn al-‘Arabī provided his readers with an example in

the relationship between ma‘nā and sūra. As was discussed earlier, meaning

and form have been frequently understood in contrast to one another. Yet

when discussed individually, the two are both described as identical with the

Real in such a way as to be also be identical with one another. However, Ibn

al-‘Arabī never explicitly described the two as identical with one another, as

this would minimize their intrinsic duality. It was only by carefully reading

78 Dagli, xxiii.79 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 134.



Fusūs al-hikam that the reader can discover the relationship of unity between

the two—just as it is only through careful attention to the Real that one can

discover the relationships of Divine Unity.

As Dagli informs readers, “only he who acknowledges God in every self-

disclosure is totally free from evil or wrongdoing (munkar ).”80 Ibn al-‘Arabī

proclaims that “when God gives someone knowledge through self-disclosure,

his knowledge of God becomes perfected. He declares Him to be

incomparable in one instance and declares Him to be similar in another, and

he sees the Real flowing in the forms of nature and those of the elements.

For him there remains no form which he does not see as being identical with

the Real. This is perfect knowledge, which the descended Laws relate to us

from God.”81 With the particular examples of sūra and ma‘na in Fusūs al-

hikam, Ibn al-‘Arabī provides his readers with the tools to understand this

complex divine relationships with humankind, the world, and Godself. Thus,

it becomes clear that God is the sūra and the ma‘nā, the eye and the sight,

and each of these are identical with the other while still maintaining an

individual identity that creates an intrinsic duality to the unity. In the words

of Ibn al-‘Arabī, “the Unity of God…is a Unity of Multiplicity”82

Bibliography

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80 Dagli 131 n. 28.81 Ibn al-‘Arabī, 227.82 Ibn al-‘Arabi, 103.



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