the evolution of air assault

7/28/2019 The Evolution of Air Assault

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Commenting on the Army after Nextproject, one observer noted that Todaysaviation allocations to light infantry di-visions are inadequate for the fast-paced

operations of the future.1 Battlefield agility mustbe strengthened if the force is to truly achievefull spectrum dominance. Likewise, as another

writer stated, In the wars of the future, there issimply no point in deploying highly trained lightinfantry without mobility and protection.2 Theintegration of infantry mobility and target acqui-sition capability with the speed, agility, and fire-power of helicopters is a potent combination; butthe current force structure does not realize that

potential. Nor does it capture the helicopters aircavalry possibilities. Airmobility has not fully real-ized the opportunities created by technological in-novations following World War II.

Different Responses

Veterans of World War II airborne operations

were particularly impressed by the promise of thehelicopter, and by 1945 the Army had acquired22 R6 utility helicopters for rescue, courier serv-ice, medical evacuation, and observation. TheArmy and Marine Corps bought several two-seatYR13s. The Marines experimented with helicop-ters to augment amphibious operations and, bythe end of 1946, the Commandant authorized atest squadron. Yet as late as 1947 no helicoptercould carry more than a couple of combat-loadedpassengers. Perhaps for that reason as well as thedifficulty in coordinating helicopter development

Summer 1999 / JFQ 51

Major Kevin J. Dougherty, USA, serves as chief of the Current Analysis

Division, Intelligence Directorate (J2), at U.S. European Command.

Assault by 1st Air

Cavalry Division

(Airmobile), 1965.

The Evolutionof Air AssaultBy K E V I N J. D O U G H E R T Y


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s J F Q F O R U M

with the Air Force, the Army focused its aerialmobility developments on the airborne division,while the Marines continued to experiment withthe helicopter.

When a provisional Marine brigade de-ployed to Korea in August 1950 it took alongseven utility helicopters. And, during the Inchonlanding, the commander of Fleet Marine ForcePacific told Washington that No effort shouldbe spared to get helicopters . . . in any form, tothe theater at once, and on a priority higherthan any other weapon.

The helicopter was primarily used to evacu-ate casualties when the first transport squadronarrived in Korea during the summer of 1951 forservice with the 1st Marine Division. It included

15 H19 Chickasaws that could carry six fullyequipped troops. The squadron progressed from

resupply operations to troop transport to embry-onic air cavalry in antiguerrilla operations.

These successes led the Army to step up op-erations and to establish the 6th TransportationCompany (Helicopter) which deployed to Koreain late 1952. The next March this unit flew itsfirst resupply mission and in May conducted itsfirst major troop haul. By the end of the war, theArmy had fielded two helicopter companies or-ganized as a light battalion while the Marines hadten helicopter squadrons.

After the armistice the Army and MarineCorps continued to refine helicopter operations.The Army emphasized the air cavalry role and

began to use the smaller, turbine-driven UH1Huey to supplement strong ground force maneu-ver by mechanized and armored units. TheMarines saw the primary mission as combat mo-bility for assaulting an objective which required apreponderance of large transport helicopters toland self-sufficient forces quickly. Accordingly,the Marine Corps organized around large single-rotor Sikorski helicopters with front clamshelldoors, later followed by a turbine driven, twin-rotor model.

52 JFQ / Summer 1999

H13 during joint

maneuvers at Fort

Hood,1952.

U.S.

Army

Testing H19G

before deploying to

Korea, 1953.


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Both services were taking unique paths withnew technology. This would have a profound ef-

fect on operations inVietnam. The Armypursued a more mo-bile, decentralized,and integrated struc-ture that proved ideal

for its tactical requirements. The Marine empha-sis on relatively larger assault helicopters, with

centralized control under an air wing com-mander, resulted in a much more cumbersomeand unresponsive structure.

The Howze Board

General James Gavin, who commanded the82d Airborne Division during World War II, was anearly supporter of air assault. He wrote a landmarkarticle in 1954 analyzing the inability of EighthArmy to exploit the return to maneuver warfareengendered by the Inchon landing in Korea. Heconcluded that the type of forces needed to con-duct long-range reconnaissance, rapid advance,and bypass of obstacles did not exist.

Where [were] helicopters and light aircraft to liftsoldiers armed with automatic weapons and hand-carried light antitank weapons, and also lightweightreconnaissance vehicles, mounting antitank weaponsthe equal of or better than the Russian T34s. . . ? Ifever in the history of our Armed Forces there was aneed for the cavalry armairlifted in light planes,helicopters, and assault-type aircraftthis was it.3

Gavins contribution to the air assault con-cept should not be underestimated. As one reportportrays it, [his] article reflected the vision of afew cavalry and helicopter enthusiasts and provedto be the catalyst [for] forward-thinking officers. 4

Among them was General Hamilton Howze, direc-tor of Army aviation who, shortly after RobertMcNamara became Secretary of Defense, wasasked to reexamine the Army posture and, in ef-fect, ordered the implementation of airmobility.

The impetus for this significant developmentwas a memo from McNamara to the Secretary ofthe Army in 1962: I have not been satisfied withArmy program submissions for tactical mobility. Ido not believe that the Army has fully ex-plored . . . technology for making a revolutionarybreak with traditional surface mobility.5 Becauseof this failure, McNamara directed that the reex-amination of [Army] aviation requirementsshould be a bold new look at land warfare mo-bility. It should be conducted in an atmospheredivorced from traditional viewpoints and pastpolicies. McNamara stated his expectation andstifled bureaucratic naysayers, concluding that he

would be disappointed if the reexaminationmerely produces logistics-oriented recommenda-tions to procure more of the same, rather than aplan for implementing fresh and perhaps un-orthodox concepts which will give us a signifi-cant increase in mobility.

McNamaras frustration can be attributed inpart to a growing helicopter industry groping fordirection. The military had not decided what itwanted and had thus failed to take advantage ofthe technological advances that were readilyavailable.


the Army pursued a more mobile

structure that proved ideal for its

tactical requirements

H21 Shawnee

in Panama, 1961.


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Among those McNamara thought capable ofgrand vision was Howze, and within a week ofthe Secretarys memo, he was appointed presidentof the Army Tactical Mobility RequirementsBoard (Howze Board). As one author noted, Sel-dom has there ever been such a broad and open-ended charter in military history, 6 and Howzecalled the Secretarys memo the best directiveever written.7 Howze would take full advantageof the strong mandate presented him.

After just 90 days the board recommendedthat five reorganization objective Army divisions

(ROADs) be replaced byairmobile and air cavalryunits. Howze saw the ad-vantage of airmobileforces as mobility, utilityin delay operations, abil-ity to ambush, and direct

firepower capability. A month after the board re-ported, the Army deployed 15 Hueys to Vietnamwith a concept team to evaluate their effectivenessin counterinsurgency operations.

Then in January 1963 the Army began or-

ganizing and testing the 11th Air Assault Division.The effort gained momentum, and in Septemberan airmobile battalion was tested at Fort Stewart.The results were promising. By 1964 the Armywas contemplating an airmobile division as partof its force structure.

The 11th Air Assault Division was activated inFebruary 1964 at Fort Benning to expand the testprogram. Under General Harry Kinnard, who hadserved with the 101st Airborne Division duringWorld War II, it conducted a second test (Air As-sault II), demonstrating that the advantages of

increased mobility and maneuverability inherentto the air assault division offers a potential com-bat effectiveness that can be decisive in tacticaloperations. Based on this success, McNamara au-thorized the organization of the 1st Cavalry Divi-sion (Airmobile) in July 1965.8

Interservice Rivalry

The Army and Air Force had been at oddsover aviation long before the Howze Board. To setboundaries, Secretary of the Army Frank Pace andSecretary of the Air Force Thomas Finletter hadsigned a memorandum of understanding in Octo-ber 1951, but the issue of roles and missions re-mained unresolved. The Army was dissatisfiedwith Air Force close air support and was formingits own air arm. Its growth was rapid. In 1950 theArmy inventory included 668 light fixed-wingand 57 rotary-wing aircraft. By 1960 it had over

5,000 aircraft of 15 varieties. The Army, not theAir Force, was becoming the acknowledged leaderin vertical flight and ground-effects assets.

The helicopter filled a dual purpose for theArmy but was a sinister threat to the Air Force. Al-though rotary-wing aircraft offered the Army acredible means of increasing air support, it placedgreat pressure on the Air Force to enhance groundsupport capabilities or risk losing that missionand the attendant budget to the Army.

Both services made half-hearted attempts toresolve their differences, taking a stab at a jointtesting program using the 11 th Air AssaultDivision. However these efforts were character-

ized by competition rather than cooperation.One example of this rivalry was an exchange insummer 1964 between General Curtis LeMay, AirForce Chief of Staff, and General HaroldJohnson, his Army opposite number. In responseto the Armys use of armed Hueys in Vietnam,LeMay challenged Johnson to an aerial duel.Pulling a cigar from his mouth and gesticulatingwildly, he screamed, Johnson, you fly one ofthese damned Hueys and Ill fly an F105, andwell see who survives. Ill shoot you down andscatter your peashooter all over the ground.This episode can be seen as a microcosm of theoverall situation. The new concept was gener-

ally supported by the Army but opposed at everyturn by the Air Force.9

In the midst of passion and in response tothe Howze Board, the Air Force created its ownboard whose findings not surprisingly refuted theArmys. In contrast to the airmobility concept,the Air Force suggested a joint service combatteam structure.

Central to the Air Force concept was an as-sumption that in a joint force, ROADsupported


the Army was dissatisfied with

Air Force close air support and

was forming its own air arm

U.S

.Army(CarlosRuiz)

H34 demonstrating

pickup system at Fort

Eustis, 1961.


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by Air Force tactical airoffered more practicaland economical means of enhancing the mobilityand combat effectiveness of Army units thanArmy air assault divisions. The Air Force proposedthat the selective tailoring of ROAD could permitvarying degrees of air transportability and combatcapability, from a relatively light mobile force toone capable of sustained combat. According tothe Air Force, this could be accomplished withoutspecialized airmobile units. Neither Army fixed-wing aircraft or medium helicopters would be re-quired for tactical movement of troops or resup-ply because C130s could accomplish mosttransport missions while other Air Force aircraft

provided reconnaissance and firepower.The Air Force concept was tested in October

and November 1964 in exercise Goldfire I, but itwas quickly evident that nothing new was beingoffered with regard to close air support of groundforces. The concept merely streamlined existingprocedures and demonstrated that, given heavydedicated tactical air support, an Army divisionhad increased firepower. After evaluating both the

Army and Air Force concepts, Johnson tactfullysummed up his services dissatisfaction: I had therare privilege of seeing the 11th Air Assault oneweek and the other concept at the early part ofthe following week, and I would make a compari-son of perhaps a gazelle and an elephant. The twoare not comparable.10

The uninspiring results of Goldfire I and thesuccess of Army tests led in January 1965 to a rec-ommendation by the Joint Chiefs, with the AirForce dissenting, to cancel Goldfire II. McNamaraapproved the cancellation, and the Joint Chiefsresponded, again with the Air Force in dissent, byrecommending approval of the Army request for

an airmobile division. In June 1965, McNamaraauthorized the organization of the 1st CavalryDivision (Airmobile). It was activated in July 1965and was made up of resources from the 11th AirAssault and the 2d Infantry Divisions. The divi-sions advance party arrived in Vietnam in lateAugust of that year.

As a sacrifice on the altar of accord with theAir Force, Johnson was forced to withdraw Armyplans to use Mohawks as attack aircraft, confiningit to reconnaissance. Later Johnson was also com-pelled to concede the third issue and give up


1st Cavalry Division,

Khe Sanh.


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s J F Q F O R U M

CV2 Caribou transports. The armed Huey, how-ever, remained an essential component of the air-mobility concept.

The 1st Cavalry Division proved valuable inVietnam and, in June 1968, the Army began toconvert the 101st Airborne Division to an airmobileconfiguration. The next month, the 1st Cavalry wasredesignated the 1st Air Cavalry Division and the101st Airborne became the 101st Air Cavalry Divi-sion. This designation was brief: in August theunits were renamed the 1st Cavalry Division (Air-mobile) and the 101st Airborne Division (Airmo-bile). With the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam1st Cavalry was reorganized as a triple capability(tricap) division in May 1971, combining armor,airmobile, and air cavalry brigades. The tricap ex-periment became mired in bureaucratic ineptitudeand, by August 1980, the 1st Cavalry was trans-formed into a heavy armored division.

The post-Vietnam War curtailment of airmo-bile capabilities was reflected in the 1976 editionof FM 1005, Operations, and the concept of active

defense. Such doctrine had focused airpowerthinking on close air support and anti-armor rolesto the detriment of more flexible and independentapplications.11 In a system so fixed on the close-inbattle, the utility of air cavalry was limited.

The 1982 edition of FM 1005 and its doc-trine of AirLand battle were much more promisingfor a reinvigorated airmobile and air cavalry func-tion. Its emphasis on deep attack and interdictioncreated an exciting time for Army aviation, equalor greater in importance than that which occurredtwo decades ago with the Howze Board.12 Withinthis doctrine, air assets could be used to guard theflanks of armored and mechanized forces, createdeeper penetrations, interdict enemy reserves, andprovide force protection and aerial fire support inthe event of counterattack. FM 1005 also ex-panded the ground commanders areas of respon-sibility and interest, which put greater emphasison aerial reconnaissance, surveillance, and target


Search and destroy

mission, 1967.


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acquisition. The edition which appeared in 1993continued this trend by emphasizing the fast-paced, nonlinear battlefield.

Army aviation seems to have made a doctri-nal resurgence from its diminished role just afterVietnam under the rubric of active defense. Acommensurate force restructuring should reflectthis increased role. Unhappily, however, the forcestructure designed to support the airmobility andair cavalry concept has never regained the promi-

nence it enjoyed during the Vietnam conflict.One division, the 101st, has been steadily re-

fining air assault. In October 1974 it dropped itsparenthetical title of airmobile in favor of air as-

saultand accepted the im-plied doctrinal change. Thatdoctrine sought to fuse man-power, weapons, and aerialtransport with cavalry doc-trine while air assault inte-grated attack, transport, andobservation aircraft with the

fighting elements of the division. By maintainingorganic helicopter assets, the division ensures con-

tinuous availability of aviation responsive tounique tactical requirements. But it is not an aircavalry division.

Although joint operations have advanced dra-matically since Vietnam, basic issues remain. Therewill always be tension between the Army and AirForce over close air support. Douglas Macgregorrecognizes this fact: [Army] reconnaissance andattack helicopters have been developed to acquirepermanently a close air support capability that re-ceives low priority in the U.S. Air Force.13 He seesthe trend continuing: Modern air defense systems

will drive jet-driven aircraft to higher and higheraltitudes with the result that stealthy, rotor-drivenaircraft along with unmanned strike aircraft willgradually supplant traditional airframes in theclose air support role. If the Army truly wants anacceptable degree of close air support, it should

provide part of the capability.

Not Finished Yet

A single air assault division does not meet theneeds of nonlinear battlefields. One of the un-adopted recommendations of the Howze Boardwas the reorganized airmobile infantry division, aconfiguration that would help address concernsabout our current light infantry. That unit was en-visioned as an infantry division with organic air-craft to provide essential airlift and logistical serv-ices. In addition, it would be able to furnishsustained, aerial-delivered combat power, excep-

tional reconnaissance and target acquisition, andintrinsic aerial fire support. It could simultaneouslyairlift a third of its combat power 100 kilometers, arevolutionary distance in Howzes day but easilymanaged today.

Aviation efforts within the Army moderniza-tion plan address the difficulties that made sucha concept previously unworkable. Modernizationwill give helicopters the digital connectivityneeded for the nonlinear battlefield. Increasedranges will allow regular aviation units to self-de-ploy over long ranges like special operations avi-ation. New programs such as the RAH66Comanche and AH64D Apache Longbow will

provide reconnaissance and security and attackovermatch. Range and payload concerns will becorrected by structurally efficient helicopterssuch as the UH60L Blackhawk and remanufac-tured CH47D Chinook that will more than dou-ble the vision of the Howze Board for a 100-kilo-meter mission radius. Certainly the technology isavailable today to realize the boards more ambi-tious recommendations.

But technology is only part of the equation.The full realization of a revolution in military af-fairs has three preconditions: technological devel-opment, doctrinal innovation, and organizationadaptation.14 Therefore what is also needed is the

decision to move forward boldly and apply thetechnology to an upgraded light infantry, organ-ized along the lines of the reorganized airmobileinfantry division. Such a reorganization and asso-ciated revision of doctrine, tactics, techniques,and procedures would alleviate the concern thatour light infantry divisions cannot keep pacewith future operations.


air assault integrated attack,

transport, and observation

aircraft with the fighting

elements of the division

U.S

.Army

Cobra attack helicop-

ter in Vietnam, 1971.


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s J F Q F O R U M

If such a course is charted, why stop there?Another recommendation of the Howze Board in-vites a reexamination of the air cavalry concept.The board considered cavalry as a different armthan armor. Cavalry traditionally excelled at pur-suit, screening, raiding, exploiting, and flexible

response. Such operations preserve friendly sur-prise and deny it to an enemy. As Stanton noted:

While the tank inherited the mantle of the dra-goons, the Howze Board innovators viewed air cavalryas the resurrection of the bold, slashing light cavalry;the aerial rocket artillery as the modern equivalent ofthe horse artillery; and the airmobile infantry as thesuccessor of mounted rifle troops.15

The Army consciously moved away from thisconcept, even the name, when it designated the1st and the 101st Air Cavalry Divisions as airmobilein 1968. While the 101st Airborne Division (Air As-sault) clearly uses helicopter flexibility and ma-

neuverability to great effect, it falls short of adopt-ing cavalry doctrine in routine operations. TheHowze Board urged three kinds of brigade-sized aircavalry formations organized to fight from amounted position and perform the traditional roleof cavalry in exploitation, pursuit, counterattack,delay, and flank protection. But again, ongoinghelicopter modernization programs make a gen-uine air cavalry role a promising prospect for in-corporation into all divisions. In addition, if thelight infantry division assumes the role filled bythe 101st, the latter unit then could be trans-formed into a true air cavalry division.

Thus the optimal exploitation of emerginghelicopter technology requires not only new andimproved equipment, but doctrinal and organiza-tional revisions to support it. The Army hasbegun the task with mechanized forces. Experi-mental force tests conducted by the 4th InfantryDivision at Fort Hood have been successfulenough for 1st Infantry in Germany to transitioninto a limited conversion division. However, crit-ics argue that the experiment simply involvesputting fancy digital equipment on weapons andkeeping the same basic organizational structure:

A revolution in military affairs has to be morethan merely adding new weapons and converting to

digital devices. Previous such revolutions have pro-duced significant changes in organization and tacticsto suit new weapons and technology and to maximizecombat potential. Indeed, previous revolutions in mili-tary affairs have been epitomized by major changes inorganizational structure.16

Advances in aviation technology allow theArmy to take such a bold step with light forces,which it has not done with its mechanized forces.Doctrine and tactics built around an organizationof air assault deployable light infantry and air

cavalry brigades would be more in line with atrue revolution in military affairs.

As the Army determines how to incorporateadvances in helicopter technology into its forcestructure, the Howze Board is a laudable modelfor putting technology into practice. Its mandate,

leadership, innovative approach, streamlinedprocess, and focused recommendations are wor-thy of emulation. The subsequent test programinvolving the 11th Air Assault Division was like-wise exemplary. Airmobility advanced in 1962, al-though some imaginative recommendations werenot adopted. If it chooses to do so, the Army hasanother opportunity to exploit helicopter tech-nology in a bold and dramatic way. JFQ

N O T E S

1 Billy Wells, The Future of Infantry: Maneuver in

the 21st Century, inAY97 Compendium: Army After Next

Project(Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Stud-ies Institute, 1998), p. 17.

2 Douglas A. Macgregor,Breaking the Phalanx: A New

Design for Landpower in the 21 st Century (Westport,

Conn.: Praeger, 1997), p. 77.3James M. Gavin, Cavalry, and I Don t Mean

Horses! Armor, vol. 67, no. 3 (May/June 1958), p. 18.4 Shelby L. Stanton, Anatomy of a Division: 1st Cav

in Vietnam (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1987), p. 11.5 Ibid., pp. 1517.6John J. Tolson, Airmobil ity, 19611971, Vietnam

Studies (Washington: Department of the Army, 1973),

p. 20.7 Stanton,Anatomy, p. 17.8 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam

(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986),pp. 11824.9 Bruce Palmer, Jr., The 25 Year War: Americas Mili-

tary Role in Vietnam (Lexington: The University Press ofKentucky, 1984), p. 27.

10 Ibid.11 Robert Hamilton, Green and Blue in the Wild

Blue: An Examination of the Evolution of Army and AirForce Airpower Thinking and Doctrine Since the Viet-

nam War, thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies,

Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, 1993.12 William R. Richardson, Airmobility in the 1980s,

U.S. Army Aviation Digest, vol. 27. no. 8 (August 1981),

p. 4.13 Macgregor,Phalanx, p. 51.14

James R. FitzSimonds and Jan M. van Tol, Revolu-tions in Military Affairs, Joint Force Quarterly, no. 4

(Spring 1994), pp. 2431.15 Shelby L. Stanton, Lessons Learned or Lost: Air

Cavalry and Airmobility,Military Review, vol. 69, no. 2

(January 1989), pp. 7576.16John R. Brinkerhoff, The Brigade-Based New

Army, Paramete rs , vol 27, no. 3 (Autumn 1997),pp. 6072.


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