Bachelor Thesis

The European Union’s Performance in International Climate Change Negotiations – an Analysis of the Bonn Climate Change

Conference in March 2014

- Bachelor Thesis, submitted to the Department of Political Science at Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz, May 2014 -

WORK IN PROGRESS – PLEASE DO NOT CITE, QUOTE OR CIRCULATE WITHOUT AUTHORS PERMISSION

Lukas Prinz, B.A. Mail: prinz.lukas@gmail.com _________________________________________________________________________ Abstract Climate change is a major challenge of the 21st century. Therefore, the European Union’s role in the global response to this challenge remains important, even after the failure of the Kyoto Protocol. Since 2011, the international community works towards a new climate treaty, evolving under the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP). This thesis analyses the Performance of the EU during the session of the ADP in March 2014, using the concept of EU Performance proposed by Groen and Oberthür in 2013. In addition to the analysis of these small-scale negotiations, it provides a reflection of the participant observation method. After a review of the EU’s global role on climate change, an overview of the conceptual literature to grasp this phenomena integrates the different strands of literature. It argues, that the approach taken builds an innovative reconceptualisation of previous accounts, further set out in chapter three. The empirical analysis is structured according to the three variables of the concept: the quality of the EU’s policy objectives, the fit of EU activities with the international constellation of the talks and the EU’s goal attainment. Overall, EU Performance during ADP 2-4 was low-intermediate. In order to increase this score, the findings point towards a need for a more coherent EU policy portfolio between different negotiation topics. Acknowledgements I am grateful to Lisanne Groen and Sebastian Oberthür for the possibility to use their very recent concept of EU performance for this thesis and their helpful replies to my questions. I also thank my supervisors, Arne Niemann and Julian Bergmann, for their stimulating advise during the process. Last but not least, my gratitude is to WWF and Germanwatch for accrediation and valuable insights into the negotiations.

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Overview of Terms ..........................................................................................13

Figure 2: Elements and Variables of EU Performance ...................................................15

Table 1: Greenhouse Gas Emissions 2010…………………………………………….. 28

Table 2: Summary of the EU's Performance during ADP …………………................. 36

List of Abbreviations ADP Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action AOSIS Alliance of Small Island States BASIC Brazil, South Africa, India and China CAT Climate Action Tracker CBDR Common, but differentiated responsibilities COP Conference of the Parties EU European Union GHG Greenhouse Gases G77/China Group of 77 and China i.e. “that is” INC Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (developed the UNFCCC) IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change KP Kyoto Protocoll LMDC Like Minded Developing Countries on Climate Change MoI Means of Implementation MS Member States NDC intended nationally determined contributions (to the 2015 agreement) OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development REIO Regional Economic Integration Organisation SEA Single European Act Umbrella Negotiating Group within the UNFCCC, comprising the US, Australia, Group Canada, Japan, Russia, Norway, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Ukraine UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change US United States (of America) WCCB World Conference Center Bonn

Contents

List of Tables and Figures

List of Abbreviations

1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................1

2. The European Union’s role in international climate change negotiations ....................3

2.1 The Evolution of EU Climate Policy ......................................................................3

2.2 Literature Review: Research on the EU’s global role...........................................10

3. Goal attainment, ambition and the international context – Concept and Methods to

assess EU performance....................................................................................................14

3.1 EU Performance – the approach by Groen and Oberthür in context ....................14

3.2 Operationalisation .................................................................................................16

3.3 Case selection........................................................................................................18

3.4 Methods.................................................................................................................19

4. The EU’s performance at the Bonn Climate Change Conference in March 2014......21

4.1 Negotiation setting and political context...............................................................21

4.2 Quality of the EU’s policy objectives ...................................................................23

4.2.1 Absolute quality .............................................................................................24

4.2.2 Relative quality ..............................................................................................25

4.3 Fit of EU activities with the international constellation........................................25

4.3.1 EU activities during the negotiations .............................................................25

4.3.2 Position in the international constellation of power and interests..................27

4.3.3 Fit of activities with the EU’s role .................................................................32

4.4 Goal attainment .....................................................................................................33

4.5 Summary ...............................................................................................................35

4.6 Method reflections.................................................................................................36

5. Conclusion...................................................................................................................37

References .......................................................................................................................41

Annex ..............................................................................................................................44

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1. Introduction “We are at the highest level of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere for the last 800,000 years and we have not yet started to bend that curve back down again - this is the urgency of the challenge. […] Just as climate change impacts are accelerating, 2014 needs to be a year of accelerated action and ambition to check the advance of climate change.” (Christiana Figueres, UNFCCC 2014).

This statement made by the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework

Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the occasion of the first session of

international climate change negotiations in 2014 points out the origins of this thesis.

Twenty years after the entry into force of the Convention to combat climate change, the

process is in deep need for progress. Most recent scientific findings leave little doubts

about global warming being the defining challenge of the 21st century. The European

Union (EU) has played a crucial role in the international response to this challenge,

most notably in the establishment of the Kyoto Protocoll (KP). The progressiveness of

both the EU and the UN processes came to a halt in 2009, however. The failure of the

Copenhagen Summit to deliver a successor treaty to the KP temporarily broke hopes for

the UNFCCC to demonstrate effective multilateral governance. It also showed the limits

of EU influence on the global stage, making a renewed assessment of the EU’s role

necessary. Scholarly accounts, so far, furthermore focussed on the EU’s role in summits

of greater scale, like the one in Copenhagen, whereas its part in smaller preparatory

sessions remains underexplored. However, the last twenty years of talks indicate the

importance of these in-between meetings for the success of the annual climate summits.

As a new climate agreement is expected to be signed at the end of 2015, the upcoming

gatherings need to specify most of the details for a deal to emerge by then. For these

reasons this thesis examines the EU’s activities during the first negotiation session in

2014, technically referred to as the fourth part of the second session of the Ad Hoc

Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP 2-4).

The main research question therefore is: How did the EU perform during ADP 2-4?

The performance concept applied was developed only recently by Lisanne Groen and

Sebastian Oberthür (2013), which is why the main added value of the case study is to

probe this concept by applying it to the assessment of the EU at the Bonn Climate

Change Conference in March 2014. Therefore, the author took part in this session of the

UNFCCC in order to collect the data through observation. This method selection

originated from the author’s curiousity about the seldom use of this method in the

literature on international negotiations, as his previous experience indicated the

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importance of informal negotiations. Also, most actors in the field rely on negotiating

tracking and observation for insights into the talks. Hence, an additional research

interest was to discover reasons why the method of observation is rarely used in

political science.

Besides these academic contributions, the high social relevance of research on climate

change negotiations is invaluable. Assuming that a legally-binding international

agreement on climate change would effectively reduce climate impacts, the knowledge

about a well-performing, progressive EU in the talks cannot be underestimated, as

global warming potentially affects every individual on our planet. The analysis could

merit EU delegates to better assess possible options for negotiation actions and the body

of research on EU performance could hence be used to enhance the overall performance

of the climate regime.

The thesis proceeds as follows. It starts with a review of the history of EU climate

policy from the beginnings of European integration until today, followed by a literature

review of the scholarly attempts to grasp the EU’s global role. It argues for an

integrated perspective on the literature, which builds the foundation for the performance

concept by Groen and Oberthür (2013) set out in chapter three. Then, the three

categories of the concept, goal attainment, quality of policy objectives and fit with the

international constellation of power and interests are briefly situated in the universe of

terms, before the detailed operationalisation is explained. It is noteworthy here, that due

to the limited scope of the thesis, the EU was compared only with two of the main

protagonists in the international context, namely the United States (US) and China.

These two countries were selected as a point of comparison due to the importance of

their participation in any meaningful climate treaty because of their significant share of

global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Chapter three concludes with an illustration of

the case selection and explanation of the methods applied. After a short summary of the

negotiating setting, chapter four analyses the EU’s performance according to the

conceptual dimensions supplemented by some reflections on the method of observation.

Finally, the findings are summarised and evaluated in the Conclusion.

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2. The European Union’s role in international climate change

negotiations

The literature review in this chapter sets the stage for the analysis later on in the thesis.

It starts with an overview of the development of the EU’s environmental and climate

policy from the beginnings of European integration until today, followed by a review of

terms and concepts applied to assess the EU’s role in the international arena.

2.1 The Evolution of EU Climate Policy

Today’s EU climate policy developed as a sub-branch of the environmental policy field.

Thus this paragraph begins with a review of the EU’s competences in this area, before

focussing on its role in the UNFCCC process leading up to the ADP 2-4 session

researched in this thesis.

Knill and Liefferink (2013: 28f.) identify three phases of EU environmental policy.1

The first one characterises the emergence of this policy field from the founding treaties

until the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987. Environmental policy was not mentioned

in the Treaty of Rome and hence lacked a legal basis for Community action. It

developed as an interpretation of the treaties in order to achieve the common market by

harmonisation of environmental standards. Raising public awareness of cross-border

phenomena like forest dieback in Germany contributed as well and led to the adoption

of the first European Environmental Action Program in 1972.

The de facto practice of environmental policy found its de jure formalisation only with

the SEA fifteen years later. The SEA also marked the beginning of the second phase,

which was “characterized by the legal and institutional consolidation and further

development” (ibid: 29) of the policy field until 1992. It introduced a new treaty title for

environmental policy including key principles and thus made it an official task of the

community. This ‘coming of age’ phase found its climax with the Treaty of Maastricht

in 1992, which created not only the EU but also established the European

Environmental Agency and the principle of sustainability as a prerequisite for all policy

areas. Since then, the policy dynamic of EU environmental policy stagnated compared

to earlier phases and limited itself to updates of the existing framework. This can be

interpreted as a sign for the maturity of the policy field (Knill/Lieffering 2013). Even

the latest reform with the Treaty of Lisbon introduced rather minor changes internally

1 For brevity and enhanced readability, the term “EU” will be continuously applied, at times also for the historic predecessors of the Union, namely the European Communities.

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by broadening the sustainability principles, the applicability of the co-decision

procedure involving the European Parliament and a de jure formalisation of already

practiced EU competences on Energy policy.

However, regarding the external competences of the EU, the Treaty of Lisbon obliged

the EU “to promote ‘measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide

environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change’” (Benson/Adelle

2013: 38), accompanied by the introduction of an EU diplomatic service represented by

the High Representative for Foreign Affairs. The interconnection of the internal and

external dimensions of EU environmental policy, in which the former builds the basis

for the latter, was pointed out by the European Court of Justice ruling 22-70 in 1971

which stated the ability of the Community to act externally on all policy areas if it

possessed the internal competences for them. These powers are therefore implied by

treaty expressions like the task established with the SEA. External competences are

furthermore shared between the EU and its member states (MS), requiring concerted

action on the international stage (Delreux 2013: 290f.). The EU developed as a relevant

and recognised player on global environmental issues such as climate change,

biodiversity loss or the depletion of the ozone layer and played a crucial role in the

development of multilateral environmental agreements to mitigate their impacts (Vogler

2011: 358, Delreux 2013: 289).

Apparently, these actions, in particular on climate change, are predominantly influenced

by normative principles, like the precautionary principle stated in the SEA and the

political perception of scientific findings. The EU’s action on the international level was

also enhanced by its commitment to “’effective multilateralism’ as a guiding principle

of international policy- and law-making” (Van Schaik/Schunz 2012: 173).

Consequently, this desire for strong global governance led the EU to an active

involvement in the process towards and in the UNFCCC. The following outline of the

EU’s role therein proceeds chronologically in five phases, according to important steps

in the development of the Convention.2

Emergence of the Convention (1990-1992)

In advance to the adoption of the UNFCCC, the EU’s dynamic in the environmental

policy field expressed itself also in its involvement in the international process from the

2 The phases build on the ones proposed in Schunz 2012, VanSchaik/Schunz 2012 and Bäckstrand/Elgström 2013. For a detailed timeline of the UNFCCC and related processes see http://unfccc.int/timeline.

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late 1980s onwards. Not yet recognised as a distinct entity, the EU participated

indirectly through its MS in the preparation of the Intergovernmental Negotiating

Committee (INC). The INC was set up by the UN General Assembly in late 1990 to

develop a regime framework on climate change, strongly influenced by the first

scientific findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) which

was established in 1988 in order to research the causes and effects of an increased

global greenhouse effect. Within the INC, two negotiating groups emerged: the

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for industrialised

countries and the Group of 77 and China (G77/China) comprising nearly 140 countries

of the developing world. Besides procedural matters, two topics were at the core of the

debate. Firstly, the question of “who should do what?” (Schunz 2012a: 194), regarding

emission reductions proved difficult. Developing countries insisted on a differentiation

taking into account historical emissions by industrialised countries. The EU MS

together with other OECD countries opposed this at first, but later compromised on the

principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” (UNFCCC 1992: 9) (CBDR),

which effectively excluded developing countries from any reduction obligations.

Secondly, the EU’s approach of “targets and timetables” (Schunz 2012: 194; Vogler

2011: 364) for emission reductions was opposed by the US, hence the final text of the

Convention only refers to a “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the

atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the

climate system” (UNFCCC 1992: 9) without specific reduction mitigation goals.

Finally, the work of the INC culminated in the 1992 Rio de Janeiro summit which

established the UNFCCC to come into force in 1994. Henceforth, the EU was

recognised as a Regional Economic Integration Organisation (REIO) and Party to the

Convention. This provided full participation rights for the Union and the opportunity to

cast the votes of MS altogether, without an additional vote for its own however (Vogler

2011, Schunz 2012 a, b; Bäckstrand/Elgström 2013).

Negotiations towards the Kyoto Protocol (1992-1997)

One year after the UNFCCC’s entry into force, the first Conference of the Parties (COP)

in Berlin set out a mandate for a legally-binding protocol to be adopted in Kyoto in

1997. In doing so, the EU, participating as the only REIO, succeeded with its approach

of binding obligations, also by defending the “firewall” (Bäckstrand / Elgström 2013:

1376) between country blocks along the CBDR principle and the annexes of the

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Convention. In 1997, the Kyoto Protocoll (KP) was finally adopted, setting GHG

reduction obligations of up to eight percent (-8%) compared to 1990 levels and

obtainable for all developed country Parties in Annex I until 2012. The relatively

ambitious target of -8% was weakened by the introduction of flexible mechanisms for

tradable emissions certificates however. These were conditions by a group of countries

around the US for them to accept binding targets (Vogler 2011, Schunz 2012b,

Bäckstrand/Elgström 2013).

Ratifying the KP (1998-2005)

Despite the latter compromise on flexible mechanisms, the US withdrew from the KP in

2001. This posed a major challenge for the KP, as from now on all other Annex-I

countries needed to ratify it in order to meet the required share of 55% of global

emissions in 1990. At the same time, the US retreat provided the opportunity for the EU

to show leadership in the process by securing the KP ratification and operationalisation.

The EU, for instance, successfully made its support for the Russian membership in the

World Trade Organisation conditional on the ratification of the KP and engaged in a

‘capitals tour’, i.e. active climate diplomacy on all levels. It furthermore ensured the

functionality of the KP with concrete proposals at the Marrakesh COP in 2001, but due

to the tedious ratification process3 the KP only entered into force in 2005. (Vogler 2011,

Bäckstrand/Elgström 2013).

Post-2012 Negotiations until Copenhagen (2006-2009):

As already foreseen by the KP and under the impressions of the new IPCC report,

which deemed the KP reduction targets insufficient to achieve the goal of the

Convention, negotiations on a second commitment period started in 2005. Due to the

CBDR-‘firewall’, the KP neither included developing countries nor the US, which is

why the 2007 COP set out the two negotiating tracks of the ‘Bali roadmap’. One on the

second commitment period for the KP from 2012 onwards, the second for a new

agreement encompassing all major emitters. The latter approach was advanced by the

EU in order to ensure involvement of the US, China and India under one stream of talks

while maintaining the CBDR distinction under the KP track, i.e. talks without the US.

However, the questions arising from this approach, in particular about the legal nature

of the new treaty, remained unresolved until the unfortunate climax in Copenhagen in

3 Russia ratified the KP only in late 2004.

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2009 (COP15). Expectations for COP15 were sky-high and the conference not only

sparked in the number of participants, media attention and involvement of Heads of

State and Government, but also in subsequent research (see inter alia Dimitrov 2010,

Groen/Niemann/Oberthür 2012, Groen/Niemann 2013, Bäckstrand/Elgström 2013).

In light of the high expectations to deliver a new climate treaty, COP15 truly collapsed.

The outcome document, the Copenhagen Accord, was not adopted but only ‘taken note

of’, as the many unresolved questions and its intransparent emergence prevented

consensus. Besides the aforementioned legal nature of the new treaty, another main

point of contention constituted the different approaches for an agreement. While the US,

Australia and China advocated a “bottom-up” (Dimitrov 2013: 348) approach to set

mitigation targets for countries - meaning every country determines their own

reductions - the EU and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) insisted on a “top-

down” (ibid.) way of targets noted in the international treaty in order to ensure

meaningful mitigation. Conditioned by repeated public disputes between EU MS and a

strategic mistake to temporarily let go of the KP as the only legally binding treaty,

which alienated AOSIS and other developing countries, the EU was sidelined in the

negotiations. The BASIC countries4 and the US deliberated a least common

denominator document behind closed doors, setting the stage for all upcoming talks:

“The Copenhagen Accord signified a new global climate order, where a system of

voluntary carbon reduction pledges submitted by countries replaced science-based

binding targets and timetables negotiated under the UN” (Bäckstrand/Elgström 2013:

1378). As a minimum requirement, it mentioned the two degree Celcius (2°C) ‘safe

limit’ and financial and technological support as political goals. In sum, the failure of

COP15 to adopt a new climate treaty was a major setback both for the UN process and

the prominent role of the EU therein (Vogler 2011, Schunz 2012 b,

Backstränd/Elgström 2013, Groen/Niemann 2013).

Getting back on track: talks from Copenhagen towards a new climate treaty in 2015

The Cancun COP, one year later, mainly served to “get the UN process back on track

after the Copenhagen failure and to make sure that multilateralism was still alive”

(Herbel 2012: 91), which was also the EU’s principle goal for the 2010 negotiating

round. That year, Cancun officially adopted the core points of the Copenhagen Accord,

thereby restoring the process in an atmosphere of low expectations. The EU regained

4 Brasil, South Africa, India and China

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the confidence of other Parties by a clear commitment to maintain the KP, while it

adapted its negotiation conduct to the changed “geopolitics of climate change”

(Groen/Niemann/Oberthür 2012: 186) and bridged gaps between major Parties as a

preparation for Durban in 2011 (Bäckstrand/Elgström 2013).

The atmosphere of low ambition surrounding COP17 in Durban reflected the different

global policy preferences at the time, in particular the fear for a repeated economic

downturn and the crisis in the Eurozone. However, the conference was the only

possibility left to ensure a continuation of the commitments under the KP, which were

about to run out by 2012. The assessment of the Durban Outcomes was twofold. On the

one hand, the establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for

Enhanced Action (ADP) postponed international action on climate change under a new

treaty until 2020 while the scope of the prolonged KP melted down to less than quarter

of global GHG emissions.5 Particularly developing countries’ and observer voices

lamented a failure to address the urgency of the issue (Banerjee 2012, Dimitrov 2013).

On the other hand, many accounts praised the regained leadership of the EU during the

summit as a success. Its “leader-cum-mediator” (Bäckstrand/Elgström 2013: 1381)

strategy to combine an extension of the KP with the prerequisite for a clear pathway

towards a new legally-binding agreement and underscoring these demands through

support of renewed coalitions with AOSIS and the African group proved successful for

the Union. Besides the shrunk KP, Durban set out a remarkable step towards a new

agreement by 2015, stating the task for the new ADP as “to develop a protocol, another

legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable

to all Parties” (UNFCCC 2011: 2, emphasis added). This constituted a clear discharge

of CBDR and the distinctive responsibilities of countries, opening the possibility for all

countries to take commitments under the 2015 agreement. The somewhat blurred

formula at the beginning resulted out of an informal ‘huddle’ in the plenary after

extended negotiating sessions, in order to find compromise between the US’s need for

legal range, the EU’s insistence on a legally-binding agreement and India’s (for the

BASIC countries’) concerns about possibly ‘top-down’ imposed mitigation targets for

them. Although focussed on emission reductions and committed to raise ambition

before 2020, the outcome mentions other elements6 to be considered under the ADP as

5 Canada withdrew from the KP while still in Durban, Russia and Japan declared their non-participation later on. 6 “Inter alia, on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, transparency of action and support, and capacity-building“ (paragraph 5, UNFCCC 2011).

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well (Banerjee 2012, Dimitrov 2013, Bäckstrand/Elgström 2013). Despite the

ambiguous wording, legal accounts of the ADP mandate suggest a legally-binding

protocol to become the core of the new agreement in 2015. As this remains disputed, a

package solution encompassing political decisions on the remaining elements seems

most likely (Voigt 2012).

Between Durban and the most recent COP19 in Warsaw in November 2013, talks in

Doha and at intersessional meetings in Bonn saw the conclusion of the negotiations

under the Bali roadmap and further decisions to operationalise the second commitment

period under the KP until 2020.

In Warsaw, the ADP fleshed out its workplan until 2015. The ADP negotiations towards

the new agreement take place under the so-called ‘Workstream 1’, while workshops to

enhance the mitigation ambition until 2020 are conducted in ‘Workstream 2’. The latter

is characterised mainly through technical exchange and knowledge transfer between

countries, which is why the analysis in chapter four focusses on the former. Concerning

this workstream, Warsaw specified the timetable for the ADP negotiations to “elaborate

the elements of the new climate agreement as of their first meeting in March 2014, table

an initial draft text by December 2014, and submit the formal draft text by May 2015

[...] to successfully conclude in December 2015” (UNFCCC 2013).

COP19 furthermore introduced “intended nationally determined contributions” (ibid.)

(NDC) as a term capturing the input from Parties for the 2015 agreement.

‘Contributions’ therein emerged again during a ‘huddle’ as a compromise between

developing countries, in particular the Like Minded Developing Countries on Climate

Change (LMDC)7, and developed countries, including the EU. Similar to the Durban

compromise this term was introduced last-minute and left the question of the pledges’

legal status open, in contrast to the term ‘commitments’ argued for by the EU.

Moreover, ‘nationally determined’ depicts the bottom-up character of the agreement

sought for by 2015 as introduced by the Copenhagen Accord, while dealing with the

question of differentiation was strategically avoided. Instead, LMDC argued for a

continued differentiation along the Annexes of the Convention and its CBDR principle

(ENB 2013: 29f.). This concludes the chronological review. In sum, today’s talks are

characterised by a different geopolitical context than twenty years ago, although the

issue of differentiation for binding commitments and hence CBDR remains contentious 7 The group consists of 18 countries: Bolivia, China, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, India, Iran, Iraq, Malaysia, Mali, Nicaragua, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Venezuela.

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between Parties.8 The short-term circumstances of ADP 2-4 are further elaborated in

chapter 4.1.

2.2 Literature Review: Research on the EU’s global role

This chapter sets out the theoretical framework and a brief overview of the State of the

Art of research on the EU’s global role. It strives for an integrated perspective on the

literature, building the foundation for the approach taken which will be further

elaborated on in chapter three.

Research on the EU as an international actor developed in two strands of literature, one

originated from scholarly interest in the EU and its external relations, the second from a

broader interest in the performance of international organisations.

The first strand evolved out of the European Foreign Policy literature, trying to

understand the EU’s ability to act on a global scale. As traditional International

Relations theories failed to adequately grasp this phenomena due to their state-centered

view on world affairs, the sui generis special nature of the EU as neither simply an

intergovernmental organisation nor yet a federal state led to scholarly debates about the

conceptualisation of this new actor. The question of how to describe the EU’s external

impacts was reformulated as ‘what kind of international power?’ the EU would

constitute. Several answers to these questions were suggested, the most known ones

being the concepts of “Civilian” or “Normative Power Europe” (Niemann/Bretherton

2013: 263f., Herbel 2012: 6). They conceive of the EU as a rather non-military power,

aiming at effective international legal governance by transferring the EU norms of

democracy and human rights to the international arena. Although criticised by scholars

for lack of empirical evidence and subject to ongoing reformulations, they retain

relevance for the EU’s self-perception as an actor, in particular in the case of climate

change (VanSchaik/Schunz 2012, Herbel 2012, Niemann/Bretherton 2013).

Another understanding of the EU’s role derives from the literature on international

negotiations. Here, the EU is understood as a “bargaining power” (Meunier 2000) able

to get as much as possible out of an agreement for both Parties (Herbel 2012: 8).9

8 Further review of the climate-specific policy research is beyond the scope of this thesis, but a recent Special Issue of ‘Climate Policy’ (Eds. Streck/Terhalle, vol. 13(5), 2013) summarises the current debate from a scholarly perspective, with a focus on policy advice. 9 Bargaining theory has implicit relevance for the concept of negotiating effectiveness/performance, set out in Chapter three.

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Whereas the studies mentioned so far shed light on the EU’s role in world affairs, they

all take EU actorness as given without further scrutinizing this assumption. “Yet, [...]

studies contesting the legitimacy and impact of EU foreign policy suggest that perhaps

the second step was taken before the first” (Niemann/Bretherton 2013: 264).

Understanding the EU as an international actor today, requires to further research its

very basis, namely the EU actorness, or, to put it differently, answer the question ‘Is the

EU an international actor?’ Therefore, recent literature revisited the concept of actorness

(cf. Niemann/Bretherton 2013), also devoting attention to the EU’s role in international

climate politics (Herbel 2012, Groen/Niemann 2013, Bretherton/Vogler 2013).

The idea of actorness was first introduced as “actor capability” by Sjösted (1977: 16).

His notion comprised a distinctive, active and conscious engagement vis-à-vis other

actors in the international arena. Furthermore, Sjösted assumed some characteristics

traditionally devoted to states, like a certain degree of autonomy. Hence, for the EU to

be able to interact with its state counterparts on the international level, stronger

integration in a supranational system was supposed to enhance EU actorness. But as a

classic work introducing the term of actor capability in general, Sjösted’s concept is not

easily operationalisable.

Therefore, the conceptualisation of Jupille and Caporaso (1998) contributed

substantially to the applicability of actorness. Aiming at global environmental politics

during the 1990s, with a focus on the 1992 Rio de Janeiro-summit, they developed four

relative, interdependent criteria to measure EU actorness: “Recognition”, defined as

“acceptance and interaction by and with an organisation and other Parties” (ibid: 214);

“Authority”, meaning the legal competence to act on an issue but also comprising

informal power through an advantage in knowledge for the European Commission;

“Autonomy” of the EU as an independent institution distinctive from member states and

able to act differently and “Cohesion”, as an internal dimension with four different

subcategories10 enabling the EU to act together towards a common goal (ibid: 214ff..).

The clear structure of Jupille and Caporaso’s approach lends itself to adaptation to

specific cases (see Groen/Niemann 2013, Herbel 2012), but was critisized for neglecting

the international context in which actions take place.

10 1) “value cohesion”: basic goals. 2) “tactical cohesion”: ability to create coherence of goals. 3) procedural cohesion: clear “rules of procedure” how to deal with disputes. 4) Output cohesion: ability to formulate a common position. (Jupille/Caporaso 1998: 214ff. and Niemann/Bretherthon 2013:265)

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This international context in turn constitutes the core for more constructivist approaches

like the one put forward by Bretherton and Vogler (2006, 2013). They suggested an

interlinked approach of three concepts, namely Opportunity, Presence and Capability.

The aforementioned international context constitutes the “Opportunity structure” (2006:

24), framing all possibilities for EU external action, for instance through the perceptions

of the EU by other actors in the international arena. “Presence” means the passive

“ability of an actor [...] to exert influence beyond its borders” (Bretherton/Vogler 2006:

24, 2013: 376). The concept of capability builds on Sjösted’s work, taking into account

the internal factors enabling action, but also the external framework of Opportunity and

Presence. Recent refinements point out the significance of coherence between different

institutions and EU MS, as well as a consistent policy framework and ‘toolkit’ to take

action (ibid: 2013).

So far, the literature tried to grasp the EU’s role in the world. But after establishing the

EU as an actor in international politics,11 the next question logically arises: Do the EU’s

actions matter?

The conceptual answer to this question was the term ‘effectiveness’, also responding to

the emergence of the EU’s goal to achieve ‘effective multilateralism’ in the early

2000’s. Whereas actorness looked at the capability to act or the “input side”

(Groen/Niemann 2013: 311), effectiveness is concerned with the “output side” (ibid.) of

international processes and most commonly understood in terms of “goal attainment”

(Jørgensen/Oberthür/Shahin 2011, Niemann/Bretherton 2013, Groen/Oberthür 2013,

Oberthür/Rabitz 2014). This understanding stems from the literature on international

regimes, which deemed a regime effective if it solved the problem that led to its

creation, as well as scholarship on organisational performance concerned with the

achievement of an organisation’s objectives.

The latter contributions build the second strand of literature, out of which ‘performance’

emerged as a concept. It was initially developed to analyse (international) organisations

and actors therein more generally and later applied to the EU. Despite the common

origin from research on regime effectiveness, the term ‘performance’ derived from

organisational theory and public management research. Attempts to conceptualise

performance in this field like the ones by Lusthaus et al. (2002) or Gutner and

Thompson (2010) included not only ‘effectiveness’ but also elements such as 11 See the EU’s legal recognition in the climate change regime in chapter 2.1 and the studies on EU actorness.

13

“relevance” (of the EU for its main stakeholders), “efficiency” (outputs vs. costs) or

“resource viability” (ability to raise funds necessary) (Jørgensen/Oberthür/Shahin 2011:

603; Groen/Shahin 2013: 3)

Together with the broader International Relations research interest it somehow

distinguished this strand of literature from the one evolved out of EU Foreign Policy

research. With elements as the ones mentioned above, performance approaches tried to

overcome the interconnectedness and lacking comparability of previous concepts

(Jørgensen/Oberthür/Shahin 2011). This led to a temporary parallel development of

concepts and terms, although the object of investigation, the EU’s global role, remained

the same for both tracks of scholarship.

However, the comparison of terms used in the literature (Figure 1) as well as integrating

proposals such as “Effectiveness 2.0” (Groen/Shahin 2013) demonstrate that

understandings converged and nowadays both strands share key concepts.12 Most

notably, the notions of opportunity structure and international context as well as the

concept of effectiveness in terms of goal attainment depict essentially the same,

independent of the broader overarching concepts.

Figure 1: Overview of Terms

12 Elaboration of all terms in the figure would exceed the scope of this thesis, why it restrains itself to the references given therein. It is also noteworthy that there is no ‘ideal’ set of criteria for EU performance but different approaches to unpack and grasp its existence.

14

Building upon the conclusion of the two strands of literature being mutually

complementary rather than exclusive, the following chapter will set out the concept and

methods used to assess the EU’s performance at the Bonn Climate Change Conference

(ADP 2-4) in March 2014.

3. Goal attainment, ambition and the international context –

Concept and Methods to assess EU performance

This chapter describes the relationships of the concept by Groen and Oberthür (2013)

with the terms in the literature reviewed above, before developing the detailed

operationalisation and research questions. As the final step of this theoretical part the

methods used and their respective challenges are characterised.

3.1 EU Performance – the approach by Groen and Oberthür in context

To begin with, the concept of EU performance consists of three major elements

(Groen/Oberthür 2013: 1-11, see Figure 2 and Research Matrix in Annex 1). First, EU

goal attainment depicts the ‘classic’ notion of effectiveness, which originated from the

literature on international regimes, organisational performance and was further applied

to the EU in the research field on actorness.

Second, the “quality of the EU’s policy objectives” (ibid: 6) measures the ambition

towards the core purpose of the institution, here the UNFCCC. This new element of

performance developed most recently (see Groen/Shahin 2013, Oberthür/Rabitz 2014),

building on ideas developed in both strands of literature noted above, most notably the

notion of ‘problem solving’ from research on regime effectiveness and the relevance of

objectives for their achievement from bargaining theory. This element assesses, whether

the EU’s policy aims at the negotiations would contribute to the main objective of the

international institution concerned.

Third, the “fit of the EU’s activities within the international constellation of power and

interests” (ibid: 8) consists of two analytical subcategories: As a precondition, the EU

must actually be active at the negotiation table, to assess, in a second step, its position in

the international context of the talks. The first subcategory therefore builds upon the

notions of recognition and authority by Jupille and Caporaso. Recent literature also

points out that a minimum degree of actorness is required to allow for any degree of

effectiveness and hence performance (Herbel 2012, Groen/Niemann 2013,

Niemann/Bretherton 2013).

15

Figure 2: Elements and Variables of EU Performance, based on Groen/Oberthür (2013)

In addition, this subcategory assesses by what means the EU is active at the talks, which

is necessary for the overall assessment of fit as the third element of EU performance.

The second subcategory adds the EU’s location in international context of power and

interests. This notion, in turn, is very close to the concept of “opportunity structure” by

Bretherton and Vogler (2006, 2013) and could be considered another way to

operationalise this concept, as done on a case by case basis before (see Herbel 2012,

Groen/Niemann 2013). The dimension of “Issue-specific power” in the constellation

builds upon both strands of literature. Groen and Oberthür (2013: 9) attribute the term to

both regime research and actorness (Sjöstedt). It also resembles the structural

component of Bretherton and Vogler’s ‘presence’ (2006, 2013) and ‘relevance’ from

organisational performance (cf. Lusthaus et al. 2002) literature (Jørgensen/Oberthür/

Shahin 2011). Complementing chapter two, these relationships situate this recent

approach as an innovative (re-)conceptualisation within the research on the EU’s role in

international institutions, taking into account both “process- and outcome related

variables” (Groen/Oberthür 2013: 3).

Regarding the relationships between the three elements, one has to bear in mind the

overall aim of the approach to describe and explain the EU’s role in international

institutions. Therefore, all three equally form part of the EU’s overall performance

score.

As this conference contribution constitutes work in progress, the relationship between

EU performance and the three elements in terms of dependent or independent variable is

not set out specifically, which is why a final causal assessment of EU performance is

16

not within the scope of the current framework. But, considering its research context, one

can certainly state that the authors suppose a dependent relationship of EU performance

on goal attainment. Notwithstanding this shortcoming, the approach already provides

clear relationships between the three elements assessed (see Figure 2). The elements of

ambition and fit with the international constellation both condition the degree to which

the EU can achieve its objectives, by setting the framework to which the EU’s

negotiation partners respond with their actions.

Therefore, the concept provides a parsimonious framework and operationalisation to

measure the EU’s activities in international negotiations, which is further specified in

the following part.

3.2 Operationalisation

The three elements of EU performance depicted in Figure 2 and outlined above will

now be operationalised for the concrete case at hand, based on Groen and Oberthür

(2013: 1-11), also pointing out the research questions behind them. Therefore, sources

of information available for ADP 2-4 and methods were allocated to the suggested

variables (see the Research Matrix in Annex 1).

The first element is goal achievement, or attainment: both terms will be used

interchangeably. It will be assessed by answering “to what extent the EU achieved its

declared policy objectives at the end of the negotiations” (Groen/Oberthür 2013: 6)

through a comparison between the official EU statements before or at the beginning of

the negotiations and the outcome documents of the session. This leads to a final result

for this variable, categorised as low, intermediate or high goal achievement.

The second element is the quality of the EU’s policy objectives regarding the purpose of

the international institution, which is subdivided into two variables. Higher efforts result

in a high score, while less ambitious targets accordingly result in a lower value. Both

categories will be rated as either low, intermediate or high, and result in a combined

score for this variable, ranging from low-low to high-high, with intermediate values

respectively in between.

Absolute goal quality answers the question, whether “the EU’s objectives aim at

achieving the objectives of the institution?” (ibid: 7). It is measured in reference to the

UNFCCC’s initial objective “to stabilise atmospheric [...][GHG] at a ‘safe level’”

(Bäckstrand/Elgström 2013: 1375, cf. UNFCCC 1992: 9). The ‘safe’ level of GHG is

determined by the IPCC’s regular reports, which also include scenarios assessing the

17

amount of emissions still ‘allowed’ to avoid any global temperature increase exceeding

2°C, as adopted in Cancun in 2010. The EU’s emission targets, therefore, will be

evaluated against this backdrop.

Under the umbrella of the institutional purpose, relative goal quality compares the EU’s

objectives with those of other Parties to evaluate whether the EU’s goals are more or

less ambitious as the contributions of other Parties. Instead of measuring absolute goals,

this variable values whether the EU’s objectives are striving more to achieve the two-

degree-goal than those of other Parties, using the overall objective of the Convention as

a point of comparison. Both elements of the ambition variable will be measured through

their score on the Climate Action Tracker13, accompanied by an analysis of relevant

policy documents.

The third element constitutes the “fit of the EU’s activities [in the negotiations] with the

international constellation of power and interests” (Groen/Oberthür 2013: 8). As a first

variable of this element and as a prerequisite for the whole analysis, the question needs

to be answered whether the EU was actively taking part in the talks. This question could

be answered with a simple yes or no, but the overall question of ‘fitting actions’ vis-à-

vis the international context requires further elaboration by what means the EU took

action, e.g. through proposals, submissions and statements during the proceedings.

Other conceivable strategies are: “coalition [...][or] bridge building, issue

linkage/making package deals [or] compromises” (Groen/Oberthür 2013: 9-10), as well

as levering public opinion, or demonstrating power as a block.

The second part of the element answers the question, where the EU is situated in the

international context of actors by measuring two variables. At first, its position is

determined through “Issue-specific power” (Groen/Oberthür 2013: 9) denoting the

Union’s relevance for the solution to the problem at hand and measured by its share in

global GHG emissions. This power can either be strong or weak.

Subsequently, the variable “Interests” (ibid: 9) answers the question where the EU is

situated in the constellation of interests vis-à-vis other Parties. The position of interests

can be determined for each agenda item and against the background of the current status

quo. In order to do so, the spectrum of interests encompassing all major players needs to

be explored to define the EU’s location. Positions can either aim at changing the status

quo of negotiations, and can therefore be progressive, or trying to keep the current state

and be conservative accordingly. Bargaining theory sets out that a progressive position 13 An interdisciplinary project evaluating current emission pledges and their impact on the GHG concentration in the atmosphere. See CAT (2014).

18

is harder to achieve under consensus decision-making rules, hence it requires more

engagement in negotiation activities than a conservative stance (Meunier 2000,

Groen/Oberthür 2013, Oberthür/Rabitz 2014).

The values of both variables lead to an aggregate score depicting the EU’s role, i.e. its

position in the international context, with four possible values: weak-progressive, weak-

conservative, strong-progressive or strong-conservative.

In order to influence goal attainment positively, the EU’s role in the international

constellation needs to fit with the activities undertaken and measured as the first

variable in this element. The degree of fit of these two dimensions can vary over low,

intermediate to high.

3.3 Case selection

This paragraph sets out the case selection before describing the methods used for the

EU’s performance assessment in the following paragraph.

As a general starting point, the thesis assumes middle-ground in the ontological-

epistemological sphere, based on a Weberian notion of the social sciences. On ontology,

or the question how we conceive of “the nature of the social world” (Jackson/Sørensen

2010: 294), the thesis follows the constructivist view of a rather socially constructed

world formed by the subjective perceptions of individuals. This, in turn, is close to the

ontological foundation of the qualitative methods applied, which postulates “an

understanding of causality that acts on the assumption of combinatory, non-linear and

heterogeneous impacts of factors” (Blatter/Janning/Wagemann 2007: 35). However, this

does not preclude the possibility of finding recurrent patterns researching (phenomena

within) this world and ‘explain’ it to a certain degree in an epistemological sense, i.e. to

gain knowledge about our living environment. Therefore, the discovery of “Causal

Mechanisms” (Seawright/Collier 2010: 317) is considered possible, based on a thorough

grasp of the socially constructed world as already expressed by Max Weber

(Jackson/Sørensen 2010: 294f.).

Concerning the selection of the case assessed, it was chosen mainly due to its ‘real

world’ characteristics. As “context-dependent knowledge” (Flyvbjerg 2006: 222) is key

to human perception of the world, the following characteristics were the origin and

main argument for the focus of this case study. Besides the occasion of the twentieth

anniversary of the UNFCCC’s entry into force in 2014, the ADP 2-4 case differed from

cases studied before in important aspects: Being a rather technical, low-level meeting of

19

delegates, political salience and public interest in this specific session were low. Most

importantly though, according to many seasoned participants of the process,

intersessional meetings between COPs such as ADP 2-4 or the biannual meeting of the

subsidiary bodies in Bonn, constitute the main arena where negotiations on most issues

make substantive progress before getting finalised and signed at the summits. Also, at

first sight, the smaller scale of ADP 2-4 (see Ch. 4.1) allowed for enhanced formal

access to the process. It was also conveniently situated in the period scheduled for the

thesis.

Practical, ‘real world’ reasons aside the case selection also accounted for theoretical

added-value of the study. Bearing in mind the ‘work in progress’ state of the conceptual

framework, commonly used types of case studies like “deviant” (Odell 2001: 166) or

“crucial” (Eckstein 1975: 113) case studies were not directly applicable, as they build

upon an established theoretical framework able to be affirmed or dismissed. Therefore,

the primary theoretical purpose of this case study is one of “plausibility prob[ing]”

(ibid: 108). Such a probe is not yet a fully-fledged test for the concept but rather a

“racehorse trial” (ibid.). Despite being inconclusive for the theory as a whole, it

strengthens it by either confirming or dismissing some of the conceptual aspects. It is

rather economic in the use of resources as well, hence suitable for a thesis of limited

scope (ibid.).

In light of the overall research framework to explain the EU’s performance in

international negotiations (see above), the case study, furthermore, forms part of an

incremental “building blocks” (George/Bennett 2005: 76) approach to theory building,

contributing to the current conceptual debate through its findings. All in all, the thesis

constitutes a single descriptive-analytical case study, in order to probe the concept

suggested by Groen and Oberthür (2013) under different contextual conditions than

studies so far.

3.4 Methods

The thesis builds on two complementary methods, participant observation and

document analysis.

Concerning the former, observation is one of, if not the, oldest method in science but

rather uncommon in political science to date. Still, the method advanced considerably

20

since the late 1970s14 and assets and drawbacks have been identified (see below).

Nevertheless, studies reflecting the methodology remain scarce, despite the growing

amount of literature applying this way of data collection.15 It, therefore, still constitutes

a rather innovative method, in particular for research on global environmental

governance (O’Neill et al. 2013: 450, Blatter/Janning/Wagemann 2007: 67-74, Schöne

2003, Dargie 1998).

Despite its shortcomings regarding the conventional quality criteria for (quantitative)

research (reliability, validity) inherent to all qualitative methods the main benefit of

observation is the consideration and inquiry of contextual data. Observing informal

interactions, getting an impression of the situation and the atmosphere as the “affective

component” (Schöne 2003) enables insights into processes like negotiations which other

methods do not provide. Combined with other data sources, such as document analysis,

observation is also capable of producing valid and reliable findings (Dargie 1998).

However, significant challenges in the implementation of the method remain and are

most likely the main reasons for its limited use. The most obvious constrains are the

limited timeframe available for observation and the high costs affiliated with it. The

researcher is unable to conduct observation at all times and, therefore, needs to identify

certain points in time for it. Nonetheless, as soon as the scholar decides for the method,

preparation and the actual observation phase become a ‘full-time job’, also bearing

additional expenditures like accommodation, transport and alike. Most important for the

substantial quality of the study is the question of access though. Administrative efforts

aside, the role of trust to gain valuable insights cannot be overestimated (Dargie 1998,

Schöne 2003, Blatter/Janning/Wagemann 2007: 68). Helpful tools to achieve a

meaningful data record are chronological notes, which, besides substantial information

on statements, should also encompass impressions and facts about the location, room

arrangements and access modalities of the observation. To ensure an adequate focussed

assessment of the variables derived from theory, a research matrix gives valuable

guidance during the implementation phase (Dargie 1998, Schöne 2003, see Annex).

Now what type of observation is applied for this thesis? There are five defining pairs of

dimensions commonly mentioned in the literature: “covert vs. open; systematic vs. non-

systematic; natural vs. artificial; self vs. external and non-participant vs. participant

14 The first ground-breaking study by Richard Fenno “Home style: House Members in their districts” researched US-congressmen and their relationships with their constituency, extensively using participant observation for the first time in 1978. 15 On observation of the climate change regime, see inter alia Dimitrov 2010; Bannerjee 2012; Bäckstrand/Elgström 2013; Groen/Oberthür 2014 and Dimitrov 2013: 347 for additional contributions.

21

observation” (Schöne 2003). At first sight, the study, therefore, classified as an open,

systematic, external participant observation in the ‘natural’ circumstances of real

negotiations. However, considering the ‘subdimension’ of an active vs. a passive

participation (Blatter/Janning/Wagemann 2007: 70), it was characterised through a

passive role during the talks with the observer ‘covert in the crowd’. “[T]he boundary

between participant and nonparticipant observation is thus not a clear one” (Lewis-

Beck/Bryman/Liao 2004: 798). For the sake of a distinct understanding, this study

therefore applies ‘observation’ and ‘participant observation’ exchangeable, in the sense

of “a method of data collection in which the investigator uses participation in an area of

ongoing social life to observe it.” (ibid: 797). The practical implications of the method

are reflected in chapter 4.6.

Regarding the complementary method of document analysis, this is foremost used in

order to verify the notes taken during the observation through secondary documents. It

roughly follows the idea of “process tracing” (George/Bennet 2005: 205-232; Herbel

2012: 27-30). Thus, documents were located in the observation context to cross-

reference and thereby ensure validity of notes and interpretations, yet generally taken

“at face value” (Groen/Oberthür 2014: 2) without considering the intentions or strategic

implications behind them, as this would have gone beyond the scope of this thesis.

4. The EU’s performance at the Bonn Climate Change

Conference in March 2014

Before assessing the EU’s performance at the fourth part of the second session of the

Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP 2-4) in

March 2014 through the concept outlined above, the next paragraph will briefly

describe the context of these negotiations.

4.1 Negotiation setting and political context

Since 2012, as described in chapter 2, the ADP constitutes the key arena of current

UNFCCC talks, with the task to achieve a broad, inclusive and accepted outcome at the

Paris summit in 2015. In order to achieve this, the ADP is chaired by two co-chairs,

proposed by Parties and elected for every session. Since the start of the ADP’s second

session in May 2013, it is co-chaired by Kishan Kumarsingh (Trinidad and Tobago) and

22

Artur Runge-Metzger (EU).16 The fourth part of the second session (2-4) took place in

the World Conference Center Bonn (WCCB) from Monday, 10 March to Friday, 14

March 2014. Being an intersessional meeting of only one Subsidiary Body to the

Convention, ADP 2-4 was of a rather small size, counting a total amount of 879

participants (ADP 2014a). The daily schedule started with a three hour session at 10.00

a.m., succeeded by a two hour lunch break. Both in the morning and noon meetings of

groups of Parties took place. Besides the formal opening and closing plenaries, each

session was attributed to a specific topic related to the elements of the ADP’s mandate

from Durban (see Annex 2).

Despite this small absolute number, the former German Federal Parliament buildings

proved to be insufficient for the usual procedures of the meeting. The big plenary hall,

in which both opening and closing plenary took place, was the only room capable of

hosting all Parties and observers. The Group of 77 and China, being the group including

most Parties, used this room for their coordination meetings during the lunch break, as

there was no separate room available. Their extensive discussions about procedural

matters (see 4.3.2) resulted in daily delays to the formal negotiating schedule of up to

sixty minutes and hence even longer negotiating days with formal consultations running

until 7.00 PM. On a more positive note, this ‘waiting time’ allowed for informal talks

with delegates in front of the plenary hall, through which relevant background

information on the proceedings was gathered (e.g. internal coordination of EU MS, see

below). However, in addition to the inconvenient delays, the second plenary room,

(Wasserwerk) used for consultations on the first two days was heavily criticised by

Parties for its size as not even all Parties could have a seat at the table due to lack of

space. Although this was intended by the co-chairs to some extent in order to accelerate

debate by means of a more intense atmosphere, this room-arrangement was rejected by

Parties as non-inclusive. To avoid further complaints distracting from substance, the

rooms were switched from Wednesday onwards, to allow for all Parties to have a seat in

the big plenary of the WCCB for talks on Workstream One.

The talks were conducted in the negotiating mode of “open-ended consultations”,

described by co-chair Runge-Metzger during the Opening Plenary as a formal

16 The EU’s potential influence through Artur Runge-Metzger (the former EU lead negotiator) is not further examined in this thesis, although some research points to a non-negligible “power of the chair” (see inter alia Tallberg, Jonas (2010): The Power of the Chair: Formal Leadership in International Cooperation. ISQ vol. 54). However, this might be counter-balanced by the fact that Runge-Metzger was conceived as an ‘EU-chair’ by developing countries, rather than an impartial ADP co-chair, as some participants noted.

23

negotiating mode, open to observers and not ‘endless’ but clearly directed towards

progress on the ADP’s mandate from Durban. Restating the positive spirit of

compromise after COP19 in Warsaw, he, furthermore, referred to the glass-walls of the

venue as a symbol of transparency and trust, which could motivate delegates to engage

with each other in good faith. Stressing this point seemed appropriate to start, bearing in

mind the overall political environment of the talks. Shortly before ADP 2-4, leaked

documents revealed the US spied on other Parties during the pivotal Copenhagen

Climate Summit in 2009 and the Crimean crisis sparked concerns over a new Cold War

(The Guardian 2014a, b). This external political landscape, that plagued the world in the

lead up to and over the duration of the talks also contributed to a lack of trust between

Parties, apart from the substantial disputes outlined below (RTCC 2014a). However, on

a more positive note, the European Commission’s (2014a) Proposal for a 2030

emissions reduction target showed some movement in the EU’s climate politics. Yet,

the simple announcement with Heads of State and Government to debate the proposal

only one week after ADP 2-4 concluded, did not build enough momentum to overcome

the ‘firewall’ divide about differentiation between countries during the talks in Bonn.

The following paragraphs will assess the variables outlined in chapter 3.2 by answering

the research questions stated therein. These are based upon information gathered during

the participant observation in Bonn (see Annex for notes and research matrix) as well as

the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB 2014) and the summaries of the talks by the Third

World Network (TWN 2014). As explained in chapter 2.1, the analysis will focus on the

talks under Workstream One, as Workstream Two explicitly aimed at technical

exchange and hence no negotiation performance would be assessable.

The order in which the variables are assessed is generally interchangeable, as they all

contribute to EU Performance. However, both the quality of the EU’s policy objectives

and the fit of the EU’s activities with the international context condition the EU’s goal

achievement. Therefore, they are determined in advance to goal attainment as the last

paragraph.

4.2 Quality of the EU’s policy objectives

This category assesses, how ambitious the EU is in achieving the objectives set out by

the Convention, that is to limit global warming to a maximum of two degree Celcius

(2°C) compared to pre-industrial levels. The assessment of ambition, or quality of

24

policy objectives is based on the assumption that more ambitious goals are more

difficult to achieve in a consensus based decision-making process than less ambitious

ones, as outlined in chapter three. The urgency of climate change furthermore requires

timely action. Hence, ambition constitutes a relevant aspect of credibility because it

matters if a party is really willing to act upon the issue.

It is also noteworthy that the current global emissions pathway does generally not meet

the landmarks towards a stable climate as identified by the IPCC. On the contrary, to

date climate policies are bound for global warming to exceed 3°C compared to 1900, so

worldwide ambition is quite low and does not react to climate change to the extent

deemed necessary by science (CAT 2013, Groen/Oberthür 2014 IES Policy Paper).

4.2.1 Absolute quality

The category of absolute quality asks if the EU’s current policy objectives are in line

with the acknowledged 2°C goal. It, therefore, depicts the EU’s ambition to the

overarching objective of the Convention. The Climate Action Tracker (CAT) rates the

current internally legally binding EU objective of GHG emission reductions of 20%

until 2020 compared to 1990 levels as “inadequate” regarding the 2°C goal. However,

the adopted option for a 30% reduction for 2020, which is conditional on international

action, i.e. an agreement enshrining efforts from other Parties, would place the EU close

to “sufficient” reductions (CAT 2013). With already 17% of reductions achieved until

2011, the EU is also about to overachieve its -20% target. The European Commissions’

impact assessment for the proposed 2030 target of -40% GHG emissions, therefore

states that the EU’s efforts would be coherent with the global 2°C goal (European

Commission 2014b: 15, 48). This assessment is based on the 80% reductions target for

2050 agreed in 2011 and modelling assumptions such as converging national and

sectoral carbon prices. Opposing the European Commissions’ assessment other

accounts consider at least -95% emissions for 2050 necessary in order to achieve the

2°C goal, which would require the EU to achieve a minimum reduction of 55% by 2030

(CAN Europe 2014). Last but not least, the -40% by 2030 target to date is only a

Commission proposal and the decision upon this has just been postponed until October

2014 (RTCC 2014b). Therefore, the only valid climate policy for the EU to date

remains the 2020 package. Although the -20% target is insufficient to achieve the 2°C

goal, the favourable implementation record and ‘overachievement’ results in an

intermediate level of absolute ambition or policy quality.

25

4.2.2 Relative quality

The level of relative quality of policy objectives answers the question, whether the EU’s

policies are more ambitious than those by other Parties in light of the 2°C goal.

The CAT (2013) analysis rates the US and China as “inadequate” regarding the 2°C

ceiling, with the US voluntary pledge representing a mere 3% cut in GHG emissions

compared to 1990 levels. Even this minimal pledge is deemed difficult to achieve for

the US. For China, however, the rating is mainly based on the uncertainty evolving out

of the data-insecurity of China’s current pledge to almost halve its emissions intensity,

i.e. the amount of GHG per unit in GDP growth. As the EU’s absolute ranking was

intermediate and both the US and China have to be considered low in this respect, the

EU’s relative ambition, therefore, assumes a high score.

In order to have a common reference framework for the analysis, the EU-US-China

‘triangle’ is continuously assessed, although the picture of the EU as a relative

frontrunner does not live up to global realities. Already within the countries assessed by

the CAT, all BASIC countries except for China outrun the EU with a ‘medium’ score

for their pledges compared to the 2°C objective. China, therefore, constitutes somewhat

of an ‘outlier’ on this variable in the analytical sample, as also meta-assessments of

different studies further confirm the wider picture that the level of ambition on

mitigation is clearly higher in developing than in developed countries (Kartha/Erickson

2011). This should be kept in mind when considering the EU’s position within the

sphere of actors. In sum, the quality of the EU’s policy objectives is rated intermediate-

high, setting the baseline for the EU’s engagement in the process.

4.3 Fit of EU activities with the international constellation.

The following part, firstly, elaborates the ways the EU undertook actions in Bonn

before, secondly, locating the EU in the international constellation of power and

interests in order to, thirdly, summarise and assess the extent to which the former fits

the latter as a main factor of the EU’s performance.

4.3.1 EU activities during the negotiations

The EU was clearly present and active in Bonn. It had already submitted its views on

how to proceed during ADP 2-4 and its work throughout 2014 in a submission one

week in advance to the session, pointing out the priorities of up front information

requirements for ‘intended nationally determined contributions’ (NDC) and progress on

26

the rules base for the 2015 agreement (see 4.4). Submissions were encouraged by the

co-chairs to have clear positions before the start of the talks. Besides the EU inter alia

the US, China, the LMDC, Switzerland and even Ukraine handed in submissions before

the opening-plenary, yet, for example the position of G77/China was not submitted.17

The EU also regularly delivered statements in plenary while also engaging in informal

debates during the welcome reception and through meetings in groups of Parties such as

those of the Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action.18 Regarding the strategies

applied by the EU, the picture emerging during the observation was a mixed one. On the

one hand, it appeared as if the EU engaged more in efforts to ‘issue-division’ rather than

issue linkage, advocating a clear distinction between mitigation-focussed NDCs and

other elements of the 2015 package, such as adaptation and Means of Implementation

(MoI), in particular finance.19 No solution for these diverging views appeared until the

end of the negotiating week and at least in official statements, there were no offers for

compromise or concessions either, impairing the EU’s chances to succeed with its

progressive proposals.

On the other hand, the EU consistently spoke with one voice, only represented by the

Greek Presidency during the official plenaries (opening and closing), while all other

interventions where delivered by lead negotiators from the European Commission or the

MS on behalf of the EU and its MS. Delegates from MS informally even phrased the

EU’s policy at ADP 2-4 as ‘prohibiting MS to take the floor’. Despite some disputes

between MS, these were reconciled behind closed doors in the morning coordination

meetings and did not affect the EU’s outside image as a unified actor. This ‘secret’

internal process for compromise is vital for the EU’s perception as a Union. The

absence of internal compromise and open divergence impaired the EU’s performance in

previous talks, most notably in Copenhagen (cf. Groen/Niemann 2013, Groen/Oberthür

2013).20 While there was no direct reference to strong public support for climate action

in the EU during the talks, the European Commission released a special Eurobarometer

report only one week before the start of the session in Bonn (European Commission

2014c).

17 All submissions are available online: http://unfccc.int/bodies/awg/items/7398.php 18 This dialogue is an informal platform of 31 countries and the EU, which developed at and during the aftermath of Copenhagen. It provides a space outside the negotiations to openly discuss positions and facilitate compromise as its small to medium sized members cover the whole development spectrum. For an insider perspective of 2011 see http://intercambioclimatico.com/en/2011/02/02/the-cartagena-dialogue-a-sui-generis-alliance-in-the-climate-negotiations/ (6 May 2014). 19 MoI include the negotiating topics of Finance, Technology and Capacity-Building. 20 Other negotiating groups face the same challenge, naturally growing with the size of the group. For an account of AOSIS see Betzold et. al (2012, In: Climate Policy, 12(5)).

27

This could be interpreted as a strategic publication in order to underscore the EU’s

commitment on climate change and set the stage for the first ADP round in 2014.

Although the EU delegates were actively engaged in outreach to other Parties by all

means, the positions in plenary statements remained unchanged (see below). If coalition

or bridge building by the EU took place in the background, this did not flesh out any

progress in the official multilateral negotiations throughout the week and was thus not

observable to non-party-delegates (see method reflection, 4.5). However, the procedural

disagreement over the establishment of a Contact Group as requested by most

developing countries could be resolved timely through compromise in the so called

“bureau” of the COP.21 Within the bureau, the EU ensured not another agenda fight

would emerge if a Contact Group would be established and, therefore, brokered a

compromise to overcome this procedural impediment (Informal NGO-meeting with

German Head of Delegation and Member of the Bureau for the EU on 13 March 2014).

This background-compromise was announced through party statements to the ADP

stocktaking plenary on Wednesday and enabled all Parties to refocus on substantial

talks for the last two days.

4.3.2 Position in the international constellation of power and interests

The EU’s position in the international context is determined through two dimensions,

“issue-specific power” (weak vs. strong) and “Interests” (progressive vs. conservative).

Both dimensions, therefore, result in a combined score describing the EU’s role in the

constellation of actors. First, “Issue-specific power” assesses the relevance of the EU

for the solution to the problem at hand, i.e. avoiding dangerous global climate change.

As the most relevant factor contributing to this issue are GHG emissions, the EU’s

power is determined through its share in global GHG emissions.

Table 1 depicts the EU, US and Chinese share of GHG emissions worldwide adding up

to almost half of all GHG released into the atmosphere in 2010. The EU, today, is only

responsible for a mere tenth of climate active emissions, whereas the other two ‘fossil

superpowers’ sum up to more than one third of the world’s GHG emissions.

Additionally, Table 1 compares the respective share of emissions for all major

negotiating blocks. This further illustrates the EU’s decline in issue-specific power, with 21 This advisory body to the secretariat consists of elected representatives of all regional groupings under the UNFCCC and, thus, possesses legitimacy to reconcile divergence on procedural issues. Cf. https://unfccc.int/bodies/body/6430.php

28

the BASIC and LMDC countries representing three times the EU’s emissions share.

Therefore, the EU’s issue-specific power has to be categorised as weak, because there is

no need for the ‘G2 superpowers’ to take the EU into account specifically when talking

about a solution to climate change.

Total GHG Emissions

in 2010

Share of Global

GHG E

GHGE Per

Capita

Number of

Countries

EU27 4848,47 MtCO₂e 10,41% 9.57 tCO₂e 28

US 6775,45 MtCO₂e 14,54% 21.90 tCO₂e 1

China 10081,53 MtCO₂e 21,64% 7.54 tCO₂e 1

G77/China 26756,36 MtCO₂e 57,43% 5.07 tCO₂e 130

BASIC 15081,78 MtCO₂e 32,37% 4

LMDC 15656,19 MtCO₂e 33,60% 19

Umbrella Group 12609,51 MtCO₂e 27,07% 9

AOSIS 497,25 MtCO₂e 1,07% 44

LDC 2344,63 MtCO₂e 5,03% 48

Global (sum of all

countries)

46589,02 MtCO₂e

Sum EU,US, China 21705,45 MtCO₂e 46,59% 30

Sum EU, G77,

Umbrella

44214,34 MtCO₂e 94,90% 167

Sum EU,US, BASIC 26705,7 MtCO₂e 57,32% 33

Table 1: GHG Emissions 2010, CAIT 2.0 (2014)22

Second, the dimension of “Interests” locates the EU vis-à-vis the position of other

actors and their position compared to the status-quo in advance to ADP 2-4 as

described in paragraphs 2.1 and 4.1. It is composed of the ADP mandate from Durban

and the subsequent COP decisions, the most recent one in Warsaw setting the timetable

until the 2015 agreement.

More specifically on the ADP, its two co-chairs presented their views on the status-quo

after Warsaw and how to proceed from here onwards. Following the Warsaw decision

they pointed out the need to discuss elements of the 2015 agreement as of the first ADP

session in 2014 and make concrete progress on the preparations for NDC, while

stressing the new “agreement will be applicable to all Parties, [...] under the Convention

and [...] [hence] guided by its objectives and principles” (ADP 2014b: 1). Furthermore,

22 Percentages calculated by the author. GHG Emissions include Emissions from Land Use and Forestry. The total percentages exceed 100% due to substantial overlap between negotiating groups, i.e. multiple memberships of Countries, mostly between the G77/China and other developing country groups.

29

pre-2020 ambition under Workstream Two should be advanced through technical expert

meetings.

Put differently, expectations framed in Warsaw for the ADP 2-4 session were to

progress on the content of the draft agreement and the information necessary for

submission of the NDC through negotiations, while enhanced emission reductions until

2020 should be achieved through exchange of knowledge and experience between

Parties. Therefore, in advance to ADP 2-4, the status-quo and workplan for Bonn

appeared to be clearly set out.

Before comparing the EU, US and Chinese positions on the most prominent agenda

items of NDCs and MoI some general remarks seem appropriate. Opening statements

already showed the first line of divergence.23 While most Parties stressed the need to

move into substantial discussions, the proposal by the LMDC group to establish a

Contact Group once more triggered discussions on procedural matters, occupying

especially the G77/China group during its coordination meetings (ENB 2014: 17).

Informal debates on this matter drew off time from negotiations, although plenary

sessions stayed relatively focussed on their assigned topics and the matter could be

resolved until the stocktaking plenary on Wednesday (see also 4.3.1). It might well be

that the matter was raised tactically by the LMDCs to generate more frankly discussions

on substantial matters like the provision of financial and technological support as

further described below. This thought is based upon an impression and is difficult to

prove, but it seems a plausible negotiating tactic. The concern by the EU and the

Umbrella group that such intersections between process and substance could lead to a

division of debates in several sub-groups and hence loss of sight of the overall picture

underscore the rationale for this tactical move.

Also, the overall tense atmosphere of the talks (see 4.1) might have furthered the re-

appearance of procedural disputes as some Parties hoped for more concrete debates in a

Contact Group-format. The Contact Group was formally established during the closing

plenary and will start its work at the beginning of the next ADP session in June 2014. In

the end, the dispute was not conducive to a progressive outcome at ADP 2-4, although

most observers viewed it as positive step to move into the June session in a slightly

more formal mode of work. Besides the procedural questions, the insufficient room

arrangements mentioned at the beginning of the chapter and the respective concerns

evolving around them additionally put a strain on the already tight schedule. 23 See Annex 2. All statements during official sessions are also available on http://unfccc.int/bodies/awg/items/7544.php

30

Another cross-cutting, yet substantial issue constituted the question of differentiation

between countries, also known as the ‘firewall’ between developed and developing

countries and on the question whether developing countries should become subject to

commitments under the new agreement. This ‘old’ dispute already emerged in Warsaw

and came back overarching most of the discussions, with developing countries (China

and the Phillipines of the LMDC in front) requesting developed countries, based on the

Conventions principles of CBDR and equity, to take the lead in emissions reductions

and, furthermore, provide financial and technological support for developing countries

to enable mitigation. To sum it up, most of the topics discussed under the ADP

(“mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, transparency of

action and support, and capacity-building”, UNFCCC 2011: 2) interact in various

aspects, hence this analysis focusses on the most frequent and pressing substantial

intersections.

It analyses, what were the EU, US and Chinese positions on the different topics

discussed and to which extent do they amend the status-quo or, more accurately,

progress on the way towards the new agreement in 2015. Accordingly, such a stance

would be ‘progressive’ in conceptual terms in contrast to ‘conservative’ interests

retaining the status-quo.

The most obvious dispute emerged on the question whether to include adaptation as

contributions of developing countries, and, therefore, equally to mitigation

commitments, or to focus NDCs on mitigation only. The latter approach by developed

country Parties ran counter to the position of most developing countries striving for an

inclusion of all elements of the Durban mandate under the umbrella of NDCs. This

dispute reflected the overall situation of party blocks repeatedly clashing on the same

issues as in Warsaw before.

The co-chairs encouraged delegates several times to not only state ‘what’ they want to

include, but ‘dig deeper’ into substance and answer ‘how’ they wish to include them

recalling the urgency of progress on a draft text by COP20. Ignoring these calls for most

of the negotiating time, the majority of countries stayed in rather parallel talks, often

simply rephrasing their well-known positions without responding to statements of other

Parties. Accordingly, the lines of divergence mainly ran along the ‘firewall’ and

positions for all three actors, the EU, US and China, on the elements of adaptation, MoI

31

and transparency of action and support need to be classified as conservative. However,

on the last element of transparency the EU made some progressive points due to the

interconnected nature of this topic with the EU’s priority of progress on up-front

information for NDCs, the other major arena of the talks in Bonn due to its need for a

timely compromise until the end of 2014.

Thus, the EU tried to point out that the agreement on up front information requirements

would be a “technical issue, rather than a political one” (Statement 12 March 2014, see

Annex 2) and framed it as a necessity to proceed towards “transparent, quantifiable,

comparable, verifiable and ambitious” (EU Submission 2014: 4) NDCs. Accompanying

these criteria, the EU provided a concrete basis for the debate on up-front information

requirements on NDCs in its submission by proposing a detailed list of information such

as target year, sector and gas coverage and methodologies used to calculate the GHG

equivalence as a basis for discussions.

This proposal, together with parsimonious and constructive statements during the

workshop and sessions on NDC were conducive to an enhanced understanding of the

scope and parts of this important element for the 2015 agreement.

The EU’s submission included key points of the US position while providing more

flexibility to include developing countries interests. Neither the US nor China voiced

their opinion on the EU’s proposal nor made concrete suggestions themselves on up-

front information requirements during ADP 2-4 (ENB 2014: 7).

In terms of the conceptual classification, the EU, therefore, assumed a rather

progressive stance on this topic, being the only major party providing specific input to

the process.

As an example of generally hard-line positions, China requested developed countries at

several occasions to deliver commitments on financial and technical support as part of

their NDCs, also mentioning concrete amounts of finance. This, in turn, proved

unacceptable for the US which due to domestic circumstances24 was unable to grant any

further commitments on support as long as capable developing countries were not

subject to mitigation commitments as well. As outlined above, developing countries

insisted on differentiating legal obligations according to the annexes of the Convention

24 Mostly fiscal constraints, but also the still valid Byrd-Hagel-Resolution. Since 1997 this bill prohibits the US to sign any agreement not including emerging economies. Majorities in the Congress leave the Obama administration little range for climate action, which is thus constrained to executive agreements. The scope of such presidential acts won’t be acceptable to other (developing) Parties (Bang et al. 2012).

32

though. Those conservative positions of both the US and China resulted in an overall

stalemate on the issue of NDCs (CAN 2014), as the US “would rather have no progress

on information requirements than commitments on finance in NDCs” according to an

informal statement by a high ranking Secretariat official. Some observers even noted the

threat of an emerging ‘G2-outcome’ for 2015, determined by the least common

denominator of the US and China’s positions.

In sum, the EU assumed a somewhat progressive position on the identification of up-

front information requirements in the international constellation compared to the US

and China. However, the overall task to identify elements for a draft text on the 2015

agreement stalled as only well-known positions were stated again resulting in a

generally conservative international context.

Combining the two dimensions of power and interests assessed in this paragraph in

order to classify the EU’s role in the international constellation of the talks, the EU

resumed its relative position of a weak-progressive actor, bearing in mind the general

atmosphere of a “low profile event [with] muted expectations” (ENB 2014: 16).

4.3.3 Fit of activities with the EU’s role

Looking at the fit of EU activities with its role in the international constellation of the

‘G2’ US and China as major actors, the picture is twofold.

The literature on EU performance in multilateral talks so far found that for the EU to

perform well in a weak-progressive position, it needs to make full use of its ‘toolkit’ of

negotiation means. On the one hand, in terms of unity the EU had no shortcomings

during ADP 2-4, as it was fully perceived as a Union, speaking with one voice.

Likewise, the attempt to demonstrate public support as a sign of the EU’s continued

commitment to climate action and the presentation of its new 2030 climate and energy

proposal would have been conducive to achieve its progressive objectives, but was not

directly leveraged during the talks.

On the other hand, their potentially positive impacts were marginalised by the overall

lacking spirit of agreement. Although the EU engagement for a compromise on the

Contact Group calmed down the tense atmosphere, it was unable to overcome the

substantial divides between developing and developed countries. Both the strategy of

‘issue-division’ and the absence of offers for compromise in plenary, therefore, failed to

capture the EU’s challenging role in the negotiating context. The rather small progress

achieved by exchanging views on draft elements and up-front information requirements

was also conditioned across issues by the EU’s conservative position on some elements

33

(e.g. finance and adaptation in NDCs) which impaired the possibility for concessions by

other Parties (in particular China/LMDCs). In the absence of strong coalition building to

put pressure on the “G2”, for example with AOSIS and the African Group as seen in

Durban, the fit of EU’s activities with its position in the international constellation of

power and interests has to be categorised as low.

4.4 Goal attainment

Having established the surrounding conditions of the EU’s actions at ADP 2-4, the last

indicator of EU performance is goal attainment, defined as the extent to which the EU

achieved its objectives during the talks. Since the ADP talks are still characterised by

the mode of ‘open-ended consultations’, there was no negotiating on concrete text

proposals but rather an exchange of views on the different elements for the 2015

agreement, summarised in a reflection note by the co-chairs published after the session

(cf. ADP 2014c). This reflection note comprises the points mentioned in statements by

all Parties and hence does not constitute a conventional outcome document suitable for

comparison with the EU’s initial goals. Therefore, EU goal attainment will be assessed

by comparing the respective submissions and statements of the EU with the closing

statements of its negotiating partners. This results in a supplement to the initial research

question for better adaptation to the empirical circumstances. In other words: To what

extent were EU objectives reflected in the closing statements by other Parties?

First of all, in order to enable an evaluation of the EU’s goal attainment the question

needs to be answered: What were the EU’s objectives at ADP 2-4?

Its submission in advance to the session in Bonn (ADP 2014b) identified one main

priority for ADP 2-4: the topic of up front information requirements. Those

requirements need to be agreed by COP 20 in Lima at the end of 2014 to ensure timely

submission of NDCs (see chapter 2.1) based on a common information framework, for

which the EU made a comprehensive, concrete proposal in its submission. .

Furthermore, the elaboration of a rules based 2015 agreement and finding common

ground on the elements to be included therein were noted as ADP priorities for 2014.

Having established what the EU aimed at during the week in Bonn, the assessment of its

extent of goal attainment will be twofold, following its two main objectives.

34

First, on up front information requirements for NDCs: The topic was treated

subsequently in time slots on three out of five negotiating days due to constant overflow

on the speakers list and also featured a workshop right at the beginning of the talks on

Tuesday, where inter alia the EU, China and the US presented their preparations for

NDCs (see Annex 2 for timed notes and schedules). This shows the stated interest of

Parties on the issue. However, the substantial quality of party statements during the

following consultations lacked concrete proposals and exchange. Although the majority

of Parties agreed on the necessity for progress on this topic, no concrete requirements

have been established in neither Umbrella’s closing statement nor in those of

G77/China nor the LMDC. They also did not state if they agreed with the EU’s proposal

or not. In absence of other Parties’ opinions on this topic, the information requirements

listed in the Chair’s reflection note (ADP 2014c) are nearly identical with the criteria

mentioned in the EU’s submission (2014) prior to ADP 2-4. Whether this constitutes

agreement on the EU’s proposal is difficult to assess at this time. The reflection note is

simply a summary of all statements made during ADP 2-4. As no divergent positions on

NDC requirements were voiced and hence do not appear in the note, this could be a

signal for consensus. However, a final assessment if this is really the case requires

further analysis of the next session of the ADP (2-5) in June 2014. If Parties would

agree on the EU’s suggestions, this would be a major success for the EU. In the

meantime, it appears like the topic of up front information requirements on NDC was

partially overshadowed by other issues, such as the procedural debate and discussions

about differentiation and support (see above). Therefore, the degree of EU goal

attainment on this element has to be categorised as low for now.

Second, talks on the rules-base and elements of the 2015 agreement were characterised

by a broader agreement of Parties (EU, China, AOSIS) concerning the inclusion of a

compliance mechanism, to achieve accountability and transparency which was deemed

key to build trust between countries. This compliance mechanism should be built upon

existing frameworks and not duplicate efforts for transparency. Despite the Parties’

agreement on these points, countries differed on who should take on specific, legally

binding commitments and therefore take the lead. China pointed towards different

means for measurable, reportable and verifiable pledges and support for developed

countries and argued that developing countries need to take national circumstances into

account “in a manner that is non-punitive and respectful of national sovereignty” (ENB

2014: 11).

35

The general agreement by Parties on transparency measures as a crucial element to

build trust between Parties was evident in statements throughout the session. Despite

this general view of the significance of transparency this as well did not flesh out in

concrete proposals and only the EU referred to it in its closing statement, pointing out

the necessity to further operationalise it during the June session. Hence, the degree of

goal achievement on this issue can be categorised as intermediate.

All in all, countries exchanged their views on both topics prioritised by the EU and

mapped the territory for upcoming negotiations, without achieving greater compromise

or substantial progress towards the new agreement. Even the small steps on

transparency measures seem rather insignificant and, in absence of concrete proposals,

purely political. This results in an overall low score for the EU’s goal attainment.

4.5 Summary

The EU’s performance at the ADP 2-4 talks in Bonn was assessed by means of three

overall categories (see Table 2). First, EU goal attainment was low, conditioned by the

scores on the other two categories. Second, quality of policy objectives or ambition

towards the 2°C goal of the Convention was intermediate-high compared with the US

and China, while some other major players’ mitigation actions (e.g. Brazil, South

Africa, India) outperform the EU’s. This, in turn, impaired the EU’s credibility towards

developing countries which called for declared leadership through actions by developed

countries and thus weakened the EU’s position in the international constellation.

Third, the fit of EU negotiating activities with the EU’s role in the international

constellation of power and interests was low. Strong EU engagement in the process

would have been necessary for the EU to achieve its objectives out of a weak-

progressive role in the international context of actors, as the carbon superpowers US

and China don’t require the EU’s small share of today’s GHG emissions for a solution

to the problem. Accordingly, their conservative interests on NDCs clashed with the

EU’s more progressive position on its prioritised topic. Yet, the EU’s conservative

interests on other topics than mitigation such as finance and adaptation ‘spilled over’

and hampered concessions by developing countries on the EU’s priority.

Hence, the misfit resulted out of a lack of coalition building efforts by the EU in the

multilateral forum, i.e. the plenary, where Parties address the entirety of other countries

and, therefore, could convince a majority. Instead of talking ‘with’ each other, Parties

talked ‘at’ each other during sessions and seldom picked up arguments from their

36

counterparts. Lacking this crucial part of actual negotiations, also factors like public

support and unified EU statements did not cut the deal. They built a sound basis but

substantial outcomes need to develop in the plenary as part of a party-driven process

and multilateral compromises. Due to the deeply rooted mistrust, also in face of the

current global political landscape and the bottom-up focus of the process since the

Copenhagen failure, such ‘package deals’ are looked at with suspicion. In conclusion

the EU needs to re-establish confidence of Parties both in the process and in itself, by

making its own policy portfolio more coherent. Closing not only the emissions gap but

also the gap in EU ambition between different elements for the 2015 agreement will be

the key to achieve an effective multilateral process, as wished for by the EU.

In sum, the three scores add up to an overall low-intermediate EU performance in Bonn.

Table 2: Summary of the EU's Performance during ADP 2-4

4.6 Method reflections This paragraph reflects the implementation of the ADP 2-4 observation in the light of

the question outlined in the introduction, why observation is rarely used in research on

international negotiations. The reflection follows the challenges reflected in the

literature as summarised in chapter 3.4. First of all, the issue of a limited timeframe and

specific location, i.e. the selection of the observation period, didn’t bear any particular

difficulties. Most UNFCCC talks are divided into sessions of one to two weeks, which

pre-selects potentially observable negotiations and determines the point in time for the

research to take place. Most logistical expenditures are inevitable though and can only

be minimised to a certain degree, for instance by using private contacts for

accommodation. Given these prerequisites, the major challenge constitutes access to the

negotiations and more specifically insights into the EU’s appearance therein. Provided

that the researcher has some contacts in the field, for instance in accredited observer

organisations, the administrative effort to register with the UNFCCC secretariat is rather

low and straightforward. One simply submits its personal identification data and

receives confirmation some time later, depending on the contingent allocated to the

Conceptual Categories Score at ADP 2-4 EU Performance

Goal attainment Low

Quality of the EU’s policy objectives Intermediate-high

Fit of EU activities with the international

constellation of power and interests

Low

Low-intermediate

37

registering organisation.25 Having arrived, all observers receive their badge at the

entrance and are henceforth free to roam the premises of the talks, except for areas

restricted to party delegates. This is were the major factor of trust comes to play.

Despite continued approaches of delegates, also via contact persons well known in the

process, EU delegates refrained from answering substantial questions. The interaction

repeatedly followed the same pattern: Personal introduction and question, friendly

response by the delegate, glance at the badge (stating non-governmental observer) and

an immediate ‘drop of temperature’ within the conversation, which henceforth stayed

on a general level of knowledge and only partially offered bits of information. Thus,

this access to backdoor intelligence was blocked and even participants registered as

party delegates were not admitted to attend the EU morning meetings, due to the

prevailing distrust between Parties.26 On a more positive note, the observation allowed

for interesting views on informal talks and a grasp of the atmosphere which was not

transmitted like this in secondary documentation. Furthermore, informal talks and

‘corridor rumours’ were even more important to comprehend the situation of the talks,

as the official negotiation sessions did not present much progress. However, reflecting

the overall efforts for the method regarding the research objective, most substantial

documents and summaries were freely available and potential interview candidates

might be even more open to enquiry when not in session. This leads to the conclusion

that observation is a useful supplement for e.g. interviews and process tracing, but the

cost-benefit analysis makes clear why it remains seldom applied in research. The

outcomes do not counterbalance the efforts, provided that most information is

accessible without participating on site.

5. Conclusion

This thesis set out to analyse the EU’s performance in the international climate change

negotiations in March 2014. In order to do so, it first illustrated the recent history of

these negotiations, before situating the recent (re-)conceptualisation of EU performance

by Groen and Oberthür (2013) in the scholarly universe of terms. Here, it was argued

that the three overarching concepts of Actorness, Effectiveness and Performance which

25 Due to the growing interest of many stakeholders and financial constraints for adequately sized venues, the UNFCCC process has seen a harsh drop in numbers for observer spots after COP15 (see also ADP 2014a). 26 One might overcome this shortcoming when accredited as a party delegate (see the examples of Bäckstrand/Elgström 2013, Oberthür/Rabitz 2014 and Groen/Oberthür 2014). However, this requires a lot more effort in advance to prepare the observation.

38

emerged out of different research fields, converged on two major aspects relevant for

performance: the importance of goal attainment and the relevance of the international

context within which the EU acts. By adding the notion of policy ambition, the new

attempt provides a parsimonious operationalisation of previous contributions to assess

the EU’s role in climate change talks. This operationalisation together with the method

of observation was outlined before adressing the main research question: How did the

EU perform during ADP 2-4?

The EU’s performance was assessed by means of the three dimensions above, which

added up to an overall low-intermediate score. Despite the intermediate-high quality of

the EU’s policy objectives compared to the climate policy goals of the US and China,

the fit of the EU’s negotiating activities with the international constellation of power

and interests was low. Similar to the Copenhagen summit, the EU again incorporated a

weak-progressive role. The former in terms of its share in global GHG emissions, the

latter compared to the status quo of the talks at the end of 2013. The EU aimed, in

particular, at progress on the question of common requirements for NDCs as an

important part of the draft for an agreement in 2015. As neither the US nor China,

representing many of the industrialised, respectively developing countries, deviated

from their commonly known positions, the EU was unable to achieve its priority for the

ADP 2-4. This results in a low score on the variable of goal attainment and

demonstrates the high degree to which this element of performance is conditioned by

the other two dimensions. However, the analysis of the EU’s negotiating activities also

revealed shortcomings in the EU’s behaviour during the talks, mostly a lack of coalition

building efforts in the plenary. Due to the lack of trust and the ‘bottom-up’ or ‘party-

driven’ nature of the process since Copenhagen, the plenary of all Parties to the

Convention becomes a main arena to exchange views and actually negotiate. Instead of

doing so, all Parties rather talked ‘at’ each other, not ‘with’ each other, rarely

referencing points made by their fellow delegates. This deficiency of the EU to mediate

as in previous years was furthered by its conservative positions on elements other than

NDCs, like finance or adaptation, as these prevented developing countries from

concessions on the EU’s priority.

In conclusion, the EU needs to re-establish confidence of Parties both in the process and

in itself, by making its own policy portfolio more coherent. Closing not only the

emissions gap but also the gap in EU ambition between different elements for the 2015

agreement will be crucial to achieve both EU goals and an effective multilateral

39

process, as wished for by the EU. For instance, the Union could send a positive signal to

developing countries with a strengthened commitment on climate finance or a more

open position on technology transfers.

Reflecting on the implementation of the study, two aspects emerged. First, the

implementation of participant observation to study the negotiations proved difficult, as

the mistrust between Parties pertained also to observers. Judging from that experience,

it appears the method is rarely used in research on multilateralism and political science

more broadly because the outcomes in data collection don’t counterbalance the

(financial) efforts. Many well-informed sources for process-tracing are publicly

available and interviews might provide even more insights outside the ‘hot phase’

during sessions.

Second, the thesis probed the concept of EU performance recently suggested by Groen

and Oberthür (2013). As mentioned above, it provides an almost ‘ready to operate’

operationalisation, which is relatively easy implementable. By using tools like a

research matrix for observation, data sources can be allocated to the variables and

adapted to the case at hand. This provides a clear distinction between the variables for

the assessment. Reflecting on the concept in light of the findings of the analysis, the

picture is twofold. On the one hand, it becomes apparent, that the concept needs to

refine the distinction between EU performance and EU goal attainment. The current

framework does not allow conclusions how these two elements interact. Furthermore,

although previous case studies found the values of the two elements to be different, the

case of ADP 2-4 finds the score on goal attainment close to the overall EU performance

score, albeit not identical. Hence, the newly introduced element of ambition does

influence the EU’s performance, but goal attainment seems to remain a major factor,

why this relationship merits further scrutiny. On the other hand, the conceptual

assumption for the ‘fit with the international constellation’ strongly influencing EU

performance is reconfirmed. Here, the main value of the concept are the case-

independent operationalised elements, integrating previous thoughts, thereby further

progressing towards more direct comparability of scholarly research on EU

performance.

In sum, the thesis restructured the scholarly debate on EU performance, applying the

latest approach in the field to a recent case with the hope to gain valuable insights on

how the EU could further its role in the global negotiations on climate change and scale

40

up its performance in the short term. As addressed in the introduction, time for action on

climate change is scarce and global action deeply needed. Being the most advanced

project of supranational integration, the EU has a crucial role to play in the

establishment of a new multilateral framework that delivers a sustainable future for

young and future generations. Let’s hope it will live up to the challenge.

41

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Annex

1. Research Matrix

2. Statements Synopsis

3. UNFCCC accreditation confirmation letter

Annex 1: Research Matrix based on Schöne (2003)

1

Conceptual category / indicator

Variable Research Question (Groen/Oberthür 2013)

Method Information Source Operationalisation Possible Scores

Goal attainment/ Effectiveness

Goal attainment

“To what extent did the EU achieve its declared policy objectives?”

Document analysis

Submission, Opening Statement vs. Closing statements and Reflection Note by Co-Chairs (ADP 2014c)

What are the EU’s objectives at ADP 2-4? Do they appear in outcome? To what degree were they fullfilled/appear?

Low, Intermediate, High

Absolute quality

“To what extent do EU goals achieve the objectives of the institution?”

Document analysis

UNFCCC-documents and Climate Action Tracker (CAT 2013)

Do the EU’s set objectives achieve the 2°C goal?

Quality of EU’s policy objectives

regarding UNFCCC goals/

Ambition

Relative quality

To what extent are EU goals more ambitious than other parties’ objectives regarding the UNFCCC goals?

Document analysis

CAT and policy studies

Does the EU strive “more” towards achievement of 2°C goal than other Countries, in particular China and USA?

Each variable assessed as Low, Intermediate or High. Results in a combined score for Quality, encompassing all nine possible combinations of both single scores, e.g. from Low-Low over Intermediate-Low or Intermediate-High to High-High

Activities at negotia-tions

Is the EU active at negotiations?

Participant observation

Observation notes of talks (Annex 2): EU statements, reactions from other parties

Is the EU active? (submissions, proposals) What means of negotiation does the EU apply/use? e.g. Does the EU deliver speeches/hold meetings with groups? What strategies did the EU adopt/implement?

“Issue-Specific Power”

What relevance does the EU have for solving the problem?

Data analysis WRI GHG emissions database CAIT 2.0 (2014)

What’s the share of the EU’s share in global GHG emissions? Hence, what’s the EU’s position of power? Strong or weak F

it of

EU

act

iviti

es w

ith

inte

rnat

iona

l con

stel

latio

n

(see reverse)

Power: weak or strong. Position in Interests: Progressive vs. Conservative Results in combined score of “roles the EU can play: A) weak-reformist; B) weak-conservative; C) strong-

Annex 1: Research Matrix based on Schöne (2003)

2

Position in global constellation of “Interests”

Where’s the EU’s position situated vis-à-vis other relevant actors positions?

Document analysis

EU, US, China submissions and statements (Annex 2)

What is the status quo? What’s the EU’s position on agenda items? Where do US and China stand? Do positions change the status quo? To which extent?

reformist or D) strong-conservative” (Groen/Oberthür 2013: 9)

Fit of activities with role in inter- national constellation

Do the activities undertaken fit with the EU’s role in the context?

Comparison of observed EU negotiations with position’ variables

Variables above, observation context

How did the EU activities match the position in constellation?

Low, Intermediate or High

Annex 2. EU,US,China Statements during ADP 2-4

Date/Session EU US China

time ran out, proceeded on Thursday on spill-over speakers list for Thursday

10 March, Adaptation

Adaptation is distinct from mitigation. Mitigation as

precaution against more adaptation. Enhance regime on individual actions, planning processes, subnational actors.Collective risk assessment and regional cooperation, EU as example for this. L&D mechanism from COP19 needs time. Methodological concerns regarding global adaptation goal.

Adaptation concerns all parties. COP19-Timetable requires to find common ground ASAP. Global goal: share questions with EU (other countries see ENB). US committed to adaptation/support, but support for whom and by whom? Adaptation can't be an alternative for mitigation in NDC.

Agrees with AOISIS, LDC on adaptation considered for Agreement as well. Treated equally. Adaptation deficit due to lack of funding. Concerned not all 6 elements of ADP mandate discussed equally. Criticises Chair. Refers to submission for substance.

11 March, Workshop on NDC preparations

not only climate + Renewable Energies, but also economic consolidation and growth. Stakeholder consultation, presents 2030 -40% proposal. Also for EU Council 21 March. Will publish NDC until 1st quarter 2015. Asks China, whether there are any developing countries willing to have a fixed target?

All parties need to contribute to emission reductions. US enhances pre-2020 ambition, power plant efficiency, HFC gases. Aims at up-front transparency rules, every country already gathers this information, should put it forward. Points towards plurilateral initiatives. Very important to overcome Annex-divide for US in order to „sell deal at home“

Lengthy (one hour) presentation, starting from principles of convention, espec. Annex-differentiation, all pillars. (Comment CJN: Much Bali, so 2007). Response to EU question: Economic development of developing difficullt to assess, therefore BAU/intensity targets easier to implement. China „does its best“. Strong wording in response (tense atmosphere)

11 March, Consultations on NDC

Contributions = diplomatic compromise to avoid blockade in Warsaw, must not forget about commitments. Basis for elements of 2015 agreement are transparency and finance. MoI are core for dev.ing countries. Convention as political and legal basis for NDC.

Annex 2. EU,US,China Statements during ADP 2-4

continued on Thursday continued on Thursday

11 March, Consultations on finance, technology and capacity-building (MoI)

Climate finance is means to an end: low carbon transformation. Member States ready to contribute to GCF as soon as ready. Also private sources for funding, to achieve greater scale for finance.

2015 agreement should entail specific amounts for climate finance by developed countries in an Annex, administered by GCF.

12 March, continued consultations on MOI from Tuesday

US takes climate finance seriously, increased funding despite domestic fiscal problems. Encourages other parties and public as well as private funds (diversity). Mitigation commitments should not be conditional on finance.Build upon existing institutions.

12 March, continued cons. On NDC

Both adaptation and mitigation part of 2015 package. Highlights stepwise approach + rules-basis for agreement. (MRV, transparency). Presents ideas for up-front information requirements (see submission), which need to be agreed pre-Lima. Technical issue, not a political one.

NDCs should focus on mitigation, componants crucial as concrete timetable for this element of 2015 agreement. Needed to build trust within talks. Adaptation no substitute for mitigation. NDC need to be quantifiable, to achieve transparency. Legal form of NDC: applicable to all, three options (see submission). Countries need to submit their best efforts right from the start.

12 March, consultations on Mitigation

Developed countries must take the lead in mitigations (Conv. = basis. CBDR, equity). GHG cuts in all sectors, accompanied by MoI.

Annex 2. EU,US,China Statements during ADP 2-4

12 March, Stock-Taking plenary

accellerate work on both WS by broad participation

of parties. WS1: consultations very helpful to come forward, clarify understandings. Transparency not enough, more rules-based discussion. We need the requirements for up-front information. WS2: key role in ADP, enhanced ambition through tech-meetings. Outcome furthers political will, crucial for June. Consultations mode worked well, but does not object to other formats. Need to focus on substance rather than process! Concerned about risk of 300-page „COP15 style“ text.

„We’re interested to have something concrete in writing to talk about” Need for broad acceptance by parties ensures

accordance with conv. Principles. US afraid of hundreds of pages of text as draft, therefore Co-Chairs need to ensure coherence. US prefer to talk about elements of text instead of concrete proposals. Look forward to careful guidance by the chairs.

13 March, continued cons. On Mitigation

(partially in NGO-meeting with German Head of Delegation and Member of the Bureau for the EU).Content of this session: ENB 2014)

New agreement should maximise broad scope of participation and contributions from all parties. Public consultative period for NDCs needs clear up-front information requirements, in order to achieve transparency and ensure equity.

(partially in NGO-meeting with German Head of Delegation and Member of the Bureau for the EU).Content of this session: ENB 2014)

Annex 2. EU,US,China Statements during ADP 2-4

Note

13 March, cons. On Transparency and Support

Rules based regime (COP19 dec.) is key element for 2015. Comprising MRV, accounting for mitigation, compliance to hold countries accountable for what they do. Ensure no double counting. IPCC serve as guidance Different types of commitments, have different types of information submitted with them. Work on transparency both inside and outside convention should be recognised, avoid duplication of work. Agreement needs to have a robust rule basis.

continued on Friday: Distinction necessary between NDC (submitted before March 2015) and elements of whole agreement. Package will include adaptation. NDC = mitigation, in order to assess aggreggate effect of contributions. Therefore schedules (see submission). Peer review system like IPCC would ensure flexibility, US commited to their level of transparency. Current MRV system already provides a lot.

Purpose is to confirm every party fullfills their commitments under the convention. based on existing frameworks (e.g. biannual reviews)enhance MRV.Not wait for others to actDeveloping countries will enhance their transparency only in amount regarding national circumstances.Without a clear roadmap developing can’t contributeResponse measures are also part of NDC

Blank cells signify the party did not make a statement during the session. All Daily Programs of ADP 2-4, including scheduled times of the sessions, are available here: http://unfccc.int/meetings/bonn_mar_2014/meeting/7979/php/view/dailyprogramme.php