Perseus, Macedonian kingNIKOLA CASULE

Perseus (213–165 or 162 BCE), king of Macedo-

nia 179–168, revived Macedonian power and

pursued a foreign policy which led to conflict

with Rome in the Third Macedonian War (see

MACEDONIAN WARS). Perseus’ defeat at the Battle

of Pydna in 168 resulted in the partition of

Macedonia and the end of the Macedonian

monarchy.

The eldest son of PHILIP V OF MACEDON

(by Polykrateia of Argos), Perseus was first in

line to the Macedonian throne. Philip con-

firmed Perseus’ pre-eminence by appointing

him to key military commands and by naming

a new city “Perseis,” in his honor, in 183.

Perseus’ alleged murder of his half-brother

Demetrios in 180 (Livy 40.24.4; Polyb. 23.10.

12) did not affect Philip’s opinion of his son,

despite the dramatic accounts of family dis-

cord found in Livy: Perseus was sent by Philip

on an important mission to the Bastarnai – he

hadmarried a Bastarnean princess in 182 – and

was in Thrace when his father died unexpect-

edly in the summer of 179 (Hammond

and Walbank 1988: 490–1). Although the suc-

cession was disputed by Antigonos, son of

Echekrates and nephew of ANTIGONOS III

DOSON, his execution cleared the way for Per-

seus to become king. After securing Mace-

donia’s northern frontier and repulsing an

invasion by Abrupolis, king of the Sapaioi,

Perseus renewed the ties of AMICITIA between

Rome and the Macedonians and may have

sought recognition as king from the Senate

(Livy 40.58.8).

Having secured the kingdom and his own

position, Perseus declared a cancellation of

debts, an amnesty for individuals convicted

of crimes against the crown, and a recall of

exiles. These measures were publicized

across Greece and increased Perseus’ popular-

ity: by 178 two delegates on the council of

the Delphic Amphictyony (see AMPHICTYONY,

DELPHIC) were “from King Perseus,” and the

Macedonian king was praised as benefactor

and philhellene (SIG3 636; Livy 41.24.11;

App. Mac. 11.1.7). The issue of debt cancella-

tion was prominent in Greece during the 170s.

A number of Greek cities were suffering

from civil strife, which was driven in large

part by debt accumulation and exacerbated

in places by indemnity payments to Rome;

the AITOLIAN LEAGUE, for example, was forced

to pay a crippling sum as punishment

for its support of ANTIOCHOS III MEGAS

(Livy 42.5.7; Derow 1989: 303). Perseus won

support within such communities at the

expense of local aristocracies, who had enjoyed

Roman favor: PERRHAIBIA, THESSALY, and the

Aitolian League, among others, cancelled

their debts and saw democratic factions

come to power with Macedonian aid

(Diod. Sic. 29.33; Livy 42.13.8–9). Perseus

also concluded a formal alliance with the

Boiotian confederacy and strengthened ties

with PRUSIAS II OF BITHYNIA and SELEUKOS IV

PHILOPATOR through royal marriages. However,

opposition remained, including among the

Achaians (see ACHAIAN LEAGUE) and at ATHENS.

The Romans increasingly took interest in

Perseus’ activities. A commission in 177, in

response to Dardanian complaints, instructed

Perseus to respect his treaty with Rome. Fur-

ther commissions to Greece followed in the

mid- and late 170s, some of which were

attempting to redress the debt crisis. Driven

in part by their reports and in part by appeals

from friendly factions across Greece, the

Romans began preparations for war. The

Roman case against Perseus, augmented by an

embassy from EUMENES II of PERGAMON in April

172 (Livy 42.11–13), was widely publicized.

A fragmentary inscription of a Roman letter

to the Delphic Amphictyony (SIG3 643) enu-

merates the charges against Perseus, and these

include having ambassadors murdered; bring-

ing political strife to Greece through the cancel-

lation of debts and the destruction of leading

men; and attempting to assassinate Eumenes.

Some of the charges were fabricated or based

on a revisionist depiction of Perseus’ early reign:

The Encyclopedia of Ancient History, First Edition. Edited by Roger S. Bagnall, Kai Brodersen, Craige B. Champion, Andrew Erskine,

and Sabine R. Huebner, print pages 5181–5183.

© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2013 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

DOI: 10.1002/9781444338386.wbeah09184

1

he is condemned for his attack onAbrupolis, for

example, but the Romans had not opposed this

act at the time (Gruen 1984: 403).

The king’s envoys to the Senate in 172 were

rebuffed (Livy 42.14.2–4), and Perseus appears

to have now devalued the currency, adopting

the lighter Rhodian standard (see COINAGE,

HELLENISTIC), perhaps with the intention of

aiding military recruitment (Hammond and

Walbank 1988: 503–4). Although the Roman

assembly did not formally vote for war until

late 172, Livy refers to belli administratio in his

discussion of events in the preceding summer

(42.18.2). Perseus’ repeated diplomatic

overtures, first to the advancing Roman force,

which had landed at Corcyra, and subse-

quently to the consul Marcius Philippus,

after his advance to Homolion, proved ineffec-

tive. Roman envoys were sent to strengthen

Greek loyalty, and some cities, including

members of the Boiotian confederacy, now

imprisoned pro-Macedonian leaders.

Perseus was victorious in the first military

encounter of the war, an engagement of cavalry

and light armed troops at Kallikinos in 171,

with the king at the head of the Macedonian

cavalry. The victory prompted a groundswell

of support for Perseus (Polyb. 27.9), intensi-

fied by subsequent Roman brutality: Aitolian

commanders who had fought at Kallikinos

were executed, and uncooperative cities,

such as Haliartos and Abdera, had their

populations sold into slavery. A pro-

Macedonian plot at Epirus in the spring of

170 failed, but resulted in the break-up of the

Epirote confederacy, with the Molossians

defecting to Perseus in 169. Macedonian sur-

prise attacks in the winter of 170/169 in

Illyria and Epirus were successful, but did not

prevent Roman forces advancing to the south-

ern border of Macedonia later that year. Per-

seus attempted, without success, to gain the

allegiance of Eumenes or Antiochos IV, but

won over the Illyrian king Genthios with

a promise of money (see GENTHIOS, ILLYRIAN

KING), though to little effect: Genthios surren-

dered to Rome in early 168.

Perseus’ forces met the army of Aemilius

Paullus at the battle of Pydna on June 22

(see PYDNA, BATTLE OF; AEMILIUS PAULLUS, LUCIAS),

168, where the tactical flexibility of the

Roman legion facilitated a resounding Roman

victory. Perseus fled to PELLA but was eventually

captured at SAMOTHRACE, where he surrendered

to the Romans (Livy 45.4-6; Plut. Aem. 26–7).

He was led through Rome in chains, as part of

Aemilius Paullus’ TRIUMPH, in November 167

BCE, and he died some years later at Alba

Fucens.

SEE ALSO: Amphictyony, Delphic; Debt, Greece

and Rome; Exile; Macedonia; Macedonian wars;

Polybius.

REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

Derow, P. S. (1989) “Rome, the fall of Macedon

and the sack of Corinth.” In Cambridge ancient

history, vol. 8: 303–19. 2nd ed. Cambridge.

Ferrary, J.-L. (1988) Philhellenisme et imperialisme:

aspects ideologiques de la conquete romaine du

monde hellenistique, de la seconde guerre de

Macedoine a la guerre contre Mithridate: 158–86.

Paris.

Gruen, E. S. (1984) The Hellenistic world and the

coming of Rome: 403–29, 505–20. Berkeley.

Hammond, N. G. L. and Walbank, F. W. (1988)

A history of Macedonia, vol. 3: 488–569. Oxford.

Harris, W. V. (1979) War and imperialism in

republican Rome: 227–33. Oxford.

Meloni, P. (1953) Perseo e la fine della monarchia

macedone. Rome.

Mendels, D. (1978) “Perseus and the socio-economic

question in Greece (179–172 BC): a study in

Roman propaganda.” Ancient Society 9: 55–73.

Walbank, F. W. (1940) Philip V of Macedon:

223–57. Cambridge.

2