TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY

Faculty of Humanities

Department of Philosophy

THE CAUSAL STRUCTURE OF ACTION

This work is presented as a thesis towards the M.A. degree

by

Asher Idan

1982

This work has been carried out under the supervision of Prof. Marcelo Dascal

December 1981

1

ABSTRACT

"The problem of causality lies at the

foundation of all the sciences which

attempt to provide a systematic ex-

planation of human behavior (such

as economics, sociology,

psychology and history)".

J. Raz, Practical Reasoning

The central question which will be discussed in my work is: What are the

causes which cause, or the reasons which bring about the beginning of an

action? The terms "cause", "reason", "brings about", "beginning", "creation"

and "action" are problematic. They have many meanings and uses which

point to different theories and presuppositions. These terms were used in

domains such as the philosophy of action, the philosophy of science, ethics,

metaphysics, theology, psychology, etc. At this point, I will not define these

terms; I will only present a few examples and show some of the

presuppositions behind them.

Causes and reasons: One of the formulas in everyday language to which

these terms are connected is "P because q".

Examples are:

1. The dam has been destroyed (natural event) because of the heavy rain

(natural event).

2. I bought an umbrella (human action) because of the heavy rain (natural

event).

3. I left the class (human action) because I thought that the teacher doesn't

understand the subject (a proposition).

4. I concluded that the teacher is not an expert (a proposition) because I

thought that he doesn't understand the subject (a proposition).

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In the formula, as well as in the examples, the term "because" is ambiguous.

Sometimes "q" is a cause (example 1) and sometimes it is a reason (example

4). It is common to say that the connection between events is causal

(example 1) and the connection between propositions is logico-semantical

(example 4). Thus, we find two "kinds" of because: "causal because" and

"logico-semantical because". Examples 2 and 3, however, are problematic

since there we find a mixture of an event and an action (example 2), or of a

proposition and an action (example 3). What are the kinds of "because" in 2

and 3? 2 is not pure causal as in 1 since we have an intuition that the heavy

rain didn't cause deterministically and exclusively the bringing of an umbrella.

We must at least add my decision to buy an umbrella, because in the same

situation, I could decide to buy a coat. In 3 the "because" relation is not purely

logico-semantical as in 4, since we have an intuition that my opinion (or

thought) about the teacher can be regarded as a reason that caused me to

leave the class. In 3 my opinion had some causal function, it moved my body

out of the class.

The presuppositions which stand behind the problematic explanation of

examples 2 and 3 can be explicated by pointing to the following three

"paradigms" in the philosophy of action:

A. There are no differences between causes and reasons. Either by reducing

causes to reasons (Schopenhauer and, in a sense, Spinoza, too, both of

whom argue that all kinds of "because" are of a logical kind) or by

reducing reasons to causes (radical behaviorists who will say that all

kinds of "because" are of a causal kind).

B. There are differences between causes and reasons of the following kind:

1) I, as an actor, have an experience of my reason while I, as an

observer, can only conclude that "9 is the cause of P" (Taylor, 1974).

2) Reasons are parts of a rule-governed human activity while causes

are not (Wittgenstein).

3) Reasons are usually connected with normativity while causes are

connected with descriptivity (Bar-On, 1975).

I think that this "paradigm" doesn't have a clear answer to the question

of what kinds of "because" occur in examples 2 and 3 (Why?).

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C. Actions are connected with events and with propositions. Only an action

can bridge the gap between the physical-causal and the intentional (or

mental)-logical. Thus, the "because" in examples 2 and 3 is of a dual

kind: it is a causal-logical relation (Danto 1976, and mainly Marx,

Bergson, and other philosophers of praxis).

Creation and beginning: The creation of x can be regarded in some theories

as a simple sum of the parts of x, while in other theories as more than the

simple sum of the parts of x. Theories about the beginning have connections

with theories about causes, reasons and creation. Thus, "x began because y"

can mean either that x was created by y, or that at a certain point in time or

space y has triggered an already existing x to appear.

Action: Action is usually distinguished from the following things:

A, a natural event. B, a human movement which was physically caused by a

natural event (man that falls because of a strong wind), or by another human

being, or by a nervous spasm. C, a spontaneous movement of a limb (heart's

beats). D, a human situation (like fear of hunger). Here I characterize an

action only negatively. Since an action is the central concept in my work, I will

characterize it positively throughout my presentation of the different solutions

to the central problem. I will do the same about the presuppositions which

stand behind the different meanings and uses of the term "action". In the

course of my work, actions will be discovered as complex entities of different

kinds. Each kind has a characteristic combination of components and

"mechanisms".

* * *

I will discuss, compare and criticize the different solutions to the central

problem. The objectives are two-fold: A, to bring together the main points

made in the wide and renewed philosophical discussion, conducted mainly in

the current century, especially after World War II. B, to point to what, in my

opinion, are the most comprehensive and adequate solutions. I conclude my

analysis with an outline for a unified theory of the causal structure and

dynamics of action.

* * *

4

Chapter 1 includes both a primary clarification of the central question and a

summary of the main answer to it.

In Chapter 2 I begin by introducing Ryle's and Wittgenstein's criticism of

traditional volitional theories of action (and of mentalistic theories in general).

Ryle argues that the theories which claim that volitions are the causes of

actions, are vague and inconsistent.

Wittgenstein sharpened the central problem by asking: What remains from "I

raise my arm" after we subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that

I raise my arm? I see Wittgenstein's question as a version of our central

problem since it can be formulated as: What is the cause (or reason) which

begins the raising of my arm? An answer to Wittgenstein's question can be

that "what remains" is a certain x (The question, of course, is what is this

"x"!!), and this x (reason, intention, experience, etc.) can be the cause which

we are looking for in our central question.

Danto and Davidson were two of the first philosophers who tried to cope with

the challenge of Ryle and Wittgenstein. Danto presents the concept of basic

action in order to avoid the need for causes which begin every action. Basic

actions can be performed or can begin but can not be caused by something.

Davidson answered that reasons can cause actions, although they are not

causes of a physical kind. Reasons are less deterministic causes than

physical causes. By pointing to reasons as the causes of actions, Davidson

can answer most of Ryle's questions. To Wittgenstein he can say that "what

remains" is the reason. Chisholm and Taylor answer to Ryle's and

Wittgenstein's questions by their theories of immanent causality of the agent.

According to their theories, the agent has a special "power" of "immanent

causality". Thus, the agent is the cause of his/her actions.

Nevertheless, we can go on and ask about these three answers. But what is

in a reason, or in an agent, or in a basic action, that causes my limb (or part of

it) to wave, and how the process of this causing happens? I think that this is

analogical to the fruitful question: But what is the atom that can scatter

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particles so widely, and how the process of scattering happens? The answers

to these questions are no less than Bohr's theory, which was the beginning of

nuclear physics.

In Chapter 3, I present Leibniz's solution to the central problem. I argue that

Ryle's criticism and the answers considered in the preceding chapter, were

concerned mainly with the "Cartesian paradigm" in philosophy. But there is a

competitive "Leibnizian paradigm" which was modified by "pre-analytical"

philosophers like Bergson, Husserl and Schutz. Ryle's criticism is a partial one

since it is directed to volitional theories within the "Cartesian paradigm".

Ontologically, Leibniz argues that every body of particle has inherent

movements in different degrees (against Descartes who relied on a strict

dichotomy between the inert and the moving). Epistemologically, he argues

that every body or particle has "small perceptions" in different degrees of

consciousness (against Descartes who relied on the dichotomy between the

mental which is conscious and the physical which is unconscious).

Praxiologically, Leibniz argues that an action can begin or be cause as a

result of combinations of more conscious and less conscious processes and

events (process is a serial and/or structural event). There is no exclusive

cause which begins an action from a "resting situation" (Leibniz directed this

argument against Locke, and I also apply it against Danto), or from a

balanced situation (against Bayle). Leibniz thinks that an action neither begins

nor is created absolutely. It is a result of a gradual process of growth in the

degree of movement and of consciousness. Intentions or volitions alone can

not cause limbs to move. The "mental" (in Descartes' paradigm) is not always

the "mover" of the "physical" and vice-versa. There is a special kind of

connection between the "mental" and the "physical". This connection is

gradual and two-directional. The "mental" is intensified by the growth of

consciousness to the "small perceptions", and the "physical" is intensified by

the growth of the degree of movement. A little growth of the one contributes to

a little growth of the other and vice-versa. Thus, we have here a kind of

"feedback process".

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In Chapter 4, I present solutions of preanalytical philosophers. Bergson

modifies Lebniz's theory of the small and unconscious perceptions, and

emphasizes movement as a primary quality of every organism. Action is not a

result of intentions or volitions which precede an action (against J.S. Mill).

Philosophers belonging to the "cortesian paradigm" do not investigate action

in its "natural" and everyday context (a person who goes to work, a dancer in

his performances, etc.), but in an "artificial context", typical of an introspective

philosopher or of a scientist in a laboratory (the raising of an arm, an isolated

movement of a finger) or in hospital. In the "natural context" there are a series

of movements with many causes before them and with many purposes

towards which these movements are directed. In this context, action is a result

of an emergetic enlargement of a whole which is composed of many

components. It is like an apple (or like drops of rain/ or like a snowball) which

grows gradually as a result of many components and at a certain point falls

from the tree. Of course, our intentions, volitions, reasons, beliefs, etc., are

components in that process. But they are only partial causes. Later, in chapter

7, I shall show how Apostel explicates this "emergentic entity".

Husserl made an important contribution to the philosophy of action by

emphasizing the importance of Brentano's notion of intentionality. According

to Husserl, the person has an intentional-hierarchical field where the lower

level is directed to the higher level and the higher level "organizes" the lower

level. This structure leads from plurality in the lower levels to a relative unity in

the higher levels. In a given situation, we can find in the higher level a unity

which is the object of intentionality towards which the action is directed and

intended. An action begins after a gradual process of concentration of the

agent from peripheral and unfocussed intentionality to a central and focussed

one, which is directed to the object of intentionality.

Schulz adds social factors to the "Leibnizian paradigm". He emphasized the

importance of the biography of a person and of his society to the causal

structure of his actions, by introducing two central notions: a system of

typicality and a system of relevance.

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In chapter 5, I return to the discussion of volitional theories belonging to the

analytical tradition. These are sophisticated volitional theories since they try to

cope with the challenges of Ryle and Wittgenstein.

Goldman's theory is particularly sophisticated since it goes a long way

towards a synthesis between ideas from the analytical philosophy of action

and ideas from pre analytical philosophy of action (especially W. James).

Sellars characterizes action by two factors: A, it is something which is caused

by a volition. But, a volition x to do y will not necessarily cause y; it can cause

another action z. B, violitions are a kind of talk without sound.

Goldman begins by criticizing Sellars' "correspondence theory" which

connects volitions to actions. Goldman argues that: 1, An agent does not fit a

propositional volition (like: "I will do x now".) for every action, or for a "whole"

set of actions. 2, There is a need for distinguishing between propositional

volitions which usually are the focus of the phenomenal field and

nonpropositional volitions which are in the periphery. (In chapter 6, I show that

this distinction is parallel to Searle's distinction between Intention-before-

action and Intention-in-action.) 3, An action can be caused by a primary

volition or by a secondary volition. Primary volition is a kind of memory (which

can be voluntary) of an accidental action which was performed earlier (W.

James called it an Image-Response).

In chapter 6, I discuss Searle's analysis and use of certain concepts from the

phenomenological tradition, especially the concept of Intentionality. He makes

a synthesis of ideas from phenomenology with ideas from analytical

philosophy and clarifies the conceptual background for our central problem.

Searle distinguishes between two kinds of intentions:

A, intention-before-action which is very important for understanding the causal

structure of action. This kind of intention has the property of self-reference of

the representational content of the intention-before-action. This property

enables the agent to begin.

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B, Intention-in-action which is less explicit than the first kind of action by

ordering himself ("self-order").

Only combinations of all three components: intentional experience, body

movement, and an external event (like the falling of a stone), can be regarded

as an action. The existence of only one or two components does not generate

an action. A lack of closeness between the content of the intention and the

description of the action (movement + event, which is caused by this intention)

makes the process to be a non-action, according to Searle.

Dascal and Gruengard think that not only semantics (closeness between

content and description) can be used as a criterion for demarcation between

action and non-action, but also syntax and intonation. They have also

extended the domain of the reference of intentionality from references to

intnetional objects to references to intentional subjects.

I begin Chapter 7 by presenting Apostel's simple model of action, by means of

which he begins to explicate the causal structure of action. Apostel modifies

some of Searle's ideas by his analysis of non-verbal contents (pictorial) of

intentions and by pointing to the dynamical character of intentions.

Intentions, reasons, volitions, etc, are only partial causes of an action. Only

combinations of many partial causes can cause an action in a natural context

(Bergson). The relations between intentions and limbs and between limbs and

objects are like relations between instrument and material (e.g. a hammer and

a wall). Only when certain combinations of partial causes which serve as

instruments are directed to certain materials, a coherent structure of field or

gestalt can be created (coherent structure is a structure which, at a certain

point, has no "conflicts"; e.g., when, in a given situation we don't have a

feeling of hunger and a reason or a will to be thin). Only a coherent structure

can cause an action according to the following scheme:

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שרטוט

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In a similar way to a given electric field which can organize particles of metal

in a characteristic structure in space, the intentional field can organize and

combine intentions, beliefs, volitions, feelings, etc, in a characteristic structure

in a certain situation. Among the constraints and causes of the combinations

of the intentional field there are reasons, roles, and the self.

Apostel does not define exactly how constraint x causes combination y. I think

that these are very complex relations and connections, which future research,

using statistical and/or fuzzy methods, will clarify.

From the point of view of the analysis of Searle and Apostel, the previous

theories seem to be partial solutions to the central problem, i.e., "partial

causes". Some of the theories see only the "tree" (volutional theories) and

others see only the "forest" (agent theories). Apostel's view is a mereological

one which investigates the relations between wholes and their parts in two

levels:

I. The levels of the objects of research which are the actions, their

structure, and their causes:

Here the parts are intentions, actions, volitions, reasons, limbs, objects,

etc., and the whole is the person. The mereological analysis enables Apostel

to investigate action not in a dichotomic way but in a hierarchical one. The

whole in level n functions as a part in relation to level n+1. In the following

scheme we can see that intention-before-action (IBA) can

שרטוט

Function as a whole in comparison to some intention-in-action (IIA), and

simultaneously as a part in comparison to the agent. We can continue

hierarchy up and down. The person can function as a part in comparison to

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the family, and a family as a part to society, etc. IIA can also function as a

whole in comparison to its sub-intentions (as Searle showed), and sub-

intentions to synaptic transfers, etc. The question of the upper and the lower

limits has been discussed in chapters 6, 7 and 8. This hierarchial structure is

connected to the complexity and heterogenity of the structure of action. Ryle,

for example, writes:

"the higher-grade dispositions of people

with which this inquiry is largely

concerned are, in general, not single

track dispositions but, . . . , indefinitely

heterogeneous."

(1949:44)

These characteristics of the structure of action enable the person to be

flexible and 'creative' in his actions. In a given situation, for example, a person

can have, in an organized way, in level n–1: a hand, an intention, a volition

and a representation. A certain reason can function in level n as an organizer.

שרטוט

Apostel closes the discussion of the "object level" by defining the connection

between person and action: An agent a has an intention i and he performs

behavior b which realizes i, if the personality of a (the organized and directed

gestalt) causes the organization of I and if the connection between the

different parts of the personality of a causes this intention to be executed by

the body of a.

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II. The methodological level of Apostel's mereological discussion:

Most of the previous theories can be combined as parts of a

comprehensive theory (as a whole). This theory will regard a person as a

whole with the following parts: agent, thinker, user of symbols, receiver of

social roles, user of tools, etc. By this comprehensive and synthetic theory,

Apostel leads to what I call a universal progmatics or a philosophical theory of

the person which includes: 1, pragmatics of action that investigates the

relations between actions, intentions, etc., and the person, and through the

person to the world. 2, Semantics of action that investigates the relations

between actions, intentions, etc. and the world (without reference to the

person). This semantics can include semantics of language (or of symbols)

which investigates the relations between representations (which can be parts

of intentions) and the world. 3, Syntax of action which investigates the

relations between actions, intentions, reasons, etc. (without reference to the

world or to the person).

4, Mereology which investigates the formal relations between parts and

wholes.

5, Logic which will be adequate for discussing actions, intentions, and other

extralinguistic entities. 6, Theory of causality which will investigate the

relations between events, actions and persons. 7, Theory of time and change

(Nowakowska's theory, 1981). 8, Theory of personality which will integrate

existing theories from psychology and phenomenology.

In chapter 8, I outline a unified-procedural theory of action which will integrate

some of the ideas from the previous chapters. Procedures are a kind of rituals

which organize physical, linguistic and intentional elements in a hierarchical,

directional, dynamical and modular way. In a given procedure we can find in

an organized way: intentions, wills, reasons, unconscious processes,

intentional objects and subjects, etc. In the structure of a procedure, level n

can function as a tool which directs the material in level n-1. The structure is

dynamical because what functions as a tool for purpose p1 can "change" and

become material for purpose p2. Thus, the structure is also modular (as in

modular furniture where a shelf of a library can function as a table or can be

used as a part of a closet).

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Before presenting the outline for a procedural theory, I have summarized the

findings of my work about physical actions, linguistic (or semiatic) actions, and

"epistemic actions". I try to explicate their structure and their components.

I think I found the common structure of semiatical and physical actions by

using the ideas of Dascal and Gruengard for extending the scope of the

intentionality from objects to subjects. Thus, not only action is dual but

intentionality too.

In the case of self-intentionality (which includes self-reference) the

intentionality is directed to my self or to my body (subject or object). Thus, the

causes of an action can be the "other" (or a group of "others", e.g., society), or

the physical world, or myself.

My own intentions can also be used as instruments which can be directed to

three causes (the physical, the social and myself), which can be regarded as

materials of actions.

Thus, a person is a dual being in two aspects: A, He can move himself and

can be moved by causes. B, He is an object and a subject. As an object he

can take part in causal processes of a physical kind. As a subject he can take

part in causal processes of some other kind ("logico-semantical" in terms of

Danto (1976), "rule governed", Wittgenstein (1953), "psychological", Davidson

(1974), "immanent", Chisholm (1976) and Taylor (1974), "intentional",

Brentano, Husserl and Searle (1981), "normative" Bar-On (1975).

Object Subjectinternal self-causality I raise my arm I intend to change my

opinion about xExternal physical or social-causality

Someone or something raise my arm

Someone (something) changes my opinion about x

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I conclude the discussion dealing with the human duality, which is related also

to the issue of freedom and determinism by quoting Goffman:

". . . face-to-face interaction provides an

admirable context for executing a double

stance – the individual's task actions un-

rebelliously adhere to the official

definition of the situation, while gestural

activity that can be sustained

simultaneously and yet non-interferingly

shows that he was not agreed to having

all of himself defined by what officially is

in progress."

(1969:85)