the editors of the metaphysics

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The Editors of the "Metaphysics"Author(s): Stephen MennSource: Phronesis, Vol. 40, No. 2 (1995), pp. 202-208Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182498 .Accessed: 08/03/2014 19:37

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DISCUSSION OTES

The Editors of the Metaphysics

STEPHEN MENN

Christopher Kirwan writes as follows in his introductory note to Meta-physics F:

We are told that the fourteen books of Metaphysics were brought nto their presentarrangement by editors after Aristotle's death. Book A, which they set at thebeginning, describes the aim of philosophy as the removal of surprise and perplex-ity by supplying knowledge of original causes, and assesses the work of Aristot-le's predecessors n that field. After the short book designated a, B outlines a set of' perplexities, ost of which get examined, more or less directly, in the rest of thetreatise. F thus stands, by the traditional ordering, at the start of Aristotle's maindiscussion of metaphysics; t announces ts subject-matter n the first chapter; andits argument s hardly more dependent on what has preceded han on other parts of

Aristotle's works.'

Kirwan thus claims that the Metaphysics as we have it has been heavilyprocessed by post-Aristotelian editors, whose work extended even to plac-ing Book A at the head of the treatise: presumably they had found it as anindependent treatise, and decided that it would make best sense as an in-troduction to a collection of Aristotle's writings on metaphysical topics.This claim is important for Kirwan's interpretation of Metaphysics r, sinceit justifies him in taking F as effectively the beginning of Aristotle's dis-cussion of metaphysics: so Kirwan takes F as defining this science in itsopening chapter, and then as addressing problems in the science so defined,rather than as adding further specifications to a science described in A or aor B. This issue is important because, on Kirwan's interpretation, meta-physics would have to be by definition the science of being as being and itsper se attributes. By contrast, if Aristotle himself intended AcaB to be readbefore F, then since these earlier books describe oowcia or i 6TL(YT,[rt714TOU[tvr not as a science of being but as a science of first principles, we

' Aristotle's Metaphysics, Books F, A, and E, translated with notes by Christopher

Kirwan Oxford, 1971), p.75. The second edition (Oxford, 1993) reproduces he originaledition with new supplementary material. The passage here cited is not modified byanything added in the second edition.

202 Plironesis 1995. Vol XU2 (Accepted Februanr 1995)







would more naturally read Fl as making a new statement about the sciencealready described: the statement, namely, that the first principles will beprinciples of being as such (and of its per se attributes such as unity andplurality), and that therefore the desired knowledge of principles will befound by a scientific investigation into being, i.e. by a search for causes ofbeing as such (and of unity and plurality).2 Since the claim (which is by nomeans Kirwan's alone)3 that the arrangement of the Metaphysics is post-Aristotelian has implications for the interpretation of F and subsequentbooks, it would be worth investigating the basis for this claim.

Kirwan says, we are told that the fourteen books of the Metaphysicswere brought into their present arrangement by editors after Aristotle'sdeath. He does not say who told us. A reader might easily draw the conclu-sion that there was some extant ancient source that said this. But there isnot.4

We have in fact very few ancient testimonies about the history of the textof the Metaphysics: and the majority are merely attempts to explain why the

2 For Kirwan, since metaphysics is defined as the science of being qua being, thequestion of the object of metaphysics is simply a matter of interpreting he restrictivephrase qua being ; and it is easy enough to dispose of Philip Merlan's view that thisrestricts the object of metaphysics to certain special beings, those separate rom matter(Kirwan, pp.77-8, together with pp.201-3 in the second edition). But the real problem forthe ontological interpretation f metaphysics is that the majority of texts, including allthose outside the Metaphysics and all those in the Metaphysics before F, describe wis-dom or first philosophy or the like), not as a science of being, but either as a scienceof first causes or as a science of a special kind of beings (divine or eternal or immate-rial); see the texts collected in Vianney D6carie, L'objet de la metaphysique selonAristote (Montreal-Paris, 1961). If [l does not define metaphysics, but merely adds aspecification to what has already been defined, then metaphysics need not deal witheverything that can be said about being as such, or even with all of its causes, but onlywith those causes of being that fall into the desired class.' So, for instance, J.L. Ackrill says that the Metaphysics consists of a number oftreatises ... which were brought together by a later editor (Aristotle the Philosopher,Oxford, 1981, p. 116); for a similar view see now also Jonathan Barnes, Metaphysics,in his Cambridge Companion o Aristotle (Cambridge, 1995).4 It is sometimes thought that Werner Jaeger's researches, n his Aristotle: Fundamentalsof the History of His Development (English translation by Richard Robinson, secondedition, Oxford, 1948), had the effect of showing that the Metaphysics as we have it wasthe result of post-Aristotelian ditors, who put together a number of originally independ-ent Aristotelian treatises (and perhaps even some non-Aristotelian reatises, since theauthenticity of a and K is controversial). But Jaeger himself did not believe this, exceptinasmuch as he thought that cc, A, K and A had been added by later editors: he thoughtthat the other books had been written at different imes, and as parts of different projects,but that they had been sewn together (not wholly successfully) by Aristotle himself.Certainly Jaeger cannot be cited as an authority or the claim that the work of the editorswent as far as putting A in its current position.

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Metaphysics ontains a book called A and a book called a.5 But there aretwo texts of Asclepius (circa 500 AD) and one of the pseudo-Alexander(probably Michael of Ephesus, circa 1100 AD), which seem to promisemore. As far as I have been able to tell, it is the two texts of Asclepius asmisinterpreted, r so I shall argue, by scholars ncluding Ross - that haveled to the impression hat we have authentic estimony about he editors ofthe Metaphysics.6

Ross says, in the introduction o his edition of the Metaphysics, hat withregard o the time at which the various reatises were put together o formthe Metaphysics we have very little to go upon. 7 He then cites, withoutendorsing, ne testimonium f the pseudo-Alexander nd one of Asclepius:

Alexander 515.20) expresses the opinion that two particular assages were placedtogether by Aristotle but separated by Eudemus. Asclepius (4.9) has a differentstory, that Aristotle sent the whole work to Eudemus, who thought t unfitting thatso great a work should be published ; and that after his death, and the loss of partsof the book, later scholars filled up the gaps by drawing upon Aristotle's otherworks and piecing the whole together as best they could.8

In the body of his commentary, Ross cites the other testimonium f Ascle-pius. Commenting n A2, Ross notes that the chapter s almost word forword dentical with Physics 194b23-195b21. He then adds that Asclepius305.19 tells us that 'they' (the editors of the Metaphysics) said that someparts of A had been lost, and they supplied he deficiency out of Aristotle'sown writings ' - i.e. that they restored the missing passage by simplycopying a passage from the Physics.9

s These texts report a tradition hat either A or a is not by Aristotle but by a nephew ofAristotle's disciple Eudemus of Rhodes, named either Pasicles or Pasicrates; see dis-cussion below, with references n n.10. None of the extant ancient writers who transmitthis story endorse it themselves.6 Kirwan and others may also have been influenced by Porphyry's comparison of hisown work in editing Plotinus to Andronicus' work on Aristotle and Theophrastus VitaPlotini 24), although Porphyry does not mention the Metaphysics n particular. But thereis no sign that Porphyry hinks Andronicus' work involved creating new large treatisesby stitching small ones together. Porphyry says that Andronicus collected or broughttogether different works of Aristotle, as Porphyry collected Plotinus' treatises into thesix topically linked Enneads: his is quite different from what an editor would have hadto do in constituting he Metaphysics out of smaller reatises, which would at a minimuminvolve inserting a great many forward and backward references, especially betweenMetaphysics B and subsequent books (there is nothing like this in any of Porphyry'sEnneads).7 Aristotle's Metaphysics, a revised text with introduction and commentary by W.D.Ross, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1924), v.1, p.xxxi.8 Ibid. Ross cites the Alexander and Asclepius commentaries on the Metaphysics bypage and line from the editions in the Commentaria n Aristotelem Graeca (in vols. 1

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These two passages of Asclepius are the only texts that offer any hope ofgiving us an authentic chain of testimony going back to the original post-Aristotelian editors of the Metaphysics. The second passage is particularlysuggestive, because (as Ross interprets it) it seems to imply that Asclepiusknew (at first or second hand) of a declaration by the editors themselves,made perhaps in a preface to their edition. Unfortunately, Ross has misin-terpreted Asclepius. The verb they said [RXryov] at Asclepius 305.20 hasno antecedent, and Ross supplies the deficiency by supposing that the un-named subjects of eXt-yov are the same as the unnamed subjects of sup-plied the deficiency [&p1QtoOGav] at 305.21, who must be the editors ofthe Metaphysics. This is initially plausible; but a closer examination willshow that Asclepius is not claiming any knowledge of anything the editorsof the Metaphysics may have said, and that he is simply reporting a school-tradition designed to exculpate Aristotle from the apparent faults of thereceived text of the Metaphysics.

This becomes clear if we look first at the passage from Asclepius' prole-gomena to the Metaphysics, which includes the story of Aristotle's sendingthe work to Eudemus. Among the various topics to be discussed beforebeginning his line-by-line exposition of the text, Asclepius notes the man-ner of composition of the work (Asclepius 4.4). He says:

The present treatise has not been fitted together in the same way as Aristotle'sothers, nor does it seem well-ordered and continuous; rather, t seems that somethings are missing for the continuity of the argument, hat others have been broughtin [[tevTvqxOat] bodily from other treatises, and that he says the same thingsseveral times. But they say in his defense, defending him nicely [;taoXoyorVTCntU t6;Q TOuOT xCL xakXig 6MoWoyoUvTat], that after he wrote the presenttreatise he sent it to his companion Eudemus of Rhodes, but then, as it turned out,he [Eudemus] decided that it would not be right to publish to the many so great [soexalted? so long?] a treatise. Meanwhile he [Eudemus] died, and some parts of thebook were destroyed; and the men of later generations, not daring to add anything

of their own, since they fell far short of that man's [Aristotle's] thought, suppliedthe missing parts [6t(?6octv-te; rT laovToaJ by bringing them in [[LePTyaCyov]from his other treatises, as far as was possible. Nonetheless you will find that thesequence of the argument s preserved n these [parts of the text] too. (4.4-16)

Asclepius does not suggest that there is any direct evidence for this story: itis simply one story that has been proposed in the school, whose attraction sthat it explains the current state of the text in such a way as to denyAristotle's responsibility for its objectionable features. But what does As-

and 6 respectively), and so will I. As Ross knows, the passage cited from the Alexandercommentary s from the spurious part.

Ross, v.1, p.292. Ross himself does not accept this explanation, and thinks (surelycorrectly) that Aristotle himself used the same passage in two different contexts.

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clepius find objectionable? am not sure exactly where he thinks hings aremissing or the continuity f the argument, ut the other objections orre-

spond to specific features of the text: the objection hat some things havebeen brought n bodily from other treatises efers to the duplications be-tween Metaphysics A2 and Physics 11,3, and between Metaphysics K8-12and a series of chapters rom the Physics; and the objection hat he says thesame thing several times within the bounds of the present reatise refers,similarly, o the duplications between Metaphysics K1-7 and MetaphysicsBFE, and between Metaphysics M4-5 and Metaphysics A9. For let us lookback at the later passage rom Asclepius, he one Ross took as referring o adeclaration y the editors of the Metaphysics:

These remarks [i.e., Metaphysics 2] have been brought in [RETEv'vExntELI erefrom the Physics [#x Tiq (puoatxi dtxQotorw;]; for they said [9Xcyov] that somethings had been lost, and being unable to imitate them, they supplied them [(Npfp-Loactv] ut of his own works. Anyway [dtFqXrL OL], he whole letter K as well las

the present text] is from his other lectures [dtxQodaowv]. 305.19-22)

This interprets he first passage, by making t clear that the evidence foreditorial ntervention, n the form of copying other Aristotelian exts intothe Metaphysics, comes from Metaphysics A2 and Metaphysics K: a Greekcommentator's X, &[LtEXEt OL Y is a sure-fire sign that Y is his onlyevidence for X. When Asclepius says that the whole letter K is from hisother ectures, t seems that he must be thinking not only of K8-12, whichare from another Aristotelian reatise, but also of KI-7, which are fromanother part of the same treatise. So this passage explains not only thecomplaint hat some things have been brought n bodily from other reatis-es, but also the complaint hat he says the same thing several timeswithin the Metaphysics; nd both of these complaints an be answered bysaying that the original Metaphysics did not have these faults, and that theeditors ntroduced hem by copying, whether rom the Physics or from theMetaphysics, o replace parts of the manuscript hat had been destroyed.(And wherever Asclepius thinks some things are missing for the continuityof the argument, his can be explained he same way: a part of the manu-script was missing, and the editors could not find any other Aristotelian extto patch t up with.) The subject of they said s not any historical witness,certainly not the editors of the Metaphysics, ut the same anonymous theywho offered he nice defense of Aristotle n the earlier passage; and theironly evidence s the fact of duplication n the text.

What is perhaps urprising s not that Asclepius has no direct evidence

about the editors of the Metaphysics, but that he imagines their work assimply filling in holes in the text: he assumes hat there was an original A2,and an original K (and presumably ither an original A9 or an original

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M4-5 different rom the present ones), and that the editors were forced topatch them up with other Aristotelian exts because the original chapterswere lost. If it has occurred o Asclepius that Aristotle himself might haveleft the text in an unfinished tate, with repetitions and perhaps with olderand newer treatments f the same material, hen he rejects he attribution fsuch human weakness o Aristotle. And it has never occurred o him that heeditors might be responsible or such structural eatures as the order of thebooks of the Metaphysics (beyond possibly inserting a spurious A or a, acharge Asclepius rejects); or what could lead him to assume a lost Ur-K?

There is one point, though, on which Asclepius gives us some valuableevidence, at least about the school-tradition f his day. The nice defense

involved Aristotle's sending he Metaphysics to Eudemus, Eudemus' refus-ing to publish t (it is apparently mplied hat he had the only copy), and thesubsequent orruption f the text while in the custody of Eudemus' chool.This fits well with the comment of the pseudo-Alexander lluded o above:commenting on Z 11 1036b32-1037b5, and pointing out that it treats thesame subject as ZIO 1034b24-1035al7, he says and I think that these[words] ought to be put next to those, and most likely [tow;] they were puttogether by Aristotle (for in none of his other treatises will you find himdoing the kind of thing that appears here [i.e. writing n such a disorderly

way]), but they were separated by Eudemus 515.19-22). It is not clearwhat exactly Eudemus s supposed o have done (if he was not motivated bysheer malice to mutilate he text, perhaps a piece of the manuscript ell outand he put it back in the wrong place); what is clear is that the pseudo-Alexander, ike Asclepius, thinks that the Metaphysics is more disorderlythan Aristotle's usual writing, and knows the scholastic radition hat what-ever is wrong with the current ext of the Metaphysics can be blamed on atime when it was in the custody of Eudemus and his school. This sametradition must underlie he stories reported by Asclepius mmediately fter

the nice defense passage, by the pseudo-Philoponus, nd in two anony-mous scholia) to explain the embarrassing act of a book called A and abook called a, by attributing ither a or (as Asclepius has it) A to a nephewof Eudemus alled either Pasicles or (as the pseudo-Philoponus as it) Pas-icrates:'? t is unclear how such a book would have been slipped into the

'0 Asclepius discusses the problem about A at 4.17-35 (Pasicles); the pseudo-Philoponusbriefly mentions the controversy about a (Pasicrates) at loannis Philoponi enarratio inomnes Aristotelis libros quos metaphysicos appellant, Latin translation by FrancescoPatrizi (Ferrara, 1583; the Greek original is lost), p.7, reprinted in Commentaria n

Aristotelem Graeca, versiones latinae temporis resuscitatarum itterarum, v.2 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1991). The scholia are cited by Paul Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei denGriechen, v.1 (Berlin-New York, 1973), p.83, n.89.

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Metaphysics, but it must have been done by Eudemus' school at a timewhen no copies of the text were available elsewhere.

The tradition, hen, that the text of the Metaphysics omes to us, editedand in some way damaged, rom Eudemus and his school, is widespreadamong he Byzantine ommentators nd must go back at least to Ammoniusthe son of Hermias whose lectures were the main source for Asclepius'commentary); t may be much older. This tradition s likely to be connectedwith whatever ies behind he title Eudemian thics, and t is possible thatit reflects some historical reality, but also possible that it reflects nothingmore than school-polemics.

To conclude: we have not been told, as Kirwan says we have, that

editors after Aristotle's death brought he fourteen books of the Metaphysicsinto their present arrangement. We have been told that the editors receivedfrom Aristotle ourteen books of Metaphysics n their current rder exceptpossibly for a or A), and that, perhaps o repair ome damage, hey madelocal changes which did not affect the overall structure although we mightconsider t a major change f the original K has been completely replaced).Apart rom the possibly correct general radition hat he present ext comesfrom the school of Eudemus, hose who tell us about the history of thetext know no more han what we know, namely, hat here are doublets, and

that sometimes we have difficulty construing he argument. Of course, wemay very well conclude hat he order of the text as we have it fails in somemajor way to reflect Aristotle's ntentions; we might even conclude hat wehave before us fourteen ndependent reatises on metaphysical opics; butwe cannot draw such conclusions rom authority. We can only draw themif, after serious effort, we are unable o make sense of the text as we have it.Kirwan may possibly be right that Metaphysics F announces ts subject-matter n the first chapter nd that it and later books of the Metaphysicsproceed o explore the science first defined there, hardly more dependent

on what has preceded han on other parts of Aristotle's works, ather hanspecifying further he science of first principles described n AaB and re-solving problems n that science; but the claim cannot be allowed to passwithout argument.

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